[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 65 (Monday, May 23, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
PROVIDING FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4301, NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 431 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 431
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule
XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for further
consideration of the bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for the other purposes.
Sec. 2. After further general debate, which shall be
confined to the bill and amendments made in order by this
resolution and which shall not exceed one hour equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority
member of the Committee on Armed Services, no further
amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except the amendments printed in
the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this
resolution or in part 1 of House Report 103-509 and
amendments en bloc described in section 4 of this resolution.
Except as specified in section 3, 4 or 5 of this resolution,
each amendment printed in the report shall be considered only
in the order printed and may be offered only by a Member
designated in the report. Each amendment printed in the
report shall be considered as read and shall not be subject
to a demand for division of the question in the House or in
the Committee of the Whole. Unless otherwise specified in the
report, each amendment printed in the report shall be
debatable for ten minutes equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent and shall not be subject to
amendment (except that pro forma amendments for the purpose
of debate may be offered by the chairman or ranking minority
member of the Committee on Armed Services). All points of
order against amendments printed in the report are waived.
Sec. 3. (a) After disposition of or postponement of further
proceedings on amendments printed in part 1 of the report of
the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution or part 1
of House Report 103-509, it shall be in order to consider the
amendment printed in part 2 of that report.
(b) After disposition of or postponement of further
proceedings on the amendment printed in part 2 of the report
it shall be in order to consider the amendments printed in
part 3 of the report. Such consideration shall begin with an
additional period of general debate, which shall be confined
to the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina and shall not exceed
thirty minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman
and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed
Services. If more than one of the amendments printed in part
3 of the report is adopted, only the last to be adopted shall
be considered as finally adopted and reported to the House.
(c) After disposition of or postponement of further
proceedings on the amendments printed in part 3 of the
report, it shall be in order to consider the amendments
printed in part 4 of the report. Such consideration shall
begin with an additional period of general debate, which
shall be confined to the subject of Haiti and shall not
exceed thirty minutes equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Armed Services.
(d) After disposition of or postponement of further
proceedings on the amendments printed in part 4 of the
report, it shall be in order to consider the amendment
printed in part 5 of the report.
(e) After disposition of or postponement of further
proceedings on the amendment printed in part 5 of the report,
it shall be in order to consider the amendments printed in
part 6 of the report. Such consideration shall begin with an
additional period of general debate, which shall be confined
to the C-17 aircraft and shall not exceed sixty minutes
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on Armed Services.
(f) After disposition of or postponement of further
proceedings on the amendments printed in part 6 of the
report, it shall be in order to consider any amendment
printed in part 1 of that report or in part 1 of House Report
103-509 not previously considered.
Sec. 4. It shall be in order at any time for the chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services or his designee to offer
amendments en bloc consisting of amendments printed in part 1
of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this
resolution or in part 1 of House Report 103-509 or germane
modifications of any such amendment. Amendments en bloc
offered pursuant to this section shall be considered as read
(except that modifications shall be reported), shall be
debatable for twenty minutes equally divided and controlled
by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee
on Armed Services, shall not be subject to amendment, and
shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question
in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. For the
purpose of inclusion in such amendments en bloc, an amendment
printed in the form of a motion to strike may be modified to
the form of a germane perfecting amendment to the text
originally proposed to be stricken. All points of order
against such amendments en bloc are waived. The original
proponent of an amendment included in such amendments en bloc
may insert a statement in the Congressional Record
immediately before the disposition of the amendments en bloc.
Sec. 5. The chairman of the Committee of the Whole may
postpone until a time during further consideration in the
Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any
amendment made in order by this resolution. The chairman of
the Committee of the Whole may reduce to not less than five
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any
postponed question that immediately follows another vote by
electronic device without intervening business, provided that
the time for voting by electronic device on the first in any
series of questions shall be not less than fifteen minutes.
The chairman of the Committee of the Whole may recognize for
consideration of any amendment made in order by this
resolution out of the order printed, but not sooner than one
hour after the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services or
a designee announces from the floor a request to that effect.
Sec. 6. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for
amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the
House with such amendments as may have been finally adopted.
Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill
or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.
The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the
bill and amendments thereto to final passage without
intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or
without instructions.
{time} 1630
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Montgomery). The gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Frost] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], for the purpose of debate only,
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 431 provides for the further
consideration of H.R. 4301, the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1995. This resolution provides for 1 hour of general
debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Armed Services Committee. The rule makes in
order only those amendments printed in the report to accompany the rule
or in part 1 of House Report 103-509, certain amendments en bloc
described in section 4, and pro forma amendments if offered by the
chairman or ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee.
Except as specified in sections 3, 4, or 5 of the rule, the
amendments shall be considered in the order and manner specified in the
report. The rule provides that unless otherwise specified in the
report, each amendment is debatable for 10 minutes equally divided and
controlled. The amendments shall be considered as read and are not
subject to amendment nor a demand for a division of the question. All
points of order are waived against the amendments in the report.
The rule provides for an additional period of 30 minutes of general
debate on the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an additional period
of 30 minutes of general debate on the subject of Haiti, and an
additional period of 60 minutes of general debate on the subject of the
C-17 strategic airlift. The rule provides that the amendments printed
in part 3 of the report--relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina--will be
considered under the king-of-the-hill procedures.
The chairman of the Armed Services Committee or his designee is
authorized to offer amendments en bloc consisting of the amendments
printed in part 1 of the report or part 1 of House Report 103-509 or
germane modifications thereto. The amendments en bloc shall be
considered as read except that modifications will be read. The
amendments en bloc are debatable for 20 minutes equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Armed
Services Committee and are not subject to amendment nor a demand for
division of the question. The original proponents are permitted to
insert statements in the Record. All points of order are waived against
the amendments en bloc.
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole is permitted to postpone
consideration of a request for a recorded vote on any amendment and to
reduce to 5 minutes the time for voting after the first of a series of
votes.
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole is permitted to recognize
for consideration of any amendment printed in the report out of the
order in which they are printed, but not sooner than 1 hour after the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee or a designee announces from
the floor a request to that effect. Finally, the rule provides one
motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, with adoption of this resolution we can continue the
important debate that we began last week on our Nation's defense
policy. We have already considered a number of important issues under
the first rule, such as ballistic missile defense, burden- sharing, the
Trident II Missile, and the Seawolf nuclear attack submarine. Now, we
can turn to other national security issues of interest to Members, such
as base closings, Bosnia, Haiti, U.S. peacekeeping, and the C-17
Strategic Airlift Program.
Mr. Speaker, the rule will give us an opportunity to debate the
future of America's airlift capability. The center of this debate will
be the C-17, the aircraft selected by the Air Force to meet all future
global airlift missions.
The rule makes in order two amendments--one will restore President
Clinton's request for six planes; the other will attempt to terminate
the program.
The C-17 will be the Air Mobility Command's core airlifter and the
cornerstone of future airlift forces. Today's primary airlifter, the C-
141, is nearing the end of its service life, and plans are to begin
retiring these aircraft. With the changing nature of the military
threat now facing our country, it is critical more than ever that we
have the ability to move troops and equipment great distances, quickly
and efficiently, anywhere in the world.
The C-17 will enable us to meet the important rapid deployment
mission. It combines the capabilities of a strategic airlifter with
those of a theater airlifter. This combination allows it to do things
no other airlifter can. It has the long range, heavy payload, and
aerial refueling capability of a strategic airlifter. Additionally, it
can use small, austere airfields close to its cargo's final destination
that previously could only be used by the C-130. This makes direct
delivery possible and provides an outsize cargo capability to our
theater airlift.
Mr. Speaker, the United States needs the C-17. It will modernize our
aging airlift forces. It has the capabilities necessary to meet our
Nation's airlift requirements. And it is the airlift option preferred
by our armed services. I hope that Members will carefully consider
these points once we begin debate on this most important issue.
Mr. Speaker, 178 amendments were submitted to the rules committee for
this bill. Twenty-five amendments were made in order by the first rule.
This rule will make another 75 amendments in order. This is a good
rule, Mr. Speaker, and I urge its adoption.
{time} 1640
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume,
and I rise in reluctant support for this rule.
I use the word ``reluctant'' because this rule is not as fair as it
should have been, especially given the subject matter of the bill, but
neither is it as bad as many of us had feared.
Add the amendments made in order under this rule to the number made
in order under the first rule considered last week, and we will find
that, altogether, 80 Democrat-sponsored amendments and only 20
Republican-sponsored amendments will be considered for this defense
authorization bill.
That is simply not fair.
And I can assure Members that we Republicans are going to continue to
hammer away at the basic unfairness that characterizes the manner in
which the Democrat leadership controls this Institution.
Having said all that, however, I must also repeat what I said a
moment ago: This rule is not as bad as many of us feared it could have
been.
This rule provides Members of the House with an additional hour of
general debate--and that is important for giving an ongoing context for
the debate of specific amendments, especially when the consideration of
the bill is spread over a number of days.
The rule also makes in order a very important Republican-sponsored
amendment on peacekeeping, and it also provides for a balanced
discussion of United States policy toward the situations in Bosnia and
Haiti.
You know, Mr. Speaker, I cannot help but remember that Republicans
were clamoring for a debate on peacekeeping last year when the fiscal
year 1994 defense authorization bill was on the floor
Now here we are, nearly 1 year later, and the House is finally being
permitted the opportunity to have that debate.
That is why we Republicans just have to keep hammering away in the
name of fairness and balance--it takes time to wear down the monolithic
Democrat leadership.
And of course, in this instance, our case was reinforced by the fact
that public confidence in the President's ability to handle foreign
affairs continues to decline--to fall through the floor would be more
accurate.
The amendment on peacekeeping that this rule makes in order addresses
the shell game that was mentioned on the floor last week.
The shell game works like this: The United States provides all kinds
of logistical and material support for a U.N. peacekeeping operation.
And then, once the U.N. peacekeepers are in place, the United States
gets a bill for nearly one-third of the U.N.'s costs.
All of this ignores the fact that the U.N. operation probably would
never have gotten off the ground in the first place without the initial
support provided by us--provided by the American taxpayers.
We get no credit all the while our costs mount all out of proportion
compared to the costs borne by the United Nations.
But there is, of course, a larger principle at stake in the debate
about peacekeeping.
That larger principle concerns the toll that ill-considered and
indiscriminate support by the United States for international
peacekeeping operations will have on our own military readiness at a
time when defense budgets are declining dramatically.
Mr. Speaker, the ominous signs are everywhere--signs that indicate
that a return to the days of a hollow military is upon us.
If the present and proposed rates of reduction in defense spending
are carried out over the next 4 years, our country will be left with a
commitment to providing for our own defense with a relative spending
level not seen since the 1930's--the Depression, a time when dictators
were on the March and America had a smaller military than that of
Romania.
Believe me, such a military will not have the means to participate in
one peacekeeping mission, much less be able to defend the vital
interests of our country.
I am not in any way criticizing the good work of the Armed Services
Committee--the members there are doing the best with what they have to
work with.
But I am very critical of the priorities established by the present
administration, priorities which have been ratified by budget
resolutions and reconciliation bills that have torn the guts out of our
national defense.
This administration and this Congress are failing to meet one of the
most basic obligations of government, something so basic it is
mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution--to ``provide for the
common defense.''
Let us keep that in mind as this debate continues.
I reluctantly urge support for this rule.
I include for the Record the following material regarding open versus
restrictive rules:
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES 95TH-103D CONG.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open rules Restrictive rules
Congress (years) Total rules ---------------------------------------
granted\1\ Number Percent\2\ Number Percent\3\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
95th (1977-78)............................................. 211 179 85 32 15
96th (1979-80)............................................. 214 161 75 53 25
97th (1981-82)............................................. 120 90 75 30 25
98th (1983-84)............................................. 155 105 68 50 32
99th (1985-86)............................................. 115 65 57 50 43
100th (1987-88)............................................ 123 66 54 57 46
101st (1989-90)............................................ 104 47 45 57 55
102d (1991-92)............................................. 109 37 34 72 66
103d (1993-94)............................................. 66 14 21 52 79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Total rules counted are all order of business resolutions reported from the Rules Committee which provide for
the initial consideration of legislation, except rules on appropriations bills which only waive points of
order. Original jurisdiction measures reported as privileged are also not counted.
\2\Open rules are those which permit any Member to offer any germane amendment to a measure so long as it is
otherwise in compliance with the rules of the House. The parenthetical percentages are open rules as a percent
of total rules granted.
\3\Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of amendments which can be offered, and include so-called
modified open and modified closed rules, as well as completely closed rule, and rules providing for
consideration in the House as opposed to the Committee of the Whole. The parenthetical percentages are
restrictive rules as a percent of total rules granted.
Sources: ``Rules Committee Calendars & Surveys of Activities,'' 95th-102d Cong.; ``Notices of Action Taken,''
Committee on Rules, 103d Cong., through May 23, 1994.
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 103D CONG.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule Amendments
Rule number date reported type Bill number and subject submitted Amendments allowed Disposition of rule and date
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Res. 58, Feb. 2, 1993...... MC H.R. 1: Family and medical 30 (D-5; R-25).. 3 (D-0; R-3).............. PQ: 246-176. A: 259-164. (Feb. 3,
leave. 1993).
H. Res. 59, Feb. 3, 1993...... MC H.R. 2: National Voter 19 (D-1; R-18).. 1 (D-0; R-1).............. PQ: 248-171. A: 249-170. (Feb. 4,
Registration Act. 1993).
H. Res. 103, Feb. 23, 1993.... C H.R. 920: Unemployment 7 (D-2; R-5).... 0 (D-0; R-0).............. PQ: 243-172. A: 237-178. (Feb.
compensation. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 106, Mar. 2, 1993..... MC H.R. 20: Hatch Act amendments 9 (D-1; R-8).... 3 (D-0; R-3).............. PQ: 248-166. A: 249-163. (Mar. 3,
1993).
H. Res. 119, Mar. 9, 1993..... MC H.R. 4: NIH Revitalization 13 (d-4; R-9)... 8 (D-3; R-5).............. PQ: 247-170. A: 248-170. (Mar.
Act of 1993. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 132, Mar. 17, 1993.... MC H.R. 1335: Emergency 37 (D-8; R-29).. 1(not submitted) (D-1; R- A: 240-185. (Mar. 18, 1993).
supplemental Appropriations. 0).
H. Res. 133, Mar. 17, 1993.... MC H. Con. Res. 64: Budget 14 (D-2; R-12).. 4 (1-D not submitted) (D- PQ: 250-172. A: 251-172. (Mar.
resolution. 2; R-2). 18, 1993).
H. Res. 138, Mar. 23, 1993.... MC H.R. 670: Family planning 20 (D-8; R-12).. 9 (D-4; R-5).............. PQ: 252-164. A: 247-169. (Mar.
amendments. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 147, Mar. 31, 1993.... C H.R. 1430: Increase Public 6 (D-1; R-5).... 0 (D-0; R-0).............. PQ: 244-168. A: 242-170. (Apr. 1,
debt limit. 1993).
H. Res. 149 Apr. 1, 1993...... MC H.R. 1578: Expedited 8 (D-1; R-7).... 3 (D-1; R-2).............. A: 212-208. (Apr. 28, 1993).
Rescission Act of 1993.
H. Res. 164, May 4, 1993...... O H.R. 820: Nate NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (May 5, 1993).
Competitiveness Act.
H. Res. 171, May 18, 1993..... O H.R. 873: Gallatin Range Act NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (May 20, 1993).
of 1993.
H. Res. 172, May 18, 1993..... O H.R. 1159: Passenger Vessel NA.............. NA........................ A: 308-0 (May 24, 1993).
Safety Act.
H. Res. 173 May 18, 1993...... MC S.J. Res. 45: United States 6 (D-1; R-5).... 6 (D-1; R-5).............. A: Voice Vote (May 20, 1993)
forces in Somalia.
H. Res. 183, May 25, 1993..... O H.R. 2244: 2d supplemental NA.............. NA........................ A: 251-174. (May 26, 1993).
appropriations.
H. Res. 186, May 27, 1993..... MC H.R. 2264: Omnibus budget 51 (D-19; R-32). 8 (D-7; R-1).............. PQ: 252-178. A: 236-194 (May 27,
reconciliation. 1993).
H. Res. 192, June 9, 1993..... MC H.R. 2348: Legislative branch 50 (D-6; R-44).. 6 (D-3; R-3).............. PQ: 240-177. A: 226-185. (June
appropriations. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 193, June 10, 1993.... O H.R. 2200: NASA authorization NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (June 14, 1993).
H. Res. 195, June 14, 1993.... MC H.R. 5: Striker replacement.. 7 (D-4; R-3).... 2 (D-1; R-1).............. A: 244-176.. (June 15, 1993).
H. Res. 197, June 15, 1993.... MO H.R. 2333: State Department. 53 (D-20; R-33). 27 (D-12; R-15)........... A: 294-129. (June 16, 1993).
H.R. 2404: Foreign aid.
H. Res. 199, June 16, 1993.... C H.R. 1876: Ext. of ``Fast NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (June 22, 1993).
Track''.
H. Res. 200, June 16, 1993.... MC H.R. 2295: Foreign operations 33 (D-11; R-22). 5 (D-1; R-4).............. A: 263-160. (June 17, 1993).
appropriations.
H. Res. 201, June 17, 1993.... O H.R. 2403: Treasury-postal NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (June 17, 1993).
appropriations.
H. Res. 203, June 22, 1993.... MO H.R. 2445: Energy and Water NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (June 23, 1993).
appropriations.
H. Res. 206, June 23, 1993.... O H.R. 2150: Coast Guard NA.............. NA........................ A: 401-0. (July 30, 1993).
authorization.
H. Res. 217, July 14, 1993.... MO H.R. 2010: National Service NA.............. NA........................ A: 261-164. (July 21, 1993).
Trust Act.
H. Res. 220, July 21, 1993.... MC H.R. 2667: Disaster 14 (D-8; R-6)... 2 (D-2; R-0).............. PQ: 245-178. F: 205-216. (July
assistance supplemental. 22, 1993).
H. Res. 226, July 23, 1993.... MC H.R. 2667: Disaster 15 (D-8; R-7)... 2 (D-2; R-0).............. A: 224-205. (July 27, 1993).
assistance supplemental.
H. Res. 229, July 28, 1993.... MO H.R. 2330: Intelligence NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (Aug. 3, 1993).
Authority Act, fiscal year
1994.
H. Res. 230, July 28, 1993.... O H.R. 1964: Maritime NA.............. NA........................ A: Voice Vote. (July 29, 1993).
Administration authority.
H. Res. 246, Aug. 6, 1993..... MO H.R. 2401: National Defense 149 (D-109; R- .......................... A: 246-172. (Sept. 8, 1993).
authority. 40).
H. Res. 248, Sept. 9, 1993.... MO H.R. 2401: National defense ................ .......................... PQ: 237-169. A: 234-169. (Sept.
authorization. 13, 1993).
H. Res. 250, Sept. 13, 1993... MC H.R. 1340: RTC Completion Act 12 (D-3; R-9)... 1 (D-1; R-0).............. A: 213-191-1. (Sept. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 254, Sept. 22, 1993... MO H.R. 2401: National Defense ................ 91 (D-67; R-24)........... A: 241-182. (Sept. 28, 1993).
authorization.
H. Res. 262, Sept. 28, 1993... O H.R. 1845: National NA.............. NA........................ A: 238-188 (10/06/93).
Biological Survey Act.
H. Res. 264, Sept. 28, 1993... MC H.R. 2351: Arts, humanities, 7 (D-0; R-7).... 3 (D-0; R-3).............. PQ: 240-185. A: 225-195. (Oct.
museums. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 265, Sept. 29, 1993... MC H.R. 3167: Unemployment 3 (D-1; R-2).... 2 (D-1; R-1).............. A: 239-150. (Oct. 15, 1993).
compensation amendments.
H. Res. 269, Oct. 6, 1993..... MO H.R. 2739: Aviation N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 7, 1993).
infrastructure investment.
H. Res. 273, Oct. 12, 1993.... MC H.R. 3167: Unemployment 3 (D-1; R-2).... 2 (D-1; R-1).............. PQ: 235-187. F: 149-254. (Oct.
compensation amendments. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 274, Oct. 12, 1993.... MC H.R. 1804: Goals 2000 Educate 15 (D-7; R-7; I- 10 (D-7; R-3)............. A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 13, 1993).
America Act. 1).
H. Res. 282, Oct. 20, 1993.... C H.J. Res. 281: Continuing N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 21, 1993).
appropriations through Oct.
28, 1993.
H. Res. 286, Oct. 27, 1993.... O H.R. 334: Lumbee Recognition N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 28, 1993).
Act.
H. Res. 287, Oct. 27, 1993.... C H.J. Res. 283: Continuing 1 (D-0; R-0).... 0......................... A: 252-170. (Oct. 28, 1993).
appropriations resolution.
H. Res. 289, Oct. 28, 1993.... O H.R. 2151: Maritime Security N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 3, 1993).
Act of 1993.
H. Res. 293, Nov. 4, 1993..... MC H. Con. Res. 170: Troop N/A............. N/A....................... A: 390-8. (Nov. 8, 1993).
withdrawal Somalia.
H. Res. 299, Nov. 8, 1993..... MO H.R. 1036: Employee 2 (D-1; R-1).... N/A....................... A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 9, 1993).
Retirement Act-1993.
H. Res. 302, Nov. 9, 1993..... MC H.R. 1025: Brady handgun bill 17 (D-6; R-11).. 4 (D-1; R-3).............. A: 238-182. (Nov. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 303, Nov. 9, 1993..... O H.R. 322: Mineral exploration N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 16, 1993).
H. Res. 304, Nov. 9, 1993..... C H.J. Res. 288: Further CR, FY N/A............. N/A....................... .................................
1994.
H. Res. 312, Nov. 17, 1993.... MC H.R. 3425: EPA Cabinet Status 27 (D-8; R-19).. 9 (D-1; R-8).............. F: 191-227. (Feb. 2, 1994).
H. Res. 313, Nov. 17, 1993.... MC H.R. 796: Freedom Access to 15 (D-9; R-6)... 4 (D-1; R-3).............. A: 233-192. (Nov. 18, 1993).
Clinics.
H. Res. 314, Nov. 17, 1993.... MC H.R. 3351: Alt Methods Young 21 (D-7; R-14).. 6 (D-3; R-3).............. A: 238-179. (Nov. 19, 1993).
Offenders.
H. Res. 316, Nov. 19, 1993.... C H.R. 51: D.C. statehood bill. 1 (D-1; R-0).... N/A....................... A: 252-172. (Nov. 20, 1993).
H. Res. 319, Nov. 20, 1993.... MC H.R. 3: Campaign Finance 35 (D-6; R-29).. 1 (D-0; R-1).............. A: 220-207. (Nov. 21, 1993).
Reform.
H. Res. 320, Nov. 20, 1993.... MC H.R. 3400: Reinventing 34 (D-15; R-19). 3 (D-3; R-0).............. A: 247-183. (Nov. 22, 1993).
Government.
H. Res. 336, Feb. 2, 1994..... MC H.R. 3759: Emergency 14 (D-8; R-5; I- 5 (D-3; R-2).............. PQ: 244-168. A: 342-65. (Feb. 3,
Supplemental Appropriations. 1). 1994).
H. Res. 352, Feb. 8, 1994..... MC H.R. 811: Independent Counsel 27 (D-8; R-19).. 10 (D-4; R-6)............. PQ: 249-174. A: 242-174. (Feb. 9,
Act. 1994).
H. Res. 357, Feb. 9, 1994..... MC H.R. 3345: Federal Workforce 3 (D-2; R-1).... 2 (D-2; R-0).............. A: VV (Feb. 10, 1994).
Restructuring.
H. Res. 366, Feb. 23, 1994.... MO H.R. 6: Improving America's NA.............. NA........................ A: VV (Feb. 24, 1994).
Schools.
H. Res. 384, Mar. 9, 1994..... MC H. Con. Res. 218: Budget 14 (D-5; R-9)... 5 (D-3; R-2).............. A: 245-171 (Mar. 10, 1994).
Resolution FY 1995-99.
H. Res. 401, Apr. 12, 1994.... MO H.R. 4092: Violent Crime 180 (D-98; R-82) 68 (D-47; R-21)........... A: 244-176 (Apr. 13, 1994).
Control.
H. Res. 410, Apr. 21, 1994.... MO H.R. 3221: Iraqi Claims Act.. N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote (Apr. 28, 1994).
H. Res. 414, Apr. 28, 1994.... O H.R. 3254: NSF Auth. Act..... N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote (May 3, 1994).
H. Res. 416, May 4, 1994...... C H.R. 4296: Assault Weapons 7 (D-5; R-2).... 0 (D-0; R-0).............. A: 220-209 (May 5, 1994).
Ban Act.
H. Res. 420, May 5, 1994...... O H.R. 2442: EDA N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote (May 10, 1994).
Reauthorization.
H. Res. 422, May 11, 1994..... MO H.R. 518: California Desert N/A............. N/A....................... PQ: 245-172 A: 248-165 (May 17,
Protection. 1994).
H. Res. 423, May 11, 1994..... O H.R. 2473: Montana Wilderness N/A............. N/A....................... A: Voice Vote (May 12, 1994).
Act.
H. Res. 428, May 17, 1994..... MO H.R. 2108: Black Lung 4 (D-1; R-3).... N/A....................... A: VV (May 19, 1994).
Benefits Act.
H. Res. 429, May 17, 1994..... MO H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY 173 (D-115; R- .......................... A: 369-49 (May 18, 1994).
1995. 58).
H. Res. 431, May 20, 1994..... MO H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY ................ 100 (D-80; R-20).......... .................................
1995.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Code: C-Closed; MC-Modified closed; MO-Modified open; O-Open; D-Democrat; R-Republican; PQ: Previous question; A-Adopted; F-Failed.
Rollcall Votes in the Rules Committee on Motions to Defense
Authorization Rule II--Friday, May 20, 1994
1. Maloney amendment No. 35--Abolishes National Board for
the Promotion of Rifle Practice. Rejected: 3-5, 1 voting
``present.'' Ayes: Derrick, Beilenson, Slaughter; NAYS:
Moakley, Hall, Solomon, Goss; Present: Dreier. Not voting :
Bonior, Wheat, Gordon, and Quillen.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5
minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, which
appears to have overwhelming bipartisan support, and I certainly would
commend the Committee on Rules for doing a tough job well.
I also want to commend, again, my chairman, the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] for doing such a magnificent job with the
defense authorization bill before us.
I rise for a limited purpose, and that is to correct some
misinformation that appeared in today's Democratic Study Group fact
sheet regarding an amendment that will be offered late tomorrow by me
and a bipartisan list of cosponsors to restore the administration
request for the C-17 plane.
In the material circulated by the DSG, there is reference ``to an
amendment to increase the bill's funding for the C-17 transport
plane.'' At a later point in describing the amendment, it says, ``The
amendment adds $637 million to the bill's authorization for the C-17
program and cuts $447 million from the bill's procurement funding * *
*.''
The implication in both places is that we are adding funding to an
item in the Committee on Armed Services' blll as reported, and that is
not the case. The facts are that we are taking the precise funding
level as reported by the House Armed Services Committee and
redistributing that funding among the same four items in an effort to
more clearly reflect what the administration had originally requested
for the C-17.
More specifically--and I have a chart here that shows this--we are
now funding six C-17's for fiscal year 1995. The committee would have
funded four. We are funding precisely the same amounts for advanced
procurement and for modifications. The biggest change in our effort is
to take some money away from the nondevelopmental aircraft account in
the Armed Services Committee bill and put it toward the procurement of
two more C-17's, while at the same time leaving enough money in the
nondevelopmental aircraft account to fund the competition proposed by
the administration for nondevelopmental aircraft. The competition will
produce a recommendation by the Defense Department at the end of 1995
as to whether we should proceed with the funding of
nondevelopmental aircraft procurement and
precisely what this procurement should include.
The bill as proposed by the House Armed Services Committee would put
up $550 million in nondevelopmental aircraft procurement and $1.856
billion in C-17 procurement. The total, therefore, would be
$2,406,402,000.
The proposed amendment which a bipartisan majority of the House Armed
Services Committee support would provide $103 million for the
nondevelopmental aircraft competition, with the remainder, $2.303
billion, for C-17 procurement. The total authorization under the
amendment is precisely the same--$2,406,402,000--as the amount in the
committee bill as reported.
{time} 1650
The chart referred to is as follows:
PROPOSED HOUSE AUTHORIZATION BILL VS AMENDMENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed
Proposed bill amendment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NDAA................................ $550,000,000 $103,000,000
C-17................................ 1,856,402,000 2,303,402,000
(A) Aircraft........................ \1\1,802,819,000 \2\2,249,819,000
(B) Adv Proc........................ 47,475,000 47,475,000
(C) Modifications................... 6,108,000 6,108,000
-----------------------------------
Total:.......................... 2,406,402,000 2,406,402,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Four aircraft.
\2\Six aircraft.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me say that we have received letters from
the President of the United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, John M. Shalikashvili, Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of the Army,
and J.P. Hoar, the General from the U.S. Marine Corps, and I would like
to insert them in the Record:
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, May 17, 1994.
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
Chairman, Committee of Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: As I look into the future, it is clear
that America's combatant commanders will become increasingly
dependent upon strategic mobility. This mobility will
continue to be based on an integrated triad of air, sea and
surface capabilities. Despite the fact that two of these
transportation modes are in relatively good condition with
bright prospects for the future, I am deeply concerned that
recent congressional actions may seriously degrade our
airlift capability and ultimately threaten the viability of
the entire strategic mobility system.
America must have a core airlifter to replace the aging C-
141. The continuing myths of a service life extension program
for the C-141 or the ability of a commercial derivative to
meet the needs of a core airlifter are just that--myths.
Neither aircraft can carry the equipment to forward areas
that the Army needs to win on tomorrow's battlefields. There
may be a future role for a commercial derivative to
supplement a core airlifter, but a CONUS-based force that
lacks a core airlifter is a hollow force.
Today there are only one alternative that can meet the
requirements of a core airlifter--the C-17. We have all been
frustrated with the repeated setbacks in the program, but we
must not let this frustration obscure the facts. We now have
an agreement in hand that allows us to test the capabilities
of the airplane to meet warfighting requirements of America's
combatant commanders and the capability of the program to
meet efficiency and quality standards America's taxpayers
deserve.
I ask for your support of the President's Budget Request
for six C-17s in FY95, and for the reliability,
maintainability, and availability and operational testing
programs. Without the former, the program will not have the
opportunity to demonstrate its significant improvements and
production efficiencies. Without the latter, the C-17 will
not be challenged to demonstrate its capabilities in the most
rigorous testing program ever devised for an airlifter.
Without your support, the program will be guaranteed to fail.
We must not let this happen on our watch.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
U.S. Army,
The Chief of Staff,
May 17, 1994.
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: By 1997, 80% of America's Army will be
stationed in the continental United States as we complete our
transformation to a power projection Army. Our capability to
lift the Army's heavy equipment by air and sea must keep pace
with our changing requirements. This nation must have the
strategic lift capabilities to project power rapidly to any
potential trouble spot in the world. We must get our forces
to the fight.
Early arriving lethal combat power is the key to our joint
warfighting capability. The Congressionally mandated Mobility
Requirements Study generated the need for delivery of
``outsized cargo'' prior to the arrival of the fastest
sealift. For the Army, this means armor, rocket systems,
helicopters, and attack missiles. These weapon systems won't
fit on any commercial aircraft--nor will they fit on most
military airlifters in service today. Future air-deployable
Army combat units will rely increasingly on the availability
of airlift to carry this type of cargo.
The C-17 will provide the Air Force the capability to
deliver critical Army ``outsized loads'' while allowing
access to 9,000 more runways (an increase of 300%) worldwide
than the C-141 and C-5. The C-17 can land on the same runways
as the C-130 and deliver four times the cargo weight. Equally
important, the C-17 will improve throughput capacity, or
rapid off-load and turn-around on the ground, by increasing
the ``maximum on the ground'' or MOG capacity. The
performance characteristics of the C-17 will permit 8 C-17's
to fit where 3 C-5's fit. Had we had the C-17 during Desert
Shield, we could have delivered the first airborne brigade in
54 hours with just 93 aircraft--an improvement of some 34%
over the 82 hours it took to deliver that brigade with 158 C-
141's and 2 C-5's.
Finally, I am concerned about our joint capabilities for
forced entry operations. In the Gulf War, we enjoyed the
luxury of time and deployment to a country with secure and
modern air and seaports. This may not always be the case.
While the aging C-141 fleet helps the Army fulfill this
requirement today, we will need the C-17 to provide the
strategic airlift for troops and equipment to provide our
forced entry capability and simultaneous application of joint
combat power across the depth of the battlefield in the 21st
century.
Mr. Chairman, I fully appreciate the concern over the
troubled history of the C-17 acquisition program. However, I
urge you to stay the course outlined by the Secretary of
Defense earlier this year. The C-17 is the only aircraft that
can get the Army's outsized combat systems to the next war
when required. I respectfully solicit your support to
maintain the President's request for the FY 1995 funding for
the C-17.
Respectfully,
Gordon R. Sullivan,
General.
____
U.S. Central Command,
Office of the Commander in Chief,
MacDill Air Force Base, FL, May 17, 1994.
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Mr. Chairman: As you know I am concerned and have been
critical of the current state of America's airlift forces.
However, I am even more concerned about our future ability to
project US forces by air.
As our forces are returning from overseas and increasingly
based in the CONUS, I become the CINC faced with the most
strenuous requirement for mobility in the world. In the
CENTCOM theater, because of the long deployment distances, we
are particularly sensitive to, and dependent on, our ability
to ensure the timely deployment of the early arriving lethal
firepower--key to limiting the escalation of a conflict. This
means armor, helicopters, rocket systems, and air defense
missiles, most of which do not fit on any commercial
aircraft. Only the C-17 and C-5 can deliver this requirement.
In addition, during the Gulf War, we were able to deploy in
a country with secure air and sea ports. In this scenario, I
have said we could be well served by the effectiveness of
large commercial type aircraft moving large amounts of bulk
cargo, particularly during the sustainment phase of an
operation. However, I do not feel this will be the case in
the early surge phase of future operations.
We must ensure that all CINCs have the flexibility to
conduct deployment operations given any set of theater
constraints. In the foreseeable future only the C-17, acting
as the Nation's core military airlifter, can provide us this
flexibility.
Mr. Chairman, CENTCOM is dependent on the country's
mobility system. We need the C-17. I urge you to support the
modernization of the nation's strategic airlift as proposed
by the Secretary of Defense and requested by the President in
his FY 1995 budget.
J.P. Hoar,
General.
I would also like to read just a brief portion of the President's
letter. He says in part, and I am quoting:
Reducing the C-17 production rate from six aircraft to four
aircraft * * * would drastically undercut the Department of
Defense's strategy to control costs and resolve program
deficiencies.
Then he goes on to say:
I urge Congress to support the amendment to be offered by
Representative Harman and others to restore our budget
request for six C-17s in fiscal year 1995.
The letter in its entirety is as follows:
The White House,
Washington, May 23, 1994.
Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: As the House of Representatives continues
its consideration of H.R. 4301, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1995, I want to reemphasize the
critical importance of the C-17 to this Nation's strategy and
force posture.
The C-17's capabilities are crucial to the Air Force's
ability to deliver and sustain forces in support of theater
commanders. The C-17 can carry outsize cargo to give early
forces firepower; it can deliver its cargo into remote
locations with short runways; and it has the ability to
airdrop heavy equipment, supplies and troops. The C-17 is the
only aircraft that can meet these core military requirements.
Thus even with a ``mixed'' strategic airlift enhancement
program that includes procurement of non-developmental
aircraft, there will be certain core capabilities that can
only be provided by the C-17.
The House Armed Services Committee recommended reducing the
C-17 production rate from six aircraft to four aircraft for
fiscal year 1995. Such a reduction would drastically undercut
the Department of Defense's strategy to control costs and
resolve program deficiencies. After consultation with outside
experts, the Defense Department determined the C-17 meets
essential airlift requirements and is affordable. A reduction
to four aircraft in 1995 would increase the annual unit costs
by $40-50 million, cause at least 8,000 layoffs over the next
two years, and undermine program stability at a time we are
holding the contractor's feet to the fire for cost and
schedule performance. Our careful evaluation of contractor
performance will lead to a decision in November 1995 on full
rate production and procurement of non-developmental
aircraft.
For these reasons, I urge Congress to support the amendment
to be offered by Representative Harman and others to restore
our Budget Request for six C-17s in FY95.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the very distinguished
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton], a member of the Committee on
Armed Services.
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Solomon] for yielding this time to me, and I would just like to thank
the gentlewoman who just spoke about the C-17 for bringing this issue
to light, and, before I start, let me just say to all of the Members
that are here today how much we appreciate the diligence of the
chairman of the committee in making sure that this debate goes forward
on the C-17 so that all the facts can come out. I say to the gentleman,
``Mr. Chairman, we thank you very, very much for that.''
Mr. Chairman, as the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] pointed
out, the C-17 is perhaps one of the most important parts of this bill
that we are going to debate. It is important for two reasons. The first
is that the current airlift capability that we have, carried out
basically by the C-141 and the C-5, along with the C-130 in theater, is
in desperate need of replacement, particularly the C-141. The C-141,
for those of my colleagues who are not familiar with it, is an airplane
that was designed in the 1950s and began to come on line in 1962. As a
matter of fact, today that makes the airplane older than the people who
fly it, and that is kind of an amazing thing when we think about modern
technology in the aeronautics world.
But second and even more important in today's world, Mr. Speaker, we
know it is important to get people who in the armed services, the
soldiers with their equipment, to where they need to be quickly and
safely. Safely is a key word here because we can get the people to the
parts of the world that they need to be in in different kinds of
airplanes. But God help us, we do not want to put them there unless
they have the capacity to protect themselves, and the airplanes that we
have that are serviceable in the armed services today simply cannot
carry the large defense mechanisms, the outsized, and my colleagues are
going to hear that word a lot, the outsized cargo that we have to think
about transporting.
Mr. Speaker, Patriot missiles are one example. It we are going to
send young men and women into harm's way, they need protection against
incoming aircraft. Some of that protection comes from Patriot missiles,
and, as they move around in the theater, we want to protect them with
personnel carriers, and the C-17 can carry the personnel carriers into
the theater.
We also provide some armor for them. We know that we would have had a
much different situation in Somalia recently if we had had the ready
capacity to get armor to the soldiers there who did not make out so
well unfortunately.
So, Mr. Speaker, safety of our troops in putting then in harm's way
with the right equipment is afforded us through the capabilities of the
C-17 and with no other aircraft that is currently being contemplated.
Second, Mr. Speaker, we hear about economies, and the C-17 provides
some economies. I ask my colleagues,
Did you know that the current big airlifter that we have,
the C-5D, requires a crew of six, and did you know that the
C-17 requires a crew of three, half the personnel? And if you
multiply that by the fleet and by the number of crews that it
takes to keep one airplane going, almost four crews per
airplane, you begin to see some real savings.
Another issue that might want to be considered is airdrop capacity
capability that the C-17 has, something that is likewise very
important. One of the things that has been pointed out in this debate
is that some very important people have come to the conclusion that it
is the C-17 that we need rather than some of the alternatives. General
Shalikashvili, as the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] pointed
out recently, wrote us all a letter, and in the letter he says, and I
quote:
Today there is only one alternative that can meet the
requirements of core airlifter, the C-17. The continuing
myths of service life extension programs for the old C-141
and the ability of commercial derivatives to meet the needs
of the core airlifter are just that, myths.
General Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, says, and I
quote:
Again the C-17 is the only aircraft that can get the Army's
outsized combat system to the next war when required.
General Hoar, the commander of CENTCOM, says:
In the foreseeable future only the C-17 acting as the
nation's core military airlifter can provide us the lift and
the flexibility that we need.
So, throughout the military establishment, throughout the armed
services community where there is significant majority support
currently, I believe, for the C-17 program, we are going to request
support for the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California
[Ms. Harman] which increases the buy from four to six, and once again I
might suggest that the economies that come with buying six rather than
four are quite significant.
So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to make these points
here this afternoon, and I look forward to the rest of this debate.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 7
minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, this rule makes in order an amendment to
the Defense Authorization bill which will increase the number of C-17's
authorized in fiscal year 1995 from four airplanes, as provided in the
bill, to six airplanes, as requested by the administration. Since the
amendment reallocates funds within the airlift account, it adds no cost
to the bill.
The C-17 has been under development for more than a decade and has
suffered its share of problems: cost increases, schedule stretchouts,
performance shortfalls. By the end of fiscal year 1994, the Air Force
will have spent $15.8 billion on the program; and by then, 26 C-17's
will be procured against a requirement of 120.
When Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch took charge of
acquisitions, he had to take a close, hard look at the C-17. Deutch
could have decided that the C-17's problems didn't happen on his watch
and canceled the program. He decided instead to put the C-17 on
probation, telling McDonnell Douglas to work out the cost and technical
problems or face termination. In the meanwhile, he moved on to complete
a buy of 40 airplanes, the number Air Mobility Command calls the
``minimum that is militarily viable.''
To complete a buy of 40 airplanes, the Air Force seeks funding for 6
C-17's in fiscal year 1995 and 8 in fiscal year 1996. During this time,
McDonnell Douglas will be on probation, required to make major
improvements in management and production or have its contract
canceled. By the delivery of the 40th airplane, the Defense Department
will decide: First, whether McDonnell Douglas has the program in good
order and second, whether the Air Force needs to buy more C-17's or
switch to an alternative aircraft.
Because of questions about the C-17 that remained unanswered at
markup, the Armed Services Committee accepted the chairman's mark,
which cut the fiscal year 1995 request from the six C-17's requested in
the President's budget to four C-17's. Out of the money saved by the
cutback, the committee directed that $550 million be spent on the
purchase of other cargo aircraft.
Alarmed by the cut, Secretary Deutch appeared before the committee
following the markup to explain his proposed work-out with McDonnell
Douglas and why six C-17's are the minimum necessary to carry out his
proposal. Deutch's presentation convinced a majority of the committee
to support our amendment, restoring $550 million in funding for six C-
17's and reversing the allocation of this money to alternative
aircraft.
Here briefly is why Secretary Deutch insists a buy of six C-17's is
necessary in fiscal year 1995 and why we and a majority of our
committee agree with him:
(1) Airlift is needed, and if the C-17 performs as
promised, it fills the need better than any alternative.
Airlift requirements have decreased, but only slightly, with
the end of the Cold War. That's because troop reductions in
Europe and elsewhere leave us largely with a continental-
based defense force. Airlift makes up for having fewer forces
forward-deployed, giving forces in the U.S. ``remote
presence.'' But if our forces are to be credible, we must be
able to project them over greater distances and in a shorter
time than ever before. Few regional conflicts will be
patterned after the Gulf War in which U.S. forces had six
months to deploy. In most conflicts, time will be of the
essence, and strategic airlift will make a critical
difference--a situation demonstrated dramatically in Desert
Storm when C-5s delivered Patriot batteries to Tel Aviv. The
same would hold true today if Patriot or Apache helicopters
or M-1 tanks had to be moved quickly to the Korean Peninsula.
No commercially available aircraft can deliver such ``out-
sized'' cargo. The C-5 is the only operational airplane
capable of the mission, and because of its limited numbers
and the imminent retirement of C-141s, there will be a
shortfall of airlift to meet overall requirements. To meet
the requirement, the only airplane in production is the C-17.
Commercial cargo planes can carry bulk freight and handle
some of the mission; but unlike the C-17, they cannot be
aerial-refueled; they are not built with redundant systems to
sustain damage in combat; they cannot air-drop paratroops
and equipment; and they cannot operate in short and narrow
runways where little or no equipment is available for
rapidly off-loading cargo. Because the C-17 has all these
capabilities, it increases the number of accessible
airfields in South America from 66 to 704, in Africa from
137 to 794, in the Far East from 217 to 576, and in Europe
from 184 to 852. Its ability to perform in austere
environments makes the C-17 more capable than the C-5,
whether it is supplying forces for combat or delivering
humanitarian cargoes.
(2) With $15.8 billion invested in the C-17 program, it is
only prudent to round out the buy and realize more return
from a substantial investment. The first rule of analysis is
to forget sunk cost, but one should walk warily when the
investment comes to $15.8 billion. By purchasing 6 aircraft
in FY 95 and 8 in FY 96, the Air Force can squeeze more
return from the $15.8 billion already committed to the C-17.
With 14 more airplanes, the Air Force can round out its buy
to what it calls a ``minimum viable force'' of 40 airplanes.
And with 40 C-17s, the Air Force can satisfy the minimum
requirements for outsize cargo capacity. Moreover, by
continuing the C-17 for two years, and ramping production
from 6 to 8 airplanes, the Air Force can give the contractor
the chance to prove it is capable of bringing the cost of the
airplane down and curing its technical problems. For all of
these reasons, it makes sense not to abandon yet the $15.8
billion sunk in this program.
3. The incremental cost of the C-17 is close to the
original cost and competitive with alternative aircraft. The
original cost of the C-17 program was estimated at $41.8
billion for 210 airplanes, or about $200 million per copy. If
we disregard sunk cost, the fly-away cost-to-complete 94
additional airplanes comes to $21.7 billion, an average of
about $230 million an airplane. The incremental cost of C-17s
would probably compare favorably with the unit cost of C-5Bs
coming off a restarted production line, particularly if C-5Bs
were equipped with new engines and avionics. Commercial cargo
planes like the 747 come cheaper, at prices ranging around
$125 million, but reconfigured to military requirements, they
would cost more and they would be subject to all the
performance limitations mentioned above.
(4) The amendment restoring the FY 95 buy to 6 C-17s will
also fully fund $106 million requested by the Air Force to
try out non-developmental aircraft, such as 747s or newly-
produced C-5Bs. Procurement of non-developmental aircraft is
still an open option for the Air Force. Our amendment
actually facilitates that option by authorizing the
Administration's request of $106 million to explore the use
of non-development aircraft in lieu of the C-17. The Air
Force's choices cover as many as 10 commercial cargo planes
and include a re-start of C-5 production. The Air Mobility
Command cites a minimum requirement of 40 C-17s, but beyond
this number, the Air Force may find it wise to buy fewer than
120, and opt instead for an off-the-shelf commercial cargo
plane. This amendment leaves that option open.
{time} 1700
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the very distinguished
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling].
(Mr. GOODLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I rise in the strongest possible
opposition I can muster to this rule. This is the United States of
America. It is the only country in the world where we have a melting
pot society that we have been very, very successful to put together and
hopefully keep together. It has been painful at times, but we have been
successful.
In the legislation coming before us, it is just one more little chip
away at the whole idea of the United States of America.
I asked an amendment be made in order that would say military and
civilian personnel leaving the Department of Defense who are bilingual
and have a baccalaureate or advanced degree can become bilingual
elementary and secondary teachers in any subject and any language that
they choose.
I guess I should have known the writing was on the wall when the
acting chairman said ``That certainly makes good sense.'' I should have
known that that was the end, because I have been told in 19\1/2\ years
that you are too practical. That is your problem in the Congress of the
United States.
Now, for those who may be turned in back in their office, I would
hope they would listen. As currently written section 1133 of H.R. 4301
creates a $3 million set-aside out of the defense conversion
reinvestment and transition assistance title for the Secretary of
Defense to carry out a pilot program to assist bilingual members of the
Armed Forces and bilingual civilian employees of the Department of
Defense after their termination of employment to obtain certification
and employment as bilingual elementary or secondary teachers in math or
science only.
Further, section 1133 focuses on Spanish as the language in which to
be trained. It targets areas where there are military installations and
a high concentration of Hispanic residents and limits where the
teaching training is acquired to a consortium of one or more Hispanic-
serving institutions of higher education with a solid background,
expertise, and experience in operating bilingual teacher training
programs in math and science, with an emphasis in English as a second
language.
In trying to determine who would receive such a grant, I have learned
there are probably 16 Hispanic-serving institutions that offer a 4-year
degree in bilingual teacher training programs. I do not know out of
that 16 how many have bilingual math and science teacher training
programs, as well as programs emphasizing English as a second language.
Since there are very few institutions that will qualify for such a
grant, I am concerned that this is a $3 million set-aside which will be
a sole source grant, which I have always fought, even for my district
when they tried to get one for Gettysburg College.
I am a supporter of bilingual education. It is interesting that I say
that, and the gentleman from California is sitting right next to me
while I say it. And I understand the need for bilingual teachers in
Spanish. However, I believe there is a general shortage of bilingual
teachers all across the country.
If we want to benefit from the expertise and knowledge of bilingual
military and civilian defense employees, I believe we should recruit
them to be bilingual elementary and secondary teachers on any subject
and any language.
Additionally, I do not believe that this pilot program should only be
open to Hispanic-serving institutions. Military or civilian personnel
who want to pursue certification as a bilingual teacher should be given
the opportunity.
Furthermore, and I come to the floor all the time pointing out how we
duplicate things, we were told we have some 150 training programs that
are on the books. And every time there is a new one that comes up, I
come to the floor to try to say we are already trying to do that. We
already have appropriations to do that.
But title VII of H.R. 6, Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,
contains a bipartisan agreement, of which I played a role to make sure
it was bipartisan, on bilingual education. I defended H.R. 6 when it
was considered by this body. It is a bilingual education teacher
training program, but it does not limit the language, and it does not
limit where they can receive it.
My amendment sought to make the DOD language consistent with the
bipartisan agreement of H.R. 6. By expanding the focus on the pilot
program, I believe my amendment would have increased the likelihood
that the shortage of bilingual teachers in all languages, in any
subject, could be reduced.
Furthermore, it is politically stupid, Mr. Speaker. That is the only
way I can phrase it, when anyone knows that 75, 80, 85 percent would go
to do what they wanted to do in the first place. So why not try to
conserve this great United States of America and protect it? Why do we
not try to save the United States and keep it united, rather than
thinking about saving the rest of the world?
{time} 1710
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 6
minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], the
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums].
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Montgomery). The gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] is recognized for 7 minutes.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, in the few moments that I have, I would
like to address myself to several remarks made by the distinguished
ranking member of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Solomon]. If I might have the gentleman's attention, I listened
very carefully to his opening remarks with respect to the rule, and I
appreciate it. I rise as well in support of this rule.
But the gentleman, in the course of his remarks, addressed three
issues that I would like to speak to. The gentleman raised the issue of
peacekeeping, the issue of Bosnia and, finally, the issue of Haiti.
I would like to first say to my colleague that with respect to the
action of the Committee on Armed Services regarding peacekeeping, we
established a line item for peacekeeping. We authorized the expenditure
of $300 million for that purpose.
I personally believe, and I think I am joined by the majority of my
colleagues, that that is just a good government issue. All of us
understand that peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement are the
realities of the future. It would seem to me that we ought to have a
line item in the military budget that attempts to address it.
What we have done in the past is, after we worked very diligently to
markup the bill, the administration allocates the dollars we have
authorized and appropriated. After the fact, we end up reprogramming
and developing supplemental requests that come to the floor of
Congress, after the fact.
It just seems to me absurd. We felt that we wanted to address the
issue up front.
Now, with respect to the more controversial aspect of peacekeeping,
something that I think we ought to deal with, and I might say,
parenthetically, I do not think that it ought to be in an ill-advised
amendment on the floor of this Chamber, I think that ought to be
something that is well-considered in the committee with appropriate
hearings, appropriate discussion, debate and deliberation and then a
proposal presented to the floor of Congress.
The gentleman and I know by the time issues come to the floor of
Congress, it is not about rationality. More often than not, it is about
taking political stances. But with respect to the issue of U.N.
assessments that the gentleman is very much interested in, and the
issue of how these dollars are credited and the whole issue of U.N.
reimbursement, I would say to my colleague, the Committee on Armed
Services did not deal with that issue. That is a foreign policy matter.
We understood that by addressing that issue, we would trigger
sequential referral to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The point I am
making to my colleague is twofold.
No. 1, it is an important issue. It ought to be discussed, and it
ought to be debated substantively and seriously in the context of the
post-cold war.
But the second point I would make to my colleague, and I will make it
two additional times, is that I am sure that my colleague clearly
understands that the issue the gentleman is concerned about on that
side of the aisle is really a foreign policy matter, not the province
of the House Committee on Armed Services.
The second point, with respect to Bosnia, my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle worked very diligently to see a Bosnia amendment come
on the floor. The Committee on Rules acquiesced to that.
What does the amendment dealing with Bosnia do? It lifts the arms
embargo, and it provides some $250 million, I think, about and beyond
the action of lifting the embargo. I think my colleague would agree
with me that that stands clearly outside of the jurisdiction and
purview of the Committee on Armed Services and sits squarely in the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Third, with respect to Haiti, this gentleman authorized a
comprehensive bill most recently dealing with Haiti, bicameral,
bipartisan support of all of the 40 black members of Congress. We now
have been joined by a substantial number of our colleagues. That bill
has over 100 sponsors. The bill was not referred to the House Committee
on Armed Services. The bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
To summarize my point, I understand the gentleman's frustration. I
think the gentleman knows, I stand second to no person in this Chamber
for my willingness and desire to debate the issues openly and honestly
and carefully. This is a momentous period that we find ourselves in,
historic, extraordinary, vital and important. We ought to take our
responsibilities here.
But in the course of my colleague's remarks, I think it is important
for him to perhaps say that if his frustration lies anywhere, it is not
with the Committee on Armed Services. The peacekeeping provisions that
the gentleman spoke of are outside our jurisdiction. The Bosnia
amendment is outside of our jurisdiction; Haiti, outside of our
jurisdiction.
Maybe if we had a foreign aid bill or foreign affairs bill that came
here once a year, we could debate these matters.
The gentlemen was also embracing the issue of war powers. That issue
also is in the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The problem that we all have here is that these are amendments of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. If we were only dealing with amendments
squarely and clearly within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed
Services, then the gentleman's frustration would be much different than
it is.
I would like to yield to the gentleman to tell me whether there is
any efficacy to the remarks that this gentleman is trying to make.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, let me just say to the distinguished
gentleman, I went out of my way in my opening remarks to praise the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], the chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, because he certainly does believe in free and open
debate on this floor. I praised him for it in the past.
Our frustration comes from a year ago, when we had this same bill on
the floor, when we made the same arguments, because we wanted to talk
about lifting the embargo on Bosnia. We wanted to talk about Haiti. We
wanted to talk about the unfair credit arrangement that we have in
being reimbursed by the United Nations.
One solid year has gone by, and that debate has never taken place.
So the gentleman is absolutely correct. Everything that he has just
said is correct. We need to have the debate here, though.
This rule, the reason I am supporting the rule and helped the
gentleman bring it to the floor, because I want him to have this bill
considered this week. Otherwise, he will lose it, and he will be back
here 3 or 4 weeks from now still trying to pass the most important bill
to come before this House in any given year.
We are going to have that debate, because the gentleman did go along
with us on these important peacekeeping issues. I admire and respect
him for it, even though it is out of his jurisdiction, for bending over
backwards to allow us this opportunity.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague very much for his
remarks.
Mr. Speaker, in the few remaining comments, let me just say that I
also am aware of the fact that the issue of the C-17 is an important
and vital issue and will be debated in the context of this second rule.
I would not take any time to address that issue at this point. At the
appropriate point in the proceedings, I would like to rise at that
point and discuss with my colleagues where we are and to frame the
issues that I think are important and what I think my colleagues ought
to be listening to as they make a decision that I think is an
extraordinarily important issue, both politically, militarily, as well
as economically.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]
has 14 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost] has
6 minutes remaining.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this opportunity to say a
few words about the C-17. I may not be permitted to do so later in this
Department of Defense authorization.
We will be increasing the number, the proposal is to increase the
number of C-17's from four to six.
I join with my colleagues, the gentlemen from California [Mr. Horn]
and the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] in support of that
measure.
It seems that America is always condemned to fight the last war.
Between the first two great World Wars, the issue was battleships. And
our Navy insisted on battleship production versus aircraft carriers.
I might add, had we looked at technology and what was the need of
technology rather than follow politics, we might have deterred World
War II, because we might have had aircraft carriers that would have
deterred the attack on Pearl Harbor.
During the cold war, it was the power of presence. Those were the
battleships of the day. We had bases all over the world, and we had a
large number of troops in our standing army.
Well, providing security in the future will depend on projecting
power from the United States and having a very strong reserve force and
will depend on technological superiority, not on large numbers of
troops based all over the world, but on our ability to project our
power, both technologically and otherwise, throughout the world.
{time} 1720
Having foreign bases will not be part of the picture, most likely, 10
years from now. It will require us to have specialists and to be able
to send sophisticated weaponry all over the world with rapid deployable
troops, and in doing so we will need things, weapons systems, like the
C-17.
The C-17 has had trouble, and every major weapons system that we
depend on today had a period of time when it had troubles. My father
was a pilot in the Marine Corps. He depended on weapons systems that
he, in the beginning, had some troubles with, and those troubles were
ironed out. Later on those weapons systems protected his life.
Whether it is an M-1 tank, an Apache helicopter, a Patriot missile
battery, or a detachment of troops, the C-17 will provide America's
defenders a tremendous level of flexibility in meeting low intensity
and, yes, even high intensity conflict in the future.
We do not need as big a military as we had, Mr. Speaker, but if we
have fewer in number, our defenders deserve the very best technology to
back them up. The supplies and the weapons, the reinforcements
delivered by the C-17, will save lives, and maybe will make our country
more secure in the future. It will be more cost-effective than a larger
standing force in foreign bases.
Is there any more that needs to be said? It is cost-effective. The
problems will be ironed out. The lives of our defenders will be more
secure and our country will be more secure if we have this technology
available.
Mr. Speaker, I support the C-17.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Lewis]. another Californian. We seem to be run over by
these Californians around here.
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate my
colleague yielding this time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, which allows for an
amendment that would restore the number of C-17 aircraft to the level
of six as reflected in the President's budget request.
I know that my colleague, the chairman, the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dellums] is very aware of the respect in which I hold him as
chairman, as well as a friend, in the House. I rise because of my
concern about the future of this program, rather than to express any
difference, basically, with my friend's direction in his bill.
Mr. Speaker, I must say that I was most impressed by the need for
this aircraft in a poignant moment recently. Our committee, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, traveled to
Korea recently, where we were attempting to address the very serious
difficulties our country faces there, with the prospect of North Korea
threatening to cross the 38th parallel, and the potential of that
impact upon world peace.
We talked a lot as we dropped off in Alaska about the number of
military programs that might be made available and needed, if a major
conflict in that place, were to erupt. A young lieutenant colonel was
listening to our conversation, and he turned around and in very, very
classic form expressed to us the need for the C-17.
He said,
Gentlemen, what good does it do us to have these billions
and billions of dollars worth of sophisticated equipment if
we cannot get our men and materiel where they are needed in a
timely manner?
The C-17 program, in this age of shrinking world and shrinking
defense budgets, allows America to extend its force in an appropriate
fashion. Unless we restore the C-17 to the level of the budget target
of six aircraft and move forward from there, we will make this plane so
expensive that eventually it will fall of its own weight.
Indeed, it is critical that we make a commitment to the C-17 at this
moment. The only way to do that is to vote for the Harman-Horn-McCurdy-
Saxton-Spratt-Johnson-Talent amendment that has been made in order
under this rule. That amendment would restore the C-17 to six airplanes
this year and eight airplanes next year. The amendment is supported by
the majority of members on the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I urge that Members support this amendment when it comes
to the full committee.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only I yield 1 minute
to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Frost] for yielding time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to state my sincere appreciation for the
fact that in the context of the Committee on Armed Services
authorization bill tomorrow, for the first time on this floor we will
have significant votes regarding the conflict in Bosnia. Particularly I
am gratified that the McCloskey-Gilman amendment will be considered, in
essence, among other things that provides for a more or less immediate
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. The rule features a king-of-
the-hill process in which the Hamilton amendment would not allow an
immediate lifting of the arms embargo.
Mr. Speaker, I urge very much a ``yes'' on McCloskey-Gilman, a ``no''
on Hamilton. We look to about an hour of total discussion on Bosnia
tomorrow.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would say to the previous speaker, the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], the reason we Republicans are supporting this
rule, which is something other than open, is because it makes in order
the amendment on lifting the embargo in Bosnia, along with some others.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the very distinguished
gentleman from Indianapolis, IN [Mr. Burton], a city that is the home
of the American Legion national headquarters.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding time to me. I am glad he pointed that out.
Mr. Speaker, I am very disappointed that the Committee on Rules chose
not to conclude in the rule an amendment that I was sponsoring dealing
with setting up boot camps for nonviolent first offenders at military
bases that are being closed around the country. The No. 1 problem
facing America today, the No. 1 problem, is crime.
About 70 percent of all crime is drug-related. Many, many, many of
the first-time offenders are young people who can be brought back into
line if we handle their problems correctly. One of the ways to do that
is through boot camps established at these closed military bases. The
States that have tried this have found that 40 percent, there has been
a reduction of 40 percent in the recidivism rate of young people who
are committing crimes for the first time, a 40-percent drop in crime
among young people.
What we wanted to do was to take these closed military bases and
establish, if the Governor of a State or if the mayor of a city wanted
to use them for boot camp programs, for them to be allowed to be able
to do that. In order to do that, we had to reprioritize the way we were
going to use these bases.
Currently when a military base is closed, the Department of Defense
or other Federal agencies have first priority. Second, if there was no
interest, the land was to be used by the Department of Housing for the
homeless in accordance with the Homeless Assistance Act, and then
finally, the States and municipalities had the opportunity to use it
for whatever purposes they wanted to.
We wanted to change that priority list so that we could use, as a
first priority, these bases for these military-style boot camps, to get
these people, these young people, back on the straight and narrow.
The Department of Defense did not like that. They wanted to still
have first priority for the Department of Defense for the use of these
facilities, so we changed our amendment. We went along with what the
Department of Defense wanted.
We said, ``Okay, we will let the Department of Defense go first, and
then we will use as a second priority these facilities for first-time
nonviolent offenders, and have a boot camp established at these
bases.'' However, the Committee on Rules did not want us to be even
able to be a second priority. They wanted this Homeless Assistance Act
to be of paramount concern.
Mr. Speaker, I am concerned about the homeless in this country, and
think everybody else is, but if we talk to people across America they
will tell us that, although the homeless problem is important, crime is
dwarfing it. The overall concern in this country about crime is growing
as we speak.
Today in Indianapolis, three or four guys went into a restaurant in
my district and they shot a 5-year-old boy, and they are holding about
20 people hostage right now as we speak. People across this country are
concerned about crime. They want it stopped. They are not safe in their
homes. The best way to attack crime is to start with the very young and
make sure that they get back on the straight and narrow before it gets
out of hand.
If we send them to a penitentiary with hardened criminals they are
going to become hardened criminals. That is why this boot camp approach
is so very important. I am very disappointed that the Committee on
Rules did not see fit to make this a priority. The people across this
country understand that crime is the number one priority. Whey did not
the Committee on Rules?
{time} 1730
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 1 minute
to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], chairman of the
committee.
Mr. DELLUMS. What was the basis of the decision that was made to
exclude the gentleman's amendment? I am not on the Committee on Rules
as the gentleman is aware. As I understand it, the Committee on
Government Operations had an area of jurisdictional responsibility that
was important as they viewed it, and there is the Committee on the
Judiciary. I think that was the problem. It was not so much that the
Committee on Armed Services was reacting but, again, this is another
example of an amendment that may on its face be meritorious. The
problem is we have a jurisdictional issue.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, what we tried to do, we have
several committees that have jurisdiction over an amendment. We try to
go through them one at a time. The Committee on Armed Services is a
priority committee because those bases are controlled by the
gentleman's committee and that is why we wanted to get it to the floor
right now. Then we could take the other committees in sequence.
Mr. DELLUMS. As I said, I think the other two committees communicated
with the Committee on Rules and I think that was part of the issue. I
thank the gentleman.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the very
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan], another member of
the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I know I have a fundamental disagreement
with the chairman of our Committee on Armed Services on whether or not
it is the responsibility of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on which I
served for 8 years, or our House Armed Services Committee to resolve
this issue of putting U.S. forces, American fighting men and women,
under foreign command.
Mr. Speaker, here for the umpteenth time I hold up this complicated
chart of the command structure in Somalia that indicates double chains
of command for both two-star General Montgomery and two-star General
Harrison--who is not even really listed here by name--the commander of
the Special Ops and the Rangers, and how this whole complicated thing
depended upon a very nice 3-star Turkish General named Bir, with whom I
had lunch over there in October, and who wanted more control of the
troops, but then this was not a pure NATO operation. Of course, we will
have levels of nations in NATO inserted in the command, but that is
only by a ratified treaty.
Mr. Speaker, what I would like to insert in the Record, again for the
umpteenth time, this time with three new commandments, are Cap
Weinberger's six commandments that must be followed before subjecting
American men and women to hot combat in harm's way.
Cap Weinberger asked me 2 weeks ago to add a seventh one, and that is
why I am voting against this rule, because we are not going to be
debating this issue this year, and then I added 3 more to bring it to a
round Mosaic 10 as I look up at Moses' great marble medallion up there,
above our House floor.
Mr. Speaker, let me see in the remaining time if I can get these in.
They all start with ``Thou shall not commit U.S. Combat forces
unless.''
``Unless all other options already have been used or considered.
``Unless the situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.
``Unless there is a clear commitment, including allocated resources,
to achieving victory.
``Unless there are clearly defined political and military objectives.
``Unless our commitment of these forces will change if our objectives
change.
``Unless the American people and Congress support the action.''
Mr. Speaker, that is Cap's original six. He and I decided to add
number 7:
``Unless under the operational command of American commanders or
allied commanders under a ratified treaty.''
Mr. Speaker, I will run these by Cap Weinberger, but here are the new
three:
``Unless properly equipped, trained and maintained by the U.S.
Congress.'' That is to prevent us from getting into this hollow
military force that we were in, in Carter's last years.
``Unless there is substantial and reliable intelligence information
including human intelligence.'' No human intelligence, we do not put
our men and women into any harm's way.
And last but maybe most important, given that this is the day at the
Rose Garden where two sergeants received posthumously, their families
on their behalf, the Medal of Honor, the Congressional Medal of Honor,
for going to the aid of their friends.
``Unless the Commander-in-Chief and Congress can explain to the loved
ones of any American soldier, sailor, marine, pilot or air crewman
killed or wounded why he or she was sent into harm's way.''
It is up to us, Mr. Speaker, to explain this to the widows, to the
fathers, the mothers, the sons, the brothers and sisters, many of whom
have been in this gallery since that firefight from hell in Somalia on
the night of October 3 and 4, or the Sunday afternoon through the early
morning hours the next day.
Mr. Speaker, I am going to be talking to the families of these Medal
of Honor winners, 1st Sgt. Randy Shugart and M. Sgt. Gary Gordon. They
were left in there without their AC-130 airship gun cover and they were
not given armored vehicles, tracked or wheeled, to extract them from
this ambush in the Bacara market where they were outnumbered 1,000 to
80 or more than 10 to 1.
No, we should live by these 10 commandments in this Congress, and in
the U.S. military, and I am voting against this rule because we will
not have this important debate this year.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, we have no other speakers at this point, so
if the gentleman would like to conclude, then we will yield back our
time.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
Mr. Speaker, just let me recall that at the outset of this debate
about an hour ago, I said that I am going to reluctantly support this
rule even though there are Republicans being denied their right to
offer amendments on this floor, as there are Democrats being denied.
I do not thing that is fair. Nevertheless, the Democrat leadership
did come to our Republican leadership and agree to make in order
amendments that deal with some critical issues that are so terribly
important. We heard the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey] speak of
it 1 minute ago. We are going to have the opportunity to debate lifting
the embargo on Bosnia so that the people over there, the official
Bosnian Government, can defend themselves against the genocide that is
taking place. This grave situation has developed under both Republican
and Democrat administrations over the last several years.
Therefore, I urge strong support for this rule so that we can get on
with this very important, critical debate on the defense budget.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, I yield back the balance
of my time, and I more the previous question on the rsolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________