[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 70 (Wednesday, June 8, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: June 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 4301.
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the
bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Bacchus of Florida, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on
Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the amendment printed in part 5 of House Report
103-520 relating to U.N. peacekeeping offered by the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] had been disposed of.
Pursuant to the order of the House of earlier today, there will now
be additional period of general debate.
The gentleman from Mississippi, [Mr. Montgomery] will be recognized
for 7\1/2\ minutes and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence]
will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
The CHAIR recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
{time} 1550
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to yield my 7\1/2\ minutes of debate time to the gentlewoman
from Florida [Mrs. Meek] and that she may yield that time as she sees
fit.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from
Florida [Mrs. Meek].
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like for my Representative from the State of
Florida and chairman of the Florida delegation, the Honorable Sam
Gibbons, to stand.
Mr. Chairman, I am so proud to join with my colleagues in honoring
U.S. Representative Sam Gibbons, an outstanding American and son of
Florida who has served his country so well both in and out of uniform.
Sam Gibbons was a member of the legendary 101st Airborne Division in
World War II. ``Theirs was not to reason why * * * Theirs was but to do
* * * or die.''
As a 24-year-old captain, Sam Gibbons was among the first American
paratroopers to land behind enemy lines in Normandy, in the middle of
the night, to spearhead the invasion of Europe on D-day, June 6, 1994.
For this reason, it was most appropriate that President Clinton
designated Congressman Gibbons as his personal representative at
several ceremonies in Normandy this past week.
Representative Gibbons wrote about his experiences on D-day. And one
cannot help be moved by this article. It helps humanize and make
understandable to those of us who were not there that day the enormity
of the contribution of those young Americans--like Sam Gibbons--who put
their lives on the line to create the toehold in France needed to
defeat Nazi Germany--and to secure the freedom too many of us take for
granted today.
I offer this article for reprinting in the Congressional Record
following my statement.
Mr. Chairman, we honor Representative Sam Gibbons for his leadership
on the battlefield, for his leadership in the House of Representatives,
and for his leadership as chairman of the Florida delegation. It is my
privilege to serve with him in this body.
Sam Gibbons, hero of World War II, hero to us in our delegation, hero
to the House of Representatives, thank God for you.
The text of the article referred to is as follows:
Two Days of the Invasion
(By Representative Sam Gibbons)
[Representative Sam Gibbons recounts the 48 hours after he parachuted
from a plane At 1:26 a.m. on June 6, 1944. For Gibbons, a 24-year-old
captain with the 501st Parachute Infantry, D-day included a bloody
ambush and at least two miracles.]
My parachute snapped open with a loud crack.
I looked around to make sure I was clear of other jumpers--
couldn't see anyone. I did see and hear rifle and machine gun
fire coming up from below me. I got brief glimpses of a
small, blacked-out town six or seven hundred yards in front
of me. Guessed it to be Ste. Mere-Eglise. Guess later proved
to be correct. Feet hit--knees give--roll forward--end lying
flat on my back.
Instantly, I knew I was in the wrong place--at least six
miles from my planned drop zone and far deeper in German
territory than planned. The time was 1:26 a.m., June 6, 1944.
D-Day was to begin on the beaches at 6:30 a.m. The parachute
jump from plane to ground in Normandy, France, had taken 35
to 40 seconds, maybe less.
I was 24 years old--a captain--in the 501st Parachute
Infantry, a part of the 101st Airborne Division which,
together with the 82nd Airborne Division, landed a total of
12,000 parachutists that might. We were the spearhead of the
invasion of Europe.
For this performance our heads had been shaved--the
surgeons insisted we'd be easier to sew up that way. Our
unique uniforms were made of a heavy cotton cloth. The jacket
collars were high and right below the neck we carried a
switch-blade knife in a pocket for emergencies, like cutting
yourself out of your parachute. My normal weight was 165
pounds. That night when I hit the ground I was well over 200
pounds.
In the leg pocket we carried a British-made anti-tank mine
because there were plenty of tanks nearby, a gas mask (I
stuck two cans of Schlitz beer in mine), an equipment bag
containing a raincoat, blanket, toothbrush, toilet paper, and
six meals of emergency K-rations, a combination shovel and
pick for digging in, maps, flashlight, compass, small hacksaw
blade, a map of France printed on silk, and $300 worth of
well-used French currency.
We carried two other items in our equipment. We wore our
identification (dog tags) on a light metal chain around our
necks, taped together so they didn't click or rattle. And a
``cricket,'' which when you depressed the steel made a
snapping sound or a ``crick.'' When you released the steel
part, it would crick again. This was to be our primary means
of identification between friend and foe during the night
assault.
Our immediate objective was to open up the assault beach
about six miles east of my landing spot and secure the river
line of the Douve so that the Germans could not bring in
reinforcements while we captured Cherbourg.
Getting oriented in the middle of the night is not easy.
Two things helped me. First, we had studied the area using
maps, aerial photographs, and models for hours and days until
it was drilled into us. Second, I had been in the open door
of the plane on the flight from England and had picked up
such landmarks as the islands of Guernsey and Sark and the
French coastline near Cap de Carteret.
I thought I recognized St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte and then the
Douve River with its marshes. As we approached the Douve our
plane had slowed down and elevated the tail to lessen the
chances of hitting the tail assembly in case you made a bad
door exit. So as we crossed the Douve, the green light signal
to jump came on.
It seemed to me that we were too far north and too far west
of our designated drop zone. But you can't hesitate and argue
with the pilot because he couldn't hear you anyway and since
we were flying in very tight formation, there was no chance
of independent judgment. At least we were over land--some
weren't so lucky that night.
But first we had to push the two equipment bundles out.
These contained radios for Headquarters Command and control
of 501st. Next were two radio operators. I never found the
operators or the radios. Next, me, and then 13 or 14 others
who probably had little or no idea where they were. I believe
the last man out that door was Lt. Col. Harry Kinnard, the
Regimental Executive Officer and second in command of the
501st Parachute Infantry. Kinnard and I next met about 40
hours later and many miles from where we jumped.
I turned again to examine the field in which I had just
landed. There was just enough moonlight coming through the
clouds to allow me to determine that no other Americans had
landed or were landing in my field. I could not hear any
American weapons being fired. The German weapons sounded
distinctly different from ours, the principal difference
being the rate of fire for their automatic weapons. Theirs
fired much faster and did not seem to sound as deep in
resonance as ours.
The Germans to my southeast--about 70 yards away--were
manning a roadblock, I figured, and the new firing about
1,000 yards to the north appeared to be near Ste. Mere-
Eglise.
I turned west and began crawling. The firing continued
behind me at the cross-roads. I could not see or hear anyone.
I began to wonder whether the whole missions had been
aborted and I just hadn't gotten the signal. I resumed moving
again, still trying to get away from that crossroads fire
without being detected. This time I was crouched over and
moved a little faster. I finally came to the southwest end of
the field.
To my left was a cattlegate and other things that cows
leave around when they are in a field, but at least I knew
the field probably wasn't mined if there were cows around. We
had been told that there was a possibility that our landing
fields would be mined and booby-trapped.
I found myself in a narrow, paved road with hedges on each
side. The tall trees in the hedges gave the place a spooky
look, but still no signs of anyone except those people back
at the crossroads. By this time I was sure that they didn't
hear me and couldn't see me so I began walking in an upright
position, my rifle in both hands ready for action and my
cricket between my left thumb and forefinger.
I must have walked along for about ten minutes keeping to
the right side of the road near the edge where there was a
shallow ditch. Then about 25 feet in front of me I thought I
saw a helmet silhouetted against the sky. It looked like an
American helmet, but in the dark I couldn't tell, so I
kneeled down in the ditch and ``cricked'' my cricket one
time.
Instantly the response came back with two cricks. I felt a
thousand years younger, and both of us moved forward so we
could touch each other. I whispered my name and he whispered
his. To my surprise, he was not from my plane. In fact, he
was not even from my Headquarters group. He was a sergeant
and lost, too.
We kept going down the road for about 50 or 100 yards when
we suddenly ran into some more cricks and picked up three
more people, none of whom were from my plane. But they seemed
to know each other and they were from the 501st. By that time
we were beginning to feel pretty good and our confidence was
coming back.
We got out the maps, pulled out the flashlight, covered it
as best we could, and began to figure out exactly where we
were. We concluded rapidly that it was impossible to get to
our designated assembly area and that we had best try to
accomplish the 501 mission of securing the Douve River line.
We then decided that moving along the road, while it might
be productive in finding other friends, also might be
extremely dangerous. So we decided to take off across the
field to our left and head for the Douve River line. As we
entered the field, we found some more 501 parachutists. Still
no one from my plane and no coherent pattern to the people we
were finding.
It was about 3 a.m. when we hit the next road.
About that time we heard noise toward the rear of the
column and a couple of shots were fired by my patrol. There
was a clatter of someone falling to the pavement. I ran back
and found that they had shot at a German who had been riding
a bicycle. He apparently was a messenger of some sort.
We disarmed and searched him, and tried to figure out what
we would do with him. His bicycle was a wreck, and he was
skinned up from his tumble. The men took off his belt and
tied his hands behind him, and we decided then that with that
noise if there were many more Germans in town, they had heard
us, so we moved in rapidly.
It was a short dash into town. It was a very small town,
completely dark. At the head of the column there were a few
more shots fired and the word came back that they had killed
some Germans--probably two who were apparently trying to run
from one of the houses in town when we ran in.
By this time we were making so much noise that if there was
anyone else there, they certainly would have heard us. The
noise of the shooting seemed to raise our spirits even more.
Still, we didn't know where we were.
I began to pound on doors and shout for people to come out,
but, of course, none of the doors opened and no one moved. I
was shouting in English and if there was anyone in that town
who understood English, we never found them.
Finally, after two or three minutes, one man about 50 to 55
years old came to the door of one of the houses. In English I
began to ask him where we were, what was the name of his
town, but he just stared back, then began to speak in French.
He was excited and eventually some other people in the
house came forward--none of whom could speak English. Some of
my men had gotten responses at doors and windows and were
running into the same trouble.
Finally I went into the dark house, pulled out my map and
flashlight, and began to make gestures, hoping he would point
to where we were. But he was either afraid or was determined
not to get involved. Even though I recited with my best
French accent the names of some towns that I thought he would
know and would point to, I got no response. Finally, one of
the sergeants came up and said he had found out the name of
the town was Carquebut.
The action in Carquebut had taken about 20 to 25 minutes.
It was now approaching 3:30 a.m. We knew that Carquebut was
outside of the sector of the 101st Airborne Division--our
parent unit--and was in the sector of the 82nd Division,
which had a different responsibility than we did that first
day.
After a quick conference with some of the sergeants, I
decided that we should move to the south toward St. Come-du-
Mont, which was about five miles from where we were. St.
Come-du-Mont had been a part of the 501st objective. It was
on the Douve River line and it was not far from the bridges
across the Douve that we had been assigned to seize and
destroy.
In about 30 minutes we hit the main two-lane, north-south
road between Ste. Mere-Eglise and Carentan. At a little town
called Les Forges, we could see two or three American
soldiers near the crossroads and we moved rapidly to meet
them.
Here for the first time I ran into someone I knew. There
was an American lieutenant by the name of Charlie Poze, a
member of 501st. He had rounded up five or six men and they
were controlling the town. They had already searched the
buildings and found no Germans.
To our north was the town of Ste. Mere-Eglise, about one
and a quarter miles away. To the south of us was St. Come-du-
Mont, nearly three miles away, and the Douve River highway
and railroad bridge crossing. Controlling these crossings was
our objective.
As dawn came it was possible to see scattered parachutes
lying around in the fields. Some were hanging in trees, some
lying partly in the road. It was obvious that we were coming
closer to a place where more men had been dropped.
Just a short distance along we ran into the town of
Blosville. We encountered some fighting from our left but it
did not appear to be well aimed. When we returned the fire,
the hostile firing would die out, so we chose to ignore it
and move more rapidly toward St. Come-du-Mont.
It was now approaching 7:30 or 8 a.m. We had gathered
strength as we had moved along and we now had approximately
50 men, including Lt. Poze, two glider pilots whom we had
picked up on the march from Carquebut and who had been
charged with controlling the prisoner, and myself.
By the time we got to the end of Blosville, a Capt.
MacNeilly, also with the 501st, moved out on the road and we
had a reunion! I had known and worked with MacNeilly. He was
from San Francisco and a genial fellow and a good man.
While our confidence had returned, we all still felt very
isolated. There was firing going on to the east of us, but it
was so faint that it was hard to distinguish what we heard.
As morning came, it was beautiful: a cloudless sky, cool,
no more planes of any sort were in sight. There was scattered
fire in about every direction except off to the west, so we
moved out to the south and headed to St. Come-du-Mont, which
seemed to be three-and-one-half miles away.
After about an hour, I called a halt, brought in Poze and
MacNeilly and the one flanker from both the east and west,
and held a council. At the end of the council no one could
suggest a better method of moving, and because there was also
occasional firing on both flanks with more to the east, some
of which seemed to be aimed at us, we decided to continue in
the diamond formation.
At the end of this council I brought out my two cans of
beer, which we shared. I estimate we had moved about a mile
and a half south from Blosville. When the cans were empty we
decided to leave them in the middle of the road as a monument
to the first cans of Schlitz consumed in France.
In about five minutes the point man signaled with his hand
and beckoned me forward, and I discovered what he had found.
In the west ditch was a wounded German soldier. I moved the
patrol on up.
The German had been hit in the stomach area and was in bad
shape. He had already turned rather gray-looking and seemed
to be rather incoherent. There were some parachutes lying in
the fields nearby and I assumed the parachutists had gotten
him. We searched the area but found no one.
The German was moaning, his eyes closed. We disarmed him
and then had to decide what to do with him. We finally
decided just to leave him where he was. He was a pitiful
sight, so all alone, so badly injured, and so near death,
with us standing over him. We didn't waste much time. We just
went on. He was no danger to us.
As I recall, one of the men did give him some water and
someone propped his head up a little and he quit moaning, but
his breathing was laborious.
Down the road a point man spotted a sign post on a little
concrete marker on the right-hand side of the road: Carentan
6km, Paris 250km. We joked about being in Paris that night,
or maybe it was just the fact that it was broad open daylight
and that our luck seemed to be going well.
All of us were tired because we hadn't had a chance to eat
or sleep since leaving our airfield in England. We had been
awake and moving for 30 hours. Our last meal had been 17
hours earlier. We halted for a minute and I called Poze to me
and told him to go up and take the forward point position
because we needed to make better time.
St. Come-du-Mont was near--perhaps 400 yards away.
According to the Regimental plan, St. Come-du-Mont should
already be in 501st hands. In fact, it should have been in
the 501st hands for about six hours. Unfortunately, I was
wrong.
As we got closer to St. Come-du-Mont, nothing appeared to
be unusual. The windows in the buildings were all closed with
wooden shutters as we had seen in all the other small towns.
The doors were not open. No one appeared to be moving around
on the main street, which was the highway that we were on.
Cows were grazing in the nearby field.
There was firing--both German and American--far off to the
left. I could now see the first building very clearly on the
right-hand side of the road, and I had great expectations
that we would at last run into the main body of the 501st
forces.
I moved over toward the edge of the road to the right. I
was now at the bottom of a very small hill with St. Come-du-
Mont sitting at the crest. We found the main body of forces,
but it wasn't the 501st. In fact, it wasn't even a friendly
force.
Shortly after I had given the signal to Poze to continue
forward, I heard a gun bolt. I looked toward the sound and
there was a gun muzzle pointed in my direction. As I dove for
the ditch, all hell broke loose! We had been ambushed.
I remember seeing Poze go down in front of me as if he,
too, were diving in the ditch. The gunner was standing behind
the hedge--the muzzle of his gun pointed through the bushes--
and he apparently had his weapon set on full automatic
because when it started to fire, it sprayed bullets all over
the area.
The first thing I had to do was to get rid of that gunner
right over my head. I knew I couldn't exist long with him
there. He had probably seen me dive into the ditch but he
couldn't get a good shot at me until he climbed to the top of
the hedge.
I took a grenade out of my pocket, pulled the safety pin,
and lobbed it over the hedge. I hoped that he didn't have
time to throw it back. He didn't. After it went off, I heard
no more firing from his position and assumed that that
problem was out of the way for awhile.
I called to Poze and had no response. I lay there for a
minute or so, but it seemed like a lifetime. I couldn't get
me head up because every time I moved I drew fire. I yelled
back to MacNeilly to tell him to cover me. He understood and
so the fire from our patrol picked up.
It was accurate enought to cause the German fire to slow
down--and as soon as it slowed, I jumped up out of the ditch,
took about six fast paces, and took cover behind a concrete
telephone pole. It wasn't very good protection, but it was
better than I had had.
I guess only luck saved me, I made a dash across the road
and dove in the ditch again. How I escaped getting hit I will
never know, but at least this ditch was deeper and no one
could directly observe my movements as long as I stayed flat
on my stomach. I slid down the ditch in the direction of
MacNeilly.
It was the easiest crawling I ever did. I had received such
a shot of adrenaline I think I could have crawled a mile. I
probably only had crawled 50 yards when I slid under a low
drainage culvert in the road and felt safe--or at least
relatively safe.
After I had gone a short distance out of the culvert, I
passed the crest of the low hill on which my patrol had taken
up firing positions, and I was out of immediate danger. The
first person I ran into was MacNeilly, and he was laughing a
sort of nervous laugh. He said he had never seen me run so
fast in my life and that I had looked like a jackrabbit going
across that road with the Germans firing at me.
We could still see St. Come-du-Mont--we were now about 300
yards from the town. By that time our patrol had taken up
some good firing positions. We slowed down our firing to
conserve ammunition. It was obvious that we were badly
outnumbered. We had at least two missing, and one man
reported that he was slightly wounded.
It was more and more obvious that the Germans were well
placed and had planned to defend St. Come-du-Mont stubbornly.
So there we were--200 to 300 yards north of St. Come-du-
Mont meeting superior fire from a major force. We had no
automatic weapons, no radios--only our semi-automatic rifles
and a few pistols.
Before we decided to break off the fire fight, two of our
men were killed. MacNeilly and I held a council. We called in
a couple of the sergeants and decided that since the day was
half over and since it appeared useless to try to attack the
town, we just couldn't sit there for the rest of the day and
wait for some miracle to happen. Also, I did not know what
was building up behind us to the north because during our
advance on St. Come-du-Mont there had been intermittent
firing from our flanks. We knew that there were Germans
behind us, but we did not know where they actually were nor
how many they were.
I decided that the best thing to do was to split the
patrol--leaving some with MacNeilly to continue firing into
St. Come-du-Mont--and for me to go northward to try to find
some friendly force. I designated two sergeants and about 15
men to stay with MacNeilly; I took the rest and returned
north.
I knew we had to move fast for it was then 1:30 or 2 in the
afternoon and we were not finding any more parachutists
coming out of the fields to join us. We moved at a slow trot
back toward Blosville. When we passed the spot where the
wounded German had been, he was dead.
About an hour and half after we departed the St. Come-du-
Mont area, we reached the outskirts of Ste. Mere-Eglise. We
found a small unit of the 82nd had established a roadblock
there near a crashed glider.
The crashed glider was one of the bloodiest sights I saw on
D-Day. It had been used by some units of the 82nd to attempt
to bring in anti-tank guns and the pilot had overshot the
field and crashed into a stone wall right off the highway. If
there were any survivors, they weren't around. There were
plenty of bodies. We turned over our prisoner and said good-
bye to our two glider pilots who rejoined the 82nd.
We headed for the designated glider landing zone, hoping
that those operations which had been planned for D-Day
evening would come off as scheduled. I had been designated to
receive one of the six jeeps the 501st was to get. Jeeps were
quarter-ton open trucks.
At Hiesville, there were other American soldiers from the
101st around. Not many--perhaps 50. They were near a
farmhouse, and I discovered it was the Division Command Post,
hardly the kind you might expect for a Division.
They de-briefed me in about ten minutes and entered the
situation as I described it on their maps, and I headed
immediately for the glider landing zone just south of
Hiesville. I got there between 6:15 and 7 p.m.
I am sure there were a lot of miracles on D-Day, but my own
second miracle occurred when that glider assigned to carry my
jeep landed right on time and right at the designated spot. I
wasn't more than 50 feet from the spot where the glider
landed--certainly within shouting distance--when the glider
nose opened and my jeep rolled out. I called the driver's
name; he recognized me and drove right over.
We had been isolated for about 18 hours that day. We had
been shot at, taken some casualties, and inflicted a few
ourselves, but the arrival of this jeep was like a miracle.
When I arrived back at the Divisions CP, I was asked to
help provide local security for protection of the Command
Post because by that time darkness was approaching fast and
there was still an awful lot of German firing going on. We
organized a guard detail with others who had been arriving a
the CP, and I was assigned a sector to the north about 300
yards from the Command Post.
I took my small patrol to our sector and we divided the
responsibility for the night. We posted the first guards,
then moved into a well-built cluster of farm buildings--a
milking shed, tool shed, hay barn, all clustered around a
stone-paved courtyard. But it was home.
I sat down in the equipment barn beside an old two-wheeled
hay rake and opened my first K-ration: ham and eggs in a
small tin can, a fruit bar, some biscuits that looked and
tasted like I guess dog biscuits taste, some kind of powdered
coffee, a hard chocolate bar for dessert. The chocolate bar
was so hard that if you had thrown it like a rock it would
have been a dangerous weapon. I devoured my meal in record
time.
I had the second shift of the guard detail that night so I
went to sleep as soon as I finished eating.
When the word came to wake up again, we were in contact
with some other members of the 501st who had also shown up in
the Division Command Post area. I went over toward the
direction of the CP and found Col. Kinnard. I knew at least
two people from the plane had survived. He said that we were
moving out in a few minutes to join a force of the 506th.
We moved from the Division Command Post near Hiesville in
the direction of Vierville with a mission of seizing the
bridges across the Douve between St. Come-du-Mont and
Carentan. The advance from Hiesville to Vierville was
relatively uneventful. There was some firing but it didn't
stop us.
It was not until I had reached Angoville that the first
serious action of that day began for me. There were already
some other American forces there--apparently remnants of our
1st Battalion. We quickly exchanged information. No sooner
than that happened we came under heavy fire.
We took some casualties. I don't remember how many. After
an hour the firing stopped. It seemed that German troops who
had been positioned on or near the beaches and who had been
driven back by the landing forces were now moving toward us.
With the 4th Division and some elements of our 101st
pushing from the east and with the only way across the Douve
River and into Carentan being blocked by us, we were picking
up one German unit after another as they were trying to move
to a better position.
Our road to the southwest to St. Come-du-Mont was still
blocked and so we spent the rest of that day in the
Angoville-Vierville area. There was too much resistance at
St. Come-du-Mont for us to move south. There was too much
resistance to the northeast for us to move in that direction.
So we settled down after nightfall for some rest.
That takes you through two days of the invasion. The first
day didn't seem like it would ever end, and the second day
went so fast I hardly remember it. Eventually we would take
St. Come-du-Mont.
Instead of taking it with one company of the 501st, as had
been our original plan of operation before the invasion--or
with my small combat patrol as I had tried to do on D-Day--it
took the whole Division plus the fire support from the
cruiser Quincy plus eight or ten tanks that were assigned to
us from the 5th Corps.
It took plenty of lives, both German and American. But
within three days we held St. Come-du-Mont and control of the
bridges, the line of the Douve River was secure, and our
first mission completed.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. Hutto].
Mr. HUTTO. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me. I appreciate
it very much.
I want to echo the sentiments the gentlewoman from Florida has
expressed and pay tribute to our good friend and colleague, Sam
Gibbons.
Sam has been an outstanding statesman from Florida, as you know, for
many years, having served in the Florida legislature with distinction
and then here in the Congress of the United States.
I remember when I was working in television news in Panama City, a
good number of years ago, the first time I had met Sam Gibbons. In
fact, the only time, I guess, until I was elected to Congress. He came
through, and I think at that time Sam was possibly looking at a run for
the U.S. Senate, which I do not believe he ever made. But I interviewed
him and was very impressed with him at that time and have always been
impressed with him.
Mr. Chairman, Nancy and I are delighted that we have as good friends
Sam and Martha and their family.
Mr. Chairman, it was my privilege and honor to be on the CODEL with
the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery], along with other World
War II veterans. We were in Normandy and participated in and were at a
number of the commemoration ceremonies. I can say with assurance that
the President made a great choice in asking Sam Gibbons to be his
representative. He did an outstanding job speaking on a number of
occasions, some of which, I take it, were carried by the national
television networks, whereas some were not. But throughout the whole
week of ceremonies in commemoration of World War II for D-day, Sam
Gibbons and his family were in there and represented us very well and
made a beautiful family, he, Martha, their sons Mark, Cliff, and Tim,
and their wives and children; that is, Sam Gibbons' grandchildren made
a very beautiful family.
Not only that, but the remarks that Sam made I think were very
touching to us because he is one, as the gentlewoman suggested, who
actually landed during this time. This was a period of triumph and
tragedy for our country, but as was pointed out time and time again,
had D-day not happened and that invasion to get the enemy out of France
and to begin the end of Adolf Hitler, we might not be here at this
time; the world might have been totally different.
So I am very, very proud of our colleague, Sam Gibbons, and his
contribution to the war effort and bringing freedom to our Nation and
to the world as well as his good work as statesman and a Member of the
House of Representatives.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I thank the gentleman from Florida for his
comments.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery], chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, we had our CODEL at Normandy, and we were there with
Sam Gibbons, his wife Martha, and his three sons and their families. We
were mighty proud of him.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gibbons used no notes in his remarks. He talked to
thousands and thousands of veterans from all the allied forces. After
his remarks, veterans stood up and cheered.
Mr. Chairman, Sam is a great American. We were honored to be with him
at three different ceremonies. He represented the President and the
Congress, and the President could not have chosen a better person out
of the 435 Members.
I thank the gentlewoman from Florida for yielding.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Bacchus].
Mr. BACCHUS of Florida. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this
time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I simply want to join my colleagues from Florida and
throughout the country in saying what a privilege it is to serve with
Sam Gibbons. Sam has long been one of my heroes. I am very privileged
and proud to say that for 25 years he has been a friend. He has known
me since I was a teenager. He has helped raise me, he has laughed at
me, laughed with me, along with me. Sam has been a leader for 50 years
in many, many ways. He is a leader still today.
Mr. Chairman, Sam has faced and met and conquered every challenge
that has ever confronted me. Today he has some new challenges in the
House. I look forward to all those stories in the fall about how so
many people have underestimated my friend, Sam Gibbons.
I am confident the gentleman will lead us this year and in the years
to come just as well as he led those troops in Normandy on D-day.
Thank you very much, Sam, for your friendship.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Berman). The time of the gentlewoman
from Florida [Mrs. Meek] has expired.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman I yield 3 minutes of my 7\1/2\ minutes to
the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek], and ask unanimous consent
that she be allowed to yield time as may be required.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from South Carolina?
There was no objection.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
{time} 1600
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, my esteemed colleague from Florida,
Congressman Sam Gibbons, established himself as a leader early in life.
Just 50 years ago, Sam Gibbons was a skinny 24-year-old captain in
the 501st Parachute Infantry.
In the dark, predawn hours of June 6, Sam began the long and
treacherous campaign to wrest control of Europe from Hitler's iron
grasp by parachuting through thick machinegun fire and behind German
lines near Normandy, France.
Realizing he was alone and miles from his planned drop point, Sam
nonetheless quickly determined his position, picked up other Americans
along the way, and carried out his mission to capture French towns and
prevent reinforcements from reaching German troops battling the Allied
invasion at Normandy.
Mr. Chairman, Sam Gibbons helped D-day succeed by carrying out his
mission.
I am proud to call Sam Gibbons my friend. I can think of no one
better, Mr. Chairman, to guide this House through the minefields of
health care reform than the man who began the defeat of the Nazi war
machine in the dark skies over France 50 years ago.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, we want to end this tribute to
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons] and say to him, ``We thank you
from the bottom of our hearts for having represented this great country
on the beaches of Normandy and as a paratrooper. We owe our lives and
the quality of our democratic ideals to your contribution. Thank you.''
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Stearns].
(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join my colleagues from
Florida in recognizing our good friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Gibbons] 50 years ago, he was one of those heroes who helped win the
battle of Normandy.
Having just returned from France, I would like to emphasize to every
American the tremendous pride that we should all feel in what Sam
Gibbons and all those who fought at Normandy accomplished. The tribute
to the veterans of D-day was one of the most moving experiences I have
ever had, as well as the tremendous appreciation the French people
showered on them.
Sam Gibbons was one of the first to land on the European continent.
He was one of those who worked behind enemy lines with the ``clickers''
which we heard so much about during the commemoration. The courage and
leadership he exhibited then was extraordinary. And we have been
fortunate that, 50 years after D-day, he continues his service to the
American people here in the House of Representatives.
So, along with our other colleagues in the House, Tom Bevill and our
minority leader Bob Michel, and all Americans who served at Normandy, I
would like to salute my colleague Sam Gibbons as a true American hero.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the
remarks of everyone speaking here today on behalf of my good friend,
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons]. On numerous occasions he and
I have discussed his exploits during World War II and in particular,
during D-day. He is a great American, and we are all indebted to him
and all those who served.
As my colleagues know, too few of us ever pause to think back. And I
am glad we have been celebrating the 50th anniversary of D-day recently
and have once again had the chance to realize what so many people did
and sacrificed on behalf of all of us. The gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Gibbons], Republican leader Bob Michel, and many others proudly
represent the millions who fought for all of us during World War II.
Mr. Chairman, I was, of course, a little bit too young for that
conflict, but thank goodness and thank God for people like the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons].
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Gibbons] so he might be able to respond and feel free to
say anything he may choose to say.
Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to pay tribute to a
great Floridian and a great American. I rise to tell the American
people about this true public servant, who has given more than 40 years
of his life to serving this country, and serving his constituents in
the Tampa Bay area.
Mr. Chairman, Sam Gibbons is this man. He has fought for our Nation
on the beaches of Normandy and has fought for the rights of poor and
older Americans. He has been a staunch voice on trade issues, and
opening foreign markets to U.S. companies.
And today, Sam Gibbons, a true friend of Florida and a defender of
our Nation, will be leading our Nation on a path toward healing and a
return to global competitiveness. A path toward reforming the way we
receive our health care. And a path to make our country more
competitive as the addresses this nation's economic problems at home
and abroad.
It is a true pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to pay tribute to this fine
American.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank very much the gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence], the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery],
and the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek], and everyone who has
participated in this. I do not deserve it, but I really appreciate it.
I was able to meet with some of my colleagues on one of those nights,
on the 5th of June just before the celebrations on the 6th, and I told
them then at that time that everyone in the room deserved the honor of
being the President's representative more than I did because I knew
they were good soldiers. But I appreciated the opportunity of being
able to serve, and I think it is important that all Americans ought to
understand that the people that fought there in Normandy for us were
good, loyal, patriotic people who loved their country, who had a great
respect for the institutions of their country, and they still show it
today. I talked to many of them, some of them rather infirmed, some of
them rather aged, but they still have that great love of country, and
great respect and pride in our institutions, and it was really
inspiring to see that and to hear that.
I want to say, as I said there, that there are a couple of lessons
that we ought to draw out of our experiences in Normandy, and the first
lesson is that America must remain involved as a world leader. Being
involved is not pleasant. We have got to make sacrifices to do that. We
have got to remain strong enough so that we are believable, so we can
say no to would-be aggressors. But, when our vital interests are at
stake, we can say no, and we can control the situation.
Second, Mr. Chairman, we really want to pay attention to the quality
of the people that we attract to serve in our Armed Forces. I had
experiences before World War II in training some of the people who were
not as well qualified physically, mentally or emotionally to be
soldiers. I can say, without any challenge in my own mind, ``You can't
lead a soldier that's not willing to fight, you can't train a soldier
that's not willing to fight, and if you got to fight, you have got to
have something you're fighting for.'' So, we need to keep the quality
of the new people who come into the service year, after year, after
year up to a very high standard. We need to reward them so that they
will look upon military service as an opportunity.
I say to my colleagues, ``Those are the kind of people we need. Those
are the kind of people who will keep America strong.''
I want to thank everybody for participating in this, and I want to
say, ``I'm just glad to be here. Thank you.''
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). All time for
general debate has expired.
amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by mr. montgomery
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to section 4 of House
Resolution 431, I offer the following en bloc amendment, consisting of
amendments 2, 3, 9, 10 (as modified), 12 (as modified), 15 (as
modified), 16 (as modified), 23, 31 (as modified), 32 (as modified),
33, 35 (as modified), 40, 46 (as modified), 50 (as modified), 51, 52
(as modified), 53 (as modified), 54, 55, 56 (as modified), 59 (as
modified), 60 (as modified), 64 (as modified), 65 (as modified) and 66
printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520; and amendment 10 (as
modified) printed in part 1 of House Report 103-509.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendments en
bloc and report the modifications.
The texts of the amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by Mr.
Montgomery are as follows:
Amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by Mr. Montgomery:
amendment offered by mr. gingrich
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. . PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS
FOR UNITED STATES SHARE OF COSTS OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
transferred or obligated for the payment of the assessed
share of the United States for costs of United Nations
peacekeeping operations or for any arrearages derived
therefrom.
amendment offered by mrs. schroeder
Page 279, line 17, strike out ``$355,600,000'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``$295,600,000''.
Page 279, line 20, strike out ``$50,000,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$80,000,000''.
Page 279, line 23, strike out ``$50,000,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$80,000,000''.
Page 280, line 4, strike out ``$15,000,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$45,000,000''.
amendment offered by ms. furse
At the end of subtitle D of title XXXI (page 414, after
line 4) add the following new section:
SEC. . PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION ON
EXPOSURE TO RADIATION RELEASED FROM HANFORD
NUCLEAR RESERVATION.
Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1834) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Prohibition on Disclosure of Exposure Information.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a person (including
the Secretary of Energy, an officer or employee of a State,
or any other person participating in or receiving assistance
under a program established under this section) may not
disclose to the public any information obtained through the
program that identifies a person who may have been exposed to
radiation released from the Hanford Nuclear Reservation or
that identifies a person participating in any of the programs
developed under this section. Information prohibited from
disclosure under this subsection shall include--
``(A) the name, address, and telephone number of a person
requesting information referred to in subsection (b)(1);
``(B) the name, address, and telephone number of a person
who has been referred to a health care professional under
subsection (b)(2);
``(C) the name, address, and telephone number of a person
who has been registered and monitored pursuant to subsection
(b)(3);
``(D) information that identifies the person from whom
information referred to in this paragraph was obtained under
the program or any other third party involved with, or
identified, by any such information so obtained; and
``(E) any other personal or medical information that
identifies a person or party referred to in subparagraphs (A)
through (D).
``(2) Information referred to in paragraph (1) may be
disclosed to the public if the person identified by the
information, or the person's legal representative, has
consented in writing to the disclosure.
``(3) The States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho shall
establish procedures for carrying out this subsection,
including procedures governing the disclosure of information
under paragraph (2).''.
Amendment, as modified, offered by mr. evans
Page 15, line 15, strike out ``$854,833,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$854,883,000''.
Strike out section 851 (page 233, line 9, and all that
follows through line 18 on page 234).
amendment as modified, offered by Mr. Peterson of Florida
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. . ASSISTANCE TO FAMILY MEMBERS OF KOREAN CONFLICT POW/
MIAS WHO REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR.
(a) Single Point of Contact.--The Secretary of Defense
shall designate an official of the Department of Defense to
serve as a single point of contact within the department for
the immediate family members (or their designees) of any
unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIA.
(b) Unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIA Defined.--For
purposes of this section, the term ``unaccounted-for Korean
Conflict POW/MIA'' means a member of the Armed Forces or
civilian employee of the United States who, as a result of
service during the Korean Conflict, was at any time
classified as a prisoner of war or missing-in-action or
otherwise as unaccounted for and whose person or remains have
not been returned to United States control and who remains
unaccounted for.
(c) Functions.--The official designated under subsection
(a) shall serve as a liaison between the family members of
unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIAs and the Department
of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies that
may hold information that may relate to unaccounted-for
Korean Conflict POW/MIAs. The functions of that official
shall include assisting family members--
(1) with procedures the family may follow in their search
for information about the unaccounted-for Korean Conflict
POW/MIA;
(2) in learning where they might locate information about
the unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/MIA;
(3) in learning how and where to identify classified
records that contain pertinent information and that will be
declassified.
(d) Assistance in Obtaining Declassification.--The official
designated under subsection (a) shall seek to obtain the
rapid declassification of any relevant classified records
that are identified.
(e) Repository.--The official designated under subsection
(a) shall provide for a centralized repository for all
documents relating to unaccounted-for Korean Conflict POW/
MIAs that are located as a result of the official's efforts.
Amendment as modified, Offered by Mr. Berman
At the end of subtitle C of title XI (page 307, after line
11), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1136. ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN WORKERS DISLOCATED DUE TO
REDUCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE EXPORT
OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.
(a) Assistance Under the Defense Conversion Adjustment
Program.--Section 325 of the Job Training Partnership Act (29
U.S.C. 1662d) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``or by closures of
United States military facilities'' each place it appears and
inserting in lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States
military facilities, or by reductions in the export of
defense articles and defense services as a result of United
States policy, including reductions in the amount of defense
articles and defense services under agreements to provide
such articles or services or through termination or
completion of any such agreements'';
(2) in subsection (d), by striking out ``or by the closure
of United States military installations'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States military
facilities, or by reductions in the export of defense
articles and defense services as a result of United States
policy, including reductions in the amount of defense
articles and defense services under agreements to provide
such articles or services or through termination or
completion of any such agreements''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
`defense articles and defense services' means defense
articles, defense services, or design and construction
services under the Arms Export Control Act, including defense
articles and defense services licensed or approved for export
under section 38 of that Act.''.
(b) Assistance Under the Defense Diversification Program.--
Section 325A of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C.
1662d-1) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(3)(A), by striking out ``or the
closure or realignment of a military installation'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``, the closure or realignment of a
military installation, or reductions in the export of defense
articles and defense services as a result of United States
policy, including reductions in the amount of defense
articles and defense services under agreements to provide
such articles or services or through termination or
completion of any such agreements'';
(2) in subsection (k)(1), by striking out ``or by the
closure of United States military installations'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``, the closure of United States
military installations, or reductions in the export of
defense articles and defense services as a result of United
States policy, including reductions in the amount of defense
articles and defense services under agreements to provide
such articles or services or through termination or
completion of any such agreements''; and
(3) in subsection (o), by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(3) Defense articles and defense services.--The term
`defense articles and defense services' means defense
articles, defense services, or design and construction
services under the Arms Export Control Act, including defense
articles and defense services licensed or approved for export
under section 38 of that Act.''.
amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Dellums
At the end of title VIII (page 246, after line 23), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 873. DEFENSE ACQUISITION PILOT PROGRAM.
(a) Designations.--Pursuant to section 809(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
(Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1485, 1593; 10 U.S.C. 2430
note), as amended by section 811 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484;
106 Stat. 2315, 2450), the following defense acquisition
programs are authorized to be designated for participation in
the Defense Acquisition Pilot Program:
(1) Fire support combined arms tactical trainer (fscatt).--
All contracts directly relating to the procurement of a
training simulation system, including related hardware,
software, and subsystems, to perform collective training of
field artillery gunnery teams, with development of software
as required to generate the training exercises.
(2) Joint direct attack munition (jdam i).--All contracts
directly relating to the development and procurement of a
strap-on guidance kit, using an inertially guided, Global
Positioning System updated guidance kit to enhance the
delivery accuracy of 1000 and 2000 pound bombs in inventory.
(3) Commercial-derivative aircraft (cda).--(A) All
contracts related to acquisition or upgrading of commercial-
derivative aircraft for use in future Air Force airlift,
tanker, and airborne warning and control system requirements.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``commercial-
derivative aircraft'' means any of the following:
(i) Any aircraft that is of a type customarily used in the
course of normal business operations for other than Federal
Government purposes, that has been issued a type certificate
by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
and--
(I) that has been sold or leased for use in the commercial
marketplace; or
(II) that has been offered for sale or lease for use in the
commercial marketplace.
(ii) Any aircraft that, but for--
(I) modifications of a type customarily available in the
commercial marketplace; or
(II) minor modifications made to meet Federal Government
requirements;
would satisfy the criteria in clause (i).
(b) Authorization for Waivers.--With respect to the
programs described in subsection (a), the Secretary of
Defense is authorized to waive or limit the applicability of
the following provisions of law:
(1) Section 2306(b) of title 10, United States Code
(relating to prohibition against contingent fees).
(2) Section 2320 of such title (relating to requirements
pertaining to technical data).
(3) Section 2321 of such title (relating to validation of
proprietary data restrictions).
(4) Section 2324 of such title (relating to requirement for
the disclosure of the identity of suppliers and sources of
supplies).
(5) Section 2393(d) of such title (relating to prohibition
against doing business with certain offerors or contractors).
(6) Section 2402 of such title (relating to prohibition on
limitation of subcontractor direct sales).
(7) Section 2408(a) of such title (relating to prohibition
on certain involvement with persons convicted of defense
contract-related felonies).
(8) Section 2410b of such title (relating to contractor
inventory accounting system standards).
(9) Section 843 of Public Law 103-160 (107 Stat. 1720)
(relating to reports on defense contractors dealings with
terrorist countries).
(c) Conduct of Defense Acquisition Programs.--In the case
of each defense acquisition program designated under
subsection (a) for participation in the Defense Acquisition
Pilot Program, the Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) develop guidelines and procedures for carrying out the
program and the criteria to be used in measuring the success
of the program;
(2) evaluate the potential costs and benefits which may be
derived from the innovative procurement methods and
procedures tested under the program; and
(3) develop the methods to be used to analyze the results
of the program.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in the amendments made
by this section shall be construed as authorizing the
appropriation or obligation of funds for the programs
designated as defense acquisition pilot programs under
subsection (a).
amendment offered by mr. fazio
Page 66, strike out line 13 and all that follows through
line 6 on page 68 (relating to a reutilization initiative for
Army and Navy depot-level activities) and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SEC. 329. REUTILIZATION INITIATIVE FOR DEPOT-LEVEL
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Pilot Program Authorized.--During fiscal year 1995, the
Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to
encourage commercial firms to enter into partnerships with
depot-level activities of the military departments for the
purpose of--
(1) demonstrating commercial uses of such depot-level
activities that are related to the principal mission of such
depot-level activities;
(2) preserving employment and skills of employees currently
employed by such depot-level activities or providing for the
reemployment and retraining of employees who, as the result
of the closure, realignment, or reduced in-house workload of
such activities, may become unemployed; and
(3) supporting the goals of other defense conversion,
reinvestment, and transition assistance programs while also
allowing such depot-level activities to remain in operation
to continue to perform their defense readiness mission.
(b) Participants in Pilot Program.--The Secretary shall
designate not less than six depot-level activities of the
military departments to participate in the pilot program
under this section. Of these depot-level activities, at least
two shall be depot-level activities of the Department of the
Army, at least two shall be depot-level activities of the
Department of the Navy, and at least two shall be depot-level
activities of Department of the Air Force.
(c) Conditions on Pilot Program.--In carrying out the pilot
program under this section, the Secretary shall ensure that
the program--
(1) does not interfere with the closure or realignment of a
depot-level activity of the military departments under a base
closure law; and
(2) does not adversely affect the readiness or primary
mission of a participating depot-level activity.
(d) Funding for Fiscal Year 1995.--Of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $100,000,000
shall be available only to carry out the pilot program under
this section.
amendment, as modified, offered by ms. mc kinney
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. . REPORT ASSESSING THE REGIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES
OF UNITED STATES MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAMS.
(a) Report.--On or before the date of the submission to
Congress of the next annual report of the Secretary of
Defense submitted after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a
report assessing the national security consequences of United
States military cooperation programs. The report shall be
organized into separate sections for each region of the world
(as defined by the Secretary) in which there is a significant
degree of internal political instability or possibility of
changes in the external policies of countries with which the
United States has significant military cooperation
relationships.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each regional section of the
report required under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A description of cooperative military relationships in
effect between the United States and the countries of the
region.
(2) A description of how these activities are intended to
improve regional security.
(3) An assessment of the risks associated with engaging in
military cooperation programs with countries in the region
should the government of any of such country change its
political orientation in a manner hostile to United States
interests.
(4) An analysis of the effect on regional security of
possible multilateral actions to reduce the military
capability of governments and military forces in the region
that could pose a future threat to United States interests.
(c) Classified and Unclassified Form of Report.--The report
under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form
and, to the extent necessary, in classified form.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. menendez
At the end of title XI (page 308, after line 24), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 1152. PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGIES FOR DREDGING OF DUAL-USE PORTS.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall
establish a plan for the Department of Defense to encourage
the further development and deployment of existing defense
environmental technologies in support of the dredging
requirements of dual-use ports, including--
(1) the environmentally secure containment and management
of contaminated dredged materials; and
(2) the decontamination of dredged materials.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--The plan to be established
pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of defense reinvestment and defense
conversion programs under chapter 148 of title 10, United
States Code, that are available to facilitate the deployment
of defense environmental technologies in support of the
dredging requirements of dual-use ports.
(2) A description of existing defense environmental
technologies and processes that are available to support the
objectives of the plan to be established pursuant to
subsection (a).
(3) Recommendations for strategies to deploy such
technologies and processes to ports of various sizes,
including--
(A) ports with projects requiring more than 5,000,000 cubic
yards of sediment to be dredged annually;
(B) ports with projects requiring more than 1,000,000 cubic
yards of sediment to be dredged annually;
(C) ports that have been affected by, or are likely to be
affected by, the closure of one or more major military
installations and that, as a result thereof, require
substantial environmental remediation; and
(D) military port installations that have experienced
significant delays in advancing dredging projects because of
environmental compliance or dredged material disposal
problems.
(4) After consultation with the heads of other appropriate
Federal agencies, an assessment of other available
technologies and processes that may be used in support of the
plan to be established pursuant to subsection (a).
(5) An assessment of the potential benefits and methods of
transfer of technologies and processes for use in connection
with dredging processes in commercial ports and waterways.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
transmit to Congress a report containing the plan to be
established pursuant to subsection (a).
At the end of subtitle D of title XXVIII (page 366, after
line 24), insert the following new section:
amendment offered by mr. miller of california
SEC. 2839. LAND CONVEYANCE, NAVAL SHIPYARD, VALLEJO,
CALIFORNIA.
(a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Navy may
convey, without consideration, to the City of Vallejo,
California (in this section referred to as the ``City''), all
right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a
parcel of real property (including improvements thereon)
described in subsection (b), which is located on Mare Island
in Vallejo, California, and is currently under the control of
Mare Island Naval Shipyard Command.
(b) Description of Property.--The parcel of real property
to be conveyed under subsection (a) shall consist of all
existing active dredge ponds and nontidal areas on Mare
Island under the jurisdiction of the Navy, except that the
parcel shall not include the nontidal areas identified in
figure 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Mare Island Naval
Shipyard, dated July 28, 1988. The exact acreage and legal
description of the real property to be conveyed shall be
determined by a survey satisfactory to the Secretary. The
cost of such survey shall be borne by the City.
(c) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary
considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United
States.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. oberstar
At the end of subtitle A of title II (page 27, after line
5), insert the following new section:
SEC. 203. TACONITE PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.
Of the amount provided in section 201 for the Navy, the sum
of $500,000 shall be available for the purpose of initiating
and carrying out a manufacturing technology program for
taconite processing technology.
amendment offered by mr. stark
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 1038. STUDY ON USE OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO FUEL NAVAL
REACTORS.
Not later than June 1, 1995, the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the Congress
a report on the costs, advantages, and disadvantages of using
low-enriched uranium to fuel naval reactors. The report shall
include the following:
(1) An examination of the implications of using low-
enriched uranium to fuel naval reactors for current and
future United States nuclear-powered naval vessels.
(2) An assessment of the effects of such use on--
(A) the factors of operating performance, ship
displacement, and reactor core life, including the full range
of plausible trade-offs between such factors;
(B) construction and operating costs; and
(C) naval fuel cycle impacts.
(3) An assessment of the effect on United States nuclear
nonproliferation policies if such use were established, under
the leadership of the United States, as the future global
norm.
(4) An assessment of the relative complexity,
effectiveness, and risks of safeguards as applied to low-
enriched uranium and highly-enriched uranium naval fuel
cycles under the President's proposal for a global cutoff in
the production of fissile material or outside of safeguards.
(5) An assessment of the potential Federal budget savings
that would result from such use.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. kennedy
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. . SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
signed at Washington, D.C., London, and Moscow on July 1,
1968, is the centerpiece of global efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons.
(2) The United States has demonstrated longstanding support
for that treaty and related efforts to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons.
(3) President Clinton has declared that preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons is one of the highest priorities of
his Administration.
(4) In April 1995, the parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will convene a Review
Conference in New York City to discuss the indefinite
extension of the treaty.
(5) The policy of the President is to seek at the Review
Conference the indefinite and unconditional extension of that
treaty.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President has the full support of Congress in
seeking the indefinite and unconditional extension of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
(2) the President should as soon as possible fill those
positions at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and other departments and agencies with responsibility
for nonproliferation and the 1995 Review Conference for the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
(3) the President, when formulating and implementing other
elements of nonproliferation policy of the United States
(including United States counter proliferation doctrine, the
nuclear Posture Review, and nuclear testing policy), should
take into account the objectives of the United States at the
1995 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and
(4) the President and the President's senior national
security advisers should dedicate themselves to ensuring the
indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 Review
Conference for that treaty.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. hamilton
In subsection (b) of section 2219 of title 10, United
States Code, as proposed to be added by section 1024(a),
insert before ``Whenever the Secretary of Defense'' the
following:
The Secretary of Defense shall carry out such foreign
disaster assistance as the President may direct the Secretary
to provide.
amendment, offered by mr. quillen
At the end of title XXVIII (page 374, after line 7), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 2858. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO PROHIBITION ON STORAGE AND
DISPOSAL OF NONDEFENSE TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
Section 2692(b) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (8)
and inserting in lieu thereof ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) The treatment and disposal of any material that is
not owned by the Department of Defense if the Secretary of
the military department concerned determines that the
material is required or generated by a private person in
connection with the authorized and compatible use by that
person of an industrial-type facility of that military
department and the Secretary enters into a contract with that
person that is consistent with the best interest of national
defense and economic and environmental security and is based
on mutually agreeable terms.''.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. underwood
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 1038. ASSISTANCE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DEFENSE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES.
(a) Establishment of Restoration Advisory Boards.--Section
2705 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding
after subsection (c) the following new subsection:
``(d) Restoration Advisory Board.--In lieu of establishing
a technical review committee under subsection (c), the
Secretary may permit the establishment of a restoration
advisory board in connection with any installation (or group
of nearby installations) where the Secretary is planning or
implementing environmental remediation activities. The
Secretary shall prescribe regulations regarding the duties,
composition, and establishment of, and the payment of routine
administrative expenses of, restoration advisory boards to be
established pursuant to this subsection.''.
(b) Assistance for Citizen Participation on Technical
Review Boards and Restoration Advisory Boards.--Such section
is further amended by adding after subsection (d) (as added
by subsection (a)) the following new subsection:
``(e) Assistance for Citizen Participation.--(1) Using such
amounts as may be made available under paragraph (3), and
pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary for this
purpose, the Secretary shall provide funds to facilitate the
participation of private individuals on technical review
committees and restoration advisory boards for the purpose of
ensuring public input into the planning and implementation of
environmental remediation activities at installations where
such committees and boards are in operation.
``(2) Funds provided under this subsection may be used
only--
``(A) to obtain technical assistance in interpreting
scientific and engineering issues with regard to the nature
of environmental hazards at an installation and the remedial
activities proposed or conducted at the installation; and
``(B) to assist such members and affected citizens to more
effectively participate in the environmental restoration
process at the installation.
``(3) To provide funds under this subsection for a fiscal
year, there shall be available an amount up to \1/4\ of one
percent of the appropriated funds (but not to exceed
$7,500,000 for fiscal year 1995) available to the Secretary
for that year for environmental restoration through--
``(A) the Defense Environmental Restoration Account; and
``(B) with respect to defense facilities to be closed or
realigned, the Department of Defense Base Closure Account
1990.''.
(c) Involvement of Committees and Boards in Defense
Environmental Restoration Program.--Such section is further
amended by adding after subsection (e) (as added by
subsection (b)) the following new subsection:
``(f) Involvement in Defense Environmental Restoration
Program.--Consistent with regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, the Secretary shall consult with, and seek the
advice of, the technical review committee or restoration
advisory board established for an installation (if any) on
the following issues:
``(1) Identifying environmental remediation activities and
projects at the installation.
``(2) Tracking progress on these activities and projects.
``(3) Collecting information regarding remediation
priorities for the installation.
``(4) Addressing land use, level of remediation, acceptable
risk, and waste management and technology development issues
related to remediation at the installation.
``(5) Developing remediation strategies.''.
(d) Report on Effect of Implementation.--Not later than
December 1, 1994, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a
report to Congress describing the manner in which the
Secretary will implement the amendments made by this section.
The report shall include--
(1) an estimate of the total amount of funds to be provided
to technical review committees and restoration advisory
boards under subsection (e) of section 2705 of title 10,
United States Code (as added by subsection (b)), during the
five-fiscal year period beginning on October 1, 1994, and the
cost to be incurred by the Secretary during such period to
carry out such amendments;
(2) an analysis of whether the establishment of restoration
advisory boards under subsection (d) of such section (as
added by subsection (a)) could delay or disrupt defense
environmental restoration activities; and
(3) an analysis of whether the funding mechanism provided
in subsection (e)(3) of such section (as added by subsection
(b)) could result in funding shortfalls for defense
environmental restoration activities.
(e) Condition on Implementation.--Until the Secretary of
Defense submits the report required by subsection (d), the
Secretary may not obligate or expend any of the funds made
available under subsection (e)(3) of section 2705 of title
10, United States Code (as added by subsection (b)) to
provide funds to technical review committees and restoration
advisory boards.
(f) Time for Regulations.--Not later than March 1, 1995,
the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations
required by the amendments made by this section.
amendment, as modified, offered by ms. kaptur
At the end of subtitle B of title II (page 42, after line
5), insert the following new section:
SEC. 221. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR STRATEGIC METALS.
(a) Research and Development.--The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall give
consideration to acceleration of research and development
projects for strategic metals and alloys to support the
objectives of section 2501(c) of title 10, United States
Code. In carrying out the preceding sentence, the Secretary
of Defense shall begin by conducting a project for the
acceleration of research in aluminum beryllium alloys to meet
military and commercial standards for emerging applications.
(b) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized in section 201(4)
for materials and electronic technology carried out by the
Advanced Research Projects Agency, $2,000,000 is authorized
for the project for acceleration of research in aluminum
beryllium alloys described in subsection (a).
amendment offered by mr. hall of ohio
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 1038. AUTHORIZATION TO EXCHANGE CERTAIN ITEMS FOR
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES.
Paragraph (1) of section 2572(b) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting ``transportation,'' after
``salvage,''.
amendment offered by mr. hall of ohio
At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII (page 351, after
line 23), insert the following new section:
SEC. 2816. GOVERNMENT RENTAL OF FACILITIES LOCATED ON CLOSED
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
(a) Authorization to Rent Base Closure Properties.--To
promote the rapid conversion of military installations that
are closed pursuant to a base closure law, the Administrator
of the General Services may give priority consideration, when
leasing space in accordance with the Public Buildings Act of
1959 (40 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 471 et seq.),
to facilities of such an installation that have been acquired
by a non-Federal entity.
(b) Base Closure Law Defined.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``base closure law'' means the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of
Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) and title II of the
Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. hamilton
At the end of subtitle D of title XI (page 307, after line
19), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1142. LOAN GUARANTEES UNDER ARMAMENT RETOOLING AND
MANUFACTURING SUPPORT INITIATIVE.
Section 193 of the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing
Support Act of 1992 (subtitle H of title I of Public Law 102-
484; 10 U.S.C. 2501 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(d) Loan Guarantees to Support ARMS Initiative.--(1)
Subject to the availability of appropriations for this
purpose, the Secretary of the Army may support the purposes
of the ARMS Initiative by conducting a program to issue
guarantees during fiscal year 1995 against the risk of
nonpayment arising out of loans provided to businesses
establishing commercial activities on inactive and active
ammunition manufacturing facilities of the Department of the
Army. During fiscal year 1995, the subsidy cost of loan
guarantees issued under the loan guarantee program may not
exceed $43,000,000.
``(2) Applications for guarantees under the loan guarantee
program shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Army. The
maximum amount of loan principal that the Secretary may
guarantee under loan guarantee program with respect to any
loan may not exceed $20,000,000. Any such loan shall provide
for repayment over a period not to exceed 10 years.
``(3) The Secretary of the Army may enter into a
cooperative agreement with an appropriate Federal agency,
under which such agency will process applications submitted
under paragraph (2) and otherwise operate the loan guarantee
program on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. From funds
made available for the loan guarantee program, the Secretary
of the Army may transfer to such agency pursuant to the
agreement such sums as may be necessary for such agency to
carry out its activities under the loan guarantee program.''.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. dicks
At the end of subtitle C of title I (page 19, after line
15), insert the following new section:
SEC. 125. ADVANCED CAPABILITY (ADCAP) MODIFICATION PROGRAM
FOR THE MK-48 TORPEDO.
Within the amount provided in section 102(a)(2) for
procurement of weapons, including missiles and torpedoes, for
the Navy--
(1) the amount provided for the Advanced Capability (ADCAP)
modification program for the MK-48 torpedo is hereby
increased by $52,300,000; and
(2) the amount provided for the Fleet Satellite
Communications program is hereby reduced by $52,300,000.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. dellums
At the end of subtitle A of title X (page 266, after line
20), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1005. IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF UNAUTHORIZED
APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--(1) Chapter 9 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 222 the following
new section:
``Sec. 223. Identification of unauthorized appropriations
``(a) Identification.--(1) Upon the enactment of a law
making a defense appropriation, the Secretary of Defense
shall determine, with respect to each defense appropriation
provided in that law--
``(A) whether any part of such appropriation provides funds
for an unauthorized program element (as defined in subsection
(c)); and
``(B) if there are funds provided as part of any such
appropriation for an unauthorized program element, the total
amount of funds provided under that appropriation for all
such unauthorized program elements.
``(2) A determination under paragraph (1) shall be made
with respect to a defense appropriation for a fiscal year
immediately upon enactment of the law making that
appropriation. However, if as of the enactment of such law
there has not been enacted a law specifically authorizing
appropriations for that fiscal year for the purposes named in
section 114(a) of this title, such determination shall be
made immediately after enactment of such an authorization
law.
``(3) Not later than 30 days after the enactment of such an
appropriation or authorization law (whichever is enacted
later), the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report
identifying--
``(A) any unauthorized program element; and
``(B) any amount determined under paragraph (1)(B).
``(b) Comptroller General Review and Report.--(1) The
Comptroller General shall promptly review each report of the
Secretary under subsection (a). The Comptroller General shall
submit a report to Congress if the Comptroller General
determines--
``(A) that the law with respect to which the Secretary
submitted a report provides appropriations for an
unauthorized program element in addition to those identified
in the report of the Secretary; or
``(B) that a program element identified in that report as
an unauthorized program element is not unauthorized.
``(2) A report under paragraph (1)--
``(A) shall identify those defense appropriations, and
program elements under appropriations, with respect to which
the Comptroller General made determinations under
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, of such paragraph;
and
``(B) shall include such comments and recommendations as
the Comptroller General considers appropriate.
``(3) Such a report shall be submitted not later than 30
days after the date on which the report of the Secretary
under subsection (a) is received by Congress.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `defense appropriation' means an amount
appropriated or otherwise made available by Congress in an
appropriation law for one of the purposes stated in section
114(a) of this title.
``(2) The term `unauthorized program element' means a
program element of a program, project, or activity of the
Department of Defense (as identified in budget documents of
the Department of Defense or in congressional budget
documents) for which an amount is provided under a defense
appropriation (whether or not specified in the appropriation
Act concerned) in an amount greater than the amount
authorized by law to be appropriated for such program element
(whether or not such authorized amount is specified by law),
determined by taking into consideration statutory language,
legislative history, and budget documents submitted to
Congress by the Department of Defense.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``223. Identification of unauthorized appropriations.''.
(b) Effective Date.--Section 223 of title 10, United States
Code, as added by subsection (a), shall with respect to
amounts appropriated for fiscal years after fiscal year 1994.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. fazio
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. . AUTHORIZATION FOR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES OF THE ARMED
FORCES TO SELL ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO PERSONS
OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) Army Sales Authority.--(1) Section 4543 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 4543. Army industrial facilities: sales of
manufactured articles or services outside Department of
Defense
``(a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--(1) Subject to
paragraph (2), the Secretary of the Army may sell to eligible
persons outside the Department of Defense articles and
services produced by a working-capital funded Army industrial
facility, including a Department of the Army arsenal.
``(2) The Secretary may not exercise the authority provided
by this section until after the Secretary certifies to
Congress that a cost accounting system has been developed--
``(A) to keep track of the costs associated with making
sales of articles and services under this section; and
``(B) to ensure that expenditures made and revenues
generated in such sales are not intermingled with funds
authorized and appropriated for the military mission of the
industrial facilities involved.
``(b) Eligible Purchasers.--Under such regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe, the following persons shall be
eligible to purchase articles and services under this
section:
``(1) State and local governments.
``(2) Citizens of the United States and persons lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
``(3) Business entities that conduct a significant level of
their research, development, engineering, and manufacturing
activities in the United States and the majority ownership or
control of which is by United States citizens.
``(c) Conditions on Sales.--The Secretary may make a sale
under this section only if--
``(1) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify
the United States, except in cases of willful conduct or
extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to
any person or property arising out of the articles or
services purchased;
``(2) the Secretary determines that the requested articles
or services can be substantially performed by the Army
industrial facility concerned with only incidental
subcontracting and that performance is in the public
interest;
``(3) the Secretary determines that the sale of the
requested articles or services will not interfere with the
military mission of the Army industrial facility concerned;
and
``(4) the sale of the goods and services is made on the
basis that it will not interfere with performance of work by
the Army industrial facility concerned for the Department of
Defense.
``(d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a
purchaser of articles or services under this section to use
advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or
services.
``(2) In the sale of articles and services under this
section, the Secretary shall--
``(A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable
costs, capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation
costs that are associated with the articles or services sold;
``(B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed
by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale;
and
``(C) develop and maintain (from sources other than
appropriated funds) working capital to be available for
paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and
other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
``(e) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles
and services under this section shall be deposited into the
Defense Business Operations Fund.
``(f) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in
this section shall be construed to affect the application of
the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which
incorporate or are produced through the use of an article
sold under this section.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `advance incremental funding', with respect
to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial
payments for the articles or services that includes--
``(A) one or more partial payments before the commencement
of work or the incurring of costs in connection with the
production of the articles or the performance of the
services, as the case may be; and
``(B) subsequent progress payments that result in full
payment being completed as the required work is being
completed.
``(2) The term `variable costs', with respect to sales of
articles or services, means the costs that are expected to
fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
``(A) in the case of articles, the volume of production
necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
``(B) in the case of services, the extent of the services
sold.''.
(2) Section 2208(i) of such title is amended by striking
out ``that manufactures large caliber cannons, gun mounts,
recoil mechanisms, ammunition, munitions, or components
thereof''.
(b) Navy Sales Authority.--(1) Chapter 645 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 7525. Navy industrial facilities: sales of
manufactured articles or services outside Department of
Defense
``(a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--Subject to paragraph
(2), the Secretary of the Navy may sell to eligible persons
outside the Department of Defense articles and services
produced by a working-capital funded Navy industrial
facility.
``(2) The Secretary may not exercise the authority provided
by this section until after the Secretary certifies to
Congress that a cost accounting system has been developed--
``(A) to keep track of the costs associated with making
sales of articles and services under this section; and
``(B) to ensure that expenditures made and revenues
generated in such sales are not intermingled with funds
authorized and appropriated for the military mission of the
industrial facilities involved.
``(b) Eligible Purchasers.--Under such regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe, the following persons shall be
eligible to purchase articles and services under this
section:
``(1) State and local governments.
``(2) Citizens of the United States and persons lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
``(3) Business entities that conduct a significant level of
their research, development, engineering, and manufacturing
activities in the United States and the majority ownership or
control of which is by United States citizens.
``(c) Conditions on Sales.--The Secretary may make a sale
under this section only if--
``(1) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify
the United States, except in cases of willful conduct or
extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to
any person or property arising out of the articles or
services purchased;
``(2) the Secretary determines that the requested articles
or services can be substantially performed by the Navy
industrial facility concerned with only incidental
subcontracting and that performance is in the public
interest;
``(3) the Secretary determines that the sale of the
requested articles or services will not interfere with the
military mission of the Navy industrial facility concerned;
and
``(4) the sale of the goods and services is made on the
basis that it will not interfere with performance of work by
the Navy industrial facility concerned for the Department of
Defense.
``(d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a
purchaser of articles or services under this section to use
advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or
services.
``(2) In the sale of articles and services under this
section, the Secretary shall--
``(A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable
costs, capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation
costs that are associated with the articles or services sold;
``(B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed
by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale;
and
``(C) develop and maintain (from sources other than
appropriated funds) working capital to be available for
paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and
other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
``(e) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles
and services under this section shall be deposited into the
Defense Business Operations Fund.
``(f) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in
this section shall be construed to affect the application of
the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which
incorporate or are produced through the use of an article
sold under this section.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `advance incremental funding', with respect
to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial
payments for the articles or services that includes--
``(A) one or more partial payments before the commencement
of work or the incurring of costs in connection with the
production of the articles or the performance of the
services, as the case may be; and
``(B) subsequent progress payments that result in full
payment being completed as the required work is being
completed.
``(2) The term `variable costs', with respect to sales of
articles or services, means the costs that are expected to
fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
``(A) in the case of articles, the volume of production
necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
``(B) in the case of services, the extent of the services
sold.''.
``(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such
chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new
item:
``7525. Navy industrial facilities: sales of manufactured articles or
services outside Department of Defense.''.
(c) Air Force Sales Authority.--(1) Chapter 933 of title
10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 9541. Air Force industrial facilities: sales of
manufactured articles or services outside Department of
Defense
``(a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--Subject to paragraph
(2), the Secretary of the Air Force may sell to eligible
persons outside the Department of Defense articles and
services produced by a working-capital funded Air Force
industrial facility.
``(2) The Secretary may not exercise the authority provided
by this section until after the Secretary certifies to
Congress that a cost accounting system has been developed--
``(A) to keep track of the costs associated with making
sales of articles and services under this section; and
``(B) to ensure that expenditures made and revenues
generated in such sales are not intermingled with funds
authorized and appropriated for the military mission of the
industrial facilities involved.
``(b) Eligible Purchasers.--Under such regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe, the following persons shall be
eligible to purchase articles and services under this
section:
``(1) State and local governments.
``(2) Citizens of the United States and persons lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
``(3) Business entities that conduct a significant level of
their research, development, engineering, and manufacturing
activities in the United States and the majority ownership or
control of which is by United States citizens.
``(c) Conditions on Sales.--The Secretary may make a sale
under this section only if--
``(1) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify
the United States, except in cases of willful conduct or
extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to
any person or property arising out of the articles or
services purchased;
``(2) the Secretary determines that the requested articles
or services can be substantially performed by the Air Force
industrial facility concerned with only incidental
subcontracting and that performance is in the public
interest;
``(3) the Secretary determines that the sale of the
requested articles or services will not interfere with the
military mission of the Air Force industrial facility
concerned; and
``(4) the sale of the goods and services is made on the
basis that it will not interfere with performance of work by
the Air Force industrial facility concerned for the
Department of Defense.
``(d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a
purchaser of articles or services under this section to use
advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or
services.
``(2) In the sale of articles and services under this
section, the Secretary shall--
``(A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable
costs, capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation
costs that are associated with the articles or services sold;
``(B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed
by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale;
and
``(C) develop and maintain (from sources other than
appropriated funds) working capital to be available for
paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and
other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
``(e) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles
and services under this section shall be deposited into the
Defense Business Operations Fund.
``(f) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in
this section shall be construed to affect the application of
the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which
incorporate or are produced through the use of an article
sold under this section.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `advance incremental funding', with respect
to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial
payments for the articles or services that includes--
``(A) one or more partial payments before the commencement
of work or the incurring of costs in connection with the
production of the articles or the performance of the
services, as the case may be; and
``(B) subsequent progress payments that result in full
payment being completed as the required work is being
completed.
``(2) The term `variable costs', with respect to sales of
articles or services, means the costs that are expected to
fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
``(A) in the case of articles, the volume of production
necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
``(B) in the case of services, the extent of the services
sold.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``9541. Air Force industrial facilities: sales of manufactured articles
or services outside Department of Defense.''.
(d) Control Effect of Sales Authority on Base Closure
Process.--Section 2903 of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law
101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(2)--
(A) by inserting after the first sentence the following new
sentence: ``The Secretary shall also include a certification
that the authorities provided in sections 4543, 7525, and
9541 of title 10, United States Code, for the sale outside
the Department of Defense of articles and services produced
by working-capital funded industrial facilities (and any
sales, workloads, revenues, or other information resulting
from the use or availability of such authorities) were not
considered in preparing the list of recommendations referred
to in paragraph (1).''; and
(B) by striking out ``preceding sentence'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``preceding sentences''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(3), by inserting after the first
sentence the following new sentence: ``The Commission shall
also include in its report a certification that the
authorities provided in sections 4543, 7525, and 9541 of
title 10, United States Code, for the sale outside the
Department of Defense of articles and services produced by
working-capital funded industrial facilities (and any sales,
workloads, revenues, or other information resulting from the
use or availability of such authorities) were not considered
in making its recommendations for closures and realignments
of military installations.''.
(e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections
(a), (b), and (c) shall take effect on June 1, 1995.
amendment as modified, offered by ms. brown of florida
At the end of section 328 (page 66, line 12), insert the
following: ``The Secretary of Defense should seek to ensure
that the military departments maintain depot-level
maintenance and repair capabilities necessary to ensure their
critical readiness requirements.''.
amendment offered by ms. delauro
At the end of subtitle A of title III (page 52, after line
11), insert the following new section:
SEC. 306. SUPPORT FOR THE 1995 SPECIAL OLYMPICS WORLD GAMES.
(a) Authority To Provide Support.--The Secretary of Defense
may provide logistical support and personnel services in
connection with the 1995 Special Olympics World Games to be
held in the State of Connecticut.
(b) Pay and Nontravel-Related Allowances.--(1) Except as
provided in paragraph (2), the costs for pay and nontravel-
related allowances of members of the Armed Forces for the
support and services referred to in subsection (a) may not be
charged to appropriations made pursuant to the authorization
in subsection (c).
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply in the case of members of
a reserve component called or ordered to active duty to
provide logistical support and personnel services for the
1995 Special Olympics World Games.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal
year 1995 the sum of $2,000,000 to carry out subsection (a).
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. farr of california
At the end of title XI (page 308, after line 24), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 1152. PILOT PROGRAM TO DEVELOP AND DEMONSTRATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Cooperative Agreement for Pilot Program.--(1) The
Secretary of Defense may enter into a cooperative agreement
with an institution of higher education for the purpose of
facilitating the development and demonstration of new methods
and technologies for more effective and expedient
environmental remediation at military installations by
engaging in a pilot demonstration project as provided in
subsection (b).
(2) If the Secretary enters into a cooperative agreement
under paragraph (1), the agreement shall authorize the
institution of higher education to enter into partnerships or
other relationships with private and public entities for
purposes of conducting activities under the cooperative
agreement.
(b) Pilot Project at Defense Landfill.--(1) If the
Secretary enters into a cooperative agreement under
subsection (a)(1), the agreement shall authorize the
institution of higher education to participate in a
cooperative pilot demonstration project at a Government
landfill described in paragraph (2) if such demonstration
project can be carried out in a manner that is consistent
with all other actions at such landfill that the Secretary is
legally required to undertake. The institution of higher
education may engage in such project on a long-term basis to
address the broader issues of environmental remediation and
conversion of facilities of the Department of Defense.
(2) The Government landfill referred to in paragraph (1) is
a Government landfill that--
(A) is listed on the National Priorities List pursuant to
section 105(a)(8)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C.
9605(a)(8)(B)); and
(B) is located on a military installation to be closed
pursuant to a base closure law.
(c) Funding.--(1) There is authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1995 $4,000,000 for
the establishment of the cooperative agreement and the
activities necessary to conduct the pilot project.
(2) The amount authorized in section 201 for the joint
Department of Defense and Department of Energy munitions
technology development program for fiscal year 1995 is hereby
reduced by $4,000,000.
{time} 1610
The Clerk proceeded to read the modifications.
Mr. MONTGOMERY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that further reading of the modifications be dispensed with.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I reserve my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gingrich
amendment sponsored by the Republican leadership, myself, and Mr.
Gilman which will be incorporated in today's en bloc package of
amendments. The amendment prohibits the use of Department of Defense
funds to pay for the assessed share to the United States of United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
First and foremost, this amendment is an important statement of
principle on behalf of maintaining the integrity of the defense budget
by explicitly rejecting the centerpiece of the Clinton administration's
controversial new peacekeeping blueprint--PDD-25. Since the inception
of the United Nations and the establishment of the first U.N.
peacekeeping operation in the Middle East in 1948, the United States
has funded its share of peacekeeping costs through the Department of
State. House adoption of the Gingrich amendment simply means we ought
to continue paying these costs out of the State Department's budget.
Unfortunately, at the same time that the role of the United Nations
in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations has escalated, the
Clinton administration has decided that the Department of Defense's
budget--now in its 10th consecutive year of real decline--ought to be
used to subsidize the mounting costs of U.N. operations. Between 1948
and 1978, the United Nations undertook 13 peacekeeping operations.
Since April 1988, the United Nations has authorized 20 operations.
Currently, 18 separate U.N. military and peacekeeping operations are
on-going with the United States paying 32 percent of the United Nations
bill. In 1988, the total cost of U.N. operations was $268 million, yet
this year, these costs are estimated to be $4.5 billion. The costs to
the United States are growing exponentially. The mounting U.S. assessed
costs also exclude the considerable unreimbursed incremental costs
borne by DOD in support of U.N. operations--costs that will exceed $1.2
billion in fiscal year 1994 alone.
The rising costs of these U.N. operations is an issue in and of
itself and we need to look at it very closely. Nonetheless, the House
today will reject the administration's ill-conceived plan to use the
DOD budget as a credit card for U.N. peacekeeping.
The emphasis the Clinton administration places on the central role of
the United Nations in the conduct of its foreign policy has apparently
led the President to endorse a shared responsibility between the
Departments of State and Defense in funding our growing U.N. bills. As
part of PDD-25--the Clinton administration's peacekeeping policy
blueprint--the President has proposed that DOD undertake the
responsibility of funding our share of the most expensive types of U.N.
peacekeeping operations. The administration included $300 million in
fiscal year 1995 defense budget--and $900 million over the 5-year
defense plan--despite the fact that the request grossly underestimates
the true DOD costs under the administration's plan by an order of
magnitude.
The United States costs for three current U.N. operations--Somalia,
Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia--would have been wholly funded this
year by DOD under the President's proposal. The most recent estimate of
the cost to the United States for those peacekeeping operations is
roughly $770 million--significantly more than the $300 million they
requested for this purpose. Within the last month we have even heard
rumors that the White House has directed that DOD increase the
currently budgeted $900 million for U.N. peacekeeping costs over the
next 5 years to $2.7 billion. No matter how you look at it, under the
administration's proposal, DOD will be forced to fund the growing costs
of U.N. peacekeeping out of hide, stretching an already underfunded
defense budget, and putting further pressure on the military service's
already constrained training and readiness accounts.
The Armed Services Committee considered this issue and expressly
rejected the administration proposal during markup of this bill--H.R.
4301. On a strong bipartisan vote of 42 to 11, the Committee adopted a
provision that rejected the administration's plan to use the defense
budget to pay for U.N. peacekeeping--a provision which is the genesis
of the Gingrich amendment in the en bloc package today.
In the negotiations over House Resolution 431, the second rule
governing consideration of H.R. 4301, the Democratic Leadership agreed
to make the Gingrich amendment in order if we would agree not to seek a
record vote and instead, have it adopted en bloc. We reluctantly agreed
to the Democratic leadership's request not to record vote this
important amendment in order to put the House on record in opposition
to the administration's proposal.
As the bipartisan record vote in the Armed Services Committee made
clear, there is broad agreement that DOD funds should not be used to
pay U.N. assessments of any kind. Today's adoption of the Gingrich
amendment further codifies the widespread objections to the Clinton
peacekeeping blueprint.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Guam [Mr. Underwood].
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this
time to me.
Mr. Chairman, included in today's en bloc amendments is a provision I
introduced. This amendment will take citizens who live near
contaminated bases, put them at the table with base commanders, and
help them participate in the base cleanup decisionmaking process.
Thousands of military installations throughout the 50 States and the
territories have environmentally contaminated sites. Too often,
citizens who live near those facilities are not informed about the
problem, do not trust the personnel in charge of clean-up, and fear for
their health and well-being. The result, at best, is strained civilian/
military relations. At worst, we get costly lawsuits between the
community and the military.
The Department of Defense has taken steps to address this problem. It
has established restoration advisory boards, or RAB's: citizen advisory
boards that advise base commanders on the community's needs and
concerns. This program was recommended by the Keystone Commission,
which was formed during the Bush administration and was comprised of
environmental advocates and Federal agencies, including DOD. However,
the advisory boards now in place are missing a very important
ingredient: technical assistance.
What good does it do to bring citizens to the table if they are not
informed on the issue? We cannot expect a homeowner near a base, for
example, to understand complex environmental impact statements and
advise base commanders accordingly. Therefore, my amendment does what
EPA, DOD, and every other member of the commission recommended: it
gives citizens technical assistance funding. With this amendment, we
won't have just token representation * * * we'll have real
participation.
How is it funded? This amendment takes a fixed percentage of existing
clean-up accounts--one-fourth of 1 percent--and requires DOD to provide
technical assistance for restoration advisory boards. Total spending
does not increase.
This amendment is supported by physicians for social responsibility,
friends of the Earth, and the military toxics project. I worked closely
with the Department of Defense in formulating this approach, along with
Chairman Dellums and Mr. Spence. We have devised a solid approach here
* * * making community participation more meaningful without breaking
the bank.
I thank the chairman and the ranking member for its inclusion in the
en bloc and urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
{time} 1620
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise to associate myself with the
Berman amendment to require assistance for dislocated defense workers
under the Job Training and Partnership Act be made available for
workers whose jobs are affected by Federal policy banning the sale
abroad of certain U.S.-made weapons.
Across our Nation, and particularly throughout California and the
Pacific Northwest, many of the best, brightest and most productive U.S.
workers are employed by defense contractors. As U.S. defense spending
has leveled off, defense contractors have increased exports around the
globe. Today, the United States is the world's leading exporter in
armaments.
Recent history, the Persian Gulf war for example, tells us that U.S.
arms exports may be profitable job creators in the short term, yet
deadly weaponry when turned against American military personnel on the
battlefield. I support legislation to scrutinize, and in some cases
forbid, U.S. arms sales. In my opinion, this closer scrutiny of U.S.
arms sales is warranted and in our national security interests.
The Berman amendment is an important component to increased scrutiny
and inevitable reductions of U.S. arms sales. I am pleased to support
it as part of this en bloc package. And I urge the adoption of the en
bloc amendment as offered by Chairman Dellums.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Berman].
(Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the en bloc
amendment to the Defense authorization bill. I am especially pleased
that my amendment to make workers impacted by reduced arms sales abroad
eligible for defense conversion programs was included.
Defense workers who are dislocated because of the Government's
decision not to allow the sale of certain weapons abroad, should have
the same rights as those workers who are dislocated because of U.S.
Government's decision to reduce its own purchases of a particular
weapon system.
Creating this parity not only brings equity to workers dislocated by
U.S. policy, it sends a strong message regarding conventional arms
restraint. Each step taken to alleviate the negative economic
consequences of reduced arms exports helps neutralize the economic
hardship arguments used by those who do not believe in arms restraint.
This amendment will help policy makers focus on proliferation and
security issues which must be paramount when considering whether to
approve arms sales. Arms are different than other exports because
making the wrong sale can have truly dire consequences.
I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], members of the
committee, and members of other committees of jurisdiction for working
with me to include this amendment en bloc. And, I'd like to thank Greg
Bishack, Lara Lumpe, Sima Osdoby, Caleb Rossiter, and the other members
of the arms control community who worked with me to make this amendment
possible.
Again, I urge all members to support this en bloc amendment.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from California [Mr. Farr].
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise to enter into a colloquy
with the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery], standing in for the chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to clarify the purpose
for which my amendment seeks to authorize $4,000,000 for the
establishment of a cooperative pilot program for remediation of a
landfill at a closing base on the Superfund list. I refer to proposed
section 1152--Amendment No. 10 in part 1 of the report of the Committee
on Rules--of H.R. 4301.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would authorize the Secretary of Defense
to enter into a cooperative agreement with a public research
institution of higher education to facilitate the development and
demonstration of new methods and technologies for more effective and
expedient environmental remediation at military installations, with the
agreement structured to include public education and policy
considerations.
For example, ground water contamination in coastal environments is a
serious problem. In one instance, a landfill is leaking low levels of
volatile organic compounds into the drinking water source of an
adjacent community. This site, at a closing base, is listed as a
Superfund site. It is characterized by highly permeable sand dunes and
a deep vadose zone, making it ideal for field testing of emerging, or
optimization of conventional, remediation technologies, although prior
to testing, the site's hydrogeology would need more thorough
characterization. My amendment provides a structure that would allow
this to occur.
Mr. Chairman, am I correct when I state that the committee concurs
with my objectives?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. If the gentleman will yield on behalf of Chairman
Dellums, the distinguished Member is correct in his understanding.
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I commend the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his outstanding work on
this legislation, and thank him for participating in this colloquy.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman
from Kentucky [Mr. Mazzoli].
Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of one of the amendments
in the en bloc amendments authored by the gentleman from California
[Mr. Fazio], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], and myself, that
allows industrial facilities, of which I represent one, to actually
sell their services and manufacturing techniques in the private sector,
so long as there is not a displacement of private workers in the
process, and so long as this is a unique activity.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the gentleman from including that in
the en bloc amendments, and I rise in behalf of the en bloc amendments.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc amendment
which includes my amendment requiring a study on the costs, advantages,
and disadvantages of using low-enriched uranium [LEU] to fuel naval
reactors for current and future U.S. nuclear powered naval vessels. The
study would be done jointly by the Department of Defense and Department
of Energy.
It is important for the future of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
policy to eliminate all rationales for nonnuclear weapon states to
acquire stockpiles of highly enriched uranium [HEU], which can be used
to make nuclear weapons. Aside from nuclear war heads, HEU is used for
two purposes: to fuel naval propulsion reactors and to power research
reactors. The United States already has a well-established program,
RERTR, for phasing out use of weapons-usable uranium in civil research
and test reactors worldwide. To head off future use of HEU in foreign
naval fuel cycles, such as in Brazil and India, it would be desirable
to place the United States in the position of being able to phase out
its own use of this material in naval reactors.
The United States and the United Kingdom rely on HEU fuel for their
naval reactors, but France and Russia do not, using less than 20
percent enriched fuel, indicating that HEU is not an irreducible
requirement for naval reactors. Weapon-usable material in naval fuel
cycles also represents a complicating factor for the safeguards regime
needed to verify President Clinton's proposed worldwide fissile
material production cut-off for weapons. Under current arrangements for
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a country can withdraw material from
safeguards for use in the naval fuel cycle, and the safeguards regime
won't see it again for decades. The potential for diversion to weapons
use in this scenario is obvious.
The success of the RERTR program indicates that conversion of naval
reactors from HEU to LEU is highly feasible on a technical basis. This
amendment requires DOE and DOD to assess how such conversion would
affect U.S. naval strategy and nonproliferation policy. With this
information, we can then determine the advisability of converting naval
reactors to LEU.
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the en bloc
amendment and particularly the McKinney ``Boomerang'' amendment.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment simply requires that the Pentagon assess
and issue a report on the potential threat to U.S. Armed Forces
stationed abroad by U.S. activities to strengthen foreign armed forces
in a region.
I suggest we must learn from our mistakes. United States soldiers
faced United States trained and armed opponents in Panama, in Somalia
and most recently, the good ship Harlan County was turned away from
Haiti because of defiance by a military whose officers were trained by
the United States.
I do not want any young American to lose his or her life because a
weapon we trade today boomerangs, tomorrow. I don't want any young
American facing an enemy with an American-made gun and American skill
and training in how to use it.
Are our military cooperation efforts making it more dangerous for
future peacekeeping efforts or humanitarian relief efforts? Will
weapons we give way to allies today, come back at our men and women in
uniform, tomorrow? Aren't there alternatives for promoting security for
our allies?
The McKinney amendment requires the Pentagon to ask itself these
questions and provide some answers to the Congress.
The McKinney amendment is based on the following assumptions: (1) The
potential threat posed to the United States, its allies, and its
deployed forces by foreign armed forces is a matter of both the
capability of those forces and the will and capabilities of their
governments; (2) arms sales, joint training exercises, and various
military cooperation programs conducted by the United States increase
the military potential of other countries around the world and increase
the proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry; (3) it has
happened in the past that, through various processes of political
change, nations that are friendly to the United States become hostile
at a later time; (4) nevertheless, it is generally accepted that
military operations in the future will be based on coalitions as was
Operation Desert Storm, suggesting that regional and global security
may be enhanced by continued military cooperation relationships between
the United States and other countries; (5) American policy should be to
work unilaterally and cooperatively with other military powers to limit
the transfers of weapons, military technology and training to countries
that may: pose a threat to our deployed forces; pose a risk to American
interests; or escalate regional tensions; (6) as the administration is
currently conducting an interagency review of many of these issues,
information and assessments developed for this review could
appropriately form the basis for the report to Congress required by the
McKinney amendment. However, this report may require additional
inquiries.
The report should focus on the identification and assessment of
military cooperation activities, including: assignment of U.S. military
personnel to advise personnel of a foreign country; joint exercises or
deployments of foreign armed forces with U.S. military personnel; and
the transfer of weaponry involving planning or assistance by U.S.
military personnel. The report should also describe how military
cooperation activities will enhance U.S. security and reduce security
tensions in the region. Alternative strategies should be assessed,
especially the possibilities of reductions in the militarization levels
of regions such as: limitations in the size, spending, and capability
of foreign armed forces. The report should suggest alternative means to
satisfy the goals presently used to justify military cooperation
activities, transfer, and training.
Military policy must be a function of foreign policy and change
subject to changes in the international geopolitical situation. This
report can help Congress assess the relative benefits of military
cooperation activities in the context of the end of the cold war.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Bacchus of Florida). The question is on
the amendments en bloc, as modified, offered by the gentleman from
Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
The amendments en bloc, as modified, were agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 5 printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by ms. pelosi
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment printed in the report.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Ms. Pelosi: At the end of title VIII
(page 246, after line 23), insert the following new section:
SEC. 873. PREFERENCE FOR LOCAL RESIDENTS.
(a) Preference Required.--In entering into contracts with
private entities as part of the closure or realignment of a
military installation under a base closure law, the Secretary
of Defense shall give preference, to the maximum extent
practicable and consistent with Federal, State, and local
laws and regulations, to entities that plan to hire residents
of the vicinity of the military installation. Contracts for
which the preference shall be given shall include contracts
to carry out environmental restoration activities at such
military installations.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term `base closure
law' means the following:
(1) The provisions of title II of the Defense Authorization
Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law
100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
(2) The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
(part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687
note).
modification to amendment offered by ms. pelosi
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer a modification to the amendment
just offered, and ask unanimous consent for its acceptance.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment, as
modified.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment, as modified, offered by Ms. Pelosi. At the end
of title VIII (page 246, after line 23), insert the following
new section:
SEC. 873. PREFERENCE FOR LOCAL RESIDENTS.
(a) Preference Allowed.--In entering into contracts with
private entities for services to be performed at a military
installation that is affected by closure or realignment under
a base closure law, the Secretary of Defense may give
preference, consistent with Federal, State, and local laws
and regulations, to entities that plan to hire, to the
maximum extent practicable, residents of the vicinity of such
military installation. Contracts for which the preference may
be given include contracts to carry out environmental
restoration activities or construction work at such military
installations.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``base closure
law'' means the following:
(1) The provisions of title II of the Defense Authorization
Amendment and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law
100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
(2) The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
(part of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687
note).
(c) Applicability.--Any preference given under subsection
(a) shall apply only with respect to contracts entered into
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Termination.--This section shall cease to be effective
on September 30, 1997.
Ms. PELOSI (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and
printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from California that the amendment be modified?
There was no objection.
Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi]
will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be
recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment would create a hiring preference for local
residents who are affected by base closures in their communities. Under
existing law, the Department of Defense is unable to provide preference
to companies with a strong record of hiring local residents, or
companies which seek to hire local residents most impacted by base
closures.
This is what people in my community are saying: Enough is enough. For
years we have asked for jobs and contracts on projects that are funded
with our tax dollars; we will no longer tolerate someone else, from
outside our community, taking all the contracts and jobs; our demands
are reasonable, peaceful and lawful; is anybody listening?
The Congress has acted to emphasize the importance of revitalizing
local communities in the area of a base closure by directing programs
and resources to provide economic benefit to minimize the impact of
base closures. Because of the way current contracts are structured, and
because of the current bidding regulations governing Federal contract
awards, there is no provision for bids to currently favor hiring locals
most affected by a base closure.
Instead, there are many reported situations where an out-of-State
company, brings in out-of-State workers to do cleanup work at a base
while unemployed workers stand outside the gate and watch. At Hunters
Point Naval Shipyard in my district, over $30 million has been spend on
environmental remediation--with not one local resident being hired,
despite the presence of qualified workers in the vicinity.
My amendment would change this by providing a preference in contract
awards to companies which plan to hire local residents. It would
encourage bidding companies to compete for having the best local hiring
plan to score higher in the bid award process.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the excellent work of the
chairman, Mr. Dellums, and the ranking member, Mr. Spence, for their
cooperation in this effort. I would also like to acknowledge the work
of my colleague, Mr. Hamburg, who has been very active and helpful on
my amendment.
With the gentleman's permission, I would like to engage the chairman
of the committee in a colloquy to clarify his understanding of the last
paragraph of my amendment.
That paragraph states that this provision will only be effective
until September 30, 1997. I recognize the value of a so-called sunset.
However, there are a number of local base contracts, with the
concurrent need for a local hiring preference, that will extend far
beyond this time limit. For example, Hunters Point in my district is a
Superfund site where cleanup activities will certainly continue for an
extended period. How will this short-term authorization affect
situations that will require much longer attention and the continuing
need for local hiring preference?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield, let me
assure the gentlewoman that this sunset should not have a negative
impact on the local hiring preference authorized by her amendment. A
sunset is a useful tool to ensure Congress has the opportunity to
conduct the necessary oversight--and make any appropriate changes in
the legislation--and to ensure that the provision is properly
implemented by the Defense Department. For that reason, sunsets have
been very effective in a number of programs such as the DOD minority
contracting goal program or the Small Business Innovation Research
program.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for offering that clarification,
and I appreciate his support.
I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and vote ``yes''.
{time} 1630
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Hamburg].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from California
[Mr. Hamburg] is recognized for 1\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hamburg].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence] may claim 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Hamburg]
is recognized for 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee in a colloquy to clarify the
interpretation of the Pelosi-Hamburg amendment.
I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to discuss the
amendment with the gentleman from California.
Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank the gentleman for all
the assistance he and his staff have provided in working through this
process. I appreciate his willingness to help resolve problems that
affect a great many people.
As a result of the many military installations being closed in
California and around the country, significant environmental and
construction work is being undertaken as part of the process. In
addition, significant military construction is occurring at open bases
such as Travis Air Force Base as a result of the relocation of
personnel and material from closing bases. This amendment would
authorize the use of a preference to contractors who plan to hire
locally, ensuring that the multiplying effect of Federal dollars
benefits the local community.
I would like to clarify with the gentleman that this amendment
applies not only to bases being closed or realigned, but also to those
bases receiving personnel or material as a result of the closures and
realignments.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct. In awarding
contracts at both closing and receiving bases, a preference may be
given to entities that plan to hire locally.
Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, It is my understanding that this provision
is intended to require that a bidding entity's plan to hire locally
shall be a significant factor to be weighed in awarding affected
contracts. Furthermore, any base declining to use the local hire
preference must demonstrate the compelling circumstances to justify its
decision.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. The gentleman is correct. The contracting officers at
the affected bases are expected to be vigilant in ensuring that an
entity's plan to hire locally is a serious, well conceived plan with a
reasonable probability of actual implementation.
Mr. HAMBURG. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's clarification
of this amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to just rise in opposition only for the
purpose of commenting briefly on the amendment.
I want to thank the gentlewoman from California for her cooperation
in working with me and other Republicans in crafting a compromise on
her amendment that all sides can support.
I do not expect any opposition as a modified amendment and would look
forward to working with the gentlewoman on this issue and other issues
in the future. I would like to support the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The question is on the
amendment as modified, offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Pelosi]
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment No.
6, printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in part 1 of
House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. solomon
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The Clerk will designate the
amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon: At the end of title X
(page 277, after line 2), add the following new section:
SEC. 1038. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
resolution on December 12, 1948, that declared the Republic
of Korea to be the only lawful government on the Korean
peninsula;
(2) between 1950 and 1953, the United States led a military
coalition that successfully repelled an invasion of the
Republic of Korea by the illegal Communist regime in North
Korea, at a cost of more than 54,000 American lives;
(3) the United States and the Republic of Korea ratified a
Mutual Security Treaty in 1954 that commits the United States
to helping the Republic of Korea defend itself against
external aggression;
(4) more than 37,000 American military personnel are
presently stationed in the Republic of Korea pursuant to the
terms of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954;
(5) the United States and the Republic of Korea have
conducted annual joint military exercises, code named ``Team
Spirit'', since 1976;
(6) the Communist regime of North Korea has built up an
armed force nearly twice the size of that in the Republic of
Korea and has never renounced the active and ongoing use of
force, terrorism, and subversion in its attempts to subdue
and subjugate the Republic of Korea;
(7) the North Korean regime signed the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, but refused until
1992 to sign the safeguard agreement that is required of all
treaty signatories and eventually announced in 1993 its
intention to withdraw from the treaty altogether;
(8) the North Korean regime has never permitted the
unfettered international inspection of its nuclear facilities
that is required of all signatories of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
(9) the Secretary of Defense has stated publicly that
efforts by the North Korean regime to develop enough
plutonium to permit the manufacture of 10 to 12 nuclear
weapons per year, and to develop the ballistic missile
capability of delivering these and other weapons over a wide
area, represent a grave threat to the security of the Korean
peninsula and the entire world;
(10) the North Korean regime continues to repudiate all
efforts by the United States to reduce tensions on the Korean
peninsula;
(11) these efforts by the United States to reduce tensions
and provide incentives for the North Korean regime to
cooperate with the international nonproliferation regime
include the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the
territory of the Republic of Korea and a reduction in the
number of American military personnel stationed there, the
establishment of direct diplomatic contacts with the North
Korean regime, and the offer of expanded diplomatic and
economic contacts with North Korea;
(12) on April 20, 1994, the United States and the Republic
of Korea announced the postponement of this year's ``Team
Spirit'' exercises as a further gesture of goodwill and
confidence-building toward North Korea;
(13) the North Korean regime responded to this latest
initiative by declaring that international inspectors will
not be permitted to examine the spent fuel rods that are
being removed from North Korea's principal nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon, nor will inspectors be permitted to see where the
rods will be taken;
(14) weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the fuel
rods in the type of nuclear facilities North Korea is known
to possess; and
(15) the ongoing diplomatic impasse concerning the North
Korean nuclear program has clearly reached a critical
juncture, the unsatisfactory resolution of which would place
the international non-proliferation regime in jeopardy and
threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the
Northeast Asia region, and, by extension, the rest of the
world.
(b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that--
(1) the North Korean regime should take an initial step
toward cooperation with the international nonproliferation
regime by permitting the unfettered international inspection
of the removal and eventual disposal of all spend fuel rods
from the Yongbyon nuclear facility, followed by a regular
inspection process as required by the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
(2) an unsatisfactory resolution of the inspection
controversy at Yongbyon that allows for anything less than
unfettered international inspection of that facility should
prompt the Government of the United States to take such
action as would indicate the severity with which it views
this provocation against international norms; and
(3) such action should include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the seeking of international sanctions against
the North Korean regime and the immediate resumption of the
``Team Spirit'' exercises.
Modification of Amendment Offered by Mr. Solomon
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment
be modified under a prior agreement with the Majority.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment, as
modified
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Solomon: At the end
of title X (page 277, after line 2), add the following new
section:
SEC. 1038. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) between 1950 and 1953, the United States led a military
coalition that successfully repelled an invasion of the
Republic of Korea by the Communist regime in North Korea, at
a cost of more than 54,000 American lives;
(2) the United States and the Republic of Korea ratified a
Mutual Security Treaty in 1954 that commits the United States
to helping the Republic of Korea defend itself against
external aggression;
(3) approximately 37,000 United States military personnel
are presently stationed in the Republic of Korea;
(4) the United States and the Republic of Korea have
conducted joint military exercises, code named ``Team
Spirit'', regularly since 1976;
(5) the Communist regime in North Korea has built up an
armed force nearly twice the size of that in the Republic of
Korea and has never renounced the active and ongoing use of
force, terrorism, and subversion in its attempts to subdue
and subjugate the Republic of Korea;
(6) although the North Korean regime signed the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, it has
never permitted the unfettered international inspection of
its nuclear facilities that is required of all signatories of
that Treaty;
(7) the Secretary of Defense has stated publicly that
efforts by the North Korean regime to develop enough
plutonium to permit the manufacture of 10 to 12 nuclear
weapons per year, and to develop the ballistic missile
capacity of delivering these and other weapons over a wide
area, represent a grave threat to the security of the Korean
peninsula and the entire world;
(8) the North Korean regime continues to resist efforts by
the United States to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula;
(9) efforts in recent years by the United States to reduce
tensions on the Korean peninsula have included the withdrawal
of all nuclear weapons from the territory of the Republic of
Korea and a reduction in the number of United States military
personnel stationed there, the postponement of the 1994
``Team Spirit'' exercises, the establishment of direct
diplomatic contacts with the North Korean regime, and the
offer of expanded diplomatic and economic contacts with North
Korea;
(10) weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the fuel
rods in the type of nuclear facilities North Korea is known
to possess;
(11) international inspectors must be permitted to examine
all spent fuel rods removed from North Korea's principal
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and to carry out tests necessary
to ensure compliance with the 1992 safeguards agreement; and
(12) the diplomatic impasse concerning the North Korean
nuclear program has clearly reached a critical juncture, the
unsatisfactory resolution of which would place the
international nonproliferation regime in jeopardy and
threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the
Northeast Asia region, and, by extension, the rest of the
world.
(b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that--
(1) the North Korean regime should take an initial step
toward cooperation with the international nonproliferation
regime by permitting the unfettered international inspection
of the removal and eventual disposal of all spent fuel rods
from the Yongbyon nuclear complex, followed by a
comprehensive inspection process as required by the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
(2) an unsatisfactory resolution of the inspection
controversy at Yongbyon that allows for anything less than
unfettered international inspection of facilities in that
complex should prompt the Government of the United States to
take such action as would indicate the severity with which it
views this provocation against international norms; and
(3) such action should include, but not necessarily be
limited to, the seeking of international sanctions against
the North Korean regime and the rescheduling of the ``Team
Spirit'' exercises for 1994.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the
amendment, as modified, be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Solomon] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed
will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment for a separate vote because I
believe the gravity of the situation with regard to the North Korean
nuclear program demands that Congress make its voice heard--this week.
Mr. Chairman, North Korea may already have at least one or two
nuclear bombs, according to our own CIA. And, just yesterday, North
Korea announced that the I.A.E.A. will never--repeat, never--be given
access to the nuclear waste sites the I.A.E.A. wants to examine.
Mr. Chairman, what I am about to say is very important: Several hours
ago President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea declared publicly
that the time for negotiations is over, and the time for sanctions has
begun. He said North Korea cannot be trusted with half a nuclear bomb,
much less one or two, or five, or six, or seven.
Mr. Chairman, only just yesterday, the Clinton administration said
that North Korea could have four or even five nuclear weapons by the
end of the year, based on the amount of plutonium that could be derived
from the spent fuel rods that have been removed from the Yongbyon
reactor over the past several weeks.
On Friday--only 2 days from now--the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency will be issuing its definitive
report on the status of inspections at the Yongbyon complex, North
Korea's principal nuclear facility. If reports in the press are
accurate--and there is every reason to believe they are--the I.A.E.A.
is going to rule that North Korea is in substantial noncompliance with
the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and its attendant
safeguards agreement.
Moreover, the I.A.E.A. is evidently prepared to declare that
destruction of evidence and other secret activities at Yongbyon make it
impossible for independent inspectors to account for the removal and
eventual disposal of spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.
So, Mr. Chairman, the moment of truth has come. The ongoing, yearlong
controversy concerning inspection of North Korea's nuclear program has
reached the critical turning point.
Every member knows what is at stake: peace on the Korean Peninsula,
the security of South Korea, Japan, and the entire Northeast Asia
region; and the future of the International Nonproliferation Regime are
in the balance.
Mr. Chairman, the I.A.E.A. report will be delivered to the U.N.
Security Council before the end of this week--and the issue of placing
international sanctions on North Korea will be put on the Security
Council's agenda.
Indeed, Ambassador Albright has confirmed to the press that initial
consultations and discussions on sanctions are already underway.
So now is the time for Congress to be heard in a united and unanimous
voice. this amendment, the language of which was agreed to in
bipartisan consultation, expresses the sense of Congress that the
administration should seek international sanctions against North Korea
and reschedule the Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea, if
the inspection controversy at Yongbyon is not resolved satisfactorily.
This amendment does not tie the hands of the administration in any
way. As a matter of fact, the management of this impending crisis
should be taken over at the Presidential level immediately. It has been
handled for too long at the sub-cabinet level. Now is the time for the
President to be President--and along with the Congress, spell out to
the American people the stakes involved.
Mr. Chairman, no Member doubts the gravity of this issue. Secretary
of Defense Perry has already called it a ``substantial near-term
crisis.'' But America is always most effective when it speaks with one
voice. I urge a unanimous vote for this amendment.
{time} 1640
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence], the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered
by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Solomon amendment expressing
the sense of Congress that the United States should take action against
North Korea including seeking international sanctions and resuming the
Team Spirit military exercises if the controversy over the North's
nuclear program is not satisfactorily resolved. In addition, I urge
support of the Kasich amendment on Korea to be offered later today
which draws much needed attention to our security relationship with the
Republic of Korea [ROK]. These two amendments provide the House with at
least a brief opportunity to discuss the North Korean crisis.
Over the past 18 months, administration policy seems to have been
predicated on the belief that North Korea is pursuing nuclear weapons
solely for bargaining purposes. But North Korea has demonstrated little
interest in bargaining on any terms except their own--which are
unacceptable on many fronts. Instead, the North has been testing United
States resolve and using the time to expand its nuclear bombmaking
program--and doing so successfully.
Last November, President Clinton declared that ``North Korea cannot
be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We have to be very firm about
it.'' This statement of U.S. policy entailed certain risks, but it was
firm and unequivocal. Over time, however, the President has vacillated
and backtracked to the point that the current objective of United
States policy is to prevent North Korea from becoming a so-called
nuclear power--whatever that means.
Mr. Chairman, the implications of this shift in United States policy
towards North Korea are enormous and disturbing. The administration now
seems willing to tolerate the possession of a small number of nuclear
weapons in the hands of Kim Il-Sung. In light of North Korea's record,
it is not hard to envision these weapons being used to threaten United
States forces and allies in the region or being sold to rogue regimes
in the Middle East or elsewhere. If the administration is willing to
tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea, is the same true for Libya? Or
Iran? What is the administration's real policy on nuclear proliferation
and where will the President draw the line?
In light of continued North Korean intransigence over inspections of
their nuclear facilities and the growing likelihood of
economic sanctions, we would all do well to heed Secretary of Defense
William Perry's admonition that:
The North Koreans have stated that they would consider the
imposition of sanctions to be equivalent to a declaration of
war. * * * We may believe, and I do believe, that this is
rhetoric on their part, but we cannot act on that belief. We
have to act on the prudent assumption that there will be some
increase in the risk of war if we go to a sanction regime.
Based on this prudent assumption, one would hope that the United
States is taking numerous steps to increase the readiness of United
States and South Korean military forces necessary to hopefully defeat
any potential military attack by the North. While North Korea is likely
to protest such actions, the United States can no longer continue to
ignore the very real threats posed by the North's escalation of this
crisis.
I urge the President to take firm steps to ensure that no one--friend
or foe--misinterpret U.S. resolve to stand up for our allies and to
protect our geopolitical interests.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues should unanimously support both the
Solomon and Kasich amendments as a way of bringing focus to the many
pressing security issues we confront on the Korean Peninsula.
Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SOLOMON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Nevada.
Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment the author of
this amendment, because as a member of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I know
the threats the gentleman speaks of are real.
I think it is a good resolution, Mr. Chairman. I think we should
enforce the embargo. We should support the embargo and get Team Spirit
back on line.
Mr. Chairman, I compliment the author of the amendment.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there a Member in opposition to the
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I am not in opposition, but I would
request the 5 minutes to address the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery] will be recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]. I may not agree with some of the
wording of the findings of the amendment, but I clearly support the
sense of the Congress language and the spirit and thrust of the
gentleman's efforts here. Clearly this is the most important issue
facing the world and the security of the world today. I want to point
out that I think the gentleman would agree that the legal right that we
have to ask to intrude, to interfere into the nation State of North
Korea, is the fact that they are a signatory of the nonproliferation
treaty. This gives us the legal authority and foundation to ask and to
seek and to go in and inspect. This is a legal document that they have
signed, they have agreed to, and if they want to be a member of the
world community, then they ought to abide by that contract.
That is what the Solomon amendment is getting at, and that is what I
fully support. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] has spelled it
out exactly as it is. They are signatories to the treaty. If they do
not follow through, then we should not be trading with them, and
neither should any of our allies who seek democracy and peace and
freedom throughout the world. I urge support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment, as
modified, offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further
proceedings on the amendment as modified, offered by the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Solomon] will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 29 printed in House
Report 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. kopetski
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Kopetski: At the end of title X
(page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:
SEC. . CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON NEGOTIATION OF LIMITATIONS ON
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) On January 25, 1994, the United States joined with 37
other nations to begin negotiations for a comprehensive
treaty to ban permanently all nuclear weapons testing.
(2) On March 14, 1994, the President decided to extend the
current United States nuclear testing moratorium at least
through September 1995.
(3) The United States is seeking to extend indefinitely the
Non-Proliferation Treaty at the April 1995 NPT Extension
Conference.
(4) Conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty could
contribute toward successful negotiations to extend the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
(5) Agreements to eliminate nuclear testing and control the
spread of nuclear weapons could contribute to the national
security of the United States, its allies, and other nations
around the world.
(b) Congressional Action.--In view of the findings set
forth in subsection (a), the Congress--
(1) applaudes the President for maintaining the United
States nuclear testing moratorium and for taking a leadership
role toward negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty;
(2) encourages all nuclear powers to refrain from
conducting nuclear explosions, prior to conclusion of a
comprehensive test ban treaty; and
(3) urges the Conference on Disarmament to make all
possible progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty by
the end of 1994.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member
opposed will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Mr. KOPETSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise for the third straight year during
consideration of the Defense authorization legislation to address the
issue of nuclear weapons testing.
Today, the international community is negotiating earnestly a
complete cessation of all nuclear weapons testing through the
Conference on Disarmament. With the strong support and active
leadership of the Clinton administration, a comprehensive test ban
treaty is close at hand. In his message to the opening session of the
Conference on Disarmament in January, President Clinton stated, ``* * *
the U.S. delegation will join you in making bold steps toward a world
made safer through the negotiation at the earliest possible time of a
comprehensive test ban treaty that will strengthen the security of all
nations.''
The international community and the Clinton administration are fully
engaged on the issue of nuclear weapons testing. My amendment, the
ongoing work in the House Arms Control Observers Group and the
continued activism of Representatives like Martin Sabo, David Skaggs,
Connie Morella, and Jim Leach demonstrate the Congress' continued
interest in this issue.
Simply put, my amendment: Applauds the President for maintaining the
U.S. nuclear testing moratorium and for taking a leadership role toward
negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty; encourages all nuclear
powers to refrain from conducting nuclear explosions prior to
conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty; and urges the Conference
on Disarmament to make all possible progress toward a comprehensive
test ban treaty by the end of 1994.
Passage of the Kopetski amendment will send a strong message of
congressional support for a comprehensive test ban treaty to the
international negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament.
Mr. Chairman, in my short time in Congress, I do believe this issue
is as important as any I have worked on. With the conclusion of a
successful comprehensive test ban treaty, the world will have taken an
historic step in the name of peace. An historic step away from the
madness of nuclear war, particularly to those of us like myself who
grew up in the shadow of America's nuclear facilities. Mr. Chairman, I
am reminded of the passage in the bible which states, ``Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.'' I ask my
colleagues, once again, please be a peacemaker and support the Kopetski
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] in opposition to the amendment?
Mr. SPENCE. I am, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by Mr. Kopetski, which would have the House express its support
for the continued moratorium on U.S. nuclear weapons testing and which
urges the prompt conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
agreement.
Mr. Chairman, despite the proponents rhetoric, there is still no
evidence to support the assertion that a comprehensive nuclear test ban
or a nuclear testing moratorium by the United States will affect or
stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya
have not abandoned and will not abandon their nuclear weapons
development programs simply because the United States has adopted a
moratorium on testing or because of the possibility of an international
agreement banning nuclear tests in the future.
President Clinton announced last summer that he was extending his
unilateral moratorium on U.S. underground nuclear testing. This past
March, the President informed Congress that he was again extending the
moratorium, this time through September 1995. Since the President's
first announcement, the People's Republic of China has conducted one
nuclear test and, according to a May 26, 1994, New York Times article,
may be preparing to conduct an additional test or tests in the months
ahead. Furthermore, North Korea is in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty by refusing to permit international inspections
of its nuclear facilities and is likely to have already developed one
or two nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein continues to rebuild
Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Nuclear weapons testing is needed to ensure the safety, reliability
and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons that will remain in the U.S.
arsenal for the foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons are a vital
component of our national security posture and must be effectively
maintained if they are to retain their deterrent value.
Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, the Administration's policy of
extending the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing is misguided. The
Administration's policy will reduce, not enhance, U.S. national
security in the increasingly dangerous post-Cold War era as well as
undermine our critical nuclear weapons infrastructure.
I have attached to my statement a September, 1993, report on these
nuclear weapons complex issues written by the Armed Services Committee
Republican Staff which I would ask be submitted for the record
immediately following my statement.
Mr. Chairman, for these reasons, I oppose the Kopetski amendment and
urge a ``No'' vote.
The statement referred to is as follows:
The Clinton Administration and Nuclear Weapons Policy: Benign Neglect
or Erosion by Design?
Executive Summary
In a span of a few short months, the Clinton administration
has dramatically shifted U.S. nuclear policy in a direction
that will lead to the atrophy of the critical capability to
develop, produce and maintain the weapons necessary to retain
a credible nuclear deterrent.
One of the more enduring canards of arms control is the
belief that the path to reduced global nuclear weapons
stockpiles must lead to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). Notwithstanding that the dramatic reductions
in nuclear arsenals realized over the past few years occurred
in the absence of a CTBT, this relic of Cold War thinking
continues to dominate the agenda of yesterday's arms
controllers. Faced with the end of the cold-war rationale,
CTBT proponents have deftly managed to transform the raison
d'etre for a CTBT from yesterday's principal weapon against
nuclear weapons to today's essential instrument in the
struggle against nuclear proliferation.
While tentative at first, the Clinton Administration
recently embraced a nuclear testing moratorium and a CTBT as
central to its arms control policy. Stating that the current
U.S. nuclear inventory is safe and reliable and that nuclear
testing is incompatible with an assertive non-proliferation
policy, President Clinton has declared that the U.S. will
forgo further nuclear testing unless ``this moratorium is
broken by another nation.'' However, even this commitment to
resume testing if another nation does is open to question
given the evident posturing within the Administration in
response to recent reports that China is finalizing
preparations to conduct a nuclear test.
By adopting the anti-nuclear agenda of the old arms control
movement, the Clinton Administration seemingly has ignored
the compelling arguments against a CTBT:
There is no evidence to support the assertion that a CTBT
or nuclear testing moratorium will affect or stop the spread
of nuclear weapons;
Nuclear testing is an unavoidable and necessary component
of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent;
There are no alternatives to nuclear testing that can
provide the requisite level of confidence in the safety and
reliability of the nuclear stockpile.
In addition, the Clinton Administration is taking
preliminary steps to mothball the nuclear weapons production
complex as the Department of Energy struggles to define a
long-term infrastructure strategy. Those issues of paramount
concern are:
DOE has suspended all production of tritium, a critical
element not only for new nuclear warheads, but also for the
replenishment of the active inventory.
For all practical purposes, the U.S. has lost the ability
to produce critical plutonium weapon components.
The Pantex facility in Texas is projected to be so
overloaded with the task of dismantling warheads for disposal
that it risks not being able to continue the random selection
of warheads in the active inventory to be disassembled and
inspected for safety and reliability purposes.
The future of the National Laboratories is highly uncertain
due to severe budget cuts and calls for a shift away from the
historic nuclear support mission they provide.
On top of seven years of steady cutbacks, the Clinton
budget calls for a reduction next year of over 20 percent of
the highly skilled, difficult-to-replace nuclear workforce.
Faced with the incompatible choices of either maintaining
an adequate nuclear support infrastructure or embracing an
anti-nuclear arms control agenda, the Clinton Administration
claims to have adopted both. However, even the most basic of
analysis of this Administration's policies illustrates that
it has apparently chosen to sacrifice nuclear preparedness in
the name of political expediency and an arms control strategy
of dubious merit.
introduction
The Clinton Administration appears to be pursuing a policy
of nuclear atrophy. The most recent manifestation of this
policy was President Clinton's July 3, 1993 announcement to
extend the moratorium on nuclear testing--first imposed by
Congress last year in the form of the ``Hatfield
amendment''--through September 1994 unless another nation
conducts a nuclear test first. When combined with other
recent decisions taken by the Clinton Administration that
further weaken the nuclear weapons development and production
infrastructure, it is clear that the U.S. risks losing the
competency and capabilities necessary to field and maintain a
credible nuclear deterrent.
If current plans are implemented, within four years the
U.S. confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear
weapons already in the stockpile and the ability to
remanufacture retired warheads will have diminished. In
effect, the Clinton Administration is eroding the U.S.
ability to maintain with high confidence the safety and
reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as
the stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and
infrastructure.
The purpose of this paper is to identify a number of
critical issues with respect to the Clinton Administration's
approach to nuclear testing and the maintenance of the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex. It will highlight the current status
of U.S. nuclear testing, problems associated with the Clinton
Administration's policy on nuclear testing--including a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)--and decisions
being made by the Administration which will continue to
contribute to the rapid erosion of the U.S. Government's
nuclear weapons development and production capability.
nuclear testing: the current moratorium
Background
Arguing that testing was needed to develop new weapons,
maintain the reliability of the stockpile and understand
weapons effects, President Reagan suspended on-going
negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing in
July, 1982. In August, 1985, Soviet President Gorbachev
announced a Soviet test moratorium that lasted through
February, 1987. In July, 1986, following negotiations with
Congressional leaders, President Reagan agreed to make
ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) a priority in the
ensuing Congress. Upon ratification, the President
committed to pursue bilateral negotiations on the step-by-
step reduction in nuclear testing as steps towards an
eventual CTBT. In exchange for this commitment,
Congressional leaders agreed not to impose a legislated
testing moratorium.
U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Testing Talks began in November 1987.
The TTBT and PNET verification protocols were completed in
May 1990. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the treaties
with the new protocols in June 1990; the Senate ratified the
agreements in September 1990, and the treaties entered into
force in December that same year.
At this point, the Bush Administration suspended
negotiations to further limit nuclear testing in order to
first consider the effects of the verification provisions
contained in the TTBT and PNET. U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Ronald Lehman testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September,
1990, that negotiations were to resume in several months and
that the Administration was studying a limit on the number or
yield of permitted tests. However, others in the Bush
Administration expressed strong reservations about further
limits on testing. Robert Barker, Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Atomic Energy, stated in September that the
Department of State, Defense and Energy ``have not succeeded
in finding a next step which does not have adverse national
security implications.''
The Nuclear Testing Talks have not resumed to date, though
the Clinton Administration recently sent a senior official
abroad to discuss the outlines of further testing
limitations.
The ``Hatfield Amendment''
The Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 1993 budget request
for the Department of Energy, submitted in February 1992,
included $429.5 million to conduct nine underground nuclear
tests at the Nevada Test Site. The testing plan included a
mix of new design, reliability and weapon-effects tests.
Subsequently, in July, 1992, the Administration modified U.S.
testing policy and announced it would conduct no more than
six tests for safety and reliability purposes in Fiscal Year
1993 and for each of the following five fiscal years, and no
more than three tests per year in excess of 35 kilotons.
Concurrently, on September 24, 1992, the House adopted H.R.
5373, the Fiscal Year 1993 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act which included the so-called ``Hatfield
Amendment'' on nuclear testing. The bill provided $375
million for nuclear weapon testing in Fiscal Year 1993, but
rejected the Administration's revised nuclear weapon testing
plans and instead, imposed a nine-month interim moratorium on
testing. Following the interim moratorium, a limited number
of tests were to be permitted, to be followed by a cessation
of all testing after September, 1996, unless another nation
tested. This marked the first time that a cessation of
nuclear testing had been imposed by the Congress. President
Bush signed the measure into law (Public Law 102-377) on
October 2, 1992.
Proponents of the ``Hatfield Amendment'' offered several
arguments in support of the moratorium, and an eventual ban
on all testing. These arguments included:
Continued nuclear testing was a ``vestige of the Cold
War;''
A cessation of U.S. nuclear testing would help to stem the
proliferation of nuclear weapons;
Continued U.S. nuclear testing would jeopardize efforts to
extend indefinitely the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
during the up-coming 1995 Treaty review conference.
Opponents of the ``Hatfield Amendment'' countered that
nuclear testing was still needed to:
Ensure the proper functioning and reliability of the
stockpile;
Modernize the existing stockpile for enhanced safety,
security and effectiveness;
Measure the effects of nuclear weapons on other weapon
systems and components which are continually changing as
technology advances.
They also noted that test ban advocates were in error
because:
A U.S. test ban would have no effect on the motivations or
capabilities of proliferant nations to acquire nuclear
weapons;
The association of a test ban with renewal of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty is artificial; the treaty does not
call for a test ban and its renewal does not depend in any
way on a test ban. (See footnote 3)
Upon assuming office, President Clinton made negotiation of
a CTBT a priority of his Administration. On April 23, 1993,
in his meetings with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in
Vancouver, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would
consult with Russia, our allies and other states, about
commencing CTBT negotiations at an early date. Consistent
with this goal, President Clinton announced on July 3, 1993,
that he was extending the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing
through at least September 1994, calling on the other nuclear
powers to do the same. In furtherance of this policy,
Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs
Lynn Davis recently visited Britain, France, China, Russia,
and other capitals to urge restraint on testing and to
discuss the modalities and parameters associated with
possible CTBT negotiations.
In extending the testing moratorium, the President stated
that a ``test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to
halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons,'' and, if
joined by the other nuclear powers, would put U.S. ``in the
strongest possible position to negotiate a comprehensive test
ban and to discourage other nations from developing their own
nuclear arsenals.'' He also directed the Department of Energy
to be ready to resume testing, stating that ``If, however,
this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct
the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional
tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress.''
Finally, the President also stated that ``To assure that
our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban,
we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in
the safety, the reliability and the performance of our own
weapons. We will also refocus much of the talent and
resources of our nation's nuclear labs on new technologies to
curb the spread of nuclear weapons and verify arms control
treaties.''
the clinton nuclear policy: on the road to atrophy
A principal underpinning of the Clinton Administration's
``no first test'' policy is the assertion that continued
testing is inconsistent with U.S. non-proliferation goals. In
arriving at its policy, the Clinton Administration also
determined and declared that U.S. nuclear weapons were
already safe and reliable, and concluded that while
additional nuclear testing could help provide some additional
improvements in safety and reliability, such benefits were of
marginal value when balanced against the priority of nuclear
nonproliferation.
CTBT and Nuclear Non-proliferation
There is no evidence to support the assertion that a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will strengthen efforts to halt
the spread of nuclear weapons. Efforts to negotiate a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty have been on-going
since the mid-1940s. In the early 1960s, U.S., Soviet and
British negotiations on a CTBT foundered when the Soviets
broke out the existing (1958-1961) test moratorium. Further,
the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which banned nuclear
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under
water, addressed a key public concern of time, namely, the
elimination of the environmental effects of testing, thereby
diminishing the enthusiasm for a CTBT. Nuclear testing
negotiations remained largely moribund until President Carter
re-initiated efforts to achieve a CTBT with the Soviet Union
in 1977. These discussions also failed to produce an accord,
however, due to opposition within the Executive branch, as
well as several international crises, including the Iran
hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Underlying President Clinton's desire to once again have
the U.S. resume negotiations on a CTBT are two proliferation-
related assumptions: (1) without such an agreement, nations
will be unwilling to indefinitely extend the NPT at the
Treaty review conference in 1995; and (2) a CTBT would
discourage or preclude other non-nuclear states from
developing or obtaining nuclear weapons. Both of these
underlying assumptions are highly questionable.
On the first point, supporters of a test ban claim that a
U.S. failure to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT
would represent a serious blow to U.S. nonproliferation
objectives. However, there is no evidence that the NPT is
dependent on the conclusion of a CTBT. This argument is often
posited by anti-nuclear activists and is not supported by
pronouncements of NPT party governments. Lack of support for
a CTBT by representatives to the 1990 NPT review conference
is evidence of the low salience of this issue for most NPT
parties.
Further, a 1991 National Academy of Sciences report stated
that, ``most countries will make their decisions about the
utility of the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) regime
or their maintenance of a nuclear option on the basis of
their perceptions of their own security interests, not on the
actions of the United States and Soviet Union or other
nuclear weapons state on testing.'' That this is true was
evidenced at the July G-7 Summit in Tokyo when Japan refused
to commit itself to an indefinite extension of the NPT
because of its worries over North Korea's development of
nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery systems.
While Japan has more recently expressed its support for an
indefinite extension of the NPT (noting also that the NPT
contains a withdrawal provision), Foreign Minister, Kabun
Muto has also stated that Japan must have the will to
build nuclear weapons if it is deemed necessary to deter
and defend against a North Korea nuclear threat.
Japan's expressed concerns point to an ironic consequence
of a CTBT, namely, the potential for an increased risk of
proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations that once
relied upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their security but
may in fact lose confidence in U.S. security guarantees under
an extended regime of no U.S. nuclear testing. Columnist
Charles Krauthammer stated in July 16 op-ed in The Washington
Post that, ``There are two kinds of countries with the
potential to acquire nuclear weapons. First, advanced and
generally friendly countries--like Germany, Japan and South
Korea--that refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in part
because they trust the American nuclear umbrella to protect
them. If they see us denuclearizing, their temptation to
acquire their own nuclear umbrella to protect them. If they
see us denuclearizing, their temptation to acquire their own
nuclear weapons will only increase. The other category of
nations comprises the pariah states * * *
With respect to the second concern--the ability of a CTBT
to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons--there is no
evidence that nuclear testing has any direct bearing on
either the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or
future arms control efforts.
First, what we have learned about the Iraqi nuclear program
since Operation Desert Storm demonstrates that nuclear
testing is not necessarily required to develop nuclear
weapons. The likely existence of Pakistani and South African
nuclear programs also prove this point. Several Third World
nations that either presently have a nuclear capability or
may be capable of assembling a nuclear weapon(s) on short
notice have reached this level of development despite never
having conducted a nuclear test of which the West is aware.
Indeed, North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT, and
latest progress on its long-running covert nuclear program,
have occurred at a time when the U.S. was observing its self-
imposed moratorium on nuclear testing.
Second, nations such as Libya, North Korea, Iran and Iraq,
might well contend that a CTBT is only a tool for global
powers like the United States and Russia to deny them their
``sovereign right'' to develop such weapons.
Third, even if countries such as Iraq and North Korea were
to sign a CTBT, their willingness to observe the spirit and
letter of such an agreement would always be in question, and
may never be adequately verifiable. Being a signatory would
have a minimal impact on the nuclear weapons development
programs of such countries since the relatively crude weapons
they are most likely to assemble and/or deploy may not
require any nuclear testing. It is doubtful whether all
countries that were to sign a CTBT would refrain from testing
if they concluded it was in their national interest to test.
Fourth, U.S. experts have also noted that a CTBT is
unlikely to ever be effectively verifiable; according to
Kathleen Bailey, an expert on nuclear proliferation issues, a
test ban cannot be verified below approximately one kiloton,
a level of explosive testing that is still highly useful to
nuclear weapons design or improvement. With efforts by the
testing nation to seismically decouple or hide the signal in
other seismic signals, the size weapon to be tested could be
increased substantially without fear of discovery. Countries
intent on cheating could identify and implement evasive
measures that would make it virtually impossible for U.S.
sensors to detect low-yield tests.
Fifth, CTBT would actually cripple the development of
certain counterproliferation technologies. There are many
nuclear threats that the U.S. or its allies could face in the
future that do not conform to the classic military scenario.
A nuclear weapon might be stolen or sold to a terrorist from
the stockpile of the former Soviet Union or a proliferant
state, and targeted for use in the U.S. Even if the U.S. were
able to locate such a weapon before it detonated, it may not
have the technical capability to disarm or render the weapon
harmless. The U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories are only now
beginning to address this serious issue. Once technologies
are developed, it will be imperative that they be tested. To
know whether they will work is likely to require testing
against a real nuclear device.
Finally, as demonstrated by the progress in U.S.-Soviet
and, more recently, U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, a
cessation of nuclear testing is not a prerequisite for
limiting or reducing nuclear arms. START I and START II, if
fully implemented, will dramatically reduce the number of
nuclear weapons in each nation's arsenal, yet were negotiated
in an era of regular nuclear testing.
Nuclear Stockpile Safety and Reliability
Nuclear testing is needed to assure the safety and
reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. Implicit in President
Clinton's July 3, 1993 announcement is the belief that the
U.S. can afford to stop testing because its nuclear weapons
are already safe and reliable. This view ignores the fact
that U.S. nuclear weapons are currently safe due, in part, to
years of nuclear testing. Furthermore, it is only through
some level of continued explosive testing that the U.S. will
be able to monitor and improve the stockpile's safety and
reliability in the future.
The Administration's view that U.S. nuclear weapons are
already safe and reliable enough demonstrates a cavalier
attitude toward the complexity of nuclear weapons and fails
to take into account past safety and reliability problems
with the stockpile. Nuclear weapons are probably the most
complex weapons the U.S. deploys, yet they are tested only a
fraction of the amount that other U.S. weapons are tested.
Since 1958, the U.S. has deployed 41 different nuclear weapon
systems, of which 14 have required corrective modifications
due to reliability deficiencies discovered or evaluated after
nuclear testing.
The majority of U.S. nuclear tests over the past few years
have been primarily concerned with testing modern safety
features for nuclear weapons. Safety improvements to the U.S.
nuclear arsenal--designed to make it nearly impossible for
nuclear weapons to give off a nuclear yield unintentionally--
include the use of insensitive high explosives (IHE--
explosives which are virtually impossible to detonate in
violent accidents), enhanced nuclear detonation safety
(ENDS--an electrical system which protects a weapon from the
effects of spurious electric signals such as lightning) and
fire resistant pits (FRP--a shell of metal around the pit
with a high melting point to contain the plutonium in a
fire). The development of all these safety features required
nuclear testing.
In summary, it was only through nuclear testing that the
U.S. discovered significant problems in certain nuclear
weapons and was consequently able to implement and validate
appropriate fixes. Without an active program of weapons
testing, the U.S. will reduce its ability to determine with
confidence and even improve the safety and reliability of its
nuclear weapons in the future.
Alternatives to Nuclear Testing
Simply stated, as compared to nuclear testing, there are no
``other means'' sufficient to maintain confidence in the
safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
There are three primary technical reasons for the testing
of nuclear weapons:
To enhance and ensure the safety of nuclear weapons by
testing modern safety features to be added to various weapon
designs
To ensure the reliability of the nuclear stockpile by
testing for problems during the development process and those
identified after deployment
To understand and improve the survivability of U.S.
military systems in a nuclear environment.
Sophisticated computer modeling and simulation,
conventional testing, and other non-nuclear testing regimes
can provide useful data on each of the above, but none of
these methods provide a high confidence alternative to ensure
the safety, reliability and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear
weapons.
With respect to the design of nuclear warheads, history has
demonstrated that computer calculations are not a viable
substitute for testing to validate warhead design. In fact,
several nuclear weapons designed and produced during the
1958-61 nuclear testing moratorium were found to be seriously
flawed when tested after the moratorium ended.
With respect to survivability, potentially fatal design
flaws were discovered in a number of critical components on
the Minuteman II and III, Poseidon, Peacekeeper and Trident I
and IF systems through nuclear testing. Even after extensive
non-nuclear testing and analysis, in every warhead/reentry
vehicle system except one, detection of such flaws did not
occur until a fully integrated system has been subjected to
an underground nuclear test.
With respect to the survivability of non-nuclear weapons
systems, any future ballistic missile defense system deployed
by the U.S., for example, may someday have to operate in a
nuclear environment produced by incoming warheads. At a
minimum, any such defensive system will have to be hardened
against the effects of a nuclear detonation. System-level X-
ray hardness testing cannot now be simulated, nor is any such
credible threat-level simulation capability expected in the
next 10-20 years. While lower-level simulation is both
feasible and useful, it is not an alternative to nuclear
testing.
There is a final irony of any plan which relies on means
other than nuclear testing to maintain confidence in the
safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Despite
progress in non-nuclear testing technology and applications,
nuclear testing will ultimately be required to refine and
validate these ``non-testing'' technologies if the U.S. hopes
to have confidence in them as viable alternatives to actual
testing.
Despite President Clinton's interest in exploring other
means to maintain U.S. confidence in the nuclear stockpile,
his direction to the DOE to be prepared to resume testing
should the testing moratorium be broken by another nation
seemingly reflects the importance of testing. Yet, in
ordering the DOE to be prepared to resume nuclear testing,
the President has ignored the importance of actually
conducting tests in order to maintain the critical skills
needed by those who are charged with stewardship of the
nuclear stockpile.
If experienced scientists and engineers affiliated with the
U.S. nuclear test program are denied the ability to maintain
the critical skills needed to do their job, they will
eventually leave to pursue other endeavors. Such a
development could put this country in a position where it
will not be able to resume nuclear testing in a timely
fashion when and if the Clinton (or some future)
Administration decides that it has become necessary to do so.
Should this occur, at the most fundamental level the U.S.
will have put at risk its core nuclear competency, of which
testing is an essential element.
infrastructure policy: benign neglect or erosion by design?
Nuclear testing is only one of the various elements
necessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons
capability. Other elements include the processing and
production of critical nuclear materials used in the weapons,
fabrication of plutonium components, and the assembly and
disassembly of warheads.
The DOE is currently reviewing the future of the nuclear
production complex--calling the review Complex 21--with the
ultimate goal of consolidating nuclear weapons production
capabilities at a single site. Although DOE has stated its
plans to maintain the weapons production capabilities through
Complex 21, there are concerns that the Clinton
Administration may be reluctant to adopt the recommendations
of its own review, resulting in an acceleration of the
erosion of the nuclear weapons infrastructure. Key components
of those issues under review are discussed below.
Tritium Production
To date, one of the most troubling decisions made by the
Clinton Administration has been to place the K reactor at
Savannah River, South Carolina in ``cold standby'' while
simultaneously postponing until at least next year selection
of a New Production Reactor (NPR) technology. The K reactor
and NPR technologies are designed to produce tritium which is
used to enhance the explosive power of a nuclear warhead.
Importantly, tritium has a half life of only 12 years and
must be replenished continually. The K reactor at Savannah
River was scheduled to proceed with a production run in 1993
in order to demonstrate its continued viability as a source
of tritium until such time as a new technology could be
brought on-line. That demonstration program has now been
canceled by the Clinton Administration. The Administration's
plan to mothball the K reactor will apparently leave the U.S.
without any capability to produce tritium for the foreseeable
future.
The K reactor was ultimately to have been to be replaced by
the NPR. Unfortunately, the decision on a future NPR
technology has already been delayed twice in the last three
years, with indications that the Clinton Administration will
again delay the decision beyond the current 1994 date. This
is important because once a decision on the NPR is made, it
will take at least 15 years before the new technology will
generate tritium. Based on current stockpile projections, a
new tritium production source ought to begin operations in
2008, so new tritium would be available to enter the
stockpile in 2010. To meet this schedule, preconstruction
activities associated with NPR must begin in 1995. Even on
this ambitious schedule, the U.S. will have to reach deeply
into its tritium reserves.
The most prudent approach to meeting future tritium
requirements would be to run the demonstration phase of the K
reactor and to keep the reactor in ``warm standby'' status in
the event it is needed to resupply tritium reserves. The
Clinton Administration, however, has rejected this approach,
contending instead that a civilian light-water reactor loaded
with special target elements could be used in a national
emergency to produce tritium. However, the target development
program was terminated at the pre-prototype stage and would
require several years to complete if it were to be
reinitiated. Furthermore, the proposal to use a civilian
reactor fails to acknowledge the likely legal and political
obstacles to utilizing a civilian reactor for military
purposes in the future. The Clinton Administration ought
to promptly identify of a means for tritium production and
commit to a plan that will provide a new tritium supply by
2010.
Plutonium Component Fabrication
Another impending crisis for the U.S. nuclear weapons
infrastructure in the shutdown of production capabilities at
Building 707 at the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado. For all
practical purposes, the United States has terminated its
ability to fabricate plutonium components for new or
redesigned weapons in the future. Plutonium components
comprise an essential element of the ``pit'' of a nuclear
warhead. With the closure of Building 707, if U.S. decision-
makers decide at some point in the future to produce a new
nuclear weapon or redesign an existing weapon to enhance its
safety, the U.S. will have to rely on reusing old pits. The
idea of reusing old pits is relatively new and much still
remains to be learned. Although reusing old pits may work in
some situations, ironically, validating a new or modified
weapon design that relies on a reused pit would still require
nuclear tests. In fact, such weapon designs incorporating
reused pits have required extensive underground testing in
recent years.
The U.S. has never incorporated a reused pit into the
stockpile. Furthermore, reusing old pits fails to acknowledge
that the U.S. does not today know what its requirements for
future nuclear weapons will be or how pits will age over
time, an issue which didn't exist in the past because pits
were not expected to be reused. In other words, new warheads
were built with new pits. Further, most older pits are not
designed to work with insensitive high explosives (IHB), a
key safety feature in more modern strategic nuclear warheads.
The National Laboratories could produce a limited number of
pits, but their current capability is insufficient if a
decision is made to proceed with new warhead development and
production. Unless the capabilities of the National
Laboratories are significantly enhanced, or a new plutonium
fabrication facility is constructed (as tentatively planned
under DoE's nuclear consolidation review), the United States
will lose the capability to fabricate more than a small
number of plutonium pits for new, redesigned, or
remanufactured warheads each year.
The National Laboratories
Although the national laboratories might be capable of
producing small quantities of nuclear warheads in an
emergency, even this may change if proposals pending in
Congress to reshape the laboratory infrastructure are
adopted. Some of these legislative proposals, such as H.R.
1432, would downgrade the priority currently assigned by the
labs to the design and maintenance of the nuclear stockpile
in favor of developing more civilian oriented technologies.
Additionally, the FY 1994 DOE Defense Programs budget,
which funds all defense nuclear activities, has decreased 19%
over FY 1993 spending levels. The National Labs are funded
from the DOE Weapons Activities account which has received
the largest spending reductions in both terms of dollars and
as a percent of the budget. Further, there are indications
that the Weapons Activities account will receive another
significant cut in the FY 1995 Defense Programs budget
request. Substantial cuts to the research and development
budget of the laboratories will cause irreparable long-term
damage and could prevent the laboratories from carrying out
what ought to be their priority mission of designing and
developing nuclear weapons.
Warhead Assembly and Maintenance
Another concern with the nuclear weapons infrastructure is
the rate of warhead dismantlement at the Pantex Plant in
Texas. Pantex is responsible for the dismantlement of nuclear
warheads for reliability checks as well as for disposal, and
for the interim storage of plutonium pits. DOE anticipates
that Pantex will soon reach its capacity of dismantling 2000
warheads per year. Achieving and maintaining this rate could
affect the ability of the dismantlement facility to carry out
another of its key missions--the routine disassembly of
warheads to ensure their reliability. In an effort to reach
an optimum rate of dismantlement at Pantex, DOE is apparently
ignoring the requirement to randomly select warheads from the
stockpile to disassemble and inspect. Neglecting this
process, in the context of a moratorium on nuclear testing,
will further undermine U.S. confidence in the integrity of
warheads in the stockpile.
One alternative, which DOE has not seriously explored, is
to expand the mission of the Device Assembly Facility (DAF)
at the Nevada Test Site from exclusively supporting the
testing agenda to supporting stockpile confidence efforts.
DAF was designed to assist in nuclear tests. Under the
testing moratorium, DAF could be reassigned the mission to
regularly conduct safety and reliability inspections on
stockpile warheads.
Workforce
A final, but critical, element of the Nation's nuclear
complex that is in jeopardy is the unique and highly skilled
workforce. In many respects, the ``cutting edge'' of U.S.
nuclear capability is a workforce that remains dedicated to
ensuring the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Less than ten years ago, the U.S. nuclear complex employed
approximately 11,000 workers. In the 1985-1993 period,
however, this number has been reduced by almost 2,000 people.
DOE now anticipates that an additional 2,000 employees
will likely be laid off in 1994 alone, taking the nuclear
workforce down to a level of 7,000 employees. Furthermore,
the number of personnel involved in critical warhead
design, development, fabrication and testing activities in
1994 is expected to be one-half the number of just eight
years ago.
That the U.S. nuclear weapons complex is only as good as
the people who work within it is an obvious, but seemingly
overlooked, truth. Highly skilled, highly motivated
scientists and engineers in sufficient numbers are critical
to maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile in the future. The Clinton Administration has yet
to establish new, ``baseline'' requirements for the nuclear
weapons complex, including personnel levels. In the absence
of these requirements, the potential Clinton reductions once
again raise serious questions about the direction of the
Administrations's policies and its level of commitment to
preserving core levels of competency in nuclear matters.
conclusion
The end of the Cold War has provided the U.S. with an
opportunity to reduce defense spending. In taking advantage
of this opportunity, the President and Congress should be
careful to drawdown U.S. defenses in a manner consistent with
a clear and concise national defense strategy reflecting the
changed international environment. First and foremost,
however, there should be recognition that the world is still
a dangerous place. The proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology is an increasing threat. There are 35,000 nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet Union now spread across four
newly independent states.
As long as other nations covet or control nuclear weapons,
the U.S. and its allies must continue to depend on nuclear
weapons for their security. Furthermore, our friends and
allies alike must continue to have confidence in the security
provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Whether supporting a force of 20,000 or 3,500 warheads,
there are unavoidable responsibilities associated with
maintaining a credible nuclear stockpile. Both the Congress
and the Administration have an obligation to ensure that
those responsibilities are met.
However, recent actions taken by the Clinton Administration
that follow on the heels of cutbacks already made by the Bush
Administration call into serious question this
Administration's willingness to step up to those
responsibilities.
Optimists will argue that the consequences of the decisions
discussed above can be easily and quickly rectified with the
rapid commitment of additional financial resources when and
if necessary in the future. But this view raises several
important questions;
Will there remain the national commitment to invest large
sums of money in the nuclear weapons complex to reinvigorate
the U.S. deterrent in the future?
Will there be legal or environmental obstacles to
reinitiating production of critical nuclear materials?
Will there be sufficient public support to rebuild
plutonium fabrication facilities if necessary?
Will there be sufficient time to reconstitute necessary
materials production and weapons fabrication capabilities?
Will the U.S. be able to hire sufficient numbers of skilled
and experienced scientists, engineers, and technicians
required to work in the nuclear weapons complex of the future
once today's experts have left to pursue other endeavors?
At present, no one can definitively answer these questions.
Accordingly, the prudent approach to maintaining a credible
nuclear stockpile is to slow the decommissioning of DOE
defense facilities, slow the rush to methodically dismantle
the DOE nuclear infrastructure, slow or reverse the U.S.
nuclear weapon complex ``brain drain,'' and continue to
perform nuclear tests to ensure the safety and reliability of
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and other critical
military systems.
Over the last half century, U.S. nuclear weapons have
evolved into complex, highly sophisticated systems developed,
produced, and maintained to meet U.S. national security
challenges. These weapons require maintenance, logistical
support, and testing--both nuclear and non-nuclear--
commensurate with their complexity and sophistication if they
are to continue to serve as reliable and effective components
of U.S. national security.
Without nuclear testing, new, safe, secure, reliable, less
complex nuclear weapons cannot be developed and produced, and
new survivable systems, technologies and processes cannot be
validated. Without nuclear testing, the U.S. can neither
maintain existing nuclear weapons nor develop new weapons
with a high degree of confidence in the future. This is the
dilemma that President Clinton currently confronts.
APPENDIX A
Public Law 102-377 102d Congress
Sec. 507. (a) Hereafter, funds made available by this Act
or any other Act for fiscal year 1993 or for any other fiscal
year may be available for conducting a test of a nuclear
explosive device only if the conduct of that test is
permitted in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) No underground test of a nuclear weapon may be
conducted by the United States after September 30, 1992, and
before July 1, 1993.
(c) On and after July 1, 1993, and before January 1, 1997,
an underground test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted by
the United States--
(1) only if--
(A) the President has submitted the annual report required
under subsection (d);
(B) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report
in accordance with that subsection; and
(C) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described
in subsection (d)(3) within the 90-day period; and
(2) only if the test is conducted during the period covered
by the report.
(d)(1) Not later than March 1, of each year beginning after
1992, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed
Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a
report containing the following matters:
(A) A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks
with Russia.
(B) A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban
on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30,
1996.
(C) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear
warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of
active nuclear weapons on September 30, 1996.
(D) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1992, an
assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that
will remain in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons
and that--
(i) will not be in the United States stockpile of active
nuclear weapons;
(ii) will remain under the control of the Department of
Defense; and
(iii) will not be transferred to the Department of Energy
for dismantlement.
(E) A description of the safety features of each warhead
that is covered by an assessment referred to in subparagraph
(C) or (D).
(F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety
features in each warhead identified in the assessment
referred to in subparagraph (C), as determined after an
analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature
or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such
features.
(G) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapons
tests, not to exceed 5 tests in any period covered by an
annual report under this paragraph and a total of 15 tests in
the 4-fiscal year period beginning with fiscal year 1993,
that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each
nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features
are installed pursuant to the plan referred to in
subparagraph (F).
(H) A schedule, in accordance with subparagraph (G), for
conducting at the Nevada test site, each of the tests
enumerated in the assessment pursuant to subparagraph (G).
(2) The first annual report shall cover the period
beginning on the date on which a resumption of testing of
nuclear weapons is permitted under subsection (c) and ending
on September 30, 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall
cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the
report is submitted.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), ``joint resolution''
means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on
which the Committees referred to in that paragraph receive
the report required by that paragraph the matter after the
resolving clause of which is as follows: ``The Congress
disapproves the report of the President on nuclear weapons
testing, dated .'' (the blank space being
appropriately filled in).
(4) No report is required under this subsection after 1996.
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), during
a period covered by an annual report submitted pursuant to
subsection (d), nuclear weapons may be tested only as
follows:
(A) Only those nuclear explosive devices in which modern
safety features have been installed pursuant to the plan
referred to in subsection (d)(1)(F) may be tested.
(B) Only the number and types of tests specified in the
report pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(G) may be conducted.
(2)(A) One test of the reliability of a nucle3ar weapon
other than one referred to in paragraph (1)(A) may be
conducted during any period covered by an annual report, but
only if--
(i) within the first 60 days after the beginning of that
period, the President certifies to Congress that it is vital
to the national security interests of the United States to
test the reliability of such a nuclear weapon; and
(ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date that
Congress receives the certification, Congress does not agree
to a joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), ``joint
resolution'' means only a joint resolution introduced after
the date on which the Congress receives the certification
referred to in that subparagraph the matter after the
resolving clause of which is as follows: ``The Congress
disapproves the testing of a nuclear weapon covered by the
certification of the President dated .'' (the blank
space being appropriately filled in).
(3) The President may authorize the United Kingdom to
conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an
annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President
determines that it is in the national interests of the United
States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of
the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United
States is permitted to conduct during that period under
paragraph (1)(B).
(f) No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted
by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a
foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at
which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing
is lifted.
(g) In the computation of the 90-day period referred to in
subsection (c)(1) and the 60-day period referred to in
subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii), the days on which either House is
not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days
to a day certain shall be excluded.
(h) In this section, the term ``modern safety feature''
means any of the following features:
(1) An insensitive high explosive (IHE).
(2) Fire resistant pits (FRP).
(3) An enhanced detonation safety (ENDS) system.
Sec. 508. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
$5,000,000 of the funds appropriated in title I shall be
available for the Central Maine Water Supply Project, to
remain available until September 30, 1993, and to become
available only upon enactment into law of authorizing
legislation.
This Act may be cited as the ``Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 1993''.
Approved October 2, 1992.
APPENDIX B
Radio Address by the President, July 2, 1993
The President: I'd like to talk to you about that for a few
minutes. Because of the vigilance, the democratic values, the
military strength of the United States and our allies, we won
the Cold War. Our inheritance, our victory is a new chance to
rebuild our economies and solve our problems in each of our
countries while we reduce military spending. But our profound
responsibility remains to redefine what it means to preserve
security in this post-Cold War era. We must be strong. We
must be resolute. And we must be safe.
This great task has certainly changed with the passage of
the Cold War. The technologies of mass destruction in the
hands of Russia and the United States are being reduced. But
technologies of mass destruction that just a few years ago
were possessed only by a handful of nations, and still are
possessed only by a few, are becoming more widely available.
It is now theoretically possible for many countries to build
missiles, to have nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. This is a new and different challenge that
requires new approaches and new thinking.
During my campaign for President, I promised a wholehearted
commitment to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban
treaty. A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to
halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons. Last year,
the Congress directed that a test ban be negotiated by 1996.
And it established an interim moratorium on nuclear testing
while we reviewed our requirements for further tests. That
moratorium on testing expires soon.
Congress said that after the moratorium expires, but before
a test ban was achieved, the United States could carry out
up to 15 nuclear tests to ensure the safety and
reliability of our weapons. After a thorough review, my
administration has determined that the nuclear weapons in
the United States arsenal are safe and reliable.
Additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a test
ban and provide for some additional improvements in safety
and reliability. However, the price we would pay in
conducting those tests now by undercutting our own
nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would
resume testing outweighs these benefits.
I have, therefore, decided to extend the current moratorium
on United States nuclear testing at least through September
of next year, as long as no other nation tests.
And I call on the other nuclear powers to do the same. If
these nations will join us in observing this moratorium, we
will be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a
comprehensive test ban and to discourage other nations from
developing their own nuclear arsenals.
If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I
will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct
additional tests while seeking approval to do so from
Congress. I therefore expect the Department to maintain a
capability to resume testing.
To assure that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned
under a test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining
our confidence in the safety, the reliability and the
performance of our own weapons. We will also refocus much of
the talent and resources of our nation's nuclear labs on new
technologies to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and verify
arms control treaties.
Beyond these significant actions, I am also taking steps to
revitalize the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, so that
it can play an active role in meeting the arms control and
nonproliferation challenges of this new era. I am committed
to protecting our people, deterring aggression and combatting
terrorism. The work of combatting proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction is difficult and unending, but it is an
essential part of this task. It must be done.
Americans have earned the right on this Fourth of July
weekend to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
in the new era America did so much to create. This moment of
opportunity is the reward for our vigilance and sacrifice
during the long years of the Cold War.
We now have the freedom to concern ourselves, not merely
with survival but with prosperity for ourselves and our
children. We have the strength and the stature to lead the
world into a future of greater security and global growth.
Because of the changes we have made, America can now
fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the patriots who made
our freedom possible more than 200 years ago. We can do them
no greater honor than to make the most of what these times
have to offer. Working together, we will.
Have a happy and safe holiday, and thanks for listening.
APPENDIX C
[From the Washington Post, July 16, 1993]
Test-Ban Trap
(By Charles Krauthammer)
On July 3, President Clinton announced that the United
States would no longer test nuclear weapons unless some other
nation went first. The president acknowledged that
``additional nuclear tests could . . . provide for some
additional improvements in safety and reliability'' of our
nuclear stockpile. But, he argued, safety and reliability
improvements are less important than getting nonnuclear
nations to stay nonnuclear. And that would be jeopardized if
we went ahead with testing.
In the 50-year history of the nuclear debate, this
argument--a test ban in the name of nonproliferation--is
quite possibly the most whimsical. Does North Korea pursue
the bomb because the United States occasionally tests the
safety and reliability of its arsenal underground in Nevada?
In fact, as former assistant secretary of defense Frank
Gaffney points out, the North Korean nuclear program reached
its frantic climactic stage precisely during the current
American moratorium on nuclear testing.
Is a cessation of American nuclear testing going to induce
Saddam to give up his pursuit of the bomb? How exactly is
this logic supposed to work? The New York Times explains. A
nuclear test ban ``will not assure an end to the peril of
proliferation,'' it boldly concedes. ``But it will help
stigmatize nuclear weapons and mobilize support for curbing
their spread.''
Stigmatize nuclear weapons. What does that mean? Make
nuclear weapons appear evil? First of all, nuclear weapons,
when used (as ours are) for deterrence, are not evil. Second,
even if they were evil, the evil nature of a weapon may
dissuade some Americans from acquiring it, but it will not
dissuade Saddam. In fact, as we have seen with his use of
chemical weapons, for the likes of Saddam evil is an
inducement.
Perhaps stigmatize means to devalue the currency of a
weapon. That seems to be the idea of Bob Musil, spokesman for
Physicians for Social Responsibility, a major test-ban
advocate. Testing, he explains, ``makes nuclear weapons look
too valuable, and I think we should make nuclear weapons look
as little valuable as possible. That's what is at issue.''
This is nonsense on stilts. The value of nuclear weapons is
inherent in their power. It has nothing to do with how the
United States makes them look. No nation that covets the
power conferred by nukes is going to respond to an American
test ban with: ``Hey, the Americans stopped testing. That
must mean that nukes are not that important anymore. No need
for us to have them then. Let's make plowshares.''
Nonproliferation is a very good idea. But there is a
problem. It is not very fair. It essentially says: Those
countries that have nuclear weapons can keep them, but no one
else can join the club.
Unfortunately, there is no cure for this problem. It is
absurd to believe that we cure it by pretending nuclear
weapons don't matter and letting ours get rusty and
unreliable. Whom do we think we are fooling? Neglecting the
maintenance of the arsenal either has no effect, in which
case it is a sham. Or it has an effect--degrading the
reliability and safety of the arsenal--in which case it is a
menace. Then we don't have nonproliferation. We have
denuclearization.
After all, if the safety and reliability of these weapons
are allowed to degrade--how safe and reliable is any complex
piece of machinery if left untested for years?--then
eventually they cannot be used. This is denuclearization by
other means. No need for some dramatic act of Congress. When
we get to a point where we simply cannot count on our
arsenal, we are effectively disarmed.
For some anti-testers, of course, that is the whole point
of a test ban. For these descendants of the old Ban the Bomb
and Nuclear Freeze movements, a test ban is not an end but a
means. It is a beginning on the road to full nuclear
disarmament. They are not so much interested in abolishing
the tests as in abolishing the weapons. And the former is a
means to the latter.
There are two kinds of countries with the potential to
acquire nuclear weapons. First, advanced and generally
friendly countries--like Germany, Japan and South Korea--that
refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in part because they
trust the American nuclear umbrella to protect them. If they
see us denuclearizing, their temptation to acquire their own
nuclear weapons will only increase. So much for
nonproliferation.
The other category of nations comprises the pariah states
like North Korea--hostile, aggressive, sometimes unstable.
There is something lunatic about saying that if we devalue
and degrade our arsenal, nukes will then have less value for
the North Koreas of the world. On the contrary. The most
elementary principle of economics is that the value of a
commodity increases with its scarcity. The fewer nuclear
weapons reliably held by the great powers, the greater the
premium--the power--conferred upon the have-not who acquires
them. Imagine, for example, that our nuclear arsenal suddenly
vanished. That would infinitely multiply the value of any
weapon falling into the hands of Kim Jong II.
On July 10 Bill Clinton warned North Korea that if it
developed and used a nuclear weapon, North Korea would cease
to exist. This is what is known as deterrence. But deterrence
only works if we have a safe and reliable deterrent.
The test ban is a trap. It is advertised as a means to
nonproliferation. It is not. It is, however, a means to
denuclearization. And while nonproliferation is a vital
American goal, denuclearization is a simple folly.
Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentlewoman from Nevada.
Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I opposed Mr. Clinton's nuclear
testing moratorium last year and his continued ``no testing policy''
concerns me greatly. I say this with extreme concern because as
American foreign policy under the Clinton administration continues like
a rudderless ship, countries like North Korea simply ignore American
ideals and are becoming greater and greater threats to the free world.
Does anyone really believe that this sense of the Congress language
is going to stop some despot from acquiring nuclear weapons? I don't.
Has it stopped countries from testing nuclear weapons? It has not.
China saw fit to conduct a test just last Fall and daily we see the
belligerence of North Korea in their headlong pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
Will we stand by while North Korea develops nuclear weapons to
threaten South Korea or Japan? What about them selling nuclear weapons
and technology to Iran, Libya, Iraq or Syria? Who will ultimately pay
the price of North Korea's adventurism? The 36,000 American troops in
Korea come to mind first and foremost.
A weak national defense did not win the cold war for the United
States and disarmament policies are not going to prevent countries from
threatening peaceful nations. The Kopetski amendment is ill advised and
I urge its defeat.
{time} 1650
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Nevada [Mr. Bilbray].
Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise against the amendment, also.
The President of the United States in deciding that he would have a
moratorium in testing also required the Department of Energy to retain
the infrastructure to resume testing if necessary upon 6 months'
notice. I think this is adequate in the present conditions of the
world.
As was stated by the previous amendment, the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Solomon], who authored that amendment, stated the fact that the
world is a very dangerous place, that the North Koreans have the
capacity of making four to five nuclear weapons, probably have one or
two presently already constructed, and the fact is we have the Chinese
that even after the President gave the notice of the moratorium
exploded a device and are capable of exploding more devices.
Mr. Chairman, I think the present moratorium as announced by the
President is adequate, it certainly is keeping everything in place in
case of imminent national emergency, and I think that the gentleman
from Oregon should support what the President of the United States has
done in his stand on this moratorium and withdraw his amendment. The
gentleman will not do it, but I urge my colleagues to vote no on it.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time each side has
remaining?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from Oregon
[Mr. Kopetski] has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
The Chair advises that the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence]
as a member of the committee has the right to close.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. Chairman, let me address a couple of the issues raised. It is the
nonproliferation treaty and future agreements like the comprehensive
test ban treaty that gives the United States and the international
community the legal authority as we discussed under the Solomon
amendment to pursue such nations as North Korea who first agree to an
international agreement and then try to back out of it. These are the
very kinds of agreements and legal contracts that we want nations to
enter into so that we can police the world against further development
of nuclear weapons.
Second, in terms of the Chinese testing, yes, they have tested. It is
regrettable. The world community rose up in protest against it and as a
result of that protest, the Chinese are actively participating in the
conference on disarmament and have come out and publicly stated that
they will support a comprehensive test ban treaty if negotiated by
1996.
Also, the fact is the United States has conducted 1,000 nuclear
weapons tests through the years. Our weapons program and technological
superiority is unequaled anywhere in the world. There is no second
place. If we take the sophistication level of a North Korea or an India
or some other emerging nuclear weapons state, they are at the 1-yard
line and we are at the other end of the football field about to score.
It is that much of a gap of superiority both in numbers of weapons
and sophistication level. Of course we ought to encourage the adoption
of a comprehensive test ban treaty as soon as possible.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spence] have further requests for time? The gentleman has the right to
close.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have only one speaker and I would like to
close.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] is
recognized for the balance of his time. The gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence] elects to close.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, let me share with my colleagues a quote
from a recent speech by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Director, Mr. Holum:
``From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind
has been struggling to recapture the ferocious beast unleased
there. Since then thousands of women and men of good will and
intellect have pursued--passionately, painstakingly--the
compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us
rededicate ourselves to that mission: to shepherd this beast
back into its cage--to bring what was unleashed in a blinding
blast of heat in the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in
the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva--to ensure that the
first half-century of nuclear explosions is the last.''
Mr. Chairman, I beg my colleagues, this is the sense of the Congress
urging our negotiators in Geneva to work with deliberate and passionate
speed to adopt the comprehensive test ban treaty. I urge my colleagues
to support the Kopetski amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] is
recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, the Kopetski amendment congratulates President
Clinton for his stance on nuclear testing and for extending the U.S.
moratorium on nuclear testing through September 1995.
Although it is simply a sense of Congress resolution, I do not think
the President should be congratulated for breaking his word.
When he initially declared it President Clinton said:
If this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will
direct the DOE to prepare to conduct additional tests.
Of course, as we now know, another nation did carry out a nuclear
test, China, and yet, the President did not so instruct the Department
of Energy.
Mr. Chairman, it is important that the United States carry out the
President's promise to ensure the safety, reliability and integrity of
our nuclear force. Reliable nuclear deterrence requires nuclear
testing. There are three reasons:
One, contrary to another Clinton assumption, nuclear testing is
needed to assure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.
The administration's apparent view that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe
enough for now demonstrates, I believe, a cavalier attitude toward the
complexity of nuclear weapons and fails to take into account past
safety and reliability problems with the stockpile.
Second, contrary to an assumption by the Clinton administration,
there are no other means sufficient to maintain confidence in the
safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Sophisticated
computer modeling and simulation, conventional testing and other non-
nuclear testing regimes can provide useful data but none provide a high
confidence alternative to ensure the safety, reliability and
effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, contrary to the President's assumption, a
comprehensive test ban treaty will not, I repeat, not strengthen
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. There is no evidence
that a testing moratorium or a CTBT will promote nonproliferation. The
most recent affirmation of this point is another planned nuclear test
by China, the second within a year, as documented by the New York
Times, and discussions in France to resume nuclear testing in the near
future.
Mr. Chairman, other nations will make their decisions about the
utility of a nuclear option on the basis of their perceptions of their
own security interests, not on the actions of the United States with
respect to moratoriums on nuclear testing. I urge a no vote on the
Kopetski amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Oregon [Mr.
Kopetski] will be postponed.
The Chair notes that amendments numbered 8 and 11 will not be
offered.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 47 printed in part 1 of
House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. reed
Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Reed: At the end of title VIII
(page 246, after line 23), insert the following new section:
SEC. 873. GAO STUDY ON SALARIES PAID TO EXECUTIVES OF DEFENSE
CONTRACTORS.
(a) Study Required.--The Comptroller General shall conduct
a study of the top 20 executive salaries among companies with
at least 75 percent of their revenues derived from contracts
with the Department of Defense.
(b) Matters To Be Studied.--The study required by
subsection (a) shall address the following matters:
(1) The reasons for high executive salaries at companies
that derive the majority of their revenues from government
contracts and not from commercial market competition.
(2) A description of salaries of chief executive officers
of the companies being studied and the amount expended by
those companies for defense conversion.
(3) A comparison of the compensation for production workers
under defense contracts with compensation for executives.
(4) An analysis of the types of workers under defense
contracts, (i.e., production workers or executives) that are
losing their jobs because of reductions in defense
expenditures.
(5) An analysis of how executive pay conforms or does not
conform with other cost cutting techniques used by defense
contractors, such as lay-offs, mergers and acquisitions, and
defense conversion.
(6) An analysis of the correlation, if any, between
executive pay and defense conversion activities.
(7) A comparison of the executive salaries being studied
with the salaries of top executives in other companies of
similar size that do not derive at least 75 percent of their
revenues from contracts with the Department of Defense.
(c) Deadline.--The Comptroller General shall complete the
study and submit to Congress a report on the study not later
than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Rhode Island [Mr. Reed] will be recognized for 5 minutes and a Member
opposed will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. Reed].
Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment to direct the
General Accounting Office to conduct a study of CEO compensation for
defense firms that have 75 percent of their business or more with the
Department of Defense. The impetus of such an amendment is what I find
in my district and I think what I find throughout this country, which
is that in the face of downsizing of defense contracting, there are
thousands of production workers who are being laid off, there are
companies which are sometimes halfheartedly trying to embrace
conversion attempts, and in contrast to these dire circumstances, there
are many senior executives who are receiving extraordinary
compensation.
Mr. Chairman, before we go ahead and draw conclusions one way or the
other, I think it is appropriate, indeed necessary to have a report
done objectively by the General Accounting Office, to look at
compensation, to correlate it with complementary civilian-type
companies, to look at efforts in these companies for conversion
activities, to look at the effect on production workers versus the
effect on the executive officers.
{time} 1700
I think it is appropriate to have such a study, to do it now, and
then to draw whatever appropriate conclusions are necessary.
I understand that this is an important issue, but there are many
others before the Committee of the Whole today, and in the interest of
expediting consideration of this issue and moving to other issues, I
yield such time as he may consume to the chairman of the committee for
purposes of a colloquy.
Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, while my preference is to statutorily require a GAO
study, I also recognize your desire to speed up consideration of this
bill.
Therefore, I will withdraw my amendment pending your continued
willingness to write the General Accounting Office to request a study
on defense CEO compensation as outlined in my amendment.
May I have the chairman's assurance that you will request this GAO
study on my behalf?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. We will be glad to, yes.
Mr. REED. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is a straight-forward amendment that all
Members can fully support.
Simply stated, the Reed amendment would require the General
Accounting Office to study the salaries paid to defense company
executives.
The study would concentrate on defense firms which derive 75 percent
of their revenue from Defense Department contracts.
In particular, the study would examine the following: What the
salaries are, the reason for these salaries, how CEO pay relates to
blue-collar wages, any correlation between CEO pay and defense
conversion efforts, which defense workers are losing their jobs, and a
comparison nondefense and defense CEO pay.
The reason for the Reed amendment is also straight-forward: Making
sure the taxpayer gets the most bang for their buck.
In an era of decreasing defense budgets, Congress is attempting to
reorder its spending priorities while maintaining essential elements of
our Nation's defense industrial base.
Regrettably, these policies have led to enormous lay-offs in many
regions of the country already struggling with the recession.
However, top-level executives of these defense contractors often
receive enormous salaries, while production workers fear each day may
be their last day on the job.
Although executive compensation is traditionally higher than
production worker salaries, defense executive pay is derived from
taxpayer funded contracts, not the commercial marketplace.
Congress needs a GAO study to provide in-depth information on this
issue so that we can ensure that our defense acquisition policy is
cost-effective and in the Nation's best interest.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence], is recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the
amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
Mr. KYL. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I simply rise
to engage in a colloquy with the distinguished chairman on another
matter.
Mr. Chairman, I see that funding was added to the Army missile/air
defense product improvement line; however, there seems to be an
omission regarding Stinger missile improvements. Is it true that the
intent of the committee is that additional funding should be made
available for accelerating the Stinger missile improvements and testing
the Starstreak missile. It is also my understanding that it will be our
intent to address these initiatives, at the appropriate funding levels,
during conference with the Senate.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KYL. I yield to the chairman.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct.
Mr. KYL. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, given the assurances of Chairman Montgomery
with respect to the letter that will provide for a study, I ask
unanimous consent that I be permitted to withdraw my amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Rhode Island?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, it is now in order to
consider amendment No. 58, printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by Mr. Traficant
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant:
In Title V, add a new section after section 534 as follows:
SEC. 535. DETAIL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL TO ASSIST
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, BORDER
PATROL AND CUSTOMS SERVICE.
(a) Authority of Secretary of Defense.--Section 374 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(d)(1) During each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense
may make Department of Defense personnel currently stationed
in Europe available to assist--
``(A) at the request of the Attorney General, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States
Border Patrol in preventing the entry of terrorists, drug
traffickers, and illegal aliens into the United States; and
``(B) at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, the
United States Customs Service in the inspection of cargo,
vehicles, and aircraft at points of entry into the United
States.''.
(c) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on
October 1, 1994.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] will be recognized for 5 minutes in support of his
amendment, and a Member in opposition will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentleman on the amendment. It
is a very important amendment, very much needed. I think it solves a
couple of problems. It allows the administration to take some of the
1,700 young people who are being cashiered each week out of the
military, specifically those coming back from Europe, and using them in
complementary services and supporting roles with the border patrol at
the United States border. Right now, we have 4,100 border patrol
agents. We need at least 10,000 to regain control of our borders.
Mr. Chairman, we have a fairly large list of criminal aliens who come
across regularly to rob, rape, and murder. Allowing our military people
to come in and work in logistical and other supportive services for the
border patrol will free up more border patrolmen for the border itself.
This is a force multiplier. I think it is an excellent amendment, and I
commend my friend for offering it.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky]
is recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I remind the gentleman from California that with regard
to these 1,700 troops discharged each week, the amendment calls for
them to be taken out of Europe.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is an ill-advised amendment for
essentially five reasons. First, under this amendment, only troops
stationed in Europe could be assigned to work on our borders. Why
should we pay to fly troops to Europe only to fly them back again? This
is wasteful.
Second, this amendment erroneously assumes troops just sit around
doing nothing, that they are some kind of free good. Peacetime troops,
however, are in constant training. Assign them to another mission and
their skills quickly erode. They are no longer qualified military
forces. Enacting this amendment is the same thing as a troop cut. But
on top of that, it would waste all the money spent to give these men
and women military skills.
Third, if INS, Customs, and the Border Patrol lack staff, the
appropriate solution is to increase their staffs, not to raid the armed
forces. This should be an amendment to another bill.
Fourth, INS, Customs, and the Border Patrol all are staffed with
people trained in the skills those agencies need. And those are not the
skills we give our military. Tank gunnery will not be much help at JFK
Airport. Except for menial chores, the military will not be of much
help. And for menial chores, like inspecting boxes of cargo, these
troops would be overpaid. Another waste of money.
Fifth and finally, military personnel do not have and cannot be given
the power of arrest. Therefore, even if they were trained in law
enforcement skills, they would not be able to contribute much. There is
yet another waste of money.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, this amendment undermines military readiness,
wastes the immense sums we spend to train people as soldiers, fails to
give understaffed agencies the skills they need, and provides labor for
menial chores at exorbitant wage rates.
Yes, we have a problem on our borders. But this amendment will not
make even a dent in the problem. It will merely cost us a lot of money.
I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Nevada [Mr. Bilbray].
Mr. BILBRAY. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding this time
to me.
Mr. Chairman, as the author of the Immigration Stabilization Act of
1993, I commend the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] for offering
this amendment.
I recognize, as the gentleman from Virginia said, that this is not
the ultimate answer, 1,700 military along the border. We need more
immigration officers, well-trained; but in the meantime, unfortunately,
there is no other fund to go get more people into the field to protect
these borders. We are not talking here of mainly around Kennedy
Airport; we are talking about around the area adjacent to San Diego,
where they are coming across the border like there was no border
existing. I have flown over the area by helicopter, and I have looked
down at them, and they have waved back to me. And I have said to the
pilot, ``Do they wave all the time?'' He said, ``Yes, they are a very
friendly group.''
But the fact is that they keep coming. I have never seen so many
people. I have seen more of them coming across than you do at a Rams
game up at Anaheim. The fact is they come across, we need some help.
Certainly the young people who are being ripped out of the military
could be sent back and be of aid and help. I know the gentleman from
Virginia is against reduction of any size in the military, but I cannot
see any better use for our military than assigning them to help with
this serious, serious problem.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I wanted to clear up some of the problems that my friend from
Virginia has with this amendment. First, there are a number of areas
where personnel who have military MOS's can be very helpful on the
border; specifically, in transport, in radar, in sensor capability, and
in a number of other areas where you have people who have an MOS of
MP's--that is, military police--who do have a lot of talent and are
being paid for by the taxpayers, who would be very supportive and allow
people to be freed up.
With respect to the people being in Europe being sent back here, my
understanding from the author of the amendment, in talking with the
folks who drafted the language, these are service people currently
stationed in Europe and as the gentleman knows, thousands of them are
coming back to the States and being cashiered every month. So,
specifically, the people in Europe who are coming back to the United
States, they are not going to be flown back to Europe, therefore
involving a transport problem; they are coming back to the States
anyway, and when they come home and instead of being stationed out of
the base in a casualty company, they are sent to the border and provide
service to their country after they come back.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire how many more speakers
the gentleman has?
Mr. SISISKY. I am it.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia has the right
to close. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, there are over 2 million illegal entries into the
United States each year.
{time} 1710
The estimated total illegal population in the United States of
America: 3.2 million people. After all the intervention we have,
400,000 adds illegal immigrants to our population each year. We are
talking about a security issue. America's greatest and most important
front is our border right now. We cannot go out and hire, and do not
have the money to hire, all these Border Patrol agents; I want the
Congress to understand this. There is officially now one Border Patrol
agent for every 2\1/2\ miles of border. This amendment does not force
the Secretary of Defense to do anything but to confer and, if necessary
for national security reasons, to deploy those troops.
I say to my colleagues, Now, if you don't like it all from Europe,
change it in conference. Talk about training? My God, what's more
needed from our military than a secure America? And, yes, I believe we
have some troops falling out of chairs without arm rests, cashing their
checks from Uncle Sam, going to dinner in Frankfurt, going to the opera
in Italy, and we are in an economic development program over there.
``The Cold War is over,'' I heard everybody say it.
Here is what the amendment says:
The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Attorney
General, Customs, INS, Border Patrol, has, as an option, the
opportunity to provide some troops. Yes, it says from Europe, and again
I say to my colleagues, If you want to change that, change it, but,
ladies and gentlemen, we don't have the money, and border States are
going to sue us. They are laughing at us, and people are running across
the border with backpacks filled with heroin and cocaine, and we have
some fancy military hardware program of air interdiction.
Mr. Chairman, we need some more eyes on the border. They do not have
to make arrests. They could be additional eyes helping to inspect those
cargoes that come in. The posse comitatus is not violated, and this
would be an act of ignorance for Congress to defeat an amendment like
this, and we would have mandated it if we thought we could have got a
little bit more consideration. But it starts the process of thinking
what to do with our borders.
Mr. Chairman, I want an aye vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The gentleman from Virginia
[Mr. Sisisky] is recognized to close debate.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted that the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] has stated that he would be willing to change it
in conference. The troops are from Europe.
I think we have to understand something really. The United States
troops in Europe are not there for the Europeans' convenience. They are
there for our convenience.
Somebody made the statement, and I do not know who, that they would
just be used on the border. I say to my colleagues, ``If you read the
bill, the amendment, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury
the United States Customs Service and the inspection of cargo, vehicles
and aircraft at points of entry into the United States.''
Mr. Chairman and Members of the House, the reason that I am opposing
this is not that we do not need more people on the border. The
gentleman is absolutely right. We send the wrong message to Europe
every time we do some of these.
The gentleman is also correct that it is just permissive. The
Secretary of Defense has to prove it. That is the safety valve on it.
But with that let us not send the wrong message, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask for a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 62 printed in part 1 of House Report 103-520.
Amendment Offered by Ms. Harman
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Ms. Harman: Page 169, line 22, strike
out ``A member of the'' and all that follows through ``be
separated.'' on page 169, line 25, and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
A member of the armed forces who is classified as
permanently nonworldwide assignable due to a medical
condition shall (except as provided in subsection (c)) be
separated unless the Secretary concerned determines that the
retention of permanently nonworldwide assignable service
members would not adversely affect the ability of the service
to carry out its mission.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member
in opposition to the amendment will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment to section 534 of this bill makes clear
that personnel decisions on who is fit to serve should be made by the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps--not micromanaged
by the U.S. Congress.
It revises language added to the bill in full committee which 10 of
us, including our committee chairman, the distinguished gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] believe is punitive and unfair.
Under current law, members of the armed services who have medical
limitations or disabilities are retained with assignment limitations as
long as they are determined to be ``fit for duty.''
This includes people who develop cancer, heart disease, asthma, and
other progressive diseases. Ongoing retention is discretionary, based
on continued ``fitness for duty.''
The Committee language would change current policy and build a
bureaucracy to handle each specific discharge. My language would allow
each service to decide whether a new policy is necessary and defer its
implementation if no need exists.
My amendment is strongly supported by the Defense Department and a
range of medical groups, including the American Cancer Society, the
American Heart Association, the American Diabetes Association, and the
Epilepsy Foundation. I think soldiers who get sick and serve well
should have a chance to get well, and I urge a ``yes'' vote on the
Harman amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan]
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I have just returned with the gentleman
from Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery] from a superb and very moving week-
long trip through England, Italy, and the beaches of Normandy, and I
had occasion on that trip to speak to four Air Force four-star
generals, four Army four-star generals, three retired four-star
generals and another three-star active duty general, three Navy
admirals and finally the four-star Commandant of the Marine Corps. They
all want the language that is in the bill to stay.
This issue has become severely politicized. When people say the
Defense Department supports the language being offered by the
gentlewoman from California, Mr. Chairman, they are talking about
civilians at the Defense Department. The uniformed personnel,
particularly the individual service chiefs, do not want hundreds of
people who stuck a dirty needle in their arm against the laws of the
State where they were serving, the country's national laws, and the
Universal Code of Military Justice, to be jerked off an airplane, a
helicopter, a ship, a sub or any armored fighting vehicle, or any
gunnery range in this country, and then kick out a healthy young man or
woman who is combat trainable and worldwide (permanently) assignable,
and replace them with this individual who has broken the law. This to
me is absolutely insane, and that is the way some of the generals
expressed it to me, that political correctness in this case has gone
crazy.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dornan] for yielding this time to me.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, I
am concerned about the need to ensure adequate flexibility to DOD and
the Services in managing the complex personnel assignment system. With
1.6 million young men and women in uniform, this is always a daunting
task, as we know.
As a result, during full committee markup, I offered a substitute
amendment to the Dornan amendment which was designed to provide greater
flexibility to Service manpower managers. The Dornan amendment requires
the separation of servicemembers who are permanently nonworldwide
assignable because of a medical condition but permits Service Secretary
waiver if the condition is combat-incurred or if the servicemember has
unique skills vital to national security.
My substitute amendment permits the Service Secretary to waive the
required separation for any other circumstance that the Secretary
considers to be for the good of the service.
{time} 1720
With this third waiver criterion, each service secretary will have
considerable discretionary authority to manage personnel with
assignment limitations in the best interests of that service. I believe
my substitute represents a very reasonable compromise on this issue.
That is why I offered it and speak in favor of it today.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan].
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, since coming to this body, I have learned
that some Members are relentless in their efforts to submit AIDS
victims to unnecessary scrutiny, but I never thought anyone would go so
far as to penalize victims of diabetes, cancer, and other illnesses in
order to evict HIV-positive personnel from the military.
If allowed to prevail, that is just want the Dornan language will
do--require automatic discharges for anyone whose medical condition
prevents their deployment worldwide.
I have joined Ms. Harman in offering this amendment because I do not
think members of the military who are diagnosed with diabetes should be
thrown out of the service even though they are still perfectly capable
of doing their jobs. I also don't think cancer victims who require
medical treatment but are in remission should be kicked out. Yet that
is exactly what will happen if we fail to pass the Harman Amendment.
Keep in mind that unless we pass this amendment, members of the
military who are diagnosed with health problems that require regulation
treatment at modern medical facilities will be thrown out, even if
their condition has no effect on their ability to perform their jobs.
Unless the committee language is amended members of the Armed Forces
whose children are physically handicapped can't be deployed worldwide.
Are we going to tell those people they can't serve their country
because their kids are disabled? That would be crazy, but it would be
the next logical step if we allow the Dornan language to remain intact.
If someone is not medically fit to serve in Iceland, they will get
kicked out of the military, even if they work in a clerical job in San
Diego.
The Dornan language will end the careers of about 3,500 people who
have done nothing wrong and are capable of continuing to serve their
country effectively.
This provision was inserted in a last-minute maneuver during the
committee markup despite the fact that the military services already
have the power to discharge anyone they judge medically unfit for duty
and the fact that the services have not asked for any additional
authority in this area.
The current language in the bill discriminates against people with
disabilities.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter], a combat infantry officer from Vietnam and a
senior member of the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the wonderful
introduction, but I just showed up. I did not do anything special in
Vietnam. I wanted to recognize for a second a gentleman who did, the
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham], our Navy top gun.
Mr. Chairman, this is an argument that has a compelling force on the
side of military families. Let me tell you, we are cashiering 1,700
young people a week out of uniform. What that means, if you have a HIV
positive person who cannot be deployed worldwide, that means that
another person is forced into that worldwide deployment and has what is
known as a higher operating tempo. That may mean nothing to us, but to
a military family, to the wife of a Navy pilot who talked to me about 5
days ago in my district when she said, Congressman, we are stretched so
thin, that my husband is away from the family for longer and longer
periods of time, it is a very important thing.
This is what one active duty Marine company commander said. In terms
of readiness, the idea that HIV positive members are a tiny fraction of
the force and therefore don't affect the whole, is preposterous. By not
being able to rotate from our nondeploying company, my one HIV Marine
kept another Marine from leaving a deploying unit.
This is a family issue, and the amendment that the gentleman from
Missouri [Mr. Skelton] put together, along with the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dornan], is an excellent amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Torkildsen].
Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment
offered by my colleague from California, Ms. Harman. This amendment has
the strong support of the Department of Defense and I believe it is the
right thing to do.
While I understand the concerns of my colleague from California, I
would note that only two-tenths of one percent of U.S. troops have
permanent medical conditions that limit their assignability. I am
concerned that the current provision in the committee bill is punitive
in nature and proposes a policy based less in medical reasoning than
political calculation.
Each service has long-established procedures for dealing with medical
disabilities. Many members of the armed services that are not eligible
for worldwide assignments continue to make substantial contributions to
our national security. I believe that these personnel issues are best
addressed by the Department itself, and not by congressional micro-
management.
I urge my colleagues to support the Harman amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I would say this first to my colleague, the gentleman
from California. In the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel
on which I and several of us who have testified for my amendment serve,
four service personnel chiefs, commissioned officers, testified that
they do not need a change in current law. In addition to that, the
Undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, Edwin Dorn, has
sent a letter in support of my amendment, and I would just like to
quote from part of it.
The number of Service members with permanent medical
conditions that restrict their assignments is small--
typically around two-tenths of a percent of the active force.
Although these members cannot serve at certain locations,
they are experienced, qualified and able to perform their
required duties. They represent a considerable investment in
training and an invaluable experienced resource. We developed
our personnel and assignment policies to support our national
objectives while providing fair treatment to the men and
women who serve our nation. Your amendment provides Service
Secretaries with the needed flexibility that allows us to get
the greatest contribution from each of our Service members
and to continue our long and proud tradition of taking care
of our own.
Mr. Chairman, once again, I urge support and passage of my amendment.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield my last 30 seconds to a company commander
and squadron commander who had to deal with this.
Mr. Chairman, let me very briefly say that two of those four three-
stars quoted by the gentlewoman have contradicted their very testimony
to me personally. One of them has since retired. They were going
against their uniformed bosses. They were responding to civilian
political leadership in the Pentagon.
The language of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] gives the
service secretaries the ability in each individual case to do just what
the gentlewoman wants. Instead, she wants a blanket vote by the service
secretaries to do the bidding of a very politicized situation of the
Pentagon.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California
[Mr. Cunningham], a distinguished Navy ace.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I was in command of the F-126 Adversary
Squadron, and we were forced to take HIV positive sailors. I had two of
them. Under the law, I could only report to my executive officer and
the flight surgeon. I could not even let my troops know of the
potential danger of that individual within the squadron.
What I did personally was to restrict that person from any
deployments to like El Centro, and so on, to protect me, because I also
had females in that squadron.
I also let the individual know that if he had any contact with any
female, and that female was not knowledgeable, that I would press full
court martial.
We do not need HIV positive in our military, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, all time for debate on this amendment
has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Harman] will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 63 printed in part 1 of
House Report No. 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. markey
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment under the rule.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Markey: At the end of title X
(page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:
SEC. . NUCLEAR COOPERATION.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the United States shall suspend any programmatic consent
given under a nuclear cooperation agreement for the use of
special nuclear material subject to such agreement at any
facility at which accounting discrepancies and uncertainties
do not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to
determine with its required level of confidence that a
significant quantity of special nuclear material has not been
diverted from the facility. Such suspension shall remain in
effect until such time as the President determines that such
discrepancies and uncertainties have been resolved and
operational problems at the facility have been corrected to
permit the Agency to detect a diversion of a significant
quantity of special nuclear material from the facility with
the required level of confidence.
(b) Limitation.--The suspension provided for in subsection
(a) shall not be required if operation of the facility in
question is voluntarily suspended until such time as the
Agency is able to detect a diversion as specified in that
subsection.
modification to amendment offered by mr. markey
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my
modified amendment be considered in place of my original amendment, so
it is a sense of Congress resolution instead of a binding resolution.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment, as modified.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Markey: At the end
of Title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the following new
section:
SEC. . NUCLEAR COOPERATION.
(a) In General--It is the sense of the Congress that the
President should suspend any programmatic consent given under
a nuclear cooperation agreement for the use of special
nuclear material subject to such agreement at any facility at
which accounting discrepancies do not permit the
International Atomic Energy Agency to determine with its
required level of confidence that a significant quantity of
special nuclear material has not been diverted from the
facility. Such suspension should remain in effect until such
time as the International Atomic Energy Agency determines
that such discrepancies and uncertainties have been resolved
and operational problems at the facility have been corrected
to permit the Agency to detect a diversion of a significant
quantity of special nuclear material from the facility with
the required level of confidence.
(b) Limitation--The suspension called for in subsection (a)
need not be carried out if operation of the facility in
question is voluntarily suspended until such time as the
Agency is able to detect a diversion as specified in that
subsection.
(c) Reporting--Not later than 90 days after enactment of
this section, the President shall submit a report to the
Congress which (i) describes the actions taken by the
President pursuant to this section, (ii) states whether the
conditions for lifting the suspension called for in
subsection (a) have been met, and (iii) provides an
assessment of the risks of both national and subnational
diversion of special nuclear material at the facility under
circumstances where such conditions have not been met. If,
within such period, the conditions for lifting the suspension
have not been satisfied, the President shall, every 90 days
thereafter, and until such time as the conditions are
satisfied, report to the Congress concerning the progress
made toward achieving this objective.
Mr. MARKEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and
printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts that the amendment be modified?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Massachusetts
[Mr. Markey] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed
will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey].
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment we have at hand is one that deals with as
sensitive a subject as this Congress has to consider, and that is that
pursuant to an agreement reached by the government of the United States
and the Japanese government, we have been sending plutonium to Japan
for use in peaceful programs. However, at a facility that began
operation in 1988, at this particular point in time the Japanese
government is unable to account for nine nuclear bombs' worth of
plutonium, 150 pounds worth, in the facility.
This resolution calls for the President of the United States to
report back to Congress as to what progress is being made to identify
where that 150 pounds is.
{time} 1730
Now, I am not saying that it has been diverted to a nuclear weapons
program. What I am saying is, we do not know whether it has or not.
We should be cognizant of the history. Korea was occupied by Japan up
through the end of World War II. If a nuclear bomb is ever dropped by
the North Koreans, God forbid it will not, the first one would be on
Seoul, and the second one would be on Tokyo.
We do not know in this country whether or not the Japanese are
responding to this historic threat.
Japan has always said that they saw the Korean Peninsula as a dagger
pointed at the heart of Japan. With the end of the cold war, with
questions being raised in Japan as to whether or not any longer they
can rely upon the United States or the NATO powers to deploy forces if
there was any military threat to that country, no one can give
assurances that some in Japan are committed to the diversion of
plutonium that could develop nuclear weapons.
This very simple sense of Congress resolution just asks that our
country, pursuant to an agreement that we would reach, ensure that the
International Atomic Energy Agency can verify that the plutonium inside
of this facility is there and has not been diverted to bomb-making
purposes.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a yes on the Markey amendment to ensure that we
have not lost the nine nuclear bombs' worth of material in Japan.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there a Member in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself a minute and a half.
Mr. Chairman, the plutonium that the gentleman speaks about is about
70 kilograms of plutonium. It is plutonium that happens to have been
held up inside a plutonium processing fuel plant at Topkai, a facility
in Japan built in 1988, through which three tons of plutonium have been
processed since 1988. Seventy kilograms are in the interstices of this
machine, in the glove box and other places in the machine where the
plutonium oxide powder has been processed. This is not plutonium that
has been secreted or diverted. It is simply plutonium that is inside of
the machine and has not come out of the machine so that the input is
less than the output to the extent of 70 kilograms.
It is accounted for. I have a letter here from Los Alamos National
Laboratory, from the Head of Nonproliferation and International
Security, Howard O. Menlove.
He says, ``The assumed 70 kilograms of plutonium holdup is not
unaccounted for. It is accounted for. There is no discrepancy. We know
where it is. Furthermore,'' he said, ``this facility has the most
effective safeguards of any plutonium facility in the IAEA
safeguards.''
Now, the North Koreans have said, do not look at us, look at the
Japanese. They have a facility there where they have 70 kilograms of
plutonium not yet accounted for.
They issued a press release to that effect on May 25.
What we would do, if we adopted this resolution, is give credence to
the North Koreans' press release and to the red herring that they are
trying to drag across the path of the IAEA.
This amendment should be defeated, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself one minute.
I support the Administration's efforts to ensure that nuclear
materials that have been diverted in Korea are accounted for, under
IAEA safeguards, by the way, historically. But I think in order for our
policy to have any credibility whatsoever that it cannot apply just to
our political foes but has to apply to our political friends as well.
The hypocrisy coefficient gets so high that our political enemies
say, why should we abide by any international safeguards? The Japanese
cannot account for these materials. The Japanese and Koreans are bitter
long-term enemies.
Japan occupied Korea up through the end of World War II. If we want
to have a sensible nonproliferation policy, we have to make sure that
nine nuclear bombs' worth are not lost and that the Koreans are not
able to point to our country and say we are going to turn a blind eye
toward it, because we did at the Oserak nuclear plant in Iraq. We did
at the Tarapur plant in India. And every time we did, the Pakistanis or
Israelis or others who felt threatened would ratchet up their demands,
their need to find nuclear materials as well.
Let us not kid ourselves.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Markey
amendment.
Let me make three points very quickly. The Markey amendment focuses
nonproliferation attention on exactly the wrong targets. It focuses the
attention on Japan.
We have a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan. Japan has a
nuclear safeguard agreement. The resources, the energy ought to be
focused on Iraq and Iran and on North Korea and not on Japan.
Second, despite the press reports about diverted plutonium, there is
no plutonium missing here. None of it has been diverted from the fuel
processing facility. Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, has
stated that the ``nuclear material in question,'' and I quote him, ``is
not missing and remains under full safeguards and is declared.''
But their point is that the Markey amendment undercuts the authority
of the IAEA. It undercuts the authority of international agreements. It
undercuts the authority of the President of the United States.
The President already has authority at any time to suspend the United
States/Japan agreement and suspend Japanese use of United States-
supplied plutonium, if there is a risk of proliferation in his
judgment.
This amendment should be defeated. It is opposed by the National
Security Council. It is opposed by the Department of State. It is
opposed by the Department of Defense.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself one additional minute.
Let me tell my colleagues what this is all about. Whether it be the
Carter Administration suspending their judgment on nonproliferation to
sell 48 tons of uranium to India in 1980 in order to isolate the Soviet
Union, whether it be our turning a blind eye to what went on in Iraq at
the Oserak plant all throughout the late 1970's and all throughout the
1980's with other materials going in, whether it be Hans Blix at the
IAEA, a paper tiger if there ever was one, we have consistently
subordinated the long-term nonproliferation agenda of our country to
the short-term diplomatic agenda of the particular Secretary of State
that had the office at that time. We are about to do the same thing
here again today.
Second, the letter from the Nuclear Industry of America here today,
we will lose business if we do not sell plutonium to the Japanese, even
if we cannot account for it. If we want to come back here and
understand what the issues of the post-cold war era were, we will know
that it was racism, religious resentment and nonproliferation across
this planet. If we do not focus on those issues in the post-cold-war
era, we are doomed to history, to have been failures in understanding
what our agenda as a people should have been.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I want to just clarify a point or two that
the gentleman made.
It appears to me that the worst fears of the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] will be realized if this House votes in
favor of his amendment, because we will have legitimized North Korea's
claim that they are at least as compliant as Japan is.
As I understand it, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt]
read a letter that indicates that our experts feel that all of the
plutonium in question is accounted for. Is that not accurate?
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. I have a letter here from
Howard Menlove at Los Alamos National Lab which not only says it is
accounted for but that this facility has the best safeguards.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, is there any way the gentleman can say that
North Korea is roughly equivalent, substantively, on the area of
nuclear development, or morally with respect to staying within the
safeguards in the sanctions that we have developed with respect to
nuclear development, or are they in any way equivalent with North
Korea?
{time} 1740
Mr. SPRATT. Absolutely and obviously not, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] has 30
seconds remaining, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt]
has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, nothing could be further from the truth. The way the
IAEA works is accounting principles. They get to stand at one door and
check as it goes in and then the back door to check if it comes out. If
it does not come out, which it has not in North Korea, then there is a
problem inside.
In Japan, 150 went in, nine bombs' worth; 150 has not come out, nine
bombs' worth. It is inside, or it has been diverted.
The IAEA does not know and cannot certify. America loses its
credibility with every other country in the world, friend and foe, if
we engage in contracts with allies like Japan and then do not certify
where nuclear bomb material could go that could threaten China or the
Korean political situation in a way that could come back to haunt us 3
and 4 and 5 years down the line.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would strike at a Japanese facility
which is one of the most modern in the world, built in 1988, more
modern than ours. We have more plutonium missing at the Savannah River
site than this facility cannot account for. Basically, three tons of
plutonium have gone into the facility since 1988, and three tons minus
70 kilograms have gone out. Where are the 70 kilograms involved? They
are not secreted away. It is in the crevices, cracks, and glove boxes
of this particular facility. We have Los Alamos to tell us that. We
have the IAEA to tell us that.
Mr. Chairman, there is no violation here, even though there is some
uncertainty as to where all of it is. What happens if we adopt this
resolution? We are telling the President of the United States, ``You
should stop the operation of this facility. You should tell the
Japanese to return all the special nuclear materials we have given
them, all the technology. That is the content, those are the provisions
of our nuclear cooperation agreement.''
At this point in time do we want to slap an ally like the Japanese in
the face with a diplomatic gaffe like this at such a sensitive time? Do
we want to lend credence to the North Koreans who say the Japanese
cannot account for their plutonium when they very well can?
We do not, Mr. Chairman, and that is why we need to defeat this
amendment and defeat it overwhelmingly.
Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Chairman, passage of this amendment would prove to be harmful to
our economy and our international relationships.
Under the current United States-Japan and United States-Euratom
agreements, our trade of nuclear materials and technologies with Japan
and Europe has flourished. These relationships have resulted in
thousands of U.S. jobs and billions of dollars in U.S. exports.
The effect of this amendment will be to harm the United States
relationship with Japan and Europe, and to hurt United States business.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
Mr. BARLOW. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to my colleague
Representative Markey's amendment to the fiscal year 1995 National
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4301). This amendment is unnecessary
and if adopted, will damage vital foreign trade and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
This amendment would require the President to suspend programmatic
consent for the use of nuclear material at a foreign facility where the
IAEA cannot affirmatively determine whether plutonium has been diverted
from a facility. According to the IAEA, the basis for this amendment
was an erroneous report that about 70 kilograms of material was missing
from the Tokai plutonium fuel production facility in Japan. The IAEA
has concluded that the plutonium involved was not lost but was only
held up in the process areas within the plant. This plutonium was never
lost and in fact, the Japanese have been very diligent in managing
their operations.
The true effect of this amendment will be to stifle trade between the
United States Enrichment Corporation and the Japanese nuclear power
industry. This industry will lose business to tough competitors
worldwide if such an amendment becomes law in the face of a perceived
problem that does not exist. Does it not make sense to step back from
this and not knee jerk into a bad restriction?
The adoption of this amendment would only serve to muddy the waters
and disrupt a quarter of century of mutual trust and cooperation
between the United States and Japan on nuclear matters. Vital United
States-Japan trade will be impaired, costing thousands of United States
jobs and billions of dollars of exports. The proposed amendment would
effectively suspend the United States-Japan nuclear cooperation
agreement. Consequently, this will diminish the U.S. role in
International nonproliferation through undercutting the authority and
effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].
Further, this amendment will duplicate and undermine Presidential
authority to suspend, at any time, the United States-Japan agreement
and the Japanese use of United States-supplied plutonium.
The uranium enrichment business is a vital component of United States
trade with Japan. Uranium enrichment services--like the gaseous
diffusion plant in Paducah, KY--account for almost 6 percent of United
States energy exports and almost 1 percent of all United States exports
to Japan. If the amendment is adopted, we could lose a large portion of
the U.S. trade balance, an estimated $600 million per year coming from
the uranium enrichment business alone.
The United States has worked too hard to develop nuclear cooperation
with Japan. We should not dispose of this relationship or the trust we
have developed. Doing so will create a loss of American jobs, a loss we
cannot afford.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered
by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to Resolution 431, further proceedings on this
amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts
[Mr. Markey] will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 67 printed in part 1 of
House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. kasich
Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Kasich: At the end of title X
(page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:
SEC. 1038. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON READINESS OF
MILITARY FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) Under existing treaties and security arrangements
between the United States and the Republic of Korea,
responsibility for the defense of the territory of the
Republic of Korea is allocated so that the Republic of Korea
has primary responsibility for the ground defense of its
territory and the United States has primary responsibility
for air and sea defense of the Korean peninsula and for
reinforcement.
(2) The Force Improvement Program of the Republic of Korea
has not addressed critical shortfalls in its ground force
capability which continue to exist even though the Republic
of Korea spends approximately $12,000,000,000 annually on
defense while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
spends approximately $4,000,000,000 annually on defense. The
Republic of Korea has diverted substantial defense resources
to procuring submarines, destroyers, advanced aircraft, and
other military systems that are marginal to its primary
ground defense responsibility.
(3) The defense acquisition decisions of the Republic of
Korea have had the effect of not allowing the Republic of
Korea to attain self-sufficiency in its ground defense
responsibility. As a result, there exists an undue burden on
the United States for the ground defense of the Korean
peninsula.
(4) The lack of intelligence capability to forecast the
military intentions of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea represents a major deficiency of the combined United
States-Republic of Korea military force.
(5) A short-warning attack by the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea would cause major losses to the combined
United States-Republic of Korea ground force.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that the President should urge the Republic of Korea to
improve its military ground forces with emphasis on
counterartillery capabilities, defense against ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction, combined United
States-Republic of Korea logistics capabilities, combined
United States-Republic of Korea medical support, and combined
United States-Republic of Korea strategic and tactical
intelligence capabilities.
(c) Report.--Not later than December 1, 1994, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and House of Representatives a report, in
classified form, on--
(1) the readiness of the military forces of the Republic of
Korea to defeat an attack by the military forces of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(2) the adequacy of the defense acquisition strategy of the
Republic of Korea to meet its primary ground defense mission.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
Kasich] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be
recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich].
Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have at the desk I know is an important
amendment. We spent the weekend reading a number of articles about the
very serious problems of North Korea. We have already had one debate
and one amendment, a sense of the Congress amendment, pass or going to
be voted on here shortly that has to do with sanctions for North Korea,
and I cannot tell, and neither can anyone else, what the impact is
going to be of sanctions on North Korean actions, what the President
intends to do.
Those are the kinds of things that clearly we do not know what the
result is going to be of those kinds of efforts, and whether we can
avoid, ultimately avoid, and we all hope and pray we do, a
confrontation with North Korea, hoping that the North Koreans will in
fact begin to comply with the international agreements that they are
partners to, but there is something that we clearly know ought to be
done in regard to the problems with North Korea. That is that the South
Koreans themselves have to begin to acquire the kind of facilities that
permit them to perform their ground mission for which they have entered
into agreement with the United States.
Just so we understand this as Members of the House, the agreement
essentially says that the United States will be primarily responsible
for the air situation in Korea. All air defense kinds of activities are
going to be the role of the United States. The South Koreans are
charged with ground defense. That is the primary agreement that the
South Koreans entered into with us.
The problem has been that South Korea has not been deploying,
acquiring nor deploying, the kinds of systems we need in order for them
to do effective ground defense to the degree that we would all be
comfortable with. The South Koreans have been acquiring such systems as
submarines, destroyers, advanced aircraft that are really marginal to
their critical mission of ground defense.
Mr. Chairman, I must tell the Members that Secretary Perry visited
with the South Korean Government and expressed many of the concerns
that I have in presenting this sense of the Congress resolution.
Secretary Perry argued that the South Koreans needed to do things, such
as acquire counter-artillery capability, more defenses
against ballistic missiles, more defenses against weapons of mass
destruction, logistics, medical support, strategic and tactical
intelligence. These are the kinds of activities that the South Koreans
should be aggressively engaged in today in preparation for any result
as a consequence of U.S., U.N., or world action.
This is an opportunity for the United States Congress, the United
States House, to go on record urging the South Koreans to preform their
ground mission, their ground defense mission, with all due diligence,
and to guarantee that all the capabilities that the South Koreans
should and must provide are going to be carried out.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that we have a vote on
this and send a strong message. Not only has Secretary Perry indicated
his concern about his area of South Korean ground defense, but the
statements of both Senator Nunn and Richard Lugar on the Korean
Peninsula indicated that the South Koreans needed to accelerate their
efforts in carrying out the ground mission, and the Government
Accounting Office, in a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness of the
Committee on Armed Services, has indicated that they also have the same
kind of concerns about the fact that the South Koreans have not
acquired the kind of weapons and acquired the kind of equipment that is
needed in order to carry out this very critical ground defense mission.
Mr. Chairman, if they do not acquire this kind of equipment, our
people sit there, and out people are vulnerable if they do not do the
kinds of things they ought to do in terms of this ground defense
mission.
This is an effort to try to guarantee success with any mission, force
the South Koreans to adhere to the agreements that they made with us,
and also to guarantee the best chances for United States Forces.
Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hutto],
chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed
Forces.
Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kasich and I have long held the
view that the Republic of Korea continues to overlook the primary
threat to its security by allocating critical funding to defense
priorities other than to defend the South from ground attack.
This amendment gets to the heart of this issue by highlighting South
Korea's spending on regional defense needs such as advanced aircraft,
destroyers, and submarines when the United States has already committed
to providing air and sea defense for the Korean Peninsula. The
interests of the Republic of Korea would be much better served by
investing in weapons that enhance its capability as primary agent for
the ground defense mission. For example, the South Korean Army would
greatly benefit from additional counterartillery radar, attack
helicopters, and advanced antitank munitions.
The amendment also gives the Congress the information base that will
be needed to assess future progress by the Republic of Korea to meet
its primary responsibility for ground defense by requiring a report on
South Korean defense readiness and acquisition strategy.
I ask my colleagues to support this amendment and send a signal that
encourages South Korea to get their defense spending on the right track
as soon as possible.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] has
expired.
Is there a Member opposed to the amendment?
If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. Kasich].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] will
be postponed.
Announcement by the chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 431, proceedings will
resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed,
in the following order:
Amendment No. 7 offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon];
amendment No. 29 offered by the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski];
amendment No. 62 offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Harman]; amendment No. 63 offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts
[Mr. Markey]; and amendment No. 67 offered by the gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. Kasich].
Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Solomon] for a recorded vote on the amendment, as
modified, offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] on which
further proceedings were postponed and on which the ``ayes'' prevailed
by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment, as modified.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment, as modified.
recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Solomon] for a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 415,
noes 1, not voting 23, as follows:
[Roll No. 217]
AYES--415
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blackwell
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Castle
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Gallo
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Hughes
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kopetski
Kreidler
Kyl
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Machtley
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McKinney
McMillan
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Norton (DC)
Nussle
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Swift
Synar
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Weldon
Wheat
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--1
Dixon
NOT VOTING--23
Becerra
Calvert
Carr
Clinger
Cooper
Coyne
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Martinez
McCurdy
Miller (CA)
Oberstar
Royce
Scott
Smith (OR)
Thomas (WY)
Tucker
Washington
Whitten
Williams
{time} 1811
Mr. EWING, Mr. CONYERS and Mrs. MINK of Hawaii changed their vote
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I inadvertently voted ``nay'' on the Solomon
amendment on North Korea. I should have voted ``aye.''
amendment offered by mr. kopetski
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman
from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] for a recorded vote on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] has demanded a
recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that this and subsequent votes
in this series will be 5 minutes each.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 263,
noes 156, not voting 20, as follows:
[Roll No. 218]
AYES--263
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Blackwell
Blute
Boehlert
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hoyer
Hughes
Inslee
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Long
Lowey
Machtley
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Norton (DC)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickle
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Price (NC)
Quinn
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Serrano
Sharp
Shays
Shepherd
Skaggs
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Walsh
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Weldon
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--156
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Boehner
Bonilla
Brooks
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Castle
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fields (TX)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gillmor
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoke
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Lloyd
Lucas
Manzullo
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Myers
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Pickett
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rowland
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Vucanovich
Walker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--20
Becerra
Calvert
Clinger
Cooper
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Martinez
McCurdy
Miller (CA)
Oberstar
Royce
Scott
Smith (OR)
Thomas (WY)
Tucker
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1823
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Smith of Oregon against.
Mr. STENHOLM changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. WILSON changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
amendment offered by ms. harman
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentlewoman
from California [Ms. Harman] for a recorded vote on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the ``noes'' prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] has
demanded a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that this will be a 5-minute
vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227,
noes 192, not voting 20, as follows:
[Roll No. 219]
AYES--227
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barca
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Blute
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Ford (MI)
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gillmor
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Harman
Hastings
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Hughes
Inslee
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Kolbe
Kopetski
Kreidler
Kyl
LaFalce
Lantos
LaRocco
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Long
Lowey
Machtley
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Matsui
McCloskey
McDermott
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Moran
Morella
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Norton (DC)
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (MN)
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Quinn
Rahall
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Serrano
Sharp
Shays
Shepherd
Skaggs
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Snowe
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swift
Synar
Talent
Tanner
Thompson
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--192
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bilirakis
Bliley
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Brewster
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clement
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Darden
DeLay
Dickey
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Herger
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Knollenberg
Lambert
Lancaster
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Lloyd
Lucas
Manzullo
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Nussle
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Ramstad
Regula
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Roth
Roukema
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thornton
Thurman
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--20
Becerra
Calvert
Clinger
Cooper
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Martinez
McCurdy
Miller (CA)
Oberstar
Royce
Scott
Smith (OR)
Thomas (WY)
Tucker
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1831
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Thomas of Wyoming against.
Mr. KOLBE changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
Ms. LAMBERT changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
amendment, as modified, offered by mr. markey
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the request by the gentleman
from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey] for a recorded vote on the amendment,
as modified, offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Markey],
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes
prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment, as modified.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment, as modified.
recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 68,
noes 349, not voting 22, as follows:
[Roll No. 220]
AYES--68
Abercrombie
Andrews (ME)
Applegate
Bentley
Bonior
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Carr
Clay
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
de Lugo (VI)
DeFazio
Dellums
Edwards (CA)
Evans
Filner
Fish
Flake
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Hamburg
Hinchey
Horn
Houghton
Kasich
Kennedy
Kildee
Lewis (GA)
Maloney
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
McKinney
Meehan
Minge
Moakley
Moran
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Olver
Owens
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Rangel
Rush
Sanders
Schroeder
Schumer
Shepherd
Slaughter
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Torres
Towns
Underwood (GU)
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt
Woolsey
Wyden
Yates
NOES--349
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blackwell
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Castle
Chapman
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kopetski
Kreidler
Kyl
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Machtley
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Mink
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Neal (NC)
Nussle
Obey
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Swift
Synar
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Waxman
Weldon
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--22
Becerra
Berman
Calvert
Clinger
Cooper
Dingell
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Martinez
McCurdy
Miller (CA)
Oberstar
Royce
Scott
Smith (OR)
Thomas (WY)
Tucker
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1839
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Thomas of Wyoming against.
So the amendment, as modified, was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Kasich
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] for a recorded vote on which further proceedings
were postponed and on which the ``ayes'' prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] has demanded a
recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414,
noes 3, not voting 22, as follows:
[Roll No. 221]
AYES--414
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blackwell
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Gallo
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Hughes
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kopetski
Kreidler
Kyl
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Machtley
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Norton (DC)
Nussle
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Swift
Synar
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Weldon
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--3
Gonzalez
McKinney
Nadler
NOT VOTING--22
Bateman
Becerra
Berman
Calvert
Clinger
Cooper
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Martinez
McCurdy
Miller (CA)
Oberstar
Royce
Scott
Smith (OR)
Thomas (WY)
Tucker
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1848
Ms. SCHENK changed her vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I wish to bring attention to the
visionary space policy provisions in the fiscal year 1995 Department of
Defense authorization bill and its accompanying report.
I am concerned about the Clinton administration's draft space policy
recommendations that would diminish the Air Force's role in the
development of a new reusable space transportation system. Luckily,
this bill keeps Defense in the game.
In spite of past technological achievements, we have failed to
provide a cheap, routine method of transporting goods to and from
space. There are widely divergent views on what's to be done. However,
there seems to be a consensus that reusable Single Stage To Orbit
(``SSTO'') launch vehicles will provide the cheapest and most reliable
form of transportation.
We have reusable vehicles for traveling on land, sea, and air, and we
need them for traveling to space. Scientists and engineers all over
this great Nation tell me the technology is now available to build and
fly a reusable SSTO rocket and that it just needs to be demonstrated.
Our Nation needs this capability, and the Air Force, NASA, and
industry need to press ahead on a cooperative program of ``X-vehicle''
advanced technology flight demonstrators to prove what the scientists
and engineers are telling us.
The Defense Department has already flown three successful test
flights with the first X-vehicle SSTO demonstrator, the DC-X1, and they
will finish the DC-X1 test program at the White Sands, NM, Test Range
this summer.
NASA will then convert the DC-X1 to the DC-XA test bed for advanced
component flight demonstrations. And the Air Force Phillips Lab at
Albuquerque, NM, is ready to proceed with the development of the
second, more advanced SSTO test vehicle, the SX-2.
This next major step would finish demonstrating the concept of fully
reusable single stage to orbit space transportation, and it should be
continued as a model of cooperation between the Air Force, NASA, and
industry.
Last year Congress approved the start of the SX-2 program and funded
it at $40 million. There is wide ranging support in Congress for such a
common sense program as this--one that will save the country money
while at the same time developing a revolutionary technology. That
bipartisan support is evident once again this year, funding the SX-2 at
$100 million in the Defense Authorization we are not working on. Let me
note that SX-2 will be a $300 million program.
Mr. Chairman, our ability to use space for national security, civil,
and commercial purposes depends on reducing the cost of getting into
orbit.
We are on the verge of opening a whole new frontier in the use of
space, including the new emerging market for vast constellations of low
Earth orbit communications satellites such as Bill Gates is now
building that will be an important part of the new information highway.
A cheap, reliable, and reusable form of space transportation for the
transportation infrastructure is essential to opening this new
frontier.
We must continue to move ahead with this cooperative program of
advanced technology flight demonstrators--X-vehicles--for fully
reusable single stage to orbit space transportation, and I encourage
those involved in writing the new administration space policy to
maintain a strong role for the Air Force in this critical development
effort and to take heed of the actions of the House on this issue as
embodied in this bill and in the committee report.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
{time} 1850
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Fields of Louisiana) having assumed the chair, Mr. Durbin, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, had
come to no resolution thereon.
____________________