[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 66 (Tuesday, May 24, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4301).

                              {time}  1453


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for 
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, with 
Mr. Mazzoli, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose 
earlier today, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah [Mr. 
Hansen] printed in part 2 of House Report 103-520 had been disposed of.
  Pursuant to the order of the House, it is now in order to debate the 
subject of the C-17 aircraft.
  Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] 
will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Barca of Wisconsin was allowed to speak 
out of order.)


             announcing the birth of ann elizabeth barrett

  Mr. BARCA of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I have an important 
announcement. It is my great pleasure to be able to announce, for 
purposes of reinforcing the family values that this House believes in, 
that our colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett] and his 
wife, Kristine, were blessed early this morning with a new baby girl. 
Her name is Ann Elizabeth, and I would ask my colleagues to join me in 
celebrating the birth of Ann Elizabeth to the Barretts.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes of the 30 minutes which 
has been allocated to me to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman 
from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], and I ask unanimous consent that the 
gentleman be allowed to control that 15-minute block of time as he sees 
fit.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] will be recognized for 15 minutes, the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] will be recognized for 15 
minutes, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Darden].
  (Mr. DARDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, it is said that those who do not study 
history are doomed to repeat it; 7 years and 12 days ago I stood in 
this spot and asked my colleagues to delete funding for the C-17 
aircraft. We stated at that time that the plane was a paper airplane 
and would never fly. Very rarely in life are we granted an opportunity 
for a second chance and an opportunity to correct our mistakes. But now 
today we have a chance and a choice to slow down this aircraft and 
hopefully reexamine its efficiency.
  In 1987 the C-17 was already behind schedule, already over budget and 
far from being anything other than a paper airplane. Now, in 1994, the 
C-17 is behind schedule by years, over cost by billions, the Department 
of Defense is cutting deals with a contractor, and I do not know if the 
plane is flying. The tail has almost fallen off. It has scraped its 
belly on the runway during takeoff. Parachutists are not allowed to 
jump out of it, and the brakes burn when it tries to land. The paper 
airplane of 1987 is now a metal airplane that really should still be a 
paper airplane.
  And now, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about adding on to the modest 
committee proposal and trying to spend even more money for this 
boondoggle? Mr. Chairman, this is pure folly, and I want to commend the 
chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums] in his approach to funding for the C-17 and strongly oppose 
any efforts to increase what has already been done responsibly by the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Saxton].
  Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the C-17 program and 
to note that later today we are going to have an opportunity to vote on 
two programs, one that would buy four C-17's in the next fiscal year 
and three or four other types of airplanes, commercial derivatives, if 
my colleagues will, or to buy six C-17's, and of course, as most of my 
colleagues know, I support the latter proposal, and the reason I do so 
is because we know that the C-141 fleet has got to be replaced. It was 
originally built in the 1960's with 1950's technology, and that 
technology is now old and needs to be replaced. In addition, the cargo 
that we need to carry into theater today is larger cargo than before, 
and so we need a new vehicle to get it there.
  Now some of our good friends in the military who have some stature 
have come to some conclusions about this. General Shalikashvili, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says this:

       Today there is only one alternative that can meet the 
     requirements of a core airlifter, the C-17.

  He goes on to say:

       The continuing myths of service life extension program for 
     the C-141 or the ability of a commercial derivative to meet 
     the needs of a core airlifted are just that, myths.

                              {time}  1500

  Then we have heard from General Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army. He says very simply, the C-17 is the only aircraft that can get 
the Army's outside combat system to the next war when required.
  We have heard from General Hoar, the commander of CENCOM, and he says 
very simply, in the foreseeable future, the C-17 is the only airplane 
acting as the Nation's core military airlifter that can provide the 
capability and flexibility that we need.
  So these people have come to some conclusions, and I think for some 
very good reasons. There are three reasons why I think we should 
support the Harman amendment this afternoon to increase the buy to six.
  One is that we all know we need more airlift. We need more outsized 
airlift, and we need more airlift that is designed specifically for 
military purposes. That is simple. That is reason No. 1.
  No. 2, buying six units instead of four decreases the unit price. The 
estimates are between $30 and $40 million a copy. Now, that is a 
powerful lot of money. One of the things that happened to some other 
weapons system programs was that we brought the buys down so low that 
it got so expensive per unit that none of us could support them. So it 
is important to keep our economy of scale at the right place.
  The third reason we should support the buy of six, not four and four, 
is that the contractor or, McDonnell-Douglas, has stated that it can do 
certain things in production models of this aircraft, and the only way 
to make them prove that they can do it is to give them the opportunity 
to provide for us the number of units that will bring that about.
  So, for those three reasons, the C-17 and its capabilities of 
airdrop, its capabilities of providing a safety structure for troops 
that we send into battle. There is a dual facet safety concern here. 
One concern, of course, is getting the troops to the theater on time, 
recognizing that when they get in theater it is a very rough place to 
be, and so redundant systems have been built into the C-17 to make them 
safer.
  But just as importantly, and maybe more importantly, we have to 
transport the materiel that these troops need there, and these are big 
systems, helicopter, troop carriers, Patriot missile systems. The C-17 
can do that. It is the only airplane on the books, on the drawing board 
or elsewhere, that can deliver troops and the goods, the materials, the 
weapon systems, they need at the same time into the theater safely.
  Finally, the large outsized cargo issue is a very important one. The 
C-5B is a great airplane and can carry that same cargo, almost the same 
tonnage. But it cannot land and it cannot service the same troops in 
the same theaters of operation that the C-17 can, primarily because the 
C-5 takes longer to land, twice as long, twice as much distance, as 
well as takes up too much room on the ground when it gets there. We can 
fit five C-17's in the same space we can fit four C-5's, a very 
important issue.
  Finally, and the last point I would make, is that once the C-17's are 
on-line, they are much more economical to operate. They are modern 
technology, not 1950's technology. The crew is three people, not six 
people, as is the case with the C-5B commercial wide bodies.
  So for all of these reasons, I hope that in about an hour so we will 
have a opportunity to vote on the Harman amendment, and I ask all my 
colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Fazio].
  Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the C-17 and urge my 
colleagues to support the Harman amendment and oppose the Furse 
amendment.
  I want to stipulate, I have one constituent employed on this 
aircraft's production. I got interested in this plane as a member of 
the Committee on Armed Services 15 long years ago. It is not something 
that is a recent interest of mine. While I learned about it from 
constituents who are with the Military Airlift Command at Travis Air 
Force Base, it is really an airplane that serves the needs of the Army.
  We are here because as we bring home our troops from overseas, we 
have got to have military airlift capability to be in those places for 
peacekeeping or for humanitarian purposes that we deem important. I 
think as we saw what happened to our troops in Somalia, we understood 
how vulnerable they could be without armor, without personnel carriers, 
without tanks. We simply have to have the ability to go to places in 
the world that cannot be served by the larger C-5 aircraft which are 
now the mainstay of MAC.
  This aircraft can get in 9,000 more runways worldwide, giving us the 
ability to respond with more effective measures, more quickly.
  The question is whether or not this aircraft has been developed to 
the point where it lives up to its potential. I believe it has. And if 
we procure six aircraft at a cost that is available in the Armed 
Services authorization bill, we will know whether or not we can go 
ahead and procure what is a reduced number of aircraft, but still a 
substantial number of aircraft, at an affordable price. If we come 
forward with four and not six, the unit costs skyrocket and our ability 
to afford this airplane, which we need, is going to go out the window.
  We have reduced our overseas facilities by 50 percent already. Eighty 
percent of the Army troops are going to be on American soil by 1997. If 
we want to be able to project them where we must around the world, we 
need the C-17.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the C-17 and urge my colleagues to 
support the Harman amendment and oppose the Furse amendment.
  The C-17 will provide the armed forces with a critical capability 
that they currently do not have.
  The C-17 has the ability to land on smaller runways and maneuver on 
smaller taxiways and ramps. This capability means that the C-17 will 
have access to 9,000 more runways worldwide, making our response 
capability more effective and far-reaching.
  The C-17's small austere airfield capabilities expand the options 
available to planners and operators conducting all airlift missions. It 
will substantially enhance our ability to respond to remote locations 
which will have a direct positive impact on peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions.
  I know there have been concerns about the C-17 program, but it is 
important to know that substantial corrections in program management 
and execution have been made. The C-17 program has successfully 
undergone exhaustive reviews by DOD, Defense Science Board, and 
independent agencies. The C-17 program is back on track.
  However, the production rate of six aircraft in fiscal year 1995 is 
essential. If we do not restore the production level to six aircraft, 
the impact will be an increase of $40 to $50 million in the unit cost 
of the plane. We simply cannot afford this added cost.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, as we base more of our troops in the United 
States, our airlift capability becomes even more important. The Army 
states that by 1997, 80 percent of Army troops will be stationed on 
American soil. We simply cannot reduce or eliminate our modern airlift 
capability in light of these changes. As General Shalikashvili recently 
wrote, ``there is only one alternative that can meet the requirements 
of a core airlifter--the C-17.''
  We need the C-17. Defeat the Furse amendment and support the Harman 
amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Talent].
  Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the Harman amendment which will 
be offered in about an hour to raise the number of C-17's we will buy 
this year from four to six. It is not a parochial amendment. This is 
not a partisan issue. That amendment will be supported I hope and 
expect by a broad coalition of Members, from liberal Democrats to 
conservative Republicans, from the top officials of the current 
administration to the leading members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
C-17 is a plane that was supported fully by the top officials of the 
last administration. There is a reason why there is such broad-based 
support for this plane and why I believe there will be broad-based 
support for the buy of six in the House, and that is quite simply this: 
It makes enormous strategic sense, no matter what your view is of where 
America's military should go.
  There is no question we are downsizing now, that we are moving back 
from forward bases, that we are going to end up with a military which 
has smaller numbers and more people concentrated in the United States. 
If we are to be a hemispheric power, if we are to continue being a 
world power, no matter what your view of American foreign policy should 
be, we have got to be able to get people from the United States to 
places around the world, whether for Desert Storm-like contingencies, 
or peacekeeping in Somalia or the Balkans, wherever you think we ought 
to be, we have got to get them from here to there. The only way to do 
that is to increase the lift that is accessible to them. And it is by 
far true, I think it is self-evidently true, that the C-17, if it 
works, is the best way of achieving that.
  So whether you are for, and I am one of those people that believes we 
need to increase the amount of money that we are putting into the 
defense budget as opposed to what we have now planned over the next few 
years, or whether you are a person who believes that what the 
administration is planning to do is about right, whatever you think, 
Mr. Chairman, the C-17 is at the crux of our plans for the American 
military over the next few years.
  The Department of Defense has a carefully tailored plan to buy six 
this year and six next year. This is the minimum that is necessary. The 
Harman amendment would not cost any more money. We are just 
reallocating. I urge the House to support it when it comes up in a hour 
or so.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly].
  (Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Harman 
amendment to restore from four to six the number of C-17 aircraft 
authorized for fiscal year 1995. Not only is the C-17 currently being 
produced at a rate of six aircraft a year, it is done so with improved 
efficiency and decreasing cost. Was there a problem early on on the C-
17 with wings? Yes. Was this problem addressed and resolved? Yes. Is 
this any longer an issue? No. To cite such an example as problemmatic 
today is a bogus argument and does not represent responsible, honest 
debate.
  The program has undergone exhaustive review by both government and 
industry. Structural experts agree--C-17 testing has verified wing 
structures meet military strength requirements. In addition, aircraft 
delivery schedule and quality commitments are improving at all levels.
  The future of air-deployable combat units rests largely with 
continued and successful production of the C-17. The military's airlift 
requirements have changed and they are unique.
  The C-17 is the only aircraft in production that can carry outsize 
cargo and has the versatility to rapidly reconfigure to carry vehicles, 
cargo, passengers, medical equipment and patients, or to perform 
airdrop missions. I urge my colleagues to consider this issue 
carefully.
  Do not vote to send our troops, our young soldiers, into military 
crises on outdated aircraft whose capabilities are ill-suited to the 
missions of tomorrow. I urge my colleagues to support the Harman 
amendment. Sunday, I talked to our Under Secretary of the Air Force, a 
woman of impeccable academic reputation. She pledged to me this plane 
is now a safe plane, a needed plane, and we must have it for our 
airlift.

                              {time}  1510

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Lewis].
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I serve on the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations that deals with defense. I am not a member of the 
authorizing committee, and normally I would not rise to take the time 
of the authorizing committee.
  But we have a very, very important amendment coming to us later in 
the day that addresses the future of the C-17. There is little doubt 
that most of us recognize that before the end of the century over 80 
percent of our troops will be here at home rather than stationed 
overseas. But America is going to continue to be a leader in the world. 
To be able to defend democracy, we have got to be able to deliver our 
materiel to our troops at foreign locations in times of crisis.
  Above and beyond that, in our committee we constantly are talking 
about the fact that it is important in terms of shrinking budgets that 
we keep ourselves on the cutting edge of technology.
  I would say, in terms of the C-17, all the technology in the world is 
going to do us no good if we cannot get our equipment there.
  Mr. Chairman, I am speaking today, however, because among those 
Members who worked as hard as anyone in support of the C-17, our 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] has been a leader 
among those Members. Unfortunately, while he gave an extended 
discussion on the floor on Friday night, on Saturday morning he had to 
go to the hospital for surgery. So today I am suggesting to my 
colleagues, please be aware of the work of the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Horn]. His efforts have made a tremendous difference in 
this debate.
  If he were here today, he would say the following:
  For those who do not pretend expertise on this subject, listen to the 
military experts. Secretary Dick Cheney: ``It is an absolutely vital 
strategic asset, regardless of what size force we have in the long 
term.''
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff: ``The C-17 aircraft continues to be the 
most cost-effective means to meet current and projected aircraft 
requirements.''
  Brigadier General John Handy: ``Something like Somalia would have 
been a heck of a lot easier with the C-17 for planners in our 
organization.''
  All of the experts support the C-17 and know of its critical 
interest.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge Members, along with my colleague, the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Horn], to join me in supporting the Harman 
amendment today on the floor.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Texas, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong 
support of the C-17 transport program. This is an issue of 
accountability. We must be accountable to our military troops, and to 
the taxpayers.
  When our Nation sends our sons and daughters and grandsons and 
granddaughters, nineteen and twenty years old, to defend us, we should 
provide them equipment with top speed, efficiency, safety, and 
flexibility.
  The military's top generals, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and 
the President, all agree that the C-17 is the only alternative that 
meets the necessary requirements.
  Mr. Chairman, we have invested $15.8 billion in the C-17 program, an 
essential investment to ensure that our military can rapidly deploy all 
of the equipment that is imperative when we place the lives of young 
soldiers at risk.
  The research and development is complete. It is time to go forward 
with this cost-effective program.
  Mr. Chairman, by the end of the decade, in addition to the 
significant troop cutbacks we have already begun, we will have 
redeployed more than 80 percent of America's troops to the United 
States.
  This will create a large demand on our strategic airlift forces and 
make the C-17 even more valuable than it is today.
  More than any other transport carrier, the C-17 combines wartime 
capability with peacetime utility. In addition to use during regional 
conflicts, the C-17 will prove invaluable in humanitarian missions such 
as famine, flood and earthquake relief operations.
  If the C-17 program is killed, not only do we lose the money we have 
invested in this program, but we will have to restart other air cargo 
programs, at a cost of at least $500 million.
  The C-17 manufacturing line is already open, and building modern, 
capable aircraft. I ask this Congress to heed the advice of our Army 
and Air Force leaders. Support the C-17.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I used to fly fighter 
aircraft in the Air Force, and we did not fly old airplanes. I mean, 
when they got old, we got rid of them. I cannot believe in today's 
environment we are talking about not buying the Air Force any new 
airplanes for nearly 8 years.
  Here we are arguing about a C-17, which is the guts of our airlift 
capability, going to protect this country for years to come in its fast 
reapplication capability, as we move our troops back home, gives us the 
ability to implement our foreign policy around the world.
  I think we are going to rely ever more increasingly on the 
availability of airlift capability.
  This aircraft provides access for outsized loads to 9,000 more 
runways, an increase of 300 percent over those available to C-5's and 
C-141's.
  The commercial alternative that everybody proposes is not there. I 
doubt there is a 747 pilot in the world that wants to fly into some 
jungle in Africa or into Haiti even for that matter.
  Our aircraft are ancient. Are we going to put our 20-year-old 
troopers in 40-year-old equipment and risk their lives by sending them 
into a combat area in an insufficient or subsufficient aircraft? I say 
no.
  We need to vote for this amendment. Vote for America. Vote for 
freedom. Vote for the C-17.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] 
for introducing the amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Ravenel].
  Mr. RAVENEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Harman 
amendment that will be offered, which restores procurement of the C-17 
to the level requested by the administration--that is 6 planes for 
fiscal year 1995 and long-lead for 8 C-17's in 1996.
  There are no two ways about it--this country has an airlift 
requirement to meet and the C-17 is the program to do it.
  As the U.S. continues to pull troops out of forward deployed bases, 
we need an aircraft that can carry outsized and oversized cargo to 
small, austere airstrips anywhere in the world. The C-17 has the unique 
capability to accomplish such missions, which are sure to become 
commonplace in future contingency scenarios.

  Let us face the facts. We have already made a significant investment 
in the C-17 of $15.8 billion resulting in 26 planes, 7 of which are in 
operation down in Charleston. I have talked to the men and women who 
fly and maintain the C-17 and, having flown them over 800 hours, they 
enthusiastically endorse the aircraft, time and time again, the C-17 
has performed above the expectations of these aircrews.
  Certainly, the C-17 has not been a model acquisition program and I am 
not here to defend its record. However, the administration has put 
McDonnell Douglas on notice and the contractor is committed to making 
significant management and production changes. Congress must give the 
program this last chance to perform. Requesting only four planes for 
1995, as the committee suggests, will slow the rate of production, 
drive up the unit cost, and throw 10,000 people out of work, not to 
mention severely hamper the future of strategic airlift. I urge my 
colleagues to vote for the Harman amendment.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 90 seconds to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Hochbrueckner].
  (Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the House Committee 
on Armed Services, and also one coming from a background in aerospace 
engineering, I strongly support the Harman amendment. We need the C-17 
aircraft.
  We learned from the Persian Gulf war that clearly we need better 
airlift and sealift in order to move our people and our materiel.

                              {time}  1520

  We also know that starting in 1995, we will be reducing 51 percent of 
our overseas assets, and therefore it is imperative that we have the 
ability to move materiel and troops very quickly to those areas where 
they are needed.
  Certainly, Mr. Chairman, as we downsize in Europe, going from 300,000 
troops to 100,000, it is even more imperative that we have good airlift 
capability.
  As an engineer with over 20 years' experience in the aerospace field, 
let me advise the Members, I have worked on many programs. In that 
period, I have never seen a program that did not have problems. Do we 
have problems? Of course we do. Will we resolve them? Yes, we will, so 
it is very important that we keep this program funded at appropriate 
levels. It is a program that I think has had a normal experience in 
aerospace development terms.
  Let me also point out that this is not a hostile amendment. After the 
chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], had a very 
excellent hearing on the C-17, 33 of the 56 members of the Committee on 
Armed Services signed a letter in support of raising the number of C-
17's from four to six, so this is not a hostile amendment. It is just a 
late-coming amendment that is supported by a majority of the House 
Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the Harman 
amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter].
  (Mr. HUNTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to also rise in support of the Harman-Horn-
McCurdy-Saxton-Spratt-Johnson amendment, and the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan] too, I think, is solidly behind this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, let me expand on one aspect of this debate that the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] so eloquently put forth to the 
House the other night during his special order when he was giving a 
very thorough analysis of the requirement for C-17's.
  This is a debate about power projection, and our security around the 
world largely depends on our ability to project power quickly. That 
means to move American forces, including equipment and personnel, to 
critical strategic spots very, very quickly. In the words of Gen. 
Nathan Bedford Forrest, ``It is the ability to get there firstest with 
the mostest.''
  We are now in a situation in Europe in which our formerly massive 
presence of over 300,000 military personnel is being directly reduced 
to around 100,000 personnel. That means we do not have the security, 
the airfield security, and the airfield security capability that we had 
a couple of years ago. It means now if we wanted to go in for these 
long runways that the C-5 requires, we might have to lose some people. 
We would certainly have conflicts, because one of the most strategic 
targets in any conflict is runways, airways, and the key to the C-17 
debate when juxtaposed with the C-5 and its capabilities is runway 
length. The C-17 uses roughly half the runway that a C-5 uses.
  What does that mean? It means in Europe that of all the runways that 
are available, the C-17 can access roughly ten times the number of 
airstrips and runways that the C-5 can access. That means instead of 
having to come in, if there is armor, if we are moving M-1 tanks into a 
particular area in Europe, or other heavy equipment, instead of having 
to fly this hardware into an area that may be 100 miles by road or 50 
miles by road or 20 miles by road from where we want to strategically 
place it for conflict with the adversary, we can fly into an air base 
that is much closer to the action and can get there first.
  In Europe we can access many times the runways with the C-17 that we 
can access with the C-5. We can access 5 times the runways in Europe, 
and we can access 10 times the runways in South America, and we can 
access roughly 5 times the runways in Africa with C-17's than those we 
can access with C-5's.
  This is a power projection issue, and the Harman amendment, so ably 
advocated by the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn], who did a great 
job before he had to go to the hospital, and others, is absolutely an 
important amendment for this House to pass today.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in favor of the 
amendment that will soon be offered by the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Harman]. As those on the Committee on Armed Services know, I have 
been very skeptical of the so-called Bottom-Up Review, and also the 
portion of it that states that we can fight two major regional 
contingencies nearly simultaneously.
  If we do not have the capability of this airplane, of a C-17, that 
will be a show-stopper. That is an absolute show-stopper. That is why 
it is best that we proceed with this as best we can.
  It is also important to point out that this amendment does not add to 
the total funding already recommended by the committee. It is supported 
by the President, and I think that it is the only logical choice that 
we can choose.
  Mr. Chairman, there is an absolute need for a new airlifter which 
will carry outsized cargo and deliver it to smaller airfields. This 
should be pointed out, that there are many airfields that this is the 
only such airplane that can land and take off.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Mexico [Mr. Skeen].
  Mr. SKEEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, as one who is on a task force to go check on the C-17's 
and is a pilot that has spent a great deal of my time in the air, and 
know a little bit about airplanes, and know a little bit about what is 
happening in their air force today, if we are going to ask the United 
States to do what we are asking it to do every day almost on a yearly 
basis, to take and transport people all over the world, we are going to 
have to have a lift capability to do it, and we do not have it now. We 
have worn it out.
  The C-17 is the only answer we have. Sure, we have engineering 
problems with all kinds of aircraft, and in the development of those 
aircraft, but that is no problem for anybody in the United States that 
has been building aircraft for as long as most of our builders have. 
This is a fine airplane, state-of-the-art, the best navigational 
equipment that any airplane has ever had in it.
  I think it is absolutely an essential part of our airlift if we are 
going to disperse people throughout the world, as we have been doing in 
all the hot spots we have had before. Mr. Chairman, I am for the C-17, 
and all six of them.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan].
  (Mr. DORNAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums], that he gave us some sage advice several times at the 
beginning of this year and last year and even the year before, that if 
we come up with armed services amendments, they had better be cost-
saving or revenue-neutral.
  I think the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] took due note of 
this recommendation, because this is a revenue-neutral amendment. It is 
merely allocating existing funds. We cannot think about revenue-neutral 
enough around here.
  We are all dedicating our speeches today to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Horn], because the C-17 is made in his district. He has 
been a strong, forceful, and passionate as well as very accurate and 
informative proponent of this great airlift system. He is in for some 
minor surgery, similar to Bob Dole's recent surgery, so of course 
prayers from all of those within reach of my voice are with Steve Horn. 
He will be back after the break, and I hope we are going to have a big 
victory for him here today.
  Mr. Chairman, the other gentleman from California, Duncan Hunter, 
mentioned the excellent presentation given by Steve Horn before he 
headed back to California on the floor a few nights ago. Here is one of 
the charts he used. I put it out today on the back of a ``Dear 
Colleague,'' and in the terms of our great loadmasters they used this 
word, ``throughput capability.'' That means if we have an average 
500,000 square ramp, we can only get three C-5's on that ramp as they 
are loading and unloading. We can only get three civilian cargo airlift 
big giants 747's on this same runway, but we can get eight C-17's on 
such a ramp, in addition to the aforementioned many times, and it 
should be mentioned, 10,000 additional airfields around the world where 
only a C-17 Globemaster III can land, and a 747, or our big C-5 Galaxy, 
cannot land; the C-17 has a throughput capability of 3,852 tons a day, 
more than double what we can get from the other two large excellent big 
lifters.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. Chairman, let us listen to Gordo and Shali, our chief of staff of 
the Army and our chairman of the joint chiefs.
  General John M. Shalikashvili says, ``Today there is only one 
alternative that can meet the requirements of a core airlifter--the C-
17 Globemaster.''
  General Gordon Sullivan says, ``The C-17 is the only aircraft that 
can get the Army's outsized combat systems to the next war when 
required.''
  Mr. Chairman, that simulator is waiting for you in Long Beach, sir. I 
flew it over a year ago. It amazed me. This big C-17 has a stick just 
like a fighter aircraft. That is why our great Gary Cooper from Texas, 
Congressman Sam Johnson, is so enthused over this aircraft. Like the B-
2, it has a stick. It flies like a fighter. Imagine an M-1 30-ton tank 
in the back of your C-17 and flying with a stick like a fighter 
aircraft.
  Mr. Chairman, the C-17 has had its growing pains, Lord knows, but my 
F-100 that I flew on active duty also had growing pains. They were 
falling out of the sky like cats and dogs in the middle and late 
1950's, and it turned out to be one of our most stable air-to-ground 
aircraft in the Vietnam war. Some aircraft have no problems going 
through a test program like a B-2 Spirit. Others have growing pains. We 
are hopefully through the growing pains with the C-17.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge everyone in this Chamber to vote for the C-17, 
for our Army and Air Force, and for the future of all of our armed 
services.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record my ``Dear Colleague'' letter 
as follows:

         Support The C-17--It Meets U.S. Military Requirements

       ``Our nation has a critical need for intertheater airlift 
     modernization if we are to maintain our ability to project 
     forces and respond to humanitarian missions worldwide. Our C-
     141 aircraft are wearing out. The C-17 aircraft continues to 
     be the most cost effective means to meet current and 
     projected airlift requirements. The C-17's ability to deliver 
     outsize cargo, combined with its special capability to use 
     austere fields, will provide us with modern, highly capable 
     strategic airlift.''
                                                 William J. Perry,
                                             Secretary of Defense.
                                  ____

       Dear Colleague: We need the C-17. It is as simple as that.
       Military leaders up and down the chain of command from our 
     young Air Force pilots to the Secretary of Defense agree that 
     the C-17 meets existing military requirements. Consider what 
     other military leaders have said about the C-17:
       ``Today there is only one alternative that can meet the 
     requirements of a core airlifter--the C-17.''
                                       Gen. John M. Shalikashvili,
                                 Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff.

       ``The C-17 is the only aircraft that can get the Army's 
     outsized combat systems to the next war when required.''
                                             Gen. Gordon Sullivan,
                                              Army Chief of Staff.

       Reprinted on the back of this letter is a diagram depicting 
     another unique and important feature of the C-17, throughput 
     capability or off-load capacity and turn around time on the 
     ground. (Diagram not reproducible in Record). As this diagram 
     clearly shows, the C-17 has much greater throughput 
     capability than existing military airlifters or civilian 
     cargo aircraft. Such off-load capacity and turn around time 
     could be vital, especially during the first few days of a 
     military build-up in an overseas conflict.
       Please listen to our military leaders and why they need the 
     C-17. By funding six instead of four C-17 aircraft in FY 
     1995, we can ensure this defense bill meets our defense 
     requirements.
           Best regards,
                                                 Robert K. Dornan,
                                                 U.S. Congressman.

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Edwards].
  Mr. EDWARDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, surely, the next Saddam Hussein 
will not be dumb enough to park his tanks in the desert for 6 months. 
Very simply--that is exactly why we need the C-17.
  The most important issue in this debate is that the C-17 will save 
the lives of young American soldiers and marines.
  How will the C-17 save lives? By moving American troops quickly into 
areas of conflict with the proper weapons and equipment.
  As we pay tribute to the 50th anniversary of D-Day, we should ask 
ourselves this question: Would we have asked brave American soldiers to 
storm the beaches of Normandy without adequate weapons and equipment? 
Certainly not.
  Whether you are a hawk or dove on defense doesn't really matter on 
this issue. The C-17 is not about making wars, it is about saving the 
lives of young Americans whenever we call them to duty.
  I urge Members to support the Harman-Horn amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Buyer].
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in full support of the C-17 program. 
We spend a lot of time talking about force structure an our needs to 
meet national security interests. We can do all that talk we like, but 
if you do not have the military lift capacities by air and sea to get 
soldiers to the battlefield, the minimum risk for which generals talk 
about will be a reality in loss of life on the battlefield.
  I do feel, though, a little odd saying I want to give my full support 
to the C-17 program given the fact of the track record of the 
contractor. That is what brings us to this debate today.
  Mr. Chairman, I have to say that Mr. Deutch of the Department of 
Defense outlined an excellent program to make the contractor 
responsive. I want to support the administration wherever possible, and 
I will support the administration in this endeavor to give the 
incentive to the contractor to be a low-cost producer. That means in 
support of the Harman-Horn amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, this aircraft is a necessary component of meeting our 
military strategic lift requirements in the coming decades. We have had 
much debate in the House about the size and capabilities of the 
military force outlined in the Bottom-Up Review. All of these arguments 
are futile if we do not have, like I said, the lift capacities to move 
our forces wherever needed throughout the world.
  Mr. Chairman, the C-17 gives us that capacity. The C-17 is an 
aircraft designed and built to meet the specific military need, the 
delivery of outsized cargo to remote and unimproved airfields in 
support of our forces during a contingency or conflict throughout the 
world. This is a most important issue for our national security.
  Mr. Chairman, according to the research and development center, a 
fleet of C-17's is more cost-effective than any combination of C-17's, 
commercial wide-body aircraft, C-5/B's or C-141's.
  Mr. Chairman, as we downsize our military, we must buy the most 
capable, effective equipment available for our men and women in 
uniform. The C-17 is a giant leap forward in our aircraft capabilities 
and is sorely needed to replace our rapidly aging fleet. I almost feel, 
though, that a request was made for a Jeep and the Air Force decided 
that we would not give just a Jeep, ``We're going to go out and give 
you the Grand Cherokee.''
  Mr. Chairman, it makes me feel a little uncomfortable about us buying 
the Jeep Grand Cherokee and possibly having a very expensive aircraft 
where it will get to the point we are saying, ``Maybe we shouldn't take 
it to the battlefield, it might get shot down.''
  Mr. Chairman, I will support the administration to make the 
contractor a low-cost producer because the incentive is built into this 
agreement, that if they do not comply, they are only going to buy their 
40 and then we are going to go with a commercial mix.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the administration, I urge my colleagues to 
support the Harman-Horn amendment, and I wish my colleague Steve Horn 
the very best in his recovery from cancer.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my distinct pleasure to yield 1 
minute to the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms.  Furse], the author of an 
amendment that will come before the body.
  (Ms. FURSE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, today I am also offering an amendment. This 
is an amendment on the C-17, and what it would do is it would stop 
production of the C-17 at the 4 we have already bought, that will bring 
us up to 30 C-17's, and it will then go to take our additional airlift 
out of commercial wide-body planes.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to cite a couple of quotes about this program. 
John Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, came before the House Armed 
Services Committee in February of this year.
  Mr. Deutch was asked about the program's performance, and he replied: 
``I think it's awful.''
  Les Aspin, former secretary of defense, said: ``The C-17 is late, 
it's over ceiling price, and it has serious operational deficiencies.''
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment would get us the airlift we need, it would 
get it to us quicker than if we go with the whole C-17 program. My 
amendment would give us 30 C-17's, and it would save $16 billion.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  (Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Harman amendment 
which will be offered in just a few minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, as we work on the defense budget this year, it is 
vitally important to keep in mind what kind of military we need for the 
post-cold-war era.
  In Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia, we have learned that this new era will 
be marked by sudden, unexpected crises in remote corners of the world. 
We will confront the urgent need to deliver humanitarian assistance or 
respond to major acts of aggression. And because we are losing so many 
overseas bases, we will need to conduct these operations largely from 
the continental United States.
  In this kind of environment, virtually every defense expert and every 
study of U.S. military policy agrees that our forces must be flexible, 
agile, and strategically mobile, capable of responding rapidly to 
unexpected crises. Nearly everyone agrees that strategic lift, both 
airlift and sealift, must rank among our top priorities.
  The C-17 represents exactly the sort of capability we need for this 
new era.
  Those of us who support the C-17 are well aware that the Air Force 
must make greater use of civilian aircraft for transport purposes. But 
we are equally well aware that civilian planes alone cannot fulfill all 
our airlift needs.
  They cannot handle all forms of military cargo, or the right 
combinations of it. They cannot operate from short, rough landing 
fields, as the C-17 will do.
  General Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 
said that ``The C-17 represents a capability that the Armed Forces 
absolutely need to have.''
  Once we decide we need the C-17, the decision to buy six planes per 
year becomes the obvious choice.
  This rate will allow the Air Force to complete its scheduled purchase 
of 40 C-17's--a number the Air Force calls the minimum that is 
militarily useful. DOD can then pass judgment on the contractor and 
decide whether to buy more.
  Buying six planes per year will allow the contractor to bring costs 
down and ensure that we produce the C-17 at the most efficient rate.
  And most importantly, with the retirement of older transport planes 
and the increasing potential for regional crises, the need for the C-17 
grows every day. We need them in our force structure as quickly as 
possible.
  We have an opportunity today to make a strong statement about the 
importance of airlift to our national security strategy. And if we are 
going to press forward with this critical program, we should do so in 
the way that makes the most sense for the taxpayer--by purchasing six 
planes per year.

                              {time}  1540

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Tucker].
  Mr. TUCKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-Saxton-
Spratt-E.B. Johnson amendment to restore C-17 funding. Mr. Chairman, if 
we get support for anything in this Congress from both sides of the 
aisle it must be good. I am proud to be speaking in favor of a bill 
with so many strong bipartisan sponsors.
  The C-17 has the support of President Clinton, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff John M. Shalikashvili, Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan of the 
U.S. Army and Gen. J.P. Hoar from Cent Com.
  The C-17 is a major logistic tool, filling a vital military and 
humanitarian need. The C-17 has the ability to use 10 times the 
airfields as any of the alternatives that have been offered, and they 
cannot compete. The C-17 has the ability to carry oversized cargo, the 
M-1 tank, that the other aircraft cannot.
  The C-17 was designed to fill a need in the New World Order of an 
aircraft capable of carrying heavy payloads to austere airfields. The 
C-17 is the ideal aircraft to meet this need.
  Mr. Chairman, we have invested a lot of money into the C-17 program. 
The C-17 fills a vital military mission and deserves our support.
  The C-17 is flying and McDonnell Douglas has met its contractual 
requirements. The seven C-17's at Charleston Air Force Base are getting 
excellent reviews by the men and women flying and maintaining them.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the C-17.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clay].
  (Mr. CLAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CLAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Harman amendment to 
restore funding for the C-17 strategic airlift program because it is 
the most cost-effective transport plane that we have, and I urge my 
colleagues to support the Harman amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, we are living at a crossroads in history. As the cold 
war subsides and new international relationships are formed, our Armed 
Forces must have flexible equipment and needs the C-17 for the wide 
range of security and humanitarian missions which lie ahead.
  We are living in ever changing times and new international 
relationships are forming throughout the globe. Perhaps more than at 
any time in history our Armed Forces are engaged in assisting those who 
are the victims of famines, earthquakes, floods and other natural 
catastrophes.
  All around the world, we are bringing our military men and women and 
their families back home. As we embark upon these courses, our defense 
posture requires that we have the ability to rapidly respond with a 
variety of equipment to unfamiliar places about which we might have 
very limited information. How many of us knew the politics, history, 
and geography of Rwanda before the bloody revolution began just a few 
short months ago? Still, our military was asked to go into that country 
on a moment's notice and help take our diplomatic staff and their 
families to places of safety. The Air Force's C-141 accomplished this 
special mission. But the C-141's are aging and must be replaced. They 
have served our Nation in times of trouble, but their usefulness is 
drawing to an end. The C-17 is the aircraft designed to replace the C-
141. The C-17 can carry twice the load of the C-141 and yet land on 
short, austere airfields like those found in Rwanda and other trouble 
spots around the world. The C-17 is unique in its cargo carrying 
ability and its short field landing ability--two attributes which 
typify what is often most demanded in a contemporary humanitarian 
mission.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support full funding of the C-
17 program because it is crucial to our defense system. Criticism of 
the C-17 has been unfounded. Independent analyses show the C-17 is the 
most cost-effective solution for meeting America's airlift needs. The 
need for the C-17 program has been established. Military leaders agree 
that it is the most capable, cost effective transport plane. I strongly 
urge my colleagues to support the Harman amendment. The C-17 
development is the program our country truly needs as we prepare for 
the challenges of the 21st century.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, last December when Secretary Aspin 
announced the decision to take control of the troubled C-17 program, I 
applauded his efforts. While limiting C-17 purchases to 40 aircraft is 
a positive step, I remained very concerned.
  Over the last 3 years, I chaired five hearings where we heard 
testimony that painted a bleak picture. The C-17 program suffers from 
massive technical and financial problems ranging from defective wings 
to hundreds of millions of dollars in extraordinary payments to the 
prime contractor, McDonnell Douglas.
  We cannot solve these very problems by throwing more money at the 
program or continuing with business as usual. The taxpayer should not 
foot the bill for hundreds of millions of dollars on a program that has 
been in default since its inception. This sends exactly the wrong 
message to defense contractors, and is the kind of practice we must end 
if we are truly going to reinvent the procurement process as promised 
by President Clinton.
  Just consider what we are being asked to buy--an Airlifter which will 
never come close to meeting its original specification. As I hear 
Member after Member extol the C-17's short runway capability, I must 
point out that today this capability simply does not exist. Similarly, 
when I hear Member after Member praise the C-17's global reach, I must 
point out that unlike the C-5 and the Boeing 747, the C-17 cannot even 
fly across the Atlantic Ocean without a mid-air refueling. And when I 
hear Member after Member praise the C-17's durability, I must point out 
that the C-17 has suffered massive structural deficiencies, from 
pervasive fuel leaks to defective wings that repeatedly have failed 
static load tests. All this in an Airlifter that costs more than half a 
billion dollars per copy.
  There is also a serious credibility problem with this program. For 
years, our committee was repeatedly assured by senior Air Force 
officers that the integrity of the wing was absolutely not in question. 
That was before the first wing failure ever occurred. Further, we were 
assured that the Air Force would never go below the threshold 
specifications identified by the U.S. Transportation Command. Now even 
those thresholds have been waived.
  In the face of these facts, I would suggest that this is indeed a 
case where the buyer should beware. It is time to face the fact that 
the C-17 program is a failure--as the C-17's capabilities decline, its 
costs continues to grow.
  Over the last 3 years, we have repeatedly been told that the C-17 
program ``has turned the corner.'' But the hard cold truth is that the 
C-17 suffers serious problems that will not go away.
  Under Chairman Dellums' leadership, the Armed Services Committee took 
the first necessary steps to secure needed airlift capability with 
existing aircraft that actually work. I commend the gentleman from 
California for his farsighted leadership in addressing this critical 
national security need. This is the prudent course, not additional buys 
of the technically and financially flawed C-17.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me sum up the general debate on this side, among 
the advocates of this amendment, first by saying what the amendment is 
all about.
  When the administration sent its bill here, the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1995, they requested six C-17's in fiscal 1995 and 
eight C-17's in fiscal 1996.
  When we did the mark in our committee, we cut that request from six 
C-17's in 1995 to four C-17's, and we took $550 million saved in that 
cut and put it in something called 
nondevelopmental alternative aircraft, NDAA, 
something other than a C-17, which could perform the mission. And what 
we would do by this amendment, based on what DOD and the Secretary of 
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Deutch, has since told 
us, is take that $550 million and put it back in the C-17 line so we 
can buy six in 1995 and eight in 1996 as the Defense Department 
originally requested. The amount of money is the same, $2.4 billion 
going in, $2.4 billion coming out. It is identical.
  Let me give you three reasons, give the Members of the House three 
reasons, why I think we should all support this amendment. First of 
all, we need the capacity. Everybody has made that argument here. As we 
draw down our forces and pull them back from Europe and overseas, we 
need more airlift than we have ever needed before.
  If the C-17 performs as promised, and that is a big ``if,'' if the C-
17 performs as it is supposed to, it fills a need for airlift better 
than any alternative we have got. You do not have to take my word for 
that.
  In this very bill 2 years ago, the House and the Senate, in passing 
the National Defense Authorization Act, directed the Department of 
Defense to do an independent, disinterested, cost-effectiveness and 
operational analysis of this very program, the C-17, a COEA, in DOD 
parlance. Here it is, prepared in December 1993, completed then, 
delivered to us just a week or two ago.
  If you look on page 9 of it, the executive summary says the C-17 is 
the preferred military airlifter for several reasons. COEA says in the 
executive summary that the C-17 is the preferred military airlifter 
because, first of all, of its unique capacity for outsized cargo. Not 
unique, because the C-5 also has that capacity. It can handle things, 
it can carry things other wide-body airplanes cannot handle, M-1 tanks, 
Patriot missile batteries, helicopters, Apache attack helicopters, 
things too large to get in any other kind of airplane which will go in 
the cargo compartment of this airplane.
  Second, not only in the air but on the ground it has unique 
capabilities and particularly on the ground, due to the footprint, the 
size of the wingspan.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Is it not true that we have 120 C-5B's, all of which are 
capable of carrying the outsized capability? In your COEA study it says 
85 percent of what we have got to transport is either oversized, not 
the big stuff or bulk, so a nondevelopmental aircraft, whether it is a 
C-5 or an MD-11 or a stripped-down C-17 or, heaven forbid, a 747 
freighter, could carry 85 percent of what we have got to take out 
there. It seems to me with 30 or 40 C-17's plus 120 C-5's, we have got 
all the outsized capability we need.
  Mr. SPRATT. Reclaiming my time, this amendment anticipates our going 
to 40 C-17's, going from 26 to 40; air mobility to command says this is 
militarily the minimum viable force, 40 planes, a couple of squadrons. 
We are to provide for downtime, for maintenance, provide for trainers. 
This is a minimal viable force.
  Beyond that, we may buy up to 120, which is the current requirement 
of C-17's, or we may mix the fleet.
  This leaves wide open to the Air Force and to the Department of 
Defense the option of mixing the fleet with 747's, 767's, MD-11's, and 
wide-bodied airplanes. Let us not get too zealous about that.
  Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield further, we have a lot of 
outsize capability with 120 C-5's that can carry everything a C-17 can 
carry.
  Mr. SPRATT. But there are some unique features to this airplane other 
than outsize capacity. It can airdrop. It can drop paratroops. Granted, 
it has a problem that has to be corrected. It can maneuver on the 
ground. It can land on short, austere strips, and a 747 simply cannot 
pull that off; it cannot land on a short strip; it cannot take off 
fully loaded on a short strip.
  Consequently, the C-17's, because of these unique capabilities, make 
it separate and distinct from anything else we can choose from.
  As you have heard here, it can land in hundreds more airports, 
hundreds more runways, in Africa, in Asia, in the place it is likely to 
be deployed, things the 747 cannot do.
  And that is why the Air Force says let us buy 40 and assess the 
viability of this airplane and decide from there whether we want to mix 
the fleet or go forward and buy 120 airplanes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 12 minutes, the remainder 
of my time, and I take that amount of time simply because no one has 
taken the floor to explain nor attempt to defend the position 
established by the House when we reported this bill from the House 
Committee on Armed Services, and I want to briefly outline the position 
of the Committee on Armed Services that brought the position of the C-
17 that is reflected in the House bill.
  In so doing, I want to reiterate over and over and over again in the 
moments that I have with you to say this, very simply, Mr. Chairman: 
The issue is not the C-17, the issue is airlift.
  It changes the nature of the debate, Mr. Chairman, when the 
discussion is not the C-17, the issue is airlift.
  I will repeat that many times in the course of my remarks.
  Mr. Chairman, it has been the intention of this gentleman to focus on 
the national security issue that should drive the decision on what to 
do about the C-17 program. That issue is airlift capability. Airlift 
for the number of needs is necessary, and these needs include our 
participation in multinational peacekeeping operations, which this 
gentleman supports.
  Our airlift problem is not just our need for short fields, for 
outsize cargo capability of the C-17; the heart of the problem is the 
planned retirement of our C-141 fleet in the 1995 to 2006 period. The 
loss of this large portion of our aircraft capability must be offset, 
and I will attempt to make that point clearly, and unequivocally, Mr. 
Chairman.

  We face a difficult task. How to provide enough overall airlift 
capability and C-17 capabilities within a realistic spending level. 
That is the question. If there are so many dollars in a limited-dollar 
environment, in a military budget that is going down, how many dollars 
do you project annually that is realistic that you choose to spend for 
the purpose of airlift? And then the question is how do you buy the 
airlift that is necessary for this country for these dollars? 
Straightforward, straightforward, straightforward, Mr. Chairman. The 
issue is not the C-17, the issue is airlift.
  There will be an amendment that comes up, and that amendment is where 
the department sees salvation primarily in higher C-17 buys. But large 
enough buys to offset this loss are not affordable at likely budget 
levels as the data is the Department's own C-17 affordability 
assessment proves.
  Buying eight planes per year, the level DOD specifies in their C-17 
white paper, and the level consistent with their affordability report 
for the next 14 years, leaves us with less airlift than we already have 
today. Mr. Chairman, I will repeat: By simply engaging in a C-17 buy 
strategy against the backdrop of the reality that C-141's are being 
retired during that 10-year period that I laid out, your airlift goes 
down. It does not come up until way out far beyond the year 2000.
  So, how do you engage in a strategy to buy airlift that does not get 
you back to square one until way out about the year 2008, 2010? Mr. 
Chairman, under that plan we would not get back to today's level until 
2008, despite spending $30 billion. The answer is twofold: Buy the 
specialized capabilities of a yet-to-be-determined number of C-17's, 
boosted with aircraft that more cheaply restored the aggregate airlift 
capability than we lose by C-141 retirements, at the same budget level 
of airlift as we have today. This is a strategy embodies in H.R. 4301 
which will offset the C-141 retirement, give us more aggregate and 
outsize airlift capability than we have today for less cost than the 
strategy behind the amendment that would simply put us back to the 
number 6.
  These conclusions are not just this gentleman's conclusions, Mr. 
Chairman. If that were the case, that is arguable. But an Air Mobility 
Command study shows that even with the buy of eight C-17's per year, 
only a substantial buy of complementary nondevelopmental or alternative 
aircraft in the next 5 years equivalent to 35 to 55 aircraft would 
prevent a significant decline in our airlift capability by the year 
2201.
  Not this gentleman's study, Mr. Chairman, the Air Mobility Command 
study. The Department has not, not, to this gentleman's knowledge, 
refuted those findings.
  Under the provision of H.R. 4301, C-17 fleet will continue to grow.
  Mr. Chairman, I listened to many people on the floor as if it were 
``C-17's to no C-141's.''Let us not distort each other's position. The 
bill has some C-17's in it, and the bill allows that strategy to go 
forward. The bill adds 4 C-17's for a total of 30 and 4 more for next 
year.
  Beyond that, if the contractor can fix its problem, we retain the 
option of moving to higher rates. If the program does not improve, we 
can still decide to buy more C-17's to reach the level of 40 that the 
Department has told us was militarily acceptable. No one is talking 
about having no C-17's. That is not in the real world. So you build a 
straw-man when you make that argument.
  The issue, again, Mr. Chairman, is not the C-17; the issue is 
airlift.
  Keep in mind that buying 4 C-17's per year would give us a fleet of 
58 by the year 2005; combined with our existing fleet that the 
gentleman pointed out of 120 C-5's, will be able to lift over twice as 
much outsize cargo than we could just 7 years ago, when the airlift 
challenge was to move army heavy divisions across the Atlantic in 10 
days, those days, to fight the vast forces of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union no longer exists, Mr. Chairman. The 
Warsaw Pact has vanished off the radar screen. And these were 
adversaries who were far better armed, far better trained, far better 
led than the forces many of my colleagues contemplate with these 
scenarios of the future, North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, that worry many of 
my colleagues today.
  In addition to this outsize capability, the airlift fleet envisioned 
by the bill would have a substantially better ability to carry the bulk 
and oversize cargos that made up 90 percent of the air cargos of Desert 
Storm than would the airlift fleet envisioned in the Department's 
plans. Again, the issue is airlift, not the C-17.
  The C-17 cost and operational effectiveness analysis study also 
validates the path that H.R. 4301 embodies, Mr. Chairman, and calls 
into question the Pentagon's approach. It shows that mixes of C-17's 
and complementary aircraft are as cost effective as a pure fleet of 120 
C-17's in hauling outsize cargo. In addition, the analysis shows those 
same mixes are far more cost effective in carrying oversize cargo than 
a pure C-17 fleet. There is wide agreement that the commercial aircraft 
are far better bulk cargo carriers than the C-17's.
  Futhermore, the Department's cost and operational effectiveness 
analysis shows the superiority of mixed fleets, Mr. Chairman, It 
understates that 747's performance by at least 22 percent, according to 
the Air Mobility Command's own data, not this gentleman's data. It 
assigns costs to the mixed fleets that internal DOD documents prove are 
improper. Thus mixes of C-17's and 747's are even better than the 
analysis says and better than pure C-17 fleets.
  Department officials have stressed outsize cargo as a main factor 
responsible for their strong preference for the C-17. But there is a 
major gap between the rhetoric on this issue and the reality of their 
own data that they provide us. The Department may tell us that oversize 
cargo is the main factor to plan for in a major regional contingency, 
but their own C-17 cost and operational effectiveness analysis disputes 
this.
  The Department finally delivered that analysis to us last week; a 
little late in the day as we attempt to address this issue. It sates, 
``In the first 30 days in these scenarios [the two MRC's]''--that is 
major regional contingencies--``used by the joint staff mobility 
requirements study, 15 percent of the delivery requirement is outsize 
cargo, 55 percent is oversize, and the remaining 30 percent is bulk,'' 
the point that I think my colleague was trying to make.

                              {time}  1600

  Their data shows that after the first 30 days the percentage of 
outsized cargo requirements actually drops.
  Mr. Chairman, there are some other issues that I would want to make 
here, but I do not want time to run out. Let me just finish, and then I 
will be happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
  Mr. Chairman, I make this point: The issue is not the C-17. The issue 
is airlift. Let me tell my colleagues how we got to this point.
  The administration should have come before us in a timely fashion as 
we proceeded to try to mark up this bill. The leadership gave us this 
date, come on the floor before Memorial Day break. We were under 
tremendous stress and tremendous strain. The administration did not 
answer on the record for the record in a timely fashion, when we were 
preparing to mark up this bill, the concerns of the criticism raised by 
the GAO. So, what my colleagues have ringing in their ears was a very 
intelligent analysis with a series of critical issues laid out by the 
GAO. So, the administration had not done a compelling selling job, had 
not attempted to support this program at a level that my colleagues 
would have felt comfortable, and they certainly had not answered these 
ringing criticisms. So, we have the responsibility of marking, in the 
absence of the administration's set of arguments, so we put before the 
Committee on Armed Services a proposal that said the issue is not the 
C-17, the issue is airlift. We figured the annual amount of dollars 
authorized for this purpose would probably be in the neighborhood of 
$2.5 billion. We said, ``With $2.5 billion annually, how do you get the 
airlift that you need?''
  So, Mr. Chairman, this led us to this four plus nine developmental 
aircraft, a mixture.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] has expired.
  (Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
inquiry.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, under the rule, does the gentleman and the 
ranking member have an opportunity to strike the last word?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Once the amendment is pending, the 
gentleman from California and the gentleman from South Carolina do have 
that opportunity, but not until an amendment is pending.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the 
amendments printed in part 6 of House Report 103-520 relating to the C-
17 aircraft, which shall be considered in the following order:
  A, the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Harman], or the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn], or the 
gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], or the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Saxton], or the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], or the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Sam Johnson], or the gentleman from Missouri 
[Mr. Talent]; and, B, the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman 
from Oregon [Ms. Furse].


                    amendment offered by Ms. Harman

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Harman: Page 19, strike out line 
     18 and all that follows through line 3 on page 20 and insert 
     in lieu thereof the following:
       (a) Authorization.--Of the amount provided in section 103 
     for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force--
       (1) $103,000,000 shall be available for Non-Developmental 
     Alternative Aircraft procurement; and
       (2) $2,303,402,000 shall be available for the C-17 aircraft 
     program, of which--
       (A) $2,249,819,000 is for procurement of six C-17 aircraft;
       (B) $47,475,000 is for advance procurement of up to eight 
     C-17 aircraft for fiscal year 1996; and
       (C) $6,108,000 is for C-17 modifications.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and a Member 
opposed will be recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] 
will be recognized for 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
  (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to send my own best wishes to 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] who is a principal cosponsor 
of this bipartisan amendment and who is not able to be with us today 
because he is in the hospital.
  Mr. Chairman, I would point out that this amendment has overwhelming 
bipartisan support, including the overwhelming support of a bipartisan 
group of the Armed Services Committee. We are in this position because, 
when we marked up and reported our bill, DOD had not adequately 
justified funding six planes. For this reason, most of us supported the 
chairman's mark which he himself characterized as a ``place holder''.
  This chart demonstrates that our amendment involves the identical 
amount of money in the bill as reported by the committee. We would 
simply redeploy this money to support procurement of six C-17s rather 
than four, and fund a competition for nondevelopmental aircraft.
  I would say to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] that what we 
are doing in this bill very adequately deals with his concerns and will 
assure us that commercial wide bodies can be a part of our airlift mix 
for the future.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Harman] has expired.
  Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Harman] would like, if she needs an additional minute, I yield a minute 
of the 2 minutes she had reserved for me at this time to her. Would the 
gentlewoman like an additional minute to complete her statement?
  Ms. HARMAN. Why don't I just take 30 seconds of the gentleman's time?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Harman] is recognized for 30 seconds.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, what we need to keep our eye on is that we 
are not adding money to the airlift program. We are simply rearranging 
the money so that we can restore the administration's original request. 
The chairman of our full committee, for whom I have the greatest 
respect, says airlift is the issue, not the C-17. I agree, and I quote 
from General Shalikashvili:
  ``Today there is only one alternative that can meet the requirements 
of a core airlifter, the C-17.''
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I took time to try to lay out the position that is 
reported in the bill, H.R. 4301. Let me, in a few moments, explain how 
we got to this point.
  A number of our colleagues requested, during the time that we were 
marking up the bill, that we bring the administration in subsequent to 
the markup of the bill in the House Committee on Armed Services and 
hopefully that that hearing would take place prior to our coming to the 
floor. I said to my colleagues in the spirit of fairness, in the spirit 
of openness and cooperation we would ask the administration to come 
before the committee, and all of my colleagues, or virtually all of my 
colleagues, because the bill passed 55 to 1, when we laid this proposal 
on the table we said, absent a ringing declaration, a ringing set of 
supporting arguments for this bill, that the House position, the 
position that we articulated, was a sound position. I turned to 
everyone in several meetings, Mr. Chairman, and said, ``If any of you 
have a better idea, lay it on the table, and, in the spirit of give and 
take, we can discuss that, if there is a new position that anyone wants 
to assume.'' No one laid a new idea on the table, and everyone 
essentially bought onto what is in the House position.
  Then they said that they would like to have the administration come. 
The administration did come, and we had several hours of hearings. 
After those hearings, Mr. Chairman, a number of my colleagues, the 
gentlewoman from California and 30-some other members of the committee, 
decided, based upon that presentation, that now they had more 
information, more facts, because they felt that the administration had 
done a, quote, adequate or good job in addressing the GAO criticisms 
and laying out the concerns and the arguments that they felt needed to 
be on the record, and they raised some questions with respect to the 
proposal that we offered. On the basis of that they were compelled then 
to go back to the original position of the six planes.
  That is a legitimate thing to do, Mr. Chairman. I am not quarreling 
with that. I simply wanted to say, one, the position enunciated in the 
bill was not just a placeholder amendment. It was carefully thought 
out, carefully conceived and, I believe, can be defended anywhere 
openly and in a very straightforward fashion. I think all of my 
colleagues here are going to have to make a very serious decision about 
this program and about the issue of airlift. I urge them to listen very 
carefully. I frankly think, and I may be wrong, that this debate turns 
on one single issue, one single issue, Mr. Chairman.
  Secretary Deutsch says, ``If the contractor is able to build 6, we 
will learn more about that contractor's ability to build 12 than if you 
have them building 4.'' Now, if my colleagues buy that argument, then 
it will lead them in one direction. If my colleagues think that that 
argument is debatable, it may lead them in a different direction. But I 
personally think that that is what the issue turns on.

                              {time}  1610

  The question is what do you think the learning curve is. The 
Secretary repeated that on more than one occasion. I need 6 because the 
learning curve on whether this contractor will be able to build 12 down 
the road, that gives me that answer. If you accept that argument, 
perhaps there is efficacy to it. But I think that is where the issue 
lies on this discussion.
  I simply wanted to discuss that in the spirit necessary of openness 
we held a hearing. A number of my colleagues were compelled to move 
beyond the committee position. this is no personal thing with us.
  You now have two considered positions on this issue, one thought 
through by the committee and one agreed to after the committee markup 
and after Secretary Cheney came before the committee, and they are both 
out there.
  I think one can argue both of them very strongly, perhaps even 
effectively, but they are two different strategies. They are two very, 
very different approaches, and they have two different consequences. 
Let me just make one final comment. Secretary Cheney said there are 
three parts to this C-17 program. There is the settlement, there is the 
2-year program, and there is the nondevelopmental airlift aircraft part 
of it.

  Well, this amendment only addresses two, not three. Everyone agreed 
to put the settlement aside at this point, because it raises a number 
of issues that go beyond the jurisdiction of the House Committee on 
Armed Services, perhaps to the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Government Operations, perhaps to the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, and that is something that has to be resolved in a 
different context, given the process that we operate under.
  So we are back to the second part. Mr. Cheney said give me all of 
these or kill the program. We even laid that proposal on the table 
among my colleagues. We said do you want to kill it? There was not a 
consensus.
  So the issue we wanted to grapple with, short of killing the program 
and short of going whole hog in the program in the context of the 
markup, was what do you do, absent a compelling set of arguments that 
refuted what GAO said? We came with that in our bill. My colleagues now 
are saying that they have new information that leads them to a new 
position. Listen very carefully, make your own judgment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  (Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to rise and say that the 
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has fully 
explained the position in the committee, and I think fairly. At the 
time the subcommittee and the committee marked, we did not have this 
information, and many of us who did not serve on the committee had 
asked that there be a hearing prior to coming to the floor.
  We had the hearing, Secretary Cheney did come, and I think the 
overwhelming majority of the members of the committee, upon hearing 
that testimony, demonstrated both by voting to go back to this 
provision that Ms. Harman is supporting and offering, and also signing 
a letter which I believe is more of the ``ringing endorsement'' that 
the chairman talked about.
  Because we believe we are overcoming the problems in the C-17 
procurement, this is the most efficient rate. Congress should not 
micromanage this contract. We are saying that there is sufficient 
evidence now presented by the administration that leads us to believe 
that this is the most appropriate way to move forward on this program.
  It does, not, as the chairman said, include the settlement, which I 
think is a contentious issue which is better resolved at a later point.
  Ms HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson].
  (Mr. GEJDENSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the C-17 
cargo plane program. Specifically, I would like to urge my colleagues 
to support the Harman amendment which restores the administration's 
request for six aircraft instead of four as in the current bill 
language and oppose the Furse amendment which terminates the program 
entirely.
  In a time when we are trying to reduce our Nation's defense spending 
and decrease our worldwide force structure, supporting the construction 
of six C-17's in fiscal year 1995 makes the most economical and 
military sense.
  Authorizing the construction of six instead of four planes is the 
least expensive way to meet the Nation's military airlift needs. 
Maintaining a production rate of six per year will decrease the unit 
costs of the planes and will not undercut the Department of Defense's 
strategy to control program costs. This rate will also allow the prime 
contractor program costs. This rate will also allow the prime 
contractor, McDonnell Douglas, to show that it can bring costs down and 
ensure that we produce the C-17 in the most efficient manner. 
Additionally, it is important to mention that the Harman amendment does 
not add to the overall cost of the bill but merely reprograms funds 
already included in the bill to cover the cost of the additional two 
planes.
  In this post-cold-war era, there is less of a need to station troops 
abroad and maintain large military installations around the globe. As 
we have seen in Grenada, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia, however, there 
is still a great need for the United States military to have the 
capability to move large numbers of troops and equipment in and out of 
remote areas quickly. Our current airlift capabilities simply do not 
make the grade. The C-141's, which was designed in the 1950's and 
produced in the 1960's are falling apart and cannot land at small 
austere airfields. While the C-5 is able to carry similar payloads as 
the C-17, the C-5 complicates deployment planning because it requires 
excessively long and wide runways which are not always available in 
developing countries. Further, the Air Force has testified that there 
have been instances at large military fields in Europe when operations 
had to be suspended because a C-5 was unloading and could not get off 
the runway to allow other planes to land or takeoff. If we are to 
reduce our global military presence, it is essential that we continue 
building C-17's which give us the ability to move troops--and the 
essential equipment needed to protect them--as quickly as possible.
  Terminating the C-17 program would have a disastrous affect on the 
economy of my congressional district. The F117 engine used in the C-17 
is constructed at the Pratt & Whitney plant located in Middletown, CT. 
I am very proud of the work my constituents have done on this engine. 
First of all, the engine--which is practically identical to the 
commercial PW2000 engine--was developed entirely by Pratt & Whitney and 
its commercial partners. This alone saved the Government over $1.5 
billion. Additionally, none of the cost overrunes or production 
problems have resulted from the F117 engine.
  To stop the program now would mean the loss of another 200 to 300 
jobs in Middletown. In an area that has been hard hit by the downsizing 
of the defense and insurance industries and where Pratt alone has laid-
off 6,700 employees during the past year, the cancellation of the C-17 
program would be devastating.
  In closing, I ask that my colleagues do what makes the most economic 
and military sense, vote for the Harman amendment and oppose the Furse 
amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Saxton].
  Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, in making the decision about how to vote on 
this bill, whether my colleagues vote for six C-17's or four C-17's and 
four nondevelopmental types of aircraft, consider the words of Colin 
Powell when he said,

       Our military strategy is changing from a focus on global 
     war to a focus on regional crisis. And to deal with those 
     kinds of crises, you have got to get there fast, and you have 
     to get there with the mostest.

  And he said,

       That is what the C-17 will do for us.

  I think he said that for three reasons. I think he said it, first, 
because it obviously increases lift, outsized lift, oversized lift, and 
personnel lift.
  Second, it keeps the unit price lower. To do four C-17's instead of 
six C-17's, it increases the price per unit from $30 to $40 million.
  Third, it requires the contractor to prove they can produce, prove 
that they can produce the product on time and of the quality that is 
necessary in the number that is necessary to get the job done.
  Finally, I would conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this: Dick Cheney 
not long ago was quoted as saying, ``The C-17 is an absolutely vital 
strategic asset, regardless of what size force we have in the long 
run.''
  I urge my colleagues to support the Harman amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Missouri, [Mr. Talent].
  Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize a point I made earlier in the 
general debate. Whatever your view of American's military strategy 
ought to be, whether you are content with the drawdown we are having 
now or not, you have to support increased additional lift. As we draw 
down the forces, we end up with a smaller force based in the United 
States. If you want to be able to do anything in the world, 
peacekeeping, protection of American interests, we have got to get 
those forces abroad. We cannot do that without the C-17. Whatever your 
perspective on the overall military strategy, you need to support the 
Harman amendment for six C-17's.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut [Mrs. Johnson].
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
Harman-Horn amendment for three reasons.
  First, we need the airlift capability and flexibility the C-17 
provides. According to Former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the C-17 
is ``an absolutely vital strategic asset regardless of what size force 
we have in the long term.'' This state-of-the-art aircraft can carry 
outsize cargo to small, remote airfields, giving us a strategic 
advantage in rapid development capability to meet regional threats. 
President Clinton agrees, and I support his modest request for funding.
  Second, we saved billions of dollars in development costs on the C-
17's Pratt & Whitney engines because the manufacturer developed it for 
commercial use on the Boeing 757 at a cost of $1\1/2\ billion. The 
engine has over 6 million hours of experience on commercial aircraft 
and is 5 to 7 percent more fuel efficient than its closest competitor. 
The Air Force has saved taxpayers billions in R&D costs by using off-
the-shelf, state-of-the-art commercial engines.
  Third, while the impact of canceling the C-17 program would cost 200 
to 300 jobs in Connecticut alone, the total employment impact would be 
far worse, as many as 10,000 jobs nationwide. Such economic dislocation 
on top of what we've already experienced in the past four years would 
be tragic under any circumstances, but it would be unconscionable to 
cause it by terminating a necessary and successful program that is 
fundamental to our military readiness according to Democratic and 
Republican administrations.
  I encourage members to check all the facts before you take the 
reckless plunge over the cliff and dismantle a critical component of 
our national security. The C-17 is important and has already proven its 
worth in the field, and I urge you to support the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-
Saxton-Spratt-E.B. Johnson amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
minority leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel].
  Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, there is an old saying among military 
people that amateurs talk about strategy, but professionals talk about 
logistics, and how quickly and efficiently an army gets military 
supplies and equipment from here to there determines whether or not 
strategic plans can be implemented.
  In today's high technology, high pressure battlefield, the army that 
gets there ``fustest with the mostest'' wins, and the C-17 can 
certainly help us do that.
  The amendment gives the House the chance to restore the C-17 program 
back to the budget request of six aircraft without increasing the 
deficit.
  My understanding is certainly the administration supports the 
amendment. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John 
Shalikashvili, supports it. The former Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin 
Powell supports it.

                              {time}  1620

  The gentleman from New Jersey quoted Defense Secretary Cheney, who 
was in my district last night for a big event and reaffirmed again his 
strong belief in the program. All senior military leaders and field 
commanders cite the need for the C-47 and the airlift capability it 
provides.
  But the most important endorsement comes from the 20-year-olds whose 
lives on the battlefield depend on being supplied quickly with the 
right equipment. As a former combat infantryman, I can tell my 
colleagues that fighting forces that are supplied with the equipment 
that they need when they need it get a boost, a big boost in morale as 
well as an edge in combat.
  The C-17 can carry not only outsized equipment, it can carry hope to 
our troops because it delivers the goods when and where they need it.
  One of the arguments raised in favor of the amendment, of course, is 
that it reduces cost per unit. Naturally, there is no question about 
that. But I want to remind our colleagues that six C-17's can 
contribute to reducing the cost in lives per military unit on the 
battlefield. That is the reduction that counts.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan 
amendment, and I thank the gentlewoman for yielding time to me.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Lewis], who is on the other side of this issue but is 
constrained by time.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I very much thank my colleague 
for yielding time to me.
  Frankly, I wanted to rise simply to express my deep appreciation for 
my colleague and the professional way he is handling this matter. We do 
disagree on a specific. That is, the increased numbers of six and eight 
in the out-years. This amendment will, in turn, reduce the cost for 
aircraft $40 million to $50 million a year. It will also save 8,000 
jobs in California, which is very important to all of us.
  This is the technology we need now. It is the airlift of the future. 
We must be able to project our force throughout the world without 
having our troops dispersed throughout the world.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me and expect passage of 
this amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Darden].
  (Mr. DARDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
Harman amendment.
  Back in 1986, the good old Heritage Foundation, a good, conservative 
think-tank, issued a report dated January 23, 1986, which I think 
summarizes my philosophy about the flawed C-17 program.
  It came to the conclusion that:

       A careful analysis by experts of U.S. airlift needs and of 
     the C-17 program reveals that a new cargo plane is not needed 
     to close the gap. As such, the Air Force should cancel the C-
     17, now in a full-scale engineering phase of development, and 
     instead build more C-5B cargo and KC-10 cargo tanker 
     aircraft. Better use, moreover, should be made of the 
     existing fleet of C-130 Hercules and C-141B Starlifter 
     strategic aircraft. Not only could this save about $20 
     billion, but the U.S. would have the needed planes available 
     much sooner.

  Let me address one other issue that was raised by the Heritage, good, 
conservative Republican think-tank, report. It said that the idea of 
using the C-17 to go to the far edge of the battle area, the FEBA, as 
it was known, was absolutely ridiculous because ``Is it realistic to 
expect the Air Force to risk the C-17, which may cost $180 million or 
more each,'' and, of course, that is up now to about $250 million or 
more, ``on austere airfields in or near combat zones? Former Air Force 
Secretary Bernon Orr apparently does not think so. As he said in 1982, 
`my worry is that with a very large expensive plane like the C-17 and a 
limited number of them, the forward commander may not want to order 
them up to the edge of the battle area.'''
  Mr. Chairman, in 1987, when I was a Member of the House and a member 
of the Committee on Armed Services and before I had two children in 
college and could afford certain extras in life, I ordered and 
purchased at my own expense these paper airplanes to be sent to each 
and every Member of the House of Representatives on which it says that 
the C-17 is a $40 billion boondoggle and, according to my friend, Ed 
Jenkins, nothing but a town car for the Air Force.
  Well, I hate to say, and it really bothers me to say, Mr. Chairman, 
``I told you so,'' but, folks, we told you so.
  We have thrown away now billions of dollars. We still do not have any 
capability. Let us not further compound the mistake. Let us put an end 
to this foolishness. Let us try to do something for the taxpayer here 
today and vote down overwhelmingly the Harmon amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following information.

                    Closing the Military Airlift Gap


                              INTRODUCTION

       Should a crisis develop in Europe or the Mideast, it would 
     take the U.S. 483 C-5 and 1,558 C-141B cargo plane loads to 
     rush the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division--with its 16,800 
     troops, 290 tanks, 430 armored fighting vehicles, 124 
     helicopters, 780 combat support vehicles, 3,580 trucks and 
     other equipment--from its base in Fort Stewart, Georgia, to 
     the trouble spot within the prescribed ten days. To support 
     Europe alone, the U.S. would have to transport six such Army 
     divisions, 60 tactical fighter squadrons, and one Marine 
     Amphibious Brigade to Western Europe.
       In the event of such demands, the U.S. does not have enough 
     cargo planes to speed its forces to distant battlefields. 
     This strategic airlift gap is one of the American arsenal's 
     most serious weaknesses. That the U.S. needs more airlift 
     capability is widely accepted. At issue, however, is whether 
     the Air Force's $39.8 billion Airlift Master Plan is the best 
     way to close the gap. By designating a new generation of 
     cargo airplane, the McDonnell Douglas C-17, as the Plan's 
     centerpiece, the Pentagon may be making a serious and costly 
     error.
       The Air Force Plan suffers from two fundamental flaws: 1) 
     it underutilizes aircraft already in the airlift fleet as 
     well as such proposed plans as the Lockheed C-5B, which could 
     be produced sooner and at a significantly lower acquisition 
     cost than the C-17's $180 million each; 2) it rests on 
     questionable operational and planning assumptions, such as 
     using the C-17 for both tactical and strategic airlift 
     missions.
       Careful analysis by experts of U.S. airlift needs and of 
     the C-17 program reveals that a new cargo plane is not needed 
     to close the gap. As such, the Air Force should cancel the C-
     17, now in a full-scale engineering phase of development, and 
     instead, build more C-5B cargo and KC-10 cargo tanker 
     aircraft. Better use, moreover, should be made of the 
     existing fleet of C-130 ``Hercules'' and C-141B 
     ``Starlifter'' strategic aircraft. Not only could this save 
     about $20 billion, but the U.S. would have the needed planes 
     available much sooner.


            STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND U.S. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

       Strategic airlift is used primarily for the rapid 
     deployment of forces, military equipment, and supplies to 
     combat zones in the early stage of wars. Without the 
     prepositioned military equipment that exists for example, in 
     Europe and Korea, most U.S. military contingencies in the 
     Third World would require rapid air transport of men and 
     materiel to the combat zone. Transport by sea is 
     indispensable for sustaining combat an average 30 days or 
     longer, but it is often too slow to reach the combat zone for 
     violent regional conflicts decided very quickly.
       The standard categories of airlift military cargoes are: 1) 
     bulk, such as fuel, ammunition, and other cargo that when 
     loaded on pallets can be carried by most airlifters; 2) 
     oversize, such as trucks and towed artillery pieces that fit 
     into all military cargo planes (C-5, C-141, C-130, and KC-10) 
     and some specially designed civilian aircraft; and 3) 
     outsize, such as main battle tanks, helicopters, and other 
     extremely large items that can be placed only in the huge C-5 
     or the proposed C-17 cargo planes.
       The principal aircraft in the Air Force's airlift fleet are 
     its 70 C-5 ``Galaxy'' and 234 C-141 ``Starlifter'' strategic 
     airlifters, 16 KC-10 dual-capable cargo/tanker aircraft, and 
     512 C-130 ``Hercules'' tactical airlifters. The C-5A jet and 
     its newer modified version, the C-5B, carry outsize cargo 
     such as tanks and helicopters over intercontinental 
     distances. The C-141, the workhorse strategic airlifter of 
     the Military Airlift Command, carries a substantial volume of 
     cargo over unlimited ranges with in-flight refueling. The 
     prop-jet C-130, on the other hand, is the mainstay of the 
     tactical airlift fleet, operating within combat theaters and 
     carrying troops and cargo 100 to 2,000 miles. When modified, 
     it can refuel helicopters and fighter planes, perform as an 
     aerial gunship, airborne command post, or airmobile 
     communication center. The KC-10 is essentially the three-
     engine McDonnell Douglas DC-10 long-range aircraft capable of 
     carrying cargo and refueling other aircraft.\1\


                    SHORTFALLS IN STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

       In the late 1970s, the possibility that the U.S. would have 
     to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf renewed interest 
     in strategic mobility. A congressional request that the 
     Pentagon review strategic mobility requirements led to the 
     Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS).\2\ In 1981, 
     the study concluded that the U.S. was woefully short of cargo 
     planes, ships, and military equipment prepositioned abroad. 
     The study recommended that the U.S. be able to airlift 66 
     million-ton-miles-per-day (MTM/D) to meet its global 
     commitments. Currently, the U.S. has a 43 MTM/D 
     capability.\3\
       Even this vastly underestimates U.S. requirements. In 1980, 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that a 150 MTM/D airlift 
     capability would be desirable just for reinforcing U.S. 
     troops in Europe.
       Simultaneous wars in Europe and the Persian Gulf, or Europe 
     and Korea, are thus far beyond U.S. airlift capabilities. 
     Even the CMMS goal of 66 MTM/D, which will not be met until 
     the late 1990s, is the absolute minimum of what is 
     required.\4\


                   The Air Force Airlift Master Plan

       Even before the CMMS was completed, the Air Force developed 
     plans for a totally new long-range or strategic cargo plane 
     to supplement the 1960s vintage C-5 and replace C-141s and C-
     130s. The capabilities of the C-X, as the design model was 
     called, were determined before the CMMS was completed.\5\ The 
     Air Force Airlift Master Plan required a plane to have both 
     intercontinental range and the ``mission flexibility'' to 
     land at small, hard-to-land-on airfields in or near combat 
     zones. Proposed airlift characteristics included short 
     landing and departure approaches for tactical operations and 
     the capability to convert back and forth between cargo, 
     troop, and aeromedical evacuation configurations. The new 
     plane should be capable of aerial refueling and of carrying 
     such outsize cargo as tanks and helicopters. The C-X, 
     therefore, was to be a hybrid cargo lifter. Its mission was 
     to be a cross between intercontinental and intratheater tasks 
     traditionally accomplished by two different airplanes.
       In 1983 the Air Force concluded that the C-17 would meet 
     these requirements. The following year, in the Airlift Master 
     Plan, and the Airlift Total Force Plan, the Air Force decided 
     to:\6\
       1. Build a strategic airlift force to meet the 
     Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study goal of 66 million-
     ton-miles-per-day airlift capability.
       2. Double tactical airlift capability.
       3. By 210 C-17s, using 30 for training and backup.
       4. Retire 180 C-130 ``Hercules'' short-range tactical 
     airlifters.
       5. Retire 54 C-141 ``Starlifter'' long-range cargo planes 
     and transfer the remaining 180 Starlifters to the reserves 
     where their use rate and wartime capability will be lower.
       6. Use C-17 short-range or ``intratheater'' shuttles to 
     replace the retired C-130 planes and to augment tactical 
     airlift capability by almost 80 percent.
       Before the Air Force issued the Airlift Master Plan, the 
     Department of Defense already had decided to increase airlift 
     capability in the near term. Its plan of January 1982 called 
     for buying an additional 50 C-5Bs, 44 KC-10 fuel tanker 
     aircraft, and 19 converted Boeing 747s for troop 
     transport.\7\ The principal reason that these aircraft were 
     bought was that they would be available significantly earlier 
     than the C-17.

                      U.S. CARGO AIRLIFT CAPABILITY                     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Number        Air Force plans to meet  
          Aircraft             operational          airlift goals       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-5........................              70  Purchase 50 C-5Bs          
C-141......................             234  Retire 54. Move 180 to     
                                              reserves at one-half      
                                              current operating rate    
C-130......................             512  Retire 180                 
C-17.......................  ..............  Purchase 210               
KC-10......................           \1\16  \2\Purchase 44             
CRAF Wide Body Cargo\3\....              39  Modify 19 747s             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\16 KC-10s assigned to Strategic Air Command.                         
\2\44 additional KC-10s to be added to Strategic Air Command fleet but  
  dedicated to airlift use.                                             
\3\Civilian Reserve Air Fleet for transporting cargo on modified        
  passenger planes in times of national emergency.                      
                                                                        
Source: Military Airlift Command, United States Air Force.              

       The Air Force claims that the C-17 program is the most 
     economical option it examined. Assistant Secretary of the Air 
     Force Tom Cooper states: ``The acquisition of 210 C-17s would 
     cost $16 billion less and require nearly 15,000 fewer 
     personnel to operate when compared to alternatives based on 
     the C-5 that provide equivalent capability.''\8\ The savings 
     will come from the lower manpower and operational costs of 
     the C-17. Savings will also accrue from the retirement of 180 
     C-130s and from transferring 180 C-141Bs into the reserves at 
     a lower operating level, which will cut down on active duty 
     manpower and operational costs.


                 problems with the airlift master plan

       The Air Force should be applauded for trying to come to 
     terms with the perennial problem of airlift shortfalls. But 
     its way of going about it raises serious questions. Among 
     them:
       1. Is a new generation strategic airlifter necessary? Under 
     Air Force plans, the C-5 air cargo plane will remain in 
     service along with the C-17 well beyond the year 2000. Is 
     there really a need for a new strategic airlifter if the 
     current model, the C-5B, has enough productive years left to 
     be retained in the inventory for that long a period?
       2. The dual-capability dilemma: A key element of the Air 
     Force plan is the capability of the C-17 to deliver troops, 
     supplies, and military equipment not only over vast distances 
     but directly to combat forces at the forward edge of the 
     battlefield. This will be essential mainly because the Air 
     Force plan would retire 180 C-130 Hercules from the fleet of 
     512 tactical airlift aircraft. The C-17 is supposed to fly 
     tactical air sorties between strategic airlift missions.
       In a major war, however, it is questionable whether the new 
     and expensive C-17 will be available for tactical combat 
     support roles. Presumably, it will be flying intercontinental 
     sorties across the Pacific or North Atlantic. Even if the 
     plane were available, some experts see problems with a hybrid 
     design that equips the C-17 for both strategic and tactical 
     airlift missions.
       3. Battlefield vulnerabilities: Is it realistic to expect 
     the Air Force to risk the C-17, which may cost $180 million 
     or more each, on ``austere'' airfields in or near combat 
     zones? Former Air Force Secretary Vernon Orr apparently does 
     not think so. As he said in 1982, ``. . . my worry . . . is 
     that with a very large expensive plane like the C-17 and a 
     limited number of them, the forward commander may not want to 
     order them up to the edge of the battle area.''\9\
       This problem of the vulnerability of a large, expensive, 
     and valuable strategic carrier plagued the 1983 U.S. military 
     operation in Grenada. Explaining why air cargo sorties were 
     backed up, Colonel Dave Starling, now a commander of the 
     Army's 18th Airborne Corps Support Command, said: ``Initially 
     there was concern that the [cargo] aircraft was susceptible 
     to gunfire and, if one got hit, we'd have really been up a 
     creek.''\10\ ``Aircraft were stacked up to the ionosphere,'' 
     another commander said, who added that lift operations might 
     have been terminated had the enemy had longer range anti-
     aircraft guns.\11\
       4. Cost: the estimated acquisition cost for the Airlift 
     Master Plan is $39.8 billion, of which $37.2 billion is for 
     the C-17. In its own terms, the C-17's price may be 
     reasonable for the research, development, and production of a 
     plane using the latest aviation technology. But whether this 
     plane is reasonable for the allotted task is another matter. 
     To be sure, the Air Force claims that its plan will be $16 
     billion less than alternatives based on the C-5. Yet by some 
     calculations, adding 101 C-5Bs to the fleet to meet the 
     Pentagon's goal of 66 MTM/D airlift capability would cost at 
     most $16.8 billion.\12\ And this is at an inflated ``then-
     year'' dollar cost computed to reflect price hikes during the 
     aircraft's production life. Yet this is still far below the 
     then-year $37.2 billion acquisition cost for the C-17. 
     Anticipated economies in producing a plane that has been in 
     production for some time, moreover, could reduce the total 
     acquisition cost of 101 C-5Bs to $14 billion.
       Greater savings will come from not retiring the C-141s and 
     C-130s as required by the Air Force Plan. While it is true 
     that the C-141s will have to be replaced some day, their 
     service life can be extended to help meet strategic airlift 
     requirements at a lower cost until 1998. In this time, the 
     Air Force can develop and deploy a follow-on tactical 
     airlifter to replace the C-130. By extending the service life 
     of the ``work horse'' C-141B at a cost of about $300 million, 
     the Air Force could keep 180 of these aircraft in active 
     status, and not, as is currently planned, transfer them to 
     the reserves.\13\ Cost there may be considerably lower, but 
     readiness is also.
       The savings from building more C-5Bs instead of C-17s will 
     enable the Air Force to keep the C-130 in operation. The 180 
     of these aircraft currently marked for retirement could be 
     kept in service until a new short-range tactical airlifter is 
     developed and produced. Keeping the C-130 in the air would 
     safeguard the Air Force's tactical airlift mission. It would 
     ensure that there are enough short-range airlifters to 
     perform the many tactical airlift missions for which an 
     expensive and essential strategic airlift cargo plane like 
     the C-17 may either be unavailable or overqualified.
       Many experts argue, in fact, that a new tactical airlifter 
     to replace the C-130 is needed far more than a new long-range 
     air cargo plane like the C-17. Said Lt. General William 
     Richardson, former Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
     and Plans: ``The C-17 is not the `solution'--there will 
     always be a need for a smaller, STOL (short take-off and 
     landing) aircraft that is technologically superior to the C-
     130.''\14\
       It is true that the C-17, with a minimum crew size of three 
     and low maintenance personnel requirements, will demand less 
     manpower than the C-5B, which has a minimum crew size of 
     seven or eight. Decreasing manpower adds to savings. The Air 
     Force claims that the C-17 option will require 15,000 fewer 
     personnel than the C-5 option. This accounts for some of the 
     alleged savings of the C-17 approach.
       But the major portion of the Air Force projections for C-17 
     savings comes not from C-17 operating and manpower economies 
     but from the cut in maintenance, operations, and manpower 
     costs if the C-141s and C-130s are retired. It makes little 
     economic sense, however, to purchase a new type of aircraft 
     to replace old ones when much of the existing fleet is still 
     capable of longer service at a relatively low cost.


                 the c-5 vs. the c-17: technical issues

       There are a number of technical issues involving the 
     relative merits of the C-17 or C-5 option. Among them:
       1. Design and Operational Concepts: Some critics of the C-
     17 argue that the design and operational concepts for the C-
     17 and C-5 are remarkably similar. The C-17 probably has a 
     capability advantage at the tactical airlift end of the 
     mission spectrum, while the C-5 has the advantage at the 
     strategic end.\15\
       2. Availability of Airfields: The C-5B requires runways 
     4,000 feet long and 150 feet wide for landing.\16\ But 
     Lockheed Corporation the manufacturer of the C-5B, claims 
     that recent tests of the wing-modified C-5A demonstrate the 
     ability of the C-5A and C-5B to land on runways only 3,000 
     feet in length.\17\ The design requirement for the C-17, on 
     the other hand, is the capability to land on runways 90 feet 
     wide and as short as 3,000 feet.\18\ Even if the C-5B still 
     needs 4,000 feet to land, operationally it barely will be at 
     a disadvantage compared to the C-17. The reason: only a tiny 
     fraction of airfields in Europe, Northeast Asia (Korea and 
     Japan), and Southwest Asia are between 3,000 and 4,000 feet 
     long and thus can accommodate the C-17 but not the C-5.\19\ 
     In Central America, however, three-quarters of all airfields 
     are shorter than 3,000 feet and thus can handle neither the 
     C-17 nor the C-5B. This is the case in many other Third World 
     countries.\20\
       3. Airfield Congestion and Obstacles: A major Air Force 
     argument for the C-17 is that because it is smaller than C-
     5B, it is less likely to cause congestion at airfields during 
     operations. This is undoubtedly true. Yet because the larger 
     C-5B delivers more cargo than the C-17 (261,000 lbs. vs. 
     172,200 lbs.), fewer C-5Bs than C-17s will be needed to 
     deliver the same load, thus decreasing congestion. Backups 
     are cut even further by the C-5s because their front and rear 
     loading doors allow them to move in and out of the airports 
     quickly.
       It is argued that trees, fences, and other obstacles at the 
     periphery of some narrow airfields in Europe can hinder C-5B 
     access because of its broad wingspan (228 feet compared to 
     165 feet for the C-17 and 195 feet for a Boeing 747 
     commercial jet). Trees and fences, however, can be removed 
     quickly. Preparing European airfields, and when necessary, 
     non-European allied airfields, for better use by the C-5B is 
     no major undertaking.


                     recommendations and proposals

       The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing bill is going to 
     force careful examination of all federal spending. The Air 
     Force thus needs an airlift-enhancement program that can be 
     sold to Congress as cost effective. If the program cannot be 
     sold, the entire effort to narrow and close the airlift gap 
     could be jeopardized. All airlift-enhancement proposals 
     should be constructed to get the most military capability for 
     the money spent. The guiding principle should be to establish 
     the strategic and military operational priorities for the 
     program, and then to find the most economical way to meet 
     these priorities.
       To do so, the Air Force should:
       1. Retain the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study goal 
     of 66 million-ton-miles-per day of airlift requirements. 
     There is a broad consensus behind this number. More 
     capability may be needed in the future, but the 66 MTM/D goal 
     appears adequate for the purposes of an affordable airlift 
     program.
       2. Cancel the C-17 program, build more C-5Bs and KC-10s, 
     and retire no C-130s.
       3. Retire and transfer no C-141s. Keep all 234 of them in 
     the active force by modifying them to extend their service 
     life. The entire C-141B fleet of 271 airplanes can be 
     extended 15 years for about $300 million.
       4. Consider developing a new short-range ``tactical'' 
     airlifter to replace the C-130. The Air Force will now know 
     more about this need after the completion sometime this fall 
     of the Pentagon's Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study 
     (WIMS), which will include an analysis of future U.S. 
     tactical airlift requirements.\21\ Because the U.S. needs a 
     robust tactical airlift capability, the current force of over 
     512 C-130s should be kept in place until a follow-up tactical 
     airlift is deployed to take its place. To do so, a service 
     life extension program will be required for the C-130.
       For the United States, whose military obligations are 
     spread across thousands of miles, the ability to fly troops, 
     supplies, and military equipment over great distances is 
     absolutely indispensable to its global strategy. The U.S. now 
     suffers from an airlift gap--and it must be closed. Yet the 
     Air Force's proposed new generation cargo plane, the C-17, 
     and the Airlift Master Plan are not the way to proceed. The 
     Administration should buy more C-5Bs instead of C-17s, while 
     moving rapidly to begin the development of a new generation 
     short-range tactical airlifter.--Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., Policy 
     Analyst.

                               footnotes

     1. Information provided by U.S. Air Force Military Airlift 
     Command.
     2. Final Report, Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, 
     Department of Defense, May 1981.
     3. U.S. Air Force Airlift Master Plan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
     Air Force, 1983), p. III-5. The million-ton-miles-per-day 
     (MTM/D) standard measure of capability combines the amount of 
     cargo moved (tons), the distance to be moved (miles), and the 
     time within which the movement is to be completed (days). A 
     follow-on study, Saber Challenge Lift, recommended that at 
     least half of the recommended 20 MTM/D additional airlift 
     capability be for outsize cargo such as tanks and 
     helicopters. The study recommended, moreover, that fast 
     sealift capabilities be * * * ed, ibid.
     4. Airlift Master Plan, p. III-5.
     5. U.S. General Accounting Office, ``The Department of 
     Defense Should Resolve Certain Issues concerning the C-X 
     Aircraft before Requesting Proposals from Industry for Its 
     Full-Scale Engineering Development (PSAD-81-B), Washington, 
     D.C., October 10, 1980.
     6. See Airlift Master Plan, pp. V-8-9.
     7. The C-5B is a modified version of the C-5A. Modifications 
     include a new engine (the General Electric TF-39-1C), new 
     wings, modernized avionics, and a fuselage structure 
     constructed from an aluminum alloy less conducive to 
     corrosion.
     8. Hearings, Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection, 
     U.S. Senate, March 7, 1985.
     9. Military Technology, Interview, August 1982, p. 87.
     10. Military Logistics Forum, July/August 1985, p. 23.
     11. Ibid.
     12. This figure is based on a Lockheed fixed unit price 
     proposal of around $100 million a copy (in 1984 dollars), 
     which includes Air Force add-on costs. The total then-year 
     cost is derived from a Selective Acquisition Report estimate 
     of $8.4 billion for 50 C-5Bs in then-year dollars. This puts 
     the unit cost of a C-5B at $168 million for a program funded 
     over the FY 1983-FY 1987 period. Adjusting for lower expected 
     inflation results in all estimated then-year cost of $155 
     million a copy for the C-5B, which compares favorably with 
     $180 million a unit for the C-17. Selective Acquisition 
     Report, Department of Defense, September 30, 1985.
     13. Information provided by Lockheed Corporation. It includes 
     cost of extending service life of C-141 from 45,000 hours to 
     60,000 hours.
     14. ``Army Operations Chief Says He's Tired of USAF's C-17,'' 
     Defense Week, February 14, 1983, p. 3.
     15. For a more complete comparison, see Jeffrey Record, U.S. 
     Strategic Airlift: Requirements and Capabilities (Cambridge, 
     Massachusetts and Washington, D.C.: Institute Foreign Policy 
     Analysis, 1985), Appendix B.
     16. Ibid., p. 44. Information also provided by U.S. Air 
     Force, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base.
     17. Record, op. cit., p. 29. Lockheed Corporation claims that 
     the C-5 can operate on dirt runways as well.
     18. Air Force, Military Airlift Command.
     19. Record, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
     20. As for the C-5B's wider runway requirement, it would be 
     more cost effective to widen runways by pouring more concrete 
     or laying metal planks to handle the C-5B's 150 feet runway 
     width requirement than to buy the C-17.
     21. The fact that no current or planned strategic airlifter 
     can operate on three-quarters of the airfields in Central 
     America is a powerful argument in favor of developing a new 
     tactical airlifter which can.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, to summarize, our bipartisan amendment reflects a 
position most of us were not prepared to endorse in the Armed Services 
Committee, because we did not have adequate information from the 
Defense Department. That information was made available shortly after 
our mark, and thanks to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], we 
were able to consider it.
  Now an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the Committee on Armed 
Services supports the Harman amendment.
  Let me underscore again that the cost of the Harman amendment and the 
cost of the committee mark are identical. The only issue is, how we 
spend that money. DOD has told us convincingly that it needs and can 
manage a program for 6 C-17s and that it would not know how to spend 
money and purchase four nondevelopmental aircraft, a part of the 
committee proposal. We who support this amendment believe that we are 
spending it in the wisest possible way, and I ask for your support.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] to close debate.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, let me just make a few wrap-up points.
  First of all, as to how many airplanes we buy because, as the 
chairman said, we have two well-considered choices before us. The 
committee's version right now would have us buy four a year. The 
Department of Defense says that will foreordain the result, because the 
cost will be so expensive, so inordinate at four a year, that trickling 
rate, that the price itself will cause us to quit the program.
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Gephardt].
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  It just makes common sense to me to vote this amendment. The Pentagon 
and the company involved have been working on this vociferously for 
some time. They have reached an agreement. Let us honor that agreement 
and let us find out if we can produce this plane at a reasonable cost.
  If we cannot, then we will decide that. But if we can, we save the 
$15 billion that we have already spent that we would lose if we 
terminate this program and do not honor that agreement.
  Let us honor that contract. It is the only sensible thing to do.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The time of the gentlewoman 
from California [Ms. Harman] has expired.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Let me simply say, we have two proposals, the committee proposition 
and the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Harman].
  What we attempted to do was not to say four in perpetuity. We said 
over the next 2 years, for each year for 2 years and then make a 
judgment.
  The amendment says six this year, eight next year. Remember, this 
only works in the context of the settlement. The settlement has not 
been dealt with.
  I would suggest to Members that this is where the real contentious 
issues and contentious arguments really are going to fall.
  Whether Members fall on their swords about four or six, that is not 
the most compelling issue here. This only makes sense within the 
framework of the settlement.
  We have to face up to that. My colleagues ought to make a judgment. I 
ask them to stay with the House and with the position articulated by 
the House Committee on Armed Services.
  Ms. DeLauro. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Harman 
amendment, and in support of the C-17. Our military experience during 
the past few years points to the clear need for a strong airlift 
capability. It is a question of strategic necessity; of logistics; and 
of saving lives.
  Recent history has taught us that we may need, at any time, to put 
U.S. forces in distant places, quickly, with the right equipment. The 
effectiveness of our troops and their ability to perform their mission 
depends on the right equipment. More importantly, so does their safety. 
That is why we need the C-17.
  Examples of where we could have used the C-17's enormous capabilities 
are numerous, and the names familiar: Mogadishu, Sarajevo, Desert 
Storm. In Mogadishu, we could have doubled the amount of equipment we 
delivered in support of our troops and for humanitarian aid with the C-
17. The consequences of not having this capability are clear: Time and 
lives can be lost.
  According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the C-17 is 
the only aircraft for this job. It delivers four times the payload of 
the C-130; it can land at small airfields that cannot be used by 
current U.S. military transport planes; it can discharge its payloads 
quickly; and it can fly much further than other military transport 
planes.
  This is a controversial plane. No question. But the controversy is 
about the program, not the need. The program has been cleaned up, at no 
cost to American taxpayers. But the need is still with us--perhaps now 
more than ever.
  We must support our fighting men and women. Let us make sure they 
have the best support, the best logistics, and access to all the 
equipment they need to do the job--no matter where they are. Support 
our troops and the dangerous work they do. Support the C-17.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of the bipartisan 
Harman-Horn-McCurdy-Saxton-Spratt-Johnson-Talent amendment which will 
increase the number of C-17 transport aircraft authorized in the 
defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1995 from four to six and 
provide funds for eight aircraft in long lead procurement. The C-17 is 
the cornerstone of our airlift modernization program to replace older 
aircraft now nearing the end of their useful life. The Harman amendment 
restores President Clinton's original budget request funding level, and 
keeps our airlift modernization program on schedule.
  The C-17 is an essential air transport program that is designed to 
meet our Nation's airlift needs well into the 21st century. Defense 
Secretary William Perry recently said:

       Our Nation has a critical need for intertheater airlift 
     modernization if we are to maintain our ability to project 
     forces and respond to humanitarian missions worldwide. Our C-
     141 aircraft are wearing out. The C-17 aircraft continues to 
     be the most cost-effective means to meet current and 
     projected airlift requirements. The C-17's ability to deliver 
     outsize cargo, combined with its special capability to use 
     austere fields, will provide us with modern, highly capable 
     strategic airlift.

  The characteristics of the C-17 far outweigh those of other aircraft 
including the C-5 and the C-141. The C-17 can land on shorter runways 
and is more maneuverable on the ground than the larger C-5 that 
requires excessively long and wide runways. In many developing 
countries and remote areas where we are witnessing small, contingent 
conflicts, the C-5 is too large to be deployed. The C-141, on the other 
hand, cannot carry critical outsized cargo such as tanks, helicopters, 
and large vehicles and artillery. Canceling the C-17 or limiting its 
production will not solve the problem of aging aircraft now in service, 
such as the C-141. For example, Army units deployed to Panama in 1989 
were carried entirely by air, and United States airlift assets were 
totally employed. The massive military airlift to the Persian Gulf 
during the Persian Gulf war put heavy additional stress on certain 
models of C-141's and probably shortened their remaining service life. 
If our Nation is to remain a world power, we need a reliable and 
dependable airlift to carry troops, supplies and system weapons, as 
well as humanitarian supplies during major disasters.
  Many of my colleagues may argue that this program is over-budgeted. 
As a member of the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, I believe that 
controlling cost on weapons programs is critical. The House Armed 
Services Committee, Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, and the Air 
Force have placed firm conditions on the C-17 aircraft program to 
reduce the overall costs, and ensure that it is cost efficient and 
meets the Air Force's performance requirements. Reducing the production 
rate from six aircraft to four aircraft would dramatically undercut the 
Department of Defense's strategy to control costs on the C-17, and 
possibly make it unaffordable. Any further reduction in the C-17 
production rate would drastically increase the annual unit costs of 
this program by $40 to $50 million. We cannot afford to keep scaling 
back programs like the C-17 and still make this program affordable. In 
addition, we must hold the contractor accountable and demand that the 
aircraft is operational and manufacturing inefficiencies are corrected.
  Over the years, we have invested $15.8 million in the C-17 transport 
program. By purchasing 6 aircraft in fiscal year 1995 and 8 of them in 
fiscal year 1996, the Air Force may round out its buy to what it calls 
a minimum viable force of 40 airplanes. And, with 40 C-17's, the Air 
Force can satisfy the minimum requirements for outsize cargo capacity.
  The Harman amendment will also fully fund the Air Force's request to 
try out nondevelopmental aircraft such as the 747's or newly produced 
C5B's. The procurement of nondevelopmental aircraft is still an open 
option for the Air Force.
  There is another key issue that I want to raise today, and that is 
jobs. My State of California, and Los Angeles County in particular, has 
been exceptionally hard hit by defense downsizing and layoffs. There 
are over 10,000 Californians employed by the prime contractor on this 
defense program, and 8,000 California subcontractors. In March of this 
year, California's unemployment rate reached 8.6 percent--2.1 percent 
higher than the national average of 6.5 percent. During the same 
period, Los Angeles County's unemployment was 9.4 percent--among the 
highest in the Nation. We can ill-afford to lose more jobs.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment today restores funding for this vital 
program that is not only important to the Los Angeles area, but to the 
Nation as well. With broad-based bipartisan support, I am pleased to 
join my colleagues in casting my vote for the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-
Saxton-Spratt-Johnson-Talent amendment to the defense authorization 
bill.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, while I have concerns about the C-17 
program, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch and Secretary of 
Defense William Perry have addressed them, and so I rise today in 
support of the amendment offered by my colleagues from California, Ms. 
Harman and Mr. Horn. As I am sure my colleagues are aware, this 
amendment would provide the authorization for full funding for six C-17 
aircraft for fiscal year 1995, as well as long lead funding for eight 
aircraft in fiscal year 1996.
  Mr. Chairman, the C-17 aircraft will meet the increasingly changing 
needs of the U.S. military in the post-cold war era. As demonstrated by 
the Desert Storm operation, there is a necessity for the military to be 
able to quickly transport combat power directly to the front line. 
According to General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, ``Today 
there is only one alternative that can meet the requirements of a core 
airlifter--the C-17.''
  Mr. Chairman, the C-17's capabilities are crucial to the Air Force's 
ability to deliver and sustain forces in support of theatre commanders. 
The C-17 can carry outsize cargo to give early forces firepower; it can 
deliver its cargo into remote locations with short runways; and it has 
the ability to airdrop heavy equipment, supplies, and troops.
  The importance of the C-17 aircraft has been recognized by the 
President of the United States and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Each has gone on record supporting the restoration of the budget 
request for six C-17's in fiscal year 1995.
  Mr. Chairman, I would also like to register my strong opposition to 
the amendment offered by the distinguished gentlelady from Oregon [Ms. 
Furse]. The Furse amendment flies in the face of every recommendation 
from the senior commanders of the U.S. military. More importantly, the 
Furse amendment will do nothing but waste resources and eliminate jobs. 
If the Furse amendment is agreed to, a projected 8,000 layoffs will 
occur over the next 2 years. A vote for the Furse amendment is a vote 
against jobs, a vote against the American worker.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to 
support the Harman amendment. Supporting the C-17 is the right thing to 
do.
  Mr. WHEAT. Mr. Chairman, allow me to first of all commend Chairman 
Dellums for his hard work in crafting the fiscal year 1995 Defense 
authorization bill and moving it to the floor so expeditiously.
  I particularly applaud the Chairman for convening a recent hearing on 
C-17 procurement to get the facts out on the program. And it is this 
important issue that I would like to comment on today.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to add my strong support to the Harman amendment 
to restore funds for the C-17 program.
  There is little debate about the vital need to modernize our 
military's lift capability. The question revolves around how best to 
meet that need.
  Among our Nation's top civilian and military experts, the answer to 
that question is clear. The C-17--and only the C-17--meets the high 
demands and the core strategic airlift requirements for our forces in 
the post-Cold War era.
  It is the only transport aircraft that meets these demands today and 
into the future.
  Mr. Chairman, the C-17 program has undergone program improvements 
over the last year. In fact, it has met all of the mandates set out in 
last year's defense authorization bill. Efficiency is going up, costs 
are going down.
  We should not penalize the C-17 program for meeting the goals we have 
set. We should not phase out this program which has the unified support 
of our military and civilian leadership. We should not turn our backs 
on a $15.8 billion investment that American taxpayers have already 
made.
  The need for the strategic airlift capability represented by the C-17 
is critical and it is growing. As regional crises erupt across the 
globe and our own forces are drawn down, only the C-17 offers the 
unique ability to deliver outsized cargo such as tanks and helicopters 
to austere environments.
  According to the DOD's Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis, 
the C-17 is the most cost-effective solution to filling a clear and 
compelling need.
  The C-17 program is a critical element to U.S. defense modernization 
in our changing world. It is also vital to thousands of people in 
Missouri and elsewhere who are working hard to produce a quality 
product for our Nation's Armed Forces at an affordable price.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to approve the Harman 
amendment, reject the Furse amendment, and restore full funding for six 
C-17 aircraft.
  Ms. LONG. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Harman 
amendment to the Department of Defense [DOD] authorization bill (H.R. 
4301) to increase the number of C-17 transport aircraft authorized in 
the bill from four to six.
  The increased number of C-17's represents what was included in the 
President's fiscal year 1995 budget request. Funds for the additional 
aircraft will be offset by reductions in other defense programs.
  I fully recognize that the C-17 program has had its share of 
timetable and budgetary difficulties in the recent past. However, since 
the Congress voted in 1992 to require the Department of Defense to 
report to the Congress on the viability of terminating the project we 
have seen marked improvements to the management of the C-17 program.
  There is no doubt that there remains much room for improvement. 
However, I believe that we should allow time for additional 
improvements--some of which have already been implemented--to take 
effect and to determine whether these improvements benefit the 
program's timeliness and cost-effectiveness. By placing the C-17 
program on probation, while supporting the administration's request, we 
will send the DoD a signal that future congressional support for the C-
17 program will depend upon the degree to which improvements have been 
made during the next year. Furthermore, this policy will ensure that we 
are not prematurely abandoning a technological development which could 
prove to be the most advantageous to our Nation's Armed Forces during 
future military contingencies.

                              {time}  1630

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 330, 
noes 100, not voting 8, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 195]

                               AYES--330

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Derrick
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Fish
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoke
     Holden
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Huffington
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kyl
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lightfoot
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Mineta
     Minge
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Myers
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Sabo
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Underwood (GU)
     Upton
     Valentine
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walsh
     Waters
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                               NOES--100

     Abercrombie
     Applegate
     Barca
     Barcia
     Becerra
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Darden
     Deal
     DeFazio
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Edwards (CA)
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Fingerhut
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gekas
     Gillmor
     Goodling
     Gutierrez
     Hamburg
     Hoekstra
     Inslee
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnston
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klug
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     Maloney
     Mann
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     McDermott
     McKinney
     McMillan
     Meehan
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Moakley
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Olver
     Pallone
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Regula
     Ridge
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rush
     Sanders
     Schaefer
     Schroeder
     Sensenbrenner
     Shepherd
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Swift
     Synar
     Taylor (MS)
     Unsoeld
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Walker
     Watt
     Waxman
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Grandy
     Horn
     Ortiz
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Washington

                              {time}  1710

  Mr. PALLONE and Mr. McMILLAN changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Mr. PETRI changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. LaRocco). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Oregon.
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention at this time to offer 
my C-17 amendment, but I would like to take a few moments to speak 
about that amendment and why I think it is still relevant. I believe 
that it would have provided more airlift sooner and done it cheaper. 
With my plan the airlift we need could have been provided for $16 
billion less than the Department of Defense's plan. Mine would have 
provided for a total of 32 C-17's, and we would have got our remaining 
airlift that we need from commercial and military alternatives.
  When any of us goes shopping, Mr. Chairman, we look for value, and 
defense spending is no different. We need to get the best value out of 
every defense dollar. But it we continue on an excessive and 
unnecessary course, the American taxpayers do not get value, they get 
soaked.
  We have military needs that we cannot afford right now: Communities 
facing base closure, veterans health care in which we must spend our 
military dollars more wisely so we meet our needs. There are several 
concerns I would have addressed in my amendment.
  One is jobs. I think people fail to realize that my alternative, Mr. 
Chairman, would have created thousands of jobs through a building of 
the Boeing 747, the Lockheed C-5 or the McDonnell Douglas MD-11. And 
then we must talk about military needs. If we spend all our airlift 
dollars on the C-17, we will not have enough money to replace our 
airlift needs when we lay down the C-141's.
  Our shortfall, Mr. Chairman, is in bulk and oversize capability. Now 
the existing commercial wide body plans, such as the 747, the MD-11 or 
the DC-10 could provide that shortfall, and it seems to me that, if the 
shortfall is there, we should be providing it there, not putting it on 
into a C-17 program which does not provide our airlift.
  Then there is another requirement we have been told about, and that 
is that the C-17 can land on austere fields. Well, I checked with the 
Department of Defense, and there is a report that states that the C-17 
can land in only 5 percent more airfields than the C-5, and the C-5 can 
land on dirt, and the C-17 cannot. Our alternative wide body commercial 
and military planes can travel farther than the C-17 with much greater 
payloads.
  I say to my colleagues, ``If you take a payload of 75 tons, which the 
C-17 can carry, it can only go 2,000 miles. The C-5 with the same 
payload can go 3,000 miles. The MD-11, same payload, 3,800 miles. And 
the 747 gets 6,400 miles with the same payload.'' So, I think we get 
more with my amendment of 32 C-17's and the rest in other outside 
airlift.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] and the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. Furse] 
that I hope that today's vote will not be seen as a repudiation of the 
committee's work in developing the notion of a nondevelopmental 
aircraft because in my judgment, looking at this budget over the next 5 
or 6 years, we are going to have a very hard time coming up with enough 
money for airlift.
  So, I commend the chairman for putting forward this notion, and it 
was also encompassed in the bill by the gentlewoman from California 
[Ms. Harman]. But I think we have got to continue to look at that 
option, and I certainly hope that the administration will look at it as 
well because, when we look at the money for airlift, it simply is not 
there unless we have a supplement to the C-17.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield further to my colleague, the gentlewoman from 
Oregon [Ms. Furse].
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to close by saying that 
good government is about making wise choices. We must remember that it 
is the taxpayer who pays the cost of unwise choices. That, I believe, 
is why the National Taxpayers Union and Citizens Against Government 
Waste endorse my amendment.
  I think the C-17 is a flawed program. I think there are less risky 
military and commercial alternatives available to us. However, Mr. 
Chairman, I bow to the will of the House, and I withdraw my amendment.
  Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, it is said that those who do not study 
history are doomed to repeat it. On May 12, 1987, I stood in this very 
spot to offer virtually the same amendment as my colleague from Oregon. 
My amendment failed to pass. Very rarely in life are we granted the 
opportunity for a second chance, an opportunity to fix our mistakes. 
But, now, this body has the chance to correct itself. The C-17 was 
waste of taxpayer funds then, in 1987, and it remains a waste of 
taxpayer funds now, in 1994.
  In 1987, the C-17 was already behind schedule, already over cost, and 
far from being anything other than a paper airplane. How, in 1994, and 
C-17 is behind schedule by years, over cost by billions, the Air Force 
is cutting deals with the contractor to keep him solvent, and although 
the paper airplane is finally flying, the tail has almost fallen off; 
it has stalled in midflight and, because the pilot was unaware of the 
situation, the plane nearly crashed; it attempted to take off with only 
three engines, a maneuver most any plane can perform, failed to have 
sufficient power for the takeoff, and its fuselage scraped the ground; 
jump testing has recently been halted due to parachutists crashing into 
the vertical stabilizer; and, in the most recent incident, the brakes 
burned up on an emergency landing. The paper airplane of 1987 is now a 
metal airplane that really should still be a paper airplane.
  There is no question that the Nation needs more airlift. As we 
drawdown our forward deployed forces we must have the capability to 
rapidly move equipment and personnel to the battle sight. The Air Force 
has singled out the C-17 as being uniquely capable of accessing more 
runways than the current C-5 and thus more capable of delivering this 
timely, critical cargo. But the Rand Corp. says this is overstated 
because the C-17 requires a much stronger runway than the C-5. The 
Armed Services Committee performed a study that verifies this Rand 
finding. The Committee study documented that the C-17 and C-5 could 
land at about the same number of runways. In fact, the recent failure 
to take off with only three engines leads many experts to believe that 
the C-17 will not be able to meet the requirement of operating off of a 
3,000 foot runway. And, the same argument that I used in 1987 remains 
true today: the Air Force will not take this $400 million aircraft into 
the front lines.
  The most rapid response to a crisis is through airlift. We must 
improve our airlift capabilities, but the C-17 is not the best 
solution.
  The original proposal was to buy 210 C-17s. The previous 
administration realized this was unaffordable at the enormous unit cost 
of almost $400 million each, and lowered the proposal to 120 aircraft. 
Now, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command has 
testified before my Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations that he only 
really needs 60 or 65 and that other aircraft, C-5s or commercial 
widebodies, could perform the mission. And even this number, 60 to 65 
aircraft, is only to establish a new core airlifter, not because the C-
17 is currently the best alternative available. Even the Secretary of 
Defense's most recent selected acquisition report, the SAR, gives the 
number of C-17s to be procured as 40, rather than 120. Citing this SAR, 
the Air Force has been unable to provide the Armed Services Committee 
with updated cost data for the C-17 past fiscal year 1996.

  There have also been tremendous alterations in the military 
specifications for the C-17. Basically, its payload capability has been 
severely decreased and its takeoff and landing distance has been 
greatly increased. When the plane couldn't meet the military 
requirements, the Air Force simply reduced the requirements.
  Since May 13, 1987 I have kept a record of all the problems 
associated with the C-17. Let me cite a few highlights:

       A March 1989 headline reports'' the Air Force Is Stretching 
     [C-17] Production to Cut Budget.''
       A June 1989 headline reports ``Software Problems Lead to 
     Massive C-17 Cost Overruns.''
       Another June 1989 headline reports ``Lukewarm Support for 
     C-17 Could Spell Doom for Costly Transport.''
       A July 1989 headline reports the Air Force ``May Give the 
     C-17 a New Job Description.''
       An October 1989 headline reports the C-17 ``Will Have to 
     Lose Weight to Meet Performance Specifications.''


                                  1990

       A February 1990 headline reports that ``Half of McDonnell's 
     C-17 Tools Defective.''
       February 1990 headline reports ``Pentagon Admits C-17 is $4 
     Billion Over Its Budget.''


                                  1991

       A January 1991 headline reports ``Massive Cost Overruns in 
     C-17 Program Raise Specter of Termination.''
       An April 1991 headline reports that ``Air Force Eases C-17 
     Payload Requirements.''
       Another April headline in Air Force Times states ``C-17 
     Standards Cut to Lower Price, MAC Chief Says.''
       A July 1991 headline reports that the ``Air Force is 
     Reluctant to Land C-17 Near Front.''


                                  1992

       April headline says ``Persistent Fuel Leaks in C-17 Test 
     Aircraft Pose Troublesome Hurdle for Air Force.''


                                  1993

       A March 1993 headline reports ``C-17 Cost Rises As 
     Deliveries Slip.''
       An April 1993 headline reports, ``C-17 Cargo Jet Nearly 
     Fell During Test.''
       Another April headline reads, ``Pentagon to Consider 
     Terminating C-17 As Part of Upcoming DAB Review.''
       Another April headline reports, ``Management Miscues, 
     Delays Snarl C-17 Program.''
       A July 1993 headline says, ``Most C-17 Test Aircraft Have 
     Substantial Fuel Leaks.'' This is the same headline as in 
     April of 1992.
       An August 1993 headline states, ``Pentagon, Industry Abuzz 
     About Possible New C-17 Wing Test Problem.''


                            and now in 1994

       Just two and a half months ago a headline reads, ``C-17 
     Belly-flops On Runway in Botched Operational Test.''
       And just last month headlines said, ``C-17 Needs New 
     Software Laws for Heavy Braking Situations.''

  The point is, Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on citing examples of 
problems with this program. Cost overrun problems, scheduling problems, 
design problems, technical problems, and management problems.
  In 1987, during debate, my colleague from Georgia, Ed Jenkins, said 
that the C-17 was ``nothing more than a Town Car for the Air Force!'' 
Well, Mr. Speaker, now the C-17 can no longer even live up to that 
label. It can best be described as a broken-down Edsel.
  Numerous committees in this House have held countless hearings on 
this program. I would suggest that there probably have been more 
hearings held on this program in the last 5 years than any other single 
Department of Defense program. These hearings were held not to 
determine the need for more airlift capability, but to see if there was 
any way to salvage this troubled program. I would also speculate that 
the majority of Members who have sat through these hearings, deep in 
their hearts, realize there is no way to effectively salvage this 
program and we should move on before we waste any more of the 
taxpayers' money.
  The proposed Furse amendment would expand what the Armed Services 
Committee has done by directing the savings from the C-17 into the 
nondevelopmental aircraft account. This is how we should be addressing 
our airlift shortfall. Recent Air Force tests have proven to the Air 
Force that commercial wide-bodies can be loaded and offloaded much more 
efficiently than they originally projected. Also, it has been reported 
that at least 11 contractor teams have responded to the Air Force's 
request for nondevelopment airlift aircraft. Better alternatives are 
out there and we should not spend another dollar on the C-17.
  The time has come for this House to make the proper decision, a 
decision that should have been made many years ago. Forget this $40 
billion boondoggle. Take these precious funds and direct them toward 
the procurement of a nondevelopment airlifter. The cancellation of this 
program and the subsequent directing of these funds to escalate a 
nondevelopmental airlift program, be it C-5's or commercial wide 
bodies, is the most cost effective, time efficient, and logical method 
for increasing and improving our airlift capabilities.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. 
Furse], and I appreciate the integrity of her remarks.
  Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
McDermott) having assumed the chair, Mr. LaRocco, Chairman pro tempore 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, had 
come to no resolution thereon.

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