[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 63 (Thursday, May 19, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 19, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, President Clinton has commenced a 
consultation process with the congressional leadership in regard to 
continuing China's current trade status. Various Members are working 
with the White House staff in an effort to develop a compromise that 
might include limited sanctions while permitting a considerable amount 
of trade to continue if China fails to meet the administration's human 
rights objectives.
  Several Members of the Senate have spoken to this issue.
  My interest is not in debating the merits or demerits of targeted 
revocation of MFN status. Rather, I want to suggest that this debate is 
perhaps too narrow and misses the mark. The trade and human rights 
components of our China policy have been joined by a strategic 
component that belies the utility of any linkages in our policy. We 
must face the growing nuclear proliferation threat in the region as 
exemplified by the North Korean nuclear program and the need to need to 
bolster our diplomatic and negotiating position while simultaneously 
considering the imposition of sanctions on North Korea. Both will 
require the full support of and full implementation by countries in the 
region, most specifically China.
  The practice of tying our human rights objectives in China to the 
continuation of MFN status for China, even if in a more limited and 
targeted way, makes less likely Chinese willingness to avoid a Security 
Council veto on any sanctions resolution or, even should China abstain 
in such vote, full participation in carrying out any such sanctions. A 
limited, targeted United States approach in conditioning the renewal of 
China's MFN status is likely to beget limited Chinese pressure on North 
Korea to be more forthcoming in the negotiations as well as conditional 
Chinese participation, if any, in any sanctions program initiated 
against North Korea.
  This is not to suggest that we should lessen an energetic pursuit of 
our human rights objectives in China, even as we pursue the increasing 
trade and business opportunities offered by the fastest growing economy 
in Asia. But I do suggest that the linkage or conditional approach, 
even if practiced in a more nuanced and targeted way, denies the United 
States the ability to set policy priorities in the region. To our 
policy objectives of the promotion of human rights in China and 
increased economic interchange with the rapidly growing economies in 
the region must now be added the policy objective of nonproliferation 
or counterprolifera-tion, an objective identified by the 
administration as one of its top priorities.
  We need to adopt a strategic policy approach to China, one that is 
significantly influenced although not exclusively dominated by the 
nuclear proliferation dilemma posed by North Korea. At least some 
elements of the North Korean leadership understand that the worsening 
domestic economic situation and the accelerating gap between North and 
South increasingly will threaten the country's political and economic 
survival. The United States must use the leverage provided by the 
desperate straits in North Korea to help persuade that country to 
abandon its nuclear program. Any serious attempt to design a package of 
sanctions must center on cutting off North Korean imports of oil.
  However, if the prospect of an oil cutoff is to be credible, Chinese 
cooperation is indispensable. China accounts for about two-thirds of 
North Korea's current oil imports, most of which are delivered via 
pipeline. Should it so decide, China could easily provide all of North 
Korea's current oil needs, even if a naval blockade cut off tankers 
delivering oil from other suppliers. At a minimum, China needs to be 
convinced not to replace oil imports from other suppliers that might be 
cut off.

  With China's support, manipulation of oil imports could provide to be 
an important source of leverage. Without that cooperation, economic 
measures are certain to be ineffective and to leave more forceful 
actions as the only alternative.
  While China may not need to be convinced that a more mature North 
Korean nuclear capability is not necessarily in its interest, it will 
have to be persuaded that the North Korean nuclear problem requires 
urgent action and that the United States has in mind a strategy that 
can succeed with their active involvement but it will fail without 
Chinese involvement, leaving only worse and starker alternatives.
  But if United States-China cooperation on the North Korean issue is 
to be realized, that cooperation must take a strategic dimension, 
grounded in serious dialog about mutual security interests and concerns 
that would benefit the United States-Chinese relationship more 
generally. Only if the North Korean issue is placed in a strategic 
framework, rather than submerged in the current agenda of MFN and human 
rights, can one realistically expect to convince the Chinese that the 
North Korean nuclear problem is not only serious but requires urgent 
action.
  The issue is not one of ignoring our bilateral differences with China 
over human rights or conditioning MFN status because of those 
differences, but rather to find common ground on an issue of mutual 
importance that transcends the bilateral issues. If this goal can be 
achieved, it would hold the promise of a constructive multilateral or 
regional approach to North Korea's march toward nuclear weapons, of 
putting our key bilateral relationship with China on a new and stronger 
footing, and of providing a more constructive framework for tackling 
the bilateral problems of trade and human rights.
  As Senator Nunn and I wrote in February following our trip to South 
Korea and Japan:

       We believe that avoiding another war on the Korean 
     peninsula and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons are 
     our paramount interests in Northeast Asia today. We cannot 
     expect a China that is the object of United States economic 
     sanctions (targeted or not) to participate in sanctions 
     against North Korea.

  As this body continues its deliberations on China's trade status, I 
would suggest that Members place the current debate over targeted 
sanctions in the larger strategic context that must be shaped by the 
nuclear proliferation dangers in that part of the world and the need 
for the United States to address those challenges in concert with real 
and would-be friends in the region. We must engage China fully in 
helping to prevent nuclear proliferation and preserve stability on the 
Korean peninsula. The Negotiations with North Korea cannot be 
fruitfully concluded, nor can any economic sanctions be effectively 
implemented, without China's cooperation. The United States must 
communicate to China that this is the highest priority in our 
relationship.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry] 
is recognized under the order previously entered for not to exceed 15 
minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe that I was, under the order, to 
be recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes. I ask unanimous consent 
that that be the order.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, that will be the order, 
and the Senator will be recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the President pro tempore.
  Mr. President, the clock is ticking on the question of MFN for China. 
I congratulate the Senator from Indiana for his statement this morning 
and also the Senators from New Jersey and Montana for the statements 
they made yesterday with respect to this issue.
  We all know that, by June 3, the President of the United States has 
to decide whether China has made sufficient progress in the area of 
human rights to meet the conditions of his Executive order for the 
renewal of most-favored-nation trade status [MFN].
  This is going to be a difficult decision, not the least because 
reasonable people will differ over the degree to which China has 
fulfilled the human rights conditions set out in that order. It is 
also, as my colleagues have already suggested, a critically important 
decision with far-reaching consequences for our overall relationship 
with China, our relationships with other nations in the Asian region, 
our role in Asia, and our domestic economy, though clearly the latter 
ought not to be put before other considerations.
  Our present policy of conditioning MFN on improvements in human 
rights in China is rooted in the tragic events that took place 5 years 
ago in Tiananmen Square. It is not rooted in a 1994 assessment of the 
overall relationship or the interests that we have today in China. It 
is a policy that grew out of the grotesque, shocking confrontation that 
took place in June 1989 in Tiananmen Square, when students and other 
peaceful pro-democracy protesters were cut down by armed Chinese 
soldiers and run over by Chinese tanks. Those who were not killed were 
detained. Many of them subsequently were executed.
  That, Mr. President, was an event that so outraged us that, in 
response, we in Congress sought to use all the means at our disposal, 
including the renewal of MFN, to put pressure on Chinese leaders to 
release those who were detained and to end the ongoing repression. At 
that time, before the cold war had ended and the Soviet Union had 
collapsed, we turned to an old and familiar tool from the cold war, the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment, which conditions the extension of MFN to 
Communist countries on freedom of emigration.
  China had been receiving MFN routinely every year since 1979, when 
the Carter administration extended it as part of the normalization of 
United States-China relations. There was little opposition in Congress 
to the extension of MFN on human rights or any other grounds from 1979 
to 1989. But the brutal attack in June 1989 on those seeking basic 
rights and freedoms in China changed all that. In the wake of Tiananmen 
Square, we sought to use the presumed leverage embodied in the 
extension of MFN to put pressure on China's leaders to release 
prodemocracy activists and fulfill other human rights conditions.
  Linking trade and human rights was an instinctive American response 
to Chinese repression in 1989. It signaled our disapproval of China's 
behavior and our willingness to forgo whatever benefits we might derive 
from trade with China for higher, moral considerations.
  I supported the policy of linking human rights to MFN at that time. 
To this day, I am convinced that that was the appropriate response at 
that moment and that we were correct in making the linkage.
  Whether it ever achieved its full effectiveness remains a question 
because every time Congress threatened to revoke MFN, the Bush 
administration relied on party pressure and the veto to undermine that 
effort. At best, China's leaders received a blurred message. At worse, 
they knew that George Bush would bail them out.
  Then we came to 1993. Unlike his predecessor who rejected the idea of 
linkage from the start, President Clinton formally embraced it. In his 
Executive order issued last May, the President set forth seven human 
rights conditions that must be met in order for China to obtain MFN 
again this year. I point out to my colleagues that only two of those 
criteria--freedom of emigration and refraining from exporting prison 
labor products to the United States as required by the 1992 United 
States-China agreement on prison labor--are mandatory, and China 
basically has met them.
  In addition, the Executive order requires China to make ``overall, 
significant progress'' in five other areas: Adhering to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, releasing and providing an acceptable 
accounting for political prisoners, allowing international humanitarian 
and human rights groups access to prisoners, protecting Tibet's 
religious and cultural heritage, and permitting international radio and 
television broadcasts into China.
  It is easy to understand why the President of the United States 
elected to proceed on this course. It reflected our deepest values and 
our concern for those who are denied basic rights and freedoms. It 
enjoyed strong support among the American public and here in Congress. 
It reversed the Bush administration's policy toward China, which many 
regarded as too soft, as appeasement. However, I suggest that in 1994 
this may no longer be the appropriate policy for achieving our 
objectives in China, beginning with human rights.
  Ever since Secretary Christopher's hostile reception in Beijing in 
March, China has sent us mixed signals about its intention to comply 
with the Executive order. On the positive side, China, as I have said, 
seems to have met the two mandatory conditions relating to emigration 
and prison labor.
  It has also moved, although not as far as we would like, on the five 
remaining conditions on which we seek ``overall, significant 
progress.'' China has issued a high level statement on its adherence to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but we know that it has a 
considerable distance to go to translate the words into practice. It is 
now in the process of negotiating an agreement with the ICRC to provide 
that organization with access to prisoners. Although Chinese officials 
still refuse to meet personally with the Dalai Lama, they have met with 
his representatives on several occasions. They have also taken 
technical data provided by the United States on the jamming of VOA 
broadcasts and expressed a willingness to review this issue.
  Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming, two of the most well-known prodemocracy 
activists arrested in Tiananmen Square, have been released. At the same 
time, however, Wei Jinsheng, the most prominent democracy activist who 
was released and then taken again into custody at the time of the 
Christopher trip, is still being held. Beijing has yet to release 
others on the list of 200 plus prisoners held since the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown.
  Moreover, last week the central government amended its public order 
law to broaden further the power of the police to detain and restrict 
the activities of labor and prodemocracy activists, those practicing 
unsanctioned religions, and national minorities such as the Tibetans. 
This is a particularly disturbing development.
  Questions will be asked in the next days. Have China's leaders gone 
as far as they intend to go? Are they waiting, as in past years, until 
the eleventh hour to take a few last-minute steps, or are they serious 
about moving further down the road? The next 2 weeks will provide the 
answers. I, personally, believe that China can go further. There is not 
any question about that. Nor is there any question about our desire to 
have them go further. And I urge China to do so in these final days.
  But the question before us is much larger than simple compliance with 
the Executive order. The question before us is how best to promote all 
of our interests in China. I respectfully submit to my colleagues that 
if we get bogged down in a debate that focuses exclusively on whether 
or not China has met the Executive order, we will be overlooking the 
totality of United States interests in China and avoiding our own 
responsibility in the United States Senate to protect those interests.
  I believe the President of the United States must recognize that the 
policy of linkage, although rooted in the best of intentions, is 
outdated and ill-suited to the promotion of the totality of our 
interests in China. It is, as I said, principally a policy shaped by 
the image of tanks and protesters in Tiananmen Square. It is geared to 
the events of 1989, not the China of 1994. It ignores the sum of our 
interests and the realities of 1994. It ignores China's power and 
potential, China's role as a regional and international actor, and our 
need to have a viable relationship with China in the post-cold-war 
period, not a cold-war relationship.
  With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, 
China has become one of the most important foreign policy challenges 
for the United States. This challenge cannot be met by a policy of 
linkage, which excludes the many other critical interests that we and 
our allies share in China.

  China accounts for 20 percent of the world's population. Its economy 
is the fastest growing in the world, at an annual rate of 13 percent in 
the last 2 years alone. According to the CIA, China has registered an 
average real growth rate of nearly 9 percent a year since the early 
1980's. Last year, China signed contracts worth more than $100 billion 
with investors from more than 40 countries. Today, China is regarded as 
the largest emerging market in the world.
  China is the strongest military power in Asia and an independent 
nuclear power. China is one of the five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council, whose vote we seek on critical issues such as Bosnia, 
peacekeeping, and, soon, sanctions against North Korea for nuclear 
proliferation. We need China's cooperation. We cannot afford to adopt a 
cold-war kind of policy that merely excludes and pushes China away.
  Unlike Russia which is in a period of turmoil, China is on the rise. 
Already the major power in Asia, China has the potential to be an 
international superpower.
  For these reasons alone, the United States needs to have a 
relationship with China that is more workable and manageable than the 
one that we have had in recent years. But there are other reasons as 
well.
  China has a population of 1.2 billion people that are denied basic 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. China is a purveyor of nuclear 
weapons related materials to some of the most dangerous nations in Asia 
and the Mideast. China poses the largest single security threat to the 
Asian nations, especially Taiwan. China controls the future of the 
Tibetan people. China is the power with the most influence on North 
Korea, as my colleague from Indiana just said. China is one of the key 
members of APEC and a major player on the range of issues affecting the 
Asian-Pacific region.
  China offers a growing and potentially large market for American 
goods, services, and technology. China is an ecological disaster in the 
making, and we must be part of the partnership to prevent that 
disaster. China needs our environmental technology and know-how to 
avoid that disaster. China wants our support for its admission into 
GATT, and we must have China as a partner in writing the new rules of 
trade in this new world marketplace.
  Our interests in China and, by extension, in the Asian region dictate 
that we have a multidimensional relationship with Beijing. But our 
present policy undermines our ability to forge this kind of 
relationship. It puts us in an untenable bind. If China fails to make 
the necessary progress in human rights, the President, to be credible, 
will have to deny the renewal of MFN for all, or some, of China's 
products. The impact of this action would be disastrous for our ability 
to promote human rights in China, our bilateral relationship with 
China, our role in Asia, and our economy.
  Let there be no doubt that the promotion of human rights has been, 
and must continue to be, a critical part of our China policy. It is 
consistent with our national history, our humanitarian traditions, and 
our values as the world's strongest democracy. Repressive governments 
throughout the world have been subjected to our condemnation and our 
pressure and, Mr. President, they ought to be. China, which has one of 
the world's worst human rights situation, should be no different.
  China is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the cornerstone of the international human rights regime. However, in 
policy and practice, it denies its citizens internationally recognized 
rights and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and 
information. Domestic critics are repressed, imprisoned and often 
subject to torture, and other forms of physical abuse. Criminal 
defendants are denied legal safeguards and visits from family members. 
Trials are in reality sentencing hearings because ``guilt'' has already 
been assumed by the state. Detainees are held for indefinite periods of 
time. Confessions are forcibly extracted. Extrajudicial 
killings take place at the hands of government security and police 
forces. Hundreds of others are executed ``officially.''
  Beijing denies that it has ``political prisoners'' because dissidents 
are generally charged and convicted, usually of ``counterrevolutionary 
offenses'' under criminal statutes. Many of China's political prisoners 
are sent to ``reeducation through labor'' camps. According to Chinese 
officials, there were 3,172 persons serving sentences for 
``counterrevolutionary'' offenses at the end of last December. Even 
when released, former political prisoners retain ``criminal'' records, 
which affects their daily lives in countless ways including where they 
live, whether and where they can be employed, and their freedom of 
movement.
  Although forced abortion and sterilization are no longer authorized 
by the central government, these practices continue to occur in rural 
areas. In urban areas, the government forces compliance through a 
combination of economic incentives, economic penalties, and 
psychological pressure.
  Religious worship is allowed but only through official, state 
sanctioned churches. Those who attempt to practice religion outside of 
these channels are harassed, at times detained, and sometimes 
imprisoned. Bibles are confiscated. Unofficial or so-called house 
churches are sporadically closed down.
  I learned of this first hand in January, when I visited the house 
church of Pastor Samuel Lamb in Guangzhou. Pastor Lamb was imprisoned 
for many years during the 1950's and 1960's because of his religious 
activities. Since his release he has continued preaching the Gospel in 
his house church.
  His church consists of the second floor of his small, darkly lit home 
in the center of Guangzhou. His pulpit is a lectern on top of a table. 
Pastor Lamb told me that his church had been closed twice after 
Tiananmen Square and that government officials had threatened to close 
it a third time. He said that they have limited the number of sermons 
he can preach per week and confiscated his tapes, records, and other 
teaching materials. Yet, despite this, Pastor Lamb's congregation has 
grown dramatically, from 400 parishioners to over 1,200. Many of these 
new worshippers are young people who learn about the church by word of 
mouth.
  Although the overall human rights situation in China remains poor, it 
is important to recognize two points. First, as I suggested earlier, 
China has basically met the two mandatory requirements in the 
President's Executive order and taken modest steps toward fulfillment 
of several of the remaining conditions. Second, the promotion of human 
rights takes place at many levels. In the case of China, other more 
dramatic changes, stemming from the decision to open China's economy, 
are taking hold.
  Today, China is a more open society than at any time since the start 
of the Cold War. Access to information has increased, not only in the 
southern provinces bordering Taiwan and Hong Kong but even in rural 
areas where satellite dishes can be seen on the horizon. The practice 
of religion outside of official churches is growing, despite official 
attempts to stop it. A middle class is beginning to emerge, 
particularly in those areas such as Guangdong province, where foreign 
investment and trade has blossomed. Parallel with this is an improved 
standard of living, greater worker mobility, and more economic choice 
for citizens in these areas. For many Chinese citizens, the work unit 
is no longer the determinant of the everyday aspects of their lives.
  Better living standards and greater economic choice are no substitute 
for fundamental political rights and freedoms. However, they are 
developments which should not be dismissed out of hand. Beijing's 
leaders have made a deliberate decision to open China's economy and 
markets to the outside world. We need to take advantage of that 
decision. We must not play into the hands of hardliners who would shut 
the door and go back to the age of doing everything and anything they 
want without the outside world looking in or objecting.
  Our companies and businessmen cannot transform China into a Western 
society but they can expose the Chinese people to our values, our 
culture, our ideas, and our way of life. Over time that exposure will 
have a profound impact on Chinese society and China's political system. 
Frankly, we ought to have more confidence in the power of our ideas and 
values. They are a potent weapon in the struggle to promote respect for 
basic rights and freedoms.
  At present there appears to be little support for the idea of cutting 
off MFN entirely. However, the administration is seriously considering 
the option of denying MFN for some Chinese exports to the United 
States, such as those produced in state-owned industries. Mr. 
President, this option would be as disastrous as cutting off MFN 
entirely because it would undermine the very process that is helping to 
bring about change in China. It would handicap, possibly even remove, 
our companies and thus our presence from China because Beijing would 
surely retaliate. It would close China off to our ideas and our 
knowledge. It would minimize, if not eliminate entirely, our direct 
influence on China's development and cede that over to our competitors.
  In short, it would make us a bit player in a production of enormous 
proportions. This approach would not enhance our ability to promote 
human rights in China. It would reduce or, worse, eliminate it.
  Failure to renew MFN would transform our bilateral relationship into 
one of confrontation, thereby diminishing our ability to influence 
China on the whole range of issues of importance to us. It would 
escalate the price of Chinese goods, making them unaffordable for lower 
income Americans and causing profit losses to many American retailers.
  American exporters no doubt would find China's markets closed off to 
them. American investors would find business deals going to their Asian 
and European counterparts. This would reduce our influence, not just in 
China, but in all of the rest of Asia.
  A confrontational relationship with China could increase the 
insecurity of other countries in Asia and undermine our ability to 
encourage peaceful resolution of economic and political problems in the 
region.
  Clearly the stakes surrounding the MFN question are high for the 
United States. But they are also high for China. The United States is 
an important and growing market for China. China has a $25 billion 
trade surplus with us. As I mentioned earlier, China needs our 
technology, particularly in the environmental area to avoid costly 
environmental cleanups in the future. Our technology and know-how is 
critical to China's development.

  China is not facing serious threats to its security at present. 
However, expansion of Russian power or North Korea's entry into the 
nuclear club could reverse this. From Beijing's perspective, a positive 
relationship with the United States could help to lessen these 
potential threats.
  The high stakes involved in the revocation of MFN make it incumbent 
upon the President to renew MFN this year and move on to a new policy 
which abandons the link between trade and human rights. Undoubtedly, 
some are going to argue that this means sacrificing our commitment to 
human rights in favor of the commercial benefits of trade. I just do 
not agree. I think they miss the point. Delinking does not force us to 
choose one interest above the other. It allows us to pursue all of our 
interests simultaneously. It liberates us from the false choice 
embodied in linkage between trade and human rights.
  The question is not MFN or human rights. It is a question of how we 
best advocate our interest in human rights and promote the development 
of those rights for the people of China. I believe that the best 
approach to achieve these objectives is severing the link between trade 
and human rights.
  Beijing must understand that we regard human rights as a legitimate 
issue in our bilateral relationship, that we will react negatively and 
decisively if there is another event like Tiananmen Square, and that we 
will continue to press China to abide by internationally recognized 
norms and standards of human rights. In turn, we in Washington must 
understand that there are many ways to press our case on human rights, 
that we cannot unilaterally compel China to comply, and that public 
confrontations are likely to produce the least results.
  A new policy toward China must be multidimensional and where 
necessary multilateral. It must allow the United States and China to 
discuss differences without destroying the overall bilateral 
relationship. It must be flexible enough to respond to changing 
circumstances. It must enable us to interact with all levels of Chinese 
society including those that are striving for greater freedom. It must 
combine carrots and sticks in meaningful and effective ways.
  If our efforts to promote change in China are to be successful, we 
must strengthen our support for those inside China who are pressing for 
change. This is essential if we are to make it clear to the Chinese 
people and the leadership in Beijing that we have not abandoned our 
commitment to human rights. We are simply changing the tools by which 
we seek to promote them.
  We should establish a human rights assistance program to be 
administered out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulate 
in Hong Kong to provide direct assistance to human rights activists. 
These programs could provide legal aide information, technical 
assistance, and financial support for grassroots undertakings when 
possible.
  To make it clear to Chinese authorities that we are watching what 
they are doing, we should designate a full- time human rights officer 
in our Embassy in Beijing and in each of our consulates in China. These 
officers should press the limits of the system to obtain and convey to 
the outside world information about the abuses wrought by the 
government upon its citizens. They should be our watchdogs on the front 
line of the struggle for human rights.
  We should establish a code of conduct for American companies in 
China, akin to the Sullivan Code adopted for American companies in 
South Africa in the 1980's. American companies would be called upon to 
set up programs providing information about worker rights, 
international labor laws and practices.
  We should continue to press the human rights agenda in multilateral 
fora. We must make our allies understand that the only effective form 
of pressure on Beijing in the human rights area is multilateral. Just a 
few months ago China succeeded in preventing the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva from voting upon a resolution condemning China's 
recent crackdown on dissidents. China controlled this situation because 
our allies were afraid that voting for this resolution would upset or 
undermine their commercial relationships. However, had all of China's 
trading partners stuck together, China would have failed in taking this 
issue off the table and no one country would have paid the price. China 
can take economic revenge on one trading partner; it cannot afford to 
take it on all.
  We should maximize the flow of information into China through 
expanded radio and television broadcasting. It is essential for us to 
undertake responsible broadcasting that provides the citizens of China 
with the information they want to hear, not with propaganda we want to 
give them. The cold war is over; we must resist the temptation to use 
outmoded cold war tools to address post cold war problems.
  International exchange programs are one of the most proven methods of 
exposing other nations to our values and ideas. China's need for 
Western, and particularly American, know-how and technology provides us 
with a ready-made opportunity. Existing U.S. governmental exchange 
programs with China, such as Fulbright, should be expanded. New ones 
should be developed in those areas where China is reaching outward. For 
example, China desperately needs to establish a rule of law to 
regularize commercial and financial transactions. China also needs more 
trained lawyers and judges. The establishment of a legal exchange 
program would be attractive to the leaders in Beijing. While, at the 
same time, promoting Western legal values and procedures.
  We need to find ways to support Tibetans struggling to preserve their 
culture and society. For example, the fiscal year 1994-95 Foreign 
Relations Authorization bill contains a provision, offered by the 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, establishing 
a small exchange program for Tibetan students.
  The past has clearly demonstrated that we possess no stick, including 
MFN, which can force China to embrace internationally recognized human 
rights and freedoms. We can encourage, we can cajole, we can entreat, 
we can embarrass the rulers in Beijing but we cannot compel. However, 
that is not the case in other areas.
  When it comes to trade, we have plenty of sticks that can and should 
be used to force China to open its markets and to become a responsible 
member of the world trading community. We can initiate investigations 
and impose sanctions against China under section 301 and special 301. 
The record to date suggests that these sanctions work. Each time we 
have initiated 301 investigations, the leadership in Beijing has 
responded positively. Why? No doubt because they regard this as a 
legitimate form of pressure exerted through legitimate instruments of 
trade.
  We can also use China's desire to join GATT as a means of forcing 
China to open its markets and change its laws and administrative 
regulations to enhance the daily business of trade and investment. The 
GATT card is significant and we should maximize it.
  Similarly, in the nonproliferation area, we can bring effective 
pressure on China, both unilaterally and multilaterally, through the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and through the sanctions 
regime on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Last 
year the administration imposed sanctions against China under the MTCR 
for its sale of the M-11 missile to Pakistan. The administration was 
absolutely correct in taking this step. China's activities in the 
proliferation area are dangerous and seriously undermine our efforts to 
stem the tide of nuclear weapons proliferation. These kinds of 
sanctions can be effective, but only if we are vigilant and hardline 
about their imposition and implementation.
  Mr. President, the passing of the cold war has initiated a period of 
uncertainty in international politics. The elements of power are 
realigning. The rules of the game are unclear. International 
institutions have yet to find their new role. International powers are 
not fully defined.
  In this context we cannot afford to ignore or to alienate China. 
China does not pose the threat to us that the Soviet Union did. 
However, China is a country on the march, a country whose power and 
influence will grow not only in Asia but in the world at large. Our 
national interests demand that we have a constructive relationship with 
China. That can only happen if we recognize the inappropriateness of 
our current policy and move on to a new one which delinks trade and 
human rights and allows us to pursue all of our interests in tandem.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. DANFORTH and Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. Danforth], is 
recognized for not to exceed 5 minutes.

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