[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 65 (Monday, May 23, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
DRUGS AND HAITI
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, some involved in the administration's Haiti
policy are shopping for an invasion rationale, and they ended up at the
narcotics counter. This is a new twist to President Clinton's foreign
policy--looking for reasons to invade a country. According to recent
news reports, United States government agencies have been tasked to
find evidence that would justify United States military action in Haiti
to fight narcotics smuggling. It seems to me that an island under
blockade is not a very good drug transshipment point, if you have ships
all around the island. But despite the obvious, the administration has
begun a fishing expedition.
The administration does not need to look any farther than the State
Department's April 1994 Comprehensive Report on International
Narcotics. On page 191, it says,
Compared to trafficking indicators in other areas such as
the Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of detected air and
maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is low.
On page 192, the report goes on to say the United States government
``does not have evidence directly linking senior [government of Haiti]
officials to drug trafficking * * *''
Activity is comparatively low, and there is no evidence of direct
complicity. The record seems pretty clear--an invasion in search of a
reason would be hard pressed to use Haitian drug smuggling. Any level
of drug smuggling is unacceptable but, based on the State Department's
own evidence, invasions of Colombia or the Bahamas would do more to
slow the drug trade than an invasion of Haiti.
Some have tried to compare Haiti to panama. Haiti is not Panama.
Months before Operation Just Cause in panama, Noriega had been indicted
in the United States--an indictment that later led to a conviction.
There are no indictments in Haiti. In Panama, American lives were at
risk. In Haiti, I know of no threat to Americans from the military
regime. On Panama, the Senate passed numerous resolutions opposed to
Noriega, and urging more United States action from 1987 to 1989. On
Haiti last year, we passed an amendment calling for congressional
authorization before military action by a vote of 98-2.
Haiti's military regime is despicable, but blaming them for the
narcotics problem in the United States is particularly ironic from an
administration that gutted the Drug Czar's office, downgraded the State
Department's international antidrug efforts, and is reducing drug
enforcement administration personnel.
If the administration wants to fight narcotics coming into the United
States, there is much to do without invading Haiti. And if the
administration really wants to build a domestic consensus over its
Haiti policy, it should join with Congress in appointing an independent
commission to evaluate the situation, not raise the false flag of
narcotics trafficking.
I would just say as far as the independent Commission is concerned it
has been done in the past. We did it 10 years ago in Central America,
looking at 5 different countries at the time. It was a bipartisan
Commission headed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
former Ambassador Robert Strauss. It was nonpartisan. They know the
specific interests in the area. They made a number of good
recommendations to the Reagan administration, many of which were later
followed and I think the value of that Commission was demonstrated
recently in the free election in El Salvador.
So, I just hope that we could have a commission that could work with
Mr. Bill Gray, who is highly respected, known by all of us. In my view
that would be very helpful to find some nonpartisan approach to what
should be done in Hati because I believe the people are really
suffering, the poorest of the poor. It is not the military, not the
middle class, not the upper class. It is the poorest of the poor. It is
also in my view that by tightening sanctions we in effect are punishing
the wrong people. We are not punishing the military. They are going to
be taken care of. They will take care of themselves. If you noticed the
picture in Sunday's Washington Post of the poor starving or hungry
children in Hati, then I think our policy is wrong. If we are going to
drive them into boats and the boats have no place to go, they are going
to return to Hati. It seems to me, there must be a better way, and I
hope we can find a better way in a bipartisan effort.
I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the comments from the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of April 1994.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters--International Narcotics Control Strategy Report--April 1994
haiti
I. Summary
Haiti continues to be used by Colombian trafficking
organizations as a base of operations and transshipment point
for the movement of South American cocaine to the United
States. The Government of Haiti (GOH) has had little success
in attacking the problem and clearly has an inadequate
interdiction and enforcement capability.
Compared to trafficking indicators in other areas such as
The Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of detected air and
maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is low. We do not
have an accurate assessment, however, of the extent of
cocaine transiting Haiti. Our best estimate is that one or
more multi-hundred kilogram loads pass through the country
monthly. President Aristide's ouster in the September 1991
coup d'etat halted close bilateral narcotics control
cooperation in Haiti, which in turn reduced opportunities to
enhance host government capabilities.
Note: In this report, GOH and host country refer to the de
facto government which the USG does not recognize.
II. Status of country
Haiti's geographic location between Colombia and the US,
coupled with a long, unpatrolled coastline and mountainous
interior and the presence of numerous uncontrolled airstrips
make the country an ideal site for illicit narcotics
trafficking. Inadequate enforcement and interdiction and the
susceptibility of Haitian officials to corruption make Haiti
even more desirable for traffickers. As a result, Colombian
trafficking organizations are using Haiti as a transshipment
and storage point. Marijuana is also transshipped through
Haiti, but to a lesser degree than cocaine.
The de facto government maintains the same antidrug
policies and bureaucratic mechanisms as the Aristide
government. Counternarcotics law enforcement efforts fall
under Haiti's Ministry of Defense. Two drug units subordinate
to the Haitian military have been established to coordinate
intelligence gathering and interdiction activities: the
National Narcotics Bureau (NNB) directs law enforcement
activities, is subordinate to the military chief of staff,
and is staffed by 40 officers and enlisted men; and, the
Center for Information and Coordination (CIC), responsible
for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence for narcotics law enforcement and interdiction
activities, is staffed by about 30 security service
personnel. Counternarcotics operations are controlled by the
military and are conducted primarily by the army and the
national police, which reports to the army commander. Haiti's
air force and navy also have a counterdrug responsibility,
but resource constraints have severely limited their
involvement in drug control operations.
The de facto government has maintained drug enforcement
efforts at or above the pre-coup level, but a lack of support
(the CIC, is almost inoperative) and dwindling resources have
affected seizures (in 1993 cocaine seizures totalled 156
kgs).
The Haitian legal system is ineffective in controlling
illicit drug activity. Although Haiti's narcotics laws are
relatively strong, law enforcement and military resources
have been grossly inadequate to cope with narcotics
trafficking. The weak judicial system has brought few
traffickers to justice, even when arrests have been made.
Defendants are routinely released on a technicality within
days of arrest and almost never come to trial. Haiti is not
an important producer of illegal drugs, though small-scale
cannabis plots have been discovered and destroyed by law
enforcement officials. There is almost no information
available on money laundering or precursor chemical
activities in Haiti.
III. Country action against drugs in 1993
Policy Initiatives. There were no significant changes in
GOH international narcotics control policy during 1993.
Political issues continued to overshadow counternarcotics
concerns for those in control of the government.
Accomplishments. Although the GOH made some minimal
enforcement efforts during 1993, its counternarcotics actions
fell far short of fulfilling the goals and objectives of the
1988 UN Convention. Illicit drug trafficking continues to be
well beyond the capacity of Haitian security forces to
control. Despite continued efforts under the de facto regime,
corruption, inadequate manpower and resources prevented the
NNB and CIC from making a substantial impact. The air force
and navy were unable to engage in effective narcotics
interdiction activities in 1993. The extent of narcotics-
related money laundering in Haiti is unknown. The lack of
currency regulations and money laundering laws, together with
an open parallel currency exchange, make Haiti vulnerable to
this type of activity. The degree of manufacture or trade in
precursor chemicals, if any, is also unknown. Additional
legislation would accomplish little in either of these areas
until enforcement capabilities are enhanced and problems in
the judicial system are adequately addressed.
Corruption. The USG does not have evidence directly linking
senior GOH officials to drug trafficking, though rumors and
(unsubstantiated) allegations abound. In 1992, the army
command issued a field order which stated that any member
found to be directly or indirectly involved with narcotics
trafficking would be expelled from the military and turned
over to public authorities for prosecution. That year,
several low ranking officers and a number of enlisted
personnel were expelled or reassigned. The civilian judicial
system declined to prosecute. We are unaware of any further
actions in 1993. If the GOH intends to prevent and punish
public corruption, it is clear that it must do so in the
judiciary first and foremost. Enhancement of drug enforcement
and interdiction capabilities and legislative reforms will
accomplish little until the prosecutors and courts are able
to bring traffickers to justice.
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