[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 70 (Wednesday, June 8, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                     ``CENTURION'' ATTACK SUBMARINE

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, yesterday, as in the past, I 
sought to hammer home my concerns regarding the affordability of the 
Centurion attack submarine. Those concerns have led me to conclude that 
the Centurion program should be redefined as a ``proof of principle'' 
effort. The class should be limited to no more than three prototypes, 
one each of an attack, ballistic missile, and cruise missile variant.
  This approach has the virtue of: First, proving beyond doubt whether 
affordability issues have been adequately addressed; second, assuring 
that the promise of modularity is achievable; and, third preserving the 
submarine industrial base.
  A prototype program would avoid prematurely locking the Navy into 
serial production of a design that might well prove unaffordable, 
unexecutable, or both, facing Congress with the choice of either 
terminating the program or bankrupting the Navy.
  Affordability remains the paramount issue. The Navy is long on 
assertion, but short on hard data concerning Centurion costs. The 
actuals associated with a prototype program will leave no room for 
debate about cost. Either the Centurion will be affordable or it won't.
  Similarly, modularity, cornerstone to both affordability and design 
flexibility, is a packaging and fabrication strategy without precedent. 
What looks good on paper may not be feasible in the ways. A prototype 
affords industry the opportunity to take modularity to extremes while 
committing the Navy to nothing.
  If the proof of principal effort is successful, we can jump 
immediately into full production. If not, the lessons learned can feed 
into the follow-on generation of submarine. Either way, design and 
production teams remain busy, thus preserving the submarine industrial 
base.
  Austerity must be an invitation to creativity. Cost must drive every 
decision. Prototyping would allow industry and the Navy to push the 
margins, reaping successes and learning from failures without the 
pressures and restrictions of a production program. The alternative, a 
commitment now to Centurion acquisition, forecloses technological 
options that might be the difference between a submarine that is 
affordable and producible and one that is not.

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