[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 25, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 25, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             EXTENDING MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS TO CHINA

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, tomorrow morning the President will 
most probably put forward his position on whether or not China should 
be granted most-favored-nation status. I would like to take this 
opportunity to say why I believe the trading status should be extended.
  For 15 years, I have traveled to China. In 1979, as mayor of San 
Francisco, I started America's first sister city relationship with a 
Chinese city. That was the one between my city and Shanghai, one of 
China's largest and most entrepreneurial cities. Jiang Zemin, once 
mayor of Shanghai, now President of China, and I negotiated several 
agreements in the areas of trade, medicine, business, and culture which 
produced many opportunities, economic and otherwise, for both cities.
  The relationship between the two cities was the most active sister-
city relationship in the world during the 1980's. Since Jiang Zemin 
became President of China, I have had an opportunity to discuss human 
rights and trade issues directly with him in two face-to-face meetings 
in 1991 and 1993, each lasting several hours.
  When I first went to China in 1979, it was not possible to discuss 
human rights, politics, or virtually any controversial subject. China 
had emerged a few years earlier from the Cultural Revolution. 
Conversations were carefully scripted and prodigious notes were taken 
by ever-watchful government representatives. Any conversation with a 
Chinese official about human rights, no less a candid one, was 
unthinkable.
  The standard of living in China was low. Worker incomes were a 
pittance. Consumer goods were highly restricted and expensive. Modern 
conveniences were limited. Skyscrapers were few and far between. And no 
foreign companies were allowed. What goods were available for one 
person had to be shared by five in a country with more than 1 billion 
people at that time.
  It was not uncommon for a family to have one pair of shoes. One 
person would go out in the shoes, and wait for the shoes to return for 
another person to wear the shoes. But that is not the China of today.
  Beginning with the establishment of four independent, special 
economic zones in the early 1980's, which grew to more than a dozen, 
and continuing with the gradual lessening of centralized economic 
control, China has grown at a faster rate than at any other time in its 
long history, more than 9 percent annually over the past decade, and 13 
percent annually over the past 2 years.
  In 1979, when I first went, everything was state-owned. In 1992, less 
than half of China's total output is from state-run companies. Today, 
consumer goods abound in the cities. A stock market has been started. 
Large industrial zones have been developed where American and other 
foreign countries have large plants. Small, privately owned businesses 
are growing. Modern skyscrapers have changed the landscape in the big 
cities. Foreign involvement is growing. And the overall quality of life 
for the people has improved. More importantly, today, candid 
discussions on different subjects can take place, and the Chinese do 
listen. Just as an economic democracy is rapidly developing, I believe 
social democracy can one day follow. But it will take time, and time 
for the Chinese is not the same as time for Americans.

  American policy toward China can improve China's economic and, 
hopefully, political situation. But not if that policy seeks to dictate 
to China. My experience has taught me that to influence the Chinese, 
one must undertake a broad policy of engagement over a lengthy period. 
Revoking MFN status will only be counterproductive to America's long-
term interests and push China back into a pre-Boxer Rebellion 
resistance to Western interaction.
  What we forget is that, historically, century after century, China 
has resisted Western influence. It is only very recently that that 
began to change.
  The first problem with a policy linking MFN to human rights is that 
it is counterproductive. Denying most-favored-nation status to China 
would hurt the United States as much as it would hurt China. It would 
jeopardize 9 billion dollars' worth of American exports to China, which 
support 200,000 jobs in the United States.
  Earlier this month, the chief executives of nine companies--AT&T, 
Boeing, Chrysler, Digital Equipment, Eastman Kodak, General Electric, 
Honeywell, Motorola, and TRW--sent President Clinton a letter 
estimating that their cumulative sales to China would reach $158 
billion over the next decade if trade relations remain normal and the 
Chinese economy continues to grow at a healthy rate.
  In California, my State--incidentally, the State with the largest 
Chinese population outside of Asia--trade with China supports more than 
30,000 jobs. The State exported more than $1.6 billion to China in 
1993, up 145 percent since 1990. More than a quarter of California's 
exports to China are from the aerospace industry, which has been 
especially devastated by defense cutbacks. China is our fastest growing 
trading partner and the State's 13th largest trade relationship.
  So denying most-favored-nation status just does not make economic 
sense. Unless the Chinese believe that we have a realistic chance of 
following through on our threat, they will ignore our policy of linking 
human rights goals with MFN.
  Plain and simple, MFN only guarantees China the same low tariff rates 
that are enjoyed by nearly every nation in the world, including Iran 
and Iraq--not exactly the world's best practitioners of human rights.
  While the economic case for extending MFN is strong, the most 
persuasive argument for extending it, I believe, is the political one. 
First, China is facing one of its most critical leadership successions 
since impatient Yankee traders demanding change first came to its 
shores more than two centuries ago. On the heels of probably the best 
decade of economic growth in their history, China's leaders are facing 
a struggle to replace Deng Xiaoping, who is gravely ill. Significantly, 
Deng remains the only single leader in China who alone can move China 
to do anything.
  Throughout China's recent history--and by that I mean just the last 
two centuries--it has failed to consolidate economic growth because it 
fell victim to crippling political struggles to replace emperors, 
dictators, or Mao Tse-Tung. The political fortunes of future Chinese 
leaders, including those we know and those yet to become known to the 
outside world, depend in part on important links that fragile, but 
emerging, private Chinese entrepreneurial forces are forging with the 
United States, their single most important trading partner. America 
accounts for 38 percent of China's trade.
  To undermine our long-term relationship with China by denying MFN is 
to tell the Chinese people--not just the leaders in Beijing--that we do 
not care about their welfare. If such a course is taken, how could we 
expect that after Deng dies, a Chinese leader, any leader, will walk 
the extra mile to cooperate with the United States?
  Chinese cooperation will be vital in persuading North Korea to stop 
its nuclear program and in influencing that country to avoid 
threatening military actions. China needs to be encouraged to cooperate 
with other global powers to stop nuclear and major weapons 
proliferations, something that we have failed to do.
  China's geographic size and economic activity make it an essential 
partner in global efforts to reduce harmful environmental trends. While 
we wait for the succession battle to be resolved, let us avoid boxing 
ourselves and China into positions that neither one of us can afford, 
into positions that can only harm our credibility with China and its 
people--hard-won credibility that we must maintain against the North 
Koreans, the Serbs, the Iraqis, and others who seek to continually test 
our word.
  Second, at the same time that Beijing's leaders are warily eying each 
other on the eve of a leadership succession, China faces mounting 
social tensions. Inflation is, today, running at more than 25 percent, 
outpacing any wage increases earned by workers. A stunning 130 million 
itinerant workers--the equivalent of half of the population of our 
country--are looking for jobs in China's urban centers. They have come 
in from the countryside. Six thousand strikes occurred last year, and 
another 1,500 occurred in the first 3 months of this year. Popular 
unrest is growing ever more widespread, as is government and Communist 
Party corruption.
  Some of these same tensions occurred before Tiananmen Square, and one 
of the lessons of Tiananmen, I believe, is that when faced with 
instability, the Chinese leadership will take the harshest of actions 
to restore order, including the horrible repression of its citizens. I 
have been personally told by Chinese leaders that stability remains the 
No. 1 priority of the Chinese Government. They, I believe, will take 
virtually any action to maintain that stability.
  As in 1989, how China handles its worsening social tensions will go a 
long way toward shaping China's relationship with the world and peace 
in the region. If we inflame Beijing's insecurities by using the MFN 
club to attack China's economic future, we would be giving comfort to 
those doctrinaire Chinese voices calling for isolation. Remember, there 
are still 20 million cultural revolution cadres in the mid-management 
level of Chinese bureaucracy. These are the same voices whose ancestors 
brought spasms of unparalleled violence to the Chinese people during 
the Boxer Rebellion and the cultural revolution.
  Maintaining China's MFN status is the best way, I believe, to prevent 
the country from becoming isolated and turning inward.
  If we move to develop an effective dialog with Chinese leaders, we 
can hope to persuade them to work with us, not just work with us on our 
agenda of trade, international security and human rights, but to find 
solutions to issues on China's agenda. Through exchanges and 
interaction, we can help show Chinese leaders at all levels of 
government how civic and social institutions can help improve social 
welfare and ease the instabilities caused by economic development.


                               Succession

  Meanwhile, any major human rights gains that we hope for China might 
well be difficult to achieve, I believe, until a new leadership 
emerges. That leadership must be one that is of laws and one that is 
willing to guarantee the protection of due process and basic freedoms 
to its people. That is where we are going to make the gains, post-
succession, not during a pre-succession stiffening. In order to do 
this, a core leadership with strong party and military support must 
emerge rather than the fragmented and competitive leadership group now 
in place.


                              Human Rights

  I am one who truly believes that human rights know no borders. We are 
our brothers and sisters keeper. If nothing else, the Holocaust taught 
us what happens to the world when we turn our back, and we see this 
reoccurring again in Bosnia and Rwanda on a brutal scale. Even 
sometimes we see human rights violations on a smaller scale in this 
country.
  China's long history is marked by brutality toward its people. From 
the day of the first emperor to today, the Chinese have not had a 
system of justice which prizes due process.
  I have often thought how lucky we are to be Americans. So many people 
in this world do not have the rights that we take so for granted in 
this country. We cannot be picked up from our beds in the middle of the 
night and imprisoned without trial. We have due process. But, in many 
countries, and China is one, due process is nonexistent.
  For some time I have believed that our China policy is flawed. It is 
not active enough, bilateral enough, welcoming enough to the American 
way and knowledgeable enough about the Chinese way.
  Tiananmen Square and its aftermath was so sobering and horrifying to 
Americans. But I am convinced that some progress has been made, 
particularly when I look back to 1979.
  Let me give the view of a liberal Chinese-American teacher of Asian 
American studies at the University of California at Berkeley and the 
Bay Area chapter president of the National Association of Chinese-
Americans. His name is Ling Chi Wang. I know him well. And I quote:

       For the vast majority of us who came to the U.S. to escape 
     oppression and poverty in China, there is another irony in 
     the spectacle of American liberals pushing to deny MFN status 
     to China. We know firsthand the fallout that any new 
     political upheaval in China will have on ordinary Chinese. 
     Yet that is precisely the kind of turmoil Washington could 
     unleash by jolting China with a cancellation of MFN. Nor will 
     the consequences stop at China's boundaries. At a time when 
     most Americans cringe at the idea of a new influx of 
     refugees, there could be a vast increase in Chinese seeking 
     safety and survival here.


                      Bilateral Dialog With China

  So what can the United States do to promote our interests in human 
rights which can run parallel with helping the Chinese people through 
this period of political succession and social instability?
  The only real answer is that America must seek to engage the Chinese 
in a real, ongoing bilateral dialog.
  The United States just cannot keep on insisting on what we want from 
China. We also must understand what they need and want.
  China and its leaders expect the respect that their strategic, 
political, economic, and cultural position in the world deserves. They 
will not be dictated to, but they will listen and, with the right 
timing and opportunity, change can be made.


                                 Tibet

  Let me speak for a moment about an area which I have had much 
discussion with the Chinese leadership.
  China has made very little, if any, progress on the issue of Tibet.
  The Dalai Lama, a personal friend of my husband and mine, has shown 
his willingness and desire to return to Lhasa as the spiritual and 
religious head of his government. For decades, he has eschewed violence 
and pleaded for justice.
  In 1979, Deng Xiaoping in a statement said that he would be prepared 
to discuss issues with the Dalai Lama, ``except that of independence.'' 
And just a few weeks ago, at the Council on Foreign Relations in New 
York, his holiness, the Dalai Lama, stated once again, as he has 
throughout the decades, that he was prepared to discuss issues of 
cultural and religious importance to Tibetans, with the ``exception of 
independence.''
  In other words, he again agreed to the statement of promise that Deng 
Xiaoping held out in 1979 that has remained unanswered by the Chinese 
to this day.
  The Dalai Lama has given the same assurances to me personally, and I 
carried messages from him to the Chinese leadership in that regard in 
1991 and 1993.
  Now, it is China's turn.
  China should agree to talks on religious and cultural autonomy for 
Tibet, not because we want them to, but because it is in China's 
domestic interest to give the Tibetans greater control over their own 
society. The key remains what incentives can be provided to a 
postsuccession leadership to take these steps. Around this, a strategy 
must be developed.
  Such discussions would lend credibility to China's regular 
declarations that their laws protect the rights of ethnic and religious 
minorities. How can the world believe that China protects the ethnic 
and religious minorities if they will not even discuss these issues 
with the leader of one of China's major minorities who was accorded the 
Noble Prize for his dedication to justice through nonviolence?
  But instead of linking China's MFN status to behavior on Tibet, and 
other human rights concerns, we should make human rights discussions a 
part of the ongoing talks with China on trade and other issues. New 
mechanisms must evolve.


                            Looking Forward

  Rather than wielding the MFN sledgehammer, the United States should 
use a variety of diplomatic and political tools and targeted trade 
sanctions to underscore our commitment to human rights in China.
  Specifically, the United States could:
  First, carefully target sanctions toward specific violations. 
Withhold low-tariff privileges or ban exports produced by military-
owned companies. Review these tightly focused sanctions every six 
months.
  Second, more strictly enforce laws that prohibit China from exporting 
products made or inspected by forced prison labor.
  Third, create a bilateral human rights commission, as has been 
suggested, where human rights issues could be intelligently discussed 
in regular meetings, progress charted, documented incidents and events 
carefully and accurately chronicled and reported, and recommendations 
made to both governments.
  Fourth, encourage efforts to promote increased understanding in both 
countries. Mutually beneficial exchanges in the law, medicine, and 
education, among others, could take place on an increased basis and 
enhance understanding on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.


                               conclusion

  In the end, it is clear that the United States should employ a 
combination of efforts utilizing wider diplomatic, business and citizen 
initiatives as well as targeted sanctions.
  Denying MFN, however, would not do anyone--including the United 
States--any good.
  In sum, my comments about United States policies toward China are not 
about what should be done this week, next month, or this year. Instead, 
I believe we need a larger framework on which to base a relationship 
between the United States and China that would define mutually-
beneficial goals over the remainder of this decade and into the next.
  We need a larger road map to point us in a new direction for 
American-Chinese cooperation based on mutual consultation, not 
unilateral demands.
  Mr. President, just yesterday an interesting poll was made public.
  Some 800 people were asked questions in a survey on the issue of 
China's most-favored-nation trading status, but the people who were 
surveyed were all Chinese scholars and students from mainland China. 
This survey was conducted through various professors at Georgia State 
University, Penn State University, and the department of chemistry at 
the University of Massachusetts. The results are very telling.
  To the question, ``President Clinton should not link the human rights 
issue with the MFN issue,'' 88 percent strongly agreed or agreed.
  To the question, ``Linking human rights with the trade issue would 
not help China improve her human rights agenda,'' 82 percent strongly 
agreed or agreed.
  And to the question, ``President Clinton should unconditionally renew 
China's MFN status,'' 85 percent strongly agreed or agreed.
  These are all students and scholars who left China for the greater 
promise of this country. I believe that these responses offer very 
telling commentary to what should happen. This is further expressed by 
the fact that an overwhelming majority believe that those most 
adversely affected by a denial of MFN to China would be ordinary 
Chinese people.
  I thank you, Mr. President, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Rhode 
Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time in the 
quorum call be evenly divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. PELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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