[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 64 (Friday, May 20, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 20, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
           SUPPORT THE C-17--SUPPORT OUR TROOPS IN THE FIELD

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Kildee). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of February 11, 1994, the gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] 
is recognized for 40 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, I want to discuss a very important subject 
that will come before this House and the American people next Tuesday 
afternoon, and that is an amendment to return the Defense Authorization 
Act for our armed services to what the President recommended was with 
reference to the C-17 military airlift aircraft.
  Next week we are going to be asked to make one of the most important 
decisions and cast one of the most significant votes of this particular 
Congress. How we vote and what we decide regarding the fate of the C-17 
will directly affect the ability of our forces to succeed in time of 
conflict. It will also directly affect the ability of this Nation to 
deliver humanitarian aid to countries that have problems of starvation.
  Senior military leaders and theater commanders have consistently 
cited strategic lift as critical to their ability to provide 
reinforcements and necessary equipment to the young men and women 
serving our Nation on the front line of the world's trouble spots.
  Particularly as our Nation reduces the size of its military and its 
presence around the world, it is essential that we have the ability 
required to project force from our shores. That is why it is essential 
that we restore the C-17 line in the fiscal year 1995 Defense 
Authorization Act to the President's request of six (6) aircraft.
  It is important to heed the message of the letter of May 17, 1994, 
which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John 
Shalikashvili, sent to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 
of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  This is what the general said:

       As I look into the future, it is clear that America's 
     combat commanders will become increasingly dependent upon 
     strategic mobility * * *. America must have a core airlifter 
     to replace the aging C-141. The continuing myths of a service 
     life extension program for the C-141 or the ability of a 
     commercial derivative to meet the needs of a core airlifter 
     are just that--myths. Neither aircraft can carry the 
     equipment to forward areas that the Army needs to win on 
     tomorrow's battlefields.

  General Shalikashvili stated unequivocally that: ``Today there is 
only one alternative that can meet the requirements of a core 
airlifter--the C-17.''
  Gen. Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has, 
unsurprisingly, made the case the C-17 most succinctly and effectively:

       Our military strategy is changing from a focus on global 
     war to a focus on regional crises . . . And to deal with 
     those kinds of crises you've got to get there fast. And 
     you've got to get there with the mostest. And that's what the 
     C-17 will do for us.

  His words are echoed repeatedly by the commanders for whom the 
capabilities provided by the C-17 may mean life and death for young men 
and women serving under their command. Gen. Joseph Hoar, who succeeded 
Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf as commander of the U.S. Central Command 
[CENTCOM], made a compelling case in his May 17 letter to Chairman 
Dellums of the Committee on Armed Services. This is what General Hoar 
said:

       As our forces are returning from overseas and increasingly 
     based in the United States, I become the commander faced with 
     the most strenuous requirement for mobility in the world. In 
     the CENTCOM theater, because of the long deployment 
     distances, we are particularly sensitive to, and dependent 
     on, our ability to ensure the timely deployment of the early 
     arriving lethal firepower--key to limiting the escalation of 
     a conflict. This means armor, helicopters, rocket systems, 
     and air defense missiles, most of which do not fit on any 
     commercial aircraft. In the foreseeable future only the C-17, 
     acting as the Nation's core military airlifter, can provide 
     us this flexibility.

  I agree with the commander of the U.S. Central Command. Gordon 
Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, reinforced that point in a 
letter:

       By 1997, 80 percent of America's Army will be stationed in 
     the Continental United States as we complete our 
     transformation to a power projection Army. * * * This Nation 
     must have the strategic lift capabilities to project power 
     rapidly to any potential trouble spot in the world. * * * 
     While the aging C-141 fleet helps the Army fulfill this 
     requirement today, we will need the C-17 to provide the 
     strategic airlift for troops and equipment to provide our 
     forced entry capability and simultaneous application of joint 
     combat power across the depth of the battlefield in the 21st 
     century. The C-17 is the only aircraft that can get the 
     Army's outsized combat systems to the next war when required.

                              {time}  1340

  I agree with the Chief of Staff of the Army. I hope this House will 
too.
  General Sullivan emphasized that the C-17 will provide the capability 
to deliver critical army outsized loads while allowing access to 9,000 
more runways, an increase of 300 percent worldwide, then does the C-141 
or the C-5, the two main load lifters which the services depend upon at 
the present time.
  Equally important, General Sullivan noted, is that the C-17 will 
improve through-put capacity, or rapid off-load and turnaround on the 
ground, as the military put it; when you have a plane coming in, how 
fast can you land it, is there space on the airfield, how fast can you 
unload it, how fast will it return to the main base to continue to 
bring supplies, personnel, and other materials needed by the forward 
forces.
  Essentially, that means how fast can we deliver the equipment in an 
efficient, effective, rapid manner. The performance characteristics of 
the C-17 will permit eight C-17's to fit on an airfield where three C-
5Bs now fit.
  General Sullivan added, ``Had we had the C-17 during Desert Shield, 
we could have delivered the First Airborne Brigade in 54 hours with 
just 93 aircraft, an improvement of some 34 percent over the 82 hours 
it took to deliver the brigade with 158 C-141's and 3 C-5's.''
  At a hearing last Tuesday in the House Committee on Armed Services, 
Gen. Ronald Fogleman, commander of the Air Mobility Command, brought 
home what a difference the C-17's capabilities can mean. He told the 
committee that the C-17 would have permitted him to double the amount 
of equipment provided to our forces in Mogadishu in support of their 
humanitarian and military operations there.
  It is an incontrovertible fact that a military airlifter specifically 
designed to meet the needs of our forces in the field will be better 
able to accomplish that mission than will a commercial airliner 
converted for that purpose. Commercial wide-bodied planes were not 
meant to be a core airlifter for the military, and they are not capable 
of fulfilling that role.
  Keep this in mind: The C-17 is not just another wide-bodied airplane. 
It was specifically designed to meet our Nation's airlift needs well 
into the 21st century, and it has successfully demonstrated its ability 
to carry heavy outsized loads long distances and land on the kinds of 
short, unimproved runways that are most likely to be the destinations 
of our airlift fleet in the post-cold war world in which you and I 
live.
  The C-17 has set more than 20 world records in proving its ability to 
meet the military's unique airlift needs.
  The chart I have with me displays the extent to which the C-17's 
capabilities dramatically exceed those of all alternatives. The 
comparison is among the C-5, the C-141, the C-17, commercial wide-
bodied planes, commercial narrow-bodied planes, and the C-141 with 
service-life extension program. I will submit for the Record a full 
explanation of what the chart means. In shorthand, though, the green 
blocks indicate a full capability to meet the military's needs, the 
yellow ones a limited capability, and the red ones an inability to do 
so in general, combat and other military missions.
  As you can see, the C-17 is unmatched in its capabilities. Nearly all 
blocks are green--and in the case of combat and military missions they 
are, in fact, all green. The C-5B, C-141, and C-141 with a service life 
extension program have more limited capabilities for fulfilling all 
three missions. And commercial variants are shown to be severely 
lacking in most missions when a strong lift capability may mean the 
difference between victory and defeat for troops in the field.
  The chart shows that the C-17 has the needed combat capabilities for 
airdrop, low altitude parachute extraction, short airfields, unimproved 
airfields and survivability. It has the needed military capabilities 
for throughput, outsized and oversized cargo, drive on/off, air 
refueling, ground support requirements, and configuration flexibility. 
No other alternative can make that claim.
  Moreover, the C-17 has an external size similar to the C-141, but 
carries twice the cargo. It has a more efficient cross section than the 
C-5B, and lands at smaller airfields. In fact, it can land at C-130 
size airfields, but with four times the cargo.
  The C-5B, perhaps the most realistic alternative to the C-17, is, 
simply put, a less capable aircraft with a higher life-cycle cost. A 
mix of commercial widebodies and C-5B's would provide one-third less 
throughput, the requirement which matters most to military operators.
  It has been suggested that design specifications of the C-17 have 
been reduced, thereby making it less capable and desirable. In fact, 
the C-17's current payload and range specifications exceed operational 
requirements to perform its designed mission. As General Fogleman has 
said, ``From my perspective, we have not changed our operational 
requirements for this aircraft.''
  The C-17 recently completed successfully the entire profile of static 
testing to 150 percent of operational load and has achieved one 
lifetime, 30,000 hours, of durability testing. The last six aircraft 
have been delivered to the Air Force within the timeframe that we in 
Congress established as a must-deliver schedule. The overall quality of 
each airplane delivered is obviously improving. Over 3,000 flight test 
hours have been completed, and flight testing is over 80 percent 
complete.
  The six C-17's delivered to the 437th Airlift Wing at Charleston Air 
Force Base, SC, have completed over 100 initial squadron operations 
missions, flown over 700 initial squadron operations hours, and 
accomplished more than 2,800 landings.
  In other words, this is a tested, proven airplane. It is a program 
which has not been without its problems. What weapon system, what major 
complex endeavor--whether in private industry or government--has not 
had problems as it has evolved over a long time period?
  But these are problems which are now meeting the strictures placed 
upon it by both Congress and the Department of Defense. To truncate or 
terminate the program at this time, as the Furse amendment would, would 
be counter to the request not only of this President of the United 
States, but previous Presidents of the United States. It would be 
contrary to the impassioned pleas of military commanders, detrimental 
to the Nation's ability to respond in time of emergency, and 
potentially harmful to the young men and women in uniform who will need 
the reinforcements and need the equipment which the C-17 was 
specifically designed to deliver efficiently and effectively in order 
that they might do their job that a grateful nation expects them to do.
  A look at recent missions performed by our military--Grenada and 
Panama in Central America, Desert Shield in the Middle East, Somalia in 
East Africa, and Bosnia in Southeastern Europe, and various 
humanitarian efforts, puts clearly into focus the choice we will be 
facing next week.
  The C-17 has the capability to meet 100 percent of the airlift 
capabilities critical to mission success, including long-range 
capability, airdrop, combat offload of outsized cargo restricted 
runway, ground agility, parking efficiency, self-supporting, and 
survivability.
  A commercial wide-bodied substitute could--at best--have performed 
only one of those missions--Desert Shield--25 to 50 percent of the 
time. It has little, if any, capability to address the military's needs 
in the other contingencies listed.

                                                    C-17 AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT NEED MILITARY CAPABILITIES                                                    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Aircraft capabilities critical to mission success                            Aircraft suitability
                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  to perform critical 
                                                                                                                                          missions      
       Recent military          Long-                                                                                             ----------------------
        contingencies           range    Airdrop   Combat    Outsize  Restricted   Ground     Parking      Self     Survivability             Commercial
                              capacity             offload              runway     agility  efficiency  supporting                    C-17     freighter
                                                                                                                                   (percent)   (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grenada.....................    ........                          100     0.        
                                                                                                                                                    
Panama......................      ........            ..........           100     0 to 25.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Desert Shield...............    ........  ........    ..........       ..........  .............     100     25 to 50. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Humanitarian................  ........      ........       ..........     .............     100     0 to 25.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Somalia.....................    ........  ........                        100     0 to 25.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Bosnia......................  ........      ........                      100     0 to 25.  
                                                                                                                                                     
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. HUNTER. Will my friend yield?
  Mr. HORN. I am delighted to yield to my distinguished colleague from 
California, Mr. Hunter.
  Mr. HUNTER. I want to commend my colleague for his advocacy for the 
C-17. I think it is appropriate you are doing such a total and long-
range perspective on the C-17, because we are now, of course, 
commemorating the landing of Normandy in recent weeks.
  We were down at the Air and Space museum watching the 2-hour feature, 
which was extremely good. I think one of the messages that was sent to 
us when we watched that enormous military effort, power projection 
under the leadership of Dwight David Eisenhower striking the beaches at 
Normandy, coming up against the best that Hitler's panzer divisions 
could offer and ultimately spreading out and moving into a position to 
win the war in Europe, the key message that I got from that film, and I 
think from Normandy in general, was that getting there firstest with 
the mostest, getting into a strategic location with your equipment 
quickly, is and should be of utmost priority to military commanders.
  The C-17 gives us the ability to get places quickly, on remote 
airfields that could not accommodate aircraft in the past, with large 
payloads, and to be effective early. And that is what saves lives, that 
is what reduces the number of body bags that come back to the United 
States in conflicts around the world.
  Of all of the programs that we are looking at and analyzing in this 
defense bill, the C-17 is one of the most critical and one of the most 
important. I thank the gentleman for this very, very thorough 
presentation to our colleagues. I will be supporting you very strongly.
  Mr. HORN. I thank my colleague. You have been always a strong 
supporter of the defense capability which this Nation needs in order to 
back up the leadership the rest of the world expects us to provide, and 
we thank you.
  Noting that the C-17 has the capability to meet 100 percent of the 
aircraft capabilities on these various types of missions' success, the 
fact is in Desert Shield, a commercial wide-bodied substitute trying to 
substitute for the C-17 would have only performed one of those missions 
25 to 50 percent of the time. It simply is not a viable alternative to 
think about commercial alternatives at this point in time in the 
evolution of the airlift airplane project, regardless of who that 
manufacturer might be.
  The commercial alternative and a commercial wide-bodied substitute 
has little, if any, capability to address the military's needs in the 
typical contingencies that we now have facing us in various regions of 
the world, where small powers increasingly have nuclear capability; 
where two-bit dictators hold an arbitrary rule over their people; where 
democracy has not taken root.
  Occasionally we have vital national interests that have to be 
protected, and it is this airlift capacity which seems innocent enough 
in essence that it is largely behind the lines, but it is taking needed 
equipment to the lines. And as my colleague mentioned, whether you are 
recalling Normandy in the Second World War, or you are describing other 
wars, what ultimately triumphs is the ability to deliver the human 
resources and the equipment produced by the industrial might of this 
and allied nations, into the field, readily, to back-up the troops that 
need food, supplies, and reinforcement to accomplish the assigned 
mission.
  At Tuesday's Committee on Armed Services hearing, General Fogleman 
stressed the importance of both the ability to land on austere, shorter 
runways, and to get the needed equipment to the troops in the field as 
efficiently and effectively as possible.

                              {time}  1350

  He reported that the Air Force, working with the Defense Mapping 
Agency, has concluded that the C-17 can land on 576 runways in the Far 
East versus only 217 for the C-5. The C-17 can land on 852 runways in 
Europe versus 184 for the C-5. The C-17 can land on 794 runways in 
Africa versus 137 for the C-5. The C-17 can land on 852 runways in 
Latin America versus 66 for the C-5.
  This does not diminish the value of the C-5. The C-5 has done a noble 
job. It is an airplane that is three decades old. It is an airplane 
that is three decades old. New designs, new avionics, new types of 
engines are important, and they are what are in the C-17, an airplane 
that is operated by only three people: pilot, copilot-navigator, and 
the loadmaster, who works the computer system that delivers that load, 
whether it be at a fairly low altitude--even 10 feet off the ground--or 
after landing. Couple this with the C-17's ability to carry out-sized 
cargo and to off-load that cargo quickly and its advantage over the 
more limited commercial valiants, which would require a very cumbersome 
loading and unloading system for the more limited cargo that any of 
them could carry, and the need for the C-17 becomes even more obvious.
  Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch has described the C-17 as 
``the highest priority defense system,'' if the military is to meet 
successfully its obligations in future years. Among the C-17's 
capabilities, which are not available in any other airlift aircraft, 
are the ability to back up and make tight turns, thus reducing the 
amount of ramp parking space needed, without its jet exhaust 
interfering with other aircraft; cargo door, ramp airdrop, cargo 
restraint systems that can be operated by one person and permit rapid 
unloading without special equipment.
  The C-17 also has improved instrument displays that the two-person 
cockpit crew can easily read; built-in test equipment, modern avionics 
gear that are readily accessible to maintenance personnel.
  The C-17 is an essential, perhaps the essential component of the 
military's ability to project power capably and in a credible way. This 
is especially so in light of the steady increase in the weight growth 
of army combat units over the last decade. The three army division 
types usually eligible for air deployment have seen weight growth 
increases between 36 and 55 percent. These weight increases in weapons, 
equipment and needed space are due to the changes in the force 
structure and the larger and heavier weapon systems. They correlate 
very closely with the increases in the airlift missions.
  The trend for past and current weapons systems has been an emphasis 
on lethality-survivability, which generally involves increases in 
weight and size of the delivery of the weapons system and the use of 
that system.
  For example, the M-2 series Bradley fighting vehicle has replaced 
systems that could be loaded three or four strong on this C-141, which 
again performed valued service for this country over several decades. 
Transporting the Bradley by C-141 is possible but impractical because 
of the massive disassembly and reassembly time required, 6 hours on 
either end.
  The C-141 carries only one Bradley with the pallet of disassembled 
parts. By comparison, the C-17 can carry two Bradleys ready to drive 
on, drive off, and go right into battle.
  The C-141, designed in the 1950's, could deliver most of the Army's 
combat vehicles over the past three decades. However, there are many 
new vehicles in the inventory which dramatically affect the military's 
ability to deliver combat forces in a timely manner.
  One example relates to jeeps and their replacement, the HMMWV, 
otherwise known as the Humvee. The C-141 could carry 17 jeeps in a 
single load, but it can carry 5 five Humvees before it becomes cubed-
out because of the additional width of the Humvee.
  On the other hand, the C-17, with its wider cargo floor, is able to 
carry 2 Humvee's side by side for a total of 10, while the C-141 can 
only fit a single line of 5.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier].
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I asked the gentleman to yield simply to 
state that I want to congratulate him on the special order he has taken 
out here and on the diligent effort that he has put into the C-17 
effort. One of the most serious problems that we face, and the 
gentleman knows it very well, is airlift capability. And as we look at 
the extraordinary challenges that we are facing throughout the world 
today, we have gone through this debate in the past. I remember when we 
had the Boeing alternative that many people had thrown before us, which 
obviously is inadequate.
  It seems to me that the need to deal with airlift capability is 
pressing one that is before us. We have the answer. The answer is as my 
friend has pointed out so well, the C-17.

  I know that he has played a key role in this effort. I congratulate 
him on that. I simply want to say that I want to do anything I possibly 
can to help us meet that very important national security imperative 
which lies before us.
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, who has done a 
tremendous amount in his leadership of this delegation in support of 
the defense of this country.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I just want to cross all of David Dreier's 
t's and dot some i's and thank you for the good work you have done.
  I went into your district and flew the simulator for this great 
aircraft, saw how aggressively and pro-actively they were trying to 
overcome the few growing pains that are generally in every system. The 
F-100 that I flew on active duty compared to the limited number of 
problems today and our accidents, we had no accidents with this one. It 
is ahead of schedule at Edwards. The F-100's were dropping 
out of the sky. It did not deter me, when I was a 22-year-old pilot who 
wanted to fly the world's fastest fighter.
  We are not going to fly anything anywhere unless we have this system 
to fly the engines around and to carry individually one big massive 30-
ton M-1 Abrams tank.
  I want everybody to know so we do not get into all of this phony, 
actually bordering on lying, propaganda that the B-1 was hit with and 
is still hit with, this aircraft is flying. We have delivered now how 
many to Charleston Air Force Base? Three?
  Mr. HORN. Much more than that are being tested there. A good part of 
the squadron in Missouri is already assembled.
  Mr. DORNAN. And when we say tested up at Edwards Base, this means 
tested with loads, with load masters working them, carrying things and 
going around and across the seas with loads, working out with two other 
great Douglas aircraft, the C-124, and the C-133 that were the largest 
of their generation.
  I just hope that people realize this is the state of the art and then 
some. It has a stick, two sticks like a fighter plane, side by side 
fighter. And this is the answer. Thank God you prevailed and General 
Fogelman, first to ever fly me in an Air Force fighter as a freshman 
Congressman back in January 1978, when he was a young major in 
Pittsburgh; four-star General Ron Fogleman presentation before the 
Armed Services Committee the other day, Deputy Secretary Deutch, it was 
compelling testimony. And they took away all the fears that some 
Members legitimately had. I would like a laminated tiny card of your 
charts for my wallet. All kidding aside, it is excellent.
  Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.
  You, as a very distinguished fighter pilot, know that Gen. Merrill A. 
McPeak, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is also a fighter 
pilot by background. And I saw him after he had just flown the C-17.
  I said, smiling ``I was a little worried that a fighter pilot could 
fly a big plane like that.'' He replied that he had never seen an 
airplane that handled as beautifully and effectively as the C-17, which 
is a great advance over the era you and many others flew in, whether it 
be Vietnam, Korea, or the Second World War.
  The C-17 can carry five armored personnel carriers used by the Army 
versus only two for the C-141. This is because the C-141 is restricted 
to an allowable cabin load of 55,000 pounds. The five carried by the C-
17 weigh almost 100,000 pounds combined.
  The Army has cited a wide range of other weapons systems which are 
critical in the early days of a conflict which the C-17's enhanced 
capabilities will permit to be delivered more quickly and in greater 
numbers. These include the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the Patriot 
Missile System, AH-64 and UH-60 helicopters, the Armored Gun System, 
the Command and Control Vehicle, the Advanced Field Artillery System, 
the Forward Area Resupply Vehicle, the Line-of-Sight Antitank System, 
and the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle, quite a range. But the importance 
of these facts and the reason commercial derivatives cannot do this job 
is because of the special design that has been made in the interior and 
exterior of the C-17 to permit the hauling, in a sensible, efficient 
way, of these various combinations of military equipment that are 
needed abroad.

  The bottom line is that the Army of the future will rely increasingly 
on the availability of airlift capable of delivering outsized cargo. 
And it will need to deploy from the United States to places all over 
the globe on short notice to defend American interests.
  It is imperative that we provide the courageous young men and women 
putting their lives on the line for their nation and for the cause of 
freedom the capability they need to defend themselves and to succeed in 
their mission with minimum loss of life and in the shortest possible 
time. We must not shortchange them or deny their commanders the C-17's 
airlift capability.
  Mr. DORNAN. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HORN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DORNAN. I am sorry to interrupt. I was looking for a break in the 
thought processes there. This is something the gentleman will want for 
his special order.
  Your staff called. No. 7, and this is not, and this shocked me. Here 
I said three, maybe I was off by one. Seven is already at the 
Charleston Air Force Base working out all the load lifting problems, 
and No. 6 has joined the test program up at Edwards. This program moves 
fast apace.
  Mr. HORN. Right. I thank my colleague for that vital fact.
  Only one airlift aircraft, the C-17, was specifically designed to 
meet the present and future military requirements as projected by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Only one airlift aircraft, the C-17, has been 
recommended by the military--the Joint Chiefs and the commanders in the 
field--and the senior civilian leaders of our country under a previous 
Republican administration and now under a Democratic administration 
including the current and former Presidents of the United States, as 
the system we need for today and well into the 21st century. As former 
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has said of the C-17, ``It is an 
absolutely vital strategic asset regardless of what size force we have 
in the long term.''
  The C-5 and C-141 were designed decades ago to meet the needs of a 
military and a world very different from the one we have today. And 
civilian widebodied planes were designed to carry passengers between 
major metropolitan areas. These planes are fine in fulfilling the 
purposes for which they were designed, but the military leadership 
uniformly tells us they are not the answer when the lives of Americans 
are on the line.
  As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has emphasized, there is 
only one plane that has the capabilities needed in a core airlifter. 
That plane is the C-17.
  I have cited the Chief of Staff of the Army, and other generals as 
strong supporters of the C-17, but let us also hear from those who have 
flown the C-17 and worked with it. They, too, are its strongest 
proponents.
  Said Capt. Mark Holland, a C-17 pilot at the Charleston Air Force 
Base in South Carolina: the C-17, ``incorporates everything we know 
about airlift into one plane.'' Capt. Ron Nadreau, a former C-5 pilot 
and current C-17 test pilot, has concluded: ``It's like going from Fred 
Flintstone to George Jetson.'' Lt. Col. Ron Ladnier, commander of the 
17th Airlift Squadron, 437th Airlift Wing, observed: ``If you asked me 
to do something important--like haul tanks into Mogadishu--and told me 
to pick the airplane I want, I'd have to choose the C-17.''
  Among loadmasters, those crucial technical personnel in the back of 
the plane who have the say over how this load is to be distributed and 
how it is to be unloaded, there are especially glowing comments.
  Chief M. Sgt. Glen Morgan commented: ``The C-17 has taken us from 
Neanderthal to state-of-the-art. Because it can land on such short 
airfields and carry such outsized cargo as the M-1 tank, we can go 
right into a trouble spot and begin the mission immediately without 
having to disassemble and reassemble equipment.'' M. Sgt. Cecil Whaley 
concluded: ``It's very user-friendly. A single loadmaster can 
reconfigure the C-17 in flight, whereas with other airlifters, it took 
a minimum of two people.'' M. Sgt. Bill Ellis reported: ``They have 
incorporated everything that is good from the C-130, the C-141 and the 
C-5 on this plane.'' Finally, M. Sgt. Tom Clemons, who has 
responsibility for maintaining the C-17, stressed: ``The aircraft was 
built for ease of maintenance. We may end up being like the Maytag 
repair man.''
  In other words, there is less need for maintenance. That means a 
saving of the money. So does the size of the crew of three.
  As I stated earlier, this is a program which has not been without its 
problems, but it is a program that both Republican and Democratic 
administrations have listed as a top priority in terms of our national 
security. It is a program which has received careful scrutiny by the 
Department of Defense under the leadership of Deputy Secretary of 
Defense John Deutch.
  Deputy Secretary Deutch is now overseeing a 2-year probationary 
period for the C-17 in which the Air Force will be limited through 1995 
to buying 40 of its planned 120 C-17's. In November 1995, the Pentagon 
will make a decision whether to proceed with further purchases of the 
C-17 or to shift to commercial aircraft derivatives or revived 
production of the C-5 cargo plane. The bill reported out of the 
Committee on Armed Services in effect negates the Air Force's plan, 
committing funds for commercial widebodies planes well in advance of 
the completion of the Pentagon's review in November 1995 and moving in 
a direction which Secretary Deutch has stated in congressional 
testimony does not provide the best airlift mix to meet the military's 
needs.
  The operational effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the C-17 have 
been emphasized by both Secretary of Defense William Perry and 
Secretary Deutch. Secretary Perry, in a May 5 letter to Speaker Foley, 
said, ``The C-17 aircraft continues to be the most cost-effective means 
to meet current and projected airlift requirements. The C-17's ability 
to deliver outsize cargo, combined with its special capability to use 
austere fields, will provide us with modern, highly capable strategic 
airlift.'' And Deputy Secretary Deutch, in recent testimony, stated, 
``In general, the results--of the Defense Department's Cost and 
Operational Effectiveness Analysis--showed that a fleet of C-17's 
operating to our best expectations was more cost effective than any 
combination of C-17's, CWB's (commercial widebodies), C-5B's or C-141's 
with service life extension program.''
  Let us not second guess our military leadership and our commanders in 
the field. Let us provide our men and women in uniform the capability 
they need to do the job we expect them to do. I urge my colleagues to 
vote against the Furse amendment, which would eliminate this program, 
cripple the forces of this country in all parts of the world. I urge my 
colleagues to vote against any proposal that will reduce our military's 
ability to respond in a time of crisis and to support the bipartisan 
amendment which will bring the defense authorization for the C-17 back 
to that of the President and the military's request for six.

                              {time}  1410

  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record various documents pertaining to 
my special order as follows:
  First, a spectrum of aircraft capabilities;
  Second, a letter from Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to 
Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley, dated May 5, 1994;
  Third, a letter from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John M. 
Shalikashvili; to House chairman of Armed Services Ronald V. Dellums, 
dated May 17, 1994;
  Fourth, a letter from Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan to 
Senator Strom Thurmond of the Senate Armed Services Committee, dated 
May 19, 1994, and
  Fifth, a letter from commander in chief, U.S. Central Command General 
J.P. Hoar, to House Armed Services Chairman Ronald V. Dellums, dated 
May 17, 1994.

                                        SPECTRUM OF AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES                                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Red                       Yellow                     Green          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERAL AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES                                                                                   
                                                                                                                
Throughput (MTM/D): Throughput  Throughput capability in    Throughput capability in   Throughput in top third. 
 of cargo to a theater of        bottom third.               middle third.                                      
 operations; numbers of                                                                                         
 airlift aircraft at en route                                                                                   
 or destination airfields are                                                                                   
 not limited by any parking or                                                                                  
 ground support limitations.                                                                                    
 Relative scale.                                                                                                
Cargo Volume and Payload:       Volume/payload in bottom    Volume/payload in middle   Volume/payload in top    
 Cargo carrying capability;      third Range <2000 nm.       third Range 2000-6000 nm.  third Range >6000 nm.   
 relative scale. Range:                                                                                         
 Aircraft range with normal                                                                                     
 planning factor payload,                                                                                       
 without air refueling.                                                                                         
Logistics Reliability:          Less than 70% of force      70%-90% of force           Greater than 90% of force
 Reliability due to logistics    available for missions.     available for missions.    available for missions. 
 factors, including                                                                                             
 maintenance, spares. Includes                                                                                  
 level of depot maintenance                                                                                     
 required, mission capable                                                                                      
 rates, and departure                                                                                           
 reliability due to logistics.                                                                                  
Acquisition Cost: Total         >$400M....................  $100M-$400M..............  <$100M.                  
 program acquisition unit                                                                                       
 cost; includes total cost to                                                                                   
 field weapon system except                                                                                     
 for O&S costs. (CY3$; per                                                                                      
 aircraft).                                                                                                     
O&S Cost: Cost on a yearly      >$60M.....................  $30M-$60M................  <$30M.                   
 basis to operate the weapon                                                                                    
 system. Includes manpower                                                                                      
 (aircrew, maintenance, and                                                                                     
 base operating support),                                                                                       
 contractor logistics support,                                                                                  
 flying hours, training. Cost                                                                                   
 per PAA per year, CY93$.                                                                                       
 Divided by MTMD per PAA to                                                                                     
 express both O&S cost and                                                                                      
 gain from that O&S cost.                                                                                       
Longevity: Measure of how       Within 10,000 hours.......  10,000-20,000 hours......  >20,000 hours.           
 close the aircraft is to the                                                                                   
 end of its design service                                                                                      
 life; potential for further                                                                                    
 service.                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                
      COMBAT CAPABILITIES                                                                                       
                                                                                                                
Airdrop: Efficiency and         Cannot airdrop............  Can airdrop; inefficient;  Can perform full spectrum
 effectiveness in the mission                                cannot perform all         of airdrop missions.    
 of airdropping troops and                                   missions.                                          
 equipment.                                                                                                     
Low Altitude Parachute          Cannot extract............  N/A......................  Can perform full spectrum
 Extraction: Efficiency and                                                             of extraction missions. 
 effectiveness in the mission                                                                                   
 of extracting equipment.                                                                                       
Short Airfields (<3000'):       Cannot operate on short     N/A......................  Can operate on short     
 Capability of the aircraft to   airfields.                                             airfields.              
 operate into and out of                                                                                        
 airfields less than 3000 ft                                                                                    
 long on a routine operational                                                                                  
 basis.                                                                                                         
Unimproved Airfields:           Cannot operate on           N/A......................  Can operate on unimproved
 Capability of the aircraft to   unimproved fields.                                     fields.                 
 operate into and out of                                                                                        
 unimproved airfields on a                                                                                      
 routine operational basis.                                                                                     
Survivability: Capability of    No design for               Some design for            Design optimized for     
 the aircraft to survive in a    survivability.              survivability.             survivability.          
 wartime threat environment.                                                                                    
 Aircraft design incorporates                                                                                   
 survivability features.                                                                                        
                                                                                                                
 MILITARY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES                                                                                  
                                                                                                                
Throughput (constrained):       Throughput is in bottom     Throughput is in middle    Throughput is in top     
 Throughput of cargo to a        third; addition of more     third; addition of more    third; addition of more 
 theater of operations; the      of same type does not       of same type slightly      of same type greatly    
 numbers of airlift aircraft     increase throughput.        increases throughput.      increases throughput.   
 at en route and destination                                                                                    
 airfields are limited by                                                                                       
 small and/or crowded parking                                                                                   
 ramps and ground support.                                                                                      
 Relative scale.                                                                                                
Outsize cargo: Capability of    No capability.............  N/A......................  Capable of carrying      
 the aircraft to carry outsize                                                          oversize cargo.         
 cargo (cargo that is too wide                                                                                  
 for any aircraft except the C-                                                                                 
 5 and C-17).                                                                                                   
Oversize cargo: Capability of   <20% of oversize cargo....  20% to 80% of oversize     >80% of oversize cargo.  
 the aircraft to carry                                       cargo.                                             
 categories of oversize cargo                                                                                   
 (cargo that is too wide or                                                                                     
 long for the standard                                                                                          
 military 436L pallet).                                                                                         
Drive on/off: Capability to     Cannot drive on/off.......  N/A......................  Can drive on/off.        
 drive vehicles on and off the                                                                                  
 aircraft from the ground.                                                                                      
Air refueling: Aircraft's       Cannot air refuel.........  N/A......................  Can air refuel.          
 capability to air refuel (as                                                                                   
 receiver).                                                                                                     
Ground support requirements:    Always requires extensive   Requires less extensive    Routinely operates with  
 Need for materiel handling      support/equipment.          support equipment.         no or minimum support   
 equipment and extensive                                                                equipment.              
 logistical support.                                                                                            
Configuration flexibility:      Cannot reconfigure          Can reconfigure with       Can reconfigure with no  
 Capability to rapidly (on the   aircraft.                   delays to mission.         delays to mission.      
 ground or in flight)                                                                                           
 reconfigure the aircraft for                                                                                   
 different types of cargo and                                                                                   
 passenger loads.                                                                                               
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                      Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
     Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
     Speaker of the House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: On March 31, 1994 the Department of 
     Defense provided the Committee on Armed Services draft 
     legislation to authorize the Department of Defense to 
     implement the January 1994 agreement between the Department 
     and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation to settle C-17 issues.
       Our nation has a critical need for intertheater airlift 
     modernization if we are to maintain our ability to project 
     forces and respond to humanitarian missions worldwide. Our C-
     141 aircraft are wearing out. The C-17 aircraft continues to 
     be the most cost-effective means to meet current and 
     projected airlift requirements. The C-17's ability to deliver 
     outsize cargo, combined with its special capability to use 
     austere fields, will provide us with modern, highly capable 
     strategic airlift.
       Last May the Department directed the Defense Science Board 
     to organize a Task Force to conduct an extensive review of 
     the C-17 program. The objectives were to assess the current 
     status and the contractor's capability to successfully 
     complete development and transition into production, and to 
     identify the changes necessary to ensure a successful 
     program.
       The Defense Science Board Task Force conducted a thorough 
     examination of the C-17 program over a two month period. At 
     the conclusion of its review, the Task Force reported that 
     the C-17 is fundamentally a good aircraft, that the 
     contractor can successfully build the aircraft if management 
     and efficiency improvements are implemented, and that 
     gridlock on contractual and business issues was seriously 
     hindering program performance. The Task Force recommended a 
     number of changes to instill greater discipline and better 
     management into the program, and a comprehensive settlement 
     to change the program environment.
       Based on these findings and recommendations, and further 
     intensive review by the Defense Acquisition Board over a 
     period of several months, the Department proposed a 
     comprehensive settlement of business and management issues to 
     the contractor on January 3, 1994, which the contractor has 
     accepted. In my view, this resolution of issues is essential 
     to ensuring that the C-17 will meet the nation's strategic 
     airlift military requirement. One key aspect of the agreement 
     is the establishment of a probationary period during which 
     the contractor will either demonstrate improved performance 
     or the Department will consider other alternatives. Enactment 
     of this proposal is of great importance to the Department, 
     and I strongly urge its favorable consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William J. Perry.
                                  ____

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                     Washington, DC, May 17, 1994.
     Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
     Chairman, Committee of Armed Services, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As I look into the future, it is clear 
     that America's combatant commanders will become increasingly 
     dependent upon strategic mobility. This mobility will 
     continue to be based on an integrated triad of air, sea and 
     surface capabilities. Despite the fact that two of these 
     transportation modes are in relatively good condition with 
     bright prospects for the future, I am deeply concerned that 
     recent congressional actions may seriously degrade our 
     airlift capability and ultimately threaten the viability of 
     the entire strategic mobility system.
       America must have a core airlifter to replace the aging C-
     141. The continuing myths of a service life extension program 
     for the C-141 or the ability of a commercial derivative to 
     meet the needs of a core airlifter are just that--myths. 
     Neither aircraft can carry the equipment to forward areas 
     that the Army needs to win on tomorrow's battlefields. There 
     may be a future role for a commercial derivative to 
     supplement a core airlifter, but a CONUS-based force that 
     lacks a core airlifter is a hollow force.
       Today there is only one alternative that can meet the 
     requirements of a core airlifter--the C-17. We have all been 
     frustrated with the repeated setbacks in the program, but we 
     mut not let this frustration obscure the facts. We now have 
     an agreement in hand that allows us to test the capabilities 
     of the airplane to meet warfighting requirements of America's 
     combatant commanders and the capability of the program to 
     meet efficiency and quality standards America's taxpayers 
     deserve.
       I ask for your support of the President's Budget Request 
     for six C-17s in FY95, and for the reliability, 
     maintainability, and availability and operational testing 
     programs. Without the former, the program will not have the 
     opportunity to demonstrate its significant improvements and 
     production efficiencies. Without the latter, the C-17 will 
     not be challenged to demonstrate its capabilities in the most 
     rigorous testing program ever devised for an airlifter. 
     Without your support, the program will guaranteed to fail. We 
     must not let this happen on our watch.
       With best wishes,
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili.
                                  ____



                                U.S. Army, The Chief of Staff,

                                                   Washington, DC.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
       Dear Senator Thurmond: By 1997, 80% of America's Army will 
     be stationed in the continental United States as we complete 
     our transformation to a power projection Army. Our capability 
     to lift the Army's heavy equipment by air and sea must keep 
     pace with our changing requirements. This nation must have 
     the strategic life capabilities to project power rapidly to 
     any potential trouble spot in the world. We must get our 
     forces to the fight.
       Early arriving lethal combat power is the key to our joint 
     warfighting capability. The Congressionally mandated Mobility 
     Requirements Study generated the need for delivery of 
     ``outsized cargo'' prior to the arrival of the fastest 
     sealift. For the Army, this means armor, rocket systems, 
     helicopters, and attack missiles. These weapon systems won't 
     fit on any commercial aircraft--nor will they fit on most 
     military airlifters in service today. Future air-deployable 
     Army combat units will rely increasingly on the availability 
     of airlift to carry this type of cargo.
       The C-7 will provide the Air Force the capability to 
     deliver critical Army ``outsized loads'' while allowing 
     access to 9,000 more runways (an increase of 300%) worldwide 
     than the C-141 and C-5. The C-7 can land on the same runways 
     as the C-130 and deliver four times the cargo weight. Equally 
     important, the C-17 will improve throughput capacity, or 
     rapid off-load and turn-around on the ground, by increasing 
     the ``maximum on the ground'' or MOG capacity. The 
     performance characteristics of the C-17 will permit 8 C-17's 
     to fit where 3 C-5's fit. Had we had the C-17 during Desert 
     Shield, we could have delivered the first airborne brigade in 
     54 hours with just 93 aircraft--and improvement of some 34% 
     over the 82 hours it took to deliver that brigade with 158 C-
     141's and 2 C-5's.
       Finally, I am concerned about our joint capabilities for 
     forced entry operations. In the Gulf War, we enjoyed the 
     luxury of time and deployment to a country with secure and 
     modern air and seaports. This may not always be the case. 
     While the aging C-141 fleet helps the Army fulfill this 
     requirement today, we will need the C-17 to provide the 
     strategic airlift for troops and equipment to provide our 
     forced entry capability and simulatenous application of joint 
     combat power across the depth of the battlefield in the 21st 
     century.
       I fully appreciate the concern over the troubled history of 
     the C-17 acquisition program. However, I urge you to stay the 
     course outlined by the Secretary of Defense earlier this 
     year. The C-17 is the only aircraft that can get the Army's 
     outsized combat systems to the next war when required. I 
     respectfully solicit your support to maintain the President's 
     request for the FY 1995 funding for the C-17.
           Respectfully,
                                               Gordon R. Sullivan,
                                               General, U.S. Army.
                                  ____

                                             U.S. Central Command,


                             Office of the Commander in Chief,

                         MacDill Air Force Base, FL, May 17, 1994.
     Hon. Ronald v. Dellums,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Mr. Chairman, As you know I am concerned and have been 
     critical of the current state of America's airlift forces. 
     However, I am even more concerned about our future ability to 
     project US forces by air.
       As our forces are returning from overseas and increasingly 
     based in the CONUS, I become the CINC faced with the most 
     strenuous requirement for mobility in the world. In the 
     CENTCOM theater, because of the long deployment distances, we 
     are particularly sensitive to, and dependent on, our ability 
     to ensure the timely deployment of the early arriving lethal 
     firepower--key to limiting the escalation of a conflict. This 
     means armor, helicopters, rocket systems, and air defense 
     missiles, most of which do not fit on any commercial 
     aircraft. Only the C-17 and C-5 can deliver this requirement.
       In addition, during the Gulf War, we were able to deploy in 
     a country with secure air and sea ports. In this scenario, I 
     have said we could be well served by the effectiveness of 
     large commercial type aircraft moving large amounts of bulk 
     cargo, particularly during the sustainment phase of an 
     operation. However, I do not feel this will be the case in 
     the early surge phase of future operations.
       We must ensure that all CINCs have the flexibility to 
     conduct deployment operations given any set of theater 
     constraints. In the foreseeable future only the C-17, acting 
     as the Nation's core military airlifter, can provide us this 
     flexibility.
       Mr. Chairman, CENTCOM is dependent on the country's 
     mobility system. We need the C-17. I urge you to support the 
     modernization of the nation's strategic airlift as proposed 
     by the Secretary of Defense and requested by the President in 
     his FY 1995 budget.

                                                    J.P. Hoar,

                                                          General,
                                                U.S. Marine Corps.

     

                          ____________________