[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 65 (Monday, May 23, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                            DRUGS AND HAITI

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, some involved in the administration's Haiti 
policy are shopping for an invasion rationale, and they ended up at the 
narcotics counter. This is a new twist to President Clinton's foreign 
policy--looking for reasons to invade a country. According to recent 
news reports, United States government agencies have been tasked to 
find evidence that would justify United States military action in Haiti 
to fight narcotics smuggling. It seems to me that an island under 
blockade is not a very good drug transshipment point, if you have ships 
all around the island. But despite the obvious, the administration has 
begun a fishing expedition.
  The administration does not need to look any farther than the State 
Department's April 1994 Comprehensive Report on International 
Narcotics. On page 191, it says,

       Compared to trafficking indicators in other areas such as 
     the Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of detected air and 
     maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is low.

  On page 192, the report goes on to say the United States government 
``does not have evidence directly linking senior [government of Haiti] 
officials to drug trafficking * * *''
  Activity is comparatively low, and there is no evidence of direct 
complicity. The record seems pretty clear--an invasion in search of a 
reason would be hard pressed to use Haitian drug smuggling. Any level 
of drug smuggling is unacceptable but, based on the State Department's 
own evidence, invasions of Colombia or the Bahamas would do more to 
slow the drug trade than an invasion of Haiti.
  Some have tried to compare Haiti to panama. Haiti is not Panama. 
Months before Operation Just Cause in panama, Noriega had been indicted 
in the United States--an indictment that later led to a conviction. 
There are no indictments in Haiti. In Panama, American lives were at 
risk. In Haiti, I know of no threat to Americans from the military 
regime. On Panama, the Senate passed numerous resolutions opposed to 
Noriega, and urging more United States action from 1987 to 1989. On 
Haiti last year, we passed an amendment calling for congressional 
authorization before military action by a vote of 98-2.
  Haiti's military regime is despicable, but blaming them for the 
narcotics problem in the United States is particularly ironic from an 
administration that gutted the Drug Czar's office, downgraded the State 
Department's international antidrug efforts, and is reducing drug 
enforcement administration personnel.
  If the administration wants to fight narcotics coming into the United 
States, there is much to do without invading Haiti. And if the 
administration really wants to build a domestic consensus over its 
Haiti policy, it should join with Congress in appointing an independent 
commission to evaluate the situation, not raise the false flag of 
narcotics trafficking.
  I would just say as far as the independent Commission is concerned it 
has been done in the past. We did it 10 years ago in Central America, 
looking at 5 different countries at the time. It was a bipartisan 
Commission headed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and 
former Ambassador Robert Strauss. It was nonpartisan. They know the 
specific interests in the area. They made a number of good 
recommendations to the Reagan administration, many of which were later 
followed and I think the value of that Commission was demonstrated 
recently in the free election in El Salvador.
  So, I just hope that we could have a commission that could work with 
Mr. Bill Gray, who is highly respected, known by all of us. In my view 
that would be very helpful to find some nonpartisan approach to what 
should be done in Hati because I believe the people are really 
suffering, the poorest of the poor. It is not the military, not the 
middle class, not the upper class. It is the poorest of the poor. It is 
also in my view that by tightening sanctions we in effect are punishing 
the wrong people. We are not punishing the military. They are going to 
be taken care of. They will take care of themselves. If you noticed the 
picture in Sunday's Washington Post of the poor starving or hungry 
children in Hati, then I think our policy is wrong. If we are going to 
drive them into boats and the boats have no place to go, they are going 
to return to Hati. It seems to me, there must be a better way, and I 
hope we can find a better way in a bipartisan effort.
  I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the comments from the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of April 1994.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics 
  Matters--International Narcotics Control Strategy Report--April 1994


                                 haiti

                               I. Summary

       Haiti continues to be used by Colombian trafficking 
     organizations as a base of operations and transshipment point 
     for the movement of South American cocaine to the United 
     States. The Government of Haiti (GOH) has had little success 
     in attacking the problem and clearly has an inadequate 
     interdiction and enforcement capability.
       Compared to trafficking indicators in other areas such as 
     The Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of detected air and 
     maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is low. We do not 
     have an accurate assessment, however, of the extent of 
     cocaine transiting Haiti. Our best estimate is that one or 
     more multi-hundred kilogram loads pass through the country 
     monthly. President Aristide's ouster in the September 1991 
     coup d'etat halted close bilateral narcotics control 
     cooperation in Haiti, which in turn reduced opportunities to 
     enhance host government capabilities.
       Note: In this report, GOH and host country refer to the de 
     facto government which the USG does not recognize.

                         II. Status of country

       Haiti's geographic location between Colombia and the US, 
     coupled with a long, unpatrolled coastline and mountainous 
     interior and the presence of numerous uncontrolled airstrips 
     make the country an ideal site for illicit narcotics 
     trafficking. Inadequate enforcement and interdiction and the 
     susceptibility of Haitian officials to corruption make Haiti 
     even more desirable for traffickers. As a result, Colombian 
     trafficking organizations are using Haiti as a transshipment 
     and storage point. Marijuana is also transshipped through 
     Haiti, but to a lesser degree than cocaine.
       The de facto government maintains the same antidrug 
     policies and bureaucratic mechanisms as the Aristide 
     government. Counternarcotics law enforcement efforts fall 
     under Haiti's Ministry of Defense. Two drug units subordinate 
     to the Haitian military have been established to coordinate 
     intelligence gathering and interdiction activities: the 
     National Narcotics Bureau (NNB) directs law enforcement 
     activities, is subordinate to the military chief of staff, 
     and is staffed by 40 officers and enlisted men; and, the 
     Center for Information and Coordination (CIC), responsible 
     for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
     intelligence for narcotics law enforcement and interdiction 
     activities, is staffed by about 30 security service 
     personnel. Counternarcotics operations are controlled by the 
     military and are conducted primarily by the army and the 
     national police, which reports to the army commander. Haiti's 
     air force and navy also have a counterdrug responsibility, 
     but resource constraints have severely limited their 
     involvement in drug control operations.
       The de facto government has maintained drug enforcement 
     efforts at or above the pre-coup level, but a lack of support 
     (the CIC, is almost inoperative) and dwindling resources have 
     affected seizures (in 1993 cocaine seizures totalled 156 
     kgs).
       The Haitian legal system is ineffective in controlling 
     illicit drug activity. Although Haiti's narcotics laws are 
     relatively strong, law enforcement and military resources 
     have been grossly inadequate to cope with narcotics 
     trafficking. The weak judicial system has brought few 
     traffickers to justice, even when arrests have been made. 
     Defendants are routinely released on a technicality within 
     days of arrest and almost never come to trial. Haiti is not 
     an important producer of illegal drugs, though small-scale 
     cannabis plots have been discovered and destroyed by law 
     enforcement officials. There is almost no information 
     available on money laundering or precursor chemical 
     activities in Haiti.

               III. Country action against drugs in 1993

       Policy Initiatives. There were no significant changes in 
     GOH international narcotics control policy during 1993. 
     Political issues continued to overshadow counternarcotics 
     concerns for those in control of the government.
       Accomplishments. Although the GOH made some minimal 
     enforcement efforts during 1993, its counternarcotics actions 
     fell far short of fulfilling the goals and objectives of the 
     1988 UN Convention. Illicit drug trafficking continues to be 
     well beyond the capacity of Haitian security forces to 
     control. Despite continued efforts under the de facto regime, 
     corruption, inadequate manpower and resources prevented the 
     NNB and CIC from making a substantial impact. The air force 
     and navy were unable to engage in effective narcotics 
     interdiction activities in 1993. The extent of narcotics-
     related money laundering in Haiti is unknown. The lack of 
     currency regulations and money laundering laws, together with 
     an open parallel currency exchange, make Haiti vulnerable to 
     this type of activity. The degree of manufacture or trade in 
     precursor chemicals, if any, is also unknown. Additional 
     legislation would accomplish little in either of these areas 
     until enforcement capabilities are enhanced and problems in 
     the judicial system are adequately addressed.
       Corruption. The USG does not have evidence directly linking 
     senior GOH officials to drug trafficking, though rumors and 
     (unsubstantiated) allegations abound. In 1992, the army 
     command issued a field order which stated that any member 
     found to be directly or indirectly involved with narcotics 
     trafficking would be expelled from the military and turned 
     over to public authorities for prosecution. That year, 
     several low ranking officers and a number of enlisted 
     personnel were expelled or reassigned. The civilian judicial 
     system declined to prosecute. We are unaware of any further 
     actions in 1993. If the GOH intends to prevent and punish 
     public corruption, it is clear that it must do so in the 
     judiciary first and foremost. Enhancement of drug enforcement 
     and interdiction capabilities and legislative reforms will 
     accomplish little until the prosecutors and courts are able 
     to bring traffickers to justice.

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