[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 70 (Wednesday, June 8, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 4301.


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for 
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, with 
Mr. Bacchus of Florida, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on 
Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the amendment printed in part 5 of House Report 
103-520 relating to U.N. peacekeeping offered by the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] had been disposed of.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of earlier today, there will now 
be additional period of general debate.
  The gentleman from Mississippi, [Mr. Montgomery] will be recognized 
for 7\1/2\ minutes and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] 
will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
  The CHAIR recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].

                              {time}  1550

  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to yield my 7\1/2\ minutes of debate time to the gentlewoman 
from Florida [Mrs. Meek] and that she may yield that time as she sees 
fit.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Meek].
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like for my Representative from the State of 
Florida and chairman of the Florida delegation, the Honorable Sam 
Gibbons, to stand.
  Mr. Chairman, I am so proud to join with my colleagues in honoring 
U.S. Representative Sam Gibbons, an outstanding American and son of 
Florida who has served his country so well both in and out of uniform.
  Sam Gibbons was a member of the legendary 101st Airborne Division in 
World War II. ``Theirs was not to reason why * * * Theirs was but to do 
* * * or die.''
  As a 24-year-old captain, Sam Gibbons was among the first American 
paratroopers to land behind enemy lines in Normandy, in the middle of 
the night, to spearhead the invasion of Europe on D-day, June 6, 1994.
  For this reason, it was most appropriate that President Clinton 
designated Congressman Gibbons as his personal representative at 
several ceremonies in Normandy this past week.
  Representative Gibbons wrote about his experiences on D-day. And one 
cannot help be moved by this article. It helps humanize and make 
understandable to those of us who were not there that day the enormity 
of the contribution of those young Americans--like Sam Gibbons--who put 
their lives on the line to create the toehold in France needed to 
defeat Nazi Germany--and to secure the freedom too many of us take for 
granted today.
  I offer this article for reprinting in the Congressional Record 
following my statement.
  Mr. Chairman, we honor Representative Sam Gibbons for his leadership 
on the battlefield, for his leadership in the House of Representatives, 
and for his leadership as chairman of the Florida delegation. It is my 
privilege to serve with him in this body.
  Sam Gibbons, hero of World War II, hero to us in our delegation, hero 
to the House of Representatives, thank God for you.
  The text of the article referred to is as follows:

                        Two Days of the Invasion

                    (By Representative Sam Gibbons)

 [Representative Sam Gibbons recounts the 48 hours after he parachuted 
 from a plane At 1:26 a.m. on June 6, 1944. For Gibbons, a 24-year-old 
  captain with the 501st Parachute Infantry, D-day included a bloody 
                   ambush and at least two miracles.]

       My parachute snapped open with a loud crack.
       I looked around to make sure I was clear of other jumpers--
     couldn't see anyone. I did see and hear rifle and machine gun 
     fire coming up from below me. I got brief glimpses of a 
     small, blacked-out town six or seven hundred yards in front 
     of me. Guessed it to be Ste. Mere-Eglise. Guess later proved 
     to be correct. Feet hit--knees give--roll forward--end lying 
     flat on my back.
       Instantly, I knew I was in the wrong place--at least six 
     miles from my planned drop zone and far deeper in German 
     territory than planned. The time was 1:26 a.m., June 6, 1944. 
     D-Day was to begin on the beaches at 6:30 a.m. The parachute 
     jump from plane to ground in Normandy, France, had taken 35 
     to 40 seconds, maybe less.
       I was 24 years old--a captain--in the 501st Parachute 
     Infantry, a part of the 101st Airborne Division which, 
     together with the 82nd Airborne Division, landed a total of 
     12,000 parachutists that might. We were the spearhead of the 
     invasion of Europe.
       For this performance our heads had been shaved--the 
     surgeons insisted we'd be easier to sew up that way. Our 
     unique uniforms were made of a heavy cotton cloth. The jacket 
     collars were high and right below the neck we carried a 
     switch-blade knife in a pocket for emergencies, like cutting 
     yourself out of your parachute. My normal weight was 165 
     pounds. That night when I hit the ground I was well over 200 
     pounds.
       In the leg pocket we carried a British-made anti-tank mine 
     because there were plenty of tanks nearby, a gas mask (I 
     stuck two cans of Schlitz beer in mine), an equipment bag 
     containing a raincoat, blanket, toothbrush, toilet paper, and 
     six meals of emergency K-rations, a combination shovel and 
     pick for digging in, maps, flashlight, compass, small hacksaw 
     blade, a map of France printed on silk, and $300 worth of 
     well-used French currency.
       We carried two other items in our equipment. We wore our 
     identification (dog tags) on a light metal chain around our 
     necks, taped together so they didn't click or rattle. And a 
     ``cricket,'' which when you depressed the steel made a 
     snapping sound or a ``crick.'' When you released the steel 
     part, it would crick again. This was to be our primary means 
     of identification between friend and foe during the night 
     assault.
       Our immediate objective was to open up the assault beach 
     about six miles east of my landing spot and secure the river 
     line of the Douve so that the Germans could not bring in 
     reinforcements while we captured Cherbourg.
       Getting oriented in the middle of the night is not easy. 
     Two things helped me. First, we had studied the area using 
     maps, aerial photographs, and models for hours and days until 
     it was drilled into us. Second, I had been in the open door 
     of the plane on the flight from England and had picked up 
     such landmarks as the islands of Guernsey and Sark and the 
     French coastline near Cap de Carteret.
       I thought I recognized St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte and then the 
     Douve River with its marshes. As we approached the Douve our 
     plane had slowed down and elevated the tail to lessen the 
     chances of hitting the tail assembly in case you made a bad 
     door exit. So as we crossed the Douve, the green light signal 
     to jump came on.
       It seemed to me that we were too far north and too far west 
     of our designated drop zone. But you can't hesitate and argue 
     with the pilot because he couldn't hear you anyway and since 
     we were flying in very tight formation, there was no chance 
     of independent judgment. At least we were over land--some 
     weren't so lucky that night.
       But first we had to push the two equipment bundles out. 
     These contained radios for Headquarters Command and control 
     of 501st. Next were two radio operators. I never found the 
     operators or the radios. Next, me, and then 13 or 14 others 
     who probably had little or no idea where they were. I believe 
     the last man out that door was Lt. Col. Harry Kinnard, the 
     Regimental Executive Officer and second in command of the 
     501st Parachute Infantry. Kinnard and I next met about 40 
     hours later and many miles from where we jumped.
       I turned again to examine the field in which I had just 
     landed. There was just enough moonlight coming through the 
     clouds to allow me to determine that no other Americans had 
     landed or were landing in my field. I could not hear any 
     American weapons being fired. The German weapons sounded 
     distinctly different from ours, the principal difference 
     being the rate of fire for their automatic weapons. Theirs 
     fired much faster and did not seem to sound as deep in 
     resonance as ours.
       The Germans to my southeast--about 70 yards away--were 
     manning a roadblock, I figured, and the new firing about 
     1,000 yards to the north appeared to be near Ste. Mere-
     Eglise.
       I turned west and began crawling. The firing continued 
     behind me at the cross-roads. I could not see or hear anyone.
       I began to wonder whether the whole missions had been 
     aborted and I just hadn't gotten the signal. I resumed moving 
     again, still trying to get away from that crossroads fire 
     without being detected. This time I was crouched over and 
     moved a little faster. I finally came to the southwest end of 
     the field.
       To my left was a cattlegate and other things that cows 
     leave around when they are in a field, but at least I knew 
     the field probably wasn't mined if there were cows around. We 
     had been told that there was a possibility that our landing 
     fields would be mined and booby-trapped.
       I found myself in a narrow, paved road with hedges on each 
     side. The tall trees in the hedges gave the place a spooky 
     look, but still no signs of anyone except those people back 
     at the crossroads. By this time I was sure that they didn't 
     hear me and couldn't see me so I began walking in an upright 
     position, my rifle in both hands ready for action and my 
     cricket between my left thumb and forefinger.
       I must have walked along for about ten minutes keeping to 
     the right side of the road near the edge where there was a 
     shallow ditch. Then about 25 feet in front of me I thought I 
     saw a helmet silhouetted against the sky. It looked like an 
     American helmet, but in the dark I couldn't tell, so I 
     kneeled down in the ditch and ``cricked'' my cricket one 
     time.
       Instantly the response came back with two cricks. I felt a 
     thousand years younger, and both of us moved forward so we 
     could touch each other. I whispered my name and he whispered 
     his. To my surprise, he was not from my plane. In fact, he 
     was not even from my Headquarters group. He was a sergeant 
     and lost, too.
       We kept going down the road for about 50 or 100 yards when 
     we suddenly ran into some more cricks and picked up three 
     more people, none of whom were from my plane. But they seemed 
     to know each other and they were from the 501st. By that time 
     we were beginning to feel pretty good and our confidence was 
     coming back.
       We got out the maps, pulled out the flashlight, covered it 
     as best we could, and began to figure out exactly where we 
     were. We concluded rapidly that it was impossible to get to 
     our designated assembly area and that we had best try to 
     accomplish the 501 mission of securing the Douve River line.
       We then decided that moving along the road, while it might 
     be productive in finding other friends, also might be 
     extremely dangerous. So we decided to take off across the 
     field to our left and head for the Douve River line. As we 
     entered the field, we found some more 501 parachutists. Still 
     no one from my plane and no coherent pattern to the people we 
     were finding.
       It was about 3 a.m. when we hit the next road.
       About that time we heard noise toward the rear of the 
     column and a couple of shots were fired by my patrol. There 
     was a clatter of someone falling to the pavement. I ran back 
     and found that they had shot at a German who had been riding 
     a bicycle. He apparently was a messenger of some sort.
       We disarmed and searched him, and tried to figure out what 
     we would do with him. His bicycle was a wreck, and he was 
     skinned up from his tumble. The men took off his belt and 
     tied his hands behind him, and we decided then that with that 
     noise if there were many more Germans in town, they had heard 
     us, so we moved in rapidly.
       It was a short dash into town. It was a very small town, 
     completely dark. At the head of the column there were a few 
     more shots fired and the word came back that they had killed 
     some Germans--probably two who were apparently trying to run 
     from one of the houses in town when we ran in.
       By this time we were making so much noise that if there was 
     anyone else there, they certainly would have heard us. The 
     noise of the shooting seemed to raise our spirits even more. 
     Still, we didn't know where we were.
       I began to pound on doors and shout for people to come out, 
     but, of course, none of the doors opened and no one moved. I 
     was shouting in English and if there was anyone in that town 
     who understood English, we never found them.
       Finally, after two or three minutes, one man about 50 to 55 
     years old came to the door of one of the houses. In English I 
     began to ask him where we were, what was the name of his 
     town, but he just stared back, then began to speak in French.
       He was excited and eventually some other people in the 
     house came forward--none of whom could speak English. Some of 
     my men had gotten responses at doors and windows and were 
     running into the same trouble.
       Finally I went into the dark house, pulled out my map and 
     flashlight, and began to make gestures, hoping he would point 
     to where we were. But he was either afraid or was determined 
     not to get involved. Even though I recited with my best 
     French accent the names of some towns that I thought he would 
     know and would point to, I got no response. Finally, one of 
     the sergeants came up and said he had found out the name of 
     the town was Carquebut.
       The action in Carquebut had taken about 20 to 25 minutes. 
     It was now approaching 3:30 a.m. We knew that Carquebut was 
     outside of the sector of the 101st Airborne Division--our 
     parent unit--and was in the sector of the 82nd Division, 
     which had a different responsibility than we did that first 
     day.
       After a quick conference with some of the sergeants, I 
     decided that we should move to the south toward St. Come-du-
     Mont, which was about five miles from where we were. St. 
     Come-du-Mont had been a part of the 501st objective. It was 
     on the Douve River line and it was not far from the bridges 
     across the Douve that we had been assigned to seize and 
     destroy.
       In about 30 minutes we hit the main two-lane, north-south 
     road between Ste. Mere-Eglise and Carentan. At a little town 
     called Les Forges, we could see two or three American 
     soldiers near the crossroads and we moved rapidly to meet 
     them.
       Here for the first time I ran into someone I knew. There 
     was an American lieutenant by the name of Charlie Poze, a 
     member of 501st. He had rounded up five or six men and they 
     were controlling the town. They had already searched the 
     buildings and found no Germans.
       To our north was the town of Ste. Mere-Eglise, about one 
     and a quarter miles away. To the south of us was St. Come-du-
     Mont, nearly three miles away, and the Douve River highway 
     and railroad bridge crossing. Controlling these crossings was 
     our objective.
       As dawn came it was possible to see scattered parachutes 
     lying around in the fields. Some were hanging in trees, some 
     lying partly in the road. It was obvious that we were coming 
     closer to a place where more men had been dropped.
       Just a short distance along we ran into the town of 
     Blosville. We encountered some fighting from our left but it 
     did not appear to be well aimed. When we returned the fire, 
     the hostile firing would die out, so we chose to ignore it 
     and move more rapidly toward St. Come-du-Mont.
       It was now approaching 7:30 or 8 a.m. We had gathered 
     strength as we had moved along and we now had approximately 
     50 men, including Lt. Poze, two glider pilots whom we had 
     picked up on the march from Carquebut and who had been 
     charged with controlling the prisoner, and myself.
       By the time we got to the end of Blosville, a Capt. 
     MacNeilly, also with the 501st, moved out on the road and we 
     had a reunion! I had known and worked with MacNeilly. He was 
     from San Francisco and a genial fellow and a good man.
       While our confidence had returned, we all still felt very 
     isolated. There was firing going on to the east of us, but it 
     was so faint that it was hard to distinguish what we heard.
       As morning came, it was beautiful: a cloudless sky, cool, 
     no more planes of any sort were in sight. There was scattered 
     fire in about every direction except off to the west, so we 
     moved out to the south and headed to St. Come-du-Mont, which 
     seemed to be three-and-one-half miles away.
       After about an hour, I called a halt, brought in Poze and 
     MacNeilly and the one flanker from both the east and west, 
     and held a council. At the end of the council no one could 
     suggest a better method of moving, and because there was also 
     occasional firing on both flanks with more to the east, some 
     of which seemed to be aimed at us, we decided to continue in 
     the diamond formation.
       At the end of this council I brought out my two cans of 
     beer, which we shared. I estimate we had moved about a mile 
     and a half south from Blosville. When the cans were empty we 
     decided to leave them in the middle of the road as a monument 
     to the first cans of Schlitz consumed in France.
       In about five minutes the point man signaled with his hand 
     and beckoned me forward, and I discovered what he had found. 
     In the west ditch was a wounded German soldier. I moved the 
     patrol on up.
       The German had been hit in the stomach area and was in bad 
     shape. He had already turned rather gray-looking and seemed 
     to be rather incoherent. There were some parachutes lying in 
     the fields nearby and I assumed the parachutists had gotten 
     him. We searched the area but found no one.
       The German was moaning, his eyes closed. We disarmed him 
     and then had to decide what to do with him. We finally 
     decided just to leave him where he was. He was a pitiful 
     sight, so all alone, so badly injured, and so near death, 
     with us standing over him. We didn't waste much time. We just 
     went on. He was no danger to us.
       As I recall, one of the men did give him some water and 
     someone propped his head up a little and he quit moaning, but 
     his breathing was laborious.
       Down the road a point man spotted a sign post on a little 
     concrete marker on the right-hand side of the road: Carentan 
     6km, Paris 250km. We joked about being in Paris that night, 
     or maybe it was just the fact that it was broad open daylight 
     and that our luck seemed to be going well.
       All of us were tired because we hadn't had a chance to eat 
     or sleep since leaving our airfield in England. We had been 
     awake and moving for 30 hours. Our last meal had been 17 
     hours earlier. We halted for a minute and I called Poze to me 
     and told him to go up and take the forward point position 
     because we needed to make better time.
       St. Come-du-Mont was near--perhaps 400 yards away. 
     According to the Regimental plan, St. Come-du-Mont should 
     already be in 501st hands. In fact, it should have been in 
     the 501st hands for about six hours. Unfortunately, I was 
     wrong.
       As we got closer to St. Come-du-Mont, nothing appeared to 
     be unusual. The windows in the buildings were all closed with 
     wooden shutters as we had seen in all the other small towns. 
     The doors were not open. No one appeared to be moving around 
     on the main street, which was the highway that we were on. 
     Cows were grazing in the nearby field.
       There was firing--both German and American--far off to the 
     left. I could now see the first building very clearly on the 
     right-hand side of the road, and I had great expectations 
     that we would at last run into the main body of the 501st 
     forces.
       I moved over toward the edge of the road to the right. I 
     was now at the bottom of a very small hill with St. Come-du-
     Mont sitting at the crest. We found the main body of forces, 
     but it wasn't the 501st. In fact, it wasn't even a friendly 
     force.
       Shortly after I had given the signal to Poze to continue 
     forward, I heard a gun bolt. I looked toward the sound and 
     there was a gun muzzle pointed in my direction. As I dove for 
     the ditch, all hell broke loose! We had been ambushed.
       I remember seeing Poze go down in front of me as if he, 
     too, were diving in the ditch. The gunner was standing behind 
     the hedge--the muzzle of his gun pointed through the bushes--
     and he apparently had his weapon set on full automatic 
     because when it started to fire, it sprayed bullets all over 
     the area.
       The first thing I had to do was to get rid of that gunner 
     right over my head. I knew I couldn't exist long with him 
     there. He had probably seen me dive into the ditch but he 
     couldn't get a good shot at me until he climbed to the top of 
     the hedge.
       I took a grenade out of my pocket, pulled the safety pin, 
     and lobbed it over the hedge. I hoped that he didn't have 
     time to throw it back. He didn't. After it went off, I heard 
     no more firing from his position and assumed that that 
     problem was out of the way for awhile.
       I called to Poze and had no response. I lay there for a 
     minute or so, but it seemed like a lifetime. I couldn't get 
     me head up because every time I moved I drew fire. I yelled 
     back to MacNeilly to tell him to cover me. He understood and 
     so the fire from our patrol picked up.
       It was accurate enought to cause the German fire to slow 
     down--and as soon as it slowed, I jumped up out of the ditch, 
     took about six fast paces, and took cover behind a concrete 
     telephone pole. It wasn't very good protection, but it was 
     better than I had had.
       I guess only luck saved me, I made a dash across the road 
     and dove in the ditch again. How I escaped getting hit I will 
     never know, but at least this ditch was deeper and no one 
     could directly observe my movements as long as I stayed flat 
     on my stomach. I slid down the ditch in the direction of 
     MacNeilly.
       It was the easiest crawling I ever did. I had received such 
     a shot of adrenaline I think I could have crawled a mile. I 
     probably only had crawled 50 yards when I slid under a low 
     drainage culvert in the road and felt safe--or at least 
     relatively safe.
       After I had gone a short distance out of the culvert, I 
     passed the crest of the low hill on which my patrol had taken 
     up firing positions, and I was out of immediate danger. The 
     first person I ran into was MacNeilly, and he was laughing a 
     sort of nervous laugh. He said he had never seen me run so 
     fast in my life and that I had looked like a jackrabbit going 
     across that road with the Germans firing at me.
       We could still see St. Come-du-Mont--we were now about 300 
     yards from the town. By that time our patrol had taken up 
     some good firing positions. We slowed down our firing to 
     conserve ammunition. It was obvious that we were badly 
     outnumbered. We had at least two missing, and one man 
     reported that he was slightly wounded.
       It was more and more obvious that the Germans were well 
     placed and had planned to defend St. Come-du-Mont stubbornly.
       So there we were--200 to 300 yards north of St. Come-du-
     Mont meeting superior fire from a major force. We had no 
     automatic weapons, no radios--only our semi-automatic rifles 
     and a few pistols.
       Before we decided to break off the fire fight, two of our 
     men were killed. MacNeilly and I held a council. We called in 
     a couple of the sergeants and decided that since the day was 
     half over and since it appeared useless to try to attack the 
     town, we just couldn't sit there for the rest of the day and 
     wait for some miracle to happen. Also, I did not know what 
     was building up behind us to the north because during our 
     advance on St. Come-du-Mont there had been intermittent 
     firing from our flanks. We knew that there were Germans 
     behind us, but we did not know where they actually were nor 
     how many they were.
       I decided that the best thing to do was to split the 
     patrol--leaving some with MacNeilly to continue firing into 
     St. Come-du-Mont--and for me to go northward to try to find 
     some friendly force. I designated two sergeants and about 15 
     men to stay with MacNeilly; I took the rest and returned 
     north.
       I knew we had to move fast for it was then 1:30 or 2 in the 
     afternoon and we were not finding any more parachutists 
     coming out of the fields to join us. We moved at a slow trot 
     back toward Blosville. When we passed the spot where the 
     wounded German had been, he was dead.
       About an hour and half after we departed the St. Come-du-
     Mont area, we reached the outskirts of Ste. Mere-Eglise. We 
     found a small unit of the 82nd had established a roadblock 
     there near a crashed glider.
       The crashed glider was one of the bloodiest sights I saw on 
     D-Day. It had been used by some units of the 82nd to attempt 
     to bring in anti-tank guns and the pilot had overshot the 
     field and crashed into a stone wall right off the highway. If 
     there were any survivors, they weren't around. There were 
     plenty of bodies. We turned over our prisoner and said good-
     bye to our two glider pilots who rejoined the 82nd.
       We headed for the designated glider landing zone, hoping 
     that those operations which had been planned for D-Day 
     evening would come off as scheduled. I had been designated to 
     receive one of the six jeeps the 501st was to get. Jeeps were 
     quarter-ton open trucks.
       At Hiesville, there were other American soldiers from the 
     101st around. Not many--perhaps 50. They were near a 
     farmhouse, and I discovered it was the Division Command Post, 
     hardly the kind you might expect for a Division.
       They de-briefed me in about ten minutes and entered the 
     situation as I described it on their maps, and I headed 
     immediately for the glider landing zone just south of 
     Hiesville. I got there between 6:15 and 7 p.m.
       I am sure there were a lot of miracles on D-Day, but my own 
     second miracle occurred when that glider assigned to carry my 
     jeep landed right on time and right at the designated spot. I 
     wasn't more than 50 feet from the spot where the glider 
     landed--certainly within shouting distance--when the glider 
     nose opened and my jeep rolled out. I called the driver's 
     name; he recognized me and drove right over.
       We had been isolated for about 18 hours that day. We had 
     been shot at, taken some casualties, and inflicted a few 
     ourselves, but the arrival of this jeep was like a miracle.
       When I arrived back at the Divisions CP, I was asked to 
     help provide local security for protection of the Command 
     Post because by that time darkness was approaching fast and 
     there was still an awful lot of German firing going on. We 
     organized a guard detail with others who had been arriving a 
     the CP, and I was assigned a sector to the north about 300 
     yards from the Command Post.
       I took my small patrol to our sector and we divided the 
     responsibility for the night. We posted the first guards, 
     then moved into a well-built cluster of farm buildings--a 
     milking shed, tool shed, hay barn, all clustered around a 
     stone-paved courtyard. But it was home.
       I sat down in the equipment barn beside an old two-wheeled 
     hay rake and opened my first K-ration: ham and eggs in a 
     small tin can, a fruit bar, some biscuits that looked and 
     tasted like I guess dog biscuits taste, some kind of powdered 
     coffee, a hard chocolate bar for dessert. The chocolate bar 
     was so hard that if you had thrown it like a rock it would 
     have been a dangerous weapon. I devoured my meal in record 
     time.
       I had the second shift of the guard detail that night so I 
     went to sleep as soon as I finished eating.
       When the word came to wake up again, we were in contact 
     with some other members of the 501st who had also shown up in 
     the Division Command Post area. I went over toward the 
     direction of the CP and found Col. Kinnard. I knew at least 
     two people from the plane had survived. He said that we were 
     moving out in a few minutes to join a force of the 506th.
       We moved from the Division Command Post near Hiesville in 
     the direction of Vierville with a mission of seizing the 
     bridges across the Douve between St. Come-du-Mont and 
     Carentan. The advance from Hiesville to Vierville was 
     relatively uneventful. There was some firing but it didn't 
     stop us.
       It was not until I had reached Angoville that the first 
     serious action of that day began for me. There were already 
     some other American forces there--apparently remnants of our 
     1st Battalion. We quickly exchanged information. No sooner 
     than that happened we came under heavy fire.
       We took some casualties. I don't remember how many. After 
     an hour the firing stopped. It seemed that German troops who 
     had been positioned on or near the beaches and who had been 
     driven back by the landing forces were now moving toward us.
       With the 4th Division and some elements of our 101st 
     pushing from the east and with the only way across the Douve 
     River and into Carentan being blocked by us, we were picking 
     up one German unit after another as they were trying to move 
     to a better position.
       Our road to the southwest to St. Come-du-Mont was still 
     blocked and so we spent the rest of that day in the 
     Angoville-Vierville area. There was too much resistance at 
     St. Come-du-Mont for us to move south. There was too much 
     resistance to the northeast for us to move in that direction. 
     So we settled down after nightfall for some rest.
       That takes you through two days of the invasion. The first 
     day didn't seem like it would ever end, and the second day 
     went so fast I hardly remember it. Eventually we would take 
     St. Come-du-Mont.
       Instead of taking it with one company of the 501st, as had 
     been our original plan of operation before the invasion--or 
     with my small combat patrol as I had tried to do on D-Day--it 
     took the whole Division plus the fire support from the 
     cruiser Quincy plus eight or ten tanks that were assigned to 
     us from the 5th Corps.
       It took plenty of lives, both German and American. But 
     within three days we held St. Come-du-Mont and control of the 
     bridges, the line of the Douve River was secure, and our 
     first mission completed.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Florida [Mr. Hutto].
  Mr. HUTTO. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me. I appreciate 
it very much.
  I want to echo the sentiments the gentlewoman from Florida has 
expressed and pay tribute to our good friend and colleague, Sam 
Gibbons.
  Sam has been an outstanding statesman from Florida, as you know, for 
many years, having served in the Florida legislature with distinction 
and then here in the Congress of the United States.
  I remember when I was working in television news in Panama City, a 
good number of years ago, the first time I had met Sam Gibbons. In 
fact, the only time, I guess, until I was elected to Congress. He came 
through, and I think at that time Sam was possibly looking at a run for 
the U.S. Senate, which I do not believe he ever made. But I interviewed 
him and was very impressed with him at that time and have always been 
impressed with him.
  Mr. Chairman, Nancy and I are delighted that we have as good friends 
Sam and Martha and their family.
  Mr. Chairman, it was my privilege and honor to be on the CODEL with 
the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], along with other World 
War II veterans. We were in Normandy and participated in and were at a 
number of the commemoration ceremonies. I can say with assurance that 
the President made a great choice in asking Sam Gibbons to be his 
representative. He did an outstanding job speaking on a number of 
occasions, some of which, I take it, were carried by the national 
television networks, whereas some were not. But throughout the whole 
week of ceremonies in commemoration of World War II for D-day, Sam 
Gibbons and his family were in there and represented us very well and 
made a beautiful family, he, Martha, their sons Mark, Cliff, and Tim, 
and their wives and children; that is, Sam Gibbons' grandchildren made 
a very beautiful family.
  Not only that, but the remarks that Sam made I think were very 
touching to us because he is one, as the gentlewoman suggested, who 
actually landed during this time. This was a period of triumph and 
tragedy for our country, but as was pointed out time and time again, 
had D-day not happened and that invasion to get the enemy out of France 
and to begin the end of Adolf Hitler, we might not be here at this 
time; the world might have been totally different.
  So I am very, very proud of our colleague, Sam Gibbons, and his 
contribution to the war effort and bringing freedom to our Nation and 
to the world as well as his good work as statesman and a Member of the 
House of Representatives.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I thank the gentleman from Florida for his 
comments.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. 
Montgomery], chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, we had our CODEL at Normandy, and we were there with 
Sam Gibbons, his wife Martha, and his three sons and their families. We 
were mighty proud of him.
  Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gibbons used no notes in his remarks. He talked to 
thousands and thousands of veterans from all the allied forces. After 
his remarks, veterans stood up and cheered.
  Mr. Chairman, Sam is a great American. We were honored to be with him 
at three different ceremonies. He represented the President and the 
Congress, and the President could not have chosen a better person out 
of the 435 Members.
  I thank the gentlewoman from Florida for yielding.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Bacchus].
  Mr. BACCHUS of Florida. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I simply want to join my colleagues from Florida and 
throughout the country in saying what a privilege it is to serve with 
Sam Gibbons. Sam has long been one of my heroes. I am very privileged 
and proud to say that for 25 years he has been a friend. He has known 
me since I was a teenager. He has helped raise me, he has laughed at 
me, laughed with me, along with me. Sam has been a leader for 50 years 
in many, many ways. He is a leader still today.
  Mr. Chairman, Sam has faced and met and conquered every challenge 
that has ever confronted me. Today he has some new challenges in the 
House. I look forward to all those stories in the fall about how so 
many people have underestimated my friend, Sam Gibbons.
  I am confident the gentleman will lead us this year and in the years 
to come just as well as he led those troops in Normandy on D-day.
  Thank you very much, Sam, for your friendship.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Berman). The time of the gentlewoman 
from Florida [Mrs. Meek] has expired.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman I yield 3 minutes of my 7\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek], and ask unanimous consent 
that she be allowed to yield time as may be required.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].

                              {time}  1600

  Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, my esteemed colleague from Florida, 
Congressman Sam Gibbons, established himself as a leader early in life.
  Just 50 years ago, Sam Gibbons was a skinny 24-year-old captain in 
the 501st Parachute Infantry.
  In the dark, predawn hours of June 6, Sam began the long and 
treacherous campaign to wrest control of Europe from Hitler's iron 
grasp by parachuting through thick machinegun fire and behind German 
lines near Normandy, France.
  Realizing he was alone and miles from his planned drop point, Sam 
nonetheless quickly determined his position, picked up other Americans 
along the way, and carried out his mission to capture French towns and 
prevent reinforcements from reaching German troops battling the Allied 
invasion at Normandy.
  Mr. Chairman, Sam Gibbons helped D-day succeed by carrying out his 
mission.
  I am proud to call Sam Gibbons my friend. I can think of no one 
better, Mr. Chairman, to guide this House through the minefields of 
health care reform than the man who began the defeat of the Nazi war 
machine in the dark skies over France 50 years ago.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, we want to end this tribute to 
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons] and say to him, ``We thank you 
from the bottom of our hearts for having represented this great country 
on the beaches of Normandy and as a paratrooper. We owe our lives and 
the quality of our democratic ideals to your contribution. Thank you.''
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Stearns].
  (Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join my colleagues from 
Florida in recognizing our good friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Gibbons] 50 years ago, he was one of those heroes who helped win the 
battle of Normandy.
  Having just returned from France, I would like to emphasize to every 
American the tremendous pride that we should all feel in what Sam 
Gibbons and all those who fought at Normandy accomplished. The tribute 
to the veterans of D-day was one of the most moving experiences I have 
ever had, as well as the tremendous appreciation the French people 
showered on them.
  Sam Gibbons was one of the first to land on the European continent. 
He was one of those who worked behind enemy lines with the ``clickers'' 
which we heard so much about during the commemoration. The courage and 
leadership he exhibited then was extraordinary. And we have been 
fortunate that, 50 years after D-day, he continues his service to the 
American people here in the House of Representatives.
  So, along with our other colleagues in the House, Tom Bevill and our 
minority leader Bob Michel, and all Americans who served at Normandy, I 
would like to salute my colleague Sam Gibbons as a true American hero.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the 
remarks of everyone speaking here today on behalf of my good friend, 
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons]. On numerous occasions he and 
I have discussed his exploits during World War II and in particular, 
during D-day. He is a great American, and we are all indebted to him 
and all those who served.
  As my colleagues know, too few of us ever pause to think back. And I 
am glad we have been celebrating the 50th anniversary of D-day recently 
and have once again had the chance to realize what so many people did 
and sacrificed on behalf of all of us. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Gibbons], Republican leader Bob Michel, and many others proudly 
represent the millions who fought for all of us during World War II.
  Mr. Chairman, I was, of course, a little bit too young for that 
conflict, but thank goodness and thank God for people like the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons].
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Gibbons] so he might be able to respond and feel free to 
say anything he may choose to say.
  Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to pay tribute to a 
great Floridian and a great American. I rise to tell the American 
people about this true public servant, who has given more than 40 years 
of his life to serving this country, and serving his constituents in 
the Tampa Bay area.
  Mr. Chairman, Sam Gibbons is this man. He has fought for our Nation 
on the beaches of Normandy and has fought for the rights of poor and 
older Americans. He has been a staunch voice on trade issues, and 
opening foreign markets to U.S. companies.
  And today, Sam Gibbons, a true friend of Florida and a defender of 
our Nation, will be leading our Nation on a path toward healing and a 
return to global competitiveness. A path toward reforming the way we 
receive our health care. And a path to make our country more 
competitive as the addresses this nation's economic problems at home 
and abroad.
  It is a true pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to pay tribute to this fine 
American.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank very much the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence], the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], 
and the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek], and everyone who has 
participated in this. I do not deserve it, but I really appreciate it.
  I was able to meet with some of my colleagues on one of those nights, 
on the 5th of June just before the celebrations on the 6th, and I told 
them then at that time that everyone in the room deserved the honor of 
being the President's representative more than I did because I knew 
they were good soldiers. But I appreciated the opportunity of being 
able to serve, and I think it is important that all Americans ought to 
understand that the people that fought there in Normandy for us were 
good, loyal, patriotic people who loved their country, who had a great 
respect for the institutions of their country, and they still show it 
today. I talked to many of them, some of them rather infirmed, some of 
them rather aged, but they still have that great love of country, and 
great respect and pride in our institutions, and it was really 
inspiring to see that and to hear that.
  I want to say, as I said there, that there are a couple of lessons 
that we ought to draw out of our experiences in Normandy, and the first 
lesson is that America must remain involved as a world leader. Being 
involved is not pleasant. We have got to make sacrifices to do that. We 
have got to remain strong enough so that we are believable, so we can 
say no to would-be aggressors. But, when our vital interests are at 
stake, we can say no, and we can control the situation.
  Second, Mr. Chairman, we really want to pay attention to the quality 
of the people that we attract to serve in our Armed Forces. I had 
experiences before World War II in training some of the people who were 
not as well qualified physically, mentally or emotionally to be 
soldiers. I can say, without any challenge in my own mind, ``You can't 
lead a soldier that's not willing to fight, you can't train a soldier 
that's not willing to fight, and if you got to fight, you have got to 
have something you're fighting for.'' So, we need to keep the quality 
of the new people who come into the service year, after year, after 
year up to a very high standard. We need to reward them so that they 
will look upon military service as an opportunity.
  I say to my colleagues, ``Those are the kind of people we need. Those 
are the kind of people who will keep America strong.''
  I want to thank everybody for participating in this, and I want to 
say, ``I'm just glad to be here. Thank you.''
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). All time for 
general debate has expired.


       amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by mr. montgomery

  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 4 of House 
Resolution 431, I offer the following en bloc amendment, consisting of 
amendments 2, 3, 9, 10 (as modified), 12 (as modified), 15 (as 
modified), 16 (as modified), 23, 31 (as modified), 32 (as modified), 
33, 35 (as modified), 40, 46 (as modified), 50 (as modified), 51, 52 
(as modified), 53 (as modified), 54, 55, 56 (as modified), 59 (as 
modified), 60 (as modified), 64 (as modified), 65 (as modified) and 66 
printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520; and amendment 10 (as 
modified) printed in part 1 of House Report 103-509.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendments en 
bloc and report the modifications.
  The texts of the amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by Mr. 
Montgomery are as follows:

       Amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by Mr. Montgomery:


                   amendment offered by mr. gingrich

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.   . PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS 
                   FOR UNITED STATES SHARE OF COSTS OF UNITED 
                   NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

       No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     transferred or obligated for the payment of the assessed 
     share of the United States for costs of United Nations 
     peacekeeping operations or for any arrearages derived 
     therefrom.


                  amendment offered by mrs. schroeder

       Page 279, line 17, strike out ``$355,600,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$295,600,000''.
       Page 279, line 20, strike out ``$50,000,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$80,000,000''.
       Page 279, line 23, strike out ``$50,000,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$80,000,000''.
       Page 280, line 4, strike out ``$15,000,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$45,000,000''.


                     amendment offered by ms. furse

       At the end of subtitle D of title XXXI (page 414, after 
     line 4) add the following new section:

     SEC.   . PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION ON 
                   EXPOSURE TO RADIATION RELEASED FROM HANFORD 
                   NUCLEAR RESERVATION.

       Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1834) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Prohibition on Disclosure of Exposure Information.--
     (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a person (including 
     the Secretary of Energy, an officer or employee of a State, 
     or any other person participating in or receiving assistance 
     under a program established under this section) may not 
     disclose to the public any information obtained through the 
     program that identifies a person who may have been exposed to 
     radiation released from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation or 
     that identifies a person participating in any of the programs 
     developed under this section. Information prohibited from 
     disclosure under this subsection shall include--
       ``(A) the name, address, and telephone number of a person 
     requesting information referred to in subsection (b)(1);
       ``(B) the name, address, and telephone number of a person 
     who has been referred to a health care professional under 
     subsection (b)(2);
       ``(C) the name, address, and telephone number of a person 
     who has been registered and monitored pursuant to subsection 
     (b)(3);
       ``(D) information that identifies the person from whom 
     information referred to in this paragraph was obtained under 
     the program or any other third party involved with, or 
     identified, by any such information so obtained; and
       ``(E) any other personal or medical information that 
     identifies a person or party referred to in subparagraphs (A) 
     through (D).
       ``(2) Information referred to in paragraph (1) may be 
     disclosed to the public if the person identified by the 
     information, or the person's legal representative, has 
     consented in writing to the disclosure.
       ``(3) The States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho shall 
     establish procedures for carrying out this subsection, 
     including procedures governing the disclosure of information 
     under paragraph (2).''.


              Amendment, as modified, offered by mr. evans

       Page 15, line 15, strike out ``$854,833,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$854,883,000''.
       Strike out section 851 (page 233, line 9, and all that 
     follows through line 18 on page 234).


       amendment as modified, offered by Mr. Peterson of Florida

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.   . ASSISTANCE TO FAMILY MEMBERS OF KOREAN CONFLICT POW/
                   MIAS WHO REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR.

       (a) Single Point of Contact.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall designate an official of the Department of Defense to 
     serve as a single point of contact within the department for 
     the immediate family members (or their designees) of any 
     unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIA.
       (b) Unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIA Defined.--For 
     purposes of this section, the term ``unaccounted-for Korean 
     Conflict POW/MIA'' means a member of the Armed Forces or 
     civilian employee of the United States who, as a result of 
     service during the Korean Conflict, was at any time 
     classified as a prisoner of war or missing-in-action or 
     otherwise as unaccounted for and whose person or remains have 
     not been returned to United States control and who remains 
     unaccounted for.
       (c) Functions.--The official designated under subsection 
     (a) shall serve as a liaison between the family members of 
     unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIAs and the Department 
     of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies that 
     may hold information that may relate to unaccounted-for 
     Korean Conflict POW/MIAs. The functions of that official 
     shall include assisting family members--
       (1) with procedures the family may follow in their search 
     for information about the unaccounted-for Korean Conflict 
     POW/MIA;
       (2) in learning where they might locate information about 
     the unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIA;
       (3) in learning how and where to identify classified 
     records that contain pertinent information and that will be 
     declassified.
       (d) Assistance in Obtaining Declassification.--The official 
     designated under subsection (a) shall seek to obtain the 
     rapid declassification of any relevant classified records 
     that are identified.
       (e) Repository.--The official designated under subsection 
     (a) shall provide for a centralized repository for all 
     documents relating to unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/
     MIAs that are located as a result of the official's efforts.


              Amendment as modified, Offered by Mr. Berman

       At the end of subtitle C of title XI (page 307, after line 
     11), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1136. ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN WORKERS DISLOCATED DUE TO 
                   REDUCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE EXPORT 
                   OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.

       (a) Assistance Under the Defense Conversion Adjustment 
     Program.--Section 325 of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 
     U.S.C. 1662d) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``or by closures of 
     United States military facilities'' each place it appears and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States 
     military facilities, or by reductions in the export of 
     defense articles and defense services as a result of United 
     States policy, including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements'';
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking out ``or by the closure 
     of United States military installations'' and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States military 
     facilities, or by reductions in the export of defense 
     articles and defense services as a result of United States 
     policy, including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     `defense articles and defense services' means defense 
     articles, defense services, or design and construction 
     services under the Arms Export Control Act, including defense 
     articles and defense services licensed or approved for export 
     under section 38 of that Act.''.
       (b) Assistance Under the Defense Diversification Program.--
     Section 325A of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. 
     1662d-1) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(3)(A), by striking out ``or the 
     closure or realignment of a military installation'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``, the closure or realignment of a 
     military installation, or reductions in the export of defense 
     articles and defense services as a result of United States 
     policy, including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements'';
       (2) in subsection (k)(1), by striking out ``or by the 
     closure of United States military installations'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``, the closure of United States 
     military installations, or reductions in the export of 
     defense articles and defense services as a result of United 
     States policy, including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements''; and
       (3) in subsection (o), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) Defense articles and defense services.--The term 
     `defense articles and defense services' means defense 
     articles, defense services, or design and construction 
     services under the Arms Export Control Act, including defense 
     articles and defense services licensed or approved for export 
     under section 38 of that Act.''.


             amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Dellums

       At the end of title VIII (page 246, after line 23), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 873. DEFENSE ACQUISITION PILOT PROGRAM.

       (a) Designations.--Pursuant to section 809(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 
     (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1485, 1593; 10 U.S.C. 2430 
     note), as amended by section 811 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 
     106 Stat. 2315, 2450), the following defense acquisition 
     programs are authorized to be designated for participation in 
     the Defense Acquisition Pilot Program:
       (1) Fire support combined arms tactical trainer (fscatt).--
     All contracts directly relating to the procurement of a 
     training simulation system, including related hardware, 
     software, and subsystems, to perform collective training of 
     field artillery gunnery teams, with development of software 
     as required to generate the training exercises.
       (2) Joint direct attack munition (jdam i).--All contracts 
     directly relating to the development and procurement of a 
     strap-on guidance kit, using an inertially guided, Global 
     Positioning System updated guidance kit to enhance the 
     delivery accuracy of 1000 and 2000 pound bombs in inventory.
       (3) Commercial-derivative aircraft (cda).--(A) All 
     contracts related to acquisition or upgrading of commercial-
     derivative aircraft for use in future Air Force airlift, 
     tanker, and airborne warning and control system requirements.
       (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``commercial-
     derivative aircraft'' means any of the following:
       (i) Any aircraft that is of a type customarily used in the 
     course of normal business operations for other than Federal 
     Government purposes, that has been issued a type certificate 
     by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, 
     and--
       (I) that has been sold or leased for use in the commercial 
     marketplace; or
       (II) that has been offered for sale or lease for use in the 
     commercial marketplace.
       (ii) Any aircraft that, but for--
       (I) modifications of a type customarily available in the 
     commercial marketplace; or
       (II) minor modifications made to meet Federal Government 
     requirements;

     would satisfy the criteria in clause (i).
       (b) Authorization for Waivers.--With respect to the 
     programs described in subsection (a), the Secretary of 
     Defense is authorized to waive or limit the applicability of 
     the following provisions of law:
       (1) Section 2306(b) of title 10, United States Code 
     (relating to prohibition against contingent fees).
       (2) Section 2320 of such title (relating to requirements 
     pertaining to technical data).
       (3) Section 2321 of such title (relating to validation of 
     proprietary data restrictions).
       (4) Section 2324 of such title (relating to requirement for 
     the disclosure of the identity of suppliers and sources of 
     supplies).
       (5) Section 2393(d) of such title (relating to prohibition 
     against doing business with certain offerors or contractors).
       (6) Section 2402 of such title (relating to prohibition on 
     limitation of subcontractor direct sales).
       (7) Section 2408(a) of such title (relating to prohibition 
     on certain involvement with persons convicted of defense 
     contract-related felonies).
       (8) Section 2410b of such title (relating to contractor 
     inventory accounting system standards).
       (9) Section 843 of Public Law 103-160 (107 Stat. 1720) 
     (relating to reports on defense contractors dealings with 
     terrorist countries).
       (c) Conduct of Defense Acquisition Programs.--In the case 
     of each defense acquisition program designated under 
     subsection (a) for participation in the Defense Acquisition 
     Pilot Program, the Secretary of Defense shall--
       (1) develop guidelines and procedures for carrying out the 
     program and the criteria to be used in measuring the success 
     of the program;
       (2) evaluate the potential costs and benefits which may be 
     derived from the innovative procurement methods and 
     procedures tested under the program; and
       (3) develop the methods to be used to analyze the results 
     of the program.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in the amendments made 
     by this section shall be construed as authorizing the 
     appropriation or obligation of funds for the programs 
     designated as defense acquisition pilot programs under 
     subsection (a).


                     amendment offered by mr. fazio

       Page 66, strike out line 13 and all that follows through 
     line 6 on page 68 (relating to a reutilization initiative for 
     Army and Navy depot-level activities) and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:

     SEC. 329. REUTILIZATION INITIATIVE FOR DEPOT-LEVEL 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Pilot Program Authorized.--During fiscal year 1995, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to 
     encourage commercial firms to enter into partnerships with 
     depot-level activities of the military departments for the 
     purpose of--
       (1) demonstrating commercial uses of such depot-level 
     activities that are related to the principal mission of such 
     depot-level activities;
       (2) preserving employment and skills of employees currently 
     employed by such depot-level activities or providing for the 
     reemployment and retraining of employees who, as the result 
     of the closure, realignment, or reduced in-house workload of 
     such activities, may become unemployed; and
       (3) supporting the goals of other defense conversion, 
     reinvestment, and transition assistance programs while also 
     allowing such depot-level activities to remain in operation 
     to continue to perform their defense readiness mission.
       (b) Participants in Pilot Program.--The Secretary shall 
     designate not less than six depot-level activities of the 
     military departments to participate in the pilot program 
     under this section. Of these depot-level activities, at least 
     two shall be depot-level activities of the Department of the 
     Army, at least two shall be depot-level activities of the 
     Department of the Navy, and at least two shall be depot-level 
     activities of Department of the Air Force.
       (c) Conditions on Pilot Program.--In carrying out the pilot 
     program under this section, the Secretary shall ensure that 
     the program--
       (1) does not interfere with the closure or realignment of a 
     depot-level activity of the military departments under a base 
     closure law; and
       (2) does not adversely affect the readiness or primary 
     mission of a participating depot-level activity.
       (d) Funding for Fiscal Year 1995.--Of the amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $100,000,000 
     shall be available only to carry out the pilot program under 
     this section.


            amendment, as modified, offered by ms.  mc kinney

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.   . REPORT ASSESSING THE REGIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES 
                   OF UNITED STATES MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAMS.

       (a) Report.--On or before the date of the submission to 
     Congress of the next annual report of the Secretary of 
     Defense submitted after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a 
     report assessing the national security consequences of United 
     States military cooperation programs. The report shall be 
     organized into separate sections for each region of the world 
     (as defined by the Secretary) in which there is a significant 
     degree of internal political instability or possibility of 
     changes in the external policies of countries with which the 
     United States has significant military cooperation 
     relationships.
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each regional section of the 
     report required under subsection (a) shall include the 
     following:
       (1) A description of cooperative military relationships in 
     effect between the United States and the countries of the 
     region.
       (2) A description of how these activities are intended to 
     improve regional security.
       (3) An assessment of the risks associated with engaging in 
     military cooperation programs with countries in the region 
     should the government of any of such country change its 
     political orientation in a manner hostile to United States 
     interests.
       (4) An analysis of the effect on regional security of 
     possible multilateral actions to reduce the military 
     capability of governments and military forces in the region 
     that could pose a future threat to United States interests.
       (c) Classified and Unclassified Form of Report.--The report 
     under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form 
     and, to the extent necessary, in classified form.


            amendment, as modified, offered by mr. menendez

       At the end of title XI (page 308, after line 24), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1152. PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL 
                   TECHNOLOGIES FOR DREDGING OF DUAL-USE PORTS.

       (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     establish a plan for the Department of Defense to encourage 
     the further development and deployment of existing defense 
     environmental technologies in support of the dredging 
     requirements of dual-use ports, including--
       (1) the environmentally secure containment and management 
     of contaminated dredged materials; and
       (2) the decontamination of dredged materials.
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--The plan to be established 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:
       (1) A description of defense reinvestment and defense 
     conversion programs under chapter 148 of title 10, United 
     States Code, that are available to facilitate the deployment 
     of defense environmental technologies in support of the 
     dredging requirements of dual-use ports.
       (2) A description of existing defense environmental 
     technologies and processes that are available to support the 
     objectives of the plan to be established pursuant to 
     subsection (a).
       (3) Recommendations for strategies to deploy such 
     technologies and processes to ports of various sizes, 
     including--
       (A) ports with projects requiring more than 5,000,000 cubic 
     yards of sediment to be dredged annually;
       (B) ports with projects requiring more than 1,000,000 cubic 
     yards of sediment to be dredged annually;
       (C) ports that have been affected by, or are likely to be 
     affected by, the closure of one or more major military 
     installations and that, as a result thereof, require 
     substantial environmental remediation; and
       (D) military port installations that have experienced 
     significant delays in advancing dredging projects because of 
     environmental compliance or dredged material disposal 
     problems.
       (4) After consultation with the heads of other appropriate 
     Federal agencies, an assessment of other available 
     technologies and processes that may be used in support of the 
     plan to be established pursuant to subsection (a).
       (5) An assessment of the potential benefits and methods of 
     transfer of technologies and processes for use in connection 
     with dredging processes in commercial ports and waterways.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     transmit to Congress a report containing the plan to be 
     established pursuant to subsection (a).
       At the end of subtitle D of title XXVIII (page 366, after 
     line 24), insert the following new section:


             amendment offered by mr. miller of california

     SEC. 2839. LAND CONVEYANCE, NAVAL SHIPYARD, VALLEJO, 
                   CALIFORNIA.

       (a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Navy may 
     convey, without consideration, to the City of Vallejo, 
     California (in this section referred to as the ``City''), all 
     right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a 
     parcel of real property (including improvements thereon) 
     described in subsection (b), which is located on Mare Island 
     in Vallejo, California, and is currently under the control of 
     Mare Island Naval Shipyard Command.
       (b) Description of Property.--The parcel of real property 
     to be conveyed under subsection (a) shall consist of all 
     existing active dredge ponds and nontidal areas on Mare 
     Island under the jurisdiction of the Navy, except that the 
     parcel shall not include the nontidal areas identified in 
     figure 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
     United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Mare Island Naval 
     Shipyard, dated July 28, 1988. The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the real property to be conveyed shall be 
     determined by a survey satisfactory to the Secretary. The 
     cost of such survey shall be borne by the City.
       (c) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United 
     States.


            amendment, as modified, offered by mr. oberstar

       At the end of subtitle A of title II (page 27, after line 
     5), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 203. TACONITE PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.

       Of the amount provided in section 201 for the Navy, the sum 
     of $500,000 shall be available for the purpose of initiating 
     and carrying out a manufacturing technology program for 
     taconite processing technology.


                     amendment offered by mr. stark

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 1038. STUDY ON USE OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO FUEL NAVAL 
                   REACTORS.

       Not later than June 1, 1995, the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the Congress 
     a report on the costs, advantages, and disadvantages of using 
     low-enriched uranium to fuel naval reactors. The report shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An examination of the implications of using low-
     enriched uranium to fuel naval reactors for current and 
     future United States nuclear-powered naval vessels.
       (2) An assessment of the effects of such use on--
       (A) the factors of operating performance, ship 
     displacement, and reactor core life, including the full range 
     of plausible trade-offs between such factors;
       (B) construction and operating costs; and
       (C) naval fuel cycle impacts.
       (3) An assessment of the effect on United States nuclear 
     nonproliferation policies if such use were established, under 
     the leadership of the United States, as the future global 
     norm.
       (4) An assessment of the relative complexity, 
     effectiveness, and risks of safeguards as applied to low-
     enriched uranium and highly-enriched uranium naval fuel 
     cycles under the President's proposal for a global cutoff in 
     the production of fissile material or outside of safeguards.
       (5) An assessment of the potential Federal budget savings 
     that would result from such use.


             amendment, as modified, offered by mr. kennedy

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.   . SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING NUCLEAR 
                   NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
     signed at Washington, D.C., London, and Moscow on July 1, 
     1968, is the centerpiece of global efforts to prevent the 
     spread of nuclear weapons.
       (2) The United States has demonstrated longstanding support 
     for that treaty and related efforts to prevent the spread of 
     nuclear weapons.
       (3) President Clinton has declared that preventing the 
     spread of nuclear weapons is one of the highest priorities of 
     his Administration.
       (4) In April 1995, the parties to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will convene a Review 
     Conference in New York City to discuss the indefinite 
     extension of the treaty.
       (5) The policy of the President is to seek at the Review 
     Conference the indefinite and unconditional extension of that 
     treaty.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the President has the full support of Congress in 
     seeking the indefinite and unconditional extension of the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
       (2) the President should as soon as possible fill those 
     positions at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
     Agency and other departments and agencies with responsibility 
     for nonproliferation and the 1995 Review Conference for the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
       (3) the President, when formulating and implementing other 
     elements of nonproliferation policy of the United States 
     (including United States counter proliferation doctrine, the 
     nuclear Posture Review, and nuclear testing policy), should 
     take into account the objectives of the United States at the 
     1995 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and
       (4) the President and the President's senior national 
     security advisers should dedicate themselves to ensuring the 
     indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 Review 
     Conference for that treaty.


            amendment, as modified, offered by mr. hamilton

       In subsection (b) of section 2219 of title 10, United 
     States Code, as proposed to be added by section 1024(a), 
     insert before ``Whenever the Secretary of Defense'' the 
     following:

     The Secretary of Defense shall carry out such foreign 
     disaster assistance as the President may direct the Secretary 
     to provide.


                   amendment, offered by mr. quillen

       At the end of title XXVIII (page 374, after line 7), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 2858. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO PROHIBITION ON STORAGE AND 
                   DISPOSAL OF NONDEFENSE TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS 
                   MATERIALS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

       Section 2692(b) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
       (2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (8) 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) The treatment and disposal of any material that is 
     not owned by the Department of Defense if the Secretary of 
     the military department concerned determines that the 
     material is required or generated by a private person in 
     connection with the authorized and compatible use by that 
     person of an industrial-type facility of that military 
     department and the Secretary enters into a contract with that 
     person that is consistent with the best interest of national 
     defense and economic and environmental security and is based 
     on mutually agreeable terms.''.


            amendment, as modified, offered by mr. underwood

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 1038. ASSISTANCE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DEFENSE 
                   ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Establishment of Restoration Advisory Boards.--Section 
     2705 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding 
     after subsection (c) the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Restoration Advisory Board.--In lieu of establishing 
     a technical review committee under subsection (c), the 
     Secretary may permit the establishment of a restoration 
     advisory board in connection with any installation (or group 
     of nearby installations) where the Secretary is planning or 
     implementing environmental remediation activities. The 
     Secretary shall prescribe regulations regarding the duties, 
     composition, and establishment of, and the payment of routine 
     administrative expenses of, restoration advisory boards to be 
     established pursuant to this subsection.''.
       (b) Assistance for Citizen Participation on Technical 
     Review Boards and Restoration Advisory Boards.--Such section 
     is further amended by adding after subsection (d) (as added 
     by subsection (a)) the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Assistance for Citizen Participation.--(1) Using such 
     amounts as may be made available under paragraph (3), and 
     pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary for this 
     purpose, the Secretary shall provide funds to facilitate the 
     participation of private individuals on technical review 
     committees and restoration advisory boards for the purpose of 
     ensuring public input into the planning and implementation of 
     environmental remediation activities at installations where 
     such committees and boards are in operation.
       ``(2) Funds provided under this subsection may be used 
     only--
       ``(A) to obtain technical assistance in interpreting 
     scientific and engineering issues with regard to the nature 
     of environmental hazards at an installation and the remedial 
     activities proposed or conducted at the installation; and
       ``(B) to assist such members and affected citizens to more 
     effectively participate in the environmental restoration 
     process at the installation.
       ``(3) To provide funds under this subsection for a fiscal 
     year, there shall be available an amount up to \1/4\ of one 
     percent of the appropriated funds (but not to exceed 
     $7,500,000 for fiscal year 1995) available to the Secretary 
     for that year for environmental restoration through--
       ``(A) the Defense Environmental Restoration Account; and
       ``(B) with respect to defense facilities to be closed or 
     realigned, the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 
     1990.''.
       (c) Involvement of Committees and Boards in Defense 
     Environmental Restoration Program.--Such section is further 
     amended by adding after subsection (e) (as added by 
     subsection (b)) the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Involvement in Defense Environmental Restoration 
     Program.--Consistent with regulations prescribed by the 
     Secretary, the Secretary shall consult with, and seek the 
     advice of, the technical review committee or restoration 
     advisory board established for an installation (if any) on 
     the following issues:
       ``(1) Identifying environmental remediation activities and 
     projects at the installation.
       ``(2) Tracking progress on these activities and projects.
       ``(3) Collecting information regarding remediation 
     priorities for the installation.
       ``(4) Addressing land use, level of remediation, acceptable 
     risk, and waste management and technology development issues 
     related to remediation at the installation.
       ``(5) Developing remediation strategies.''.
       (d) Report on Effect of Implementation.--Not later than 
     December 1, 1994, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
     report to Congress describing the manner in which the 
     Secretary will implement the amendments made by this section. 
     The report shall include--
       (1) an estimate of the total amount of funds to be provided 
     to technical review committees and restoration advisory 
     boards under subsection (e) of section 2705 of title 10, 
     United States Code (as added by subsection (b)), during the 
     five-fiscal year period beginning on October 1, 1994, and the 
     cost to be incurred by the Secretary during such period to 
     carry out such amendments;
       (2) an analysis of whether the establishment of restoration 
     advisory boards under subsection (d) of such section (as 
     added by subsection (a)) could delay or disrupt defense 
     environmental restoration activities; and
       (3) an analysis of whether the funding mechanism provided 
     in subsection (e)(3) of such section (as added by subsection 
     (b)) could result in funding shortfalls for defense 
     environmental restoration activities.
       (e) Condition on Implementation.--Until the Secretary of 
     Defense submits the report required by subsection (d), the 
     Secretary may not obligate or expend any of the funds made 
     available under subsection (e)(3) of section 2705 of title 
     10, United States Code (as added by subsection (b)) to 
     provide funds to technical review committees and restoration 
     advisory boards.
       (f) Time for Regulations.--Not later than March 1, 1995, 
     the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations 
     required by the amendments made by this section.


             amendment, as modified, offered by ms. kaptur

       At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 42, after line 
     5), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 221. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR STRATEGIC METALS.

       (a) Research and Development.--The Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall give 
     consideration to acceleration of research and development 
     projects for strategic metals and alloys to support the 
     objectives of section 2501(c) of title 10, United States 
     Code. In carrying out the preceding sentence, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall begin by conducting a project for the 
     acceleration of research in aluminum beryllium alloys to meet 
     military and commercial standards for emerging applications.
       (b) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized in section 201(4) 
     for materials and electronic technology carried out by the 
     Advanced Research Projects Agency, $2,000,000 is authorized 
     for the project for acceleration of research in aluminum 
     beryllium alloys described in subsection (a).


                 amendment offered by mr. hall of ohio

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 1038. AUTHORIZATION TO EXCHANGE CERTAIN ITEMS FOR 
                   TRANSPORTATION SERVICES.

       Paragraph (1) of section 2572(b) of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting ``transportation,'' after 
     ``salvage,''.


                 amendment offered by mr. hall of ohio

       At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII (page 351, after 
     line 23), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 2816. GOVERNMENT RENTAL OF FACILITIES LOCATED ON CLOSED 
                   MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

       (a) Authorization to Rent Base Closure Properties.--To 
     promote the rapid conversion of military installations that 
     are closed pursuant to a base closure law, the Administrator 
     of the General Services may give priority consideration, when 
     leasing space in accordance with the Public Buildings Act of 
     1959 (40 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and the Federal Property and 
     Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 471 et seq.), 
     to facilities of such an installation that have been acquired 
     by a non-Federal entity.
       (b) Base Closure Law Defined.--For purposes of this 
     section, the term ``base closure law'' means the Defense Base 
     Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of 
     Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) and title II of the 
     Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 
     Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).


            amendment, as modified, offered by mr. hamilton

       At the end of subtitle D of title XI (page 307, after line 
     19), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1142. LOAN GUARANTEES UNDER ARMAMENT RETOOLING AND 
                   MANUFACTURING SUPPORT INITIATIVE.

       Section 193 of the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing 
     Support Act of 1992 (subtitle H of title I of Public Law 102-
     484; 10 U.S.C. 2501 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(d) Loan Guarantees to Support ARMS Initiative.--(1) 
     Subject to the availability of appropriations for this 
     purpose, the Secretary of the Army may support the purposes 
     of the ARMS Initiative by conducting a program to issue 
     guarantees during fiscal year 1995 against the risk of 
     nonpayment arising out of loans provided to businesses 
     establishing commercial activities on inactive and active 
     ammunition manufacturing facilities of the Department of the 
     Army. During fiscal year 1995, the subsidy cost of loan 
     guarantees issued under the loan guarantee program may not 
     exceed $43,000,000.
       ``(2) Applications for guarantees under the loan guarantee 
     program shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Army. The 
     maximum amount of loan principal that the Secretary may 
     guarantee under loan guarantee program with respect to any 
     loan may not exceed $20,000,000. Any such loan shall provide 
     for repayment over a period not to exceed 10 years.
       ``(3) The Secretary of the Army may enter into a 
     cooperative agreement with an appropriate Federal agency, 
     under which such agency will process applications submitted 
     under paragraph (2) and otherwise operate the loan guarantee 
     program on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. From funds 
     made available for the loan guarantee program, the Secretary 
     of the Army may transfer to such agency pursuant to the 
     agreement such sums as may be necessary for such agency to 
     carry out its activities under the loan guarantee program.''.


              amendment, as modified, offered by mr. dicks

       At the end of subtitle C of title I (page 19, after line 
     15), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 125. ADVANCED CAPABILITY (ADCAP) MODIFICATION PROGRAM 
                   FOR THE MK-48 TORPEDO.

       Within the amount provided in section 102(a)(2) for 
     procurement of weapons, including missiles and torpedoes, for 
     the Navy--
       (1) the amount provided for the Advanced Capability (ADCAP) 
     modification program for the MK-48 torpedo is hereby 
     increased by $52,300,000; and
       (2) the amount provided for the Fleet Satellite 
     Communications program is hereby reduced by $52,300,000.


             amendment, as modified, offered by mr. dellums

       At the end of subtitle A of title X (page 266, after line 
     20), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1005. IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF UNAUTHORIZED 
                   APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 9 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 222 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 223. Identification of unauthorized appropriations

       ``(a) Identification.--(1) Upon the enactment of a law 
     making a defense appropriation, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall determine, with respect to each defense appropriation 
     provided in that law--
       ``(A) whether any part of such appropriation provides funds 
     for an unauthorized program element (as defined in subsection 
     (c)); and
       ``(B) if there are funds provided as part of any such 
     appropriation for an unauthorized program element, the total 
     amount of funds provided under that appropriation for all 
     such unauthorized program elements.
       ``(2) A determination under paragraph (1) shall be made 
     with respect to a defense appropriation for a fiscal year 
     immediately upon enactment of the law making that 
     appropriation. However, if as of the enactment of such law 
     there has not been enacted a law specifically authorizing 
     appropriations for that fiscal year for the purposes named in 
     section 114(a) of this title, such determination shall be 
     made immediately after enactment of such an authorization 
     law.
       ``(3) Not later than 30 days after the enactment of such an 
     appropriation or authorization law (whichever is enacted 
     later), the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report 
     identifying--
       ``(A) any unauthorized program element; and
       ``(B) any amount determined under paragraph (1)(B).
       ``(b) Comptroller General Review and Report.--(1) The 
     Comptroller General shall promptly review each report of the 
     Secretary under subsection (a). The Comptroller General shall 
     submit a report to Congress if the Comptroller General 
     determines--
       ``(A) that the law with respect to which the Secretary 
     submitted a report provides appropriations for an 
     unauthorized program element in addition to those identified 
     in the report of the Secretary; or
       ``(B) that a program element identified in that report as 
     an unauthorized program element is not unauthorized.
       ``(2) A report under paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) shall identify those defense appropriations, and 
     program elements under appropriations, with respect to which 
     the Comptroller General made determinations under 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, of such paragraph; 
     and
       ``(B) shall include such comments and recommendations as 
     the Comptroller General considers appropriate.
       ``(3) Such a report shall be submitted not later than 30 
     days after the date on which the report of the Secretary 
     under subsection (a) is received by Congress.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `defense appropriation' means an amount 
     appropriated or otherwise made available by Congress in an 
     appropriation law for one of the purposes stated in section 
     114(a) of this title.
       ``(2) The term `unauthorized program element' means a 
     program element of a program, project, or activity of the 
     Department of Defense (as identified in budget documents of 
     the Department of Defense or in congressional budget 
     documents) for which an amount is provided under a defense 
     appropriation (whether or not specified in the appropriation 
     Act concerned) in an amount greater than the amount 
     authorized by law to be appropriated for such program element 
     (whether or not such authorized amount is specified by law), 
     determined by taking into consideration statutory language, 
     legislative history, and budget documents submitted to 
     Congress by the Department of Defense.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``223. Identification of unauthorized appropriations.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Section 223 of title 10, United States 
     Code, as added by subsection (a), shall with respect to 
     amounts appropriated for fiscal years after fiscal year 1994.


              amendment, as modified, offered by mr. fazio

       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.   . AUTHORIZATION FOR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES OF THE ARMED 
                   FORCES TO SELL ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO PERSONS 
                   OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Army Sales Authority.--(1) Section 4543 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 4543. Army industrial facilities: sales of 
       manufactured articles or services outside Department of 
       Defense

       ``(a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--(1) Subject to 
     paragraph (2), the Secretary of the Army may sell to eligible 
     persons outside the Department of Defense articles and 
     services produced by a working-capital funded Army industrial 
     facility, including a Department of the Army arsenal.
       ``(2) The Secretary may not exercise the authority provided 
     by this section until after the Secretary certifies to 
     Congress that a cost accounting system has been developed--
       ``(A) to keep track of the costs associated with making 
     sales of articles and services under this section; and
       ``(B) to ensure that expenditures made and revenues 
     generated in such sales are not intermingled with funds 
     authorized and appropriated for the military mission of the 
     industrial facilities involved.
       ``(b) Eligible Purchasers.--Under such regulations as the 
     Secretary may prescribe, the following persons shall be 
     eligible to purchase articles and services under this 
     section:
       ``(1) State and local governments.
       ``(2) Citizens of the United States and persons lawfully 
     admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
       ``(3) Business entities that conduct a significant level of 
     their research, development, engineering, and manufacturing 
     activities in the United States and the majority ownership or 
     control of which is by United States citizens.
       ``(c) Conditions on Sales.--The Secretary may make a sale 
     under this section only if--
       ``(1) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify 
     the United States, except in cases of willful conduct or 
     extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to 
     any person or property arising out of the articles or 
     services purchased;
       ``(2) the Secretary determines that the requested articles 
     or services can be substantially performed by the Army 
     industrial facility concerned with only incidental 
     subcontracting and that performance is in the public 
     interest;
       ``(3) the Secretary determines that the sale of the 
     requested articles or services will not interfere with the 
     military mission of the Army industrial facility concerned; 
     and
       ``(4) the sale of the goods and services is made on the 
     basis that it will not interfere with performance of work by 
     the Army industrial facility concerned for the Department of 
     Defense.
       ``(d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a 
     purchaser of articles or services under this section to use 
     advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or 
     services.
       ``(2) In the sale of articles and services under this 
     section, the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable 
     costs, capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation 
     costs that are associated with the articles or services sold;
       ``(B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed 
     by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale; 
     and
       ``(C) develop and maintain (from sources other than 
     appropriated funds) working capital to be available for 
     paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and 
     other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
       ``(e) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles 
     and services under this section shall be deposited into the 
     Defense Business Operations Fund.
       ``(f) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to affect the application of 
     the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which 
     incorporate or are produced through the use of an article 
     sold under this section.
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `advance incremental funding', with respect 
     to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial 
     payments for the articles or services that includes--
       ``(A) one or more partial payments before the commencement 
     of work or the incurring of costs in connection with the 
     production of the articles or the performance of the 
     services, as the case may be; and
       ``(B) subsequent progress payments that result in full 
     payment being completed as the required work is being 
     completed.
       ``(2) The term `variable costs', with respect to sales of 
     articles or services, means the costs that are expected to 
     fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
     ``(A) in the case of articles, the volume of production 
     necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
     ``(B) in the case of services, the extent of the services 
     sold.''.
       (2) Section 2208(i) of such title is amended by striking 
     out ``that manufactures large caliber cannons, gun mounts, 
     recoil mechanisms, ammunition, munitions, or components 
     thereof''.
       (b) Navy Sales Authority.--(1) Chapter 645 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 7525. Navy industrial facilities: sales of 
       manufactured articles or services outside Department of 
       Defense

       ``(a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--Subject to paragraph 
     (2), the Secretary of the Navy may sell to eligible persons 
     outside the Department of Defense articles and services 
     produced by a working-capital funded Navy industrial 
     facility.
       ``(2) The Secretary may not exercise the authority provided 
     by this section until after the Secretary certifies to 
     Congress that a cost accounting system has been developed--
       ``(A) to keep track of the costs associated with making 
     sales of articles and services under this section; and
       ``(B) to ensure that expenditures made and revenues 
     generated in such sales are not intermingled with funds 
     authorized and appropriated for the military mission of the 
     industrial facilities involved.
       ``(b) Eligible Purchasers.--Under such regulations as the 
     Secretary may prescribe, the following persons shall be 
     eligible to purchase articles and services under this 
     section:
       ``(1) State and local governments.
       ``(2) Citizens of the United States and persons lawfully 
     admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
       ``(3) Business entities that conduct a significant level of 
     their research, development, engineering, and manufacturing 
     activities in the United States and the majority ownership or 
     control of which is by United States citizens.
       ``(c) Conditions on Sales.--The Secretary may make a sale 
     under this section only if--
       ``(1) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify 
     the United States, except in cases of willful conduct or 
     extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to 
     any person or property arising out of the articles or 
     services purchased;
       ``(2) the Secretary determines that the requested articles 
     or services can be substantially performed by the Navy 
     industrial facility concerned with only incidental 
     subcontracting and that performance is in the public 
     interest;
       ``(3) the Secretary determines that the sale of the 
     requested articles or services will not interfere with the 
     military mission of the Navy industrial facility concerned; 
     and
       ``(4) the sale of the goods and services is made on the 
     basis that it will not interfere with performance of work by 
     the Navy industrial facility concerned for the Department of 
     Defense.
       ``(d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a 
     purchaser of articles or services under this section to use 
     advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or 
     services.
       ``(2) In the sale of articles and services under this 
     section, the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable 
     costs, capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation 
     costs that are associated with the articles or services sold;
       ``(B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed 
     by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale; 
     and
       ``(C) develop and maintain (from sources other than 
     appropriated funds) working capital to be available for 
     paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and 
     other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
       ``(e) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles 
     and services under this section shall be deposited into the 
     Defense Business Operations Fund.
       ``(f) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to affect the application of 
     the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which 
     incorporate or are produced through the use of an article 
     sold under this section.
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `advance incremental funding', with respect 
     to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial 
     payments for the articles or services that includes--
       ``(A) one or more partial payments before the commencement 
     of work or the incurring of costs in connection with the 
     production of the articles or the performance of the 
     services, as the case may be; and
       ``(B) subsequent progress payments that result in full 
     payment being completed as the required work is being 
     completed.
       ``(2) The term `variable costs', with respect to sales of 
     articles or services, means the costs that are expected to 
     fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
       ``(A) in the case of articles, the volume of production 
     necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
       ``(B) in the case of services, the extent of the services 
     sold.''.
       ``(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such 
     chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     item:

``7525. Navy industrial facilities: sales of manufactured articles or 
              services outside Department of Defense.''.
       (c) Air Force Sales Authority.--(1) Chapter 933 of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 9541. Air Force industrial facilities: sales of 
       manufactured articles or services outside Department of 
       Defense

       ``(a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--Subject to paragraph 
     (2), the Secretary of the Air Force may sell to eligible 
     persons outside the Department of Defense articles and 
     services produced by a working-capital funded Air Force 
     industrial facility.
       ``(2) The Secretary may not exercise the authority provided 
     by this section until after the Secretary certifies to 
     Congress that a cost accounting system has been developed--
       ``(A) to keep track of the costs associated with making 
     sales of articles and services under this section; and
       ``(B) to ensure that expenditures made and revenues 
     generated in such sales are not intermingled with funds 
     authorized and appropriated for the military mission of the 
     industrial facilities involved.
       ``(b) Eligible Purchasers.--Under such regulations as the 
     Secretary may prescribe, the following persons shall be 
     eligible to purchase articles and services under this 
     section:
       ``(1) State and local governments.
       ``(2) Citizens of the United States and persons lawfully 
     admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
       ``(3) Business entities that conduct a significant level of 
     their research, development, engineering, and manufacturing 
     activities in the United States and the majority ownership or 
     control of which is by United States citizens.
       ``(c) Conditions on Sales.--The Secretary may make a sale 
     under this section only if--
       ``(1) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify 
     the United States, except in cases of willful conduct or 
     extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to 
     any person or property arising out of the articles or 
     services purchased;
       ``(2) the Secretary determines that the requested articles 
     or services can be substantially performed by the Air Force 
     industrial facility concerned with only incidental 
     subcontracting and that performance is in the public 
     interest;
       ``(3) the Secretary determines that the sale of the 
     requested articles or services will not interfere with the 
     military mission of the Air Force industrial facility 
     concerned; and
       ``(4) the sale of the goods and services is made on the 
     basis that it will not interfere with performance of work by 
     the Air Force industrial facility concerned for the 
     Department of Defense.
       ``(d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a 
     purchaser of articles or services under this section to use 
     advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or 
     services.
       ``(2) In the sale of articles and services under this 
     section, the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable 
     costs, capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation 
     costs that are associated with the articles or services sold;
       ``(B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed 
     by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale; 
     and
       ``(C) develop and maintain (from sources other than 
     appropriated funds) working capital to be available for 
     paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and 
     other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
       ``(e) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles 
     and services under this section shall be deposited into the 
     Defense Business Operations Fund.
       ``(f) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to affect the application of 
     the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which 
     incorporate or are produced through the use of an article 
     sold under this section.
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `advance incremental funding', with respect 
     to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial 
     payments for the articles or services that includes--
       ``(A) one or more partial payments before the commencement 
     of work or the incurring of costs in connection with the 
     production of the articles or the performance of the 
     services, as the case may be; and
       ``(B) subsequent progress payments that result in full 
     payment being completed as the required work is being 
     completed.
       ``(2) The term `variable costs', with respect to sales of 
     articles or services, means the costs that are expected to 
     fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
       ``(A) in the case of articles, the volume of production 
     necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
       ``(B) in the case of services, the extent of the services 
     sold.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``9541. Air Force industrial facilities: sales of manufactured articles 
              or services outside Department of Defense.''.

       (d) Control Effect of Sales Authority on Base Closure 
     Process.--Section 2903 of the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 
     101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(2)--
       (A) by inserting after the first sentence the following new 
     sentence: ``The Secretary shall also include a certification 
     that the authorities provided in sections 4543, 7525, and 
     9541 of title 10, United States Code, for the sale outside 
     the Department of Defense of articles and services produced 
     by working-capital funded industrial facilities (and any 
     sales, workloads, revenues, or other information resulting 
     from the use or availability of such authorities) were not 
     considered in preparing the list of recommendations referred 
     to in paragraph (1).''; and
       (B) by striking out ``preceding sentence'' and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``preceding sentences''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(3), by inserting after the first 
     sentence the following new sentence: ``The Commission shall 
     also include in its report a certification that the 
     authorities provided in sections 4543, 7525, and 9541 of 
     title 10, United States Code, for the sale outside the 
     Department of Defense of articles and services produced by 
     working-capital funded industrial facilities (and any sales, 
     workloads, revenues, or other information resulting from the 
     use or availability of such authorities) were not considered 
     in making its recommendations for closures and realignments 
     of military installations.''.
       (e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections 
     (a), (b), and (c) shall take effect on June 1, 1995.


         amendment as modified, offered by ms. brown of florida

       At the end of section 328 (page 66, line 12), insert the 
     following: ``The Secretary of Defense should seek to ensure 
     that the military departments maintain depot-level 
     maintenance and repair capabilities necessary to ensure their 
     critical readiness requirements.''.


                    amendment offered by ms. delauro

       At the end of subtitle A of title III (page 52, after line 
     11), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. SUPPORT FOR THE 1995 SPECIAL OLYMPICS WORLD GAMES.

       (a) Authority To Provide Support.--The Secretary of Defense 
     may provide logistical support and personnel services in 
     connection with the 1995 Special Olympics World Games to be 
     held in the State of Connecticut.
       (b) Pay and Nontravel-Related Allowances.--(1) Except as 
     provided in paragraph (2), the costs for pay and nontravel-
     related allowances of members of the Armed Forces for the 
     support and services referred to in subsection (a) may not be 
     charged to appropriations made pursuant to the authorization 
     in subsection (c).
       (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply in the case of members of 
     a reserve component called or ordered to active duty to 
     provide logistical support and personnel services for the 
     1995 Special Olympics World Games.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal 
     year 1995 the sum of $2,000,000 to carry out subsection (a).


       amendment, as modified, offered by mr. farr of california

       At the end of title XI (page 308, after line 24), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1152. PILOT PROGRAM TO DEVELOP AND DEMONSTRATE 
                   ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES.

       (a) Cooperative Agreement for Pilot Program.--(1) The 
     Secretary of Defense may enter into a cooperative agreement 
     with an institution of higher education for the purpose of 
     facilitating the development and demonstration of new methods 
     and technologies for more effective and expedient 
     environmental remediation at military installations by 
     engaging in a pilot demonstration project as provided in 
     subsection (b).
       (2) If the Secretary enters into a cooperative agreement 
     under paragraph (1), the agreement shall authorize the 
     institution of higher education to enter into partnerships or 
     other relationships with private and public entities for 
     purposes of conducting activities under the cooperative 
     agreement.
       (b) Pilot Project at Defense Landfill.--(1) If the 
     Secretary enters into a cooperative agreement under 
     subsection (a)(1), the agreement shall authorize the 
     institution of higher education to participate in a 
     cooperative pilot demonstration project at a Government 
     landfill described in paragraph (2) if such demonstration 
     project can be carried out in a manner that is consistent 
     with all other actions at such landfill that the Secretary is 
     legally required to undertake. The institution of higher 
     education may engage in such project on a long-term basis to 
     address the broader issues of environmental remediation and 
     conversion of facilities of the Department of Defense.
       (2) The Government landfill referred to in paragraph (1) is 
     a Government landfill that--
       (A) is listed on the National Priorities List pursuant to 
     section 105(a)(8)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
     Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 
     9605(a)(8)(B)); and
       (B) is located on a military installation to be closed 
     pursuant to a base closure law.
       (c) Funding.--(1) There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1995 $4,000,000 for 
     the establishment of the cooperative agreement and the 
     activities necessary to conduct the pilot project.
       (2) The amount authorized in section 201 for the joint 
     Department of Defense and Department of Energy munitions 
     technology development program for fiscal year 1995 is hereby 
     reduced by $4,000,000.

                              {time}  1610

  The Clerk proceeded to read the modifications.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that further reading of the modifications be dispensed with.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). Is there objection 
to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I reserve my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gingrich 
amendment sponsored by the Republican leadership, myself, and Mr. 
Gilman which will be incorporated in today's en bloc package of 
amendments. The amendment prohibits the use of Department of Defense 
funds to pay for the assessed share to the United States of United 
Nations peacekeeping operations.
  First and foremost, this amendment is an important statement of 
principle on behalf of maintaining the integrity of the defense budget 
by explicitly rejecting the centerpiece of the Clinton administration's 
controversial new peacekeeping blueprint--PDD-25. Since the inception 
of the United Nations and the establishment of the first U.N. 
peacekeeping operation in the Middle East in 1948, the United States 
has funded its share of peacekeeping costs through the Department of 
State. House adoption of the Gingrich amendment simply means we ought 
to continue paying these costs out of the State Department's budget.
  Unfortunately, at the same time that the role of the United Nations 
in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations has escalated, the 
Clinton administration has decided that the Department of Defense's 
budget--now in its 10th consecutive year of real decline--ought to be 
used to subsidize the mounting costs of U.N. operations. Between 1948 
and 1978, the United Nations undertook 13 peacekeeping operations. 
Since April 1988, the United Nations has authorized 20 operations. 
Currently, 18 separate U.N. military and peacekeeping operations are 
on-going with the United States paying 32 percent of the United Nations 
bill. In 1988, the total cost of U.N. operations was $268 million, yet 
this year, these costs are estimated to be $4.5 billion. The costs to 
the United States are growing exponentially. The mounting U.S. assessed 
costs also exclude the considerable unreimbursed incremental costs 
borne by DOD in support of U.N. operations--costs that will exceed $1.2 
billion in fiscal year 1994 alone.
  The rising costs of these U.N. operations is an issue in and of 
itself and we need to look at it very closely. Nonetheless, the House 
today will reject the administration's ill-conceived plan to use the 
DOD budget as a credit card for U.N. peacekeeping.
  The emphasis the Clinton administration places on the central role of 
the United Nations in the conduct of its foreign policy has apparently 
led the President to endorse a shared responsibility between the 
Departments of State and Defense in funding our growing U.N. bills. As 
part of PDD-25--the Clinton administration's peacekeeping policy 
blueprint--the President has proposed that DOD undertake the 
responsibility of funding our share of the most expensive types of U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. The administration included $300 million in 
fiscal year 1995 defense budget--and $900 million over the 5-year 
defense plan--despite the fact that the request grossly underestimates 
the true DOD costs under the administration's plan by an order of 
magnitude.
  The United States costs for three current U.N. operations--Somalia, 
Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia--would have been wholly funded this 
year by DOD under the President's proposal. The most recent estimate of 
the cost to the United States for those peacekeeping operations is 
roughly $770 million--significantly more than the $300 million they 
requested for this purpose. Within the last month we have even heard 
rumors that the White House has directed that DOD increase the 
currently budgeted $900 million for U.N. peacekeeping costs over the 
next 5 years to $2.7 billion. No matter how you look at it, under the 
administration's proposal, DOD will be forced to fund the growing costs 
of U.N. peacekeeping out of hide, stretching an already underfunded 
defense budget, and putting further pressure on the military service's 
already constrained training and readiness accounts.

  The Armed Services Committee considered this issue and expressly 
rejected the administration proposal during markup of this bill--H.R. 
4301. On a strong bipartisan vote of 42 to 11, the Committee adopted a 
provision that rejected the administration's plan to use the defense 
budget to pay for U.N. peacekeeping--a provision which is the genesis 
of the Gingrich amendment in the en bloc package today.
  In the negotiations over House Resolution 431, the second rule 
governing consideration of H.R. 4301, the Democratic Leadership agreed 
to make the Gingrich amendment in order if we would agree not to seek a 
record vote and instead, have it adopted en bloc. We reluctantly agreed 
to the Democratic leadership's request not to record vote this 
important amendment in order to put the House on record in opposition 
to the administration's proposal.
  As the bipartisan record vote in the Armed Services Committee made 
clear, there is broad agreement that DOD funds should not be used to 
pay U.N. assessments of any kind. Today's adoption of the Gingrich 
amendment further codifies the widespread objections to the Clinton 
peacekeeping blueprint.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Guam [Mr. Underwood].
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, included in today's en bloc amendments is a provision I 
introduced. This amendment will take citizens who live near 
contaminated bases, put them at the table with base commanders, and 
help them participate in the base cleanup decisionmaking process.
  Thousands of military installations throughout the 50 States and the 
territories have environmentally contaminated sites. Too often, 
citizens who live near those facilities are not informed about the 
problem, do not trust the personnel in charge of clean-up, and fear for 
their health and well-being. The result, at best, is strained civilian/
military relations. At worst, we get costly lawsuits between the 
community and the military.
  The Department of Defense has taken steps to address this problem. It 
has established restoration advisory boards, or RAB's: citizen advisory 
boards that advise base commanders on the community's needs and 
concerns. This program was recommended by the Keystone Commission, 
which was formed during the Bush administration and was comprised of 
environmental advocates and Federal agencies, including DOD. However, 
the advisory boards now in place are missing a very important 
ingredient: technical assistance.
  What good does it do to bring citizens to the table if they are not 
informed on the issue? We cannot expect a homeowner near a base, for 
example, to understand complex environmental impact statements and 
advise base commanders accordingly. Therefore, my amendment does what 
EPA, DOD, and every other member of the commission recommended: it 
gives citizens technical assistance funding. With this amendment, we 
won't have just token representation * * * we'll have real 
participation.
  How is it funded? This amendment takes a fixed percentage of existing 
clean-up accounts--one-fourth of 1 percent--and requires DOD to provide 
technical assistance for restoration advisory boards. Total spending 
does not increase.
  This amendment is supported by physicians for social responsibility, 
friends of the Earth, and the military toxics project. I worked closely 
with the Department of Defense in formulating this approach, along with 
Chairman Dellums and Mr. Spence. We have devised a solid approach here 
* * * making community participation more meaningful without breaking 
the bank.
  I thank the chairman and the ranking member for its inclusion in the 
en bloc and urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].

                              {time}  1620

  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise to associate myself with the 
Berman amendment to require assistance for dislocated defense workers 
under the Job Training and Partnership Act be made available for 
workers whose jobs are affected by Federal policy banning the sale 
abroad of certain U.S.-made weapons.
  Across our Nation, and particularly throughout California and the 
Pacific Northwest, many of the best, brightest and most productive U.S. 
workers are employed by defense contractors. As U.S. defense spending 
has leveled off, defense contractors have increased exports around the 
globe. Today, the United States is the world's leading exporter in 
armaments.
  Recent history, the Persian Gulf war for example, tells us that U.S. 
arms exports may be profitable job creators in the short term, yet 
deadly weaponry when turned against American military personnel on the 
battlefield. I support legislation to scrutinize, and in some cases 
forbid, U.S. arms sales. In my opinion, this closer scrutiny of U.S. 
arms sales is warranted and in our national security interests.
  The Berman amendment is an important component to increased scrutiny 
and inevitable reductions of U.S. arms sales. I am pleased to support 
it as part of this en bloc package. And I urge the adoption of the en 
bloc amendment as offered by Chairman Dellums.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman].
  (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the en bloc 
amendment to the Defense authorization bill. I am especially pleased 
that my amendment to make workers impacted by reduced arms sales abroad 
eligible for defense conversion programs was included.
  Defense workers who are dislocated because of the Government's 
decision not to allow the sale of certain weapons abroad, should have 
the same rights as those workers who are dislocated because of U.S. 
Government's decision to reduce its own purchases of a particular 
weapon system.
  Creating this parity not only brings equity to workers dislocated by 
U.S. policy, it sends a strong message regarding conventional arms 
restraint. Each step taken to alleviate the negative economic 
consequences of reduced arms exports helps neutralize the economic 
hardship arguments used by those who do not believe in arms restraint. 
This amendment will help policy makers focus on proliferation and 
security issues which must be paramount when considering whether to 
approve arms sales. Arms are different than other exports because 
making the wrong sale can have truly dire consequences.
  I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], members of the 
committee, and members of other committees of jurisdiction for working 
with me to include this amendment en bloc. And, I'd like to thank Greg 
Bishack, Lara Lumpe, Sima Osdoby, Caleb Rossiter, and the other members 
of the arms control community who worked with me to make this amendment 
possible.
  Again, I urge all members to support this en bloc amendment.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Farr].
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise to enter into a colloquy 
with the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. 
Montgomery], standing in for the chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to clarify the purpose 
for which my amendment seeks to authorize $4,000,000 for the 
establishment of a cooperative pilot program for remediation of a 
landfill at a closing base on the Superfund list. I refer to proposed 
section 1152--Amendment No. 10 in part 1 of the report of the Committee 
on Rules--of H.R. 4301.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment would authorize the Secretary of Defense 
to enter into a cooperative agreement with a public research 
institution of higher education to facilitate the development and 
demonstration of new methods and technologies for more effective and 
expedient environmental remediation at military installations, with the 
agreement structured to include public education and policy 
considerations.
  For example, ground water contamination in coastal environments is a 
serious problem. In one instance, a landfill is leaking low levels of 
volatile organic compounds into the drinking water source of an 
adjacent community. This site, at a closing base, is listed as a 
Superfund site. It is characterized by highly permeable sand dunes and 
a deep vadose zone, making it ideal for field testing of emerging, or 
optimization of conventional, remediation technologies, although prior 
to testing, the site's hydrogeology would need more thorough 
characterization. My amendment provides a structure that would allow 
this to occur.
  Mr. Chairman, am I correct when I state that the committee concurs 
with my objectives?
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. If the gentleman will yield on behalf of Chairman 
Dellums, the distinguished Member is correct in his understanding.
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I commend the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his outstanding work on 
this legislation, and thank him for participating in this colloquy.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman 
from Kentucky [Mr. Mazzoli].
  Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of one of the amendments 
in the en bloc amendments authored by the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Fazio], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], and myself, that 
allows industrial facilities, of which I represent one, to actually 
sell their services and manufacturing techniques in the private sector, 
so long as there is not a displacement of private workers in the 
process, and so long as this is a unique activity.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the gentleman from including that in 
the en bloc amendments, and I rise in behalf of the en bloc amendments.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment 
which includes my amendment requiring a study on the costs, advantages, 
and disadvantages of using low-enriched uranium [LEU] to fuel naval 
reactors for current and future U.S. nuclear powered naval vessels. The 
study would be done jointly by the Department of Defense and Department 
of Energy.
  It is important for the future of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 
policy to eliminate all rationales for nonnuclear weapon states to 
acquire stockpiles of highly enriched uranium [HEU], which can be used 
to make nuclear weapons. Aside from nuclear war heads, HEU is used for 
two purposes: to fuel naval propulsion reactors and to power research 
reactors. The United States already has a well-established program, 
RERTR, for phasing out use of weapons-usable uranium in civil research 
and test reactors worldwide. To head off future use of HEU in foreign 
naval fuel cycles, such as in Brazil and India, it would be desirable 
to place the United States in the position of being able to phase out 
its own use of this material in naval reactors.
  The United States and the United Kingdom rely on HEU fuel for their 
naval reactors, but France and Russia do not, using less than 20 
percent enriched fuel, indicating that HEU is not an irreducible 
requirement for naval reactors. Weapon-usable material in naval fuel 
cycles also represents a complicating factor for the safeguards regime 
needed to verify President Clinton's proposed worldwide fissile 
material production cut-off for weapons. Under current arrangements for 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a country can withdraw material from 
safeguards for use in the naval fuel cycle, and the safeguards regime 
won't see it again for decades. The potential for diversion to weapons 
use in this scenario is obvious.
  The success of the RERTR program indicates that conversion of naval 
reactors from HEU to LEU is highly feasible on a technical basis. This 
amendment requires DOE and DOD to assess how such conversion would 
affect U.S. naval strategy and nonproliferation policy. With this 
information, we can then determine the advisability of converting naval 
reactors to LEU.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc 
amendment and particularly the McKinney ``Boomerang'' amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment simply requires that the Pentagon assess 
and issue a report on the potential threat to U.S. Armed Forces 
stationed abroad by U.S. activities to strengthen foreign armed forces 
in a region.
  I suggest we must learn from our mistakes. United States soldiers 
faced United States trained and armed opponents in Panama, in Somalia 
and most recently, the good ship Harlan County was turned away from 
Haiti because of defiance by a military whose officers were trained by 
the United States.
  I do not want any young American to lose his or her life because a 
weapon we trade today boomerangs, tomorrow. I don't want any young 
American facing an enemy with an American-made gun and American skill 
and training in how to use it.
  Are our military cooperation efforts making it more dangerous for 
future peacekeeping efforts or humanitarian relief efforts? Will 
weapons we give way to allies today, come back at our men and women in 
uniform, tomorrow? Aren't there alternatives for promoting security for 
our allies?
  The McKinney amendment requires the Pentagon to ask itself these 
questions and provide some answers to the Congress.
  The McKinney amendment is based on the following assumptions: (1) The 
potential threat posed to the United States, its allies, and its 
deployed forces by foreign armed forces is a matter of both the 
capability of those forces and the will and capabilities of their 
governments; (2) arms sales, joint training exercises, and various 
military cooperation programs conducted by the United States increase 
the military potential of other countries around the world and increase 
the proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry; (3) it has 
happened in the past that, through various processes of political 
change, nations that are friendly to the United States become hostile 
at a later time; (4) nevertheless, it is generally accepted that 
military operations in the future will be based on coalitions as was 
Operation Desert Storm, suggesting that regional and global security 
may be enhanced by continued military cooperation relationships between 
the United States and other countries; (5) American policy should be to 
work unilaterally and cooperatively with other military powers to limit 
the transfers of weapons, military technology and training to countries 
that may: pose a threat to our deployed forces; pose a risk to American 
interests; or escalate regional tensions; (6) as the administration is 
currently conducting an interagency review of many of these issues, 
information and assessments developed for this review could 
appropriately form the basis for the report to Congress required by the 
McKinney amendment. However, this report may require additional 
inquiries.
  The report should focus on the identification and assessment of 
military cooperation activities, including: assignment of U.S. military 
personnel to advise personnel of a foreign country; joint exercises or 
deployments of foreign armed forces with U.S. military personnel; and 
the transfer of weaponry involving planning or assistance by U.S. 
military personnel. The report should also describe how military 
cooperation activities will enhance U.S. security and reduce security 
tensions in the region. Alternative strategies should be assessed, 
especially the possibilities of reductions in the militarization levels 
of regions such as: limitations in the size, spending, and capability 
of foreign armed forces. The report should suggest alternative means to 
satisfy the goals presently used to justify military cooperation 
activities, transfer, and training.
  Military policy must be a function of foreign policy and change 
subject to changes in the international geopolitical situation. This 
report can help Congress assess the relative benefits of military 
cooperation activities in the context of the end of the cold war.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). The question is on 
the amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
  The amendments en bloc, as modified, were agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 5 printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.


                    amendment offered by ms. pelosi

  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment printed in the report.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Pelosi: At the end of title VIII 
     (page 246, after line 23), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 873. PREFERENCE FOR LOCAL RESIDENTS.

       (a) Preference Required.--In entering into contracts with 
     private entities as part of the closure or realignment of a 
     military installation under a base closure law, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall give preference, to the maximum extent 
     practicable and consistent with Federal, State, and local 
     laws and regulations, to entities that plan to hire residents 
     of the vicinity of the military installation. Contracts for 
     which the preference shall be given shall include contracts 
     to carry out environmental restoration activities at such 
     military installations.
       (b) Definition.--In this section, the term `base closure 
     law' means the following:
       (1) The provisions of title II of the Defense Authorization 
     Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 
     100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
       (2) The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 
     (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 
     note).


            modification to amendment offered by ms. pelosi

  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer a modification to the amendment 
just offered, and ask unanimous consent for its acceptance.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment, as 
modified.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment, as modified, offered by Ms. Pelosi. At the end 
     of title VIII (page 246, after line 23), insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 873. PREFERENCE FOR LOCAL RESIDENTS.

       (a) Preference Allowed.--In entering into contracts with 
     private entities for services to be performed at a military 
     installation that is affected by closure or realignment under 
     a base closure law, the Secretary of Defense may give 
     preference, consistent with Federal, State, and local laws 
     and regulations, to entities that plan to hire, to the 
     maximum extent practicable, residents of the vicinity of such 
     military installation. Contracts for which the preference may 
     be given include contracts to carry out environmental 
     restoration activities or construction work at such military 
     installations.
       (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``base closure 
     law'' means the following:
       (1) The provisions of title II of the Defense Authorization 
     Amendment and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 
     100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
       (2) The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 
     (part of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 
     note).
       (c) Applicability.--Any preference given under subsection 
     (a) shall apply only with respect to contracts entered into 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (d) Termination.--This section shall cease to be effective 
     on September 30, 1997.

  Ms. PELOSI (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California that the amendment be modified?
  There was no objection.
  Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi] 
will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment would create a hiring preference for local 
residents who are affected by base closures in their communities. Under 
existing law, the Department of Defense is unable to provide preference 
to companies with a strong record of hiring local residents, or 
companies which seek to hire local residents most impacted by base 
closures.
  This is what people in my community are saying: Enough is enough. For 
years we have asked for jobs and contracts on projects that are funded 
with our tax dollars; we will no longer tolerate someone else, from 
outside our community, taking all the contracts and jobs; our demands 
are reasonable, peaceful and lawful; is anybody listening?
  The Congress has acted to emphasize the importance of revitalizing 
local communities in the area of a base closure by directing programs 
and resources to provide economic benefit to minimize the impact of 
base closures. Because of the way current contracts are structured, and 
because of the current bidding regulations governing Federal contract 
awards, there is no provision for bids to currently favor hiring locals 
most affected by a base closure.
  Instead, there are many reported situations where an out-of-State 
company, brings in out-of-State workers to do cleanup work at a base 
while unemployed workers stand outside the gate and watch. At Hunters 
Point Naval Shipyard in my district, over $30 million has been spend on 
environmental remediation--with not one local resident being hired, 
despite the presence of qualified workers in the vicinity.
  My amendment would change this by providing a preference in contract 
awards to companies which plan to hire local residents. It would 
encourage bidding companies to compete for having the best local hiring 
plan to score higher in the bid award process.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the excellent work of the 
chairman, Mr. Dellums, and the ranking member, Mr. Spence, for their 
cooperation in this effort. I would also like to acknowledge the work 
of my colleague, Mr. Hamburg, who has been very active and helpful on 
my amendment.
  With the gentleman's permission, I would like to engage the chairman 
of the committee in a colloquy to clarify his understanding of the last 
paragraph of my amendment.
  That paragraph states that this provision will only be effective 
until September 30, 1997. I recognize the value of a so-called sunset. 
However, there are a number of local base contracts, with the 
concurrent need for a local hiring preference, that will extend far 
beyond this time limit. For example, Hunters Point in my district is a 
Superfund site where cleanup activities will certainly continue for an 
extended period. How will this short-term authorization affect 
situations that will require much longer attention and the continuing 
need for local hiring preference?
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield, let me 
assure the gentlewoman that this sunset should not have a negative 
impact on the local hiring preference authorized by her amendment. A 
sunset is a useful tool to ensure Congress has the opportunity to 
conduct the necessary oversight--and make any appropriate changes in 
the legislation--and to ensure that the provision is properly 
implemented by the Defense Department. For that reason, sunsets have 
been very effective in a number of programs such as the DOD minority 
contracting goal program or the Small Business Innovation Research 
program.
  Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for offering that clarification, 
and I appreciate his support.
  I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and vote ``yes''.

                              {time}  1630

  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Hamburg].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Hamburg] is recognized for 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hamburg].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] may claim 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Hamburg] 
is recognized for 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee in a colloquy to clarify the 
interpretation of the Pelosi-Hamburg amendment.
  I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to discuss the 
amendment with the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank the gentleman for all 
the assistance he and his staff have provided in working through this 
process. I appreciate his willingness to help resolve problems that 
affect a great many people.
  As a result of the many military installations being closed in 
California and around the country, significant environmental and 
construction work is being undertaken as part of the process. In 
addition, significant military construction is occurring at open bases 
such as Travis Air Force Base as a result of the relocation of 
personnel and material from closing bases. This amendment would 
authorize the use of a preference to contractors who plan to hire 
locally, ensuring that the multiplying effect of Federal dollars 
benefits the local community.
  I would like to clarify with the gentleman that this amendment 
applies not only to bases being closed or realigned, but also to those 
bases receiving personnel or material as a result of the closures and 
realignments.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct. In awarding 
contracts at both closing and receiving bases, a preference may be 
given to entities that plan to hire locally.
  Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, It is my understanding that this provision 
is intended to require that a bidding entity's plan to hire locally 
shall be a significant factor to be weighed in awarding affected 
contracts. Furthermore, any base declining to use the local hire 
preference must demonstrate the compelling circumstances to justify its 
decision.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. The gentleman is correct. The contracting officers at 
the affected bases are expected to be vigilant in ensuring that an 
entity's plan to hire locally is a serious, well conceived plan with a 
reasonable probability of actual implementation.
  Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's clarification 
of this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to just rise in opposition only for the 
purpose of commenting briefly on the amendment.
  I want to thank the gentlewoman from California for her cooperation 
in working with me and other Republicans in crafting a compromise on 
her amendment that all sides can support.
  I do not expect any opposition as a modified amendment and would look 
forward to working with the gentlewoman on this issue and other issues 
in the future. I would like to support the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The question is on the 
amendment as modified, offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Pelosi]
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 
6, printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in part 1 of 
House Report 103-520.


                    amendment offered by mr. solomon

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The Clerk will designate the 
amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon: At the end of title X 
     (page 277, after line 2), add the following new section:

     SEC. 1038. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN 
                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
     resolution on December 12, 1948, that declared the Republic 
     of Korea to be the only lawful government on the Korean 
     peninsula;
       (2) between 1950 and 1953, the United States led a military 
     coalition that successfully repelled an invasion of the 
     Republic of Korea by the illegal Communist regime in North 
     Korea, at a cost of more than 54,000 American lives;
       (3) the United States and the Republic of Korea ratified a 
     Mutual Security Treaty in 1954 that commits the United States 
     to helping the Republic of Korea defend itself against 
     external aggression;
       (4) more than 37,000 American military personnel are 
     presently stationed in the Republic of Korea pursuant to the 
     terms of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954;
       (5) the United States and the Republic of Korea have 
     conducted annual joint military exercises, code named ``Team 
     Spirit'', since 1976;
       (6) the Communist regime of North Korea has built up an 
     armed force nearly twice the size of that in the Republic of 
     Korea and has never renounced the active and ongoing use of 
     force, terrorism, and subversion in its attempts to subdue 
     and subjugate the Republic of Korea;
       (7) the North Korean regime signed the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, but refused until 
     1992 to sign the safeguard agreement that is required of all 
     treaty signatories and eventually announced in 1993 its 
     intention to withdraw from the treaty altogether;
       (8) the North Korean regime has never permitted the 
     unfettered international inspection of its nuclear facilities 
     that is required of all signatories of the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
       (9) the Secretary of Defense has stated publicly that 
     efforts by the North Korean regime to develop enough 
     plutonium to permit the manufacture of 10 to 12 nuclear 
     weapons per year, and to develop the ballistic missile 
     capability of delivering these and other weapons over a wide 
     area, represent a grave threat to the security of the Korean 
     peninsula and the entire world;
       (10) the North Korean regime continues to repudiate all 
     efforts by the United States to reduce tensions on the Korean 
     peninsula;
       (11) these efforts by the United States to reduce tensions 
     and provide incentives for the North Korean regime to 
     cooperate with the international nonproliferation regime 
     include the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the 
     territory of the Republic of Korea and a reduction in the 
     number of American military personnel stationed there, the 
     establishment of direct diplomatic contacts with the North 
     Korean regime, and the offer of expanded diplomatic and 
     economic contacts with North Korea;
       (12) on April 20, 1994, the United States and the Republic 
     of Korea announced the postponement of this year's ``Team 
     Spirit'' exercises as a further gesture of goodwill and 
     confidence-building toward North Korea;
       (13) the North Korean regime responded to this latest 
     initiative by declaring that international inspectors will 
     not be permitted to examine the spent fuel rods that are 
     being removed from North Korea's principal nuclear reactor at 
     Yongbyon, nor will inspectors be permitted to see where the 
     rods will be taken;
       (14) weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the fuel 
     rods in the type of nuclear facilities North Korea is known 
     to possess; and
       (15) the ongoing diplomatic impasse concerning the North 
     Korean nuclear program has clearly reached a critical 
     juncture, the unsatisfactory resolution of which would place 
     the international non-proliferation regime in jeopardy and 
     threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the 
     Northeast Asia region, and, by extension, the rest of the 
     world.
       (b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) the North Korean regime should take an initial step 
     toward cooperation with the international nonproliferation 
     regime by permitting the unfettered international inspection 
     of the removal and eventual disposal of all spend fuel rods 
     from the Yongbyon nuclear facility, followed by a regular 
     inspection process as required by the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
       (2) an unsatisfactory resolution of the inspection 
     controversy at Yongbyon that allows for anything less than 
     unfettered international inspection of that facility should 
     prompt the Government of the United States to take such 
     action as would indicate the severity with which it views 
     this provocation against international norms; and
       (3) such action should include, but not necessarily be 
     limited to, the seeking of international sanctions against 
     the North Korean regime and the immediate resumption of the 
     ``Team Spirit'' exercises.


            Modification of Amendment Offered by Mr. Solomon

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
be modified under a prior agreement with the Majority.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment, as 
modified
  The Clerk read as follows:

        Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Solomon: At the end 
     of title X (page 277, after line 2), add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 1038. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN 
                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) between 1950 and 1953, the United States led a military 
     coalition that successfully repelled an invasion of the 
     Republic of Korea by the Communist regime in North Korea, at 
     a cost of more than 54,000 American lives;
       (2) the United States and the Republic of Korea ratified a 
     Mutual Security Treaty in 1954 that commits the United States 
     to helping the Republic of Korea defend itself against 
     external aggression;
       (3) approximately 37,000 United States military personnel 
     are presently stationed in the Republic of Korea;
       (4) the United States and the Republic of Korea have 
     conducted joint military exercises, code named ``Team 
     Spirit'', regularly since 1976;
       (5) the Communist regime in North Korea has built up an 
     armed force nearly twice the size of that in the Republic of 
     Korea and has never renounced the active and ongoing use of 
     force, terrorism, and subversion in its attempts to subdue 
     and subjugate the Republic of Korea;
       (6) although the North Korean regime signed the Treaty on 
     the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, it has 
     never permitted the unfettered international inspection of 
     its nuclear facilities that is required of all signatories of 
     that Treaty;
       (7) the Secretary of Defense has stated publicly that 
     efforts by the North Korean regime to develop enough 
     plutonium to permit the manufacture of 10 to 12 nuclear 
     weapons per year, and to develop the ballistic missile 
     capacity of delivering these and other weapons over a wide 
     area, represent a grave threat to the security of the Korean 
     peninsula and the entire world;
       (8) the North Korean regime continues to resist efforts by 
     the United States to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula;
       (9) efforts in recent years by the United States to reduce 
     tensions on the Korean peninsula have included the withdrawal 
     of all nuclear weapons from the territory of the Republic of 
     Korea and a reduction in the number of United States military 
     personnel stationed there, the postponement of the 1994 
     ``Team Spirit'' exercises, the establishment of direct 
     diplomatic contacts with the North Korean regime, and the 
     offer of expanded diplomatic and economic contacts with North 
     Korea;
       (10) weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the fuel 
     rods in the type of nuclear facilities North Korea is known 
     to possess;
       (11) international inspectors must be permitted to examine 
     all spent fuel rods removed from North Korea's principal 
     nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and to carry out tests necessary 
     to ensure compliance with the 1992 safeguards agreement; and
       (12) the diplomatic impasse concerning the North Korean 
     nuclear program has clearly reached a critical juncture, the 
     unsatisfactory resolution of which would place the 
     international nonproliferation regime in jeopardy and 
     threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the 
     Northeast Asia region, and, by extension, the rest of the 
     world.
       (b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) the North Korean regime should take an initial step 
     toward cooperation with the international nonproliferation 
     regime by permitting the unfettered international inspection 
     of the removal and eventual disposal of all spent fuel rods 
     from the Yongbyon nuclear complex, followed by a 
     comprehensive inspection process as required by the Treaty on 
     the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
       (2) an unsatisfactory resolution of the inspection 
     controversy at Yongbyon that allows for anything less than 
     unfettered international inspection of facilities in that 
     complex should prompt the Government of the United States to 
     take such action as would indicate the severity with which it 
     views this provocation against international norms; and
       (3) such action should include, but not necessarily be 
     limited to, the seeking of international sanctions against 
     the North Korean regime and the rescheduling of the ``Team 
     Spirit'' exercises for 1994.

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment, as modified, be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Solomon] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed 
will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment for a separate vote because I 
believe the gravity of the situation with regard to the North Korean 
nuclear program demands that Congress make its voice heard--this week.
  Mr. Chairman, North Korea may already have at least one or two 
nuclear bombs, according to our own CIA. And, just yesterday, North 
Korea announced that the I.A.E.A. will never--repeat, never--be given 
access to the nuclear waste sites the I.A.E.A. wants to examine.
  Mr. Chairman, what I am about to say is very important: Several hours 
ago President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea declared publicly 
that the time for negotiations is over, and the time for sanctions has 
begun. He said North Korea cannot be trusted with half a nuclear bomb, 
much less one or two, or five, or six, or seven.
  Mr. Chairman, only just yesterday, the Clinton administration said 
that North Korea could have four or even five nuclear weapons by the 
end of the year, based on the amount of plutonium that could be derived 
from the spent fuel rods that have been removed from the Yongbyon 
reactor over the past several weeks.
  On Friday--only 2 days from now--the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency will be issuing its definitive 
report on the status of inspections at the Yongbyon complex, North 
Korea's principal nuclear facility. If reports in the press are 
accurate--and there is every reason to believe they are--the I.A.E.A. 
is going to rule that North Korea is in substantial noncompliance with 
the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and its attendant 
safeguards agreement.
  Moreover, the I.A.E.A. is evidently prepared to declare that 
destruction of evidence and other secret activities at Yongbyon make it 
impossible for independent inspectors to account for the removal and 
eventual disposal of spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.
  So, Mr. Chairman, the moment of truth has come. The ongoing, yearlong 
controversy concerning inspection of North Korea's nuclear program has 
reached the critical turning point.
  Every member knows what is at stake: peace on the Korean Peninsula, 
the security of South Korea, Japan, and the entire Northeast Asia 
region; and the future of the International Nonproliferation Regime are 
in the balance.
  Mr. Chairman, the I.A.E.A. report will be delivered to the U.N. 
Security Council before the end of this week--and the issue of placing 
international sanctions on North Korea will be put on the Security 
Council's agenda.
  Indeed, Ambassador Albright has confirmed to the press that initial 
consultations and discussions on sanctions are already underway.
  So now is the time for Congress to be heard in a united and unanimous 
voice. this amendment, the language of which was agreed to in 
bipartisan consultation, expresses the sense of Congress that the 
administration should seek international sanctions against North Korea 
and reschedule the Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea, if 
the inspection controversy at Yongbyon is not resolved satisfactorily.

  This amendment does not tie the hands of the administration in any 
way. As a matter of fact, the management of this impending crisis 
should be taken over at the Presidential level immediately. It has been 
handled for too long at the sub-cabinet level. Now is the time for the 
President to be President--and along with the Congress, spell out to 
the American people the stakes involved.
   Mr. Chairman, no Member doubts the gravity of this issue. Secretary 
of Defense Perry has already called it a ``substantial near-term 
crisis.'' But America is always most effective when it speaks with one 
voice. I urge a unanimous vote for this amendment.

                              {time}  1640

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence], the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Solomon amendment expressing 
the sense of Congress that the United States should take action against 
North Korea including seeking international sanctions and resuming the 
Team Spirit military exercises if the controversy over the North's 
nuclear program is not satisfactorily resolved. In addition, I urge 
support of the Kasich amendment on Korea to be offered later today 
which draws much needed attention to our security relationship with the 
Republic of Korea [ROK]. These two amendments provide the House with at 
least a brief opportunity to discuss the North Korean crisis.
  Over the past 18 months, administration policy seems to have been 
predicated on the belief that North Korea is pursuing nuclear weapons 
solely for bargaining purposes. But North Korea has demonstrated little 
interest in bargaining on any terms except their own--which are 
unacceptable on many fronts. Instead, the North has been testing United 
States resolve and using the time to expand its nuclear bombmaking 
program--and doing so successfully.
  Last November, President Clinton declared that ``North Korea cannot 
be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We have to be very firm about 
it.'' This statement of U.S. policy entailed certain risks, but it was 
firm and unequivocal. Over time, however, the President has vacillated 
and backtracked to the point that the current objective of United 
States policy is to prevent North Korea from becoming a so-called 
nuclear power--whatever that means.
  Mr. Chairman, the implications of this shift in United States policy 
towards North Korea are enormous and disturbing. The administration now 
seems willing to tolerate the possession of a small number of nuclear 
weapons in the hands of Kim Il-Sung. In light of North Korea's record, 
it is not hard to envision these weapons being used to threaten United 
States forces and allies in the region or being sold to rogue regimes 
in the Middle East or elsewhere. If the administration is willing to 
tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea, is the same true for Libya? Or 
Iran? What is the administration's real policy on nuclear proliferation 
and where will the President draw the line?
  In light of continued North Korean intransigence over inspections of 
their nuclear facilities and the growing likelihood of 
economic sanctions, we would all do well to heed Secretary of Defense 
William Perry's admonition that:

       The North Koreans have stated that they would consider the 
     imposition of sanctions to be equivalent to a declaration of 
     war. * * * We may believe, and I do believe, that this is 
     rhetoric on their part, but we cannot act on that belief. We 
     have to act on the prudent assumption that there will be some 
     increase in the risk of war if we go to a sanction regime.

  Based on this prudent assumption, one would hope that the United 
States is taking numerous steps to increase the readiness of United 
States and South Korean military forces necessary to hopefully defeat 
any potential military attack by the North. While North Korea is likely 
to protest such actions, the United States can no longer continue to 
ignore the very real threats posed by the North's escalation of this 
crisis.
  I urge the President to take firm steps to ensure that no one--friend 
or foe--misinterpret U.S. resolve to stand up for our allies and to 
protect our geopolitical interests.
  Mr. Chairman, my colleagues should unanimously support both the 
Solomon and Kasich amendments as a way of bringing focus to the many 
pressing security issues we confront on the Korean Peninsula.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SOLOMON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Nevada.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment the author of 
this amendment, because as a member of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence and a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I know 
the threats the gentleman speaks of are real.
  I think it is a good resolution, Mr. Chairman. I think we should 
enforce the embargo. We should support the embargo and get Team Spirit 
back on line.
  Mr. Chairman, I compliment the author of the amendment.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there a Member in opposition to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]?
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I am not in opposition, but I would 
request the 5 minutes to address the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. 
Montgomery] will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]. I may not agree with some of the 
wording of the findings of the amendment, but I clearly support the 
sense of the Congress language and the spirit and thrust of the 
gentleman's efforts here. Clearly this is the most important issue 
facing the world and the security of the world today. I want to point 
out that I think the gentleman would agree that the legal right that we 
have to ask to intrude, to interfere into the nation State of North 
Korea, is the fact that they are a signatory of the nonproliferation 
treaty. This gives us the legal authority and foundation to ask and to 
seek and to go in and inspect. This is a legal document that they have 
signed, they have agreed to, and if they want to be a member of the 
world community, then they ought to abide by that contract.
  That is what the Solomon amendment is getting at, and that is what I 
fully support. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] has spelled it 
out exactly as it is. They are signatories to the treaty. If they do 
not follow through, then we should not be trading with them, and 
neither should any of our allies who seek democracy and peace and 
freedom throughout the world. I urge support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment, as 
modified, offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further 
proceedings on the amendment as modified, offered by the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Solomon] will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 29 printed in House 
Report 103-520.


                   amendment offered by mr. kopetski

  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Kopetski: At the end of title X 
     (page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:

     SEC. . CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON NEGOTIATION OF LIMITATIONS ON 
                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) On January 25, 1994, the United States joined with 37 
     other nations to begin negotiations for a comprehensive 
     treaty to ban permanently all nuclear weapons testing.
       (2) On March 14, 1994, the President decided to extend the 
     current United States nuclear testing moratorium at least 
     through September 1995.
       (3) The United States is seeking to extend indefinitely the 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty at the April 1995 NPT Extension 
     Conference.
       (4) Conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty could 
     contribute toward successful negotiations to extend the Non-
     Proliferation Treaty.
       (5) Agreements to eliminate nuclear testing and control the 
     spread of nuclear weapons could contribute to the national 
     security of the United States, its allies, and other nations 
     around the world.
       (b) Congressional Action.--In view of the findings set 
     forth in subsection (a), the Congress--
       (1) applaudes the President for maintaining the United 
     States nuclear testing moratorium and for taking a leadership 
     role toward negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty;
       (2) encourages all nuclear powers to refrain from 
     conducting nuclear explosions, prior to conclusion of a 
     comprehensive test ban treaty; and
       (3) urges the Conference on Disarmament to make all 
     possible progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty by 
     the end of 1994.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member 
opposed will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Mr. KOPETSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise for the third straight year during 
consideration of the Defense authorization legislation to address the 
issue of nuclear weapons testing.
  Today, the international community is negotiating earnestly a 
complete cessation of all nuclear weapons testing through the 
Conference on Disarmament. With the strong support and active 
leadership of the Clinton administration, a comprehensive test ban 
treaty is close at hand. In his message to the opening session of the 
Conference on Disarmament in January, President Clinton stated, ``* * * 
the U.S. delegation will join you in making bold steps toward a world 
made safer through the negotiation at the earliest possible time of a 
comprehensive test ban treaty that will strengthen the security of all 
nations.''
  The international community and the Clinton administration are fully 
engaged on the issue of nuclear weapons testing. My amendment, the 
ongoing work in the House Arms Control Observers Group and the 
continued activism of Representatives like Martin Sabo, David Skaggs, 
Connie Morella, and Jim Leach demonstrate the Congress' continued 
interest in this issue.
  Simply put, my amendment: Applauds the President for maintaining the 
U.S. nuclear testing moratorium and for taking a leadership role toward 
negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty; encourages all nuclear 
powers to refrain from conducting nuclear explosions prior to 
conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty; and urges the Conference 
on Disarmament to make all possible progress toward a comprehensive 
test ban treaty by the end of 1994.
  Passage of the Kopetski amendment will send a strong message of 
congressional support for a comprehensive test ban treaty to the 
international negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament.
  Mr. Chairman, in my short time in Congress, I do believe this issue 
is as important as any I have worked on. With the conclusion of a 
successful comprehensive test ban treaty, the world will have taken an 
historic step in the name of peace. An historic step away from the 
madness of nuclear war, particularly to those of us like myself who 
grew up in the shadow of America's nuclear facilities. Mr. Chairman, I 
am reminded of the passage in the bible which states, ``Blessed are the 
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.'' I ask my 
colleagues, once again, please be a peacemaker and support the Kopetski 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence] in opposition to the amendment?
  Mr. SPENCE. I am, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by Mr. Kopetski, which would have the House express its support 
for the continued moratorium on U.S. nuclear weapons testing and which 
urges the prompt conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
agreement.
  Mr. Chairman, despite the proponents rhetoric, there is still no 
evidence to support the assertion that a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
or a nuclear testing moratorium by the United States will affect or 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya 
have not abandoned and will not abandon their nuclear weapons 
development programs simply because the United States has adopted a 
moratorium on testing or because of the possibility of an international 
agreement banning nuclear tests in the future.
  President Clinton announced last summer that he was extending his 
unilateral moratorium on U.S. underground nuclear testing. This past 
March, the President informed Congress that he was again extending the 
moratorium, this time through September 1995. Since the President's 
first announcement, the People's Republic of China has conducted one 
nuclear test and, according to a May 26, 1994, New York Times article, 
may be preparing to conduct an additional test or tests in the months 
ahead. Furthermore, North Korea is in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty by refusing to permit international inspections 
of its nuclear facilities and is likely to have already developed one 
or two nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein continues to rebuild 
Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
  Nuclear weapons testing is needed to ensure the safety, reliability 
and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons that will remain in the U.S. 
arsenal for the foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons are a vital 
component of our national security posture and must be effectively 
maintained if they are to retain their deterrent value.
  Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, the Administration's policy of 
extending the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing is misguided. The 
Administration's policy will reduce, not enhance, U.S. national 
security in the increasingly dangerous post-Cold War era as well as 
undermine our critical nuclear weapons infrastructure.
  I have attached to my statement a September, 1993, report on these 
nuclear weapons complex issues written by the Armed Services Committee 
Republican Staff which I would ask be submitted for the record 
immediately following my statement.
  Mr. Chairman, for these reasons, I oppose the Kopetski amendment and 
urge a ``No'' vote.
  The statement referred to is as follows:

 The Clinton Administration and Nuclear Weapons Policy: Benign Neglect 
                         or Erosion by Design?


                           Executive Summary

       In a span of a few short months, the Clinton administration 
     has dramatically shifted U.S. nuclear policy in a direction 
     that will lead to the atrophy of the critical capability to 
     develop, produce and maintain the weapons necessary to retain 
     a credible nuclear deterrent.
       One of the more enduring canards of arms control is the 
     belief that the path to reduced global nuclear weapons 
     stockpiles must lead to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
     Treaty (CTBT). Notwithstanding that the dramatic reductions 
     in nuclear arsenals realized over the past few years occurred 
     in the absence of a CTBT, this relic of Cold War thinking 
     continues to dominate the agenda of yesterday's arms 
     controllers. Faced with the end of the cold-war rationale, 
     CTBT proponents have deftly managed to transform the raison 
     d'etre for a CTBT from yesterday's principal weapon against 
     nuclear weapons to today's essential instrument in the 
     struggle against nuclear proliferation.
       While tentative at first, the Clinton Administration 
     recently embraced a nuclear testing moratorium and a CTBT as 
     central to its arms control policy. Stating that the current 
     U.S. nuclear inventory is safe and reliable and that nuclear 
     testing is incompatible with an assertive non-proliferation 
     policy, President Clinton has declared that the U.S. will 
     forgo further nuclear testing unless ``this moratorium is 
     broken by another nation.'' However, even this commitment to 
     resume testing if another nation does is open to question 
     given the evident posturing within the Administration in 
     response to recent reports that China is finalizing 
     preparations to conduct a nuclear test.
       By adopting the anti-nuclear agenda of the old arms control 
     movement, the Clinton Administration seemingly has ignored 
     the compelling arguments against a CTBT:
       There is no evidence to support the assertion that a CTBT 
     or nuclear testing moratorium will affect or stop the spread 
     of nuclear weapons;
       Nuclear testing is an unavoidable and necessary component 
     of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent;
       There are no alternatives to nuclear testing that can 
     provide the requisite level of confidence in the safety and 
     reliability of the nuclear stockpile.
       In addition, the Clinton Administration is taking 
     preliminary steps to mothball the nuclear weapons production 
     complex as the Department of Energy struggles to define a 
     long-term infrastructure strategy. Those issues of paramount 
     concern are:
       DOE has suspended all production of tritium, a critical 
     element not only for new nuclear warheads, but also for the 
     replenishment of the active inventory.
       For all practical purposes, the U.S. has lost the ability 
     to produce critical plutonium weapon components.
       The Pantex facility in Texas is projected to be so 
     overloaded with the task of dismantling warheads for disposal 
     that it risks not being able to continue the random selection 
     of warheads in the active inventory to be disassembled and 
     inspected for safety and reliability purposes.
       The future of the National Laboratories is highly uncertain 
     due to severe budget cuts and calls for a shift away from the 
     historic nuclear support mission they provide.
       On top of seven years of steady cutbacks, the Clinton 
     budget calls for a reduction next year of over 20 percent of 
     the highly skilled, difficult-to-replace nuclear workforce.
       Faced with the incompatible choices of either maintaining 
     an adequate nuclear support infrastructure or embracing an 
     anti-nuclear arms control agenda, the Clinton Administration 
     claims to have adopted both. However, even the most basic of 
     analysis of this Administration's policies illustrates that 
     it has apparently chosen to sacrifice nuclear preparedness in 
     the name of political expediency and an arms control strategy 
     of dubious merit.


                              introduction

       The Clinton Administration appears to be pursuing a policy 
     of nuclear atrophy. The most recent manifestation of this 
     policy was President Clinton's July 3, 1993 announcement to 
     extend the moratorium on nuclear testing--first imposed by 
     Congress last year in the form of the ``Hatfield 
     amendment''--through September 1994 unless another nation 
     conducts a nuclear test first. When combined with other 
     recent decisions taken by the Clinton Administration that 
     further weaken the nuclear weapons development and production 
     infrastructure, it is clear that the U.S. risks losing the 
     competency and capabilities necessary to field and maintain a 
     credible nuclear deterrent.
       If current plans are implemented, within four years the 
     U.S. confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear 
     weapons already in the stockpile and the ability to 
     remanufacture retired warheads will have diminished. In 
     effect, the Clinton Administration is eroding the U.S. 
     ability to maintain with high confidence the safety and 
     reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as 
     the stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and 
     infrastructure.
       The purpose of this paper is to identify a number of 
     critical issues with respect to the Clinton Administration's 
     approach to nuclear testing and the maintenance of the U.S. 
     nuclear weapons complex. It will highlight the current status 
     of U.S. nuclear testing, problems associated with the Clinton 
     Administration's policy on nuclear testing--including a 
     Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)--and decisions 
     being made by the Administration which will continue to 
     contribute to the rapid erosion of the U.S. Government's 
     nuclear weapons development and production capability.


                nuclear testing: the current moratorium

                               Background

       Arguing that testing was needed to develop new weapons, 
     maintain the reliability of the stockpile and understand 
     weapons effects, President Reagan suspended on-going 
     negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing in 
     July, 1982. In August, 1985, Soviet President Gorbachev 
     announced a Soviet test moratorium that lasted through 
     February, 1987. In July, 1986, following negotiations with 
     Congressional leaders, President Reagan agreed to make 
     ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the 
     Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) a priority in the 
     ensuing Congress. Upon ratification, the President 
     committed to pursue bilateral negotiations on the step-by-
     step reduction in nuclear testing as steps towards an 
     eventual CTBT. In exchange for this commitment, 
     Congressional leaders agreed not to impose a legislated 
     testing moratorium.
       U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Testing Talks began in November 1987. 
     The TTBT and PNET verification protocols were completed in 
     May 1990. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the treaties 
     with the new protocols in June 1990; the Senate ratified the 
     agreements in September 1990, and the treaties entered into 
     force in December that same year.
       At this point, the Bush Administration suspended 
     negotiations to further limit nuclear testing in order to 
     first consider the effects of the verification provisions 
     contained in the TTBT and PNET. U.S. Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Ronald Lehman testified 
     before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September, 
     1990, that negotiations were to resume in several months and 
     that the Administration was studying a limit on the number or 
     yield of permitted tests. However, others in the Bush 
     Administration expressed strong reservations about further 
     limits on testing. Robert Barker, Assistant to the Secretary 
     of Defense for Atomic Energy, stated in September that the 
     Department of State, Defense and Energy ``have not succeeded 
     in finding a next step which does not have adverse national 
     security implications.''
       The Nuclear Testing Talks have not resumed to date, though 
     the Clinton Administration recently sent a senior official 
     abroad to discuss the outlines of further testing 
     limitations.

                       The ``Hatfield Amendment''

       The Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 1993 budget request 
     for the Department of Energy, submitted in February 1992, 
     included $429.5 million to conduct nine underground nuclear 
     tests at the Nevada Test Site. The testing plan included a 
     mix of new design, reliability and weapon-effects tests. 
     Subsequently, in July, 1992, the Administration modified U.S. 
     testing policy and announced it would conduct no more than 
     six tests for safety and reliability purposes in Fiscal Year 
     1993 and for each of the following five fiscal years, and no 
     more than three tests per year in excess of 35 kilotons.
       Concurrently, on September 24, 1992, the House adopted H.R. 
     5373, the Fiscal Year 1993 Energy and Water Development 
     Appropriations Act which included the so-called ``Hatfield 
     Amendment'' on nuclear testing. The bill provided $375 
     million for nuclear weapon testing in Fiscal Year 1993, but 
     rejected the Administration's revised nuclear weapon testing 
     plans and instead, imposed a nine-month interim moratorium on 
     testing. Following the interim moratorium, a limited number 
     of tests were to be permitted, to be followed by a cessation 
     of all testing after September, 1996, unless another nation 
     tested. This marked the first time that a cessation of 
     nuclear testing had been imposed by the Congress. President 
     Bush signed the measure into law (Public Law 102-377) on 
     October 2, 1992.
       Proponents of the ``Hatfield Amendment'' offered several 
     arguments in support of the moratorium, and an eventual ban 
     on all testing. These arguments included:
       Continued nuclear testing was a ``vestige of the Cold 
     War;''
       A cessation of U.S. nuclear testing would help to stem the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons;
       Continued U.S. nuclear testing would jeopardize efforts to 
     extend indefinitely the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
     during the up-coming 1995 Treaty review conference.
       Opponents of the ``Hatfield Amendment'' countered that 
     nuclear testing was still needed to:
       Ensure the proper functioning and reliability of the 
     stockpile;
       Modernize the existing stockpile for enhanced safety, 
     security and effectiveness;
       Measure the effects of nuclear weapons on other weapon 
     systems and components which are continually changing as 
     technology advances.
       They also noted that test ban advocates were in error 
     because:
       A U.S. test ban would have no effect on the motivations or 
     capabilities of proliferant nations to acquire nuclear 
     weapons;
       The association of a test ban with renewal of the Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Treaty is artificial; the treaty does not 
     call for a test ban and its renewal does not depend in any 
     way on a test ban. (See footnote 3)
       Upon assuming office, President Clinton made negotiation of 
     a CTBT a priority of his Administration. On April 23, 1993, 
     in his meetings with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 
     Vancouver, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would 
     consult with Russia, our allies and other states, about 
     commencing CTBT negotiations at an early date. Consistent 
     with this goal, President Clinton announced on July 3, 1993, 
     that he was extending the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing 
     through at least September 1994, calling on the other nuclear 
     powers to do the same. In furtherance of this policy, 
     Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs 
     Lynn Davis recently visited Britain, France, China, Russia, 
     and other capitals to urge restraint on testing and to 
     discuss the modalities and parameters associated with 
     possible CTBT negotiations.
       In extending the testing moratorium, the President stated 
     that a ``test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to 
     halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons,'' and, if 
     joined by the other nuclear powers, would put U.S. ``in the 
     strongest possible position to negotiate a comprehensive test 
     ban and to discourage other nations from developing their own 
     nuclear arsenals.'' He also directed the Department of Energy 
     to be ready to resume testing, stating that ``If, however, 
     this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct 
     the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional 
     tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress.''
       Finally, the President also stated that ``To assure that 
     our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, 
     we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in 
     the safety, the reliability and the performance of our own 
     weapons. We will also refocus much of the talent and 
     resources of our nation's nuclear labs on new technologies to 
     curb the spread of nuclear weapons and verify arms control 
     treaties.''


           the clinton nuclear policy: on the road to atrophy

       A principal underpinning of the Clinton Administration's 
     ``no first test'' policy is the assertion that continued 
     testing is inconsistent with U.S. non-proliferation goals. In 
     arriving at its policy, the Clinton Administration also 
     determined and declared that U.S. nuclear weapons were 
     already safe and reliable, and concluded that while 
     additional nuclear testing could help provide some additional 
     improvements in safety and reliability, such benefits were of 
     marginal value when balanced against the priority of nuclear 
     nonproliferation.

                   CTBT and Nuclear Non-proliferation

       There is no evidence to support the assertion that a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will strengthen efforts to halt 
     the spread of nuclear weapons. Efforts to negotiate a 
     comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty have been on-going 
     since the mid-1940s. In the early 1960s, U.S., Soviet and 
     British negotiations on a CTBT foundered when the Soviets 
     broke out the existing (1958-1961) test moratorium. Further, 
     the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which banned nuclear 
     weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
     water, addressed a key public concern of time, namely, the 
     elimination of the environmental effects of testing, thereby 
     diminishing the enthusiasm for a CTBT. Nuclear testing 
     negotiations remained largely moribund until President Carter 
     re-initiated efforts to achieve a CTBT with the Soviet Union 
     in 1977. These discussions also failed to produce an accord, 
     however, due to opposition within the Executive branch, as 
     well as several international crises, including the Iran 
     hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
       Underlying President Clinton's desire to once again have 
     the U.S. resume negotiations on a CTBT are two proliferation-
     related assumptions: (1) without such an agreement, nations 
     will be unwilling to indefinitely extend the NPT at the 
     Treaty review conference in 1995; and (2) a CTBT would 
     discourage or preclude other non-nuclear states from 
     developing or obtaining nuclear weapons. Both of these 
     underlying assumptions are highly questionable.
       On the first point, supporters of a test ban claim that a 
     U.S. failure to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT 
     would represent a serious blow to U.S. nonproliferation 
     objectives. However, there is no evidence that the NPT is 
     dependent on the conclusion of a CTBT. This argument is often 
     posited by anti-nuclear activists and is not supported by 
     pronouncements of NPT party governments. Lack of support for 
     a CTBT by representatives to the 1990 NPT review conference 
     is evidence of the low salience of this issue for most NPT 
     parties.
       Further, a 1991 National Academy of Sciences report stated 
     that, ``most countries will make their decisions about the 
     utility of the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) regime 
     or their maintenance of a nuclear option on the basis of 
     their perceptions of their own security interests, not on the 
     actions of the United States and Soviet Union or other 
     nuclear weapons state on testing.'' That this is true was 
     evidenced at the July G-7 Summit in Tokyo when Japan refused 
     to commit itself to an indefinite extension of the NPT 
     because of its worries over North Korea's development of 
     nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery systems. 
     While Japan has more recently expressed its support for an 
     indefinite extension of the NPT (noting also that the NPT 
     contains a withdrawal provision), Foreign Minister, Kabun 
     Muto has also stated that Japan must have the will to 
     build nuclear weapons if it is deemed necessary to deter 
     and defend against a North Korea nuclear threat.
       Japan's expressed concerns point to an ironic consequence 
     of a CTBT, namely, the potential for an increased risk of 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations that once 
     relied upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their security but 
     may in fact lose confidence in U.S. security guarantees under 
     an extended regime of no U.S. nuclear testing. Columnist 
     Charles Krauthammer stated in July 16 op-ed in The Washington 
     Post that, ``There are two kinds of countries with the 
     potential to acquire nuclear weapons. First, advanced and 
     generally friendly countries--like Germany, Japan and South 
     Korea--that refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in part 
     because they trust the American nuclear umbrella to protect 
     them. If they see us denuclearizing, their temptation to 
     acquire their own nuclear umbrella to protect them. If they 
     see us denuclearizing, their temptation to acquire their own 
     nuclear weapons will only increase. The other category of 
     nations comprises the pariah states * * *
       With respect to the second concern--the ability of a CTBT 
     to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons--there is no 
     evidence that nuclear testing has any direct bearing on 
     either the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or 
     future arms control efforts.
       First, what we have learned about the Iraqi nuclear program 
     since Operation Desert Storm demonstrates that nuclear 
     testing is not necessarily required to develop nuclear 
     weapons. The likely existence of Pakistani and South African 
     nuclear programs also prove this point. Several Third World 
     nations that either presently have a nuclear capability or 
     may be capable of assembling a nuclear weapon(s) on short 
     notice have reached this level of development despite never 
     having conducted a nuclear test of which the West is aware. 
     Indeed, North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT, and 
     latest progress on its long-running covert nuclear program, 
     have occurred at a time when the U.S. was observing its self-
     imposed moratorium on nuclear testing.
       Second, nations such as Libya, North Korea, Iran and Iraq, 
     might well contend that a CTBT is only a tool for global 
     powers like the United States and Russia to deny them their 
     ``sovereign right'' to develop such weapons.
       Third, even if countries such as Iraq and North Korea were 
     to sign a CTBT, their willingness to observe the spirit and 
     letter of such an agreement would always be in question, and 
     may never be adequately verifiable. Being a signatory would 
     have a minimal impact on the nuclear weapons development 
     programs of such countries since the relatively crude weapons 
     they are most likely to assemble and/or deploy may not 
     require any nuclear testing. It is doubtful whether all 
     countries that were to sign a CTBT would refrain from testing 
     if they concluded it was in their national interest to test.
       Fourth, U.S. experts have also noted that a CTBT is 
     unlikely to ever be effectively verifiable; according to 
     Kathleen Bailey, an expert on nuclear proliferation issues, a 
     test ban cannot be verified below approximately one kiloton, 
     a level of explosive testing that is still highly useful to 
     nuclear weapons design or improvement. With efforts by the 
     testing nation to seismically decouple or hide the signal in 
     other seismic signals, the size weapon to be tested could be 
     increased substantially without fear of discovery. Countries 
     intent on cheating could identify and implement evasive 
     measures that would make it virtually impossible for U.S. 
     sensors to detect low-yield tests.
       Fifth, CTBT would actually cripple the development of 
     certain counterproliferation technologies. There are many 
     nuclear threats that the U.S. or its allies could face in the 
     future that do not conform to the classic military scenario. 
     A nuclear weapon might be stolen or sold to a terrorist from 
     the stockpile of the former Soviet Union or a proliferant 
     state, and targeted for use in the U.S. Even if the U.S. were 
     able to locate such a weapon before it detonated, it may not 
     have the technical capability to disarm or render the weapon 
     harmless. The U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories are only now 
     beginning to address this serious issue. Once technologies 
     are developed, it will be imperative that they be tested. To 
     know whether they will work is likely to require testing 
     against a real nuclear device.
       Finally, as demonstrated by the progress in U.S.-Soviet 
     and, more recently, U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, a 
     cessation of nuclear testing is not a prerequisite for 
     limiting or reducing nuclear arms. START I and START II, if 
     fully implemented, will dramatically reduce the number of 
     nuclear weapons in each nation's arsenal, yet were negotiated 
     in an era of regular nuclear testing.

                Nuclear Stockpile Safety and Reliability

       Nuclear testing is needed to assure the safety and 
     reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. Implicit in President 
     Clinton's July 3, 1993 announcement is the belief that the 
     U.S. can afford to stop testing because its nuclear weapons 
     are already safe and reliable. This view ignores the fact 
     that U.S. nuclear weapons are currently safe due, in part, to 
     years of nuclear testing. Furthermore, it is only through 
     some level of continued explosive testing that the U.S. will 
     be able to monitor and improve the stockpile's safety and 
     reliability in the future.
       The Administration's view that U.S. nuclear weapons are 
     already safe and reliable enough demonstrates a cavalier 
     attitude toward the complexity of nuclear weapons and fails 
     to take into account past safety and reliability problems 
     with the stockpile. Nuclear weapons are probably the most 
     complex weapons the U.S. deploys, yet they are tested only a 
     fraction of the amount that other U.S. weapons are tested. 
     Since 1958, the U.S. has deployed 41 different nuclear weapon 
     systems, of which 14 have required corrective modifications 
     due to reliability deficiencies discovered or evaluated after 
     nuclear testing.
       The majority of U.S. nuclear tests over the past few years 
     have been primarily concerned with testing modern safety 
     features for nuclear weapons. Safety improvements to the U.S. 
     nuclear arsenal--designed to make it nearly impossible for 
     nuclear weapons to give off a nuclear yield unintentionally--
     include the use of insensitive high explosives (IHE--
     explosives which are virtually impossible to detonate in 
     violent accidents), enhanced nuclear detonation safety 
     (ENDS--an electrical system which protects a weapon from the 
     effects of spurious electric signals such as lightning) and 
     fire resistant pits (FRP--a shell of metal around the pit 
     with a high melting point to contain the plutonium in a 
     fire). The development of all these safety features required 
     nuclear testing.
       In summary, it was only through nuclear testing that the 
     U.S. discovered significant problems in certain nuclear 
     weapons and was consequently able to implement and validate 
     appropriate fixes. Without an active program of weapons 
     testing, the U.S. will reduce its ability to determine with 
     confidence and even improve the safety and reliability of its 
     nuclear weapons in the future.

                    Alternatives to Nuclear Testing

       Simply stated, as compared to nuclear testing, there are no 
     ``other means'' sufficient to maintain confidence in the 
     safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
       There are three primary technical reasons for the testing 
     of nuclear weapons:
       To enhance and ensure the safety of nuclear weapons by 
     testing modern safety features to be added to various weapon 
     designs
       To ensure the reliability of the nuclear stockpile by 
     testing for problems during the development process and those 
     identified after deployment
       To understand and improve the survivability of U.S. 
     military systems in a nuclear environment.
       Sophisticated computer modeling and simulation, 
     conventional testing, and other non-nuclear testing regimes 
     can provide useful data on each of the above, but none of 
     these methods provide a high confidence alternative to ensure 
     the safety, reliability and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear 
     weapons.
       With respect to the design of nuclear warheads, history has 
     demonstrated that computer calculations are not a viable 
     substitute for testing to validate warhead design. In fact, 
     several nuclear weapons designed and produced during the 
     1958-61 nuclear testing moratorium were found to be seriously 
     flawed when tested after the moratorium ended.
       With respect to survivability, potentially fatal design 
     flaws were discovered in a number of critical components on 
     the Minuteman II and III, Poseidon, Peacekeeper and Trident I 
     and IF systems through nuclear testing. Even after extensive 
     non-nuclear testing and analysis, in every warhead/reentry 
     vehicle system except one, detection of such flaws did not 
     occur until a fully integrated system has been subjected to 
     an underground nuclear test.
       With respect to the survivability of non-nuclear weapons 
     systems, any future ballistic missile defense system deployed 
     by the U.S., for example, may someday have to operate in a 
     nuclear environment produced by incoming warheads. At a 
     minimum, any such defensive system will have to be hardened 
     against the effects of a nuclear detonation. System-level X-
     ray hardness testing cannot now be simulated, nor is any such 
     credible threat-level simulation capability expected in the 
     next 10-20 years. While lower-level simulation is both 
     feasible and useful, it is not an alternative to nuclear 
     testing.
       There is a final irony of any plan which relies on means 
     other than nuclear testing to maintain confidence in the 
     safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Despite 
     progress in non-nuclear testing technology and applications, 
     nuclear testing will ultimately be required to refine and 
     validate these ``non-testing'' technologies if the U.S. hopes 
     to have confidence in them as viable alternatives to actual 
     testing.
       Despite President Clinton's interest in exploring other 
     means to maintain U.S. confidence in the nuclear stockpile, 
     his direction to the DOE to be prepared to resume testing 
     should the testing moratorium be broken by another nation 
     seemingly reflects the importance of testing. Yet, in 
     ordering the DOE to be prepared to resume nuclear testing, 
     the President has ignored the importance of actually 
     conducting tests in order to maintain the critical skills 
     needed by those who are charged with stewardship of the 
     nuclear stockpile.
       If experienced scientists and engineers affiliated with the 
     U.S. nuclear test program are denied the ability to maintain 
     the critical skills needed to do their job, they will 
     eventually leave to pursue other endeavors. Such a 
     development could put this country in a position where it 
     will not be able to resume nuclear testing in a timely 
     fashion when and if the Clinton (or some future) 
     Administration decides that it has become necessary to do so. 
     Should this occur, at the most fundamental level the U.S. 
     will have put at risk its core nuclear competency, of which 
     testing is an essential element.


      infrastructure policy: benign neglect or erosion by design?

       Nuclear testing is only one of the various elements 
     necessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons 
     capability. Other elements include the processing and 
     production of critical nuclear materials used in the weapons, 
     fabrication of plutonium components, and the assembly and 
     disassembly of warheads.
       The DOE is currently reviewing the future of the nuclear 
     production complex--calling the review Complex 21--with the 
     ultimate goal of consolidating nuclear weapons production 
     capabilities at a single site. Although DOE has stated its 
     plans to maintain the weapons production capabilities through 
     Complex 21, there are concerns that the Clinton 
     Administration may be reluctant to adopt the recommendations 
     of its own review, resulting in an acceleration of the 
     erosion of the nuclear weapons infrastructure. Key components 
     of those issues under review are discussed below.

                           Tritium Production

       To date, one of the most troubling decisions made by the 
     Clinton Administration has been to place the K reactor at 
     Savannah River, South Carolina in ``cold standby'' while 
     simultaneously postponing until at least next year selection 
     of a New Production Reactor (NPR) technology. The K reactor 
     and NPR technologies are designed to produce tritium which is 
     used to enhance the explosive power of a nuclear warhead. 
     Importantly, tritium has a half life of only 12 years and 
     must be replenished continually. The K reactor at Savannah 
     River was scheduled to proceed with a production run in 1993 
     in order to demonstrate its continued viability as a source 
     of tritium until such time as a new technology could be 
     brought on-line. That demonstration program has now been 
     canceled by the Clinton Administration. The Administration's 
     plan to mothball the K reactor will apparently leave the U.S. 
     without any capability to produce tritium for the foreseeable 
     future.
       The K reactor was ultimately to have been to be replaced by 
     the NPR. Unfortunately, the decision on a future NPR 
     technology has already been delayed twice in the last three 
     years, with indications that the Clinton Administration will 
     again delay the decision beyond the current 1994 date. This 
     is important because once a decision on the NPR is made, it 
     will take at least 15 years before the new technology will 
     generate tritium. Based on current stockpile projections, a 
     new tritium production source ought to begin operations in 
     2008, so new tritium would be available to enter the 
     stockpile in 2010. To meet this schedule, preconstruction 
     activities associated with NPR must begin in 1995. Even on 
     this ambitious schedule, the U.S. will have to reach deeply 
     into its tritium reserves.
       The most prudent approach to meeting future tritium 
     requirements would be to run the demonstration phase of the K 
     reactor and to keep the reactor in ``warm standby'' status in 
     the event it is needed to resupply tritium reserves. The 
     Clinton Administration, however, has rejected this approach, 
     contending instead that a civilian light-water reactor loaded 
     with special target elements could be used in a national 
     emergency to produce tritium. However, the target development 
     program was terminated at the pre-prototype stage and would 
     require several years to complete if it were to be 
     reinitiated. Furthermore, the proposal to use a civilian 
     reactor fails to acknowledge the likely legal and political 
     obstacles to utilizing a civilian reactor for military 
     purposes in the future. The Clinton Administration ought 
     to promptly identify of a means for tritium production and 
     commit to a plan that will provide a new tritium supply by 
     2010.

                    Plutonium Component Fabrication

       Another impending crisis for the U.S. nuclear weapons 
     infrastructure in the shutdown of production capabilities at 
     Building 707 at the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado. For all 
     practical purposes, the United States has terminated its 
     ability to fabricate plutonium components for new or 
     redesigned weapons in the future. Plutonium components 
     comprise an essential element of the ``pit'' of a nuclear 
     warhead. With the closure of Building 707, if U.S. decision-
     makers decide at some point in the future to produce a new 
     nuclear weapon or redesign an existing weapon to enhance its 
     safety, the U.S. will have to rely on reusing old pits. The 
     idea of reusing old pits is relatively new and much still 
     remains to be learned. Although reusing old pits may work in 
     some situations, ironically, validating a new or modified 
     weapon design that relies on a reused pit would still require 
     nuclear tests. In fact, such weapon designs incorporating 
     reused pits have required extensive underground testing in 
     recent years.
       The U.S. has never incorporated a reused pit into the 
     stockpile. Furthermore, reusing old pits fails to acknowledge 
     that the U.S. does not today know what its requirements for 
     future nuclear weapons will be or how pits will age over 
     time, an issue which didn't exist in the past because pits 
     were not expected to be reused. In other words, new warheads 
     were built with new pits. Further, most older pits are not 
     designed to work with insensitive high explosives (IHB), a 
     key safety feature in more modern strategic nuclear warheads. 
     The National Laboratories could produce a limited number of 
     pits, but their current capability is insufficient if a 
     decision is made to proceed with new warhead development and 
     production. Unless the capabilities of the National 
     Laboratories are significantly enhanced, or a new plutonium 
     fabrication facility is constructed (as tentatively planned 
     under DoE's nuclear consolidation review), the United States 
     will lose the capability to fabricate more than a small 
     number of plutonium pits for new, redesigned, or 
     remanufactured warheads each year.

                       The National Laboratories

       Although the national laboratories might be capable of 
     producing small quantities of nuclear warheads in an 
     emergency, even this may change if proposals pending in 
     Congress to reshape the laboratory infrastructure are 
     adopted. Some of these legislative proposals, such as H.R. 
     1432, would downgrade the priority currently assigned by the 
     labs to the design and maintenance of the nuclear stockpile 
     in favor of developing more civilian oriented technologies.
       Additionally, the FY 1994 DOE Defense Programs budget, 
     which funds all defense nuclear activities, has decreased 19% 
     over FY 1993 spending levels. The National Labs are funded 
     from the DOE Weapons Activities account which has received 
     the largest spending reductions in both terms of dollars and 
     as a percent of the budget. Further, there are indications 
     that the Weapons Activities account will receive another 
     significant cut in the FY 1995 Defense Programs budget 
     request. Substantial cuts to the research and development 
     budget of the laboratories will cause irreparable long-term 
     damage and could prevent the laboratories from carrying out 
     what ought to be their priority mission of designing and 
     developing nuclear weapons.

                    Warhead Assembly and Maintenance

       Another concern with the nuclear weapons infrastructure is 
     the rate of warhead dismantlement at the Pantex Plant in 
     Texas. Pantex is responsible for the dismantlement of nuclear 
     warheads for reliability checks as well as for disposal, and 
     for the interim storage of plutonium pits. DOE anticipates 
     that Pantex will soon reach its capacity of dismantling 2000 
     warheads per year. Achieving and maintaining this rate could 
     affect the ability of the dismantlement facility to carry out 
     another of its key missions--the routine disassembly of 
     warheads to ensure their reliability. In an effort to reach 
     an optimum rate of dismantlement at Pantex, DOE is apparently 
     ignoring the requirement to randomly select warheads from the 
     stockpile to disassemble and inspect. Neglecting this 
     process, in the context of a moratorium on nuclear testing, 
     will further undermine U.S. confidence in the integrity of 
     warheads in the stockpile.
       One alternative, which DOE has not seriously explored, is 
     to expand the mission of the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) 
     at the Nevada Test Site from exclusively supporting the 
     testing agenda to supporting stockpile confidence efforts. 
     DAF was designed to assist in nuclear tests. Under the 
     testing moratorium, DAF could be reassigned the mission to 
     regularly conduct safety and reliability inspections on 
     stockpile warheads.

                               Workforce

       A final, but critical, element of the Nation's nuclear 
     complex that is in jeopardy is the unique and highly skilled 
     workforce. In many respects, the ``cutting edge'' of U.S. 
     nuclear capability is a workforce that remains dedicated to 
     ensuring the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.
       Less than ten years ago, the U.S. nuclear complex employed 
     approximately 11,000 workers. In the 1985-1993 period, 
     however, this number has been reduced by almost 2,000 people. 
     DOE now anticipates that an additional 2,000 employees 
     will likely be laid off in 1994 alone, taking the nuclear 
     workforce down to a level of 7,000 employees. Furthermore, 
     the number of personnel involved in critical warhead 
     design, development, fabrication and testing activities in 
     1994 is expected to be one-half the number of just eight 
     years ago.
       That the U.S. nuclear weapons complex is only as good as 
     the people who work within it is an obvious, but seemingly 
     overlooked, truth. Highly skilled, highly motivated 
     scientists and engineers in sufficient numbers are critical 
     to maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
     stockpile in the future. The Clinton Administration has yet 
     to establish new, ``baseline'' requirements for the nuclear 
     weapons complex, including personnel levels. In the absence 
     of these requirements, the potential Clinton reductions once 
     again raise serious questions about the direction of the 
     Administrations's policies and its level of commitment to 
     preserving core levels of competency in nuclear matters.


                               conclusion

       The end of the Cold War has provided the U.S. with an 
     opportunity to reduce defense spending. In taking advantage 
     of this opportunity, the President and Congress should be 
     careful to drawdown U.S. defenses in a manner consistent with 
     a clear and concise national defense strategy reflecting the 
     changed international environment. First and foremost, 
     however, there should be recognition that the world is still 
     a dangerous place. The proliferation of nuclear weapons 
     technology is an increasing threat. There are 35,000 nuclear 
     weapons of the former Soviet Union now spread across four 
     newly independent states.
       As long as other nations covet or control nuclear weapons, 
     the U.S. and its allies must continue to depend on nuclear 
     weapons for their security. Furthermore, our friends and 
     allies alike must continue to have confidence in the security 
     provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
       Whether supporting a force of 20,000 or 3,500 warheads, 
     there are unavoidable responsibilities associated with 
     maintaining a credible nuclear stockpile. Both the Congress 
     and the Administration have an obligation to ensure that 
     those responsibilities are met.
       However, recent actions taken by the Clinton Administration 
     that follow on the heels of cutbacks already made by the Bush 
     Administration call into serious question this 
     Administration's willingness to step up to those 
     responsibilities.
       Optimists will argue that the consequences of the decisions 
     discussed above can be easily and quickly rectified with the 
     rapid commitment of additional financial resources when and 
     if necessary in the future. But this view raises several 
     important questions;
       Will there remain the national commitment to invest large 
     sums of money in the nuclear weapons complex to reinvigorate 
     the U.S. deterrent in the future?
       Will there be legal or environmental obstacles to 
     reinitiating production of critical nuclear materials?
       Will there be sufficient public support to rebuild 
     plutonium fabrication facilities if necessary?
       Will there be sufficient time to reconstitute necessary 
     materials production and weapons fabrication capabilities?
       Will the U.S. be able to hire sufficient numbers of skilled 
     and experienced scientists, engineers, and technicians 
     required to work in the nuclear weapons complex of the future 
     once today's experts have left to pursue other endeavors?
       At present, no one can definitively answer these questions. 
     Accordingly, the prudent approach to maintaining a credible 
     nuclear stockpile is to slow the decommissioning of DOE 
     defense facilities, slow the rush to methodically dismantle 
     the DOE nuclear infrastructure, slow or reverse the U.S. 
     nuclear weapon complex ``brain drain,'' and continue to 
     perform nuclear tests to ensure the safety and reliability of 
     the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and other critical 
     military systems.
       Over the last half century, U.S. nuclear weapons have 
     evolved into complex, highly sophisticated systems developed, 
     produced, and maintained to meet U.S. national security 
     challenges. These weapons require maintenance, logistical 
     support, and testing--both nuclear and non-nuclear--
     commensurate with their complexity and sophistication if they 
     are to continue to serve as reliable and effective components 
     of U.S. national security.
       Without nuclear testing, new, safe, secure, reliable, less 
     complex nuclear weapons cannot be developed and produced, and 
     new survivable systems, technologies and processes cannot be 
     validated. Without nuclear testing, the U.S. can neither 
     maintain existing nuclear weapons nor develop new weapons 
     with a high degree of confidence in the future. This is the 
     dilemma that President Clinton currently confronts.

                               APPENDIX A


                    Public Law 102-377 102d Congress

       Sec. 507. (a) Hereafter, funds made available by this Act 
     or any other Act for fiscal year 1993 or for any other fiscal 
     year may be available for conducting a test of a nuclear 
     explosive device only if the conduct of that test is 
     permitted in accordance with the provisions of this section.
       (b) No underground test of a nuclear weapon may be 
     conducted by the United States after September 30, 1992, and 
     before July 1, 1993.
       (c) On and after July 1, 1993, and before January 1, 1997, 
     an underground test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted by 
     the United States--
       (1) only if--
       (A) the President has submitted the annual report required 
     under subsection (d);
       (B) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report 
     in accordance with that subsection; and
       (C) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described 
     in subsection (d)(3) within the 90-day period; and
       (2) only if the test is conducted during the period covered 
     by the report.
       (d)(1) Not later than March 1, of each year beginning after 
     1992, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed 
     Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a 
     report containing the following matters:
       (A) A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks 
     with Russia.
       (B) A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban 
     on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 
     1996.
       (C) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear 
     warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of 
     active nuclear weapons on September 30, 1996.
       (D) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1992, an 
     assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that 
     will remain in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons 
     and that--
       (i) will not be in the United States stockpile of active 
     nuclear weapons;
       (ii) will remain under the control of the Department of 
     Defense; and
       (iii) will not be transferred to the Department of Energy 
     for dismantlement.
       (E) A description of the safety features of each warhead 
     that is covered by an assessment referred to in subparagraph 
     (C) or (D).
       (F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety 
     features in each warhead identified in the assessment 
     referred to in subparagraph (C), as determined after an 
     analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature 
     or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such 
     features.
       (G) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapons 
     tests, not to exceed 5 tests in any period covered by an 
     annual report under this paragraph and a total of 15 tests in 
     the 4-fiscal year period beginning with fiscal year 1993, 
     that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each 
     nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features 
     are installed pursuant to the plan referred to in 
     subparagraph (F).
       (H) A schedule, in accordance with subparagraph (G), for 
     conducting at the Nevada test site, each of the tests 
     enumerated in the assessment pursuant to subparagraph (G).
       (2) The first annual report shall cover the period 
     beginning on the date on which a resumption of testing of 
     nuclear weapons is permitted under subsection (c) and ending 
     on September 30, 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall 
     cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the 
     report is submitted.
       (3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), ``joint resolution'' 
     means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on 
     which the Committees referred to in that paragraph receive 
     the report required by that paragraph the matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``The Congress 
     disapproves the report of the President on nuclear weapons 
     testing, dated         .'' (the blank space being 
     appropriately filled in).
       (4) No report is required under this subsection after 1996.
       (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), during 
     a period covered by an annual report submitted pursuant to 
     subsection (d), nuclear weapons may be tested only as 
     follows:
       (A) Only those nuclear explosive devices in which modern 
     safety features have been installed pursuant to the plan 
     referred to in subsection (d)(1)(F) may be tested.
       (B) Only the number and types of tests specified in the 
     report pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(G) may be conducted.
       (2)(A) One test of the reliability of a nucle3ar weapon 
     other than one referred to in paragraph (1)(A) may be 
     conducted during any period covered by an annual report, but 
     only if--
       (i) within the first 60 days after the beginning of that 
     period, the President certifies to Congress that it is vital 
     to the national security interests of the United States to 
     test the reliability of such a nuclear weapon; and
       (ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date that 
     Congress receives the certification, Congress does not agree 
     to a joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
       (B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), ``joint 
     resolution'' means only a joint resolution introduced after 
     the date on which the Congress receives the certification 
     referred to in that subparagraph the matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``The Congress 
     disapproves the testing of a nuclear weapon covered by the 
     certification of the President dated      .'' (the blank 
     space being appropriately filled in).
       (3) The President may authorize the United Kingdom to 
     conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an 
     annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President 
     determines that it is in the national interests of the United 
     States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of 
     the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United 
     States is permitted to conduct during that period under 
     paragraph (1)(B).
       (f) No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted 
     by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a 
     foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at 
     which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing 
     is lifted.
       (g) In the computation of the 90-day period referred to in 
     subsection (c)(1) and the 60-day period referred to in 
     subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii), the days on which either House is 
     not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days 
     to a day certain shall be excluded.
       (h) In this section, the term ``modern safety feature'' 
     means any of the following features:
       (1) An insensitive high explosive (IHE).
       (2) Fire resistant pits (FRP).
       (3) An enhanced detonation safety (ENDS) system.
       Sec. 508. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
     $5,000,000 of the funds appropriated in title I shall be 
     available for the Central Maine Water Supply Project, to 
     remain available until September 30, 1993, and to become 
     available only upon enactment into law of authorizing 
     legislation.
       This Act may be cited as the ``Energy and Water Development 
     Appropriations Act, 1993''.

       Approved October 2, 1992.

                               APPENDIX B

              Radio Address by the President, July 2, 1993

       The President: I'd like to talk to you about that for a few 
     minutes. Because of the vigilance, the democratic values, the 
     military strength of the United States and our allies, we won 
     the Cold War. Our inheritance, our victory is a new chance to 
     rebuild our economies and solve our problems in each of our 
     countries while we reduce military spending. But our profound 
     responsibility remains to redefine what it means to preserve 
     security in this post-Cold War era. We must be strong. We 
     must be resolute. And we must be safe.
       This great task has certainly changed with the passage of 
     the Cold War. The technologies of mass destruction in the 
     hands of Russia and the United States are being reduced. But 
     technologies of mass destruction that just a few years ago 
     were possessed only by a handful of nations, and still are 
     possessed only by a few, are becoming more widely available. 
     It is now theoretically possible for many countries to build 
     missiles, to have nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
     destruction. This is a new and different challenge that 
     requires new approaches and new thinking.
       During my campaign for President, I promised a wholehearted 
     commitment to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
     treaty. A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to 
     halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons. Last year, 
     the Congress directed that a test ban be negotiated by 1996. 
     And it established an interim moratorium on nuclear testing 
     while we reviewed our requirements for further tests. That 
     moratorium on testing expires soon.
       Congress said that after the moratorium expires, but before 
     a test ban was achieved, the United States could carry out 
     up to 15 nuclear tests to ensure the safety and 
     reliability of our weapons. After a thorough review, my 
     administration has determined that the nuclear weapons in 
     the United States arsenal are safe and reliable.
       Additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a test 
     ban and provide for some additional improvements in safety 
     and reliability. However, the price we would pay in 
     conducting those tests now by undercutting our own 
     nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would 
     resume testing outweighs these benefits.
       I have, therefore, decided to extend the current moratorium 
     on United States nuclear testing at least through September 
     of next year, as long as no other nation tests.
       And I call on the other nuclear powers to do the same. If 
     these nations will join us in observing this moratorium, we 
     will be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a 
     comprehensive test ban and to discourage other nations from 
     developing their own nuclear arsenals.
       If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I 
     will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct 
     additional tests while seeking approval to do so from 
     Congress. I therefore expect the Department to maintain a 
     capability to resume testing.
       To assure that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned 
     under a test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining 
     our confidence in the safety, the reliability and the 
     performance of our own weapons. We will also refocus much of 
     the talent and resources of our nation's nuclear labs on new 
     technologies to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and verify 
     arms control treaties.
       Beyond these significant actions, I am also taking steps to 
     revitalize the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, so that 
     it can play an active role in meeting the arms control and 
     nonproliferation challenges of this new era. I am committed 
     to protecting our people, deterring aggression and combatting 
     terrorism. The work of combatting proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction is difficult and unending, but it is an 
     essential part of this task. It must be done.
       Americans have earned the right on this Fourth of July 
     weekend to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
     in the new era America did so much to create. This moment of 
     opportunity is the reward for our vigilance and sacrifice 
     during the long years of the Cold War.
       We now have the freedom to concern ourselves, not merely 
     with survival but with prosperity for ourselves and our 
     children. We have the strength and the stature to lead the 
     world into a future of greater security and global growth.
       Because of the changes we have made, America can now 
     fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the patriots who made 
     our freedom possible more than 200 years ago. We can do them 
     no greater honor than to make the most of what these times 
     have to offer. Working together, we will.
       Have a happy and safe holiday, and thanks for listening.

                               APPENDIX C

               [From the Washington Post, July 16, 1993]

                             Test-Ban Trap

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       On July 3, President Clinton announced that the United 
     States would no longer test nuclear weapons unless some other 
     nation went first. The president acknowledged that 
     ``additional nuclear tests could . . . provide for some 
     additional improvements in safety and reliability'' of our 
     nuclear stockpile. But, he argued, safety and reliability 
     improvements are less important than getting nonnuclear 
     nations to stay nonnuclear. And that would be jeopardized if 
     we went ahead with testing.
       In the 50-year history of the nuclear debate, this 
     argument--a test ban in the name of nonproliferation--is 
     quite possibly the most whimsical. Does North Korea pursue 
     the bomb because the United States occasionally tests the 
     safety and reliability of its arsenal underground in Nevada? 
     In fact, as former assistant secretary of defense Frank 
     Gaffney points out, the North Korean nuclear program reached 
     its frantic climactic stage precisely during the current 
     American moratorium on nuclear testing.
       Is a cessation of American nuclear testing going to induce 
     Saddam to give up his pursuit of the bomb? How exactly is 
     this logic supposed to work? The New York Times explains. A 
     nuclear test ban ``will not assure an end to the peril of 
     proliferation,'' it boldly concedes. ``But it will help 
     stigmatize nuclear weapons and mobilize support for curbing 
     their spread.''
       Stigmatize nuclear weapons. What does that mean? Make 
     nuclear weapons appear evil? First of all, nuclear weapons, 
     when used (as ours are) for deterrence, are not evil. Second, 
     even if they were evil, the evil nature of a weapon may 
     dissuade some Americans from acquiring it, but it will not 
     dissuade Saddam. In fact, as we have seen with his use of 
     chemical weapons, for the likes of Saddam evil is an 
     inducement.
       Perhaps stigmatize means to devalue the currency of a 
     weapon. That seems to be the idea of Bob Musil, spokesman for 
     Physicians for Social Responsibility, a major test-ban 
     advocate. Testing, he explains, ``makes nuclear weapons look 
     too valuable, and I think we should make nuclear weapons look 
     as little valuable as possible. That's what is at issue.''
       This is nonsense on stilts. The value of nuclear weapons is 
     inherent in their power. It has nothing to do with how the 
     United States makes them look. No nation that covets the 
     power conferred by nukes is going to respond to an American 
     test ban with: ``Hey, the Americans stopped testing. That 
     must mean that nukes are not that important anymore. No need 
     for us to have them then. Let's make plowshares.''
       Nonproliferation is a very good idea. But there is a 
     problem. It is not very fair. It essentially says: Those 
     countries that have nuclear weapons can keep them, but no one 
     else can join the club.
       Unfortunately, there is no cure for this problem. It is 
     absurd to believe that we cure it by pretending nuclear 
     weapons don't matter and letting ours get rusty and 
     unreliable. Whom do we think we are fooling? Neglecting the 
     maintenance of the arsenal either has no effect, in which 
     case it is a sham. Or it has an effect--degrading the 
     reliability and safety of the arsenal--in which case it is a 
     menace. Then we don't have nonproliferation. We have 
     denuclearization.
       After all, if the safety and reliability of these weapons 
     are allowed to degrade--how safe and reliable is any complex 
     piece of machinery if left untested for years?--then 
     eventually they cannot be used. This is denuclearization by 
     other means. No need for some dramatic act of Congress. When 
     we get to a point where we simply cannot count on our 
     arsenal, we are effectively disarmed.
       For some anti-testers, of course, that is the whole point 
     of a test ban. For these descendants of the old Ban the Bomb 
     and Nuclear Freeze movements, a test ban is not an end but a 
     means. It is a beginning on the road to full nuclear 
     disarmament. They are not so much interested in abolishing 
     the tests as in abolishing the weapons. And the former is a 
     means to the latter.
       There are two kinds of countries with the potential to 
     acquire nuclear weapons. First, advanced and generally 
     friendly countries--like Germany, Japan and South Korea--that 
     refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in part because they 
     trust the American nuclear umbrella to protect them. If they 
     see us denuclearizing, their temptation to acquire their own 
     nuclear weapons will only increase. So much for 
     nonproliferation.
       The other category of nations comprises the pariah states 
     like North Korea--hostile, aggressive, sometimes unstable. 
     There is something lunatic about saying that if we devalue 
     and degrade our arsenal, nukes will then have less value for 
     the North Koreas of the world. On the contrary. The most 
     elementary principle of economics is that the value of a 
     commodity increases with its scarcity. The fewer nuclear 
     weapons reliably held by the great powers, the greater the 
     premium--the power--conferred upon the have-not who acquires 
     them. Imagine, for example, that our nuclear arsenal suddenly 
     vanished. That would infinitely multiply the value of any 
     weapon falling into the hands of Kim Jong II.
       On July 10 Bill Clinton warned North Korea that if it 
     developed and used a nuclear weapon, North Korea would cease 
     to exist. This is what is known as deterrence. But deterrence 
     only works if we have a safe and reliable deterrent.
       The test ban is a trap. It is advertised as a means to 
     nonproliferation. It is not. It is, however, a means to 
     denuclearization. And while nonproliferation is a vital 
     American goal, denuclearization is a simple folly.
  Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentlewoman from Nevada.
  Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I opposed Mr. Clinton's nuclear 
testing moratorium last year and his continued ``no testing policy'' 
concerns me greatly. I say this with extreme concern because as 
American foreign policy under the Clinton administration continues like 
a rudderless ship, countries like North Korea simply ignore American 
ideals and are becoming greater and greater threats to the free world.
  Does anyone really believe that this sense of the Congress language 
is going to stop some despot from acquiring nuclear weapons? I don't. 
Has it stopped countries from testing nuclear weapons? It has not. 
China saw fit to conduct a test just last Fall and daily we see the 
belligerence of North Korea in their headlong pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.
  Will we stand by while North Korea develops nuclear weapons to 
threaten South Korea or Japan? What about them selling nuclear weapons 
and technology to Iran, Libya, Iraq or Syria? Who will ultimately pay 
the price of North Korea's adventurism? The 36,000 American troops in 
Korea come to mind first and foremost.
  A weak national defense did not win the cold war for the United 
States and disarmament policies are not going to prevent countries from 
threatening peaceful nations. The Kopetski amendment is ill advised and 
I urge its defeat.

                              {time}  1650

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Nevada [Mr. Bilbray].
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise against the amendment, also.
  The President of the United States in deciding that he would have a 
moratorium in testing also required the Department of Energy to retain 
the infrastructure to resume testing if necessary upon 6 months' 
notice. I think this is adequate in the present conditions of the 
world.
  As was stated by the previous amendment, the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Solomon], who authored that amendment, stated the fact that the 
world is a very dangerous place, that the North Koreans have the 
capacity of making four to five nuclear weapons, probably have one or 
two presently already constructed, and the fact is we have the Chinese 
that even after the President gave the notice of the moratorium 
exploded a device and are capable of exploding more devices.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the present moratorium as announced by the 
President is adequate, it certainly is keeping everything in place in 
case of imminent national emergency, and I think that the gentleman 
from Oregon should support what the President of the United States has 
done in his stand on this moratorium and withdraw his amendment. The 
gentleman will not do it, but I urge my colleagues to vote no on it.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time each side has 
remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from Oregon 
[Mr. Kopetski] has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  The Chair advises that the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] 
as a member of the committee has the right to close.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, let me address a couple of the issues raised. It is the 
nonproliferation treaty and future agreements like the comprehensive 
test ban treaty that gives the United States and the international 
community the legal authority as we discussed under the Solomon 
amendment to pursue such nations as North Korea who first agree to an 
international agreement and then try to back out of it. These are the 
very kinds of agreements and legal contracts that we want nations to 
enter into so that we can police the world against further development 
of nuclear weapons.
  Second, in terms of the Chinese testing, yes, they have tested. It is 
regrettable. The world community rose up in protest against it and as a 
result of that protest, the Chinese are actively participating in the 
conference on disarmament and have come out and publicly stated that 
they will support a comprehensive test ban treaty if negotiated by 
1996.
  Also, the fact is the United States has conducted 1,000 nuclear 
weapons tests through the years. Our weapons program and technological 
superiority is unequaled anywhere in the world. There is no second 
place. If we take the sophistication level of a North Korea or an India 
or some other emerging nuclear weapons state, they are at the 1-yard 
line and we are at the other end of the football field about to score.
  It is that much of a gap of superiority both in numbers of weapons 
and sophistication level. Of course we ought to encourage the adoption 
of a comprehensive test ban treaty as soon as possible.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence] have further requests for time? The gentleman has the right to 
close.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have only one speaker and I would like to 
close.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] is 
recognized for the balance of his time. The gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] elects to close.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, let me share with my colleagues a quote 
from a recent speech by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Director, Mr. Holum:

       ``From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind 
     has been struggling to recapture the ferocious beast unleased 
     there. Since then thousands of women and men of good will and 
     intellect have pursued--passionately, painstakingly--the 
     compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us 
     rededicate ourselves to that mission: to shepherd this beast 
     back into its cage--to bring what was unleashed in a blinding 
     blast of heat in the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in 
     the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva--to ensure that the 
     first half-century of nuclear explosions is the last.''

  Mr. Chairman, I beg my colleagues, this is the sense of the Congress 
urging our negotiators in Geneva to work with deliberate and passionate 
speed to adopt the comprehensive test ban treaty. I urge my colleagues 
to support the Kopetski amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] is 
recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, the Kopetski amendment congratulates President 
Clinton for his stance on nuclear testing and for extending the U.S. 
moratorium on nuclear testing through September 1995.
  Although it is simply a sense of Congress resolution, I do not think 
the President should be congratulated for breaking his word.
  When he initially declared it President Clinton said:

       If this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will 
     direct the DOE to prepare to conduct additional tests.

  Of course, as we now know, another nation did carry out a nuclear 
test, China, and yet, the President did not so instruct the Department 
of Energy.
  Mr. Chairman, it is important that the United States carry out the 
President's promise to ensure the safety, reliability and integrity of 
our nuclear force. Reliable nuclear deterrence requires nuclear 
testing. There are three reasons:
  One, contrary to another Clinton assumption, nuclear testing is 
needed to assure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. 
The administration's apparent view that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe 
enough for now demonstrates, I believe, a cavalier attitude toward the 
complexity of nuclear weapons and fails to take into account past 
safety and reliability problems with the stockpile.
  Second, contrary to an assumption by the Clinton administration, 
there are no other means sufficient to maintain confidence in the 
safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Sophisticated 
computer modeling and simulation, conventional testing and other non-
nuclear testing regimes can provide useful data but none provide a high 
confidence alternative to ensure the safety, reliability and 
effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, contrary to the President's assumption, a 
comprehensive test ban treaty will not, I repeat, not strengthen 
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. There is no evidence 
that a testing moratorium or a CTBT will promote nonproliferation. The 
most recent affirmation of this point is another planned nuclear test 
by China, the second within a year, as documented by the New York 
Times, and discussions in France to resume nuclear testing in the near 
future.
  Mr. Chairman, other nations will make their decisions about the 
utility of a nuclear option on the basis of their perceptions of their 
own security interests, not on the actions of the United States with 
respect to moratoriums on nuclear testing. I urge a no vote on the 
Kopetski amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. 
Kopetski] will be postponed.
  The Chair notes that amendments numbered 8 and 11 will not be 
offered.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 47 printed in part 1 of 
House Report 103-520.


                     amendment offered by mr. reed

  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Reed: At the end of title VIII 
     (page 246, after line 23), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 873. GAO STUDY ON SALARIES PAID TO EXECUTIVES OF DEFENSE 
                   CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Study Required.--The Comptroller General shall conduct 
     a study of the top 20 executive salaries among companies with 
     at least 75 percent of their revenues derived from contracts 
     with the Department of Defense.
       (b) Matters To Be Studied.--The study required by 
     subsection (a) shall address the following matters:
       (1) The reasons for high executive salaries at companies 
     that derive the majority of their revenues from government 
     contracts and not from commercial market competition.
       (2) A description of salaries of chief executive officers 
     of the companies being studied and the amount expended by 
     those companies for defense conversion.
       (3) A comparison of the compensation for production workers 
     under defense contracts with compensation for executives.
       (4) An analysis of the types of workers under defense 
     contracts, (i.e., production workers or executives) that are 
     losing their jobs because of reductions in defense 
     expenditures.
       (5) An analysis of how executive pay conforms or does not 
     conform with other cost cutting techniques used by defense 
     contractors, such as lay-offs, mergers and acquisitions, and 
     defense conversion.
       (6) An analysis of the correlation, if any, between 
     executive pay and defense conversion activities.
       (7) A comparison of the executive salaries being studied 
     with the salaries of top executives in other companies of 
     similar size that do not derive at least 75 percent of their 
     revenues from contracts with the Department of Defense.
       (c) Deadline.--The Comptroller General shall complete the 
     study and submit to Congress a report on the study not later 
     than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Rhode Island [Mr. Reed] will be recognized for 5 minutes and a Member 
opposed will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. Reed].
  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment to direct the 
General Accounting Office to conduct a study of CEO compensation for 
defense firms that have 75 percent of their business or more with the 
Department of Defense. The impetus of such an amendment is what I find 
in my district and I think what I find throughout this country, which 
is that in the face of downsizing of defense contracting, there are 
thousands of production workers who are being laid off, there are 
companies which are sometimes halfheartedly trying to embrace 
conversion attempts, and in contrast to these dire circumstances, there 
are many senior executives who are receiving extraordinary 
compensation.
  Mr. Chairman, before we go ahead and draw conclusions one way or the 
other, I think it is appropriate, indeed necessary to have a report 
done objectively by the General Accounting Office, to look at 
compensation, to correlate it with complementary civilian-type 
companies, to look at efforts in these companies for conversion 
activities, to look at the effect on production workers versus the 
effect on the executive officers.

                              {time}  1700

  I think it is appropriate to have such a study, to do it now, and 
then to draw whatever appropriate conclusions are necessary.
  I understand that this is an important issue, but there are many 
others before the Committee of the Whole today, and in the interest of 
expediting consideration of this issue and moving to other issues, I 
yield such time as he may consume to the chairman of the committee for 
purposes of a colloquy.
  Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, while my preference is to statutorily require a GAO 
study, I also recognize your desire to speed up consideration of this 
bill.
  Therefore, I will withdraw my amendment pending your continued 
willingness to write the General Accounting Office to request a study 
on defense CEO compensation as outlined in my amendment.
  May I have the chairman's assurance that you will request this GAO 
study on my behalf?
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. We will be glad to, yes.
  Mr. REED. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is a straight-forward amendment that all 
Members can fully support.
  Simply stated, the Reed amendment would require the General 
Accounting Office to study the salaries paid to defense company 
executives.
  The study would concentrate on defense firms which derive 75 percent 
of their revenue from Defense Department contracts.
  In particular, the study would examine the following: What the 
salaries are, the reason for these salaries, how CEO pay relates to 
blue-collar wages, any correlation between CEO pay and defense 
conversion efforts, which defense workers are losing their jobs, and a 
comparison nondefense and defense CEO pay.
  The reason for the Reed amendment is also straight-forward: Making 
sure the taxpayer gets the most bang for their buck.
  In an era of decreasing defense budgets, Congress is attempting to 
reorder its spending priorities while maintaining essential elements of 
our Nation's defense industrial base.
  Regrettably, these policies have led to enormous lay-offs in many 
regions of the country already struggling with the recession.
  However, top-level executives of these defense contractors often 
receive enormous salaries, while production workers fear each day may 
be their last day on the job.
  Although executive compensation is traditionally higher than 
production worker salaries, defense executive pay is derived from 
taxpayer funded contracts, not the commercial marketplace.
  Congress needs a GAO study to provide in-depth information on this 
issue so that we can ensure that our defense acquisition policy is 
cost-effective and in the Nation's best interest.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence], is recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the 
amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
  Mr. KYL. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I simply rise 
to engage in a colloquy with the distinguished chairman on another 
matter.
  Mr. Chairman, I see that funding was added to the Army missile/air 
defense product improvement line; however, there seems to be an 
omission regarding Stinger missile improvements. Is it true that the 
intent of the committee is that additional funding should be made 
available for accelerating the Stinger missile improvements and testing 
the Starstreak missile. It is also my understanding that it will be our 
intent to address these initiatives, at the appropriate funding levels, 
during conference with the Senate.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KYL. I yield to the chairman.
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, given the assurances of Chairman Montgomery 
with respect to the letter that will provide for a study, I ask 
unanimous consent that I be permitted to withdraw my amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Rhode Island?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, it is now in order to 
consider amendment No. 58, printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.


                   amendment offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant:
       In Title V, add a new section after section 534 as follows:

     SEC. 535. DETAIL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL TO ASSIST 
                   IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, BORDER 
                   PATROL AND CUSTOMS SERVICE.

       (a) Authority of Secretary of Defense.--Section 374 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) During each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense 
     may make Department of Defense personnel currently stationed 
     in Europe available to assist--
       ``(A) at the request of the Attorney General, the 
     Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States 
     Border Patrol in preventing the entry of terrorists, drug 
     traffickers, and illegal aliens into the United States; and
       ``(B) at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
     United States Customs Service in the inspection of cargo, 
     vehicles, and aircraft at points of entry into the United 
     States.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on 
     October 1, 1994.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] will be recognized for 5 minutes in support of his 
amendment, and a Member in opposition will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentleman on the amendment. It 
is a very important amendment, very much needed. I think it solves a 
couple of problems. It allows the administration to take some of the 
1,700 young people who are being cashiered each week out of the 
military, specifically those coming back from Europe, and using them in 
complementary services and supporting roles with the border patrol at 
the United States border. Right now, we have 4,100 border patrol 
agents. We need at least 10,000 to regain control of our borders.
  Mr. Chairman, we have a fairly large list of criminal aliens who come 
across regularly to rob, rape, and murder. Allowing our military people 
to come in and work in logistical and other supportive services for the 
border patrol will free up more border patrolmen for the border itself. 
This is a force multiplier. I think it is an excellent amendment, and I 
commend my friend for offering it.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky] 
is recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I remind the gentleman from California that with regard 
to these 1,700 troops discharged each week, the amendment calls for 
them to be taken out of Europe.
  Mr. Chairman, I think this is an ill-advised amendment for 
essentially five reasons. First, under this amendment, only troops 
stationed in Europe could be assigned to work on our borders. Why 
should we pay to fly troops to Europe only to fly them back again? This 
is wasteful.
  Second, this amendment erroneously assumes troops just sit around 
doing nothing, that they are some kind of free good. Peacetime troops, 
however, are in constant training. Assign them to another mission and 
their skills quickly erode. They are no longer qualified military 
forces. Enacting this amendment is the same thing as a troop cut. But 
on top of that, it would waste all the money spent to give these men 
and women military skills.
  Third, if INS, Customs, and the Border Patrol lack staff, the 
appropriate solution is to increase their staffs, not to raid the armed 
forces. This should be an amendment to another bill.
  Fourth, INS, Customs, and the Border Patrol all are staffed with 
people trained in the skills those agencies need. And those are not the 
skills we give our military. Tank gunnery will not be much help at JFK 
Airport. Except for menial chores, the military will not be of much 
help. And for menial chores, like inspecting boxes of cargo, these 
troops would be overpaid. Another waste of money.
  Fifth and finally, military personnel do not have and cannot be given 
the power of arrest. Therefore, even if they were trained in law 
enforcement skills, they would not be able to contribute much. There is 
yet another waste of money.
  In sum, Mr. Chairman, this amendment undermines military readiness, 
wastes the immense sums we spend to train people as soldiers, fails to 
give understaffed agencies the skills they need, and provides labor for 
menial chores at exorbitant wage rates.
  Yes, we have a problem on our borders. But this amendment will not 
make even a dent in the problem. It will merely cost us a lot of money. 
I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Nevada [Mr. Bilbray].
  Mr. BILBRAY. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding this time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, as the author of the Immigration Stabilization Act of 
1993, I commend the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] for offering 
this amendment.
  I recognize, as the gentleman from Virginia said, that this is not 
the ultimate answer, 1,700 military along the border. We need more 
immigration officers, well-trained; but in the meantime, unfortunately, 
there is no other fund to go get more people into the field to protect 
these borders. We are not talking here of mainly around Kennedy 
Airport; we are talking about around the area adjacent to San Diego, 
where they are coming across the border like there was no border 
existing. I have flown over the area by helicopter, and I have looked 
down at them, and they have waved back to me. And I have said to the 
pilot, ``Do they wave all the time?'' He said, ``Yes, they are a very 
friendly group.''
  But the fact is that they keep coming. I have never seen so many 
people. I have seen more of them coming across than you do at a Rams 
game up at Anaheim. The fact is they come across, we need some help. 
Certainly the young people who are being ripped out of the military 
could be sent back and be of aid and help. I know the gentleman from 
Virginia is against reduction of any size in the military, but I cannot 
see any better use for our military than assigning them to help with 
this serious, serious problem.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I wanted to clear up some of the problems that my friend from 
Virginia has with this amendment. First, there are a number of areas 
where personnel who have military MOS's can be very helpful on the 
border; specifically, in transport, in radar, in sensor capability, and 
in a number of other areas where you have people who have an MOS of 
MP's--that is, military police--who do have a lot of talent and are 
being paid for by the taxpayers, who would be very supportive and allow 
people to be freed up.
  With respect to the people being in Europe being sent back here, my 
understanding from the author of the amendment, in talking with the 
folks who drafted the language, these are service people currently 
stationed in Europe and as the gentleman knows, thousands of them are 
coming back to the States and being cashiered every month. So, 
specifically, the people in Europe who are coming back to the United 
States, they are not going to be flown back to Europe, therefore 
involving a transport problem; they are coming back to the States 
anyway, and when they come home and instead of being stationed out of 
the base in a casualty company, they are sent to the border and provide 
service to their country after they come back.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire how many more speakers 
the gentleman has?
  Mr. SISISKY. I am it.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia has the right 
to close. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, there are over 2 million illegal entries into the 
United States each year.

                              {time}  1710

  The estimated total illegal population in the United States of 
America: 3.2 million people. After all the intervention we have, 
400,000 adds illegal immigrants to our population each year. We are 
talking about a security issue. America's greatest and most important 
front is our border right now. We cannot go out and hire, and do not 
have the money to hire, all these Border Patrol agents; I want the 
Congress to understand this. There is officially now one Border Patrol 
agent for every 2\1/2\ miles of border. This amendment does not force 
the Secretary of Defense to do anything but to confer and, if necessary 
for national security reasons, to deploy those troops.
  I say to my colleagues, Now, if you don't like it all from Europe, 
change it in conference. Talk about training? My God, what's more 
needed from our military than a secure America? And, yes, I believe we 
have some troops falling out of chairs without arm rests, cashing their 
checks from Uncle Sam, going to dinner in Frankfurt, going to the opera 
in Italy, and we are in an economic development program over there.
  ``The Cold War is over,'' I heard everybody say it.
  Here is what the amendment says:
  The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Attorney 
General, Customs, INS, Border Patrol, has, as an option, the 
opportunity to provide some troops. Yes, it says from Europe, and again 
I say to my colleagues, If you want to change that, change it, but, 
ladies and gentlemen, we don't have the money, and border States are 
going to sue us. They are laughing at us, and people are running across 
the border with backpacks filled with heroin and cocaine, and we have 
some fancy military hardware program of air interdiction.
  Mr. Chairman, we need some more eyes on the border. They do not have 
to make arrests. They could be additional eyes helping to inspect those 
cargoes that come in. The posse comitatus is not violated, and this 
would be an act of ignorance for Congress to defeat an amendment like 
this, and we would have mandated it if we thought we could have got a 
little bit more consideration. But it starts the process of thinking 
what to do with our borders.
  Mr. Chairman, I want an aye vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from Virginia 
[Mr. Sisisky] is recognized to close debate.
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted that the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] has stated that he would be willing to change it 
in conference. The troops are from Europe.
  I think we have to understand something really. The United States 
troops in Europe are not there for the Europeans' convenience. They are 
there for our convenience.
  Somebody made the statement, and I do not know who, that they would 
just be used on the border. I say to my colleagues, ``If you read the 
bill, the amendment, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury 
the United States Customs Service and the inspection of cargo, vehicles 
and aircraft at points of entry into the United States.''
  Mr. Chairman and Members of the House, the reason that I am opposing 
this is not that we do not need more people on the border. The 
gentleman is absolutely right. We send the wrong message to Europe 
every time we do some of these.
  The gentleman is also correct that it is just permissive. The 
Secretary of Defense has to prove it. That is the safety valve on it. 
But with that let us not send the wrong message, Mr. Chairman.
  I would ask for a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 62 printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.


                    Amendment Offered by Ms. Harman

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Harman: Page 169, line 22, strike 
     out ``A member of the'' and all that follows through ``be 
     separated.'' on page 169, line 25, and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:
       A member of the armed forces who is classified as 
     permanently nonworldwide assignable due to a medical 
     condition shall (except as provided in subsection (c)) be 
     separated unless the Secretary concerned determines that the 
     retention of permanently nonworldwide assignable service 
     members would not adversely affect the ability of the service 
     to carry out its mission.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member 
in opposition to the amendment will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment to section 534 of this bill makes clear 
that personnel decisions on who is fit to serve should be made by the 
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps--not micromanaged 
by the U.S. Congress.
  It revises language added to the bill in full committee which 10 of 
us, including our committee chairman, the distinguished gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] believe is punitive and unfair.
  Under current law, members of the armed services who have medical 
limitations or disabilities are retained with assignment limitations as 
long as they are determined to be ``fit for duty.''
  This includes people who develop cancer, heart disease, asthma, and 
other progressive diseases. Ongoing retention is discretionary, based 
on continued ``fitness for duty.''
  The Committee language would change current policy and build a 
bureaucracy to handle each specific discharge. My language would allow 
each service to decide whether a new policy is necessary and defer its 
implementation if no need exists.
  My amendment is strongly supported by the Defense Department and a 
range of medical groups, including the American Cancer Society, the 
American Heart Association, the American Diabetes Association, and the 
Epilepsy Foundation. I think soldiers who get sick and serve well 
should have a chance to get well, and I urge a ``yes'' vote on the 
Harman amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I have just returned with the gentleman 
from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] from a superb and very moving week-
long trip through England, Italy, and the beaches of Normandy, and I 
had occasion on that trip to speak to four Air Force four-star 
generals, four Army four-star generals, three retired four-star 
generals and another three-star active duty general, three Navy 
admirals and finally the four-star Commandant of the Marine Corps. They 
all want the language that is in the bill to stay.
  This issue has become severely politicized. When people say the 
Defense Department supports the language being offered by the 
gentlewoman from California, Mr. Chairman, they are talking about 
civilians at the Defense Department. The uniformed personnel, 
particularly the individual service chiefs, do not want hundreds of 
people who stuck a dirty needle in their arm against the laws of the 
State where they were serving, the country's national laws, and the 
Universal Code of Military Justice, to be jerked off an airplane, a 
helicopter, a ship, a sub or any armored fighting vehicle, or any 
gunnery range in this country, and then kick out a healthy young man or 
woman who is combat trainable and worldwide (permanently) assignable, 
and replace them with this individual who has broken the law. This to 
me is absolutely insane, and that is the way some of the generals 
expressed it to me, that political correctness in this case has gone 
crazy.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dornan] for yielding this time to me.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, I 
am concerned about the need to ensure adequate flexibility to DOD and 
the Services in managing the complex personnel assignment system. With 
1.6 million young men and women in uniform, this is always a daunting 
task, as we know.
  As a result, during full committee markup, I offered a substitute 
amendment to the Dornan amendment which was designed to provide greater 
flexibility to Service manpower managers. The Dornan amendment requires 
the separation of servicemembers who are permanently nonworldwide 
assignable because of a medical condition but permits Service Secretary 
waiver if the condition is combat-incurred or if the servicemember has 
unique skills vital to national security.
  My substitute amendment permits the Service Secretary to waive the 
required separation for any other circumstance that the Secretary 
considers to be for the good of the service.

                              {time}  1720

  With this third waiver criterion, each service secretary will have 
considerable discretionary authority to manage personnel with 
assignment limitations in the best interests of that service. I believe 
my substitute represents a very reasonable compromise on this issue. 
That is why I offered it and speak in favor of it today.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan].
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, since coming to this body, I have learned 
that some Members are relentless in their efforts to submit AIDS 
victims to unnecessary scrutiny, but I never thought anyone would go so 
far as to penalize victims of diabetes, cancer, and other illnesses in 
order to evict HIV-positive personnel from the military.
  If allowed to prevail, that is just want the Dornan language will 
do--require automatic discharges for anyone whose medical condition 
prevents their deployment worldwide.
  I have joined Ms. Harman in offering this amendment because I do not 
think members of the military who are diagnosed with diabetes should be 
thrown out of the service even though they are still perfectly capable 
of doing their jobs. I also don't think cancer victims who require 
medical treatment but are in remission should be kicked out. Yet that 
is exactly what will happen if we fail to pass the Harman Amendment.
  Keep in mind that unless we pass this amendment, members of the 
military who are diagnosed with health problems that require regulation 
treatment at modern medical facilities will be thrown out, even if 
their condition has no effect on their ability to perform their jobs. 
Unless the committee language is amended members of the Armed Forces 
whose children are physically handicapped can't be deployed worldwide. 
Are we going to tell those people they can't serve their country 
because their kids are disabled? That would be crazy, but it would be 
the next logical step if we allow the Dornan language to remain intact. 
If someone is not medically fit to serve in Iceland, they will get 
kicked out of the military, even if they work in a clerical job in San 
Diego.
  The Dornan language will end the careers of about 3,500 people who 
have done nothing wrong and are capable of continuing to serve their 
country effectively.
  This provision was inserted in a last-minute maneuver during the 
committee markup despite the fact that the military services already 
have the power to discharge anyone they judge medically unfit for duty 
and the fact that the services have not asked for any additional 
authority in this area.
  The current language in the bill discriminates against people with 
disabilities.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter], a combat infantry officer from Vietnam and a 
senior member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the wonderful 
introduction, but I just showed up. I did not do anything special in 
Vietnam. I wanted to recognize for a second a gentleman who did, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham], our Navy top gun.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an argument that has a compelling force on the 
side of military families. Let me tell you, we are cashiering 1,700 
young people a week out of uniform. What that means, if you have a HIV 
positive person who cannot be deployed worldwide, that means that 
another person is forced into that worldwide deployment and has what is 
known as a higher operating tempo. That may mean nothing to us, but to 
a military family, to the wife of a Navy pilot who talked to me about 5 
days ago in my district when she said, Congressman, we are stretched so 
thin, that my husband is away from the family for longer and longer 
periods of time, it is a very important thing.
  This is what one active duty Marine company commander said. In terms 
of readiness, the idea that HIV positive members are a tiny fraction of 
the force and therefore don't affect the whole, is preposterous. By not 
being able to rotate from our nondeploying company, my one HIV Marine 
kept another Marine from leaving a deploying unit.
  This is a family issue, and the amendment that the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Skelton] put together, along with the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan], is an excellent amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Torkildsen].
  Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment 
offered by my colleague from California, Ms. Harman. This amendment has 
the strong support of the Department of Defense and I believe it is the 
right thing to do.
  While I understand the concerns of my colleague from California, I 
would note that only two-tenths of one percent of U.S. troops have 
permanent medical conditions that limit their assignability. I am 
concerned that the current provision in the committee bill is punitive 
in nature and proposes a policy based less in medical reasoning than 
political calculation.
  Each service has long-established procedures for dealing with medical 
disabilities. Many members of the armed services that are not eligible 
for worldwide assignments continue to make substantial contributions to 
our national security. I believe that these personnel issues are best 
addressed by the Department itself, and not by congressional micro-
management.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Harman amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would say this first to my colleague, the gentleman 
from California. In the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel 
on which I and several of us who have testified for my amendment serve, 
four service personnel chiefs, commissioned officers, testified that 
they do not need a change in current law. In addition to that, the 
Undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, Edwin Dorn, has 
sent a letter in support of my amendment, and I would just like to 
quote from part of it.

       The number of Service members with permanent medical 
     conditions that restrict their assignments is small--
     typically around two-tenths of a percent of the active force. 
     Although these members cannot serve at certain locations, 
     they are experienced, qualified and able to perform their 
     required duties. They represent a considerable investment in 
     training and an invaluable experienced resource. We developed 
     our personnel and assignment policies to support our national 
     objectives while providing fair treatment to the men and 
     women who serve our nation. Your amendment provides Service 
     Secretaries with the needed flexibility that allows us to get 
     the greatest contribution from each of our Service members 
     and to continue our long and proud tradition of taking care 
     of our own.

  Mr. Chairman, once again, I urge support and passage of my amendment.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, I will yield my last 30 seconds to a company commander 
and squadron commander who had to deal with this.
  Mr. Chairman, let me very briefly say that two of those four three-
stars quoted by the gentlewoman have contradicted their very testimony 
to me personally. One of them has since retired. They were going 
against their uniformed bosses. They were responding to civilian 
political leadership in the Pentagon.
  The language of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] gives the 
service secretaries the ability in each individual case to do just what 
the gentlewoman wants. Instead, she wants a blanket vote by the service 
secretaries to do the bidding of a very politicized situation of the 
Pentagon.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Cunningham], a distinguished Navy ace.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I was in command of the F-126 Adversary 
Squadron, and we were forced to take HIV positive sailors. I had two of 
them. Under the law, I could only report to my executive officer and 
the flight surgeon. I could not even let my troops know of the 
potential danger of that individual within the squadron.
  What I did personally was to restrict that person from any 
deployments to like El Centro, and so on, to protect me, because I also 
had females in that squadron.
  I also let the individual know that if he had any contact with any 
female, and that female was not knowledgeable, that I would press full 
court martial.
  We do not need HIV positive in our military, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, all time for debate on this amendment 
has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Harman] will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 63 printed in part 1 of 
House Report No. 103-520.


                    amendment offered by mr. markey

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment under the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Markey: At the end of title X 
     (page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:

     SEC.   . NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the United States shall suspend any programmatic consent 
     given under a nuclear cooperation agreement for the use of 
     special nuclear material subject to such agreement at any 
     facility at which accounting discrepancies and uncertainties 
     do not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to 
     determine with its required level of confidence that a 
     significant quantity of special nuclear material has not been 
     diverted from the facility. Such suspension shall remain in 
     effect until such time as the President determines that such 
     discrepancies and uncertainties have been resolved and 
     operational problems at the facility have been corrected to 
     permit the Agency to detect a diversion of a significant 
     quantity of special nuclear material from the facility with 
     the required level of confidence.
       (b) Limitation.--The suspension provided for in subsection 
     (a) shall not be required if operation of the facility in 
     question is voluntarily suspended until such time as the 
     Agency is able to detect a diversion as specified in that 
     subsection.


            modification to amendment offered by mr. markey

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my 
modified amendment be considered in place of my original amendment, so 
it is a sense of Congress resolution instead of a binding resolution.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment, as modified.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Markey: At the end 
     of Title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the following new 
     section:

     SEC.  . NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

       (a) In General--It is the sense of the Congress that the 
     President should suspend any programmatic consent given under 
     a nuclear cooperation agreement for the use of special 
     nuclear material subject to such agreement at any facility at 
     which accounting discrepancies do not permit the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency to determine with its 
     required level of confidence that a significant quantity of 
     special nuclear material has not been diverted from the 
     facility. Such suspension should remain in effect until such 
     time as the International Atomic Energy Agency determines 
     that such discrepancies and uncertainties have been resolved 
     and operational problems at the facility have been corrected 
     to permit the Agency to detect a diversion of a significant 
     quantity of special nuclear material from the facility with 
     the required level of confidence.
       (b) Limitation--The suspension called for in subsection (a) 
     need not be carried out if operation of the facility in 
     question is voluntarily suspended until such time as the 
     Agency is able to detect a diversion as specified in that 
     subsection.
       (c) Reporting--Not later than 90 days after enactment of 
     this section, the President shall submit a report to the 
     Congress which (i) describes the actions taken by the 
     President pursuant to this section, (ii) states whether the 
     conditions for lifting the suspension called for in 
     subsection (a) have been met, and (iii) provides an 
     assessment of the risks of both national and subnational 
     diversion of special nuclear material at the facility under 
     circumstances where such conditions have not been met. If, 
     within such period, the conditions for lifting the suspension 
     have not been satisfied, the President shall, every 90 days 
     thereafter, and until such time as the conditions are 
     satisfied, report to the Congress concerning the progress 
     made toward achieving this objective.

  Mr. MARKEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts that the amendment be modified?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Massachusetts 
[Mr. Markey] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed 
will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey].
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment we have at hand is one that deals with as 
sensitive a subject as this Congress has to consider, and that is that 
pursuant to an agreement reached by the government of the United States 
and the Japanese government, we have been sending plutonium to Japan 
for use in peaceful programs. However, at a facility that began 
operation in 1988, at this particular point in time the Japanese 
government is unable to account for nine nuclear bombs' worth of 
plutonium, 150 pounds worth, in the facility.
  This resolution calls for the President of the United States to 
report back to Congress as to what progress is being made to identify 
where that 150 pounds is.

                              {time}  1730

  Now, I am not saying that it has been diverted to a nuclear weapons 
program. What I am saying is, we do not know whether it has or not.
  We should be cognizant of the history. Korea was occupied by Japan up 
through the end of World War II. If a nuclear bomb is ever dropped by 
the North Koreans, God forbid it will not, the first one would be on 
Seoul, and the second one would be on Tokyo.
  We do not know in this country whether or not the Japanese are 
responding to this historic threat.
  Japan has always said that they saw the Korean Peninsula as a dagger 
pointed at the heart of Japan. With the end of the cold war, with 
questions being raised in Japan as to whether or not any longer they 
can rely upon the United States or the NATO powers to deploy forces if 
there was any military threat to that country, no one can give 
assurances that some in Japan are committed to the diversion of 
plutonium that could develop nuclear weapons.
  This very simple sense of Congress resolution just asks that our 
country, pursuant to an agreement that we would reach, ensure that the 
International Atomic Energy Agency can verify that the plutonium inside 
of this facility is there and has not been diverted to bomb-making 
purposes.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a yes on the Markey amendment to ensure that we 
have not lost the nine nuclear bombs' worth of material in Japan.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there a Member in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself a minute and a half.
  Mr. Chairman, the plutonium that the gentleman speaks about is about 
70 kilograms of plutonium. It is plutonium that happens to have been 
held up inside a plutonium processing fuel plant at Topkai, a facility 
in Japan built in 1988, through which three tons of plutonium have been 
processed since 1988. Seventy kilograms are in the interstices of this 
machine, in the glove box and other places in the machine where the 
plutonium oxide powder has been processed. This is not plutonium that 
has been secreted or diverted. It is simply plutonium that is inside of 
the machine and has not come out of the machine so that the input is 
less than the output to the extent of 70 kilograms.
  It is accounted for. I have a letter here from Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, from the Head of Nonproliferation and International 
Security, Howard O. Menlove.
  He says, ``The assumed 70 kilograms of plutonium holdup is not 
unaccounted for. It is accounted for. There is no discrepancy. We know 
where it is. Furthermore,'' he said, ``this facility has the most 
effective safeguards of any plutonium facility in the IAEA 
safeguards.''
  Now, the North Koreans have said, do not look at us, look at the 
Japanese. They have a facility there where they have 70 kilograms of 
plutonium not yet accounted for.
  They issued a press release to that effect on May 25.
  What we would do, if we adopted this resolution, is give credence to 
the North Koreans' press release and to the red herring that they are 
trying to drag across the path of the IAEA.
  This amendment should be defeated, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself one minute.
  I support the Administration's efforts to ensure that nuclear 
materials that have been diverted in Korea are accounted for, under 
IAEA safeguards, by the way, historically. But I think in order for our 
policy to have any credibility whatsoever that it cannot apply just to 
our political foes but has to apply to our political friends as well.
  The hypocrisy coefficient gets so high that our political enemies 
say, why should we abide by any international safeguards? The Japanese 
cannot account for these materials. The Japanese and Koreans are bitter 
long-term enemies.
  Japan occupied Korea up through the end of World War II. If we want 
to have a sensible nonproliferation policy, we have to make sure that 
nine nuclear bombs' worth are not lost and that the Koreans are not 
able to point to our country and say we are going to turn a blind eye 
toward it, because we did at the Oserak nuclear plant in Iraq. We did 
at the Tarapur plant in India. And every time we did, the Pakistanis or 
Israelis or others who felt threatened would ratchet up their demands, 
their need to find nuclear materials as well.
  Let us not kid ourselves.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Markey 
amendment.
  Let me make three points very quickly. The Markey amendment focuses 
nonproliferation attention on exactly the wrong targets. It focuses the 
attention on Japan.
  We have a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan. Japan has a 
nuclear safeguard agreement. The resources, the energy ought to be 
focused on Iraq and Iran and on North Korea and not on Japan.
  Second, despite the press reports about diverted plutonium, there is 
no plutonium missing here. None of it has been diverted from the fuel 
processing facility. Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, has 
stated that the ``nuclear material in question,'' and I quote him, ``is 
not missing and remains under full safeguards and is declared.''
  But their point is that the Markey amendment undercuts the authority 
of the IAEA. It undercuts the authority of international agreements. It 
undercuts the authority of the President of the United States.
  The President already has authority at any time to suspend the United 
States/Japan agreement and suspend Japanese use of United States-
supplied plutonium, if there is a risk of proliferation in his 
judgment.
  This amendment should be defeated. It is opposed by the National 
Security Council. It is opposed by the Department of State. It is 
opposed by the Department of Defense.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself one additional minute.
  Let me tell my colleagues what this is all about. Whether it be the 
Carter Administration suspending their judgment on nonproliferation to 
sell 48 tons of uranium to India in 1980 in order to isolate the Soviet 
Union, whether it be our turning a blind eye to what went on in Iraq at 
the Oserak plant all throughout the late 1970's and all throughout the 
1980's with other materials going in, whether it be Hans Blix at the 
IAEA, a paper tiger if there ever was one, we have consistently 
subordinated the long-term nonproliferation agenda of our country to 
the short-term diplomatic agenda of the particular Secretary of State 
that had the office at that time. We are about to do the same thing 
here again today.
  Second, the letter from the Nuclear Industry of America here today, 
we will lose business if we do not sell plutonium to the Japanese, even 
if we cannot account for it. If we want to come back here and 
understand what the issues of the post-cold war era were, we will know 
that it was racism, religious resentment and nonproliferation across 
this planet. If we do not focus on those issues in the post-cold-war 
era, we are doomed to history, to have been failures in understanding 
what our agenda as a people should have been.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I want to just clarify a point or two that 
the gentleman made.
  It appears to me that the worst fears of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] will be realized if this House votes in 
favor of his amendment, because we will have legitimized North Korea's 
claim that they are at least as compliant as Japan is.
  As I understand it, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] 
read a letter that indicates that our experts feel that all of the 
plutonium in question is accounted for. Is that not accurate?
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. I have a letter here from 
Howard Menlove at Los Alamos National Lab which not only says it is 
accounted for but that this facility has the best safeguards.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, is there any way the gentleman can say that 
North Korea is roughly equivalent, substantively, on the area of 
nuclear development, or morally with respect to staying within the 
safeguards in the sanctions that we have developed with respect to 
nuclear development, or are they in any way equivalent with North 
Korea?

                              {time}  1740

  Mr. SPRATT. Absolutely and obviously not, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] has 30 
seconds remaining, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] 
has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
   Mr. Chairman, nothing could be further from the truth. The way the 
IAEA works is accounting principles. They get to stand at one door and 
check as it goes in and then the back door to check if it comes out. If 
it does not come out, which it has not in North Korea, then there is a 
problem inside.
  In Japan, 150 went in, nine bombs' worth; 150 has not come out, nine 
bombs' worth. It is inside, or it has been diverted.
  The IAEA does not know and cannot certify. America loses its 
credibility with every other country in the world, friend and foe, if 
we engage in contracts with allies like Japan and then do not certify 
where nuclear bomb material could go that could threaten China or the 
Korean political situation in a way that could come back to haunt us 3 
and 4 and 5 years down the line.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
   Mr. Chairman, this amendment would strike at a Japanese facility 
which is one of the most modern in the world, built in 1988, more 
modern than ours. We have more plutonium missing at the Savannah River 
site than this facility cannot account for. Basically, three tons of 
plutonium have gone into the facility since 1988, and three tons minus 
70 kilograms have gone out. Where are the 70 kilograms involved? They 
are not secreted away. It is in the crevices, cracks, and glove boxes 
of this particular facility. We have Los Alamos to tell us that. We 
have the IAEA to tell us that.
   Mr. Chairman, there is no violation here, even though there is some 
uncertainty as to where all of it is. What happens if we adopt this 
resolution? We are telling the President of the United States, ``You 
should stop the operation of this facility. You should tell the 
Japanese to return all the special nuclear materials we have given 
them, all the technology. That is the content, those are the provisions 
of our nuclear cooperation agreement.''
  At this point in time do we want to slap an ally like the Japanese in 
the face with a diplomatic gaffe like this at such a sensitive time? Do 
we want to lend credence to the North Koreans who say the Japanese 
cannot account for their plutonium when they very well can?

  We do not, Mr. Chairman, and that is why we need to defeat this 
amendment and defeat it overwhelmingly.
  Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. Chairman, passage of this amendment would prove to be harmful to 
our economy and our international relationships.
  Under the current United States-Japan and United States-Euratom 
agreements, our trade of nuclear materials and technologies with Japan 
and Europe has flourished. These relationships have resulted in 
thousands of U.S. jobs and billions of dollars in U.S. exports.
  The effect of this amendment will be to harm the United States 
relationship with Japan and Europe, and to hurt United States business. 
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  Mr. BARLOW. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to my colleague 
Representative Markey's amendment to the fiscal year 1995 National 
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4301). This amendment is unnecessary 
and if adopted, will damage vital foreign trade and foreign policy 
interests of the United States.
  This amendment would require the President to suspend programmatic 
consent for the use of nuclear material at a foreign facility where the 
IAEA cannot affirmatively determine whether plutonium has been diverted 
from a facility. According to the IAEA, the basis for this amendment 
was an erroneous report that about 70 kilograms of material was missing 
from the Tokai plutonium fuel production facility in Japan. The IAEA 
has concluded that the plutonium involved was not lost but was only 
held up in the process areas within the plant. This plutonium was never 
lost and in fact, the Japanese have been very diligent in managing 
their operations.
  The true effect of this amendment will be to stifle trade between the 
United States Enrichment Corporation and the Japanese nuclear power 
industry. This industry will lose business to tough competitors 
worldwide if such an amendment becomes law in the face of a perceived 
problem that does not exist. Does it not make sense to step back from 
this and not knee jerk into a bad restriction?
  The adoption of this amendment would only serve to muddy the waters 
and disrupt a quarter of century of mutual trust and cooperation 
between the United States and Japan on nuclear matters. Vital United 
States-Japan trade will be impaired, costing thousands of United States 
jobs and billions of dollars of exports. The proposed amendment would 
effectively suspend the United States-Japan nuclear cooperation 
agreement. Consequently, this will diminish the U.S. role in 
International nonproliferation through undercutting the authority and 
effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. 
Further, this amendment will duplicate and undermine Presidential 
authority to suspend, at any time, the United States-Japan agreement 
and the Japanese use of United States-supplied plutonium.
  The uranium enrichment business is a vital component of United States 
trade with Japan. Uranium enrichment services--like the gaseous 
diffusion plant in Paducah, KY--account for almost 6 percent of United 
States energy exports and almost 1 percent of all United States exports 
to Japan. If the amendment is adopted, we could lose a large portion of 
the U.S. trade balance, an estimated $600 million per year coming from 
the uranium enrichment business alone.
  The United States has worked too hard to develop nuclear cooperation 
with Japan. We should not dispose of this relationship or the trust we 
have developed. Doing so will create a loss of American jobs, a loss we 
cannot afford.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered 
by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to Resolution 431, further proceedings on this 
amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts 
[Mr. Markey] will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 67 printed in part 1 of 
House Report 103-520.


                    amendment offered by mr. kasich

  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Kasich: At the end of title X 
     (page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1038. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON READINESS OF 
                   MILITARY FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Under existing treaties and security arrangements 
     between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 
     responsibility for the defense of the territory of the 
     Republic of Korea is allocated so that the Republic of Korea 
     has primary responsibility for the ground defense of its 
     territory and the United States has primary responsibility 
     for air and sea defense of the Korean peninsula and for 
     reinforcement.
       (2) The Force Improvement Program of the Republic of Korea 
     has not addressed critical shortfalls in its ground force 
     capability which continue to exist even though the Republic 
     of Korea spends approximately $12,000,000,000 annually on 
     defense while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
     spends approximately $4,000,000,000 annually on defense. The 
     Republic of Korea has diverted substantial defense resources 
     to procuring submarines, destroyers, advanced aircraft, and 
     other military systems that are marginal to its primary 
     ground defense responsibility.
       (3) The defense acquisition decisions of the Republic of 
     Korea have had the effect of not allowing the Republic of 
     Korea to attain self-sufficiency in its ground defense 
     responsibility. As a result, there exists an undue burden on 
     the United States for the ground defense of the Korean 
     peninsula.
       (4) The lack of intelligence capability to forecast the 
     military intentions of the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea represents a major deficiency of the combined United 
     States-Republic of Korea military force.
       (5) A short-warning attack by the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea would cause major losses to the combined 
     United States-Republic of Korea ground force.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that the President should urge the Republic of Korea to 
     improve its military ground forces with emphasis on 
     counterartillery capabilities, defense against ballistic 
     missiles and weapons of mass destruction, combined United 
     States-Republic of Korea logistics capabilities, combined 
     United States-Republic of Korea medical support, and combined 
     United States-Republic of Korea strategic and tactical 
     intelligence capabilities.
       (c) Report.--Not later than December 1, 1994, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and House of Representatives a report, in 
     classified form, on--
       (1) the readiness of the military forces of the Republic of 
     Korea to defeat an attack by the military forces of the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
       (2) the adequacy of the defense acquisition strategy of the 
     Republic of Korea to meet its primary ground defense mission.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Kasich] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich].
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have at the desk I know is an important 
amendment. We spent the weekend reading a number of articles about the 
very serious problems of North Korea. We have already had one debate 
and one amendment, a sense of the Congress amendment, pass or going to 
be voted on here shortly that has to do with sanctions for North Korea, 
and I cannot tell, and neither can anyone else, what the impact is 
going to be of sanctions on North Korean actions, what the President 
intends to do.
  Those are the kinds of things that clearly we do not know what the 
result is going to be of those kinds of efforts, and whether we can 
avoid, ultimately avoid, and we all hope and pray we do, a 
confrontation with North Korea, hoping that the North Koreans will in 
fact begin to comply with the international agreements that they are 
partners to, but there is something that we clearly know ought to be 
done in regard to the problems with North Korea. That is that the South 
Koreans themselves have to begin to acquire the kind of facilities that 
permit them to perform their ground mission for which they have entered 
into agreement with the United States.
  Just so we understand this as Members of the House, the agreement 
essentially says that the United States will be primarily responsible 
for the air situation in Korea. All air defense kinds of activities are 
going to be the role of the United States. The South Koreans are 
charged with ground defense. That is the primary agreement that the 
South Koreans entered into with us.
  The problem has been that South Korea has not been deploying, 
acquiring nor deploying, the kinds of systems we need in order for them 
to do effective ground defense to the degree that we would all be 
comfortable with. The South Koreans have been acquiring such systems as 
submarines, destroyers, advanced aircraft that are really marginal to 
their critical mission of ground defense.
  Mr. Chairman, I must tell the Members that Secretary Perry visited 
with the South Korean Government and expressed many of the concerns 
that I have in presenting this sense of the Congress resolution. 
Secretary Perry argued that the South Koreans needed to do things, such 
as acquire counter-artillery capability, more defenses 
against ballistic missiles, more defenses against weapons of mass 
destruction, logistics, medical support, strategic and tactical 
intelligence. These are the kinds of activities that the South Koreans 
should be aggressively engaged in today in preparation for any result 
as a consequence of U.S., U.N., or world action.

  This is an opportunity for the United States Congress, the United 
States House, to go on record urging the South Koreans to preform their 
ground mission, their ground defense mission, with all due diligence, 
and to guarantee that all the capabilities that the South Koreans 
should and must provide are going to be carried out.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that we have a vote on 
this and send a strong message. Not only has Secretary Perry indicated 
his concern about his area of South Korean ground defense, but the 
statements of both Senator Nunn and Richard Lugar on the Korean 
Peninsula indicated that the South Koreans needed to accelerate their 
efforts in carrying out the ground mission, and the Government 
Accounting Office, in a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness of the 
Committee on Armed Services, has indicated that they also have the same 
kind of concerns about the fact that the South Koreans have not 
acquired the kind of weapons and acquired the kind of equipment that is 
needed in order to carry out this very critical ground defense mission.
  Mr. Chairman, if they do not acquire this kind of equipment, our 
people sit there, and out people are vulnerable if they do not do the 
kinds of things they ought to do in terms of this ground defense 
mission.
  This is an effort to try to guarantee success with any mission, force 
the South Koreans to adhere to the agreements that they made with us, 
and also to guarantee the best chances for United States Forces.
  Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hutto], 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed 
Forces.
  Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kasich and I have long held the 
view that the Republic of Korea continues to overlook the primary 
threat to its security by allocating critical funding to defense 
priorities other than to defend the South from ground attack.
  This amendment gets to the heart of this issue by highlighting South 
Korea's spending on regional defense needs such as advanced aircraft, 
destroyers, and submarines when the United States has already committed 
to providing air and sea defense for the Korean Peninsula. The 
interests of the Republic of Korea would be much better served by 
investing in weapons that enhance its capability as primary agent for 
the ground defense mission. For example, the South Korean Army would 
greatly benefit from additional counterartillery radar, attack 
helicopters, and advanced antitank munitions.
  The amendment also gives the Congress the information base that will 
be needed to assess future progress by the Republic of Korea to meet 
its primary responsibility for ground defense by requiring a report on 
South Korean defense readiness and acquisition strategy.
  I ask my colleagues to support this amendment and send a signal that 
encourages South Korea to get their defense spending on the right track 
as soon as possible.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] has 
expired.
  Is there a Member opposed to the amendment?
  If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Ohio [Mr. Kasich].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] will 
be postponed.


                      Announcement by the chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, proceedings will 
resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed, 
in the following order:
  Amendment No. 7 offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]; 
amendment No. 29 offered by the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski]; 
amendment No. 62 offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Harman]; amendment No. 63 offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts 
[Mr. Markey]; and amendment No. 67 offered by the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Kasich].


                    Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Solomon] for a recorded vote on the amendment, as 
modified, offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] on which 
further proceedings were postponed and on which the ``ayes'' prevailed 
by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment, as modified.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment, as modified.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Solomon] for a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 415, 
noes 1, not voting 23, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 217]

                               AYES--415

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Myers
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                                NOES--1

       
     Dixon
       

                             NOT VOTING--23

     Becerra
     Calvert
     Carr
     Clinger
     Cooper
     Coyne
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Martinez
     McCurdy
     Miller (CA)
     Oberstar
     Royce
     Scott
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas (WY)
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten
     Williams

                              {time}  1811

  Mr. EWING, Mr. CONYERS and Mrs. MINK of Hawaii changed their vote 
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I inadvertently voted ``nay'' on the Solomon 
amendment on North Korea. I should have voted ``aye.''


                   amendment offered by mr. kopetski

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman 
from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] for a recorded vote on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] has demanded a 
recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that this and subsequent votes 
in this series will be 5 minutes each.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 263, 
noes 156, not voting 20, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 218]

                               AYES--263

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Bacchus (FL)
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Long
     Lowey
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Skaggs
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (NJ)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--156

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Brooks
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fields (TX)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gillmor
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoke
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lazio
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rowland
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--20

     Becerra
     Calvert
     Clinger
     Cooper
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Martinez
     McCurdy
     Miller (CA)
     Oberstar
     Royce
     Scott
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas (WY)
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1823

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Smith of Oregon against.

  Mr. STENHOLM changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. WILSON changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                    amendment offered by ms. harman

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentlewoman 
from California [Ms. Harman] for a recorded vote on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the ``noes'' prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] has 
demanded a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that this will be a 5-minute 
vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227, 
noes 192, not voting 20, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 219]

                               AYES--227

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Applegate
     Bacchus (FL)
     Baesler
     Barca
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Blute
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamburg
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Long
     Lowey
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Moran
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Skaggs
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Snowe
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swift
     Synar
     Talent
     Tanner
     Thompson
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--192

     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Brewster
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clement
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Darden
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Myers
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--20

     Becerra
     Calvert
     Clinger
     Cooper
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Martinez
     McCurdy
     Miller (CA)
     Oberstar
     Royce
     Scott
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas (WY)
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1831

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Thomas of Wyoming against.

  Mr. KOLBE changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  Ms. LAMBERT changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


             amendment, as modified, offered by mr. markey

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the request by the gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] for a recorded vote on the amendment, 
as modified, offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey], 
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment, as modified.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment, as modified.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 68, 
noes 349, not voting 22, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 220]

                                AYES--68

     Abercrombie
     Andrews (ME)
     Applegate
     Bentley
     Bonior
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Carr
     Clay
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeFazio
     Dellums
     Edwards (CA)
     Evans
     Filner
     Fish
     Flake
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gonzalez
     Hamburg
     Hinchey
     Horn
     Houghton
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Lewis (GA)
     Maloney
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Minge
     Moakley
     Moran
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Norton (DC)
     Olver
     Owens
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Rangel
     Rush
     Sanders
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Shepherd
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Stokes
     Studds
     Torres
     Towns
     Underwood (GU)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates

                               NOES--349

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Fingerhut
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Myers
     Neal (NC)
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--22

     Becerra
     Berman
     Calvert
     Clinger
     Cooper
     Dingell
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Martinez
     McCurdy
     Miller (CA)
     Oberstar
     Royce
     Scott
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas (WY)
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1839

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Thomas of Wyoming against.

  So the amendment, as modified, was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                    Amendment Offered by Mr. Kasich

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman 
from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] for a recorded vote on which further proceedings 
were postponed and on which the ``ayes'' prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] has demanded a 
recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414, 
noes 3, not voting 22, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 221]

                               AYES--414

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Myers
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                                NOES--3

     Gonzalez
     McKinney
     Nadler

                             NOT VOTING--22

     Bateman
     Becerra
     Berman
     Calvert
     Clinger
     Cooper
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Martinez
     McCurdy
     Miller (CA)
     Oberstar
     Royce
     Scott
     Smith (OR)
     Thomas (WY)
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1848

  Ms. SCHENK changed her vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I wish to bring attention to the 
visionary space policy provisions in the fiscal year 1995 Department of 
Defense authorization bill and its accompanying report.
  I am concerned about the Clinton administration's draft space policy 
recommendations that would diminish the Air Force's role in the 
development of a new reusable space transportation system. Luckily, 
this bill keeps Defense in the game.
  In spite of past technological achievements, we have failed to 
provide a cheap, routine method of transporting goods to and from 
space. There are widely divergent views on what's to be done. However, 
there seems to be a consensus that reusable Single Stage To Orbit 
(``SSTO'') launch vehicles will provide the cheapest and most reliable 
form of transportation.
  We have reusable vehicles for traveling on land, sea, and air, and we 
need them for traveling to space. Scientists and engineers all over 
this great Nation tell me the technology is now available to build and 
fly a reusable SSTO rocket and that it just needs to be demonstrated.
  Our Nation needs this capability, and the Air Force, NASA, and 
industry need to press ahead on a cooperative program of ``X-vehicle'' 
advanced technology flight demonstrators to prove what the scientists 
and engineers are telling us.
  The Defense Department has already flown three successful test 
flights with the first X-vehicle SSTO demonstrator, the DC-X1, and they 
will finish the DC-X1 test program at the White Sands, NM, Test Range 
this summer.

  NASA will then convert the DC-X1 to the DC-XA test bed for advanced 
component flight demonstrations. And the Air Force Phillips Lab at 
Albuquerque, NM, is ready to proceed with the development of the 
second, more advanced SSTO test vehicle, the SX-2.
  This next major step would finish demonstrating the concept of fully 
reusable single stage to orbit space transportation, and it should be 
continued as a model of cooperation between the Air Force, NASA, and 
industry.
  Last year Congress approved the start of the SX-2 program and funded 
it at $40 million. There is wide ranging support in Congress for such a 
common sense program as this--one that will save the country money 
while at the same time developing a revolutionary technology. That 
bipartisan support is evident once again this year, funding the SX-2 at 
$100 million in the Defense Authorization we are not working on. Let me 
note that SX-2 will be a $300 million program.
  Mr. Chairman, our ability to use space for national security, civil, 
and commercial purposes depends on reducing the cost of getting into 
orbit.
  We are on the verge of opening a whole new frontier in the use of 
space, including the new emerging market for vast constellations of low 
Earth orbit communications satellites such as Bill Gates is now 
building that will be an important part of the new information highway. 
A cheap, reliable, and reusable form of space transportation for the 
transportation infrastructure is essential to opening this new 
frontier.
  We must continue to move ahead with this cooperative program of 
advanced technology flight demonstrators--X-vehicles--for fully 
reusable single stage to orbit space transportation, and I encourage 
those involved in writing the new administration space policy to 
maintain a strong role for the Air Force in this critical development 
effort and to take heed of the actions of the House on this issue as 
embodied in this bill and in the committee report.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.

                              {time}  1850

  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Fields of Louisiana) having assumed the chair, Mr. Durbin, Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, had 
come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________