[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 66 (Tuesday, May 24, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant the House Resolution 431 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 4301.

                              {time}  1721


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for 
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, with 
Mr. LaRocco Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose 
earlier today, amendment No. 1 printed in part 6 of House Report 103-
520, offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman], had been 
disposed of, and amendment No. 2, printed in part 6 of that report, was 
not offered.
  It is now in order to debate the subject of Haiti. The gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 15 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my distinct pleasure to yield 5 
minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens].
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise because I think this is an 
unprecedented amendment. We are considering an authorization of the 
Defense Department, and we suddenly plunged into foreign policy.
  We consider the issue of Haiti so important that we have forced it on 
the agenda, and I would like to note that this is a matter that was not 
discussed and not taken through the usual committee procedure, neither 
the Committee on Armed Services or the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Neither committee has considered this amendment. It went directly to 
the Committee on Rules, which means a number of people consider the 
issue of Haiti to be of great importance and great immediacy.
  No one thinks the problem is more important than I do. As the 
chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus task force on Haiti, we have 
been wrestling with the issue now for almost 2 years. We see no reason 
necessary to rush to judgment on any aspect of Haitian policy at this 
moment. However, we would like to call to the attention of those who 
see it as being such an immediate problem that it is an immediate 
problem which requires a more reasoned and a more 
deliberative solution, without interference of this kind.

  It is important to note that it is a complex issue that has been 
discussed quite a bit lately, and the President finally has spelled out 
the fact that we do have compelling national interest in Haiti. We do 
have compelling national interests, because Haiti is located less than 
an hour away from the shores of the United States. We do have 
compelling interests, because there are a million Haitian-American 
citizens. We do have compelling interests because of the fact that 
large numbers of Haitians have left the country since the deposing of 
its rightfully elected president, John-Bertrand Aristide, elected by 70 
percent of the vote, but overthrown by military coup. Since that time 
large numbers have left to come to the shores of the United States, and 
there is definitely a problem with relocating and resettling refugees.
  We have not acted in a very moral manner. We have imposed conditions 
upon the Haitian refugees unlike any conditions ever imposed on 
refugees before. When the Hungarian revolution took place, not only did 
we accept refugees from Hungary without extensive interviews, but we 
also sent planes to pick them up. The planes were for free. They picked 
them up, they brought them back into this country, and large numbers of 
Hungarians were resettled because of the fact it was understood they 
were escaping a totalitarian regime.
  Nobody interviewed each Hungarian to ask them are you a politician or 
in some way connected with the government, and sent them through a set 
of refined criteria to determine whether or not they deserve to come 
into this country as political refugees.
  We do not recognize the Government of Haiti, and none of the other 
nations of the world recognize the Government of Haiti at present. The 
military thugs who are in charge are criminals. They have no plan, they 
have no philosophy. They are not even good fascists. They are just 
criminals, using their power to drain off all the remaining resources 
of a very poor country. We are dealing with criminals, and we cannot 
negotiate with criminals.
  The issue is raised over and over again about the use of every other 
means to effect change in Haiti and restore the rightfully elected 
President. We would like to see every other means used, but we do not 
want to rule out the option of force.
  We do not want them to know there is no option to use force to 
restore the democratically elected President. We do want to use every 
means, and we must concede that this administration has not used every 
available means.
  We have had rhetoric which talked about using sanctions. We have had 
rhetoric which talked about an embargo, rhetoric which talked about 
lifting the passports of the military leaders and the elite who helped 
to overthrow the rightfully elected government. But those sanctions 
have not been enforced, the passports have not been lifted, and the 
assets of the officers have not been frozen.
  There are a number of steps we were promised that would be taken that 
were never taken. Even now there is a shallow commitment to the lifting 
of passports, the freezing of assets, and going beyond the U.N. 
resolution which imposes an embargo on all goods except food and 
medicine. That embargo itself is a joke if we continue to allow the 
border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti to be a sieve through 
which everything flows.
  We can put pressure on the Dominican Republic. They are a close 
friend of ours and receive aid from us. But we are not seriously 
enforcing the embargo, because we let the traffic continue to flow 
across the border. We have not taken all the steps we can take 
peacefully. We should take those steps. We should do nothing here in 
the Congress to rule out any policy option of the administration in the 
meantime.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by commending the efforts of 
my colleagues, Porter Goss and Jon Kyl, in bringing this matter to the 
floor of the House. It is due to their diligence that the House has 
this timely opportunity to debate and consider the various directions 
of the administration's Haiti policy.
  A few short weeks ago, the President signed ``PDD-25'' which attempts 
to map out administration policy on peacekeeping. A central element of 
this document is a checklist of conditions used to evaluate whether the 
United States should undertake any given peacekeeping operation.
  However, when you apply the Clinton Peacekeeping Doctrine to Haiti, 
the first test since the PDD was signed, it flunks the test.
  The first criteria for U.S. involvement is: ``Is there a threat to 
international peace and security?'' The answer in Haiti is obviously 
no. If such a threat to international security existed the only country 
sharing land with Haiti--the Dominican Republican--would be clamoring 
for action.
  The second criteria for U.S. involvement is: ``Does the mission have 
a clear objective?'' The answer is once again no. The only mission 
objective seems to be to restore Aristide to power, even if that may 
not be the most realistic or viable approach to achieving a lasting 
democracy in Haiti. The long-term mission of U.S. military is very 
unclear.
  The third criteria for U.S. involvement is: ``Do all parties agree to 
a U.N. presence?'' The answer for Haiti is no. Supporters of the 
military regime proved that last October 11 in greeting the U.S.S. 
Harlan County with violent protests.
  The fourth criteria for U.S. involvement is: ``Are sufficient 
resources available for the mission?'' The answer here is a qualified 
no. The DOD budget is already reeling from budget cuts under President 
Clinton and burdened with the costs of numerous other peacekeeping 
operations, and it is unlikely that Congress would appropriate new 
funds to bankroll a military expedition in Haiti.

  The fifth criteria for U.S. involvement is: ``Can an end-point to the 
operation be identified?'' The answer once again is a resounding no 
unless the United States enters with only the limited objective of 
restoring Aristide and withdraws immediately afterwards. Such a 
strategy would likely result in a replay of the military coup that 
chased Aristide from Haiti in the first place and is therefore not a 
viable option in the long term.
  Mr. Chairman, as you can see, U.S. military action to restore 
President Aristide to power resoundingly fails the administration's own 
peacekeeping conditions. If for no other reason, the House ought to 
strongly reject the military option under consideration.
  The Haiti amendments that the House will consider are similar in 
substance but different in tone. Both embrace Mr. Kyl's original 
language expressing congressional opposition to military intervention 
in Haiti. As such, the House has before it little choice on that 
question.
  Therefore, I am hopeful that the outcome of today's debate will send 
a clear message to the White House that elements of its current policy 
considerations on Haiti are not supported by the Congress.
  Vote ``yes'' on the Goss-Kyl amendment to send the clearest message 
possible.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I remember taking the well in a different context 
dealing with issues that were compelling, human rights questions that 
were extraordinarily important. At that time it was in the context of 
South Africa.
  Mr. Chairman, at that time I rose and I said to my colleagues that 
what is happening in South Africa is deplorable. And it seems to me 
that there are three options that we can address.
  Mr. Chairman, we said then, in the context of South Africa, that 
there were three options available to us. I would suggest in the 
context of Haiti, there are three options available to us.
  We can step aside and do nothing. That is unacceptable. We can talk 
about the use of force and the invasion of Haiti. Mr. Chairman, I came 
here 24 years ago as an advocate of peace. I have stood in the well 
over and over and over again saying that peace is a better idea and 
diplomacy and political solutions to problems are a better idea. So I 
take the use of force off the table.
  Which comes then to the third option, how do we, within the context 
of the powers that we have available to us, stand up in defense of 
human rights and democratic principles in the context of Haiti?
  Mr. Chairman, this issue has been on the back burner for too long. 
The gentleman from New York is absolutely correct. This is not the 
fashion in which this amendment ought to come. The Committee on Foreign 
Affairs ought to bring a bill to the floor of Congress to address this. 
We introduced such a bill and had over 100 cosponsors. There should be 
hearings. There should be a process by which these matters are dealt 
with.
  But we all understand the politics that go on in these Chambers and, 
because there is no vehicle, the House Committee on Armed Services bill 
becomes a vehicle for foreign policy matters.
  All right. Then here we are. I am prepared to stand up and face the 
moment. We cannot keep crying about should have or would have or could 
have been. We have to deal with what is at this moment. We now have to 
deal with what is at this moment. We now have an opportunity to talk.
  Mr. Chairman, the death and destruction that is taking place in Haiti 
is an abomination, and we need to stand up unequivocally and oppose it. 
The drugs that are being trafficked through this situation that have 
impacted upon our Nation are something that we need to address.
  Mr. Chairman, the refugees that are coming toward this country is an 
example of the deplorable set of circumstances that exist in Haiti that 
must be addressed. The issue in Haiti, the message we ought to be 
sending around the world and certainly in this region is, what is more 
powerful, the bullet or the ballot?
  In the context of Haiti, the Haitian people said, the ballot is more 
powerful than the bullet. And if we truly believe that, then we must 
stand in unequivocal opposition to what is happening in Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, I applaud the international efforts that have been 
taken by this administration, but I believe that this administration 
also, on a unilateral basis, has an opportunity to impose sanctions and 
bring stringent pressure on the people in Haiti that are denying these 
human beings their human rights, their human dignity, their human 
freedom, and their democratic principles.
  Mr. Chairman, remember Nelson Mandela just raised his hand as the 
President of a great nation in some part because of what this Nation 
did unilaterally, as we stood up in the world community and took a 
position and said that we must stand in defense of democratic 
principles.
  Can we do less with respect to Haiti? Can we do less in this region? 
We should be buoyed by the experiences of South Africa. We should be 
inspired by the installment of Nelson Mandela in South Africa to give 
us a feeling that we do have a role to play, make a significant 
contribution in elevating the international conscience with respect to 
this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, I would not have liked to see this amendment come to 
the floor in this fashion. I always believe there ought to be hearings 
and discussions and debate and deliberation. But the fact of the matter 
is that there is great frustration in these Chambers and so we end up 
in this place. The one gentleman has offered an amendment. We offer an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute. But at least it takes the 
issue off the back burner, puts it on the front burner of America and 
allows us to discuss this issue in some clear and unequivocal terms.
  The message that we must send to the elite and the powerful in the 
military in Haiti is that as a great Nation we cannot sit by idly and 
allow these things to happen.

  The world is marching toward a more rational reality. The world is 
marching toward some greater reality, some greater commitment to human 
rights.
  When Israelis and Palestinians can cross eons of time to shake hands, 
to march forward into the future, when Nelson Mendela and Afrikaners 
can shake hands to march into the future, then it is very clear that 
the world is on a different path, Mr. Chairman.
  We have to be on the right side of history. I am concerned that we 
are not bringing the most stringent pressure that we can on Haiti.
  Question: Does sanction create greater dislocation and bring pain to 
people in Haiti? The answer is yes. But it can be temporary. At this 
point, the pain and the oppression are permanent. The death and 
destruction is real on a daily basis.
  My hope is that this separate strategy, nonviolent though it be, a 
rejection of force, though it be, I will stand proudly and clearly 
saying that I think that there is a nonviolent mechanism that we can 
use. We have always argued in these Chambers that before we talk about 
the use of force that we should be willing to exhaust all nonviolent 
means to bring pressure to achieve our commitment to democratic 
principles and to a commitment to human rights.
  Well, we are not there yet, Mr. Chairman. We are not bringing the 
awesome, necessary pressure to bear that we in this country can bring. 
I hope that we do. This is beginning a significant debate that I hope 
ends up putting this country on the right side of history.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona [Mr. Kyl].

                              {time}  1740

  Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to compliment the chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Dellums, for an excellent statement. 
It is not often that he and I are in agreement on matters, or I should 
say only occasionally we are not in agreement. On this matter we are 
very much in agreement.
  I think his statement was eloquent, first of all, in making the point 
that it is no option to do nothing; second, in making the point that it 
is no option to use force, and I might say that I introduced a 
resolution to the Committee on Rules rejecting the use of force in 
Haiti unless it could be determined that the security interests of the 
United States were involved, at which point, of course, we could do so. 
That has not been demonstrated. I do not think it can be, so we should 
not be resorting to force.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to say that both the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] 
incorporated the language of my resolution regarding the use of 
force into their two amendments, so irrespective of which of those two 
amendments might be adopted, we make a clear statement in both of them 
that we are not going to resort to force. In that, I certainly 
compliment the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] in making the 
case more eloquently than could I.

  Of course, he points out that the third option is to debate, study, 
and to determine a course of action that forcefully deals with the 
issue, the issue politically, the issue economically, the issue from a 
standpoint of human rights, and on this we are also in agreement.
  The only point I would disagree with my colleague on is that I do not 
believe that the use of sanctions at this point is a sound policy. That 
is a matter upon which reasonable people can differ. It is a matter 
upon which I believe, unfortunately, the people who are in power there 
today will not respond positively, and that sanctions only hurt the 
people who we are trying to help. I know, as I say, that it is a point 
upon which reasonable people can differ.
  However, I would suggest that it is the diplomatic and the economic 
and the political pressure that the United States can bring to bear 
that must ultimately resolve this situation, as the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] just pointed out. We have to bring that kind 
of pressure to bear.
  Just to note, yesterday in the Washington Times there was an article 
describing how the smugglers make a mockery of the toughened U.N. 
embargo on Haiti, shipping hundreds of gallons of gasoline and diesel 
oil from the Dominican Republic. So even if there is an embargo, it 
does not work.
  We have the problem of the Haitian children, who are having to rely 
upon CARE distribution of soy meal and wheat for their daily ration. 
Most of them go to sleep crying from hunger. This is something that has 
to be resolved and has to be resolved quickly.
  Mr. Chairman, if the greatest Nation on earth cannot bring the kind 
of pressure to bear upon the situation there that can relieve this 
hunger and can relieve this poverty, then we have not done our day's 
work.
  We have a problem, of course, because we can only take in the 
political refugees, and they only represent a proportion of those 
people who are tying to immigrate from Haiti, so we have to address the 
problem of the economic refugees. It is not good enough to simply turn 
them back. We have to resolve the situation by finding a way to bring 
the pressure on the people who are currently in Haiti and running that 
Government there, to resolve the political differences, to change the 
political system, to restore a sense of economic prosperity to the 
country which will relieve both the political and the economic burden, 
and the poverty and the sense of frustration that the people cannot 
resolve the situation on their own, and have to emigrate to this 
country.
  Only by relieving that pressure will we resolve the suffering of the 
people who set out on the high seas, to come to this country, only to 
either end up drowning on the high seas or find themselves having to be 
turned back. That is a situation that we cannot allow to continue.
  Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I think it is wise that we have made a 
very strong statement here against the use of force in Haiti, and I 
compliment my colleagues for adopting my resolution that abjures the 
use of force, and compliment the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums] for again raising our voice to find a way to restore both the 
political and the economic situation to Haiti that will resolve this 
situation once and for all.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman form 
Florida [Mr. Goss].
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, during the next 70 minutes, this House will 
have the chance to focus attention on an ongoing foreign and 
immigration policy crisis. Under the original boundaries of the DOD 
authorization bill, this debate would not have been allowed. But many 
Members--representing hundreds of thousands of Americans concerned 
about U.S. military intervention and an ongoing refugee crisis--forced 
the issue. United States policy toward Haiti is important and is 
directly relevant to our national interests.
  While the President might prefer we remain silent, it is appropriate 
for this Congress to go on record now, before American lives are placed 
in harm's way. So I thank the chairman and ranking member of the Rules 
Committee, and the chairman and ranking members of the Armed Services 
Committee for agreeing to allow this debate to proceed. Later, my 
colleagues will be asked to consider two competing views of where 
United States policy toward Haiti should be heading. Do we look back, 
toward failed policies of punishing economic sanctions and stalled 
negotiated agreements? Or do we look ahead, toward a positive solution 
for Haiti, implemented by Haitians and carried out on Haitian soil? Mr. 
Chairman, Haiti lies in America's own backyard. Although desperately 
poor, the Haitian people know what they want: peace, democracy, and a 
better life. In overwhelming numbers they took a courageous step toward 
that future when, in December 1990, they elected Father Jean Bertrand 
Aristide to be their President. As an official elections observer, I 
watched as nearly 70 percent of Haitians voted enthusiastically for 
President Aristide, and celebrated his victory with new hope for a 
better future in Haiti. After the military coup in 1991, the United 
States and the international community have sought in vain to broker a 
solution to the ongoing stalemate. But the result of these efforts has 
been greater polarization and an emboldened military right wing. As 
President Clinton and outspoken United States activists continue to 
beat the drum for military intervention--somehow believing that 
democracy can be propped up at the barrel of a gun--the Haitian people, 
suffering under the terrible burden of international sanctions, grow 
more demoralized. Since the President's latest policy swerve on Haiti, 
hundreds of Haitians have again taken to leaky boats in a desperate 
attempt to flee economic hardship, and in some cases, fear of political 
persecution. It doesn't matter to them that the details of the 
President's ill-defined new refugee processing policy are still 
unavailable. It doesn't matter that the shipboard processing has not 
yet begun and there is no third country option in play. It does not 
matter whether this is a foreign affairs or an armed services debate. 
The only thing that matters to these people without hope is getting out 
of Haiti--where they see no future. Mr. Chairman, there is a better way 
for Haiti that can bring about an end to the economic sanctions, an 
opportunity for return of the duly elected President, an orderly and 
expanded policy for processing refugees, a workable means for supplying 
humanitarian relief, and a stepping stone to long-term democracy in 
Haiti. Take a close look at the Goss safe haven plan--it is all there: 
Haitians, solving Haiti's problems on Haitian soil, under UN/OAS 
auspices. There in the Ile de la Gonave in the heart of Haiti's major 
bay.

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
  The increasing human rights abuses and repression in Haiti are tragic 
and deeply distressing. The situation highlights the need for 
international actions that clearly show support for the democratically-
elected government. The Goss amendment puts the House on record in that 
regard.
  The House should be on record as recognizing that there are other 
options than using U.S. military force; that we support development of 
the democratic center; and that any ultimate solution lies with the 
Haitians themselves.
  Regardless of how one views President Aristide, he was elected in a 
process deemed ``free and fair'' by the international community, and by 
a broad spectrum of Haitians themselves.
  We have a long-term hemispheric interest in supporting democratic 
processes, even when they produce people with whom we do not 
philosophically agree.
  Since the coup that ousted President Aristide, I have favored a 
strong United States response in support of the return of 
constitutional rule to Haiti; and, until that is achieved, a 
recognition that we should not condone repression by denying people the 
right to flee from the tyranny of their oppressors.
  Diplomatic and political pressure, and full implementation of the 
Governors Island Accord, offers the best hope for resolving the crisis 
and is essential to restoring constitutional government to Haiti.
  Recent actions by the Haitian military underscore that they are not 
interested in respecting the Haitian people, human rights, or their own 
commitments made to the international community at Governors Island.
  I share the concern of many over the likely ineffectiveness and 
ultimately negative consequences of economic sanctions against Haiti. 
After some 15 years of encouraging U.S. business to invest in that 
country, the sanctions have destroyed an important United States 
presence and will deter many businessmen from looking to Haiti in the 
future as a place to invest.
  However, we are limited in the diplomatic and political instruments 
available to us. Sanctions is one such instrument. As a moral statement 
that the coup regime lacks legitimacy, they are important.
  My work over the years has been based on one fundamental principle: 
respect for the human rights and dignity of all individuals. The 
tragedy that has befallen Haiti only strengthen my opinion that respect 
for human rights is central to democratic rule and economic 
development.
  Given the increasing violence by the military, and having set out on 
a course of comprehensive sanctions, it is unfair to say to the Haitian 
people that they suffer by remaining on the island.
  As a result, I have repeatedly called on the Executive branch to 
change our immigration policy, which discriminates against Haitians on 
the basis that they are economic refugees, not political refugees. 
Given the current realities of Haiti, this is a distinction without a 
difference.
  The Goss amendment urges the establishment of a temporary safe haven 
for Haitian refugees. Such a safe haven would be a humane and 
constructive alternative to current Administration policy, and the idea 
merits our endorsement and support.
  Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to vote for the Goss amendment.

                              {time}  1750

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Foglietta].
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, we have reached the point which very seldom happens in 
the Congress of the United States where I do not fully agree with my 
colleague from California. Our positions have been together for a long, 
long time. Some years ago, he and I led a coalition against our 
involvement in the Persian Gulf War. Our position then was that we 
should not use force because we had not exhausted our ability to 
negotiate, we had not negotiated as far as we could. We had said that 
sanctions were not given the chance to work. We should see sanctions to 
their fullest, we should negotiate and try to avoid bloodshed. We 
believed that our Government was not doing that.
  Mr. Chairman, our coalition got 186 Members of this body to vote 
against the use of force in the Persian Gulf. Now we come to a 
situation in Haiti, we see a situation where one of our ships went 
there to offer humanitarian aid and 50 to 100 hoodlums standing on the 
dock turned away a ship of the United States of America and sent us 
back. We hear a suggestion here for safe havens, to take Aristide and 
those who would support him out of their homeland and put them on an 
island somewhere.
  What would we do? Then give the criminals, Francois and Cedras, the 
island? ``This is your island, do what you will with it, kill as you 
will with it.''
  Mr. Chairman, is that what we say we should do? Let us look at 
sanctions. The sanctions have not worked. We see what is happening. 
Quoting an Associated Press article just the other day, ``Eight hours 
after New World sanctions had taken effect, boats loaded with fuel 
crossed Saumatre Lake from the Dominican Republic.'' Boats docked every 
5 minutes with fuel that people were selling and making the criminals 
richer and richer.
  Mr. Chairman, they are laughing at us in Haiti. Certainly the 
sanctions which have been imposed are not the fullest sanctions, we 
still could go further. We could also now at this point freeze assets. 
We could do other things right now. However, we have tried sanctions. 
Sanctions have not worked. Negotiations? We have negotiated until we 
are blue in the face. The Governors Island Accord, they laughed at us, 
thumbed their nose at us on the Governors Island Accord.
  Mr. Chairman, when I was in Haiti, there was actually a suggestion 
made that Cedras be made Ambassador to Spain, that Francois be made 
Ambassador to Chile. How much more could we have negotiated? We 
negotiated as far as we could. Sanctions are not working.
  My friend spoke the other day on the University of the Americas. The 
gentleman said, ``Sometimes we must send a signal.'' I think now we 
must send a signal that we will support democracy and we will not 
support the kind of criminal anarchy we see on that island.
  I believe, sir, we really have to sit down and say, ``Have we reached 
the ultimate last resort?'' I believe we have.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Shaw].
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no congressional district in this country that 
is more impacted by what is going on in Haiti than my home district 
along the southeast coast of the State of Florida. We know the pitiful 
situation that does exist in Haiti and we know the reason that we 
should go forward and do something to alleviate the problem.
  Mr. Chairman, we have two suggestions here before us today. One I 
think they both have in common, they say, let us not repeat a mistake 
of history that was made many, many years ago when we found American 
troops going to Haiti and not being able to remove them for decades. I 
applaud that provision in both of the amendments that are before us. 
But the problem with the Dellums amendment is that the Dellums 
amendment would intensify a mistake that the present administration is 
presently making.
  Mr. Chairman, in this particular amendment what the gentleman from 
California advocates is that we look for land base in order to question 
these people seeking asylum, and where it does speak of seeking a land 
base in other countries, it does in no way preclude that land base to 
be here in the United States. We know that once the refugees get into 
the United States, whether they have any claim to political asylum at 
all, all they have to say is a few words and they are here.

  Mr. Chairman, we are already overrun in this country. One-sixth of 
the population of Haiti lives in the United States. There are more 
Haitians right now living in New York than there are in Port-au-Prince. 
This is how we have gotten the situation totally out of control.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the Clinton administration is making a horrible 
mistake in intensifying the sanctions, making it rougher for the people 
who live in Haiti, giving them more incentives to leave and then 
telling them, ``All you have to do is get off shore, we are going to 
put you on an ocean liner where you can live until such time as we 
determine whether you can come to the United States.'' In the meantime, 
many are going to slip through the net, come as refugees to the United 
States and stay here.
  Mr. Chairman, it is time we look for a positive force on what are we 
going to do to change this. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 
come up with a recommendation that sets up a safe haven right on 
Haitian soil. It is so practical and so simplistic that it is workable 
and there is no question about it.
  It is a first step. I would hope that we would then train Haitians 
who live here in the United States as soldiers to go back and reclaim 
their island, not to impose on them the forces of the United States but 
train the Haitian forces to go back. That particular provision was not 
made in order under the rules and that, I think, is unfortunate.
  However, the only constructive amendment out there that is going to 
change the status quo is the Goss amendment. To do otherwise is to 
simply leave the pressure on the Haitian people to escape to the United 
States and then set up a procedure where more of them will get into the 
United States. That is a mistake, that does not solve the problem of 
Haiti, that does not solve the problem of the people of South Florida.
  Mr. Chairman, I would urge a rejection of the Dellums amendment and I 
would urge acceptance of the Goss amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. LaRocco). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] has 2 minutes remaining to close the debate.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy].
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's leadership 
from the great State of California who has been an outspoken advocate 
of the return of democracy to Haiti. I know that everyone in this 
Chamber believes that we ought to return democracy to Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, many people that talk about the Haitian issue want to 
try in some ways to distinguish whether or not Haiti deserves United 
States military attention, whether it deserves the attention of our 
country in general. I would suggest that unlike Bosnia, unlike Somalia, 
unlike Rwanda and other hot spots around the world, Haiti is in a 
unique position because it crosses a line in the United States own 
self-interest.
  Mr. Chairman, the key question in my mind is not so much a particular 
friendship with President Aristide, although he is a close friend, not 
whether or not the United States is morally committed to returning 
democracy to Haiti, which I think we are as a Nation, but the real 
question is whether or not this is in the United States own enlightened 
self-interest.
  Mr. Chairman, I think there is no question that Haiti meets that 
test. The reason it meets that test is because no other Nation has the 
potential of putting 5 or 6 million people on boats that are going to 
come and invade our shores. If we are serious about holding off that 
kind of flotilla, if we are willing to deal with the economic 
devastation that that could create, it seems to me that we have a moral 
obligation to, in fact, restore democracy into Haiti.

                              {time}  1800

  That is the only way we will build up the economy. It is the only way 
we will build up the confidence of the people of Haiti to stay in Haiti 
and to build up their own nation. That is why I believe that it is 
important for us to avoid the circumstances of putting people on 
islands as the Goss amendment will call for. It is the reason why I 
believe we ought to allow President Clinton's new policy that has just 
gone into effect this last Saturday night of tough and swift sanctions, 
that we know are going to be devastating and difficult on the people of 
Haiti, but will, in fact, bring about, in my opinion, the return of 
President Aristide.
  Let us give the sanctions a try. Let us give this policy a real 
chance. Let us ask the administration to be tougher in terms of how it 
stands up to the Dominican Republic, but let us give this policy a 
chance before we give up and before we disallow the return of President 
Aristide.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, let me simply say to my 
colleagues that I understand that there are a number of my 
distinguished colleagues on this side of the aisle who, in a great 
sense of frustration, are not prepared to reject the issue of the use 
of force. I would simply say to all of them and remind them that it has 
always been their position that the use of force should be the last 
alternative and that we needed to escalate as far as we could until we 
have exhausted all other avenues.
  I would submit to you that I am prepared to challenge anyone walking 
in the well of the House that could say to us at this point that that 
is where we are. We know we are not there. We know that those sanctions 
are not on. We know that visas have not been lifted. We know commercial 
aircraft have not been stopped. We know that assets have not been laid 
on.
  Mr. Chairman, we know that full sanctions are not there. They just 
came on a couple of days ago. We know that the borders are not 
leakproof. We know that we have not come to the point where the issue 
of force is one of last resort.
  I am simply saying that if you could come with us on the piece of 
legislation that we introduced into the House of Representatives, 
cosponsored by over a hundred Members, that that is where we are at 
this point, and we are not being inconsistent.
  I thank you for your generosity.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the 
amendments printed in part 4 of House Report 103-520 relating to Haiti 
which shall be considered in the following order: First, by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and, second, a substitute by the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] or the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. Hamilton].
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 4 of 
House Report 103-520.


                     amendment offered by mr. goss

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goss:
       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), add the 
     following:

     SEC. 1038. UNITED STATES POLICY ON HAITI.

       (A) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) the 1990 presidential election in Haiti was deemed to 
     be both free and democratic;
       (2) a military coup toppled the duly elected government in 
     1991;
       (3) the process to restore democratic rule in Haiti agreed 
     to at Governor's Island has stalled;
       (4) the economic crisis in Haiti is worsening; and
       (5) the people of Haiti are preparing in mass numbers to 
     leave their country to seek economic and political refuge 
     overseas.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress--
       (1) that the United States should not undertake any 
     military action directed against the mainland of Haiti unless 
     the President first certifies to Congress that clear and 
     present danager to citizens of the United States or United 
     States interests requires such action; and
       (2) that the United States should work with the 
     Organization of American States and the United Nations--
       (A) to establish a temporary safe haven on the Haitian 
     island of Ile de la Gonave for Haitian refugees escaping 
     economic and political hardship on the mainland of Haiti;
       (B) to assist in providing humanitarian assistance and visa 
     processing for such refugees in such safe haven; and
       (C) to assist the legitimate Haitian government in 
     establishing the long-term stability of democracy in Haiti.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Goss] will be recognized for 10 minutes on his amendment, and a Member 
opposed will be recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be 
recognized for 10 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I had heard before we began this that there 
was a possibility we would combine the times of the two amendments into 
two 20-minute blocks. Does that no longer have the favor of the Chair?
  The CHAIRMAN. The only thing that precludes that from occurring is 
the offering of the substitute amendment by the gentleman from 
California or the gentleman from Indiana. Once it has been offered, the 
time can be commingled and divided.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to do that for the 
convenience and the continuity of the debate.


  amendment offered by mr. dellums as a substitute for the amendment 
                          offered by mr. goss

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a Substitute for 
the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Dellums as a substitute for the 
     amendment offered by Mr. Goss: At the end of title X add the 
     following:

     SEC. 1038. UNITED STATES POLICY ON HAITI.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) the 1990 presidential election in Haiti was deemed by 
     numerous international observers to be both free and 
     democratic;
       (2) a military coup toppled the duly elected government of 
     President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1991;
       (3) the process to restore democratic rule in Haiti agreed 
     to at Governor's Island has stalled; and
       (4) a deepening economic crisis in Haiti and political 
     oppression and systematic human rights abuses by Haiti's 
     military leaders have created a reprehensible humanitarian 
     crisis and driven Haitians to risk the perils of the sea to 
     seek refuge in increasing numbers.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress--
       (1) that the United States should not undertake any 
     military action directed against the mainland of Haiti unless 
     there is a clear and present danger to citizens of the United 
     States or United States interests requires such action;
       (2) that the President should swiftly intensify economic 
     pressure on Haiti's military should United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 917 fail to result in Haiti's military 
     leaders to step down by May 21, 1994. The first step in any 
     such increased pressure should be the severing of commercial 
     air links with Haiti. The President should seek international 
     compliance with any such heightened pressure, if possible, 
     but should act unilaterally, if necessary, and should seek 
     improved sanctions enforcement by the international community 
     to compel Haiti's military rulers to relinquish power;
       (3) that the United States should make every effort to 
     replace shipboard processing of Haitian migrants with land-
     based processing at the earliest opportunity; and in view of 
     past difficulties in the processing of Haitian applicants for 
     refugee status under the laws of the United States, Creole 
     translators and counsel should be integral parts of any 
     revamped refugee policy;
       (4) that the United States should seek the cooperation of 
     third countries for the establishment of refugee processing 
     centers;
       (5) that the United States should augment humanitarian 
     assistance for Haiti's poor and seek the expeditious return 
     to Haiti of human rights monitors acting under the auspices 
     of the United Nations and the Organization of American 
     States; and
       (6) that the United States should continue to engage in 
     intensive, immediate consultation within the international 
     community to encourage support for the restoration of 
     democracy and national reconciliation in Haiti, including 
     encouraging all parties to honor their obligations under the 
     Governor's Island Accord of July 3, 1993 and the New York 
     Pact of July 16, 1993 with the principal aim of restoration 
     of democracy and the return to Haiti of President Aristide.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlemen from Florida [Mr. 
Goss] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] in support of his amendment, will be 
recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, the President is holding open his options in 
Haiti with a stepped up embargo and contingency plans for military 
intervention. Failing the first, the second option will do. In fact, 
Randall Robinson, the President's de facto special adviser on Haiti, 
gave voice to this idea yesterday saying that ``Because sanctions will 
not work we have no choice but to pursue ultimately a solution of 
military intervention.''
  I agree about the sanctions, but I disagree about the military 
intervention. Today, Members who feel strongly about keeping United 
States soldiers out of a quagmire in Haiti and about the unwise 
extension of the embargo can go on record in opposition to the 
President's policy and I support of the constructive alternative 
embodied in the Goss safe-haven amendment. This resolution supports the 
establishment of a safe haven under U.N./OAS auspices on the 269-
square-mile Haitian island of Gonave to accomplish a number of things.
  That island, incidentally, is right here in the Bay of Haiti, 270 
square miles. It is a rather large island with about 80,000 people on 
it right now.
  By following the safe-haven plan, we provide the real opportunity for 
the duly elected President to return. We provide to reestablish his 
administration if he does return. We provide the opportunity to give 
nearby refuge to Haitians who truly are in danger and stop the flood of 
refugees going from this area, 900 miles through shark-infested waters, 
to the U.S. mainland. It helps to facilitate the provision of much 
needed humanitarian aid, and there is not a person in this room who 
does not know that, allowing for orderly visa processing in a safer 
environment than the Haitian mainland or the high seas.
  With one standby Coast Guard cutter already in the area, as we all 
know, we would be able to enhance the natural defense of the island 
without military commitment. With only 15 miles to travel, Haitian 
refugees do not have to make that long trip to Florida, and they do not 
have to risk taking to the seas to rendezvous with American vessels 
which are who knows where. We do not know which vessels even.
  Everything we need to do is encompassed in this deceptively simple 
plan. It offers an open door to solve the refugee problem, to solve the 
Aristide problem, to keep American soldiers out of harm's way. This is 
not a new idea. We did it in Sri Lanka, and it is called the open 
refugee center. It works. We did it on Mannar Island successfully.
  The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] and the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will offer a substitute amendment which offers 
strong language against military intervention, thank heavens. The 
Dellums-Hamilton amendment has no safe-haven plan, though. It does have 
a strong endorsement of the punitive sanctions that have turned the 
economy to rubble in Haiti, that have turned the environment to a 
catastrophe and to a wasteland, and that have victimized almost 
everybody except the military it is aimed to hit.
  It has no plan to move Haiti beyond the current impasse. Let us look 
at the key differences. The Goss amendment demagnetizes United States 
shores by creating a safe haven on Haitian soil, offering a long-term 
solution for stability in Haiti, and an end to the embargo.
  Dellums-Hamilton endorses the ill-advised policy of tougher sanctions 
and expanded but nonexistent refugee processing which has already led 
almost 1,300 Haitians to take to the seas only to be returned 
immediately. A cruel hoax, to be sure.
  President Aristide: Let us talk about him. The Goss amendment 
provides for the opportunity for return of the democratically elected 
President to begin rebuilding stability in Haiti. Dellums-Hamilton 
depends on the failed Governor's Island accord It tries to breathe life 
into the corpse.
  Fostering democracy, the Goss amendment helps Haiti back on the 
democratic track. It paves the way to ending the punishing embargo and 
providing a much needed morale boost to the poor people of Haiti.
  The Dellums-Hamilton amendment amounts to an externally imposed 
solution to the crisis that will do little to bolster confidence among 
Haitians but a lot to polarize the extremes as we have already seen in 
the Emile Jonassaint alleged government.
  The Goss amendment obviates the need to charter cruise ships for 
high-seas refugee processing.
  Dellums-Hamilton endorses the President's protracted refugee 
processing plan.
  Mr. Chairman, if you want meaningful progress in Haiti, the 
administration's approach is not the answer. Do not be fooled into 
endorsing a voodoo policy by voting for the Dellums-Hamilton 
substitute.
  Vote for the original Goss amendment and send the White House a sense 
of Congress to help the Haitians get on with the business of taking 
back their country today. It is the humane and practical thing to do 
and this is the island, and it is, indeed, in Haiti, and there are 
80,000 Haitians on it now.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for 
yielding me this time.
  I want to speak in support of the Dellums-Hamilton amendment. What we 
are trying to do with this amendment is to move the Haitian policy in a 
more constructive direction, and the amendment is designed to help 
create a better policy for Haiti.

                              {time}  1810

  It is very important I think that the leaders in Haiti, the regime 
leaders now understand that we are committed to their removal and we 
support the democratic will of the Haitian people. It is clearly time 
for them to go.
  Now what we do here is set out in the amendment drafted by Mr. 
Dellums and myself a policy toward Haiti. The first statement is that 
other options have to be exhausted before you turn to military force. 
Force is a last resort. This amendment urges the administration to seek 
alternatives to the use of force and urges it to ratchet up the 
pressure through other means and seek national reconciliation in Haiti.
  The second point of the amendment is with respect to the refugees. 
What we are trying to do here is simply establish a fair procedure for 
dealing with the refugees. We move to a land-based refugee processing 
system. We think that is essential in order for the system to be fair.
  We want to provide translators and legal representation made 
available to those who need the service. We welcome the use of private 
organizations and their services and the involvement of the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees, certainly a sound and good step 
forward.
  It is also important that the administration encourage Haiti's 
neighbors to establish refugee processing centers. So the second point 
of the amendment is trying to make the process for the refugees a fair 
one.
  The next point is with respect to sanctions: The amendment addresses 
that. Greater economic pressure should be imposed on the Haitian 
regime. The whole point here is to tighten the sanctions and to target 
the sanctions. Sanctions should be imposed on regime leaders and 
prominent supporters across-the-board without exception.
  Bank accounts should be frozen, travel should be denied. The 
administration should sever commercial air links which are used by the 
Haitian elite and the military to circumvent sanctions. We certainly 
need to seek to improve the enforcement along the border with the 
Dominican Republic and to increase humanitarian relief efforts.
  The final point of the amendment is national reconciliation. It 
addresses a political solution. To increase the chances for the success 
of the policy, the United States urges President Aristide to reach out 
to other democratic elements in Haiti in the spirit of national 
reconciliation as outlined in the amendment. So you have here then a 
strategy of strong United States-led international pressure on the 
Haitian regime combined with a political strategy to pave the way for 
Aristide's return. We believe that that offers the best chance for 
success.
  Now the gentleman from Florida has an amendment that is offered in a 
very constructive manner, and I know he has done a lot of thinking with 
respect to this problem, also constructively. But his proposal for a 
temporary safe haven on the Haitian island simply, I think, will not 
work. It establishes an international presence on the island that 
constitutes invasion of Haitian sovereignty. That island lacks basic 
infrastructure including a source of drinkable water. Supplying that 
island is complicated because it does not have a deep water port, nor 
an airstrip. Upgrading the facilities to set up this legitimate regime 
in a nonpermissive territory would cost a great deal of money.
  The United States would have to pay for it.
  Setting up a refugee camp on sovereign Haitian territory is 
problematic in the application of international refugee standards. It 
is very doubtful that President Aristide would agree to the plan 
outlined in the amendment. He may simply view this as a ruse to restore 
him to power in purely technical terms without removing the military 
junta or restoring democracy.

  So I would urge my colleagues here to defeat the Goss amendment and 
to support the Dellums/Hamilton amendment because that amendment moves 
us toward a better policy in Haiti.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Lewis].
  (Mr. LEWIS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. LEWIS of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Goss amendment. The 
Goss amendment gives us a chance to address the most important and 
dangerous result of the President's failed Haitian policy: The 
increasing numbers of refugees entering the United States through 
Florida.
  Since President Clinton invited Haitians to take to the seas 2 weeks 
ago, the Coast Guard has intercepted and returned 1,400 of them without 
asylum hearings. As the United Nations sanctions make life worse in 
Haiti, thousands and thousands of Haitians per week are expected to 
flee their suffering nation. President Clinton offers his Ukrainian 
``Loveboat'' scenario in response. But this will not prevent thousands 
of refugees from Haiti or the Bahamas from coming to the United States 
in search of education, medical care and other social services, 
services which cost the State of Florida an annual average of $3,000 
for each refugee.
  With the Goss proposal in place using the island as a safe haven, 
fewer Haitians would drown at sea, fewer political refugees would be 
returned to Haiti and fewer economic refugees would end up in the 
United States. It would eliminate the use of military force which I 
oppose. It would feed the poorest of the poor. It is the right idea at 
the right time, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege to yield 2 minutes to 
the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek].
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I thank the chairman for yielding this time to 
me. I hear two points of view here today, and I would like to say that 
with all respect to my Florida colleagues, I hear more a referendum on 
not having Haitians come to Florida than I do on solving the foreign 
policy issue of Haitians and freeing them and making a democracy in 
Haiti.
  I think that we should certainly vote against the Goss amendment 
because it is an amendment that sets up a safe haven, quote unquote. It 
is not a safe haven to set up the kind of arrangement which Mr. Goss 
has mentioned here.
  I think the main purpose behind it is to keep the Haitians from 
trying to return to Florida and to receive some kind of safe haven 
there or in the United States.
  I think I rise in opposition to my good friend who is a friend of 
peace, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], who feels very 
strongly within himself, within every sinew of his being, that there 
should be freedom and peace throughout this world. But this country, 
the Clinton administration has tried everything possible.
  Sanctions are dangerous also; they kill people also. If you read the 
paper, you will see children lining up for food; that is in a killing 
field, almost as dangerous as a gun or as dangerous as a bullet.
  I also feel that we should show that we are the freedom leaders of 
the world as we have with other countries and the military 
intervention, whatever the cost is--this morning I listened to Randall 
Robinson on television, a man who gave his life--put his life on the 
line for freedom to Haiti. He is now saying that he thinks the military 
intervention is the only course. I think the reason he is saying it is 
because everything else has been tried.
  So I stand today to say to all of you, that I know that the sanctions 
are there, but they are not helping; people are still being killed, and 
that Haiti is in danger. Four people were killed recently. The 
children--the parents are in Miami, the children are in Haiti, and I 
cannot listen to this particular debate without saying to you to think 
of what is happening in Haiti today. Forget about having some more 
immigrants coming to our shores. This is really in the wrong venue 
today. This is not a foreign policy bill. This is an armed services 
bill. But we are talking about Haiti here. So I must come to my feet 
and say that we must vote against the Goss amendment. The Dellums 
amendment is better designed for better reasons, but I cannot even 
support that, because I feel we should leave some option open for us to 
let the thugs in Haiti understand that they cannot continue to kill and 
to maim people and hurt little children as they continue to do.
  I want my chairman [Mr. Dellums] to know that I respect him and I 
also respect the Florida delegation.
  They have two different motives. But I think the Goss amendment 
should definitely be defeated. I certainly want to give deference in 
saying that I cannot vote for either one of these.

                              {time}  1820

  Mr. GOSS Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  (Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, like all of us, I am very sympathetic to 
the plight of the Haitians. I do not think anybody in this Chamber can 
look at what is going on down there and not be concerned over the past 
several years with increasing military domination of that island and 
the failure to allow democracy to be restored, as it should have been 
when President Aristide was elected. However, Mr. Chairman, the 
solutions that are there on the table today that President Clinton is 
offering contain no vision, no real innovative way of getting around 
the problem or solving it, and therein lies the rub.
  Mr. Chairman, sanctions are not working. They are not likely to work. 
A military invasion of Haiti, while relatively simple to accomplish, 
leaves us holding the bag for however many years, who knows, once we 
have established the ground base there, as we did many years ago. That 
does not seem to me to be any solution.
  What the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has offered is something 
that he and I talked about over a year ago. It seems like a very 
logical way to begin to see if we cannot break the logjam.
  There is an island that is about 35 miles long, about 8 miles wide. 
It contains sufficient land space and habitability that we could have 
on that island a government in exile in essence set up that President 
Aristide could occupy, from which he could launch efforts to try to 
recapture the island in ways that would be much more feasible and 
practical than we are today engaged in, and it would provide, as the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] says, a safe haven so those who want 
to leave Haiti could leave there with a trip of no more than 15 miles, 
and under our protection, and would not be subject to the kinds of 
hazards of going to sea.
  Mr. Chairman, it makes a lot of sense it seems to me. We have been 
processing Haitians on Haitian soil for some time who claim refugee 
status, who claim they are in fear of persecution if they go back. Of 
course most people who come in and seek that asylum and status do not 
quality because they are really economic refugees, but this island 
would provide a haven, not just for those who are truly in fear of 
persecution or political or religious reasons, but also for economic 
refugees who want to leave, and it would provide the impetus of this 
government in exile to actually come back, and take over and dominate 
the island of the full Haitian countryside once again.
  Mr. Chairman, I applaud the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] for his 
innovation, for his vision, and I wish that the other side and the 
President would exercise that same kind of vision. What we should do 
today is express the sense of the Congress, and that is all this is, as 
the gentleman from Florida suggests, that we explore this particular 
idea, that we see if we can make something new and different work 
instead of going and retreading the same old tired ideas of sanctions 
that are not working and the threat of military intervention which will 
not work unless it is carried out, and which, if it is carried out, 
will only involve the U.S. military in a long-term situation of being 
bogged down over there that none of us want.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I urge defeat of the Dellums proposal and the 
passage of the Goss amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Owens].
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify a position.
  The gentleman is the sponsor of a bill, H.R. 4114, on which I am a 
cosponsor and all the members of the Congressional Black Caucus are 
cosponsors, and there are in all more than a hundred cosponsors, and I 
would like to ask him if he would just clarify for us the similarities 
and the differences between H.R. 4114 and this amendment. Basically I 
see a lot of similarities. I just would like to hear him clarify if 
there are any differences.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. OWENS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, very briefly let me respond to my 
colleague by saying this amendment embraces the spirit of what we are 
attempting to do. It is not a duplication in detail because, as the 
gentleman is well aware, the piece of legislation that we offered is 
very detailed and very specific. A great deal of thought and effort 
went into it. This amendment in the nature of a substitute embraces the 
spirit of that amendment, but it does not get to all of the details 
that the gentleman and I laid out as we worked through that amendment.
  Mr. OWENS. Is H.R. 4114 neutral on the question of military 
intervention? Does it discuss it at all?
  Mr. DELLUMS. It did not discuss it, and the gentleman and I full well 
know that we though that the Congressional Black Caucus would take the 
moral high ground in an area where we were all in agreement.
  The place where we were not all in agreement is on the issue of the 
use of force, and we consciously did not deal with that question, and 
the gentleman from New York and this gentleman had a handshake 
agreement that the bill that we would introduce would be silent on that 
question. So, I am saying that before God and country, the answer to 
the gentleman.
  Mr. OWENS. This amendment is not silent on the question. This 
amendment rules out the use of force, and H.R. 4114 does not deal with 
the use of force at all.
  Mr. DELLUMS. In the nature of a substitute we had fashioned an 
amendment that addressed the amendment that the gentleman was offering, 
so we have to address the issue. The gentleman addressed the issue.
  Mr. OWENS. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague, the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Shaw].
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] 
for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a very good debate, and I think it is on the 
level that we should be debating such issues as this.
  The gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek], my friend, she correctly 
pointed out that both of these bills exclude military intervention, and 
I say to my colleagues, ``Quite clearly, if you want to invade Haiti, 
if you think that a military intervention by the United States is the 
right way to go, you simply vote against each amendment, and by the 
way, as far as I can tell, the language is exactly identical. I don't 
see any difference in the language between the two bills. But let's 
look at what is different in the bills.''
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California, his bill would tighten 
the economic sanctions. Well, if my colleagues think sanctions are 
going to work, then that is in the bill. But let us also look further 
into what the gentleman from California is talking about. He is talking 
about when people are escaping from the island, that we supply them 
lawyers. Read the bill. It says, ``Counsel will be appointed as well as 
Creole-speaking translators.''
  I say to my colleagues, ``If you think we should extend legal aid to 
the high seas, and to foreign countries, and to Haiti, to advise people 
on ships that they have a right to come to the United States, you think 
that's a proper use of American tax dollars, then support the gentleman 
from California.''
  I simply do not. I do not think that it is our business here in the 
Congress to supply these people with lawyers.
  Also in the gentleman from California's bill he talks about coming up 
with land base. Well now, there is only two bases that we know of where 
we can get it. One is Guantanamo. We tried that, and it was a disaster 
under the Bush administration, so I do not see that as an alternative. 
So the only other land base that is left and that every other country 
in the world has denied us is the United States, and I say, ``If you 
bring them over to the United States, then you bet they will get 
counsel. They'll get counsel, and they'll get endless appeals, and they 
are here.''
  The bottom line is simply this:
  ``If you think that more Haitians should immigrate to the United 
States, vote for the Dellums amendment. If you think we should enforce 
our immigration policy and come up with something new and innovative, 
vote for the Goss amendment.''
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Mica].
  Mr. MICA. My colleagues in the House, the current policy or lack of 
policy ranks probably among the greatest foreign policy failures of any 
era. If President Kennedy's term in office, after only 2 years, was 
called Camelot, with Haiti President Clinton's era may be known as 
Nightmare on Elm Street.
  This week we have imposed tighter economic sanctions on the poorest 
country in the Western Hemisphere. Get this: We are tightening 
sanctions, economic sanctions, on a country where the average Haitian 
annual income is $252 a year. That is 69 cents a day.
  That is the proposal this week.
  The other proposal this week is to put the Haitians and process them 
on cruise ships off of Florida. That is not the answer to this problem.
  Then we have my colleague, and I know he is well intended, the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], and he has a just-pretend solution. 
It is a temporary solution. My colleagues, it is not a permanent 
solution. The only solution is to restore democracy, to enforce the 
U.N. accord to enforce the agreement of Governor's Island to restore 
democracy.

                              {time}  1830

  When you say something, you do something. That is going to be the 
permanent solution, not setting up a temporary government in exile. We 
must have a multilateral force. We must not sacrifice U.S. Forces until 
we restore democracy on that island. We are not going to resolve the 
problems. Until we restore economic development on that island, these 
people will continue to wash on our shores, dead and alive. And I am 
telling you, you cannot take temporary solutions.
  We must defeat the Goss amendment, and we must not send U.S. troops. 
We must go back to the accords that have been agreed upon. We must 
enforce international law or we have made a mockery of the whole 
process.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 8 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Goss amendment. On the 
surface this amendment seems to be an expression of compassion, human 
decency, and concern for those who would otherwise risk death on the 
high seas in an attempt to escape our region's most brutal military.
  In reality, however, this amendment is far less kind.
  Instead of proving a safe haven for those fleeing torture and death, 
the Goss amendment would have the U.S. Navy be a part of a multilateral 
effort to dump fleeing Haitians on Ile de Gonave, a mosquito-infested 
island just west of Port-au-Prince--an island with no infrastructure 
whatsoever, an island readily accessible to the Haitian military and 
death squads, an island to which we cannot and must not even consider 
returning human-beings already panic-stricken and traumatized by the 
brutality of the military leadership and their followers.

  Simply on the basis of human decency and compassion, this amendment 
should be rejected. Because it falls far short of reflecting sound 
policy it does not deserve our vote. However, over and above this, all 
of us in this Chamber are bound to uphold the cardinal tenent of the 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, now codified in our 
own Immigration and Nationality Act, which holds that no person, 
regardless of his country of origin, shall be returned to a country 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on the basis of his 
religion, race, or personal belief.
  By returning Haitian refugees to Ile de Gonave, Mr. Chairman, we will 
be returning them to Haiti. And by returning them to Haiti we will be 
violating United States law and international law.
  This we cannot and must not do.
  This we cannot and must not do not only because it would be wrong and 
illegal, but also because there are already policy changes being 
implemented by the Clinton administration that make the Goss amendment 
unnecessary. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, the administration has already 
committed itself to providing both shipboard and land-based processing 
for Haitian refugees and, as we speak, arrangements are being made to 
implement this. Why, then, do we need this amendment? What does this 
add to current practice and policy? Why should we embark upon a path 
that is so patently inhuman, and so clearly in violation of current 
law?
  Mr. Chairman, during recent weeks, when the national focus on United 
States-Haiti refugee policy was at its most intense, the State 
Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and all other 
pertinent United States agencies looked very carefully at a number of 
variations on the basic theme of the Goss amendment. The possibility of 
returning Haitian refugees to some part of that country--to some type 
of internal safe haven, was looked at, was carefully studied, and was 
roundly rejected. It was rejected, Mr. Chairman, because it was 
indefensible, inhumane, illegal, and unworkable.
  Do we wish to create a concentration camp for refugees on Haitian 
soil? And if we did, how would we prevent members of FRAPH--Haiti's 
death squad--or the Haitian military from entering these camps? Since 
these individuals would advertise neither their death-squad nor their 
military affiliation, how on earth would we, when death-squad types 
claim to be ordinary Haitians attempting to move freely on Haitian 
soil, prevent them getting to and harming the refugees supposedly in 
our care? What kind of unworkable logistical nightmare are we bringing 
upon ourselves and those who would have to implement this policy?
  We already know that Haitians returned by our vessels are often taken 
away by Haitian authorities right at the docks in Port-au-Prince. Some 
have been tortured, some have disappeared, some have turned up dead. In 
addition to this, just a few days ago, on the very day that the U.N. 
trade embargo was put in place, the Haitian military upped the ante by 
announcing that they will prosecute anyone involved in illegal boat 
departures. In light of all of this and so much more, we must not even 
contemplate supporting the Goss amendment.

  Most importantly, we must cease investing this much energy, expending 
this much time, committing such tremendous resources to locking up 
Haitian refugees when the refugees are but a system of a much broader, 
deadly problem--the brutality of the Haitian military. As long as the 
military and the coup supporters are brutalizing the Haitian people, 
there will be political refugees. Our own Coast Guard attests to the 
fact that while President Aristide was in power, Haiti's boat people 
dried to a trickle. With the derailment of democracy, their numbers 
shot skyward. Our challenge, therefore, whether our primary concern is 
the restoration of democracy or halting refugee flows, is the removal 
of the military. Our challenge, whether our primary concern is saving 
the hundreds of millions of dollars that we must now spend to enforce 
the embargo or halting the military's transshipment of illegal 
narcotics to our shores is the removal of the military.
  The problem is the removal of the military.
  If we want an end to refugee flows, Mr. Chairman, we must place 
maximum pressure on Haiti's military and death squads, and the most 
effective way to do this is via the speedy enactment of H.R. 4114, 
without the special exemptions being sought by the President and his 
Haiti team for Haiti's wealthy coup supporters. And if we want to send 
a serious message to the Haitian military via sanctions, we must ensure 
that the Dominican Republic stops its brazen violation of the embargo.
  But the Dominican Republic will not comply as long as the United 
States refuses to use the leverage we have. The Dominican Republic will 
not comply as long as we refuse to use our foreign assistance, and 
their sugar and textile quotas to this country as leverage.
  Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has documented in grisly detail how 
General Cedras and his colleagues have unleashed a reign of terror in 
Haiti. It is also now generally understood that the brutality of the 
Haitian military was the worst in the western hemisphere, if not the 
entire world.
  This having been said, Mr. Chairman, we must resist any impulse, 
reject any encouragement, and break any tendency to rationalize 
returning innocent men, women, and children to Haitian soil and the 
clutches of the most brutal military in our hemisphere. We must defeat 
the Goss amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 2 
minutes remaining and has the right to close. The gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss] has 9 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  (Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the Goss amendment on 
Haiti.
  As we debate this issue today, I would like to call my colleagues' 
attention to one overwhelming fact that each and every one of us must 
acknowledge. This fundamental truth must form the foundation of all 
United States policy toward Haiti in the days and weeks to come.
  I am referring to the fact that the American people will not assume 
responsibility for events in Haiti.
  I have the utmost respect for my colleagues in this body who feel 
passionately about the violence and political repression in Haiti. And 
I have great sympathy for the dilemmas confronted by the administration 
as it tries to do the right thing.
  But if we believe for 1 minute that the American people will support 
military action in Haiti and the prolonged occupation that will follow, 
we are kidding ourselves. If we believe for 1 minute that economic 
sanctions alone will force the Haitian generals from power without such 
military action, we are deceiving ourselves.
  And if we have learned one lesson from our tragic experience in 
Somalia, it is that turning a humanitarian problem into a military one 
is a prescription for disaster.
  Tougher economic sanctions will only further impoverish Haiti's most 
vulnerable poor. Sanctions by themselves are not a policy; they 
represent the admission that we have no real Haiti policy.
  That is why I believe Porter Goss offers an innovative solution. It 
offers Father Aristide and the Haitian people the chance to take 
responsibility for their own destiny. And I believe that, by training 
police and military officials in the safe haven, we can begin to lay 
the groundwork for a democratic government in Haiti--without sending in 
the Marines.
  Support the Goss amendment.

                              {time}  1840

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, this is really an interesting and important 
debate. I am delighted that the gentleman from California, the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, also 
advocates not invading Haiti. I think that would be a very serious 
mistake.
  The Cubans have feared that we would invade since 1959. Daniel Ortega 
used to terrify the Sandinistas and their followers by saying that we 
were going to invade next month and the month after that. None of those 
invasions came about, and I would hate to see us invade Haiti.
  There are many reasons why it would be ill-advised. Of course, our 
last experience of spending 19 years there without any real positive 
result ought to have taught us something.
  Now, Mr. Aristide was elected in a democratic election, and he was 
the overwhelming democratic choice of the people. But the problem is, 
with democracy, it is more than just a process. It is more than just an 
election. You have to conduct yourself as a Democrat, once you are 
elected.
  You have to respect opposition parties. You have to respect civil 
rights of other people who disagree with you.
  Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that Mr. Aristide failed 
miserably in that department. This is not the testimony of right-wing, 
off-the-wall people. I quote the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs of this administration, Alexander Watson, who 
testified in May of last year before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations that, and I quote, ``There was ample evidence that President 
Aristide invited intimidating or violent behavior among his 
followers.''
  So we have a poor choice. We have General Cedras and the brutal 
military or we have a man who was elected who did not conduct himself 
in a way to reconcile the opposing forces inside Haiti. And so what to 
do?
  It seems to me that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has got an 
ideal solution. The Island of Gonava presents a place where the 
infrastructure could be improved. We can try to get rid of the 
mosquitos. I dare say the same mosquitos in Haiti populate the Ile of 
Gonava. But we would not have these people desperately floating in the 
sea in these rickety boats, clamoring abroad a ship and then, if only 5 
percent of them are found to be truly refugees as we are told and the 
rest have to be returned at the risk of their lives, it seems to me 
that is a terrible situation.
  They are suffering enough from the sanctions. We cannot sanction the 
military. It is the people, the poor, poverty-stricken people who feel 
the brunt of the sanctions.
  So it seems to me, in this very difficult situation where human 
beings are suffering, that we ought to avail ourselves of the Ile of 
Gonava which is just off coast. It provides a land-based place for 
these hearings on asylum that the gentleman from California asked for 
in his resolution. It seems to me that it could work and provide a 
solution to what otherwise is a very, very difficult situation. And so 
let us understand that democracy is important, but it is more than 
simply getting elected. After all Hitler was elected when he first came 
in in 1933. But he certainly did not conduct himself as a democrat 
thereafter.
  The people of Haiti deserve freedom, dignity, a standard of living 
that is decent and that can be provided by reestablishing democracy but 
to do it in a way that does not invite them to drown at sea trying to 
clamor abroad ships and have asylum hearings.
  I support the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] enthusiastically.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Foglietta].
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I just have to respond to the gentleman 
from Illinois who just spoke. How in God's name he could start to 
compare Adolf Hitler with President Aristide, how could he possibly say 
that the choice of the people of Haiti is between a criminal-like 
Cedras and a man, a respected Catholic priest like Aristide who may 
have made some mistakes. But to compare them, to put them in the same 
category, I think, is horrendous.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I do not compare Hitler with Aristide.
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman said there was a choice.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I do not compare them as people. What I 
suggest is getting elected does not mean you are a Democrat. That is my 
point. Hitler was elected in 1933. Aristide was elected but being a 
Democrat is more than just being elected. If the analogy is imperfect, 
maybe the gentleman can suggest other people who got elected but once 
in office did not conduct themselves as Democrats.
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, 
I can respond by using the saying of the Jesuit teachers who taught the 
gentleman as well as me that most analogies limp. The gentleman's has 
no legs whatsoever.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. He is very perceptive 
about orthopedic problems.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is recognized for 
2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to talk a little bit about facts. We 
seem to have gotten away from them.
  First of all, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] said this is 
going to be some kind of a big international detente. It is not. We are 
talking about the U.N.-OAS participation, as we are in the Dellums-
Hamilton amendment. The same type of thing we are dealing with, human 
rights and peacekeeping down there now. No big thing there. I am just 
trying to get away from the stigma of the U.S. Marines, which the 
Haitians remember those 19 years of occupation.
  Talking about water, no water on the Ile of Gonava. There are 88,000 
people out there. I do not know what they are doing for water. I know 
there is a water problem in Florida. There is a dry season and a wet 
season. No access. There is a port, Anse A Galets. It is there. Boat 
traffic goes in and out every day, right there.
  There is no airfield. There is no military. There is only 100 or less 
soldiers there. That is why we like it as a safe haven.
  The question about we are going to have to pay for it. Wrong. This is 
Haitians doing it for Haitians in that area. We are not talking about 
U.S. costs here and, in fact, if there are costs, I would suggest they 
come out of the fund that is used to support President Aristide in 
Washington in the manner in which he is living right now. That will be 
more than sufficient to pay for this.
  Third, going to the Aristide question, our proposal allows for 
Aristide to come back. I think that is important, because down on I-95, 
the other day, we had a demonstration in Florida that said, a bunch of 
Haitians saying, ``Look, we want to go back to Haiti and we want 
Aristide to go with us.'' And that is what my plan does. That is why I 
think it is important.
  Those are the facts.
  My colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek] said that 
there may be some hidden policy here, we do not want any Haitians in 
Florida.

                              {time}  1850

  Mr. Chairman, we have lots of Haitians in Florida. The welcome mat is 
out. The problem is the Krome Detention Center is full. It is full. 
There is no room for anybody else, so what do we do? Built another 
Krome Detention Center? That is not going to solve the problem for the 
Haitians who are leaving by the thousands now every week. That does not 
work, either.
  What we have to face up to is the fact that the President's policy 
has not worked. It has made it worse. It absolutely polarized the right 
wing opposition. It has ruined the economy of the country. It has 
destroyed the quality of life for all Haitians except the military, so 
let us recognize the fact that it is a failed policy. Let us try 
something that might work better.
  There is no U.S. Navy, I would say to the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] involved in this, Mr. Chairman. This is a 280 square mile 
island. I believe it is a true safe haven. I do not know that it is any 
more mosquito-ridden than any place in Florida, any other place.
  Having said those things, I honestly believe my amendment gives a 
better chance for the Haitians and democracy in Haiti. I ask for 
support for it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 1\1/2\ 
minutes to close debate.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], and I ask my 
colleagues to support the amendment we offer as a substitute.
  With those remarks, Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to 
the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Rangel].
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the Goss amendment. I have all the 
respect in the world for the gentleman, and certainly believe that his 
ideas as it relates to this solution should always be made available to 
the President.
  However, I rise because I think it is an insult to democracies all 
over the world when some of our friends in this House find it in their 
hearts to have a double standard for the Government of Haiti. When we 
find the overwhelming number of people who never had a chance to drink 
the sweet nectar of democracy willing to risk their lives to vote for 
this person, I think it is an arrogant double standard for us to now 
determine what kind of president did they elect.
  We, as Republicans and Democrats, may differ, but once we have a 
President, we do not tolerate foreigners to insult the intelligence of 
American voters to tell us what type of President we have.
  I go further to say if this was in any other country, in any other 
continent, I do not think we would have the arrogance to talk about the 
ability of that president to govern. It is not our job to like or 
dislike people who have been elected democratically and to raise that 
type of issue in a discussion as to what is best for the United States. 
I think it lowers the credibility of this great House of 
Representatives.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Goss 
amendment as you are aware, the United States intervened in Haiti from 
1915 to 1934. The initial landings made by American Marines were to 
restore order following a coup and to restore a government to Haiti 
that was friendly toward the United States. The result was that Haiti 
was a virtual protectorate of the United States for 19 years.
  Our extended involvement in Haiti during the early part of this 
century failed to bring about any real reforms. Rather, it fostered 
great resentment towards our Nation for conducting ``gun-boat 
diplomacy'' that survives to this day. It serves as a prime example of 
the difficulties of ``enforcing democracy'' in a country that has no 
history of democratic ideals.
  It is unlikely that military intervention will solve Haiti's 
problems. Severe poverty has divided that nation's affluent political 
and military elite from the average citizen since the country was 
founded. These cultural and economic problems were noted during our 
previous involvement in Haiti earlier this century. Unable to change 
the system after years of occupation then, it will be extremely 
difficult for the United States to bring about any real change now.
  As a result, I am hesitant to use American military power to force 
the return of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Our 
State Department has indicated that during Aristide's short tenure in 
power, he used political violence and approved human rights abuses 
against his opposition. To enforce his return only condones such 
actions and turns a blind eye to growing segment of the Haitian people 
who no longer support his return.
  The United States only vital national security interest in Haiti is 
that of stemming the tide of immigration to our southern shores. 
Refugees fleeing that island nation are forced to negotiate treacherous 
waters in unseaworthy craft, only to be returned to Port-au-Prince. The 
President's recent decision to begin screening those fleeing Haiti 
again will only encourage more Haitians to undertake this dangerous 
journey.
  Yet it is clear that something must be done. This amendment offers a 
bold and creative approach to the problems of Haiti. Placing Mr. 
Aristide and his supporters on the Isle de la Gonave ``demagnetizes'' 
United States shores by creating a safe haven to Haitian refugees on 
Haitian soil. It provides a unique opportunity to return the elected 
Government of Haiti to Haiti without direct military intervention.
  This proposal also fosters democracy in Haiti by providing a boost to 
the morale of Aristide supporters. With Aristide back in Haiti, the 
people of that impoverished nation will have an alternative to the 
military dictatorship currently in place. This is a meaningful 
alternative to military intervention and to refugee screening on the 
high seas.
  This is a humanitarian option as well. It has become clear that the 
U.N. imposed embargo on Haiti is not hurting the perpetrators in Haiti. 
Rather it hurts those already suffering from the abject poverty of that 
nation. This measure will allow for the safe introduction to 
humanitarian relief to the supporters of Aristide without the fear of 
reprisals by the military dictatorship.
  Mr. Chairman, there are few good options in Haiti. However, the least 
desirable and least responsible is that of disengagement. The Goss 
amendment offers us a creative solution to a difficult problem. I urge 
my colleagues to vote `'yes'' on this measure.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] as a substitute for the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will announce that pursuant to 
clause 2(c) and rule XXIII, the Chair will reduce to a minimum of 5 
minutes the time for an electronic vote, if ordered, on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 191, 
noes 236, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 196]

                               AYES--191

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Barca
     Barcia
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brooks
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Camp
     Cantwell
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hochbrueckner
     Hughes
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murphy
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Tucker
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates

                               NOES--236

     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Canady
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooper
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Huffington
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kyl
     Lambert
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Nussle
     Obey
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Royce
     Sarpalius
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Valentine
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Fish
     Grandy
     Horn
     Ortiz
     Santorum
     Stark
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1914

  Messrs. McINNIS, McCLOSKEY, MAZZOLI, DICKS, and CRAMER, Ms. LAMBERT, 
Mr. TRAFICANT, and Mr. MINGE change their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. INSLEE, RUSH, GILCHREST, and MFUME changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was 
rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, this rollcall vote is reduced to 
5 minutes.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 223, 
noes 201, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 197]

                               AYES--223

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     Deal
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Houghton
     Huffington
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murphy
     Myers
     Nussle
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Royce
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Upton
     Valentine
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--201

     Abercrombie
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Barca
     Becerra
     Berman
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brooks
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     LaRocco
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Norton (DC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swift
     Synar
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     DeLay
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Fish
     Gibbons
     Grandy
     Horn
     Neal (NC)
     Ortiz
     Santorum
     Stark
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1925

  Mr. DEUTSCH and Mr. ROEMER changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. DARDEN changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule it is now in order to consider the 
amendment printed in part 5 of House Report 103-520.


                    amendment offered by mr. spence

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the rule, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Spence: At the end of title X 
     (page 277, after line 2), insert the following new section:

     SEC.   . CREDIT AGAINST ASSESSMENTS FOR UNITED STATES 
                   EXPENDITURES IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS 
                   PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

       (a) Annual Report.--The President shall, at the time of 
     submission of the budget to Congress for any fiscal year, 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
     the total amount of funds appropriated for national defense 
     purposes for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1994 that were 
     expended during the preceding fiscal year to support or 
     participate in, directly or indirectly, United Nations 
     peacekeeping activities. Such report shall include a 
     breakdown by United Nations peacekeeping operation of the 
     amount of funds expended to support or participate in each 
     such operation.
       (b) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, in each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1996, 
     funds may be obligated or expended for payment to the United 
     Nations of the United States assessed share of peacekeeping 
     operations for that fiscal year only to the extent that such 
     assessed share exceeds the total amount identified in the 
     report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) for the preceding 
     fiscal year, reduced by the amount of any reimbursement or 
     credit to the United States by the United Nations for the 
     costs of United States support for, or participation in, 
     United Nations peacekeeping activities for that fiscal year.
       (c) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) The term ``United Nations peacekeeping activities'' 
     means any international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
     enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by the 
     United Nations Security Council under chapter VI or VII of 
     the United Nations Charter.
       (2) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member in 
opposition, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the minority leader, 
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel].
  (Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MICHEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, the aim of this amendment is simple: Peacekeeping 
payments to the United Nations would be adjusted to take into account 
the Defense Department's substantial peacekeeping-related expenditures. 
The Department of Defense spends millions of taxpayer dollars every 
year for U.S. participation in and support of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. It seems to me we ought to be getting credit 
at the United Nations for what our Armed Forces do for peacekeeping 
operations. If the United Nations did not have the United States to 
turn to every time whenever there is a crisis requiring a show of 
force, I doubt it would have the power to implement any of its 
resolutions. Quite frankly, we are just taken for granted, and it is 
high time our in-kind contributions of any and all kinds of military 
support be considered as a direct contribution to the United Nations 
peacekeeping operational expense.
  Suffice it to say that we must regain the proper relationship between 
our country and the United Nations. The United Nations should be on our 
side and off our backs. This amendment will start the process of 
restoring the proper balance between our security needs and the United 
Nations' various needs. I suggest the United Nations buy a rubber stamp 
marked ``Full credit, U.S.A.,'' and just stamp it on the next bill they 
send us with the Defense Department's contribution written in.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this very commonsense 
amendment.

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, this amendment was coauthored by the 
Minority Leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], and there 
was also another coauthor of the amendment, the gentleman from Georgia 
[Mr. Gingrich].
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. 
Gingrich].
  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, let me start by saying I want to thank my 
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], for yielding 
this time to me, and I want to thank the chairman of the committee, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], who has been, I think, most 
generous in his efforts to work out a procedure and a process for a 
number of very, very difficult issues, and I have often gotten on the 
floor and complained about some of the rules we get and some of the 
situations, but I would say that working on this bill has been frankly 
a very important step toward bipartisanship, and I want to thank Mr. 
Dellums for, I think, an exemplary effort to reach out and to try to 
actually have time for everybody to explore important issues.
  So, in that spirit I want to briefly describe an amendment which we 
thought was so important that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel] 
and I wanted to lead off the conversation on our side, and other 
members of our leadership, I think, are going to want to join in.
  Let me be very clear what this is about. We are going through a 
period of terrible downsizing in our defense budget. We are cutting 
beyond bone. We are shrinking below what President Bush thought, we are 
shrinking below what President Clinton, said was necessary. We are 
going to weaken America's military over the next 5 years in very 
significant ways.
  Now, when we were building up the military under Presidents Reagan 
and Bush, Mr. Chairman, we got into the habit of carrying out for the 
United Nations a whole series of invisible services often involving 
logistics, air mobility, supplies, command and control, a whole range 
of things which we just threw in. So, we were about the largest payer 
to the United Nations of money for peacekeeping. We had been assessed 
at 31 percent, and I must thank the appropriate committee member who 
brought that back down. Hope to bring it down to 25 by something they 
just adopted. But clearly we are the largest payer in the world of 
peacekeeping in direct cash.
  In addition, Mr. Chairman, there was a hidden subsidy in that a very 
substantial part of the cost of many of these operations was American 
C-141's, American C-5's, American C-130's, all of them, by the way, 
made in de Kalb County, GA, which I represent. But that is not the 
point. The point is that, when we were a much larger defense system, we 
could afford these invisible costs.
  Now they are not trivial. Look at Somalia, Operation Provide Relief; 
Yugoslavia, Operation Deny Flight, embargo enforcement and air drops; 
Southern Iraq, Operation Southern Watch; Northern Iraq, Operation 
Provide Comfort; Haiti, embargo enforcement. These are not small sums 
of money. For fiscal 1994 alone, just for fiscal 1994, Congress has 
already appropriated $1,200,000,000 in supplemental defense funds to 
cover such costs and will probably have to come back and approve even 
more.
  Now some examples:
  Somalia, $424 million in United States costs of supporting the United 
Nations without compensation; Yugoslavia and Bosnia, $277 million in 
United States invisible costs without being compensated; Iraq, $450 
million in United States costs without compensation; Haiti, $48 million 
in additional and invisible costs to the United States without being 
able to be reimbursed. So, Mr. Chairman, what is happening is we are 
both the largest direct payer to United Nations peacekeeping, and we do 
not get to score any of our own costs as part of the cost of the 
peacekeeping.
  Now all this amendment does, Mr. Chairman, is begin to raise a very 
serious issue, to wit: ``When you're cutting the American defense 
budget, when you're laying off 15,000 uniformed personnel a month and 
10,000 civilian personnel a month in your defense system, when you're 
shrinking the number of ships, when you're reducing the number of 
planes, when you're shrinking the number of tanks, when you're 
weakening America's defense, can you really afford to have an invisible 
subsidy to the United Nations on top of the money that is already the 
largest single source for U.N. peacekeeping?''
  I do not think so.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GINGRICH. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] 
briefly.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman consider the U.N. 
supported, participated action in Desert Storm to be an action in which 
the U.S. Government spend billions of dollars in direct or indirect 
costs in support of a peacekeeping/peacemaking operation?
  Mr. GINGRICH. I think that Desert Storm was a unique moment, as was 
the Korean war, in both of those cases involving a large theater level 
conflict. The United Nations provided virtual total leadership and 
virtual total military capacity while assembling around it a coalition 
of forces under United Nations command. But the fact is, in both the 
Korean war and in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it was American 
leadership to accomplish American objectives with the support of the 
United Nations.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I think I am out of time, I am afraid, 
but I appreciate very much my colleague participating.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding this time to me.
  As I understand the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia, 
Mr. Chairman, it prohibits the State Department from paying U.N. 
peacekeeping assessment unless the Defense Department is fully 
reimbursed for its support to U.N. peacekeeping operations.
  Now I think everybody in this Chamber agrees that the Department of 
Defense should be reimbursed when appropriate for additional costs it 
incurs in U.N. peacekeeping operations. There should be no doubt about 
that. We all accept that. It is my understanding that the Department of 
Defense today has already been reimbursed by the United Nations for 
incremental costs in support of peacekeeping operations, and for most 
of its direct support to peacekeeping, such as provision of equipment 
in airlift where there are additional costs, and the Department of 
Defense should receive reimbursement for those additional costs as 
well. And when those additional costs occur, Mr. Chairman, we have a 
means to take care of that through supplemental appropriations, and we 
should. Mr. Chairman, the President has committed himself to seeking 
supplemental appropriations whenever the Defense Department incurs 
these costs, and indeed he should, and he has honored that commitment 
in Somalia and, I think, will do so in the future.
  I think the important thing here is not to mix up two issues. The one 
issue is Defense Department reimbursement. There should be no debate 
about it. We all agree to it. The other issue is funds the United 
States is legally required, committed, to pay the United Nations. 
Holding U.N. peacekeeping assessments hostage will not reimburse the 
Defense Department for costs. Holding U.N. peacekeeping funds hostage 
does mean that the U.N. peacekeeping operations will shut down, and 
that is what is dangerous about this amendment. Those countries that 
are contributing troops, the troops will not be paid. They will pull 
their troops out.
  Members who vote for this amendment must understand the consequences, 
and the consequences are that we will have to shut down peacekeeping 
operations; for example, in Cyprus. We will pull out peacekeeping 
forces in the Middle East, right in the middle of the peace process. We 
will let the violence and the slaughter continue in Rwanda. We will 
halt the peace process in Angola. We will pull out forces from Kuwait 
on Saddam Hussein's border.

                              {time}  1940

  So this amendment sets a bad precedent. It suggests that every nation 
is entitled, regardless of U.N. rules, regardless of our commitments, 
to decide for itself what expenses are incurred in support of 
peacekeeping, and then to credit all of these expenses against the 
peacekeeping assessment.
  If we claim that any Department of Defense cost remotely connected to 
peacekeeping must be reimbursed by the United Nations, what will stop 
the Russians from claiming it is peacekeeping in the Novgorod, and then 
reducing its payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping?
  What would stop countries who are incurring costs as a result of 
economic embargoes against Serbia, Haiti, Libya, and Iraq from charging 
those costs against their U.N. assessments?
  The bottom line I think is that the United Nations peacekeeping is in 
the American national interest. It is in our interest that the United 
Nations does peacekeeping, and not the United States. We do not want to 
be the cop on the beat around the world. We should pay our peacekeeping 
assessments and not mix up those assessments with the reimbursement for 
the Department of Defense.
  When the United States decides that it is in the national interest to 
provide Department of Defense support for peacekeeping, we do and we 
can contract with the United Nations for reimbursement. Costs beyond 
normal reimbursement, as in the case of Somalia, should be covered by 
supplemental appropriations.
  As Secretary Christopher has pointed out, what this amendment does is 
compel the President to make an unacceptable choice. On the one hand, 
withdraw U.S. military support for these peacekeeping operations; or 
refuse to comply with our U.N. charter obligations to pay for our 
peacekeeping activities. That is an unacceptable choice, and the 
amendment should be defeated.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  (Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a slick way to avoid paying our bills 
to the United Nations. This amendment is a little too cute. It pulls 
the rug out from under the United Nations--the problem is: We are 
standing on that same rug.
  This amendment is a clever attempt to make the United Nations pay for 
U.S. military operations--for operations we want to conduct and for 
which we sought U.N. endorsement. This amendment tells the United 
Nations: ``Anytime you endorse an American operation, we're gonna make 
you pay for it.'' Well, what do you suppose will be the U.N. response: 
``In that case, you Americans don't get a U.N. endorsement.'' The 
result is this:
  First, we still have to pay for the costs of the operation.
  Second, we are forced to act as a lone wolf without U.N. endorsement, 
making it harder to defend the operation.
  Mr. Chairman, let's look at what kind of military operations the 
United States is engaged in today in our national interest with U.N. 
endorsement. All of these operations are authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council. But none of them are U.N.-assessed operations because 
we choose to run them as U.S.-commanded operations. Here's the list.
  Off Haiti, Operation Support Democracy.
  Around former Yugoslavia, four different efforts--Operation Deny 
Flight, Operation Sharp Guard, Operation Provide Promise and Sanctions 
Against Missions--all designed to reduce the conflict there.
  Over Iraq, Operation Southern Watch is the effort to stop Iraqi 
flights over southern Iraq and includes the blockade enforcement 
operation in the Red Sea. Operation Provide Comfort is the effort to 
stop flights in the north and to protect the Kurds there.
  In Somalia, a United States amphibious readiness group consisting of 
3 ships and over 4,000 personnel is deployed in the Indian Ocean, by 
our choice.
  In the Middle East, the Western Sahara, and in Mozambique, the U.S. 
military provides a modicum of support for U.N. operations at a cost of 
about $100,000 each.
  Mr. Chairman, the projected costs for this year for these 
operations--U.S. run but U.N. endorsed--less U.N. reimbursements to the 
United States, total more than $900 million. That amount would almost 
wipe out the anticipated arrearages for U.N. peacekeeping operations, 
which are almost $1 billion. Last September, the President promised the 
world that the United States would pay its assessed contributions in 
full. Other U.N. member nations are watching whether the United States 
meets its responsibilities. This amendment says we won't.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is harmful. I strongly urge Members to 
oppose and defeat this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record a letter from Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher.


                                       The Secretary of State,

                                         Washington, May 24, 1994.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing to express my strong 
     opposition to a proposed amendment on peacekeeping to the 
     Department of Defense Authorization bill. This amendment, 
     were it to become law, would have disastrous consequences for 
     the ability of the United States to advance our interests 
     through the United Nations.
       Except in rare circumstances where the United States waives 
     reimbursement from the UN, the Department of Defense is 
     reimbursed for goods and services it provides to UN assessed 
     peacekeeping activities. The U.S. also receives the same per 
     soldier reimbursement as other countries when we participate 
     in peacekeeping operations. This amendment, however, would go 
     far beyond these arrangements.
       It is important for the Congress to understand that U.S. 
     participation in UN--sponsored activities, such as the non-
     fly zone over Bosnia and the maritime interdiction forces 
     around Haiti, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, are all 
     undertaken voluntarily to advance our national interests. 
     This has been the case under both Democratic and Republican 
     Administrations.
       This amendment, however, would compel the President to make 
     an unacceptable choice: withdraw U.S. military support for 
     these and other operations or refuse to comply with our UN 
     Charter obligations to pay for UN peacekeeping activities. 
     The UN peacekeeping system already is under enormous 
     financial strain, and this amendment could lead to its 
     collapse.
       The Administration believes that peacekeeping operations 
     can be a useful tool for our foreign policy. We have recently 
     completed a comprehensive review of U.S. participation in UN 
     peacekeeping operations, and we are working to address many 
     of the concerns raised by this amendment, particularly 
     reducing the cost of these operations.
       Therefore, I urge the Congress to defeat this amendment.
           Sincerely,
                                               Warren Christopher.

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to another coauthor of 
the amendment, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, for some time now, the United States has been 
providing what amounts to pro bono support for U.N. peacekeeping 
activities. But what is pro bono for the United Nations is double 
billing to the American people. Under an antiquated assessment system 
that does not take into account economic realities of the last 30 
years, including the growth of Germany, Japan, and China, the United 
States is assessed over 31 percent of the United Nations peacekeeping 
budget. In the State Department Authorization Act recently signed into 
law, Congress took steps to force the administration to address this 
inequity and reduce the proportion of our assessment.
  Today we have an opportunity to address another inequity in the U.N. 
assessment formula. When President Bush sent armed forces on a mission 
to Somalia in December 1992, it was to enforce a U.N. Security Council 
resolution. Although our forces were fulfilling a U.N. mandate, the 
costs were all absorbed by the American taxpayer.
  Hear me, the American taxpayer. Only after the mission was formally 
turned back over to the United Nations were the costs shared by other 
countries in addition to ourselves. The administration ultimately 
requested a supplemental appropriation of $750 million to cover part of 
the cost of the mission, choosing to absorb the other costs in the 
regular Department of Defense budget.
  We passed that supplemental spending bill earlier this year. We did 
not ask for nor did we receive from the United Nations financial credit 
for this substantial contribution, and our U.N. assessment remained 
unchanged.
  This is not the first time we have undertaken this double burden, and 
I fear it will not be the last. As I speak, we are expending 
substantial resources from our distressed Department of Defense budget 
to pay for several missions that directly support U.N. operations.
  Our participation in the no-fly zone over Bosnia is financed wholly 
by the United States. So is our enforcement of the embargo on arms for 
Bosnia, which the President says he does not support, as is the broader 
embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. We are also paying for our part 
of Operation Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in Iraq.
  In fact, over the years we have funded a substantial amount of 
activity in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations, above and beyond 
our bloated 31-plus percent for those operations. The amendment before 
us today will give us proper credit for those costs and would end the 
practice that unfairly burdens the Pentagon with costs contracted for 
by the State Department.
  Most importantly, its adoption will be one more step in winning fair 
treatment for the American taxpayer.

                              {time}  1950

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  I think it bears pointing out that the United States is reimbursed by 
the United Nations for most direct DOD support to peacekeeping 
activities, such as when we provide equipment, when we provide airlift. 
We are paid for that. And when we are participants in a peacekeeping 
effort, we are reimbursed on the same basis as other countries which 
contribute troops to the peacekeeping.
  This amendment would take us much further along. It is really a 
unilateral decree that will allow us to charge the U.N. for missions 
that we have undertaken, allow the United States to offset against its 
share of peacekeeping operations the assessment delivered to us, what 
we have spent on U.N. endorsed but nevertheless not directly sponsored 
undertakings.
  There are dozens of different problems with this, but let me just 
highlight several.
  First of all, it would violate our legal obligations under the United 
Nations charter to pay our assessment in accordance with the rules that 
all countries who are parties to that charter follow. Great nations 
ought to keep their word. It is as simple as that. We should abide by 
the charter as long as we are a party to it.
  Second, this amendment, if we got away with it, would invite other 
countries to do the same, so the British and the French and the 
Italians and others who are now involved in enforcing the no-fly zone, 
say in Bosnia, they could do the same. They could credit their 
assessments.
  Third, the unilateral nature of this amendment, coupled with its 
invitation to fiscal anarchy in the United Nations, would weaken our 
ability to work out other reforms in the United Nations, including a 
reduction in our peacekeeping assessments.
  The Secretary of Defense has written the Speaker of the House a 
letter today in which he said, ``All of these things, taken together, 
mean that this amendment would ensure disaster for a U.N. peacekeeping 
system already teetering on the financial brink.''
  Mr. Chairman, we should defeat this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Buyer].
  (Mr. BUYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment. 
Today, the defense budget faces a double threat. First, the Clinton 
administration has embarked on a plan to cut from Defense, over the 
next 5 years, $127 billion more than the amount the Bush administration 
proposed over the same period. The second threat is the idea, firmly 
embraced by the administration, that the defense budget is a ready pool 
of funds that can be raided for any project deemed necessary by the 
President.
  Funding for peacekeeping has become one of those projects. Mr. 
Clinton has made the United Nations a centerpiece of his foreign 
policy. Deferring to this international body on a variety of foreign 
policy crises, we have seen the folly of this approach from Bosnia, to 
Somalia, to Haiti.
  Yet today, we see the rapid expansion of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations around the world. With this expansion, we have seen the 
extensive involvement of the U.S. military in support of the U.N. This 
support is not without costs. By the end of this year, the United 
States will be in arrears to the United Nations in excess of $1 
billion. In fact, the President has asked for a supplemental 
peacekeeping appropriation of $640 million for 1994.
  Historically, the bills for peacekeeping operations have been paid 
from the State Department budget. But in addition, the United Nations 
has benefited from the support of U.S. military forces deployed 
overseas. These forces are often sent on U.N. missions without 
reimbursement. Their costs are paid from the individual services' 
operations and maintenance accounts.
  Somalia is a prime example. Last year, this Congress passed a 
supplemental appropriation bill to pay for the ill-fated United States 
participation in the U.N. mission in Somalia. This cost the American 
taxpayer over $1 billion. Today, in Bosnia, most of the costs accrued 
in support of that operation come from the operations and maintenance 
fund of the individual services. It is unlikely that these costs will 
be reimbursed by the United Nations.
  This amendment is simple. It stops this drain on the defense budget 
by requiring the United States to deduct from its annual U.N. 
peacekeeping bill the money the Department of Defense spends in support 
of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I think this is only fair.
  Mr. Chairman, the free ride is over. The United Nations should no 
longer be allowed to raid our defense budget without reimbursement. I 
strongly support this amendment and urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kentucky [Mr. Rogers].
  Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, the question here is fairness, purely and 
simply. Why not treat us fairly?
  Do not be fooled. We are paying twice to the United Nations for these 
peacekeeping operations. Number one, we are paying three times, almost, 
what Japan pays in outright assessments, 31.7 percent. Almost four 
times what Germany pays. Not only that, but then we send our aircraft 
carriers to the scene or we send our planes to the scene and incur 
these exorbitant extra costs on top of that.
  We are told that this year alone that is $1.5 billion, so we are 
paying 31.7 percent of the total cost. Then on top of that, we are 
paying another $1.5 billion in logistical support. What is fair?
  The true cost to the American taxpayer this year, 1994, for 
peacekeeping is really $2.7 billion.
  Now, we are not just talking about chicken feed anymore, Mr. 
Chairman. We used to be, in 1988. But look at the growth in the 
assessed cost for U.N. peacekeeping over the years.
  Here is 1988. Here is 1994, estimated, and still going on up.
  We are involved now in 19 peacekeeping missions in the world, and we 
are paying much more than a third of the cost. I do not think that is 
fair.
  What does the United Nations do when we try to correct that? They 
refuse.
  We asked permission for years to lower our assessment to just 25 
percent, merely twice what Japan pays, the next highest. They refused.
  They refused to allow us to credit against what we pay these extra 
costs militarily that comes out of our defense budget. And they refused 
our request for an independent inspector general to tell us how the 
books are kept.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is time that we stood on our hind feet and 
said, this is enough.
  Now, where does the money come from, Mr. Chairman? It comes from my 
appropriations subcommittee that also appropriates the funds for the 
war on crime, the war on drugs. Every penny that we send in this fund 
here comes out of the same fund out of which we are trying to fight the 
war on crime. That explains itself, because the President this year, in 
requesting funds for the war on crime, decreases the FBI by 300 people, 
decreases the DEA by 800 people because of this element right here.
  I ask for fairness. I urge support of this amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. Furse].
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleague for 
yielding time to me.
  I am not going to give my own words. I am going to quote from a 
letter from Secretary of Defense Perry.
  He says:

       I am writing to express my strong opposition to 
     Representative Gingrich's peacekeeping amendment.
  He goes on to say:

       The impact on U.S. foreign policy and U.S. leadership in 
     the post-cold war era would be devastating. This amendment 
     would jeopardize missions such as our peacekeeping operations 
     in Cyprus, our sanction enforcement in Iraq, our U.N. 
     peacekeeping in southern Lebanon.

  And again I quote, he says:

       In addition to bringing about the virtual collapse of U.N. 
     peacekeeping, withholding payments to our U.N. assessment 
     would create a serious violation of our treaty obligations 
     under the U.N. charter. Peacekeeping operations are an 
     important tool for protecting and advancing U.S. interests in 
     the post-cold war.

  Mr. Chairman, I want to join with the Secretary of Defense, William 
Perry, and say vote ``no'' on the Gingrich amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the remaining amount 
of time on both sides of the debate.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 18\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] 
has 19 minutes remaining.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman], another coauthor of this amendment.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to rise in support of the 
Michel-Gingrich-Hyde-Gilman-Spence amendment. This amendment will, for 
the first time, require that our Nation's peacekeeping payments to the 
United Nations be adjusted to take account of in-kind contributions to 
U.N. peacekeeping operations by the Department of Defense.
  The logic of this amendment is simple and powerful. Every year, DOD 
spends millions of dollars for U.S. participation in and support for 
U.N. peacekeeping operations, with little or no reimbursement from the 
United Nations. And every year, the United Nations has been assessing 
us for 31.7 percent of the total cost of its peacekeeping operations.
  That's a bill that traditionally has been paid in cash by the State 
Department. This amendment requires that DOD's peacekeeping 
expenditures be offset against our U.N. peacekeeping assessment before 
the State Department makes cash payments to the United Nations. In 
effect, the United States will begin to pay part of its U.N. bill in 
kind rather than in cash.
  This is an important, long overdue innovation that addresses a 
growing problem.
  Because the number and cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations has been 
growing, the amount of our annual assessment has been growing as well, 
and increasingly the United States has fallen behind in its payments. 
For this fiscal year, $401 million has been appropriated for assessed 
peacekeeping costs. Even after State pays this $401 million to the 
United Nations, however, it is estimated that by the end of this fiscal 
year our total arrearage to the U.N. for assessed peacekeeping costs 
will exceed $1 billion.
  That's why the President has asked for a supplemental peacekeeping 
appropriation this year of $670 million--that is, $670 million in 
addition to the $401 million already appropriated. And even if that 
supplemental appropriation is approved, we will end the year with at 
least a $350 million arrearage.
  This is a situation that only promises to become worse. Our U.N. 
peacekeeping assessment for fiscal 1995 is likely to be in the 
neighborhood of $1.2 to $1.3 billion. But Congress has authorized only 
$510 million for assessed peacekeeping contributions in 1995. So, 
without some supplemental appropriations, our total arrearage at the 
end of 1995 could be as high as $1.8 billion.
  While these bills are piling up, the Defense Department has been 
incurring huge unreimbursed costs for participating in and supporting 
U.N. peacekeeping operations.
  For the failed peacekeeping operation in Somalia, for example, 
Congress had to approve a reprogramming and a supplemental 
appropriation totaling over $1 billion to cover DOD's unreimbursed 
costs.
  Similarly, DOD is now racking up large unreimbursed costs for its 
operations in, over, and around Bosnia in support of United Nations 
peacekeeping activities there. It is estimated that those costs will 
total approximately $275 million this year.
  The time has come to restore some balance to the equation. If the 
United Nations is going to continue piling peacekeeping debts on us, it 
is only fair that we develop a way to charge back to the United Nations 
the costs that DOD incurs in supporting peacekeeping operations.
  This amendment does not prohibit our Nation's involvement in U.N. 
peacekeeping.
  The Michel-Gingrich-Hyde-Gilman-Spence amendment simply provides a 
mechanism for the United Nations to credit our Nation's costs against 
the U.N. assessment. It is a long-overdue step that deserves support.
  Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.

                              {time}  2000

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe what I am hearing. I ask my colleagues 
to read the text of this amendment and understand what would have 
happened if this had been in effect 3 years ago.
  First, understand this. We can try and dissociate ourselves all we 
want from U.N. peacekeeping operations, but the fact is there is not 
one peacekeeping operation going on now that the United States could 
not have killed at its inception by exercising its power of veto. The 
Security Council is the only body empowered to have the United Nations 
authorize any peacekeeping operations. We can veto anything at the 
Security Council.
  Secondly, if this had been in effect 3 years ago, when we chose to 
undertake Desert Shield and then Desert Storm, and we sought the U.N. 
endorsement of that proposition and received the U.N. endorsement, with 
a lot of great and excellent diplomatic work by the previous 
administration, and we spent, what, $50, $60, $70 billion, much of 
which was reimbursed, and there is no reference, by the way, to the 
fact that reimbursements come off of the credit, but whatever we spent 
there, billions of dollars in direct and indirect U.S. costs in this 
operation, if this resolution had been in effect at that time, for 25 
years in the future we would never pay one dollar into any approved 
U.N. peacekeeping operation.
  What is the consequence of that? It is either we shrink from our 
superpower status totally, and totally disengage ourselves from the 
world, and yes, then we would have more money for cops on the streets 
and the crime bill and the FBI and a lot of domestic programs. We could 
also repeal our defense budget while we are at it as well, and have 
even more money for doing that. But a superpower does not operate under 
that kind of situation.
  Second, we would either remove ourselves from every consideration 
internationally or we would find ourselves unilaterally involved in 
maintaining the peace in Cyprus, in monitoring human rights in the 
election process in Salvador, in doing all these unilaterally, because 
the Security Council would never undertake a single international 
peacekeeping operation because the United States would not be paying. 
We would be taking credits off of our obligations and our assessments 
in violation of the charter, notwithstanding the fact we could block 
any specific peacekeeping operation, because we had provided indirect 
or direct costs to some operation we thought was worthy of our support.

  Let me tell the Members, I think enforcing the no fly zone in 
northern Iraq and protecting the Kurds in the consequence of Desert 
Storm in a worthwhile expenditure, and yes, we are doing it, and yes, 
the U.S. sanctioned it. I do not think that should mean that because of 
that we ask the United Nations to pull out of Cambodia and we ask the 
United Nations to pull out of Cyprus and we ask the United Nations to 
pull out of El Salvador. That is crazy.
  Mr. Chairman, the only salvation, I think, in this amendment is I 
truly believe that the sponsors of it do not really want it to happen. 
They want to register some criticism of U.S. foreign policy in the area 
of peacekeeping, but the way to do that and the way to deal with equity 
in the sanctions is to only appropriate the arrearages on the condition 
that those ratios come down to a more realistic level, that we meet the 
25 percent.
  That is exactly what we did in the State Department authorization 
bill that was signed into law a month ago. That is exactly what the 
appropriators are talking about doing. That is the right way to get 
some sense of efficient management and fair participation in 
international peacekeeping.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a no vote on the amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Louisiana [Mr. Livingston].
  (Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, the minority leader characterized this 
amendment as one of common sense. That is exactly what it is. When it 
comes to U.N. peacekeeping efforts, the United States contributes an 
incredible amount of money through logistics, air power, lethal 
weaponry, and manpower, in addition to cash. The soldiers, the sailors, 
marines and airmen who risk their lives to provide the wherewithal to 
keep indigenous people from killing themselves benefit from all of 
these contributions.
  Over the years, I have visited United States soldiers sweating in the 
Sinai, airmen feeding the peoples of Bosnia and northern Iraq, marines 
and sailors in Somalia, troops in Desert Storm, the DMZ in Korea, the 
war zone in Beirut, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Through the United 
Nations, America feeds and nurtures and protects people around the 
world.
  Because of earlier commitments, we provide $75 million for 
peacekeeping process in the Sinai, in Cyprus, and in Lebanon. That is 
under the appropriation bills, the Foreign Aid Subcommittee, apart from 
the provisions of this bill. Again, apart from the provisions of this 
bill, under the State-Justice appropriation bill, we have been 
contributing over 33 percent of all current U.N. peacekeeping 
operations.
  Recently, we trimmed down that figure, all the way down to 32 
percent, still the most significant proportion of any country in the 
world. We have 80,000 troops stationed in some 18 U.S. peacekeeping 
operations around the world, with some eight more countries on the 
planning boards.
  The costs of these operations are borne solely by United States 
taxpayers, in addition to the 33 percent of the U.N. operations, which 
costs alone, for Somalia, $1 billion last year, all in addition to the 
$75 billion in the foreign aid bill.
  Mr. Chairman, we also contribute hundreds of millions of dollars to 
multilateral banks. We spend a total of $14 billion in our foreign aid 
bill, which is not even discussed here today, for foreign aid of all 
kinds around the world. It is not too much to ask the United Nations to 
give us financial credit for the costs of our military effort on behalf 
of world peace.
  Enough is enough. Our taxpayers are overburdened. This would be a 
very good place to lower the cost of their generosity. The burden of 
being the beacon of liberty throughout the world should warrant at 
least some sensible credit and recognition. Accordingly, I urge the 
adoption of this common sense amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos].
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend, colleague, and 
neighbor, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] for yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I am glad the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] 
is here, because he misspoke, and I would like to correct a statement 
that he made, and I am sure he will agree with me.
  Mr. Chairman, we do not have 80,000 troops in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations around the world, which is what the gentleman said, I am 
sure inadvertently. There are 80,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops around 
the world from many countries. We have 800 U.S. troops in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LANTOS. I am delighted to yield to my friend, the gentleman from 
Louisiana.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman should explain 
that to the 30,000 United States troops in Korea or the 500 in 
Macedonia alone, a very small portion of the people.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time, the gentleman 
knows as well as I do that the United States forces in Korea are not 
part of U.N. peacekeeping operations. The gentleman knows that as wells 
I do.
  The fact is that the small country of Norway has more peacekeepers in 
U.N. peacekeeping operations than we do. We have 800, 800 out of the 
80,000 peacekeepers who happen to be members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
  As I listened to this debate on both sides, I tried to decide what 
are the issues on which we agree, so let me begin with those.
  Mr. Chairman, No. 1, I take it we all agree that the United States 
pays too large a share of U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Japanese, 
the Germans, the Kuwaitis, the Saudis, many others should pay a large 
share of U.N. peacekeeping costs, and we should reduce our payment. We 
should do so in an orderly fashion.
  No. 2, very important, as my friend, the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Berman] pointed out, there is not a single U.N. peacekeeping 
operation any place on this planet that we could not have stopped with 
our veto. Every single U.N. peacekeeping operation is in existence with 
our concurrence, approval, and vote. There is not a single one of the 
18 that we objected to.

                             {time}   2010

  No. 3. We do not wish to be the policeman of this world. We want to 
the maximum possible extent other countries participating in 
peacekeeping activities.
  Mr. Chairman, if I may use a local analogy. What the amendment from 
the other side proposes is something like this: Let us assume that you 
are in a city and the city taxes are $1,000. This $1,000 is budgeted 
for the police department and the fire department and the street 
cleaning department. That is what the city runs on. But you also decide 
without concurrence or approval by anybody that you will buy $1,000 
worth of equipment for a playground and you do it. Nobody approved of 
it, nobody budgeted for it. Nobody said that is what we are going to 
spend our monies on, and then you say having spent $1,000 for equipment 
on the playground, I will not now pay my city taxes.
  Mr. Chairman, this is absurd, and every one of my colleagues on the 
other side knows that it is absurd.
  If this absurd proposal is accepted, I tell Members what will happen 
next. Russia is currently having troops in Georgia to supplement a U.N. 
peacekeeping observer team. If we do what the gentleman is proposing, 
nothing prevents Russia from charging as much of the Russian Army to 
U.N. peacekeepng obligations as they choose. Nothing prevents the 
French and the British from charging their cost of preventing 
overflights in Yugoslavia to their peacekeeping costs.
  If my colleagues want to destroy the peacekeeping activity of the 
United Nations, vote for this ill-advised amendment. If my colleagues 
want others to carry their fair share of the load, vote against it.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman form 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment. 
This debate is amazing to me. As I recall last week, we were on the 
floor in a similar debate. The big issue then was called burdensharing. 
Many of my colleagues from the other side who spoke in support of the 
burdensharing amendment were the same ones who got up now and said that 
the U.N. has to be paid for from Japan and Europe and other countries, 
but we cannot pull the plug out from under the United Nations at this 
point in time.
  Mr. Chairman, where were these people when we argued in support of 
President Clinton's partnership for peace which he has unveiled in 
support of our NATO allies, when we pulled the rug out from under the 
President last week in this body? I stood up on the floor of the House 
and I said I want to defend the President, and I want to support 
Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry. I want to give them the 
flexibility.
  I cannot believe some of my colleagues who got up and quoted the 
Secretary of Defense today who laughed at the Secretary last week. That 
is absolutely beyond my comprehension.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment does not curtail the leadership of 
President Clinton. What it simply says is that when we respond to a 
U.N. operation, we should be given credit for our cost. I think the 
American taxpayers would agree with that. We are not saying we should 
not comply and help out in these U.N. operations. We are saying we 
should be given credit for it.
  I ask my colleagues that supported the burdensharing amendment last 
week, here is your chance. This is burdensharing at its best. This is 
our opportunity to say to Japan, to France, to Germany, cough up the 
money, support the United Nations financially. Do not make the United 
States pay for the cost of all these missions that we get dragged into 
by the U.N. leadership.
  Mr. Chairman, this is the real burdensharing amendment. People of 
America, watch this vote closely. Because what we are saying is we want 
the President to have flexibility. If the President wants to send our 
troops on a U.N. mission anyplace in the world, we will support him, 
but we think our allies through the United Nations should help pay the 
cost.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would counter by yielding 2 
minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha.]
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be very practical about 
this money. The chances are, we are not going to have any peacekeeping 
money in our bill this year. But for us to try to make this an issue 
when it is actually not an issue is not appropriate.
  I remember vividly going down to the White House when President Bush 
wanted to go to Somalia. I was the only one who spoke up and said, ``I 
don't think this is as good operation.'' We forced the United Nations 
into that operation. If we would have had them take an assessment from 
other countries and pay for the peacekeeping mission based on that 
assessment, it would have bankrupted the United Nations.
  Mr. Chairman, we use the United Nations to our advantage. We 
sometimes use the United Nations to legitimize our military effort. 
President Bush did it. President Clinton has inherited it. We have not 
paid our full U.N. assessment, and it is embarrassing to the United 
States for us not to pay the legitimate assessment we agreed to.
  Mr. Chairman, for us to try by subterfuge to say now that, even 
though there is an agreement, ``Well, wait a minute, we want you to 
give us credit for our flights into Bosnia because we don't have any 
troops on the ground,'' and they should reimburse us for some of this 
action is not appropriate. It certainly should be discussed when it is 
legitimate. But to say the flights into Bosnia which are humanitarian 
aid and in our interest, which we want to do and all of us support, are 
going to be part of the cost of operating the official U.N. 
peacekeeping mission, it is just wrong.
  From a practical standpoint, we are behind in our regular assessment. 
I believe our assessment is too high, but we have to negotiate it. We 
cannot unilaterally say to the people in the United Nations when we use 
them whenever we want that the assessment is too high and we want to 
pay in kind.
  Mr. Chairman, I would urge the Members of this Congress to be very 
careful and to vote against this amendment, which sounds good on the 
surface. Many of us do not want to take peacekeeping money out of the 
defense budget, and we are trying to avoid that. It now comes out of 
the State Department budget. But I urge the Members of Congress not to 
try to pay for peacekeeping in this high-handed method.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Louisiana [Mr. Livingston].
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not know if the gentleman who is walking away from 
the microphone would like to listen, but in response to the gentleman 
from California, I think it is ironic that he would count only 800 
United States troops in U.N. peacekeeping operations when the gentleman 
who just spoke has visited the 30,000 in Korea who are there for 
peacekeeping, the 12,000 to 14,000 troops in Bosnia are there for 
peacekeeping. They are feeding people. The 17,000 people who are 
involved in the feeding of the Kurds in northern Iraq where we had the 
tragic accident are involved in peacekeeping.
  Mr. Chairman, it is ludicrous for the gentleman from California to 
say that we only have 800 troops involved in peacekeeping efforts. We 
have thousands and thousands and thousands of troops engaged in helping 
people around the world to survive. All we are saying is that those 
people that are involved in those operations should be given some 
credit against the incredible fees that the United Nations assesses us 
for other peacekeeping operations.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Lantos].
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, my friend, the gentleman from Louisiana, 
knows every bit as well as I do that there is a very precise definition 
of U.N. peacekeeping troops. Those are troops around the globe who are 
in various locations as a result of United Nations Security Council 
action. There are 80,000 such troops around the globe, of which 79,200 
are not members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
  Mr. Chairman, there are lots of American troops in many parts of the 
globe. We used to have hundreds of thousands as members of NATO all 
over Europe. They kept the peace. But they were not there as U.S. 
peacekeeping troops.
  I think it is important to get our terminology straight. Our troops 
in Korea are there to keep the peace.

                              {time}  2020

  They are there not as a result of the United Nations resolutions 
designating them as peacekeeping troops. They have been there since the 
end of the Korean war.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I 
think he is quibbling about how many angels can dance on the head of a 
pin.
  Mr. LANTOS. I am not quibbling at all.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. I would like him to explain that to the 40 people 
killed in Somalia that they were not part of the peacekeeping effort in 
Somalia.
  Mr. LANTOS. Those are the facts.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. I would like to tell him to tell that to the families 
of the people that were killed. Beyond that, they are losing their 
lives with some unfortunate degree of regularity. They are 
peacekeepers. And we are asking to be reimbursed for their efforts.
  Mr. LANTOS. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman clearly understands the 
difference between NATO forces which have been in Europe for two 
generations and United Nations designated peacekeeping forces wherever 
they are, in Macedonia, which are there as a result of United Nations 
resolutions designated as peacekeeping forces. By definition, all 
American forces are designed to keep the peace. We know what the 
distinction is.
  The 80,000 U.N. peacekeepers have 1 percent U.S. participation.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. The gentleman is incorrect.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out in response to the comment by 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] that this amendment does not 
apply to operations like Desert Storm. The amendment extends only to 
DOD costs related to peacekeeping operations.
  Desert Storm was a war, not a peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar operation. Desert Storm-type operations in the 
future are exempted from this amendment by the very definition in the 
section.
  I further submit that I recognize that not everyone in this Chamber 
agrees with the approach that we are suggesting of an in-kind credit 
proposed by the amendment, but to those who object to that approach, I 
think it is only fair to ask: What is the alternative solution? How do 
you propose to pay off the $1 billion peacekeeping arrearages we will 
have at the end of this fiscal year? And how shall we pay off the $1.8 
billion arrearages we may have at the end of next year?
  So before you reject this amendment's approach, make certain that you 
have an alternative for finding the money for paying the growing U.N. 
peacekeeping assessment.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Calling a tail a leg does not make it one. Definition: United Nations 
peacekeeping activities means any international peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity authorized by the 
U.N. Security Council under chapter 6 or chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. 
Desert Storm and Desert Shield were both authorized activities under 
the U.N. Charter, under chapter 7.
  This absolutely does not exclude Desert Storm. If Desert Storm 
applied when this was in effect, no money would be paid for the next 25 
years.
  Mr. GILMAN. Reclaiming my time, even though Desert Storm was 
authorized by the Security Council under chapter 7, that does not 
necessarily make it peacemaking or peacekeeping.
  Mr. BERMAN. What was it? It was not knitting.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman] to conclude his comments.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Desert Storm was a chapter 7 U.N. operation for peacemaking. It was 
covered by this. You can say it all you want that it is not covered, 
Desert Storm was not covered. I understand why you have to say it was 
not covered, because if Desert Storm is covered, it shows what this 
resolution does. It prohibits any U.N. dollars for any international 
peacekeeping operation for the next 25 years. You have to support that, 
so you have to say it is excluded. Well, it is not.
  Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield, the Desert Storm operation 
we all know was a hostile war.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Smith].
  Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman of the subcommittee 
for 13 years that handles the funding for the U.S. assessed 
contributions to the United Nations, I want to lay out some unvarnished 
facts here.
  We have both voluntary and assessed contributions. We are talking 
about the assessed contributions.
  They are established as a result of a treaty, and these assessments 
are the law of the land. They are owed until the treaty is changed.
  About 10 years or so ago, there were only a few peacekeeping 
operations for which we were making assessed contributions. One of 
those was $18 million for the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL]. 
But then the United Nations with our vote and support, voted to 
establish peacekeeping forces for many world problems. Then, they would 
say, ``Well, we have solved that.''
  The last 4 or 5 years our subcommittee has been demanding that the 
U.N. establish criteria and that they not vote for all of these 
peacekeeping operations every time a problem came up. We were the ones 
that, in our subcommittee, tried to do something about this. These 
criteria were not established until the last month. These criteria mean 
that the United States will not support new peacekeeping operations 
unless certain requirements are met.
  After Ambassador Albright took office a year ago last January, I went 
up to the United Nations. I spent a day or two up there, and I know 
that she wants to do something about reducing U.S. assessments. She 
came to my office. She came to our subcommittee hearing, and she has 
indicated she wants to do something about negotiating a better deal 
that we have now.
  Secretary General Boutros-Ghali came to my office. He started telling 
me about how wonderful these peacekeeping operations are. I explained 
to him that he did not need to go through that process. The facts were 
we did not have the money and were not going to have the money and were 
not going to contribute the amount of money that he wanted for 
peacekeeping operations. When he left, I think he understood better 
what the situation is.
  We then did not appropriate all of the requests for the U.S. assessed 
contributions, so we would get some leverage. The arrearages will 
amount to $1.2 billion by the end of fiscal year 1994 and we have the 
leverage so that we can negotiate the kind of a deal we need.
  I was one of those who suggested we get credit for the expenses that 
our troops incur in participating in peacekeeping operations, and I 
think it was the right thing to do. But I never did think that you 
could completely offset the U.S. assessment. After all, if we 
completely offset our assessment, it would be extremely difficult to 
maintain these peacekeeping operations. But it is the right approach to 
take in our negotiations.
  We generally do not provide U.S. troops for a good reason. Troops 
from the Third World countries are generally more politically 
acceptable than troop provided from the major world countries. But the 
troops that are provided for peacekeeping operations have got to be 
paid. It is in our interest to curtail any new peacekeeping operations 
to make sure they meet the new criteria, but it is not in our interest 
to make it impossible to have any more peacekeeping operations.
  That is what this amendment would do.
  For example, the gentleman from California mentioned U.N. 
peacekeeping operations in Georgia. In Georgia, if we do not have U.N. 
peacekeeping forces, the Russians will furnish all the troops, and we 
do not want the Russians to have all the troops in Georgia. It is 
better to have a U.N. presence there than to have the Russians have all 
the troops in Georgia. So this amendment, I say to you, has some appeal 
probably with some people. But it is too severe. You cannot say you 
will not have any more peacekeeping operations until or unless you are 
going to get all the credit for all the expenses that we may have. It 
is too severe, and I think we ought to defeat this amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE Mr. Chairman, I am completely amazed at how my friends on 
the other side of the aisle can take a logical proposition and turn it 
on its head. I hear this amendment described as shutting down U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. For those who make such claims, I urge you to 
read the amendment.
  I would like to read part of the amendment at this time:

       Funds may be obligated or expended for payment to the 
     United Nations of the United States assessed share of 
     peacekeeping operations for that fiscal year only to the 
     extent that such assessed share exceeds the total amount 
     identified, reduced by the amount of any reimbursement or 
     credit to the United States by the United Nations for the 
     costs of the United States' support for, or participation in, 
     U.N. peacekeeping activities.

                              {time}  2030

  That is all it says. Right now this country pays approximately 33 
percent of the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
  I do not know what my colleagues hear from people back home, but 
where I come from people think we are already paying too much. Yet in 
addition to this 33 percent assessment, we are also paying the 
additional unreimbursable cost accrued by the Department of Defense in 
support of these operations.
  In Bosnia, we are paying one-third, approximately, of all the costs 
of all the troops from Great Britain, from France, from all of the 
other nations who have personnel on the ground. In addition, however, 
we are paying all the costs of our ships and sailors and airman in the 
Adriatic flying support of the rescue operation.
  We ought to deduct all those expenses from the one-third assessment 
that the United Nations asks us to pay--that is all the amendment says. 
All the rest of the rhetoric we are hearing is simply a smokescreen.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota, [Mr. Penny].
  (Mr. PENNY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PENNY I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment would require the United States to make 
a dangerous choice:
  Either cease all military actions in support of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions, including: defending South Korea; 
enforcing the no-fly zone and NATO ultimata in Bosnia; enforcing 
sanctions against Serbia, Haiti and Iraq; and supporting Operation 
Provide Comfort in North Iraq and Southern Watch in southern Iraq.
  Or force the shut-down of all existing U.N. peacekeeping operations.
  Either way, important U.S. interests in the Middle East, Europe, 
Latin America and Asia would be left undefended.
  This amendment would require us to deduct from our U.N. peacekeeping 
assessment any nonreimbursed expenses incurred by the Department of 
Defense directly or indirectly in support of U.N. peacekeeping 
operations.
  The premise of the amendment is obviously attractive and seems fair. 
But in fact, it could have unintended consequences seriously harmful to 
our national interests.
  The United States in fact is reimbursed for most of our direct DOD 
expenses on behalf of peacekeeping activities. The United States does 
perform other activities related to U.N. peacekeeping because they are 
in our national interest, not simply as a favor to the United Nations.
  Our current approach to these issues has been supported by 
administrations both Democratic and Republican, for many, many years. 
This amendment has tremendous political appeal, but it flies in the 
face of years of tradition. It undercuts the authority of the United 
Nations at a time in our history when we need a stronger, not a weaker, 
voice for international stability and cooperation. The United States is 
free to decide always on a case-by-case basis when to participate and 
when to refrain from participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Our 
commitment to both the United Nations and to various peacekeeping 
efforts is essential in this post-cold war era.
  I strongly urge rejection of the Gingrich amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Let us set the record straight: This issue is not about pulling out 
of the United Nations, this issue is not about undermining President 
Clinton; this issue relates back to what was debated on this House 
floor last week. It is called burden sharing. Remember what we heard in 
this body? The allies need to pay their fair share. No more free 
lunches, no more free rides. Let me read some of the quotes from the 
Congressional Record of May 19 which I have in front of me, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Let me read a few quotes. The majority whip said, and I quote:

       Mr. Chairman, there was once a time when America needed to 
     foot the bill to defend our allies.

  He went on to say:

       With this amendment, we are saying it is time for our 
     European allies to pay their fair share too. It is not like 
     they cannot afford it, Mr. Chairman.

  Another speaker said, in terms of the amendment we were debating last 
week, ``It is called responsibility-sharing. That is fine with me. I do 
not care. The politically correct thing now is responsibility-sharing. 
We need to have our allies pay their fair share.''
  Another of our colleagues spoke on the floor. As a matter of fact, 
she spoke on the floor tonight. And what did she say last week? ``I 
want to tell you how my constituents respond when asked the question, 
`Should our allies bear more of the costs of their defense?' They 
respond with an overwhelming `yes'.'' She goes on to talk about asking 
Europe to pay their fair share when they say they cannot afford it. Mr. 
Chairman, that is what we are doing. We are saying, when we commit to a 
United Nations operation, why cannot all of the allies--the Europeans, 
the Japanese, the French, the Germans--why can they not pay part of the 
bill?

  Mr. Chairman, this is burden-sharing; this is burden-sharing at its 
best.
  One of our other colleagues got upon the House floor and he said, 
``We are subsidizing to the tune of billions of dollars the economies 
of our European allies by letting them off the hook when it comes to 
paying their fair share. And that is all we are talking about, paying 
their fair share for their own defense.''
  Another of our colleagues got up and made the same point.
  Mr. Chairman, I could go through the entire Congressional Record on 
that debate. The facts are very simple: We need to have our allies, 
through the United Nations, reimburse us for the costs that we bear in 
sending our troops for missions overseas. That is all that this 
amendment does. It does not undermine the United Nations, it does not 
undermine our role, and it does not say that we are not going to 
support this President when he commits our troops to a U.N. operation. 
It says one simple thing: Give us credit for our costs and help in the 
form of our allies paying for the costs associated with this and not 
have us bear the costs alone.
  I think we should support this amendment. It is common sense. It is 
burden-sharing at its best.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Weldon] has expired. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 1 
minute remaining to close the debate.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule the gentleman is entitled to strike the 
requisite number of words and is now recognized for 5 minutes in 
addition to the 1 minute remaining, for a total of 6 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we come to the close of 
the debate. My first observation would be, as you listen very carefully 
to this debate, it is a classic example of why significant policy with 
such extraordinary implications should not be offered on the floor and 
debated on the floor when you have not had adequate time in the context 
of committee proceedings to deliberate carefully. None of us knows the 
awesome implications of this amendment. This is not the place to simply 
offer an amendment without having laid the prefatory base for this 
amendment.
  Having made that observation, Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to 
the Gingrich amendment because I believe this is bad foreign policy, 
from whatever vantage point one views it.

                              {time}  2040

  The amendment would unilaterally change the mechanism by which U.S. 
assessments for U.N. peacekeeping operations are determined and paid. 
It would limit our U.N. peacekeeping contributions in a fashion that 
would do damage, in this gentleman's opinion, to our overall foreign 
policy and, Mr. Chairman, to national security interests.
  This amendment may appeal to some because it appears to hit hard at 
the United Nations. I would suggest that this amendment is rather anti-
United States rather than anti-United Nations. It strikes at the heart 
of American interests in preventing wars from erupting and expanding.
  First, let us be clear on what this amendment does. It says:

       Total up everything we spend on military operations that 
     are endorsed by the United Nations, including those that we 
     undertake on our own outside any United Nations 
     administrative framework; then unilaterally recalculate the 
     U.S. assessment for U.N.-conducted peacekeeping by 
     subtracting from this assessment the total of our own 
     expenditures.

  Mr. Chairman, several points:
  First, again this is bad foreign policy. It unilaterally revises our 
international obligations; in this case to the U.N., without any 
attempt at negotiating first if we have any valid concerns.
  Second, Mr. Chairman, the administration is working to reduce our 
share of U.N. peacekeeping assessments to 25 percent from around 30 to 
31 percent. Let us allow the diplomats to do their job.
  Third, Mr. Chairman, the Gingrich amendment would hinder attempts of 
future administrations to turn to the U.N. for involvement and sanction 
when our Government determines that we should undertake operations in 
support of international peacekeeping or humanitarian needs, as George 
Bush did in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Why would the 
U.N. give us cover for such operations if doing so would automatically 
reduce our required contribution to the U.N. budget?
  Next point: In this post-cold-war world, we need the United Nations 
to have more peacekeeping capacity, Mr. Chairman, not less. By reducing 
the predictability of the American commitment, this would place a large 
boulder in the path to a stronger U.N. peacekeeping capacity. Do we 
want our only option in the next Rwanda to be to commit U.S. forces? 
Or, as the administration suggests, do we want to build a stronger 
mechanism where international forces, generally without U.S. ground 
force participation, can be sent to resolve humanity's worst 
nightmares?
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, more generally, if we start unilaterally 
picking and choosing which of our international obligations to accept, 
why should other countries not do the same? Why should other countries 
not decide not to be bound by their U.N. obligations, and proceed to 
sell nuclear technologies to Saddam Hussein if they so desire? We must 
build a world of law and of predictable international relations. This 
amendment would be a giant step backward.
  Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, are 
in opposition to this amendment, and I would think that any reasonable 
person in these Chambers would want to oppose this amendment.
  The implications of this amendment are far-reaching. As a matter of 
fact, I tried to talk the authors of this amendment out of offering 
this amendment, allowing the gentleman from South Carolina and this 
gentleman to raise this issue in the context of the Committee on Armed 
Services, allow the Committee on Foreign Affairs to address this issue, 
let us deliberate substantively on a clear matter that has such 
extraordinary foreign policy implications that it should be not at the 
eleventh hour in an amendment drawn on the floor of Congress, ill-
conceived, ill-advised, misdirected and inappropriate.
  With those observations, Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by asking my 
colleagues to solidly reject this amendment, and let us go forward with 
reason and sanity.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, all time for debate on this amendment 
has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 191, 
noes 221, not voting 26, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 198]

                               AYES--191

     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooper
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Houghton
     Huffington
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lambert
     Lazio
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Nussle
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Petri
     Pombo
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Royce
     Sangmeister
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--221

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Bacchus (FL)
     Baesler
     Barca
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inslee
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Long
     Lowey
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCloskey
     McCurdy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Spratt
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Towns
     Tucker
     Unsoeld
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--26

     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Conyers
     de Lugo (VI)
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Fish
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Gibbons
     Grandy
     Horn
     Lewis (FL)
     Lloyd
     Michel
     Ortiz
     Pickle
     Santorum
     Sharp
     Stark
     Underwood (GU)
     Valentine
     Washington
     Whitten
     Wolf

                              {time}  2103

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, today I rise to discuss two important 
provisions of H.R. 4301. The first provision is the military pay raise. 
The second provision concerns the cost of living adjustments [COLA] for 
military retirees.
  On the subject of the military pay raise, I am pleased with the 
committee's action. This year, the Armed Services Committee, of which I 
am a member, rejected the President's requested 1.6 percent pay raise 
and approved the full 2.6 percent pay raise which is due to our service 
men and women. This initiative by the committee corrected the 
shortcomings in the President's pay proposal. I note that this 
provision mirrors the proposal in the fiscal year 1995 Republican 
budget, written by the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich].
  Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Military is the best-trained, best-equipped 
fighting force in the world. The young men and women who serve in the 
military must be rewarded for their hard work. These people put their 
lives on the line every day to protect the security of the United 
States. It is the duty of Congress to provide them with adequate 
compensation. More importantly, it is the law. I urge my colleagues to 
support this provision of the Defense Reauthorization Act.
  Mr. Chairman, I would also like to register my strong support for the 
cost of living adjustments for military retirees. The House Armed 
Services Committee approved payment of the fiscal year 1995 cost of 
living adjustments for military retirees on the same schedule as 
Federal civilian retirees. As a military retiree, I strongly believe in 
fair pay for current and retired military personnel, and I understand 
that workers come to rely on their COLA's.
  The administration had proposed delaying the COLA for military 
retirees for several months, in effect, decoupling them from the 
civilian retirees. This treatment is unfair. Fortunately, H.R. 4301, as 
reported corrects this. The bill before us ensures that military 
retirees will get their COLA on time. This provision has my strong 
support.
  Mr. Chairman, it is time to stop targeting military personnel and 
retirees in an attempt to balance the Federal budget. I strongly 
support both the pay raise provision and the provision that will 
provide for cost of living increases. Fair pay is the right thing to 
do, and the time to do it is now.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker, having assumed the 
chair, Mr. Durbin, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
State of the union, reported that the Committee, having had under 
consideration the bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 1995 for military activities of the Department of Defense, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for 
other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________