[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 66 (Tuesday, May 24, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
              UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE CRISIS IN KOREA

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on another and more important subject, on 
several occasions I have felt it necessary to criticize the 
administration for its overly accommodationist policy toward North 
Korea. Administration efforts to address the emerging North Korean 
nuclear threat, in my view, have been fundamentally flawed in two 
respects. First, administration approaches to North Korea have relied 
too heavily on the promise of rewards and too little on the prospect of 
punishment--giving the impression of weakness in our resolve. Second, 
administration policy seemed premised on the mistaken notion that time 
works to the advantage of the United States and not North Korea. 
Exacerbating these flaws, is a fault common to many other 
administration foreign policies--inconsistency.
  Contemplating the terrible consequences which I believe may well 
ensue from what The New Republic described as a humiliating exercise in 
appeasement provoked my frequent, strong dissent from administration 
policy. But despite my past criticism, for a brief moment last week I 
had hoped that further dissent from the administration's Korea policy 
would no longer be necessary.
  When the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, reported last 
Thursday that North Korea had removed some of the spent fuel from its 
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon before IAEA inspectors had arrived to 
monitor that process, I though that the administration would finally 
appreciate the futility of further accommodation and begin to show a 
little resolve in its dealing with the North Koreans. After all, the 
United States and the IAEA had insisted for weeks that North Korea not 
withdraw any spent fuel rods without IAEA inspectors present.
  When earlier in the week Defense Secretary Perry had indicated his 
appreciation of the gravity and the urgency of the crisis, I began to 
believe that the administration had belatedly come to understand that 
negotiations or even IAEA inspections were not ends in themselves. I 
began to believe that the President's foreign policy team had finally 
embraced as the object of United States policy the directive the 
President issued last November when he declared: ``North Korea cannot 
be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We have to be very firm about 
it.''
  Sadly, Mr. President, this was not the first time I underestimated 
the administration's almost limitless capacity for self deception. Nor, 
probably, will it be the last time.
  Upon discovering North Korea's removal of the spent fuel rods, 
estimated in a South Korean report as up to 15 percent of the reactor's 
fuel, the IAEA immediately reported the North Korean action to the 
Security Council, condemning it as a ``serious violation'' of the 
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, NPT.
  IAEA's reaction was perfectly appropriate under the circumstances, 
but was apparently inconsistent with the administration's approach to 
grave national security problems--an approach which can be charitably 
described as procrastinating, irresolute and exceedingly dangerous.
  Last Friday morning's headlines heralded the growing sense of crisis 
provoked by North Korea's latest violation of the NPT. The 
administration had no comment on the matter, however, until later in 
the afternoon, when it would attempt a dazzling display of reverse spin 
on the bad news coming from Pyongyang.
  Mr. President, when spent fuel rods are removed from a nuclear 
reactor they must be placed in a cooling pond of distilled water for a 
minimum of 6 weeks before they can be used for any purpose. They cannot 
be withdrawn from the reactor and immediately reprocessed into weapons 
grade plutonium.
  On Friday afternoon, administration officials reported that IAEA 
inspectors had determined that the fuel rods which had been removed 
prior to their arrival were all currently located in a cooling pond--as 
they must be--and had not yet been diverted for reprocessing. The 
administration greeted this information as if it were some sort of 
revelation. For good measure they identified as an additional cause for 
celebration reports that the specific fuel rods which the IAEA would 
use to measure past diversion of fuel for reprocessing remained in the 
reactor.
  What then ensued was a full court administration press to downplay 
the significance of what the IAEA--an agency not noted for its 
inflammatory or belligerent rhetoric--condemned as a serious violation 
of the NPT meriting the immediate attention of the Security Council. 
Secretary Perry's recent characterization of the situation as a 
particularly grave, near-term crisis was replaced with his calming 
assurance that North Korea's action constituted only a procedural 
violation, giving the impression that their conduct barely warranted 
any U.S. interest.
  Mr. President, the confirmation that spent fuel could not be 
immediately reprocessed hardly qualifies as a stunning disclosure. And 
the fact that certain fuel rods had not yet been removed from the 
reactor does not in any way mitigate this latest example of North 
Korea's complete disregard for its obligations under the NPT. In fact, 
North Korea's removal of the fuel rods without IAEA monitoring is a 
flagrant violation, of the treaty and a serious rebuke to U.S. 
diplomacy. That the administration would treat it as anything other 
than that constitutes yet another retreat from anything resembling a 
coherent, resolute, and honest approach to this crisis.
  I was at first uncertain why the administration would reverse 
position so suddenly last Friday. I took it as just another indication 
that administration policy still suffered from a failure of nerve. It 
certainly was that, Mr. President, but I would not learn just how 
completely they had lost their nerve until the following day.
  On Saturday, we learned that the administration's contrived rationale 
for dismissing North Korea's latest violation was also intended to 
justify a new administration venture into vacillating diplomacy. The 
administration announced that it would resume high level negotiations 
with North Korea. Remember, Mr. President, that the administration had 
broken off the talks when North Korea had prevented IAEA inspectors 
from determining if reactor fuel had been diverted in the past for 
reprocessing and when North Korea withdrew from negotiations with South 
Korea.
  Has North Korea succumbed to U.S. pressure and allowed the IAEA 
adequate access to nuclear facilities so that they can judge whether 
any fuel has been diverted? No, they have not. They have only agreed to 
discuss with the IAEA the terms under which the IAEA might be allowed, 
I repeat, might be allowed, to resume their inspections.
  Has North Korea resumed dialogue with the South on a range of issues 
including the nuclear crisis and the prospect of reunification between 
north and south? No, they have not. They have, however, threatened to 
turn South Korea into a sea of fire.
  In sum, Mr. President, the administration had decided in advance of 
the IAEA's report on Friday that it wanted to resume direct 
negotiations with North Korea--something the North Koreans have sought 
to achieve for 40 years--even though North Korea had done nothing to 
rescind the provocations that had led to the earlier disruption of the 
talks.
  The IAEA's declaration of North Korea's serious violation of the NPT 
frustrated the administration's intention. So, administration officials 
attempted to intentionally deceive the American people into believing 
that Pyongyang had done something that warranted a resumption of the 
talks. That the administration would initiate such a deception knowing 
full well that North Korea would correctly recognize it as another sign 
of American weakness is as reckless an action as the administration has 
taken to date in this crisis.
  At the moment, we have conflicting reports about whether North Korea 
is continuing to defuel the Yongbyon reactor. On Friday, the 
administration and the IAEA insisted that North Korea delay discharging 
any more of the fuel rods until an agreement had been concluded for 
IAEA inspectors to monitor their removal and measure the fuel level in 
the rods of interest. Reports in the Defense Department indicate that 
the defueling has continued over our objections. The State Department 
is still hopeful that the defueling has not resumed.

  Irrespective of whether North Korea has ignored our latest demand, 
the administration intends to resume direct talks with them. 
Administration officials claim that North Korea has met all the 
prerequisites for those talks. Whatever those prerequisites might be 
remain a mystery to the rest of us.
  Mr. President, I assume that the administration hopes that its latest 
transparent attempt at appeasement will succeed where all their other 
attempts failed. Given the administration's unwavering devotion to 
carrots and gestures of friendship, surely the North Koreans will 
finally be overwhelmed by U.S. good will and graciously abandon their 
nuclear ambitions in return. What a surprise it must have been to 
administration officials yesterday when North Korea forgot its manners 
again and denounced a regularly scheduled U.S.-led naval exercise in 
the Pacific with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and other of our 
allies as a hostile military action which North Korea is prepared to 
counter.
  Mr. President, it has become exceedingly difficult to keep one's 
remarks free from cynicism when discussing administration diplomacy in 
this crisis. A brief review of the administration's record of failed 
appeasement over the last year illustrates why.
  In January 1993, North Korea rejected an IAEA request to inspect 2 
nuclear waste sites. In February, the IAEA set a March 31 deadline for 
North Korea to allow the requested inspection. North Korea responded by 
announcing its decision to withdraw from the NPT.
  The Clinton administration responded by entering direct negotiations 
with North Korea on the issue. Its stated policy at the time was to 
persuade the Koreans to remain in the NPT; to assure them that we would 
not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; to convince them to allow 
inspections to ensure the continuity of safeguards, as defined by the 
United States, not the IAEA; and to use the talks or the cancellation 
of talks as a carrot and stick to induce North Korea's cooperation.
  In June and July, two rounds of talks were held. Two joint statements 
were issued respectively containing North Korea's promise to suspend 
their withdrawal from the NPT; the United States promise not to use 
nuclear weapons against North Korea and not to interfere in their 
internal affairs. The first statement also specified an agreement on 
the impartial application of full scope safeguards and included North 
Korea's commitment to negotiate nuclear questions simultaneously with 
the United States, the IAEA and South Korea.
  After the talks, North Korea continued to refuse special inspections 
or a resumption of regular inspections. They reneged on their 
commitment to negotiate with the IAEA. And they conditioned their 
discussions with South Korea on the termination of ``nuclear war 
exercises'' by South Korea and the United States.
  In response, the Clinton administration scheduled a third round of 
direct talks.
  In August, North Korea limited the IAEA to night time access during 
routine inspection. In September, North Korea refused to allow a 
follow-up inspection. They refused again in October.
  The Clinton administration sent State Department officials to meet 
with the North Koreans at the United Nations. In November, they again 
dispatched those officials to New York.
  Later that month, the IAEA declared that it could no longer monitor 
activities in North Korea's nuclear facilities because the film and 
batteries in its cameras had run out.
  President Clinton made his infamous declaration stating without 
qualification that North Korea would not be allowed to possess a single 
nuclear weapon. The administration then proposed comprehensive 
negotiations with North Korea to include discussion of diplomatic 
relations, United States military exercises, and economic relations. 
Shortly thereafter, the administration canceled Operation Team Spirit.
  Later in the month after meeting with South Korean President Kim, 
President Clinton announced a new policy which held that North Korea 
must be made to honor its NPT obligations; and must open talks with 
South Korea on the nuclear issue before the United States would hold 
another round of direct talks.
  In December, the United States and North Korea reached an agreement 
which North Korea contends was limited to North Korea's permission for 
one restricted IAEA inspection. The administration first acknowledged, 
then denied that the agreement was limited to one inspection. The 
administration promised to cancel Team Spirit again and to resume 
direct talks if North Korea opened talks with the South.
  In January, the IAEA refused to accept North Korea's terms for a 
limited inspection. The Clinton administration threatened economic 
sanctions if the IAEA reported that it could not longer monitor North 
Korea's nuclear program. North Korea then advised the IAEA that it will 
accept inspections.
  The Clinton administration suspended Team Spirit and scheduled 
another round of direct talks for March 21.
  Come March, North Korea blocked an IAEA inspection of its 
reprocessing facility, and refused to begin talks with South Korea.
  The Clinton administration canceled the March 21 round of talks, and 
asked the Security Council to vote on a resolution condemning North 
Korea and threatening the future imposition of sanctions. Blocked by 
China, the administration fails to get a vote on its resolution, 
settling instead for a watered down Presidential statement which 
instructs the IAEA to continue to seek an inspection and report back to 
the council in May.
  North Korea offered to allow the completion of the March inspection 
if the United States dropped its insistence on simultaneous talks with 
South Korea.
  In April, at the urging of the Clinton administration, South Korea 
dropped its demand for talks with the North.
  North Korea then disclosed its planned shut down and refueling of the 
reactor, and told the IAEA it could be present during the refueling. 
However, they rejected the IAEA's demand that inspectors be allowed to 
sample ``fuel rods of interest'' to determine whether fuel had been 
diverted in 1989.
  This month, the United States and the IAEA instructed North Korea not 
to begin refueling until IAEA inspectors had arrived.
  North Korea ignored the demand and began refueling, earning the 
IAEA's condemnation of the act as a serious violation of the NPT.
  The Clinton administration responded by scheduling another round of 
high level direct negotiations with North Korea.
  Mr. President, this abysmal record of failed appeasement speaks for 
itself without any further commentary by me.
  In a few minutes I will enumerate what actions I believe the United 
States should take if we are to ever stop retreating in the face of 
international lawlessness and direct threats to the security of the 
United States and our allies. I intend to include in this summary a 
discussion of that action which the administration has virtually 
excluded as a response to North Korea's bad faith--to the great relief 
of Pyongyang--the military option.
  Before I begin that discussion, Mr. President, I want to explain why 
I believe this situation is so grave that the United States must take 
whatever actions are required to force an end to North Korea's unlawful 
nuclear ambitions.
  North Korea's nuclear program may be the defining crisis of the post-
cold-war world. It represents a clear and present danger to our closest 
Asian allies and to the security of the United States itself. I am 
greatly concerned that the eventual outcome of North Korea's pursuit of 
nuclear status will be a world where the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction explodes exponentially; where in a never ending spiral 
of escalation all Asian powers capable of producing nuclear weapons do 
so and seriously undermine the stability of all Asia; where the most 
irresponsible, terrorist regimes in the world have the capacity to 
intimidate regional rivals into total submission or annihilate them; 
where the United States itself might be the victim of a terrorist 
attack like the bombing of the World Trade Center--only this time the 
weapon of choice will be a nuclear bomb.
  From 1985 to 1992, North Korea exported more than $2.5 billion in 
arms. While most of the recipients of these sales are classified, CIA 
Director Woolsey has identified Syria, Iran, and Libya among the 
countries which have taken delivery of North Korean Scud C ballistic 
missiles.
  To all those apologists for the administration's appeasement policy 
who argue that we must refrain from responses that might provoke the 
North into launching a military attack, I ask one question: Would an 
attack be more or less likely after North Korea acquires a nuclear 
arsenal and after it has completed its production of ballistic missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear warheads to Tokyo? I think the answer is 
obvious.
  Armed with a sufficient arsenal to both export and use to their own 
ends, North Korea could soon be blackmailing South Korea, Japan, and 
even the United States into providing sufficient aid and diplomatic 
concessions in order to sustain their crumbling regime and earning hard 
currency from its nuclear sales abroad.
  Should the United States and our allies resist North Korea's threats, 
and take the necessary steps to prepare for a military confrontation, 
the North could be more inclined to strike first knowing that if their 
aggression was repelled, the United States and South Korea might be 
dissuaded from crossing the 38th parallel in a counterattack out of 
fear that it would trigger a nuclear war--a prospect more daunting that 
the artillery barrage it is currently capable of inflicting on Seoul. 
Unless, the administration completely squanders all credibility with 
Pyongyang, Kim Il-Song could not rule out today the possibility that an 
attack on the South might lead to the complete destruction of his 
regime.
  What is the nature of the regime that currently threatens us? It is 
led by the same man today who over 40 years ago misread American 
resolve and launched the Korean war--a war for which the United States 
was not prepared and which cost us dearly. It is a regime that in one 
1983 incident assassinated most of South Korea's Government. It is a 
regime that captured the U.S.S. Pueblo, imprisoned and tortured its 
crew. It is a regime that in 1987 blew up a South Korean airliner 
carrying over 150 South Korean construction workers home from work in 
the Middle East. It is a regime that has committed numerous other 
terrorist acts so ruthless that they defy brief summarization.

  Mr. President, North Korea has utterly impoverished its nation in 
order to finance its enormous military and its nuclear weapons 
programs. I find it difficult to accept that any number of economic and 
diplomatic rewards from the United States, by themselves, would 
sufficiently entice Pyongyang into abandoning the aspirations they have 
paid so dearly to achieve. Given the administration's appeasement 
policy's sorry record of accomplishment to date, it is abundantly clear 
to any rational person that the time for more forceful, coercive action 
is long overdue. Any further delay in hardening our policy would 
constitute administration negligence so gross as to damage our security 
interests for a generation or more.
  Before describing the stronger action I have referred to, let me 
first quote Secretary Perry from remarks he made last week prior to the 
administration's latest change in policy.

       Whatever risks we are facing by actions we take today, I 
     believe they would be less than the risks we would face if we 
     tried to face their program two years from now after they had 
     developed a substantial inventory of nuclear bombs and 
     missiles for their delivery vehicles.

  Secretary Perry had it exactly right. North Korea's recent purchase 
of 60 submarines from Russia which, Janes Weekly contends, could be 
adapted to fire ballistic missiles underscores the urgency of the 
Secretary's remarks. So, let us now--at long last--consider those steps 
that would bring this expanding crisis to its earliest and most 
favorable conclusion.
  The United States should once again inform North Korea that should 
they abandon their nuclear ambitions, we are prepared to normalize our 
economic and diplomatic relations with that isolated country. After we 
have reaffirmed that intention, we should talk no more of carrots. Any 
further discussion of the crisis should only detail the punitive 
measures we are prepared to take immediately to force their 
cooperation.
  The United States should then quietly inform the Chinese that our 
policy of accommodation with North Korea has failed and we intend to 
seek a resolution of sanctions in the Security Council.
  We should make clear to China, quietly but very forcefully, that 
there is no other issue involved in our relations of comparable 
importance. A mutually advantageous engagement between our two 
countries will simply not be possible absent their cooperation on the 
sanctions question. At the same time, we should inform the Chinese that 
we intend to pursue our advocacy of human rights through some means 
other than linking it to MFN. The administration must spare no effort 
to be persuasive in this endeavor. China must understand that should 
they decline to cooperate, we will have reached an insurmountable 
impasse in our own relations.
  We should make the same representations to Russia.
  Whether or not China or Russia indicate they are prepared to 
cooperate, we must still ask the Security Council to impose tough 
sanctions. In discussions with our allies before we go to the Security 
Council, we should make clear our expectations of Japan. Even if a 
sanctions resolution is vetoed, Japan must cut off all remittances from 
Korean-Japanese to North Korea.
  Japanese Prime Minister Hata, when he still served as Foreign 
Minister, estimated that financial flows to North Korea from Koreans 
residing in Japan had reached $1.8 billion annually. Of that figure, 
$600-700 million is in the form of cash remittances. They account for 
40 percent or more of North Korea's foreign exchange earnings, and a 
little more than 8 percent of its GNP. Depriving North Korea of this 
important source of hard currency will be sharply felt in Pyongyang as 
it struggles to keep the collapsing North Korean economy from plunging 
the entire society into chaos.
  North Korea has threatened to go to war over the imposition of 
sanctions. I do not think they will, but I am not certain. Thus, it is 
critical that the United States prepare for such a contingency 
immediately for two obvious reasons. First, we have 37,000 American 
troops in Korea and we must take every measure to ensure that they are 
protected to the extent possible from North Korean attack and would 
prevail as quickly as possible in a conflict. Second, visibility 
improving our readiness to counter North Korean aggression will 
emphasize the seriousness of our intention to resolve this crisis on 
our terms.
  Again, let me quote Secretary Perry:

       The North Koreans have stated that they would consider the 
     imposition of sanctions to be equivalent to a declaration of 
     war. * * * We may believe, and I do believe, that this is 
     rhetoric on their part, but we cannot act on that belief. We 
     have to act on the prudent assumption that there will be some 
     increase in the risk of war if we go to a sanction regime.

  Once more, the Secretary had it exactly right. Unfortunately, the 
administration has done nothing to act on his prudent assumption. With 
the exception of the very slow deployment of the Patriot missile 
batteries the United States has done nothing to prepare for a possible 
attack from the North.
  U.S. forces in Korea number approximately 37,000. South Korean forces 
number approximately 500,000. Much of these forces are deployed north 
of Seoul. American capabilities include 2 mechanized light brigades, 
with Bradley and M-1 tanks.
  North Korean forces number approximately 1.2 million men, most of 
whom are deployed within 20 to 30 miles of the DMZ. Long range North 
Korean artillery is deployed all along the DMZ with the capability of 
striking all of Seoul. Deployed SCUD missiles, possibly armed with 
chemical warheads, could hit almost any point on the southern 
peninsula.
  The American commander in South Korea, General Luck, was reported to 
have estimated that war on the Korean peninsula would last no longer 
than 90 days. I do not have sufficient information to support or 
contradict the general's estimation. Suffice it to say, that should it 
come to war, it will be a very difficult experience, and we should be 
prepared to bring it to a very rapid conclusion, well short of the 
general's 90 days if possible.
  Mr. President, the objects of U.S. military policy in Korea should be 
to deter a North Korean attack; to ensure a decisive win and the least 
lost of life possible if deterrence fails; to compel North Korea to 
terminate its nuclear weapons program; and to enforce any economic 
embargo which might be imposed.
  In order to ensure the readiness of U.S. and South Korean forces to 
serve those ends, the administration should have already ordered the 
following action. Unfortunately, they have not yet seen fit do so. Lack 
of adequate strategic lift, Mr. President, makes it imperative that the 
following deployments occur well ahead of any anticipated military 
action.
  First, increase the readiness and alert posture of U.S. and South 
Korean forces; second, deploy to South Korea additional troops from the 
United States; third, deploy additional fighter aircraft squadrons and 
Apache helicopters to South Korea; fourth, deploy a carrier battle 
group to the area; fifth, preposition bombers and tankers in the 
region; sixth, preposition stocks in South Korea; since, again, 
significant lack of strategic lift precludes the timely sustainment of 
our forces during the crisis; seventh, enhance intelligence collection 
and sharing with South Korea, focusing increased intelligence assets, 
both satellites and aircraft systems, in the theater; eighth, enhance 
South Korean defenses with Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 
counter-artillery radars, and precision-guided munitions; and ninth, 
neither American and South Korean forces nor the population of Seoul 
have effective defenses against a chemical or biological attack from 
the North. This failing should be quickly remedied.

  Mr. President, these are but a few of the actions which the United 
States should quickly take in accordance with Secretary Perry's prudent 
assumption directive. That none of them have yet been ordered exposes 
the administration's considerable negligence.
  Mr. President, I have not outlined these few steps because I am eager 
for a confrontation in Korea. I contemplate such a contingency with 
great dread. I know well the full terrible measure of war, and 
appreciate its consequences for the people of South Korea and the 
Americans stationed there. I ask that the administration act on these 
recommendations because I believe they will have a deterrent value--
they will better acquaint North Korea with the futility of any attempt 
to conquer the South.
  I also appreciate how difficult it might be for Pyongyang to 
interpret the extraordinarily confused signals they receive from the 
administration. Accordingly, I think the administration should take 
pains to inform North Korea that these actions are purely defensive. 
But should they decide to make a fight of it nevertheless, we should 
also have informed them in unmistakable terms that any war they begin 
on the Korean peninsula will end in Pyongyang. They must be made to 
understand that the United States intends to make their regime the last 
casualty of a second Korean War.
  I hope they will heed that warning, Mr. President. But if they do 
not, we must not be dissuaded from our commitment to prepare for the 
prospect of North Korean aggression, and to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear crisis on our terms by whatever means necessary.
  Mr. President, I have opposed the use of American force in Beirut, in 
Bosnia, in Somalia, and in Haiti. I am not such a hawk that I favor 
using force to resolve problems in places where vital U.S. interests 
are not threatened. But for the reasons I have provided, I believe 
those interests are very gravely threatened in Korea.
  Therefore, I believe the United States must consider taking stronger 
measures should we further fail to persuade North Korea to end this 
crisis. I do not believe that we should resort to offensive military 
actions immediately. The imposition of sanctions should be attempted 
and the necessary improvements to our readiness should be affected 
before we embrace such a serious option. But we should not exclude it 
from consideration. It should be considered very carefully.
  The administration would have us believe that a military response to 
Pyongyang's intransigence would be ineffective. That is not true, Mr. 
President. Air or cruise missile strikes on North Korea's nuclear 
facilities would not completely destroy their nuclear program, but they 
could damage it severely over both the near and long term. There are 
risks involved, of course, that must be minimized to the greatest 
extent possible.
  Disabling or limiting North Korea's near-term nuclear capability 
poses the most difficulties. However, those difficulties are not 
insurmountable.
  Since the reactor's shut down, only a small percentage of its fuel 
rods have been removed. Discharge of all the rods, refueling and 
restart may take as long as 60 to 90 days, meaning that the reactor 
could be operational as early as late July or August. Most, if not all, 
of the spent rods will be stored in the reactor's cooling pond, 
although some may be moved later to the reprocessing plant about 1000 
meters from the reactor or stored in other hidden locations. 
Reprocessing the plutonium in the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon could 
provide a three to four-fold increase in North Korea's nuclear weapons 
capability.
  A significant portion of the reprocessing plant is underground and is 
reinforced with concrete and earthworks. In addition, there is a fuel 
rod assembly facility located in this region. The facilities have 
independent power sources.
  Strikes using high-performance aircraft would be required to 
eliminate these facilities, since they are so heavily reinforced and 
cruise missiles would not be effective. Because of heavy air defenses 
around these facilities, the risk to our pilots would be considerable. 
However, we should have a pretty detailed understanding of the 
facilities' interior and exterior design and defenses.
  Timing is critical in targeting these facilities. Extensive bombing 
of the reactor or reprocessing plant could cause the release of nuclear 
radiation which might be carried by prevailing winds to South Korea. 
Precision targeting could effectively damage the capabilities of both 
facilities without requiring that they be reduced to rubble, and with 
little or no radiation release.
  It would be preferable to strike the reactor while it is not 
operational. But even if it is fully refueled and has been restarted, I 
am told that the radiation release would be minimal with a new fuel 
load. Strikes could be targeted in such a way as to cause the building 
to collapse in on itself without seriously damaging any fuel rods in 
the core.
  If no spent fuel rods are moved to the reprocessing facility, it 
could be hit without risk of a radiation release. Even if a small 
number have been stored there, a precision strike on the building, 
designed to disrupt future operations for some period of time, would 
not result in a significant release of radiation. Again, with precision 
targeting, a hit could be designed to cause the building to collapse in 
on itself with virtually no radiation release.
  Less difficult options--if also less effective against North Korea's 
near-term threat--would be strikes against North Korea's huge new 250 
megawatt reactor which is scheduled to become operational by the end of 
the year, another even larger reactor which will be operational in 
1996, and an associated reprocessing plant that will begin operations 
in about 6 months. Since these facilities are not on-line, and have no 
nuclear fuel on site at this time, there would be no risk of radiation 
release.
  The objective of the strikes would be to irreparably damage the 
facilities and surrounding support structures, including power plants. 
High-performance aircraft or Tomahawk cruise missile strikes targeted 
on these three facilities might effectively eliminate North Korea's 
planned expansion of their nuclear program. Cruise missiles would 
eliminate the direct risk of death or capture of any American pilots.
  Mr. President, I have just described in dry, technical terms what 
would be a very serious, and dangerous undertaking by the United 
States. I would not want my colleagues to think that I take such 
matters lightly. But I felt it important to refute claims that we have 
no viable military options in this situation. We do have several very 
considerable options available to us today. We should not utilize them 
hastily or without careful consideration. But we should be considering 
them, and ultimately prepared to implement them if that is what is 
required to meet the President's correctly stated objective that the 
United States will not tolerate their nuclear program, period.
  I began these lengthy remarks by stating how I had hoped that the 
administration and I were finally in accordance on how to resolve this 
crisis. Regrettably, that is not the case. I have heard reports that 
the administration has used my previous statements on this problem to 
show the North Koreans that there are some Americans who would be less 
accommodating in their approach to them. That is fine by me, Mr. 
President. But I hope today that I have a larger audience. I hope today 
the administration is listening to me.
  I would leave them with a final warning which I have given before by 
paraphrasing Winston Churchill. Let it not be said of this 
administration that in a defining crisis of the post-cold-war world, 
they faced a choice between dishonorable appeasement and war, they 
chose appeasement first and got war later.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
California [Mrs. Feinstein].
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I would like to commend the Senator 
from Arizona on his very thoughtful remarks about what is a very 
difficult and challenging world problem and thank him.
  I had the pleasure of listening to him and learned a great deal.
  So I would just like to extend my thanks.

                          ____________________