[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 65 (Monday, May 23, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                      ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                          Monday, May 23, 1994

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I recently asked Secretary of Defense 
William Perry to provide me with his assessment of the implications and 
consequences of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.
  As my colleagues know, this question will come before us shortly in 
the form of an amendment to the Department of Defense authorization 
bill. I hope my colleagues will consider Secretary Perry's response, in 
the form of a series of questions and answers, before casting their 
vote on this critical issue:

                                      The Secretary of Defense

                                     Washington, DC, May 19, 1994.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
         Representatives, Rayburn House Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your interest in the 
     United Nations arms embargo as it applies to Bosnia. The 
     attached contains questions and answers concerning the 
     implications of lifting the arms embargo which I hope will be 
     useful to you during House consideration of legislation 
     related to Bosnia.
       Your support of the Administration's position on this issue 
     is crucial. A peaceful settlement in Bosnia will require a 
     multilateral approach. The support of our allies and the 
     United Nations cannot be sustained if we unilaterally lift 
     the embargo. Please know that we remain steadfast in our 
     commitment to a peaceful and viable settlement in that 
     country.
       Thank you for your continued attention to this matter. I 
     look forward to working with you on this and other policy 
     issues.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William J. Perry.
                                  ____


       Responses to Questions on the Arms Embargo Against Bosnia

       Question. If the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
     government were unilaterally lifted by the United States, 
     what impact would such a move have on the compliance of other 
     nations with the broad range of UN Security Council-imposed 
     embargoes, such as economic sanctions against Serbia and 
     sanctions against Iraq?
       Answer. There is a clear danger that other nations would 
     use the U.S. precedent as a pretext to unilaterally ``lift'' 
     sanctions regimes that they found inconvenient or opposed for 
     political or economic reasons. This could lead to a total 
     breakdown in the ability of the UN to enforce sanctions 
     against Serbia, Iraq, Libya and Haiti, and over time could 
     limit the power of the UN to affect international behavior 
     through binding resolutions.
       Question. Some have argued that the arms embargo against 
     Bosnia is not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed 
     against the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not a successor 
     state; and because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of 
     self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. What is the 
     Administration's legal opinion on this issue?
       Answer. The arms embargo was imposed on the territory of 
     the former Yugoslavia by UN Security Council Resolution 713 
     (1991) and reaffirmed in later resolutions (e.g., Resolutions 
     724, 727, 740, 743, and 787). Resolution 713 is a mandatory 
     decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and expressly 
     provides that the embargo will remain in effect ``until the 
     Security Council decides otherwise.'' The Council has also 
     made clear that the embargo applies throughout the territory 
     of the former Yugoslavia, notwithstanding its breakup into 
     separate states (see Resolution 727 (1992)). Thus it applies 
     to Bosnia.
       The embargo does not violate Bosnia's right of self-defense 
     under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Any self-defense right 
     that may exist to receive arms from other states under 
     Article 51 is subject to the authority of the Security 
     Council, which may take action affecting it. Thus, under 
     Article 51, measures taken in self-defense ``shall not in any 
     way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
     Council under the [UN] Charter to take at any time such 
     action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
     international peace and security.''
       The Security Council may take various actions--imposition 
     of cease-fires, limits on armaments, and establishment of 
     protected or demilitarized zones--that affect a state's right 
     of self-defense. For example, the Council may impose a cease-
     fire even though its immediate effect may leave an aggressor 
     in temporary occupation of part of the defender's territory. 
     Article 51 takes as its premise the principle that the 
     Security Council may impose such sanctions when it judges 
     them to be necessary, and this is an essential part of the 
     Council's authorities to maintain and restore peace.
       Question. How would a unilateral lifting of the arms 
     embargo affect our relations with our NATO Allies and the 
     Russian Federation?
       Answer. Our Allies and the Russians are extremely concerned 
     at the prospect of unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms 
     embargo. They would argue that our behavior encouraged an 
     erosion of the UN sanctions regime as an instrument of 
     international policy. If they came to believe that unilateral 
     U.S. lifting of the embargo had more than a symbolic effect, 
     they might decide to pull some or all of their forces out of 
     UNPROFOR, leading to the collapse of the humanitarian relief 
     effort. Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, which are 
     surrounded by Serb forces, would be cut off from most relief 
     supplies. Should the Bosnian Serbs attack any remaining 
     European forces or take them hostage, the Europeans would 
     hold us accountable. Nations like Iran, who have standing 
     offers to provide troops to the Bosnian government, might 
     elect to do so, arguing that the U.S. had set a precedent for 
     ignoring a UN resolution.
       Question. If the arm embargo were lifted, what types of 
     weapons would the Bosnian government forces need to achieve a 
     degree of weapon equivalence with the Bosnian Serb forces? 
     Which nations would train the Bosnian forces with these new 
     weapons?
       Answer. We presume that the Bosnian government would 
     require large-caliber heavy weapons to match the capabilities 
     of the Bosnian Serbs. This could include medium and heavy 
     artillery, medium tanks, and long-range anti-tank weapons 
     such as the Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Anti-Tank 
     Weapons (TOW) System. Personnel familiar with weapons 
     provided, usually the supplier (government or industry), 
     generally train recipients in the use, tactical employment, 
     and maintenance of systems procured. Potential suppliers/
     trainers span the globe.
       Question. How long would it take for heavy weapons to be 
     transported to the Bosnian government forces? What are the 
     various access routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable 
     are these routes to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? 
     How large a military force would it take to guard and 
     maintain these logistical routes?
       Answer. If the arms embargo were lifted by UN action and 
     Croatia cooperated, heavy weapons could be brought in Bosnia 
     through Croatian Adriatic ports. It would be difficult to 
     deliver substantial amounts of equipment by air since all 
     major Bosnian government airstrips are within Serb artillery 
     range, and aircraft would be subject to SAM fire. Shipment by 
     sea would require weeks and perhaps months, depending on how 
     long it took the Bosnian government to purchase or otherwise 
     procure the weapons. If the U.S. unilaterally lifted the arms 
     embargo, heavy weapons could not be shipped to Bosnia without 
     a willingness on the part of other nations to violate the UN 
     arms embargo. If Croatia were to cooperate with the U.S. in 
     violating the UN arms embargo, and the Bosnian government 
     were able to purchase or otherwise obtain weapons, arms could 
     begin reaching Bosnia in some weeks or months. It is quite 
     possible that most, if not all, UNPROFOR forces would 
     probably have departed by then, perhaps having had to fight 
     its way out, and would not be available to secure routes for 
     arms imports. The Serbs would naturally take advantage of any 
     lag-time between international lifting of the arms embargo 
     and provision of weapons to the Bosnian government. The 
     incentive for the Serbs to launch an all-out final offensive 
     before their forces were put at a disadvantage would be great 
     Thus the U.S. might have to undertake air striks--in this 
     case, without the participation of our NATO Allies--to help 
     repel new Bosnian Serb aggression.
       Question. How long would it take to effectively train the 
     Bosnia government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this 
     training require the presence of U.S. military personnel in 
     Bosnia, or are other nations capable of training Bosnians on 
     the U.S. military equipment that may be provided if the 
     embargo is lifted? Would this training take place in Bosnia 
     or out of country?
       Answer. Estimating the time required to train a force to 
     use, tactically employ and maintain sophisticated weapons is 
     difficult without exact knowledge of the capabilities of the 
     force to be trained. As a rough estimate, DoD notes that 
     training time of one to six months is required to train 
     soldiers to survive on the battlefield and properly use 
     rudimentary weapons. Until there is a definitive plan to 
     train a particular force, it is not possible to estimate 
     where the training might take place.
       Question. What is required in terms of logistics and 
     maintenance to service the heavy weapons that the Bosnians 
     would receive? Are the Bosnian government forces capable of 
     maintaining this equipment without outside assistance?
       Answer. The more sophisticated the weapon system, the more 
     lengthy and complicated the maintenance and supply system. 
     The following factors, inter alia, would have a direct impact 
     on both sustenance and tempo of operations: The complexity of 
     the weapons system, number of units to be operated, skill of 
     the operators, the level of training, the equipment's 
     exposure to hostilities and weather, and logistics 
     (ammunition, parts, transportation) and infrastructure (lines 
     of communication, facilities) capacities. If the Bosnian 
     government acquired weapons and equipment compatible with its 
     existing indigenous weapons and equipment compatible with its 
     existing indigenous armaments production capabilities (e.g., 
     former Soviet Union sourced), it could possibly maintain them 
     without outside assistance.
       Question. How would the Serbs (or other belligerents) react 
     in that interim period between announcement of lifting and 
     adequate training?
       Answer. Any formal lifting of the arms embargo by the UN 
     prior to a peace settlement would give the Serbs an obvious 
     incentive to exploit their current military superiority 
     before foreign arms began to be used effectively by Bosnian 
     forces. Assuming that UNPROFOR stayed in place, its soldiers 
     could face attack by Bosnian Serb forces. The Serbs could 
     also be expected to halt the humanitarian relief effort. 
     While relief could still flow into central Bosnia from the 
     Adriatic coast through Croatia, the Serbs are currently 
     capable of cutting off all land routes into Sarajevo, 
     Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica. They could also close Sarajevo 
     and Tuzla airports. The only possibility of supply to these 
     areas would be through air drops. While these might sustain 
     some of the outlying enclaves, they would be insufficient for 
     a city the size of Sarajevo, which has at most a three-week 
     supply of food on hand. In addition, air drop aircraft would 
     be susceptible to anti-aircraft fire. The eastern enclaves 
     and other isolated areas like Maglaj and Bihac would probably 
     fall and Sarajevo would be at serious risk even if the 
     population did not face starvation.
       Question. If there is an increase in fighting, should air 
     power be used against the Serbs during this period? What are 
     the military risks associated with air delivery of the new 
     weapons? Is it likely the airfields in the government-
     controlled areas can be kept open for such deliveries? Should 
     Allied aircraft be expected to participate in such a air 
     operation if we unilaterally lift the embargo? If not, would 
     U.S. air controllers have to be put on the ground to control 
     air strikes?
       Answer. The only possible way to discourage large-scale 
     Serb attacks on the Bosnian government or on UNPROFOR forces, 
     or to prevent the Serbs from halting the continued supply of 
     Sarajevo via the airport, would be through the threat of 
     military invasion or a massive bombing campaign aimed at 
     Bosnian Serb military and strategic infrastructure targets. 
     Unless we were prepared to undertake such actions, the 
     destruction of Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, and other 
     isolated Bosnian government positions before the arrival of 
     weaponry would become a distinct possibility. This is why the 
     U.S. has always linked the lifting of the arms embargo to a 
     bombing campaign, as exemplified in the ``lift and strike'' 
     proposal of May, 1993.
       Question. Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior 
     to the lifting of the arms embargo? How long would such a 
     withdrawal take and what are the risks involved? Would the 
     Serbs intercept the withdrawal and endeavor to take hostages?
       Answer. Our understanding is that the key UNPROFOR 
     contributors, most of whom are NATO Allies, would not be 
     prepared to stay in Bosnia if the arms embargo were lifted. 
     If UNPROFOR's departure were unopposed by the Bosnian Serbs, 
     all UNPROFOR forces could probably leave within several 
     weeks. The primary impediments would be logistical. If the 
     Bosnian Serbs retaliated for a formal or unilateral lifting 
     of the arms embargo by targeting UNPROFOR, the departure of 
     the troops might be difficult or impossible. UNPROFOR troops, 
     civil affairs officers and military observers are deployed 
     widely and could not defend themselves against concerted 
     attack. Allies might call on the U.S. to join them in sending 
     ground forces in to rescue their troops or to launch a 
     massive bombing campaign aimed at getting the Serbs to stop 
     impeding UNPROFOR's departure.
       Question. What impact would an UNPROFOR withdrawal have on 
     the people now receiving their assistance?
       Answer. IF UNPROFOR were to leave before the Bosnian 
     Government was in a position to take the offensive on the 
     battlefield, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, which 
     are already surrounded, would be cut off from resupply via 
     land routes. The Serbs could also cut resupply to Sarajevo by 
     closing down the airport. Any assistance deliveries to either 
     Sarajevo or the eastern enclaves would have to be by air 
     drops. Sarajevo could not survive on air drops alone, and 
     with only a three-week supply of food.
       Question. If the arms embargo were lifted against Bosnia, 
     would it also have to be lifted against Croatia since 
     Croatian cooperation is essential for transporting weapons to 
     the Bosnians? What impact would lifting the arms embargo 
     against Croatia have on the situation in Krajina? What is the 
     likely Serb reaction?
       Answer. The only reliable way to deliver heavy weapons to 
     Bosnia in large quantities is through croatia. If the UN 
     Security Council lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia 
     alone, Croatia might be permitted (by resolution) to have 
     arms transit its territory. Thanks to the Federation 
     agreement signed in March, relations between the Croatian and 
     Bosnian governments are relatively good. Still, it is likely 
     that weapons bound for Bosnia through Croatia would only 
     reach their final destination if Croatia also received arms 
     either openly or covertly. If the arms embargo were also 
     lifted against Croatia, and the Croats used these weapons 
     against the Krajina Serbs (who currently control almost one 
     third of Croatian territory) it is possible, and perhaps 
     likely, that Serbia proper would intervene, leading to an 
     outbreak of war between Croatia and Serbia. Lifting the 
     embargo against Croatia would also raise questions on whether 
     the embargo should remain in effect against Solvenia and 
     FYROM.
       Question. What is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia 
     to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable 
     to assume that they would come to the assistance of the 
     Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian government began to recapture 
     territory in the wake of the lifting of the embargo?
       Answer. The Russian reaction would be similar to that of 
     our NATO Allies. A Russian withdrawal from UNPROFOR would be 
     likely. A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally 
     would certainly play into the hands of pro-Serbian extremists 
     in Russia, who could make political decisions even more 
     difficult for the Yeltsin government. The Belgrade reaction 
     would depend on how seriously the threat were perceived. If a 
     humanitarian disaster in Sarajevo could be avoided and the 
     Bonsian government survived long enough for the situation on 
     the battlefield to change, the Serbian government could be 
     prompted to intervene on behalf of their Bosnian Serb 
     brethren. Milosevic would certainly be under tremendous 
     domestic pressure to do so. The threat or use of NATO 
     military actions, either on the ground or from the air, might 
     be needed to deter him.
       Question. Would the lifting of the arms embargo help or 
     hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the 
     conflict? Is it an option for future consideration? Under 
     what circumstances?
       Answer. Unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo would 
     probably have a chilling effect on the negotiating process. 
     The Bosnian government might feel less inclined to seek a 
     negotiated solution in the hope that it could achieve a 
     better solution on the battlefield. The Bosnian Serbs, for 
     their part, would be less inclined than ever to accept a U.S. 
     mediating role in the conflict, depriving us of the ability 
     to serve as an honest broker for a settlement. If the Serbes 
     perceived an immediate physical threat to themselves as a 
     result of the U.S. decision, they could attack the Bosnian 
     government or UNPROFOR forces or close down the humanitarian 
     relief supply to Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves, thus 
     making a negotiated settlement even more remote.
       Question. If the lifting of the arms embargo does not give 
     the Bosnian government force a degree of military equivalence 
     with Bosnian Serb forces, what would be our next step?
       Answer. Assuming that UNPROFOR has departed, or needs to be 
     rescued, and that Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves are at 
     grave risk, the U.S. might have no choice but to intervene 
     massively in the conflict or acquiesce in a humanitarian and 
     political disaster.

                          ____________________