[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 25, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 25, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   CHINA'S MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS

  Mr. NUNN. First, Mr. President, let me congratulate the Senator from 
Oklahoma on I think a very thorough and very logical presentation on 
the important subject of renewing MFN for China. I particularly believe 
he is correct in saying we must continue to promote our ideals without 
forfeiting our strategic interests. That applies to economic interests 
as well as national security interests.
  Mr. President, I know the Senator from South Carolina has been in the 
Chamber and others are waiting to speak. I am going to abbreviate my 
remarks today, but I do want to hit on one aspect while identifying 
myself with the other aspects that Senator Boren laid out so clearly.
  Senator Boren correctly pointed out that several of our interests in 
China and Asia would be harmed by linking our trade relations with 
China through MFN denial to its human rights practices. I would like to 
discuss just one aspect of those broader interests and that is 
maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula and also in northeast 
Asia and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  The United States and its allies face a determined effort by Korea to 
acquire nuclear weapons--a totalitarian regime that is isolated, that 
is heavily armed, that is facing a leadership crisis inevitably at some 
point in the coming months, or at least in the coming year or two and 
also deteriorating from within. The President and other senior 
officials in the Clinton administration have tried to explain the 
serious consequences of this nuclear program, and they have done so 
repeatedly. I think they are correct.
  On May 3, 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry stated in a speech to the 
Asia Society that ``North Korea threatens the peace and stability of 
northeast Asia.'' Secretary Perry went on to describe the situation in 
the following terms. Again I quote him.

       How the United States and its allies and the international 
     community respond to the challenge posed by the North Korean 
     nuclear program will be very important not only for the 
     future of Asia but, indeed, for the entire world. Our 
     response to this challenge now will be a benchmark for 
     responding to possible similar challenges in the future.

  Mr. President, if Secretary Perry has accurately characterized the 
risks of North Korea's nuclear program--and I believe he has--we must 
make our policies correspond to our statements. If North Korea does, 
indeed, threaten the peace and stability of northeast Asia, we must 
make that concern our highest priority in our relations with China.
  China is the country that has the most influence with the isolated 
leadership of North Korea. China and Japan are very influential, but 
China is the country that has the closest relationship and has had for 
a long number of years.
  Mr. President, while we are concerned about every political prisoner 
in China--and we must continue to be--I think we have to put front and 
center in our policies in Northeast Asia our strategic and vital 
interests.
  Mr. President, we have 38,000 Americans who are now stationed in 
South Korea. We have two goals regarding that peninsula. One is to 
provide stability and help prevent a war; and, second, to avoid North 
Korea becoming a nuclear force in that part of the world. We cannot 
afford to sacrifice either of those goals. We must pursue them both. 
And that is why we need all the assistance we can get from China and 
Japan and other countries.
  In January of this year, Senator Lugar and I visited South Korea and 
Japan. Since then, I have supported the President's overall approach to 
North Korea of combining vigorous diplomatic efforts with prudent 
military precautions. However, I am concerned that linking our trade 
through denial of MFN and our human rights interests with China would 
overlook China's tremendous potential contribution to resolving the 
North Korean problem without an all-out conflict.
  How can China help? First, it is North Korea's only significant 
friend in the world. China and North Korea are among the few Communist 
regimes left. Moreover, they retain especially among their military 
leaders some of the emotional solidarity they formed while fighting 
together during the Korean war. On a more practical level, China is 
North Korea's major trading partner, primary source of oil and 
steelmaking coke, and main overland link to the rest of Asia. All of 
these ties make China virtually the primary country that could persuade 
North Korea to live up to its international obligations and gradually 
persuade North Korea to join the family of nations.
  Second, if our diplomatic efforts should fail and sanctions against 
North Korea should become necessary, they would be most effective if 
they are sponsored by the United Nations. With its veto power in the 
U.N. Security Council, China could obviously prevent this U.N. action.
  Third, even if China does allow the United Nations to impose 
sanctions, through either voting for the sanctions or through 
abstaining, the effectiveness of the sanctions will largely depend upon 
the extent to which China enforces these sanctions.
  North Korea's trade with other countries is fairly limited, so the 
significance of China's supply of oil, coke, and even food is 
heightened in comparison.
  All of these realities have implications for our relations with 
Beijing. In the most extreme case, we cannot expect a China that is the 
object of United States economic sanctions if we deny MFN to 
participate in any kind of meaningful way in sanctions against North 
Korea. We hope that sanctions against North Korea will not be 
necessary, but it is entirely possible they may be our only recourse in 
the coming days or weeks ahead.
  Mr. President, United States relations with a major country like 
China must balance several United States interests, as Senator Boren 
has pointed out, including the important matter of human rights. We 
must not neglect that interest and we must not be shy about giving our 
forthright view on that subject.
  However, like Senator Boren, Senator Baucus and others, I believe 
that we can successfully pursue these interests with other vehicles and 
mechanisms and make our voice heard clearly on human rights. But we can 
do it much better in the context of a normal, stable relationship with 
China. Withdrawing MFN from China will thoroughly disrupt that 
relationship and make it virtually impossible to advance our 
objectives, whether they are political, economic, security, 
educational, social or particularly national security interests.
  At the same time that we try to pursue several goals with China, I 
think we must also be aware of the relative importance of each of these 
goals and give them each their appropriate weight. If we consider all 
of our goals in terms of our relationship with China to be equally 
important, we are unlikely to achieve any of them. Some interests are 
certainly more important than others.
  Given the dangers of North Korea's nuclear program and China's role 
in potentially helping to solve this dangerous situation, I am 
convinced the United States relations with China should be oriented to 
emphasize this strategic priority.
  Mr. President, that requires the United States to continue China's 
MFN status by separating trade from human rights while continuing to 
emphasize our overall feeling on human rights and our own value system.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia yields the floor.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond].

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