[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 66 (Tuesday, May 24, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4301).
{time} 1453
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the
bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for
military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, with
Mr. Mazzoli, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose
earlier today, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah [Mr.
Hansen] printed in part 2 of House Report 103-520 had been disposed of.
Pursuant to the order of the House, it is now in order to debate the
subject of the C-17 aircraft.
Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]
will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Barca of Wisconsin was allowed to speak
out of order.)
announcing the birth of ann elizabeth barrett
Mr. BARCA of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I have an important
announcement. It is my great pleasure to be able to announce, for
purposes of reinforcing the family values that this House believes in,
that our colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett] and his
wife, Kristine, were blessed early this morning with a new baby girl.
Her name is Ann Elizabeth, and I would ask my colleagues to join me in
celebrating the birth of Ann Elizabeth to the Barretts.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes of the 30 minutes which
has been allocated to me to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman
from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], and I ask unanimous consent that the
gentleman be allowed to control that 15-minute block of time as he sees
fit.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] will be recognized for 15 minutes, the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] will be recognized for 15
minutes, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be
recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Darden].
(Mr. DARDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, it is said that those who do not study
history are doomed to repeat it; 7 years and 12 days ago I stood in
this spot and asked my colleagues to delete funding for the C-17
aircraft. We stated at that time that the plane was a paper airplane
and would never fly. Very rarely in life are we granted an opportunity
for a second chance and an opportunity to correct our mistakes. But now
today we have a chance and a choice to slow down this aircraft and
hopefully reexamine its efficiency.
In 1987 the C-17 was already behind schedule, already over budget and
far from being anything other than a paper airplane. Now, in 1994, the
C-17 is behind schedule by years, over cost by billions, the Department
of Defense is cutting deals with a contractor, and I do not know if the
plane is flying. The tail has almost fallen off. It has scraped its
belly on the runway during takeoff. Parachutists are not allowed to
jump out of it, and the brakes burn when it tries to land. The paper
airplane of 1987 is now a metal airplane that really should still be a
paper airplane.
And now, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about adding on to the modest
committee proposal and trying to spend even more money for this
boondoggle? Mr. Chairman, this is pure folly, and I want to commend the
chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dellums] in his approach to funding for the C-17 and strongly oppose
any efforts to increase what has already been done responsibly by the
Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. Saxton].
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the C-17 program and
to note that later today we are going to have an opportunity to vote on
two programs, one that would buy four C-17's in the next fiscal year
and three or four other types of airplanes, commercial derivatives, if
my colleagues will, or to buy six C-17's, and of course, as most of my
colleagues know, I support the latter proposal, and the reason I do so
is because we know that the C-141 fleet has got to be replaced. It was
originally built in the 1960's with 1950's technology, and that
technology is now old and needs to be replaced. In addition, the cargo
that we need to carry into theater today is larger cargo than before,
and so we need a new vehicle to get it there.
Now some of our good friends in the military who have some stature
have come to some conclusions about this. General Shalikashvili, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says this:
Today there is only one alternative that can meet the
requirements of a core airlifter, the C-17.
He goes on to say:
The continuing myths of service life extension program for
the C-141 or the ability of a commercial derivative to meet
the needs of a core airlifted are just that, myths.
{time} 1500
Then we have heard from General Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the
Army. He says very simply, the C-17 is the only aircraft that can get
the Army's outside combat system to the next war when required.
We have heard from General Hoar, the commander of CENCOM, and he says
very simply, in the foreseeable future, the C-17 is the only airplane
acting as the Nation's core military airlifter that can provide the
capability and flexibility that we need.
So these people have come to some conclusions, and I think for some
very good reasons. There are three reasons why I think we should
support the Harman amendment this afternoon to increase the buy to six.
One is that we all know we need more airlift. We need more outsized
airlift, and we need more airlift that is designed specifically for
military purposes. That is simple. That is reason No. 1.
No. 2, buying six units instead of four decreases the unit price. The
estimates are between $30 and $40 million a copy. Now, that is a
powerful lot of money. One of the things that happened to some other
weapons system programs was that we brought the buys down so low that
it got so expensive per unit that none of us could support them. So it
is important to keep our economy of scale at the right place.
The third reason we should support the buy of six, not four and four,
is that the contractor or, McDonnell-Douglas, has stated that it can do
certain things in production models of this aircraft, and the only way
to make them prove that they can do it is to give them the opportunity
to provide for us the number of units that will bring that about.
So, for those three reasons, the C-17 and its capabilities of
airdrop, its capabilities of providing a safety structure for troops
that we send into battle. There is a dual facet safety concern here.
One concern, of course, is getting the troops to the theater on time,
recognizing that when they get in theater it is a very rough place to
be, and so redundant systems have been built into the C-17 to make them
safer.
But just as importantly, and maybe more importantly, we have to
transport the materiel that these troops need there, and these are big
systems, helicopter, troop carriers, Patriot missile systems. The C-17
can do that. It is the only airplane on the books, on the drawing board
or elsewhere, that can deliver troops and the goods, the materials, the
weapon systems, they need at the same time into the theater safely.
Finally, the large outsized cargo issue is a very important one. The
C-5B is a great airplane and can carry that same cargo, almost the same
tonnage. But it cannot land and it cannot service the same troops in
the same theaters of operation that the C-17 can, primarily because the
C-5 takes longer to land, twice as long, twice as much distance, as
well as takes up too much room on the ground when it gets there. We can
fit five C-17's in the same space we can fit four C-5's, a very
important issue.
Finally, and the last point I would make, is that once the C-17's are
on-line, they are much more economical to operate. They are modern
technology, not 1950's technology. The crew is three people, not six
people, as is the case with the C-5B commercial wide bodies.
So for all of these reasons, I hope that in about an hour so we will
have a opportunity to vote on the Harman amendment, and I ask all my
colleagues to support it.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Fazio].
Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the C-17 and urge my
colleagues to support the Harman amendment and oppose the Furse
amendment.
I want to stipulate, I have one constituent employed on this
aircraft's production. I got interested in this plane as a member of
the Committee on Armed Services 15 long years ago. It is not something
that is a recent interest of mine. While I learned about it from
constituents who are with the Military Airlift Command at Travis Air
Force Base, it is really an airplane that serves the needs of the Army.
We are here because as we bring home our troops from overseas, we
have got to have military airlift capability to be in those places for
peacekeeping or for humanitarian purposes that we deem important. I
think as we saw what happened to our troops in Somalia, we understood
how vulnerable they could be without armor, without personnel carriers,
without tanks. We simply have to have the ability to go to places in
the world that cannot be served by the larger C-5 aircraft which are
now the mainstay of MAC.
This aircraft can get in 9,000 more runways worldwide, giving us the
ability to respond with more effective measures, more quickly.
The question is whether or not this aircraft has been developed to
the point where it lives up to its potential. I believe it has. And if
we procure six aircraft at a cost that is available in the Armed
Services authorization bill, we will know whether or not we can go
ahead and procure what is a reduced number of aircraft, but still a
substantial number of aircraft, at an affordable price. If we come
forward with four and not six, the unit costs skyrocket and our ability
to afford this airplane, which we need, is going to go out the window.
We have reduced our overseas facilities by 50 percent already. Eighty
percent of the Army troops are going to be on American soil by 1997. If
we want to be able to project them where we must around the world, we
need the C-17.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the C-17 and urge my colleagues to
support the Harman amendment and oppose the Furse amendment.
The C-17 will provide the armed forces with a critical capability
that they currently do not have.
The C-17 has the ability to land on smaller runways and maneuver on
smaller taxiways and ramps. This capability means that the C-17 will
have access to 9,000 more runways worldwide, making our response
capability more effective and far-reaching.
The C-17's small austere airfield capabilities expand the options
available to planners and operators conducting all airlift missions. It
will substantially enhance our ability to respond to remote locations
which will have a direct positive impact on peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions.
I know there have been concerns about the C-17 program, but it is
important to know that substantial corrections in program management
and execution have been made. The C-17 program has successfully
undergone exhaustive reviews by DOD, Defense Science Board, and
independent agencies. The C-17 program is back on track.
However, the production rate of six aircraft in fiscal year 1995 is
essential. If we do not restore the production level to six aircraft,
the impact will be an increase of $40 to $50 million in the unit cost
of the plane. We simply cannot afford this added cost.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, as we base more of our troops in the United
States, our airlift capability becomes even more important. The Army
states that by 1997, 80 percent of Army troops will be stationed on
American soil. We simply cannot reduce or eliminate our modern airlift
capability in light of these changes. As General Shalikashvili recently
wrote, ``there is only one alternative that can meet the requirements
of a core airlifter--the C-17.''
We need the C-17. Defeat the Furse amendment and support the Harman
amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri [Mr. Talent].
Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the Harman amendment which will
be offered in about an hour to raise the number of C-17's we will buy
this year from four to six. It is not a parochial amendment. This is
not a partisan issue. That amendment will be supported I hope and
expect by a broad coalition of Members, from liberal Democrats to
conservative Republicans, from the top officials of the current
administration to the leading members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
C-17 is a plane that was supported fully by the top officials of the
last administration. There is a reason why there is such broad-based
support for this plane and why I believe there will be broad-based
support for the buy of six in the House, and that is quite simply this:
It makes enormous strategic sense, no matter what your view is of where
America's military should go.
There is no question we are downsizing now, that we are moving back
from forward bases, that we are going to end up with a military which
has smaller numbers and more people concentrated in the United States.
If we are to be a hemispheric power, if we are to continue being a
world power, no matter what your view of American foreign policy should
be, we have got to be able to get people from the United States to
places around the world, whether for Desert Storm-like contingencies,
or peacekeeping in Somalia or the Balkans, wherever you think we ought
to be, we have got to get them from here to there. The only way to do
that is to increase the lift that is accessible to them. And it is by
far true, I think it is self-evidently true, that the C-17, if it
works, is the best way of achieving that.
So whether you are for, and I am one of those people that believes we
need to increase the amount of money that we are putting into the
defense budget as opposed to what we have now planned over the next few
years, or whether you are a person who believes that what the
administration is planning to do is about right, whatever you think,
Mr. Chairman, the C-17 is at the crux of our plans for the American
military over the next few years.
The Department of Defense has a carefully tailored plan to buy six
this year and six next year. This is the minimum that is necessary. The
Harman amendment would not cost any more money. We are just
reallocating. I urge the House to support it when it comes up in a hour
or so.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly].
(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Harman
amendment to restore from four to six the number of C-17 aircraft
authorized for fiscal year 1995. Not only is the C-17 currently being
produced at a rate of six aircraft a year, it is done so with improved
efficiency and decreasing cost. Was there a problem early on on the C-
17 with wings? Yes. Was this problem addressed and resolved? Yes. Is
this any longer an issue? No. To cite such an example as problemmatic
today is a bogus argument and does not represent responsible, honest
debate.
The program has undergone exhaustive review by both government and
industry. Structural experts agree--C-17 testing has verified wing
structures meet military strength requirements. In addition, aircraft
delivery schedule and quality commitments are improving at all levels.
The future of air-deployable combat units rests largely with
continued and successful production of the C-17. The military's airlift
requirements have changed and they are unique.
The C-17 is the only aircraft in production that can carry outsize
cargo and has the versatility to rapidly reconfigure to carry vehicles,
cargo, passengers, medical equipment and patients, or to perform
airdrop missions. I urge my colleagues to consider this issue
carefully.
Do not vote to send our troops, our young soldiers, into military
crises on outdated aircraft whose capabilities are ill-suited to the
missions of tomorrow. I urge my colleagues to support the Harman
amendment. Sunday, I talked to our Under Secretary of the Air Force, a
woman of impeccable academic reputation. She pledged to me this plane
is now a safe plane, a needed plane, and we must have it for our
airlift.
{time} 1510
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Lewis].
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for
yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I serve on the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations that deals with defense. I am not a member of the
authorizing committee, and normally I would not rise to take the time
of the authorizing committee.
But we have a very, very important amendment coming to us later in
the day that addresses the future of the C-17. There is little doubt
that most of us recognize that before the end of the century over 80
percent of our troops will be here at home rather than stationed
overseas. But America is going to continue to be a leader in the world.
To be able to defend democracy, we have got to be able to deliver our
materiel to our troops at foreign locations in times of crisis.
Above and beyond that, in our committee we constantly are talking
about the fact that it is important in terms of shrinking budgets that
we keep ourselves on the cutting edge of technology.
I would say, in terms of the C-17, all the technology in the world is
going to do us no good if we cannot get our equipment there.
Mr. Chairman, I am speaking today, however, because among those
Members who worked as hard as anyone in support of the C-17, our
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] has been a leader
among those Members. Unfortunately, while he gave an extended
discussion on the floor on Friday night, on Saturday morning he had to
go to the hospital for surgery. So today I am suggesting to my
colleagues, please be aware of the work of the gentleman from
California [Mr. Horn]. His efforts have made a tremendous difference in
this debate.
If he were here today, he would say the following:
For those who do not pretend expertise on this subject, listen to the
military experts. Secretary Dick Cheney: ``It is an absolutely vital
strategic asset, regardless of what size force we have in the long
term.''
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: ``The C-17 aircraft continues to be the
most cost-effective means to meet current and projected aircraft
requirements.''
Brigadier General John Handy: ``Something like Somalia would have
been a heck of a lot easier with the C-17 for planners in our
organization.''
All of the experts support the C-17 and know of its critical
interest.
Mr. Chairman, I urge Members, along with my colleague, the gentleman
from California [Mr. Horn], to join me in supporting the Harman
amendment today on the floor.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Texas, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson.
Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong
support of the C-17 transport program. This is an issue of
accountability. We must be accountable to our military troops, and to
the taxpayers.
When our Nation sends our sons and daughters and grandsons and
granddaughters, nineteen and twenty years old, to defend us, we should
provide them equipment with top speed, efficiency, safety, and
flexibility.
The military's top generals, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
the President, all agree that the C-17 is the only alternative that
meets the necessary requirements.
Mr. Chairman, we have invested $15.8 billion in the C-17 program, an
essential investment to ensure that our military can rapidly deploy all
of the equipment that is imperative when we place the lives of young
soldiers at risk.
The research and development is complete. It is time to go forward
with this cost-effective program.
Mr. Chairman, by the end of the decade, in addition to the
significant troop cutbacks we have already begun, we will have
redeployed more than 80 percent of America's troops to the United
States.
This will create a large demand on our strategic airlift forces and
make the C-17 even more valuable than it is today.
More than any other transport carrier, the C-17 combines wartime
capability with peacetime utility. In addition to use during regional
conflicts, the C-17 will prove invaluable in humanitarian missions such
as famine, flood and earthquake relief operations.
If the C-17 program is killed, not only do we lose the money we have
invested in this program, but we will have to restart other air cargo
programs, at a cost of at least $500 million.
The C-17 manufacturing line is already open, and building modern,
capable aircraft. I ask this Congress to heed the advice of our Army
and Air Force leaders. Support the C-17.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I used to fly fighter
aircraft in the Air Force, and we did not fly old airplanes. I mean,
when they got old, we got rid of them. I cannot believe in today's
environment we are talking about not buying the Air Force any new
airplanes for nearly 8 years.
Here we are arguing about a C-17, which is the guts of our airlift
capability, going to protect this country for years to come in its fast
reapplication capability, as we move our troops back home, gives us the
ability to implement our foreign policy around the world.
I think we are going to rely ever more increasingly on the
availability of airlift capability.
This aircraft provides access for outsized loads to 9,000 more
runways, an increase of 300 percent over those available to C-5's and
C-141's.
The commercial alternative that everybody proposes is not there. I
doubt there is a 747 pilot in the world that wants to fly into some
jungle in Africa or into Haiti even for that matter.
Our aircraft are ancient. Are we going to put our 20-year-old
troopers in 40-year-old equipment and risk their lives by sending them
into a combat area in an insufficient or subsufficient aircraft? I say
no.
We need to vote for this amendment. Vote for America. Vote for
freedom. Vote for the C-17.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman]
for introducing the amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Ravenel].
Mr. RAVENEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Harman
amendment that will be offered, which restores procurement of the C-17
to the level requested by the administration--that is 6 planes for
fiscal year 1995 and long-lead for 8 C-17's in 1996.
There are no two ways about it--this country has an airlift
requirement to meet and the C-17 is the program to do it.
As the U.S. continues to pull troops out of forward deployed bases,
we need an aircraft that can carry outsized and oversized cargo to
small, austere airstrips anywhere in the world. The C-17 has the unique
capability to accomplish such missions, which are sure to become
commonplace in future contingency scenarios.
Let us face the facts. We have already made a significant investment
in the C-17 of $15.8 billion resulting in 26 planes, 7 of which are in
operation down in Charleston. I have talked to the men and women who
fly and maintain the C-17 and, having flown them over 800 hours, they
enthusiastically endorse the aircraft, time and time again, the C-17
has performed above the expectations of these aircrews.
Certainly, the C-17 has not been a model acquisition program and I am
not here to defend its record. However, the administration has put
McDonnell Douglas on notice and the contractor is committed to making
significant management and production changes. Congress must give the
program this last chance to perform. Requesting only four planes for
1995, as the committee suggests, will slow the rate of production,
drive up the unit cost, and throw 10,000 people out of work, not to
mention severely hamper the future of strategic airlift. I urge my
colleagues to vote for the Harman amendment.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 90 seconds to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Hochbrueckner].
(Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the House Committee
on Armed Services, and also one coming from a background in aerospace
engineering, I strongly support the Harman amendment. We need the C-17
aircraft.
We learned from the Persian Gulf war that clearly we need better
airlift and sealift in order to move our people and our materiel.
{time} 1520
We also know that starting in 1995, we will be reducing 51 percent of
our overseas assets, and therefore it is imperative that we have the
ability to move materiel and troops very quickly to those areas where
they are needed.
Certainly, Mr. Chairman, as we downsize in Europe, going from 300,000
troops to 100,000, it is even more imperative that we have good airlift
capability.
As an engineer with over 20 years' experience in the aerospace field,
let me advise the Members, I have worked on many programs. In that
period, I have never seen a program that did not have problems. Do we
have problems? Of course we do. Will we resolve them? Yes, we will, so
it is very important that we keep this program funded at appropriate
levels. It is a program that I think has had a normal experience in
aerospace development terms.
Let me also point out that this is not a hostile amendment. After the
chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], had a very
excellent hearing on the C-17, 33 of the 56 members of the Committee on
Armed Services signed a letter in support of raising the number of C-
17's from four to six, so this is not a hostile amendment. It is just a
late-coming amendment that is supported by a majority of the House
Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the Harman
amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter].
(Mr. HUNTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I want to also rise in support of the Harman-Horn-
McCurdy-Saxton-Spratt-Johnson amendment, and the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dornan] too, I think, is solidly behind this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, let me expand on one aspect of this debate that the
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] so eloquently put forth to the
House the other night during his special order when he was giving a
very thorough analysis of the requirement for C-17's.
This is a debate about power projection, and our security around the
world largely depends on our ability to project power quickly. That
means to move American forces, including equipment and personnel, to
critical strategic spots very, very quickly. In the words of Gen.
Nathan Bedford Forrest, ``It is the ability to get there firstest with
the mostest.''
We are now in a situation in Europe in which our formerly massive
presence of over 300,000 military personnel is being directly reduced
to around 100,000 personnel. That means we do not have the security,
the airfield security, and the airfield security capability that we had
a couple of years ago. It means now if we wanted to go in for these
long runways that the C-5 requires, we might have to lose some people.
We would certainly have conflicts, because one of the most strategic
targets in any conflict is runways, airways, and the key to the C-17
debate when juxtaposed with the C-5 and its capabilities is runway
length. The C-17 uses roughly half the runway that a C-5 uses.
What does that mean? It means in Europe that of all the runways that
are available, the C-17 can access roughly ten times the number of
airstrips and runways that the C-5 can access. That means instead of
having to come in, if there is armor, if we are moving M-1 tanks into a
particular area in Europe, or other heavy equipment, instead of having
to fly this hardware into an area that may be 100 miles by road or 50
miles by road or 20 miles by road from where we want to strategically
place it for conflict with the adversary, we can fly into an air base
that is much closer to the action and can get there first.
In Europe we can access many times the runways with the C-17 that we
can access with the C-5. We can access 5 times the runways in Europe,
and we can access 10 times the runways in South America, and we can
access roughly 5 times the runways in Africa with C-17's than those we
can access with C-5's.
This is a power projection issue, and the Harman amendment, so ably
advocated by the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn], who did a great
job before he had to go to the hospital, and others, is absolutely an
important amendment for this House to pass today.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in favor of the
amendment that will soon be offered by the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Harman]. As those on the Committee on Armed Services know, I have
been very skeptical of the so-called Bottom-Up Review, and also the
portion of it that states that we can fight two major regional
contingencies nearly simultaneously.
If we do not have the capability of this airplane, of a C-17, that
will be a show-stopper. That is an absolute show-stopper. That is why
it is best that we proceed with this as best we can.
It is also important to point out that this amendment does not add to
the total funding already recommended by the committee. It is supported
by the President, and I think that it is the only logical choice that
we can choose.
Mr. Chairman, there is an absolute need for a new airlifter which
will carry outsized cargo and deliver it to smaller airfields. This
should be pointed out, that there are many airfields that this is the
only such airplane that can land and take off.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Mexico [Mr. Skeen].
Mr. SKEEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, as one who is on a task force to go check on the C-17's
and is a pilot that has spent a great deal of my time in the air, and
know a little bit about airplanes, and know a little bit about what is
happening in their air force today, if we are going to ask the United
States to do what we are asking it to do every day almost on a yearly
basis, to take and transport people all over the world, we are going to
have to have a lift capability to do it, and we do not have it now. We
have worn it out.
The C-17 is the only answer we have. Sure, we have engineering
problems with all kinds of aircraft, and in the development of those
aircraft, but that is no problem for anybody in the United States that
has been building aircraft for as long as most of our builders have.
This is a fine airplane, state-of-the-art, the best navigational
equipment that any airplane has ever had in it.
I think it is absolutely an essential part of our airlift if we are
going to disperse people throughout the world, as we have been doing in
all the hot spots we have had before. Mr. Chairman, I am for the C-17,
and all six of them.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dornan].
(Mr. DORNAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dellums], that he gave us some sage advice several times at the
beginning of this year and last year and even the year before, that if
we come up with armed services amendments, they had better be cost-
saving or revenue-neutral.
I think the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] took due note of
this recommendation, because this is a revenue-neutral amendment. It is
merely allocating existing funds. We cannot think about revenue-neutral
enough around here.
We are all dedicating our speeches today to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Horn], because the C-17 is made in his district. He has
been a strong, forceful, and passionate as well as very accurate and
informative proponent of this great airlift system. He is in for some
minor surgery, similar to Bob Dole's recent surgery, so of course
prayers from all of those within reach of my voice are with Steve Horn.
He will be back after the break, and I hope we are going to have a big
victory for him here today.
Mr. Chairman, the other gentleman from California, Duncan Hunter,
mentioned the excellent presentation given by Steve Horn before he
headed back to California on the floor a few nights ago. Here is one of
the charts he used. I put it out today on the back of a ``Dear
Colleague,'' and in the terms of our great loadmasters they used this
word, ``throughput capability.'' That means if we have an average
500,000 square ramp, we can only get three C-5's on that ramp as they
are loading and unloading. We can only get three civilian cargo airlift
big giants 747's on this same runway, but we can get eight C-17's on
such a ramp, in addition to the aforementioned many times, and it
should be mentioned, 10,000 additional airfields around the world where
only a C-17 Globemaster III can land, and a 747, or our big C-5 Galaxy,
cannot land; the C-17 has a throughput capability of 3,852 tons a day,
more than double what we can get from the other two large excellent big
lifters.
{time} 1530
Mr. Chairman, let us listen to Gordo and Shali, our chief of staff of
the Army and our chairman of the joint chiefs.
General John M. Shalikashvili says, ``Today there is only one
alternative that can meet the requirements of a core airlifter--the C-
17 Globemaster.''
General Gordon Sullivan says, ``The C-17 is the only aircraft that
can get the Army's outsized combat systems to the next war when
required.''
Mr. Chairman, that simulator is waiting for you in Long Beach, sir. I
flew it over a year ago. It amazed me. This big C-17 has a stick just
like a fighter aircraft. That is why our great Gary Cooper from Texas,
Congressman Sam Johnson, is so enthused over this aircraft. Like the B-
2, it has a stick. It flies like a fighter. Imagine an M-1 30-ton tank
in the back of your C-17 and flying with a stick like a fighter
aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, the C-17 has had its growing pains, Lord knows, but my
F-100 that I flew on active duty also had growing pains. They were
falling out of the sky like cats and dogs in the middle and late
1950's, and it turned out to be one of our most stable air-to-ground
aircraft in the Vietnam war. Some aircraft have no problems going
through a test program like a B-2 Spirit. Others have growing pains. We
are hopefully through the growing pains with the C-17.
Mr. Chairman, I urge everyone in this Chamber to vote for the C-17,
for our Army and Air Force, and for the future of all of our armed
services.
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record my ``Dear Colleague'' letter
as follows:
Support The C-17--It Meets U.S. Military Requirements
``Our nation has a critical need for intertheater airlift
modernization if we are to maintain our ability to project
forces and respond to humanitarian missions worldwide. Our C-
141 aircraft are wearing out. The C-17 aircraft continues to
be the most cost effective means to meet current and
projected airlift requirements. The C-17's ability to deliver
outsize cargo, combined with its special capability to use
austere fields, will provide us with modern, highly capable
strategic airlift.''
William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense.
____
Dear Colleague: We need the C-17. It is as simple as that.
Military leaders up and down the chain of command from our
young Air Force pilots to the Secretary of Defense agree that
the C-17 meets existing military requirements. Consider what
other military leaders have said about the C-17:
``Today there is only one alternative that can meet the
requirements of a core airlifter--the C-17.''
Gen. John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff.
``The C-17 is the only aircraft that can get the Army's
outsized combat systems to the next war when required.''
Gen. Gordon Sullivan,
Army Chief of Staff.
Reprinted on the back of this letter is a diagram depicting
another unique and important feature of the C-17, throughput
capability or off-load capacity and turn around time on the
ground. (Diagram not reproducible in Record). As this diagram
clearly shows, the C-17 has much greater throughput
capability than existing military airlifters or civilian
cargo aircraft. Such off-load capacity and turn around time
could be vital, especially during the first few days of a
military build-up in an overseas conflict.
Please listen to our military leaders and why they need the
C-17. By funding six instead of four C-17 aircraft in FY
1995, we can ensure this defense bill meets our defense
requirements.
Best regards,
Robert K. Dornan,
U.S. Congressman.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Edwards].
Mr. EDWARDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, surely, the next Saddam Hussein
will not be dumb enough to park his tanks in the desert for 6 months.
Very simply--that is exactly why we need the C-17.
The most important issue in this debate is that the C-17 will save
the lives of young American soldiers and marines.
How will the C-17 save lives? By moving American troops quickly into
areas of conflict with the proper weapons and equipment.
As we pay tribute to the 50th anniversary of D-Day, we should ask
ourselves this question: Would we have asked brave American soldiers to
storm the beaches of Normandy without adequate weapons and equipment?
Certainly not.
Whether you are a hawk or dove on defense doesn't really matter on
this issue. The C-17 is not about making wars, it is about saving the
lives of young Americans whenever we call them to duty.
I urge Members to support the Harman-Horn amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Buyer].
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in full support of the C-17 program.
We spend a lot of time talking about force structure an our needs to
meet national security interests. We can do all that talk we like, but
if you do not have the military lift capacities by air and sea to get
soldiers to the battlefield, the minimum risk for which generals talk
about will be a reality in loss of life on the battlefield.
I do feel, though, a little odd saying I want to give my full support
to the C-17 program given the fact of the track record of the
contractor. That is what brings us to this debate today.
Mr. Chairman, I have to say that Mr. Deutch of the Department of
Defense outlined an excellent program to make the contractor
responsive. I want to support the administration wherever possible, and
I will support the administration in this endeavor to give the
incentive to the contractor to be a low-cost producer. That means in
support of the Harman-Horn amendment.
Mr. Chairman, this aircraft is a necessary component of meeting our
military strategic lift requirements in the coming decades. We have had
much debate in the House about the size and capabilities of the
military force outlined in the Bottom-Up Review. All of these arguments
are futile if we do not have, like I said, the lift capacities to move
our forces wherever needed throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman, the C-17 gives us that capacity. The C-17 is an
aircraft designed and built to meet the specific military need, the
delivery of outsized cargo to remote and unimproved airfields in
support of our forces during a contingency or conflict throughout the
world. This is a most important issue for our national security.
Mr. Chairman, according to the research and development center, a
fleet of C-17's is more cost-effective than any combination of C-17's,
commercial wide-body aircraft, C-5/B's or C-141's.
Mr. Chairman, as we downsize our military, we must buy the most
capable, effective equipment available for our men and women in
uniform. The C-17 is a giant leap forward in our aircraft capabilities
and is sorely needed to replace our rapidly aging fleet. I almost feel,
though, that a request was made for a Jeep and the Air Force decided
that we would not give just a Jeep, ``We're going to go out and give
you the Grand Cherokee.''
Mr. Chairman, it makes me feel a little uncomfortable about us buying
the Jeep Grand Cherokee and possibly having a very expensive aircraft
where it will get to the point we are saying, ``Maybe we shouldn't take
it to the battlefield, it might get shot down.''
Mr. Chairman, I will support the administration to make the
contractor a low-cost producer because the incentive is built into this
agreement, that if they do not comply, they are only going to buy their
40 and then we are going to go with a commercial mix.
Mr. Chairman, I support the administration, I urge my colleagues to
support the Harman-Horn amendment, and I wish my colleague Steve Horn
the very best in his recovery from cancer.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my distinct pleasure to yield 1
minute to the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. Furse], the author of an
amendment that will come before the body.
(Ms. FURSE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, today I am also offering an amendment. This
is an amendment on the C-17, and what it would do is it would stop
production of the C-17 at the 4 we have already bought, that will bring
us up to 30 C-17's, and it will then go to take our additional airlift
out of commercial wide-body planes.
Mr. Chairman, I want to cite a couple of quotes about this program.
John Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, came before the House Armed
Services Committee in February of this year.
Mr. Deutch was asked about the program's performance, and he replied:
``I think it's awful.''
Les Aspin, former secretary of defense, said: ``The C-17 is late,
it's over ceiling price, and it has serious operational deficiencies.''
Mr. Chairman, my amendment would get us the airlift we need, it would
get it to us quicker than if we go with the whole C-17 program. My
amendment would give us 30 C-17's, and it would save $16 billion.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Harman amendment
which will be offered in just a few minutes.
Mr. Chairman, as we work on the defense budget this year, it is
vitally important to keep in mind what kind of military we need for the
post-cold-war era.
In Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia, we have learned that this new era will
be marked by sudden, unexpected crises in remote corners of the world.
We will confront the urgent need to deliver humanitarian assistance or
respond to major acts of aggression. And because we are losing so many
overseas bases, we will need to conduct these operations largely from
the continental United States.
In this kind of environment, virtually every defense expert and every
study of U.S. military policy agrees that our forces must be flexible,
agile, and strategically mobile, capable of responding rapidly to
unexpected crises. Nearly everyone agrees that strategic lift, both
airlift and sealift, must rank among our top priorities.
The C-17 represents exactly the sort of capability we need for this
new era.
Those of us who support the C-17 are well aware that the Air Force
must make greater use of civilian aircraft for transport purposes. But
we are equally well aware that civilian planes alone cannot fulfill all
our airlift needs.
They cannot handle all forms of military cargo, or the right
combinations of it. They cannot operate from short, rough landing
fields, as the C-17 will do.
General Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
said that ``The C-17 represents a capability that the Armed Forces
absolutely need to have.''
Once we decide we need the C-17, the decision to buy six planes per
year becomes the obvious choice.
This rate will allow the Air Force to complete its scheduled purchase
of 40 C-17's--a number the Air Force calls the minimum that is
militarily useful. DOD can then pass judgment on the contractor and
decide whether to buy more.
Buying six planes per year will allow the contractor to bring costs
down and ensure that we produce the C-17 at the most efficient rate.
And most importantly, with the retirement of older transport planes
and the increasing potential for regional crises, the need for the C-17
grows every day. We need them in our force structure as quickly as
possible.
We have an opportunity today to make a strong statement about the
importance of airlift to our national security strategy. And if we are
going to press forward with this critical program, we should do so in
the way that makes the most sense for the taxpayer--by purchasing six
planes per year.
{time} 1540
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from California [Mr. Tucker].
Mr. TUCKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-Saxton-
Spratt-E.B. Johnson amendment to restore C-17 funding. Mr. Chairman, if
we get support for anything in this Congress from both sides of the
aisle it must be good. I am proud to be speaking in favor of a bill
with so many strong bipartisan sponsors.
The C-17 has the support of President Clinton, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff John M. Shalikashvili, Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan of the
U.S. Army and Gen. J.P. Hoar from Cent Com.
The C-17 is a major logistic tool, filling a vital military and
humanitarian need. The C-17 has the ability to use 10 times the
airfields as any of the alternatives that have been offered, and they
cannot compete. The C-17 has the ability to carry oversized cargo, the
M-1 tank, that the other aircraft cannot.
The C-17 was designed to fill a need in the New World Order of an
aircraft capable of carrying heavy payloads to austere airfields. The
C-17 is the ideal aircraft to meet this need.
Mr. Chairman, we have invested a lot of money into the C-17 program.
The C-17 fills a vital military mission and deserves our support.
The C-17 is flying and McDonnell Douglas has met its contractual
requirements. The seven C-17's at Charleston Air Force Base are getting
excellent reviews by the men and women flying and maintaining them.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the C-17.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clay].
(Mr. CLAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CLAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Harman amendment to
restore funding for the C-17 strategic airlift program because it is
the most cost-effective transport plane that we have, and I urge my
colleagues to support the Harman amendment.
Mr. Chairman, we are living at a crossroads in history. As the cold
war subsides and new international relationships are formed, our Armed
Forces must have flexible equipment and needs the C-17 for the wide
range of security and humanitarian missions which lie ahead.
We are living in ever changing times and new international
relationships are forming throughout the globe. Perhaps more than at
any time in history our Armed Forces are engaged in assisting those who
are the victims of famines, earthquakes, floods and other natural
catastrophes.
All around the world, we are bringing our military men and women and
their families back home. As we embark upon these courses, our defense
posture requires that we have the ability to rapidly respond with a
variety of equipment to unfamiliar places about which we might have
very limited information. How many of us knew the politics, history,
and geography of Rwanda before the bloody revolution began just a few
short months ago? Still, our military was asked to go into that country
on a moment's notice and help take our diplomatic staff and their
families to places of safety. The Air Force's C-141 accomplished this
special mission. But the C-141's are aging and must be replaced. They
have served our Nation in times of trouble, but their usefulness is
drawing to an end. The C-17 is the aircraft designed to replace the C-
141. The C-17 can carry twice the load of the C-141 and yet land on
short, austere airfields like those found in Rwanda and other trouble
spots around the world. The C-17 is unique in its cargo carrying
ability and its short field landing ability--two attributes which
typify what is often most demanded in a contemporary humanitarian
mission.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support full funding of the C-
17 program because it is crucial to our defense system. Criticism of
the C-17 has been unfounded. Independent analyses show the C-17 is the
most cost-effective solution for meeting America's airlift needs. The
need for the C-17 program has been established. Military leaders agree
that it is the most capable, cost effective transport plane. I strongly
urge my colleagues to support the Harman amendment. The C-17
development is the program our country truly needs as we prepare for
the challenges of the 21st century.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, last December when Secretary Aspin
announced the decision to take control of the troubled C-17 program, I
applauded his efforts. While limiting C-17 purchases to 40 aircraft is
a positive step, I remained very concerned.
Over the last 3 years, I chaired five hearings where we heard
testimony that painted a bleak picture. The C-17 program suffers from
massive technical and financial problems ranging from defective wings
to hundreds of millions of dollars in extraordinary payments to the
prime contractor, McDonnell Douglas.
We cannot solve these very problems by throwing more money at the
program or continuing with business as usual. The taxpayer should not
foot the bill for hundreds of millions of dollars on a program that has
been in default since its inception. This sends exactly the wrong
message to defense contractors, and is the kind of practice we must end
if we are truly going to reinvent the procurement process as promised
by President Clinton.
Just consider what we are being asked to buy--an Airlifter which will
never come close to meeting its original specification. As I hear
Member after Member extol the C-17's short runway capability, I must
point out that today this capability simply does not exist. Similarly,
when I hear Member after Member praise the C-17's global reach, I must
point out that unlike the C-5 and the Boeing 747, the C-17 cannot even
fly across the Atlantic Ocean without a mid-air refueling. And when I
hear Member after Member praise the C-17's durability, I must point out
that the C-17 has suffered massive structural deficiencies, from
pervasive fuel leaks to defective wings that repeatedly have failed
static load tests. All this in an Airlifter that costs more than half a
billion dollars per copy.
There is also a serious credibility problem with this program. For
years, our committee was repeatedly assured by senior Air Force
officers that the integrity of the wing was absolutely not in question.
That was before the first wing failure ever occurred. Further, we were
assured that the Air Force would never go below the threshold
specifications identified by the U.S. Transportation Command. Now even
those thresholds have been waived.
In the face of these facts, I would suggest that this is indeed a
case where the buyer should beware. It is time to face the fact that
the C-17 program is a failure--as the C-17's capabilities decline, its
costs continues to grow.
Over the last 3 years, we have repeatedly been told that the C-17
program ``has turned the corner.'' But the hard cold truth is that the
C-17 suffers serious problems that will not go away.
Under Chairman Dellums' leadership, the Armed Services Committee took
the first necessary steps to secure needed airlift capability with
existing aircraft that actually work. I commend the gentleman from
California for his farsighted leadership in addressing this critical
national security need. This is the prudent course, not additional buys
of the technically and financially flawed C-17.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
Mr. Chairman, let me sum up the general debate on this side, among
the advocates of this amendment, first by saying what the amendment is
all about.
When the administration sent its bill here, the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1995, they requested six C-17's in fiscal 1995 and
eight C-17's in fiscal 1996.
When we did the mark in our committee, we cut that request from six
C-17's in 1995 to four C-17's, and we took $550 million saved in that
cut and put it in something called
nondevelopmental alternative aircraft, NDAA,
something other than a C-17, which could perform the mission. And what
we would do by this amendment, based on what DOD and the Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Deutch, has since told
us, is take that $550 million and put it back in the C-17 line so we
can buy six in 1995 and eight in 1996 as the Defense Department
originally requested. The amount of money is the same, $2.4 billion
going in, $2.4 billion coming out. It is identical.
Let me give you three reasons, give the Members of the House three
reasons, why I think we should all support this amendment. First of
all, we need the capacity. Everybody has made that argument here. As we
draw down our forces and pull them back from Europe and overseas, we
need more airlift than we have ever needed before.
If the C-17 performs as promised, and that is a big ``if,'' if the C-
17 performs as it is supposed to, it fills a need for airlift better
than any alternative we have got. You do not have to take my word for
that.
In this very bill 2 years ago, the House and the Senate, in passing
the National Defense Authorization Act, directed the Department of
Defense to do an independent, disinterested, cost-effectiveness and
operational analysis of this very program, the C-17, a COEA, in DOD
parlance. Here it is, prepared in December 1993, completed then,
delivered to us just a week or two ago.
If you look on page 9 of it, the executive summary says the C-17 is
the preferred military airlifter for several reasons. COEA says in the
executive summary that the C-17 is the preferred military airlifter
because, first of all, of its unique capacity for outsized cargo. Not
unique, because the C-5 also has that capacity. It can handle things,
it can carry things other wide-body airplanes cannot handle, M-1 tanks,
Patriot missile batteries, helicopters, Apache attack helicopters,
things too large to get in any other kind of airplane which will go in
the cargo compartment of this airplane.
Second, not only in the air but on the ground it has unique
capabilities and particularly on the ground, due to the footprint, the
size of the wingspan.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Is it not true that we have 120 C-5B's, all of which are
capable of carrying the outsized capability? In your COEA study it says
85 percent of what we have got to transport is either oversized, not
the big stuff or bulk, so a nondevelopmental aircraft, whether it is a
C-5 or an MD-11 or a stripped-down C-17 or, heaven forbid, a 747
freighter, could carry 85 percent of what we have got to take out
there. It seems to me with 30 or 40 C-17's plus 120 C-5's, we have got
all the outsized capability we need.
Mr. SPRATT. Reclaiming my time, this amendment anticipates our going
to 40 C-17's, going from 26 to 40; air mobility to command says this is
militarily the minimum viable force, 40 planes, a couple of squadrons.
We are to provide for downtime, for maintenance, provide for trainers.
This is a minimal viable force.
Beyond that, we may buy up to 120, which is the current requirement
of C-17's, or we may mix the fleet.
This leaves wide open to the Air Force and to the Department of
Defense the option of mixing the fleet with 747's, 767's, MD-11's, and
wide-bodied airplanes. Let us not get too zealous about that.
Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield further, we have a lot of
outsize capability with 120 C-5's that can carry everything a C-17 can
carry.
Mr. SPRATT. But there are some unique features to this airplane other
than outsize capacity. It can airdrop. It can drop paratroops. Granted,
it has a problem that has to be corrected. It can maneuver on the
ground. It can land on short, austere strips, and a 747 simply cannot
pull that off; it cannot land on a short strip; it cannot take off
fully loaded on a short strip.
Consequently, the C-17's, because of these unique capabilities, make
it separate and distinct from anything else we can choose from.
As you have heard here, it can land in hundreds more airports,
hundreds more runways, in Africa, in Asia, in the place it is likely to
be deployed, things the 747 cannot do.
And that is why the Air Force says let us buy 40 and assess the
viability of this airplane and decide from there whether we want to mix
the fleet or go forward and buy 120 airplanes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 12 minutes, the remainder
of my time, and I take that amount of time simply because no one has
taken the floor to explain nor attempt to defend the position
established by the House when we reported this bill from the House
Committee on Armed Services, and I want to briefly outline the position
of the Committee on Armed Services that brought the position of the C-
17 that is reflected in the House bill.
In so doing, I want to reiterate over and over and over again in the
moments that I have with you to say this, very simply, Mr. Chairman:
The issue is not the C-17, the issue is airlift.
It changes the nature of the debate, Mr. Chairman, when the
discussion is not the C-17, the issue is airlift.
I will repeat that many times in the course of my remarks.
Mr. Chairman, it has been the intention of this gentleman to focus on
the national security issue that should drive the decision on what to
do about the C-17 program. That issue is airlift capability. Airlift
for the number of needs is necessary, and these needs include our
participation in multinational peacekeeping operations, which this
gentleman supports.
Our airlift problem is not just our need for short fields, for
outsize cargo capability of the C-17; the heart of the problem is the
planned retirement of our C-141 fleet in the 1995 to 2006 period. The
loss of this large portion of our aircraft capability must be offset,
and I will attempt to make that point clearly, and unequivocally, Mr.
Chairman.
We face a difficult task. How to provide enough overall airlift
capability and C-17 capabilities within a realistic spending level.
That is the question. If there are so many dollars in a limited-dollar
environment, in a military budget that is going down, how many dollars
do you project annually that is realistic that you choose to spend for
the purpose of airlift? And then the question is how do you buy the
airlift that is necessary for this country for these dollars?
Straightforward, straightforward, straightforward, Mr. Chairman. The
issue is not the C-17, the issue is airlift.
There will be an amendment that comes up, and that amendment is where
the department sees salvation primarily in higher C-17 buys. But large
enough buys to offset this loss are not affordable at likely budget
levels as the data is the Department's own C-17 affordability
assessment proves.
Buying eight planes per year, the level DOD specifies in their C-17
white paper, and the level consistent with their affordability report
for the next 14 years, leaves us with less airlift than we already have
today. Mr. Chairman, I will repeat: By simply engaging in a C-17 buy
strategy against the backdrop of the reality that C-141's are being
retired during that 10-year period that I laid out, your airlift goes
down. It does not come up until way out far beyond the year 2000.
So, how do you engage in a strategy to buy airlift that does not get
you back to square one until way out about the year 2008, 2010? Mr.
Chairman, under that plan we would not get back to today's level until
2008, despite spending $30 billion. The answer is twofold: Buy the
specialized capabilities of a yet-to-be-determined number of C-17's,
boosted with aircraft that more cheaply restored the aggregate airlift
capability than we lose by C-141 retirements, at the same budget level
of airlift as we have today. This is a strategy embodies in H.R. 4301
which will offset the C-141 retirement, give us more aggregate and
outsize airlift capability than we have today for less cost than the
strategy behind the amendment that would simply put us back to the
number 6.
These conclusions are not just this gentleman's conclusions, Mr.
Chairman. If that were the case, that is arguable. But an Air Mobility
Command study shows that even with the buy of eight C-17's per year,
only a substantial buy of complementary nondevelopmental or alternative
aircraft in the next 5 years equivalent to 35 to 55 aircraft would
prevent a significant decline in our airlift capability by the year
2201.
Not this gentleman's study, Mr. Chairman, the Air Mobility Command
study. The Department has not, not, to this gentleman's knowledge,
refuted those findings.
Under the provision of H.R. 4301, C-17 fleet will continue to grow.
Mr. Chairman, I listened to many people on the floor as if it were
``C-17's to no C-141's.''Let us not distort each other's position. The
bill has some C-17's in it, and the bill allows that strategy to go
forward. The bill adds 4 C-17's for a total of 30 and 4 more for next
year.
Beyond that, if the contractor can fix its problem, we retain the
option of moving to higher rates. If the program does not improve, we
can still decide to buy more C-17's to reach the level of 40 that the
Department has told us was militarily acceptable. No one is talking
about having no C-17's. That is not in the real world. So you build a
straw-man when you make that argument.
The issue, again, Mr. Chairman, is not the C-17; the issue is
airlift.
Keep in mind that buying 4 C-17's per year would give us a fleet of
58 by the year 2005; combined with our existing fleet that the
gentleman pointed out of 120 C-5's, will be able to lift over twice as
much outsize cargo than we could just 7 years ago, when the airlift
challenge was to move army heavy divisions across the Atlantic in 10
days, those days, to fight the vast forces of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union no longer exists, Mr. Chairman. The
Warsaw Pact has vanished off the radar screen. And these were
adversaries who were far better armed, far better trained, far better
led than the forces many of my colleagues contemplate with these
scenarios of the future, North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, that worry many of
my colleagues today.
In addition to this outsize capability, the airlift fleet envisioned
by the bill would have a substantially better ability to carry the bulk
and oversize cargos that made up 90 percent of the air cargos of Desert
Storm than would the airlift fleet envisioned in the Department's
plans. Again, the issue is airlift, not the C-17.
The C-17 cost and operational effectiveness analysis study also
validates the path that H.R. 4301 embodies, Mr. Chairman, and calls
into question the Pentagon's approach. It shows that mixes of C-17's
and complementary aircraft are as cost effective as a pure fleet of 120
C-17's in hauling outsize cargo. In addition, the analysis shows those
same mixes are far more cost effective in carrying oversize cargo than
a pure C-17 fleet. There is wide agreement that the commercial aircraft
are far better bulk cargo carriers than the C-17's.
Futhermore, the Department's cost and operational effectiveness
analysis shows the superiority of mixed fleets, Mr. Chairman, It
understates that 747's performance by at least 22 percent, according to
the Air Mobility Command's own data, not this gentleman's data. It
assigns costs to the mixed fleets that internal DOD documents prove are
improper. Thus mixes of C-17's and 747's are even better than the
analysis says and better than pure C-17 fleets.
Department officials have stressed outsize cargo as a main factor
responsible for their strong preference for the C-17. But there is a
major gap between the rhetoric on this issue and the reality of their
own data that they provide us. The Department may tell us that oversize
cargo is the main factor to plan for in a major regional contingency,
but their own C-17 cost and operational effectiveness analysis disputes
this.
The Department finally delivered that analysis to us last week; a
little late in the day as we attempt to address this issue. It sates,
``In the first 30 days in these scenarios [the two MRC's]''--that is
major regional contingencies--``used by the joint staff mobility
requirements study, 15 percent of the delivery requirement is outsize
cargo, 55 percent is oversize, and the remaining 30 percent is bulk,''
the point that I think my colleague was trying to make.
{time} 1600
Their data shows that after the first 30 days the percentage of
outsized cargo requirements actually drops.
Mr. Chairman, there are some other issues that I would want to make
here, but I do not want time to run out. Let me just finish, and then I
will be happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
Mr. Chairman, I make this point: The issue is not the C-17. The issue
is airlift. Let me tell my colleagues how we got to this point.
The administration should have come before us in a timely fashion as
we proceeded to try to mark up this bill. The leadership gave us this
date, come on the floor before Memorial Day break. We were under
tremendous stress and tremendous strain. The administration did not
answer on the record for the record in a timely fashion, when we were
preparing to mark up this bill, the concerns of the criticism raised by
the GAO. So, what my colleagues have ringing in their ears was a very
intelligent analysis with a series of critical issues laid out by the
GAO. So, the administration had not done a compelling selling job, had
not attempted to support this program at a level that my colleagues
would have felt comfortable, and they certainly had not answered these
ringing criticisms. So, we have the responsibility of marking, in the
absence of the administration's set of arguments, so we put before the
Committee on Armed Services a proposal that said the issue is not the
C-17, the issue is airlift. We figured the annual amount of dollars
authorized for this purpose would probably be in the neighborhood of
$2.5 billion. We said, ``With $2.5 billion annually, how do you get the
airlift that you need?''
So, Mr. Chairman, this led us to this four plus nine developmental
aircraft, a mixture.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dellums] has expired.
(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary
inquiry.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, under the rule, does the gentleman and the
ranking member have an opportunity to strike the last word?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Once the amendment is pending, the
gentleman from California and the gentleman from South Carolina do have
that opportunity, but not until an amendment is pending.
Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the
amendments printed in part 6 of House Report 103-520 relating to the C-
17 aircraft, which shall be considered in the following order:
A, the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Harman], or the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn], or the
gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], or the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. Saxton], or the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], or the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Sam Johnson], or the gentleman from Missouri
[Mr. Talent]; and, B, the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman
from Oregon [Ms. Furse].
amendment offered by Ms. Harman
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Ms. Harman: Page 19, strike out line
18 and all that follows through line 3 on page 20 and insert
in lieu thereof the following:
(a) Authorization.--Of the amount provided in section 103
for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force--
(1) $103,000,000 shall be available for Non-Developmental
Alternative Aircraft procurement; and
(2) $2,303,402,000 shall be available for the C-17 aircraft
program, of which--
(A) $2,249,819,000 is for procurement of six C-17 aircraft;
(B) $47,475,000 is for advance procurement of up to eight
C-17 aircraft for fiscal year 1996; and
(C) $6,108,000 is for C-17 modifications.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and a Member
opposed will be recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]
will be recognized for 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to send my own best wishes to
the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] who is a principal cosponsor
of this bipartisan amendment and who is not able to be with us today
because he is in the hospital.
Mr. Chairman, I would point out that this amendment has overwhelming
bipartisan support, including the overwhelming support of a bipartisan
group of the Armed Services Committee. We are in this position because,
when we marked up and reported our bill, DOD had not adequately
justified funding six planes. For this reason, most of us supported the
chairman's mark which he himself characterized as a ``place holder''.
This chart demonstrates that our amendment involves the identical
amount of money in the bill as reported by the committee. We would
simply redeploy this money to support procurement of six C-17s rather
than four, and fund a competition for nondevelopmental aircraft.
I would say to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] that what we
are doing in this bill very adequately deals with his concerns and will
assure us that commercial wide bodies can be a part of our airlift mix
for the future.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Harman] has expired.
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Harman] would like, if she needs an additional minute, I yield a minute
of the 2 minutes she had reserved for me at this time to her. Would the
gentlewoman like an additional minute to complete her statement?
Ms. HARMAN. Why don't I just take 30 seconds of the gentleman's time?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Harman] is recognized for 30 seconds.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, what we need to keep our eye on is that we
are not adding money to the airlift program. We are simply rearranging
the money so that we can restore the administration's original request.
The chairman of our full committee, for whom I have the greatest
respect, says airlift is the issue, not the C-17. I agree, and I quote
from General Shalikashvili:
``Today there is only one alternative that can meet the requirements
of a core airlifter, the C-17.''
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I took time to try to lay out the position that is
reported in the bill, H.R. 4301. Let me, in a few moments, explain how
we got to this point.
A number of our colleagues requested, during the time that we were
marking up the bill, that we bring the administration in subsequent to
the markup of the bill in the House Committee on Armed Services and
hopefully that that hearing would take place prior to our coming to the
floor. I said to my colleagues in the spirit of fairness, in the spirit
of openness and cooperation we would ask the administration to come
before the committee, and all of my colleagues, or virtually all of my
colleagues, because the bill passed 55 to 1, when we laid this proposal
on the table we said, absent a ringing declaration, a ringing set of
supporting arguments for this bill, that the House position, the
position that we articulated, was a sound position. I turned to
everyone in several meetings, Mr. Chairman, and said, ``If any of you
have a better idea, lay it on the table, and, in the spirit of give and
take, we can discuss that, if there is a new position that anyone wants
to assume.'' No one laid a new idea on the table, and everyone
essentially bought onto what is in the House position.
Then they said that they would like to have the administration come.
The administration did come, and we had several hours of hearings.
After those hearings, Mr. Chairman, a number of my colleagues, the
gentlewoman from California and 30-some other members of the committee,
decided, based upon that presentation, that now they had more
information, more facts, because they felt that the administration had
done a, quote, adequate or good job in addressing the GAO criticisms
and laying out the concerns and the arguments that they felt needed to
be on the record, and they raised some questions with respect to the
proposal that we offered. On the basis of that they were compelled then
to go back to the original position of the six planes.
That is a legitimate thing to do, Mr. Chairman. I am not quarreling
with that. I simply wanted to say, one, the position enunciated in the
bill was not just a placeholder amendment. It was carefully thought
out, carefully conceived and, I believe, can be defended anywhere
openly and in a very straightforward fashion. I think all of my
colleagues here are going to have to make a very serious decision about
this program and about the issue of airlift. I urge them to listen very
carefully. I frankly think, and I may be wrong, that this debate turns
on one single issue, one single issue, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Deutsch says, ``If the contractor is able to build 6, we
will learn more about that contractor's ability to build 12 than if you
have them building 4.'' Now, if my colleagues buy that argument, then
it will lead them in one direction. If my colleagues think that that
argument is debatable, it may lead them in a different direction. But I
personally think that that is what the issue turns on.
{time} 1610
The question is what do you think the learning curve is. The
Secretary repeated that on more than one occasion. I need 6 because the
learning curve on whether this contractor will be able to build 12 down
the road, that gives me that answer. If you accept that argument,
perhaps there is efficacy to it. But I think that is where the issue
lies on this discussion.
I simply wanted to discuss that in the spirit necessary of openness
we held a hearing. A number of my colleagues were compelled to move
beyond the committee position. this is no personal thing with us.
You now have two considered positions on this issue, one thought
through by the committee and one agreed to after the committee markup
and after Secretary Cheney came before the committee, and they are both
out there.
I think one can argue both of them very strongly, perhaps even
effectively, but they are two different strategies. They are two very,
very different approaches, and they have two different consequences.
Let me just make one final comment. Secretary Cheney said there are
three parts to this C-17 program. There is the settlement, there is the
2-year program, and there is the nondevelopmental airlift aircraft part
of it.
Well, this amendment only addresses two, not three. Everyone agreed
to put the settlement aside at this point, because it raises a number
of issues that go beyond the jurisdiction of the House Committee on
Armed Services, perhaps to the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Government Operations, perhaps to the jurisdiction of the Committee on
the Judiciary, and that is something that has to be resolved in a
different context, given the process that we operate under.
So we are back to the second part. Mr. Cheney said give me all of
these or kill the program. We even laid that proposal on the table
among my colleagues. We said do you want to kill it? There was not a
consensus.
So the issue we wanted to grapple with, short of killing the program
and short of going whole hog in the program in the context of the
markup, was what do you do, absent a compelling set of arguments that
refuted what GAO said? We came with that in our bill. My colleagues now
are saying that they have new information that leads them to a new
position. Listen very carefully, make your own judgment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to rise and say that the
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has fully
explained the position in the committee, and I think fairly. At the
time the subcommittee and the committee marked, we did not have this
information, and many of us who did not serve on the committee had
asked that there be a hearing prior to coming to the floor.
We had the hearing, Secretary Cheney did come, and I think the
overwhelming majority of the members of the committee, upon hearing
that testimony, demonstrated both by voting to go back to this
provision that Ms. Harman is supporting and offering, and also signing
a letter which I believe is more of the ``ringing endorsement'' that
the chairman talked about.
Because we believe we are overcoming the problems in the C-17
procurement, this is the most efficient rate. Congress should not
micromanage this contract. We are saying that there is sufficient
evidence now presented by the administration that leads us to believe
that this is the most appropriate way to move forward on this program.
It does, not, as the chairman said, include the settlement, which I
think is a contentious issue which is better resolved at a later point.
Ms HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson].
(Mr. GEJDENSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the C-17
cargo plane program. Specifically, I would like to urge my colleagues
to support the Harman amendment which restores the administration's
request for six aircraft instead of four as in the current bill
language and oppose the Furse amendment which terminates the program
entirely.
In a time when we are trying to reduce our Nation's defense spending
and decrease our worldwide force structure, supporting the construction
of six C-17's in fiscal year 1995 makes the most economical and
military sense.
Authorizing the construction of six instead of four planes is the
least expensive way to meet the Nation's military airlift needs.
Maintaining a production rate of six per year will decrease the unit
costs of the planes and will not undercut the Department of Defense's
strategy to control program costs. This rate will also allow the prime
contractor program costs. This rate will also allow the prime
contractor, McDonnell Douglas, to show that it can bring costs down and
ensure that we produce the C-17 in the most efficient manner.
Additionally, it is important to mention that the Harman amendment does
not add to the overall cost of the bill but merely reprograms funds
already included in the bill to cover the cost of the additional two
planes.
In this post-cold-war era, there is less of a need to station troops
abroad and maintain large military installations around the globe. As
we have seen in Grenada, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia, however, there
is still a great need for the United States military to have the
capability to move large numbers of troops and equipment in and out of
remote areas quickly. Our current airlift capabilities simply do not
make the grade. The C-141's, which was designed in the 1950's and
produced in the 1960's are falling apart and cannot land at small
austere airfields. While the C-5 is able to carry similar payloads as
the C-17, the C-5 complicates deployment planning because it requires
excessively long and wide runways which are not always available in
developing countries. Further, the Air Force has testified that there
have been instances at large military fields in Europe when operations
had to be suspended because a C-5 was unloading and could not get off
the runway to allow other planes to land or takeoff. If we are to
reduce our global military presence, it is essential that we continue
building C-17's which give us the ability to move troops--and the
essential equipment needed to protect them--as quickly as possible.
Terminating the C-17 program would have a disastrous affect on the
economy of my congressional district. The F117 engine used in the C-17
is constructed at the Pratt & Whitney plant located in Middletown, CT.
I am very proud of the work my constituents have done on this engine.
First of all, the engine--which is practically identical to the
commercial PW2000 engine--was developed entirely by Pratt & Whitney and
its commercial partners. This alone saved the Government over $1.5
billion. Additionally, none of the cost overrunes or production
problems have resulted from the F117 engine.
To stop the program now would mean the loss of another 200 to 300
jobs in Middletown. In an area that has been hard hit by the downsizing
of the defense and insurance industries and where Pratt alone has laid-
off 6,700 employees during the past year, the cancellation of the C-17
program would be devastating.
In closing, I ask that my colleagues do what makes the most economic
and military sense, vote for the Harman amendment and oppose the Furse
amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey [Mr. Saxton].
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, in making the decision about how to vote on
this bill, whether my colleagues vote for six C-17's or four C-17's and
four nondevelopmental types of aircraft, consider the words of Colin
Powell when he said,
Our military strategy is changing from a focus on global
war to a focus on regional crisis. And to deal with those
kinds of crises, you have got to get there fast, and you have
to get there with the mostest.
And he said,
That is what the C-17 will do for us.
I think he said that for three reasons. I think he said it, first,
because it obviously increases lift, outsized lift, oversized lift, and
personnel lift.
Second, it keeps the unit price lower. To do four C-17's instead of
six C-17's, it increases the price per unit from $30 to $40 million.
Third, it requires the contractor to prove they can produce, prove
that they can produce the product on time and of the quality that is
necessary in the number that is necessary to get the job done.
Finally, I would conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this: Dick Cheney
not long ago was quoted as saying, ``The C-17 is an absolutely vital
strategic asset, regardless of what size force we have in the long
run.''
I urge my colleagues to support the Harman amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Missouri, [Mr. Talent].
Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize a point I made earlier in the
general debate. Whatever your view of American's military strategy
ought to be, whether you are content with the drawdown we are having
now or not, you have to support increased additional lift. As we draw
down the forces, we end up with a smaller force based in the United
States. If you want to be able to do anything in the world,
peacekeeping, protection of American interests, we have got to get
those forces abroad. We cannot do that without the C-17. Whatever your
perspective on the overall military strategy, you need to support the
Harman amendment for six C-17's.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut [Mrs. Johnson].
Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
Harman-Horn amendment for three reasons.
First, we need the airlift capability and flexibility the C-17
provides. According to Former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the C-17
is ``an absolutely vital strategic asset regardless of what size force
we have in the long term.'' This state-of-the-art aircraft can carry
outsize cargo to small, remote airfields, giving us a strategic
advantage in rapid development capability to meet regional threats.
President Clinton agrees, and I support his modest request for funding.
Second, we saved billions of dollars in development costs on the C-
17's Pratt & Whitney engines because the manufacturer developed it for
commercial use on the Boeing 757 at a cost of $1\1/2\ billion. The
engine has over 6 million hours of experience on commercial aircraft
and is 5 to 7 percent more fuel efficient than its closest competitor.
The Air Force has saved taxpayers billions in R&D costs by using off-
the-shelf, state-of-the-art commercial engines.
Third, while the impact of canceling the C-17 program would cost 200
to 300 jobs in Connecticut alone, the total employment impact would be
far worse, as many as 10,000 jobs nationwide. Such economic dislocation
on top of what we've already experienced in the past four years would
be tragic under any circumstances, but it would be unconscionable to
cause it by terminating a necessary and successful program that is
fundamental to our military readiness according to Democratic and
Republican administrations.
I encourage members to check all the facts before you take the
reckless plunge over the cliff and dismantle a critical component of
our national security. The C-17 is important and has already proven its
worth in the field, and I urge you to support the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-
Saxton-Spratt-E.B. Johnson amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
minority leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel].
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, there is an old saying among military
people that amateurs talk about strategy, but professionals talk about
logistics, and how quickly and efficiently an army gets military
supplies and equipment from here to there determines whether or not
strategic plans can be implemented.
In today's high technology, high pressure battlefield, the army that
gets there ``fustest with the mostest'' wins, and the C-17 can
certainly help us do that.
The amendment gives the House the chance to restore the C-17 program
back to the budget request of six aircraft without increasing the
deficit.
My understanding is certainly the administration supports the
amendment. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John
Shalikashvili, supports it. The former Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin
Powell supports it.
{time} 1620
The gentleman from New Jersey quoted Defense Secretary Cheney, who
was in my district last night for a big event and reaffirmed again his
strong belief in the program. All senior military leaders and field
commanders cite the need for the C-47 and the airlift capability it
provides.
But the most important endorsement comes from the 20-year-olds whose
lives on the battlefield depend on being supplied quickly with the
right equipment. As a former combat infantryman, I can tell my
colleagues that fighting forces that are supplied with the equipment
that they need when they need it get a boost, a big boost in morale as
well as an edge in combat.
The C-17 can carry not only outsized equipment, it can carry hope to
our troops because it delivers the goods when and where they need it.
One of the arguments raised in favor of the amendment, of course, is
that it reduces cost per unit. Naturally, there is no question about
that. But I want to remind our colleagues that six C-17's can
contribute to reducing the cost in lives per military unit on the
battlefield. That is the reduction that counts.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan
amendment, and I thank the gentlewoman for yielding time to me.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Lewis], who is on the other side of this issue but is
constrained by time.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I very much thank my colleague
for yielding time to me.
Frankly, I wanted to rise simply to express my deep appreciation for
my colleague and the professional way he is handling this matter. We do
disagree on a specific. That is, the increased numbers of six and eight
in the out-years. This amendment will, in turn, reduce the cost for
aircraft $40 million to $50 million a year. It will also save 8,000
jobs in California, which is very important to all of us.
This is the technology we need now. It is the airlift of the future.
We must be able to project our force throughout the world without
having our troops dispersed throughout the world.
I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me and expect passage of
this amendment.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Darden].
(Mr. DARDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to the
Harman amendment.
Back in 1986, the good old Heritage Foundation, a good, conservative
think-tank, issued a report dated January 23, 1986, which I think
summarizes my philosophy about the flawed C-17 program.
It came to the conclusion that:
A careful analysis by experts of U.S. airlift needs and of
the C-17 program reveals that a new cargo plane is not needed
to close the gap. As such, the Air Force should cancel the C-
17, now in a full-scale engineering phase of development, and
instead build more C-5B cargo and KC-10 cargo tanker
aircraft. Better use, moreover, should be made of the
existing fleet of C-130 Hercules and C-141B Starlifter
strategic aircraft. Not only could this save about $20
billion, but the U.S. would have the needed planes available
much sooner.
Let me address one other issue that was raised by the Heritage, good,
conservative Republican think-tank, report. It said that the idea of
using the C-17 to go to the far edge of the battle area, the FEBA, as
it was known, was absolutely ridiculous because ``Is it realistic to
expect the Air Force to risk the C-17, which may cost $180 million or
more each,'' and, of course, that is up now to about $250 million or
more, ``on austere airfields in or near combat zones? Former Air Force
Secretary Bernon Orr apparently does not think so. As he said in 1982,
`my worry is that with a very large expensive plane like the C-17 and a
limited number of them, the forward commander may not want to order
them up to the edge of the battle area.'''
Mr. Chairman, in 1987, when I was a Member of the House and a member
of the Committee on Armed Services and before I had two children in
college and could afford certain extras in life, I ordered and
purchased at my own expense these paper airplanes to be sent to each
and every Member of the House of Representatives on which it says that
the C-17 is a $40 billion boondoggle and, according to my friend, Ed
Jenkins, nothing but a town car for the Air Force.
Well, I hate to say, and it really bothers me to say, Mr. Chairman,
``I told you so,'' but, folks, we told you so.
We have thrown away now billions of dollars. We still do not have any
capability. Let us not further compound the mistake. Let us put an end
to this foolishness. Let us try to do something for the taxpayer here
today and vote down overwhelmingly the Harmon amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following information.
Closing the Military Airlift Gap
INTRODUCTION
Should a crisis develop in Europe or the Mideast, it would
take the U.S. 483 C-5 and 1,558 C-141B cargo plane loads to
rush the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division--with its 16,800
troops, 290 tanks, 430 armored fighting vehicles, 124
helicopters, 780 combat support vehicles, 3,580 trucks and
other equipment--from its base in Fort Stewart, Georgia, to
the trouble spot within the prescribed ten days. To support
Europe alone, the U.S. would have to transport six such Army
divisions, 60 tactical fighter squadrons, and one Marine
Amphibious Brigade to Western Europe.
In the event of such demands, the U.S. does not have enough
cargo planes to speed its forces to distant battlefields.
This strategic airlift gap is one of the American arsenal's
most serious weaknesses. That the U.S. needs more airlift
capability is widely accepted. At issue, however, is whether
the Air Force's $39.8 billion Airlift Master Plan is the best
way to close the gap. By designating a new generation of
cargo airplane, the McDonnell Douglas C-17, as the Plan's
centerpiece, the Pentagon may be making a serious and costly
error.
The Air Force Plan suffers from two fundamental flaws: 1)
it underutilizes aircraft already in the airlift fleet as
well as such proposed plans as the Lockheed C-5B, which could
be produced sooner and at a significantly lower acquisition
cost than the C-17's $180 million each; 2) it rests on
questionable operational and planning assumptions, such as
using the C-17 for both tactical and strategic airlift
missions.
Careful analysis by experts of U.S. airlift needs and of
the C-17 program reveals that a new cargo plane is not needed
to close the gap. As such, the Air Force should cancel the C-
17, now in a full-scale engineering phase of development, and
instead, build more C-5B cargo and KC-10 cargo tanker
aircraft. Better use, moreover, should be made of the
existing fleet of C-130 ``Hercules'' and C-141B
``Starlifter'' strategic aircraft. Not only could this save
about $20 billion, but the U.S. would have the needed planes
available much sooner.
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND U.S. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Strategic airlift is used primarily for the rapid
deployment of forces, military equipment, and supplies to
combat zones in the early stage of wars. Without the
prepositioned military equipment that exists for example, in
Europe and Korea, most U.S. military contingencies in the
Third World would require rapid air transport of men and
materiel to the combat zone. Transport by sea is
indispensable for sustaining combat an average 30 days or
longer, but it is often too slow to reach the combat zone for
violent regional conflicts decided very quickly.
The standard categories of airlift military cargoes are: 1)
bulk, such as fuel, ammunition, and other cargo that when
loaded on pallets can be carried by most airlifters; 2)
oversize, such as trucks and towed artillery pieces that fit
into all military cargo planes (C-5, C-141, C-130, and KC-10)
and some specially designed civilian aircraft; and 3)
outsize, such as main battle tanks, helicopters, and other
extremely large items that can be placed only in the huge C-5
or the proposed C-17 cargo planes.
The principal aircraft in the Air Force's airlift fleet are
its 70 C-5 ``Galaxy'' and 234 C-141 ``Starlifter'' strategic
airlifters, 16 KC-10 dual-capable cargo/tanker aircraft, and
512 C-130 ``Hercules'' tactical airlifters. The C-5A jet and
its newer modified version, the C-5B, carry outsize cargo
such as tanks and helicopters over intercontinental
distances. The C-141, the workhorse strategic airlifter of
the Military Airlift Command, carries a substantial volume of
cargo over unlimited ranges with in-flight refueling. The
prop-jet C-130, on the other hand, is the mainstay of the
tactical airlift fleet, operating within combat theaters and
carrying troops and cargo 100 to 2,000 miles. When modified,
it can refuel helicopters and fighter planes, perform as an
aerial gunship, airborne command post, or airmobile
communication center. The KC-10 is essentially the three-
engine McDonnell Douglas DC-10 long-range aircraft capable of
carrying cargo and refueling other aircraft.\1\
SHORTFALLS IN STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
In the late 1970s, the possibility that the U.S. would have
to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf renewed interest
in strategic mobility. A congressional request that the
Pentagon review strategic mobility requirements led to the
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS).\2\ In 1981,
the study concluded that the U.S. was woefully short of cargo
planes, ships, and military equipment prepositioned abroad.
The study recommended that the U.S. be able to airlift 66
million-ton-miles-per-day (MTM/D) to meet its global
commitments. Currently, the U.S. has a 43 MTM/D
capability.\3\
Even this vastly underestimates U.S. requirements. In 1980,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that a 150 MTM/D airlift
capability would be desirable just for reinforcing U.S.
troops in Europe.
Simultaneous wars in Europe and the Persian Gulf, or Europe
and Korea, are thus far beyond U.S. airlift capabilities.
Even the CMMS goal of 66 MTM/D, which will not be met until
the late 1990s, is the absolute minimum of what is
required.\4\
The Air Force Airlift Master Plan
Even before the CMMS was completed, the Air Force developed
plans for a totally new long-range or strategic cargo plane
to supplement the 1960s vintage C-5 and replace C-141s and C-
130s. The capabilities of the C-X, as the design model was
called, were determined before the CMMS was completed.\5\ The
Air Force Airlift Master Plan required a plane to have both
intercontinental range and the ``mission flexibility'' to
land at small, hard-to-land-on airfields in or near combat
zones. Proposed airlift characteristics included short
landing and departure approaches for tactical operations and
the capability to convert back and forth between cargo,
troop, and aeromedical evacuation configurations. The new
plane should be capable of aerial refueling and of carrying
such outsize cargo as tanks and helicopters. The C-X,
therefore, was to be a hybrid cargo lifter. Its mission was
to be a cross between intercontinental and intratheater tasks
traditionally accomplished by two different airplanes.
In 1983 the Air Force concluded that the C-17 would meet
these requirements. The following year, in the Airlift Master
Plan, and the Airlift Total Force Plan, the Air Force decided
to:\6\
1. Build a strategic airlift force to meet the
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study goal of 66 million-
ton-miles-per-day airlift capability.
2. Double tactical airlift capability.
3. By 210 C-17s, using 30 for training and backup.
4. Retire 180 C-130 ``Hercules'' short-range tactical
airlifters.
5. Retire 54 C-141 ``Starlifter'' long-range cargo planes
and transfer the remaining 180 Starlifters to the reserves
where their use rate and wartime capability will be lower.
6. Use C-17 short-range or ``intratheater'' shuttles to
replace the retired C-130 planes and to augment tactical
airlift capability by almost 80 percent.
Before the Air Force issued the Airlift Master Plan, the
Department of Defense already had decided to increase airlift
capability in the near term. Its plan of January 1982 called
for buying an additional 50 C-5Bs, 44 KC-10 fuel tanker
aircraft, and 19 converted Boeing 747s for troop
transport.\7\ The principal reason that these aircraft were
bought was that they would be available significantly earlier
than the C-17.
U.S. CARGO AIRLIFT CAPABILITY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number Air Force plans to meet
Aircraft operational airlift goals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-5........................ 70 Purchase 50 C-5Bs
C-141...................... 234 Retire 54. Move 180 to
reserves at one-half
current operating rate
C-130...................... 512 Retire 180
C-17....................... .............. Purchase 210
KC-10...................... \1\16 \2\Purchase 44
CRAF Wide Body Cargo\3\.... 39 Modify 19 747s
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\16 KC-10s assigned to Strategic Air Command.
\2\44 additional KC-10s to be added to Strategic Air Command fleet but
dedicated to airlift use.
\3\Civilian Reserve Air Fleet for transporting cargo on modified
passenger planes in times of national emergency.
Source: Military Airlift Command, United States Air Force.
The Air Force claims that the C-17 program is the most
economical option it examined. Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force Tom Cooper states: ``The acquisition of 210 C-17s would
cost $16 billion less and require nearly 15,000 fewer
personnel to operate when compared to alternatives based on
the C-5 that provide equivalent capability.''\8\ The savings
will come from the lower manpower and operational costs of
the C-17. Savings will also accrue from the retirement of 180
C-130s and from transferring 180 C-141Bs into the reserves at
a lower operating level, which will cut down on active duty
manpower and operational costs.
problems with the airlift master plan
The Air Force should be applauded for trying to come to
terms with the perennial problem of airlift shortfalls. But
its way of going about it raises serious questions. Among
them:
1. Is a new generation strategic airlifter necessary? Under
Air Force plans, the C-5 air cargo plane will remain in
service along with the C-17 well beyond the year 2000. Is
there really a need for a new strategic airlifter if the
current model, the C-5B, has enough productive years left to
be retained in the inventory for that long a period?
2. The dual-capability dilemma: A key element of the Air
Force plan is the capability of the C-17 to deliver troops,
supplies, and military equipment not only over vast distances
but directly to combat forces at the forward edge of the
battlefield. This will be essential mainly because the Air
Force plan would retire 180 C-130 Hercules from the fleet of
512 tactical airlift aircraft. The C-17 is supposed to fly
tactical air sorties between strategic airlift missions.
In a major war, however, it is questionable whether the new
and expensive C-17 will be available for tactical combat
support roles. Presumably, it will be flying intercontinental
sorties across the Pacific or North Atlantic. Even if the
plane were available, some experts see problems with a hybrid
design that equips the C-17 for both strategic and tactical
airlift missions.
3. Battlefield vulnerabilities: Is it realistic to expect
the Air Force to risk the C-17, which may cost $180 million
or more each, on ``austere'' airfields in or near combat
zones? Former Air Force Secretary Vernon Orr apparently does
not think so. As he said in 1982, ``. . . my worry . . . is
that with a very large expensive plane like the C-17 and a
limited number of them, the forward commander may not want to
order them up to the edge of the battle area.''\9\
This problem of the vulnerability of a large, expensive,
and valuable strategic carrier plagued the 1983 U.S. military
operation in Grenada. Explaining why air cargo sorties were
backed up, Colonel Dave Starling, now a commander of the
Army's 18th Airborne Corps Support Command, said: ``Initially
there was concern that the [cargo] aircraft was susceptible
to gunfire and, if one got hit, we'd have really been up a
creek.''\10\ ``Aircraft were stacked up to the ionosphere,''
another commander said, who added that lift operations might
have been terminated had the enemy had longer range anti-
aircraft guns.\11\
4. Cost: the estimated acquisition cost for the Airlift
Master Plan is $39.8 billion, of which $37.2 billion is for
the C-17. In its own terms, the C-17's price may be
reasonable for the research, development, and production of a
plane using the latest aviation technology. But whether this
plane is reasonable for the allotted task is another matter.
To be sure, the Air Force claims that its plan will be $16
billion less than alternatives based on the C-5. Yet by some
calculations, adding 101 C-5Bs to the fleet to meet the
Pentagon's goal of 66 MTM/D airlift capability would cost at
most $16.8 billion.\12\ And this is at an inflated ``then-
year'' dollar cost computed to reflect price hikes during the
aircraft's production life. Yet this is still far below the
then-year $37.2 billion acquisition cost for the C-17.
Anticipated economies in producing a plane that has been in
production for some time, moreover, could reduce the total
acquisition cost of 101 C-5Bs to $14 billion.
Greater savings will come from not retiring the C-141s and
C-130s as required by the Air Force Plan. While it is true
that the C-141s will have to be replaced some day, their
service life can be extended to help meet strategic airlift
requirements at a lower cost until 1998. In this time, the
Air Force can develop and deploy a follow-on tactical
airlifter to replace the C-130. By extending the service life
of the ``work horse'' C-141B at a cost of about $300 million,
the Air Force could keep 180 of these aircraft in active
status, and not, as is currently planned, transfer them to
the reserves.\13\ Cost there may be considerably lower, but
readiness is also.
The savings from building more C-5Bs instead of C-17s will
enable the Air Force to keep the C-130 in operation. The 180
of these aircraft currently marked for retirement could be
kept in service until a new short-range tactical airlifter is
developed and produced. Keeping the C-130 in the air would
safeguard the Air Force's tactical airlift mission. It would
ensure that there are enough short-range airlifters to
perform the many tactical airlift missions for which an
expensive and essential strategic airlift cargo plane like
the C-17 may either be unavailable or overqualified.
Many experts argue, in fact, that a new tactical airlifter
to replace the C-130 is needed far more than a new long-range
air cargo plane like the C-17. Said Lt. General William
Richardson, former Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans: ``The C-17 is not the `solution'--there will
always be a need for a smaller, STOL (short take-off and
landing) aircraft that is technologically superior to the C-
130.''\14\
It is true that the C-17, with a minimum crew size of three
and low maintenance personnel requirements, will demand less
manpower than the C-5B, which has a minimum crew size of
seven or eight. Decreasing manpower adds to savings. The Air
Force claims that the C-17 option will require 15,000 fewer
personnel than the C-5 option. This accounts for some of the
alleged savings of the C-17 approach.
But the major portion of the Air Force projections for C-17
savings comes not from C-17 operating and manpower economies
but from the cut in maintenance, operations, and manpower
costs if the C-141s and C-130s are retired. It makes little
economic sense, however, to purchase a new type of aircraft
to replace old ones when much of the existing fleet is still
capable of longer service at a relatively low cost.
the c-5 vs. the c-17: technical issues
There are a number of technical issues involving the
relative merits of the C-17 or C-5 option. Among them:
1. Design and Operational Concepts: Some critics of the C-
17 argue that the design and operational concepts for the C-
17 and C-5 are remarkably similar. The C-17 probably has a
capability advantage at the tactical airlift end of the
mission spectrum, while the C-5 has the advantage at the
strategic end.\15\
2. Availability of Airfields: The C-5B requires runways
4,000 feet long and 150 feet wide for landing.\16\ But
Lockheed Corporation the manufacturer of the C-5B, claims
that recent tests of the wing-modified C-5A demonstrate the
ability of the C-5A and C-5B to land on runways only 3,000
feet in length.\17\ The design requirement for the C-17, on
the other hand, is the capability to land on runways 90 feet
wide and as short as 3,000 feet.\18\ Even if the C-5B still
needs 4,000 feet to land, operationally it barely will be at
a disadvantage compared to the C-17. The reason: only a tiny
fraction of airfields in Europe, Northeast Asia (Korea and
Japan), and Southwest Asia are between 3,000 and 4,000 feet
long and thus can accommodate the C-17 but not the C-5.\19\
In Central America, however, three-quarters of all airfields
are shorter than 3,000 feet and thus can handle neither the
C-17 nor the C-5B. This is the case in many other Third World
countries.\20\
3. Airfield Congestion and Obstacles: A major Air Force
argument for the C-17 is that because it is smaller than C-
5B, it is less likely to cause congestion at airfields during
operations. This is undoubtedly true. Yet because the larger
C-5B delivers more cargo than the C-17 (261,000 lbs. vs.
172,200 lbs.), fewer C-5Bs than C-17s will be needed to
deliver the same load, thus decreasing congestion. Backups
are cut even further by the C-5s because their front and rear
loading doors allow them to move in and out of the airports
quickly.
It is argued that trees, fences, and other obstacles at the
periphery of some narrow airfields in Europe can hinder C-5B
access because of its broad wingspan (228 feet compared to
165 feet for the C-17 and 195 feet for a Boeing 747
commercial jet). Trees and fences, however, can be removed
quickly. Preparing European airfields, and when necessary,
non-European allied airfields, for better use by the C-5B is
no major undertaking.
recommendations and proposals
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing bill is going to
force careful examination of all federal spending. The Air
Force thus needs an airlift-enhancement program that can be
sold to Congress as cost effective. If the program cannot be
sold, the entire effort to narrow and close the airlift gap
could be jeopardized. All airlift-enhancement proposals
should be constructed to get the most military capability for
the money spent. The guiding principle should be to establish
the strategic and military operational priorities for the
program, and then to find the most economical way to meet
these priorities.
To do so, the Air Force should:
1. Retain the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study goal
of 66 million-ton-miles-per day of airlift requirements.
There is a broad consensus behind this number. More
capability may be needed in the future, but the 66 MTM/D goal
appears adequate for the purposes of an affordable airlift
program.
2. Cancel the C-17 program, build more C-5Bs and KC-10s,
and retire no C-130s.
3. Retire and transfer no C-141s. Keep all 234 of them in
the active force by modifying them to extend their service
life. The entire C-141B fleet of 271 airplanes can be
extended 15 years for about $300 million.
4. Consider developing a new short-range ``tactical''
airlifter to replace the C-130. The Air Force will now know
more about this need after the completion sometime this fall
of the Pentagon's Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study
(WIMS), which will include an analysis of future U.S.
tactical airlift requirements.\21\ Because the U.S. needs a
robust tactical airlift capability, the current force of over
512 C-130s should be kept in place until a follow-up tactical
airlift is deployed to take its place. To do so, a service
life extension program will be required for the C-130.
For the United States, whose military obligations are
spread across thousands of miles, the ability to fly troops,
supplies, and military equipment over great distances is
absolutely indispensable to its global strategy. The U.S. now
suffers from an airlift gap--and it must be closed. Yet the
Air Force's proposed new generation cargo plane, the C-17,
and the Airlift Master Plan are not the way to proceed. The
Administration should buy more C-5Bs instead of C-17s, while
moving rapidly to begin the development of a new generation
short-range tactical airlifter.--Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., Policy
Analyst.
footnotes
1. Information provided by U.S. Air Force Military Airlift
Command.
2. Final Report, Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study,
Department of Defense, May 1981.
3. U.S. Air Force Airlift Master Plan (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Air Force, 1983), p. III-5. The million-ton-miles-per-day
(MTM/D) standard measure of capability combines the amount of
cargo moved (tons), the distance to be moved (miles), and the
time within which the movement is to be completed (days). A
follow-on study, Saber Challenge Lift, recommended that at
least half of the recommended 20 MTM/D additional airlift
capability be for outsize cargo such as tanks and
helicopters. The study recommended, moreover, that fast
sealift capabilities be * * * ed, ibid.
4. Airlift Master Plan, p. III-5.
5. U.S. General Accounting Office, ``The Department of
Defense Should Resolve Certain Issues concerning the C-X
Aircraft before Requesting Proposals from Industry for Its
Full-Scale Engineering Development (PSAD-81-B), Washington,
D.C., October 10, 1980.
6. See Airlift Master Plan, pp. V-8-9.
7. The C-5B is a modified version of the C-5A. Modifications
include a new engine (the General Electric TF-39-1C), new
wings, modernized avionics, and a fuselage structure
constructed from an aluminum alloy less conducive to
corrosion.
8. Hearings, Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection,
U.S. Senate, March 7, 1985.
9. Military Technology, Interview, August 1982, p. 87.
10. Military Logistics Forum, July/August 1985, p. 23.
11. Ibid.
12. This figure is based on a Lockheed fixed unit price
proposal of around $100 million a copy (in 1984 dollars),
which includes Air Force add-on costs. The total then-year
cost is derived from a Selective Acquisition Report estimate
of $8.4 billion for 50 C-5Bs in then-year dollars. This puts
the unit cost of a C-5B at $168 million for a program funded
over the FY 1983-FY 1987 period. Adjusting for lower expected
inflation results in all estimated then-year cost of $155
million a copy for the C-5B, which compares favorably with
$180 million a unit for the C-17. Selective Acquisition
Report, Department of Defense, September 30, 1985.
13. Information provided by Lockheed Corporation. It includes
cost of extending service life of C-141 from 45,000 hours to
60,000 hours.
14. ``Army Operations Chief Says He's Tired of USAF's C-17,''
Defense Week, February 14, 1983, p. 3.
15. For a more complete comparison, see Jeffrey Record, U.S.
Strategic Airlift: Requirements and Capabilities (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and Washington, D.C.: Institute Foreign Policy
Analysis, 1985), Appendix B.
16. Ibid., p. 44. Information also provided by U.S. Air
Force, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base.
17. Record, op. cit., p. 29. Lockheed Corporation claims that
the C-5 can operate on dirt runways as well.
18. Air Force, Military Airlift Command.
19. Record, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
20. As for the C-5B's wider runway requirement, it would be
more cost effective to widen runways by pouring more concrete
or laying metal planks to handle the C-5B's 150 feet runway
width requirement than to buy the C-17.
21. The fact that no current or planned strategic airlifter
can operate on three-quarters of the airfields in Central
America is a powerful argument in favor of developing a new
tactical airlifter which can.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, to summarize, our bipartisan amendment reflects a
position most of us were not prepared to endorse in the Armed Services
Committee, because we did not have adequate information from the
Defense Department. That information was made available shortly after
our mark, and thanks to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], we
were able to consider it.
Now an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the Committee on Armed
Services supports the Harman amendment.
Let me underscore again that the cost of the Harman amendment and the
cost of the committee mark are identical. The only issue is, how we
spend that money. DOD has told us convincingly that it needs and can
manage a program for 6 C-17s and that it would not know how to spend
money and purchase four nondevelopmental aircraft, a part of the
committee proposal. We who support this amendment believe that we are
spending it in the wisest possible way, and I ask for your support.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] to close debate.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, let me just make a few wrap-up points.
First of all, as to how many airplanes we buy because, as the
chairman said, we have two well-considered choices before us. The
committee's version right now would have us buy four a year. The
Department of Defense says that will foreordain the result, because the
cost will be so expensive, so inordinate at four a year, that trickling
rate, that the price itself will cause us to quit the program.
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Gephardt].
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
It just makes common sense to me to vote this amendment. The Pentagon
and the company involved have been working on this vociferously for
some time. They have reached an agreement. Let us honor that agreement
and let us find out if we can produce this plane at a reasonable cost.
If we cannot, then we will decide that. But if we can, we save the
$15 billion that we have already spent that we would lose if we
terminate this program and do not honor that agreement.
Let us honor that contract. It is the only sensible thing to do.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The time of the gentlewoman
from California [Ms. Harman] has expired.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Let me simply say, we have two proposals, the committee proposition
and the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Harman].
What we attempted to do was not to say four in perpetuity. We said
over the next 2 years, for each year for 2 years and then make a
judgment.
The amendment says six this year, eight next year. Remember, this
only works in the context of the settlement. The settlement has not
been dealt with.
I would suggest to Members that this is where the real contentious
issues and contentious arguments really are going to fall.
Whether Members fall on their swords about four or six, that is not
the most compelling issue here. This only makes sense within the
framework of the settlement.
We have to face up to that. My colleagues ought to make a judgment. I
ask them to stay with the House and with the position articulated by
the House Committee on Armed Services.
Ms. DeLauro. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Harman
amendment, and in support of the C-17. Our military experience during
the past few years points to the clear need for a strong airlift
capability. It is a question of strategic necessity; of logistics; and
of saving lives.
Recent history has taught us that we may need, at any time, to put
U.S. forces in distant places, quickly, with the right equipment. The
effectiveness of our troops and their ability to perform their mission
depends on the right equipment. More importantly, so does their safety.
That is why we need the C-17.
Examples of where we could have used the C-17's enormous capabilities
are numerous, and the names familiar: Mogadishu, Sarajevo, Desert
Storm. In Mogadishu, we could have doubled the amount of equipment we
delivered in support of our troops and for humanitarian aid with the C-
17. The consequences of not having this capability are clear: Time and
lives can be lost.
According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the C-17 is
the only aircraft for this job. It delivers four times the payload of
the C-130; it can land at small airfields that cannot be used by
current U.S. military transport planes; it can discharge its payloads
quickly; and it can fly much further than other military transport
planes.
This is a controversial plane. No question. But the controversy is
about the program, not the need. The program has been cleaned up, at no
cost to American taxpayers. But the need is still with us--perhaps now
more than ever.
We must support our fighting men and women. Let us make sure they
have the best support, the best logistics, and access to all the
equipment they need to do the job--no matter where they are. Support
our troops and the dangerous work they do. Support the C-17.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of the bipartisan
Harman-Horn-McCurdy-Saxton-Spratt-Johnson-Talent amendment which will
increase the number of C-17 transport aircraft authorized in the
defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1995 from four to six and
provide funds for eight aircraft in long lead procurement. The C-17 is
the cornerstone of our airlift modernization program to replace older
aircraft now nearing the end of their useful life. The Harman amendment
restores President Clinton's original budget request funding level, and
keeps our airlift modernization program on schedule.
The C-17 is an essential air transport program that is designed to
meet our Nation's airlift needs well into the 21st century. Defense
Secretary William Perry recently said:
Our Nation has a critical need for intertheater airlift
modernization if we are to maintain our ability to project
forces and respond to humanitarian missions worldwide. Our C-
141 aircraft are wearing out. The C-17 aircraft continues to
be the most cost-effective means to meet current and
projected airlift requirements. The C-17's ability to deliver
outsize cargo, combined with its special capability to use
austere fields, will provide us with modern, highly capable
strategic airlift.
The characteristics of the C-17 far outweigh those of other aircraft
including the C-5 and the C-141. The C-17 can land on shorter runways
and is more maneuverable on the ground than the larger C-5 that
requires excessively long and wide runways. In many developing
countries and remote areas where we are witnessing small, contingent
conflicts, the C-5 is too large to be deployed. The C-141, on the other
hand, cannot carry critical outsized cargo such as tanks, helicopters,
and large vehicles and artillery. Canceling the C-17 or limiting its
production will not solve the problem of aging aircraft now in service,
such as the C-141. For example, Army units deployed to Panama in 1989
were carried entirely by air, and United States airlift assets were
totally employed. The massive military airlift to the Persian Gulf
during the Persian Gulf war put heavy additional stress on certain
models of C-141's and probably shortened their remaining service life.
If our Nation is to remain a world power, we need a reliable and
dependable airlift to carry troops, supplies and system weapons, as
well as humanitarian supplies during major disasters.
Many of my colleagues may argue that this program is over-budgeted.
As a member of the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, I believe that
controlling cost on weapons programs is critical. The House Armed
Services Committee, Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, and the Air
Force have placed firm conditions on the C-17 aircraft program to
reduce the overall costs, and ensure that it is cost efficient and
meets the Air Force's performance requirements. Reducing the production
rate from six aircraft to four aircraft would dramatically undercut the
Department of Defense's strategy to control costs on the C-17, and
possibly make it unaffordable. Any further reduction in the C-17
production rate would drastically increase the annual unit costs of
this program by $40 to $50 million. We cannot afford to keep scaling
back programs like the C-17 and still make this program affordable. In
addition, we must hold the contractor accountable and demand that the
aircraft is operational and manufacturing inefficiencies are corrected.
Over the years, we have invested $15.8 million in the C-17 transport
program. By purchasing 6 aircraft in fiscal year 1995 and 8 of them in
fiscal year 1996, the Air Force may round out its buy to what it calls
a minimum viable force of 40 airplanes. And, with 40 C-17's, the Air
Force can satisfy the minimum requirements for outsize cargo capacity.
The Harman amendment will also fully fund the Air Force's request to
try out nondevelopmental aircraft such as the 747's or newly produced
C5B's. The procurement of nondevelopmental aircraft is still an open
option for the Air Force.
There is another key issue that I want to raise today, and that is
jobs. My State of California, and Los Angeles County in particular, has
been exceptionally hard hit by defense downsizing and layoffs. There
are over 10,000 Californians employed by the prime contractor on this
defense program, and 8,000 California subcontractors. In March of this
year, California's unemployment rate reached 8.6 percent--2.1 percent
higher than the national average of 6.5 percent. During the same
period, Los Angeles County's unemployment was 9.4 percent--among the
highest in the Nation. We can ill-afford to lose more jobs.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment today restores funding for this vital
program that is not only important to the Los Angeles area, but to the
Nation as well. With broad-based bipartisan support, I am pleased to
join my colleagues in casting my vote for the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-
Saxton-Spratt-Johnson-Talent amendment to the defense authorization
bill.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, while I have concerns about the C-17
program, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch and Secretary of
Defense William Perry have addressed them, and so I rise today in
support of the amendment offered by my colleagues from California, Ms.
Harman and Mr. Horn. As I am sure my colleagues are aware, this
amendment would provide the authorization for full funding for six C-17
aircraft for fiscal year 1995, as well as long lead funding for eight
aircraft in fiscal year 1996.
Mr. Chairman, the C-17 aircraft will meet the increasingly changing
needs of the U.S. military in the post-cold war era. As demonstrated by
the Desert Storm operation, there is a necessity for the military to be
able to quickly transport combat power directly to the front line.
According to General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, ``Today
there is only one alternative that can meet the requirements of a core
airlifter--the C-17.''
Mr. Chairman, the C-17's capabilities are crucial to the Air Force's
ability to deliver and sustain forces in support of theatre commanders.
The C-17 can carry outsize cargo to give early forces firepower; it can
deliver its cargo into remote locations with short runways; and it has
the ability to airdrop heavy equipment, supplies, and troops.
The importance of the C-17 aircraft has been recognized by the
President of the United States and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Each has gone on record supporting the restoration of the budget
request for six C-17's in fiscal year 1995.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to register my strong opposition to
the amendment offered by the distinguished gentlelady from Oregon [Ms.
Furse]. The Furse amendment flies in the face of every recommendation
from the senior commanders of the U.S. military. More importantly, the
Furse amendment will do nothing but waste resources and eliminate jobs.
If the Furse amendment is agreed to, a projected 8,000 layoffs will
occur over the next 2 years. A vote for the Furse amendment is a vote
against jobs, a vote against the American worker.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to
support the Harman amendment. Supporting the C-17 is the right thing to
do.
Mr. WHEAT. Mr. Chairman, allow me to first of all commend Chairman
Dellums for his hard work in crafting the fiscal year 1995 Defense
authorization bill and moving it to the floor so expeditiously.
I particularly applaud the Chairman for convening a recent hearing on
C-17 procurement to get the facts out on the program. And it is this
important issue that I would like to comment on today.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to add my strong support to the Harman amendment
to restore funds for the C-17 program.
There is little debate about the vital need to modernize our
military's lift capability. The question revolves around how best to
meet that need.
Among our Nation's top civilian and military experts, the answer to
that question is clear. The C-17--and only the C-17--meets the high
demands and the core strategic airlift requirements for our forces in
the post-Cold War era.
It is the only transport aircraft that meets these demands today and
into the future.
Mr. Chairman, the C-17 program has undergone program improvements
over the last year. In fact, it has met all of the mandates set out in
last year's defense authorization bill. Efficiency is going up, costs
are going down.
We should not penalize the C-17 program for meeting the goals we have
set. We should not phase out this program which has the unified support
of our military and civilian leadership. We should not turn our backs
on a $15.8 billion investment that American taxpayers have already
made.
The need for the strategic airlift capability represented by the C-17
is critical and it is growing. As regional crises erupt across the
globe and our own forces are drawn down, only the C-17 offers the
unique ability to deliver outsized cargo such as tanks and helicopters
to austere environments.
According to the DOD's Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis,
the C-17 is the most cost-effective solution to filling a clear and
compelling need.
The C-17 program is a critical element to U.S. defense modernization
in our changing world. It is also vital to thousands of people in
Missouri and elsewhere who are working hard to produce a quality
product for our Nation's Armed Forces at an affordable price.
Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to approve the Harman
amendment, reject the Furse amendment, and restore full funding for six
C-17 aircraft.
Ms. LONG. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Harman
amendment to the Department of Defense [DOD] authorization bill (H.R.
4301) to increase the number of C-17 transport aircraft authorized in
the bill from four to six.
The increased number of C-17's represents what was included in the
President's fiscal year 1995 budget request. Funds for the additional
aircraft will be offset by reductions in other defense programs.
I fully recognize that the C-17 program has had its share of
timetable and budgetary difficulties in the recent past. However, since
the Congress voted in 1992 to require the Department of Defense to
report to the Congress on the viability of terminating the project we
have seen marked improvements to the management of the C-17 program.
There is no doubt that there remains much room for improvement.
However, I believe that we should allow time for additional
improvements--some of which have already been implemented--to take
effect and to determine whether these improvements benefit the
program's timeliness and cost-effectiveness. By placing the C-17
program on probation, while supporting the administration's request, we
will send the DoD a signal that future congressional support for the C-
17 program will depend upon the degree to which improvements have been
made during the next year. Furthermore, this policy will ensure that we
are not prematurely abandoning a technological development which could
prove to be the most advantageous to our Nation's Armed Forces during
future military contingencies.
{time} 1630
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Harman].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 330,
noes 100, not voting 8, as follows:
[Roll No. 195]
AYES--330
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blackwell
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Condit
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
DeLauro
DeLay
Derrick
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
Engel
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Fish
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoke
Holden
Houghton
Hoyer
Huffington
Hughes
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kopetski
Kyl
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Machtley
Manton
Manzullo
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Mineta
Minge
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Neal (NC)
Oberstar
Obey
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Sabo
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schenk
Schiff
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Upton
Valentine
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walsh
Waters
Weldon
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
NOES--100
Abercrombie
Applegate
Barca
Barcia
Becerra
Brown (OH)
Cantwell
Conyers
Coyne
Darden
Deal
DeFazio
Dellums
Deutsch
Dingell
Edwards (CA)
English
Eshoo
Evans
Fingerhut
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gekas
Gillmor
Goodling
Gutierrez
Hamburg
Hoekstra
Inslee
Johnson (GA)
Johnston
Kasich
Kennedy
Kildee
Kingston
Klein
Klug
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lewis (GA)
Linder
Maloney
Mann
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
McDermott
McKinney
McMillan
Meehan
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Mink
Moakley
Morella
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Nussle
Olver
Pallone
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Penny
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Regula
Ridge
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Rush
Sanders
Schaefer
Schroeder
Sensenbrenner
Shepherd
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Swift
Synar
Taylor (MS)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Walker
Watt
Waxman
Woolsey
Wyden
Yates
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--8
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Faleomavaega (AS)
Grandy
Horn
Ortiz
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Washington
{time} 1710
Mr. PALLONE and Mr. McMILLAN changed their vote from ``aye'' to
``no.''
Mr. PETRI changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. LaRocco). The gentleman from California
[Mr. Dellums] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Oregon.
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention at this time to offer
my C-17 amendment, but I would like to take a few moments to speak
about that amendment and why I think it is still relevant. I believe
that it would have provided more airlift sooner and done it cheaper.
With my plan the airlift we need could have been provided for $16
billion less than the Department of Defense's plan. Mine would have
provided for a total of 32 C-17's, and we would have got our remaining
airlift that we need from commercial and military alternatives.
When any of us goes shopping, Mr. Chairman, we look for value, and
defense spending is no different. We need to get the best value out of
every defense dollar. But it we continue on an excessive and
unnecessary course, the American taxpayers do not get value, they get
soaked.
We have military needs that we cannot afford right now: Communities
facing base closure, veterans health care in which we must spend our
military dollars more wisely so we meet our needs. There are several
concerns I would have addressed in my amendment.
One is jobs. I think people fail to realize that my alternative, Mr.
Chairman, would have created thousands of jobs through a building of
the Boeing 747, the Lockheed C-5 or the McDonnell Douglas MD-11. And
then we must talk about military needs. If we spend all our airlift
dollars on the C-17, we will not have enough money to replace our
airlift needs when we lay down the C-141's.
Our shortfall, Mr. Chairman, is in bulk and oversize capability. Now
the existing commercial wide body plans, such as the 747, the MD-11 or
the DC-10 could provide that shortfall, and it seems to me that, if the
shortfall is there, we should be providing it there, not putting it on
into a C-17 program which does not provide our airlift.
Then there is another requirement we have been told about, and that
is that the C-17 can land on austere fields. Well, I checked with the
Department of Defense, and there is a report that states that the C-17
can land in only 5 percent more airfields than the C-5, and the C-5 can
land on dirt, and the C-17 cannot. Our alternative wide body commercial
and military planes can travel farther than the C-17 with much greater
payloads.
I say to my colleagues, ``If you take a payload of 75 tons, which the
C-17 can carry, it can only go 2,000 miles. The C-5 with the same
payload can go 3,000 miles. The MD-11, same payload, 3,800 miles. And
the 747 gets 6,400 miles with the same payload.'' So, I think we get
more with my amendment of 32 C-17's and the rest in other outside
airlift.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] and the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. Furse]
that I hope that today's vote will not be seen as a repudiation of the
committee's work in developing the notion of a nondevelopmental
aircraft because in my judgment, looking at this budget over the next 5
or 6 years, we are going to have a very hard time coming up with enough
money for airlift.
So, I commend the chairman for putting forward this notion, and it
was also encompassed in the bill by the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Harman]. But I think we have got to continue to look at that
option, and I certainly hope that the administration will look at it as
well because, when we look at the money for airlift, it simply is not
there unless we have a supplement to the C-17.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. Chairman, I yield further to my colleague, the gentlewoman from
Oregon [Ms. Furse].
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to close by saying that
good government is about making wise choices. We must remember that it
is the taxpayer who pays the cost of unwise choices. That, I believe,
is why the National Taxpayers Union and Citizens Against Government
Waste endorse my amendment.
I think the C-17 is a flawed program. I think there are less risky
military and commercial alternatives available to us. However, Mr.
Chairman, I bow to the will of the House, and I withdraw my amendment.
Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, it is said that those who do not study
history are doomed to repeat it. On May 12, 1987, I stood in this very
spot to offer virtually the same amendment as my colleague from Oregon.
My amendment failed to pass. Very rarely in life are we granted the
opportunity for a second chance, an opportunity to fix our mistakes.
But, now, this body has the chance to correct itself. The C-17 was
waste of taxpayer funds then, in 1987, and it remains a waste of
taxpayer funds now, in 1994.
In 1987, the C-17 was already behind schedule, already over cost, and
far from being anything other than a paper airplane. How, in 1994, and
C-17 is behind schedule by years, over cost by billions, the Air Force
is cutting deals with the contractor to keep him solvent, and although
the paper airplane is finally flying, the tail has almost fallen off;
it has stalled in midflight and, because the pilot was unaware of the
situation, the plane nearly crashed; it attempted to take off with only
three engines, a maneuver most any plane can perform, failed to have
sufficient power for the takeoff, and its fuselage scraped the ground;
jump testing has recently been halted due to parachutists crashing into
the vertical stabilizer; and, in the most recent incident, the brakes
burned up on an emergency landing. The paper airplane of 1987 is now a
metal airplane that really should still be a paper airplane.
There is no question that the Nation needs more airlift. As we
drawdown our forward deployed forces we must have the capability to
rapidly move equipment and personnel to the battle sight. The Air Force
has singled out the C-17 as being uniquely capable of accessing more
runways than the current C-5 and thus more capable of delivering this
timely, critical cargo. But the Rand Corp. says this is overstated
because the C-17 requires a much stronger runway than the C-5. The
Armed Services Committee performed a study that verifies this Rand
finding. The Committee study documented that the C-17 and C-5 could
land at about the same number of runways. In fact, the recent failure
to take off with only three engines leads many experts to believe that
the C-17 will not be able to meet the requirement of operating off of a
3,000 foot runway. And, the same argument that I used in 1987 remains
true today: the Air Force will not take this $400 million aircraft into
the front lines.
The most rapid response to a crisis is through airlift. We must
improve our airlift capabilities, but the C-17 is not the best
solution.
The original proposal was to buy 210 C-17s. The previous
administration realized this was unaffordable at the enormous unit cost
of almost $400 million each, and lowered the proposal to 120 aircraft.
Now, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command has
testified before my Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations that he only
really needs 60 or 65 and that other aircraft, C-5s or commercial
widebodies, could perform the mission. And even this number, 60 to 65
aircraft, is only to establish a new core airlifter, not because the C-
17 is currently the best alternative available. Even the Secretary of
Defense's most recent selected acquisition report, the SAR, gives the
number of C-17s to be procured as 40, rather than 120. Citing this SAR,
the Air Force has been unable to provide the Armed Services Committee
with updated cost data for the C-17 past fiscal year 1996.
There have also been tremendous alterations in the military
specifications for the C-17. Basically, its payload capability has been
severely decreased and its takeoff and landing distance has been
greatly increased. When the plane couldn't meet the military
requirements, the Air Force simply reduced the requirements.
Since May 13, 1987 I have kept a record of all the problems
associated with the C-17. Let me cite a few highlights:
A March 1989 headline reports'' the Air Force Is Stretching
[C-17] Production to Cut Budget.''
A June 1989 headline reports ``Software Problems Lead to
Massive C-17 Cost Overruns.''
Another June 1989 headline reports ``Lukewarm Support for
C-17 Could Spell Doom for Costly Transport.''
A July 1989 headline reports the Air Force ``May Give the
C-17 a New Job Description.''
An October 1989 headline reports the C-17 ``Will Have to
Lose Weight to Meet Performance Specifications.''
1990
A February 1990 headline reports that ``Half of McDonnell's
C-17 Tools Defective.''
February 1990 headline reports ``Pentagon Admits C-17 is $4
Billion Over Its Budget.''
1991
A January 1991 headline reports ``Massive Cost Overruns in
C-17 Program Raise Specter of Termination.''
An April 1991 headline reports that ``Air Force Eases C-17
Payload Requirements.''
Another April headline in Air Force Times states ``C-17
Standards Cut to Lower Price, MAC Chief Says.''
A July 1991 headline reports that the ``Air Force is
Reluctant to Land C-17 Near Front.''
1992
April headline says ``Persistent Fuel Leaks in C-17 Test
Aircraft Pose Troublesome Hurdle for Air Force.''
1993
A March 1993 headline reports ``C-17 Cost Rises As
Deliveries Slip.''
An April 1993 headline reports, ``C-17 Cargo Jet Nearly
Fell During Test.''
Another April headline reads, ``Pentagon to Consider
Terminating C-17 As Part of Upcoming DAB Review.''
Another April headline reports, ``Management Miscues,
Delays Snarl C-17 Program.''
A July 1993 headline says, ``Most C-17 Test Aircraft Have
Substantial Fuel Leaks.'' This is the same headline as in
April of 1992.
An August 1993 headline states, ``Pentagon, Industry Abuzz
About Possible New C-17 Wing Test Problem.''
and now in 1994
Just two and a half months ago a headline reads, ``C-17
Belly-flops On Runway in Botched Operational Test.''
And just last month headlines said, ``C-17 Needs New
Software Laws for Heavy Braking Situations.''
The point is, Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on citing examples of
problems with this program. Cost overrun problems, scheduling problems,
design problems, technical problems, and management problems.
In 1987, during debate, my colleague from Georgia, Ed Jenkins, said
that the C-17 was ``nothing more than a Town Car for the Air Force!''
Well, Mr. Speaker, now the C-17 can no longer even live up to that
label. It can best be described as a broken-down Edsel.
Numerous committees in this House have held countless hearings on
this program. I would suggest that there probably have been more
hearings held on this program in the last 5 years than any other single
Department of Defense program. These hearings were held not to
determine the need for more airlift capability, but to see if there was
any way to salvage this troubled program. I would also speculate that
the majority of Members who have sat through these hearings, deep in
their hearts, realize there is no way to effectively salvage this
program and we should move on before we waste any more of the
taxpayers' money.
The proposed Furse amendment would expand what the Armed Services
Committee has done by directing the savings from the C-17 into the
nondevelopmental aircraft account. This is how we should be addressing
our airlift shortfall. Recent Air Force tests have proven to the Air
Force that commercial wide-bodies can be loaded and offloaded much more
efficiently than they originally projected. Also, it has been reported
that at least 11 contractor teams have responded to the Air Force's
request for nondevelopment airlift aircraft. Better alternatives are
out there and we should not spend another dollar on the C-17.
The time has come for this House to make the proper decision, a
decision that should have been made many years ago. Forget this $40
billion boondoggle. Take these precious funds and direct them toward
the procurement of a nondevelopment airlifter. The cancellation of this
program and the subsequent directing of these funds to escalate a
nondevelopmental airlift program, be it C-5's or commercial wide
bodies, is the most cost effective, time efficient, and logical method
for increasing and improving our airlift capabilities.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms.
Furse], and I appreciate the integrity of her remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
McDermott) having assumed the chair, Mr. LaRocco, Chairman pro tempore
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, had
come to no resolution thereon.
____________________