[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 62 (Wednesday, May 18, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 18, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
               CHINA'S MOST-FAVORED-NATION TRADING STATUS

  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, on June 3, President Clinton will 
determine the fate of China's most-favored-nation trade status. 
Although the issue has been framed in terms of trade and human rights, 
in fact the choice is between two competing views of America's 
relationship with China. The President will be choosing whether to free 
China policy from the cold war straitjacket embodied in the MFN-human 
rights linkage. He should end the linkage and free American policy to 
pursue a more multifaceted approach to United States-China relations.
  For over 40 years, America's China policy was subordinated to the 
cold war struggle between liberal market democracy and communist 
totalitarianism. After failing to prevent the fall of China in 1949, 
the United States worked to isolate and exclude Red China from the 
international community. Then, after over 20 years of a China policy 
that tried to pretend that the world's most populist country did not 
exist, President Nixon played the China card against the Soviet Union, 
starting a process which led to full diplomatic relations in 1979.
  Just as the United States established full diplomatic relations with 
the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping unleashed the first of 
the reforms that would open China to the world and transform it from a 
command society built around a centralized bureaucracy and Communist 
economy, to a primarily market economy.
  Deng's reforms have turned China into an economic giant. Using 
purchasing power parities, the World Bank has determined that China is 
already the world's third largest economy. That may be stretching the 
point but, by any measure, it is clear that China is a major economic 
power.
  Growing at over 10 percent per year, China has become an important 
engine for global economic growth. For example, China is America's 
fastest growing export market. American exports to the People's 
Republic rose by 18 percent last year to $8.8 billion, triple the 
figure of a decade ago, making China our 13th largest export market. 
Even that figure may be an understatement, when reexports through Hong 
Kong are taken into account. United States companies have also 
committed billions in investment in China. America's strategy for 
export-led growth requires continued economic engagement with China.
  China's economic growth, with its associated opening to the outside 
world, is also the primary engine of China's continuing social and 
political transformation. What do I mean by that? In a Marxian irony, 
Communist social and governmental structures have become a constraint 
on China's continued development and are changing under the pressure of 
China's economic dynamism. Government cannot cope with the billions of 
pieces of information and the millions of decisions necessary for the 
functioning of any market economy, let alone a marketizing economy with 
the size and growth rate of China's. In this information age, economic 
development requires openness to outside information and outside 
influences, otherwise no growth--or not as fast. It requires fax 
machines, telephones, and copiers, which are profoundly subversive to 
centralized control.

  China's regions are gaining power at the expense of the center, as 
economic decisionmaking becomes more and more decentralized. Foreign 
firms are training workers and exposing them to western business values 
and practices. The rigor of law is starting to replace the whim of 
party dictate in many areas of the economy.
  Individuals have freedom in their personal and economic lives that, 
while incomplete and clearly inadequate, is unparalleled in modern 
Chinese history. Economic growth has undermined the dan-wei system, 
under which the work unit controlled the personal lives of its members. 
It is also undermining the household registration system which 
restricted freedom of travel within China.
  However, there is a residual cold war-era trap which could slow this 
progress and put the United States at odds with the forces transforming 
China--the linkage of MFN and human rights. This linkage embodies two 
aspects of what I call ``old-think,'' both of which should join the 
cold war on the dust heap of history.
  First, the original Jackson-Vanik requirement for yearly MFN waivers 
is a product of the United States-Soviet rivalry. The Soviet Union is 
gone, and Jackson-Vanik should have gone with it.
  Second, the additional human rights conditionality contained in 
President Clinton's Executive order originated in Congress' opposition 
to George Bush's early reengagement with China's dictators after 
Tiananmen Square. George Bush has left office, and the human rights-MFN 
linkage should have left with him.
  Mr. President, the time is past due to escape this trap and turn the 
page to a new policy framework that will do justice to the importance 
of the United States-China relationship. For America has a big stake in 
a healthy United States-China relationship. Without responsible Chinese 
behavior, no stable Asian security equilibrium is possible. Without 
responsible Chinese behavior, America cannot manage its regional and 
global security agenda. Trade, the future of Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
North Korean proliferation, environmental degradation--all require 
Chinese cooperation. Because China is a veto-wielding permanent member 
of the United Nations Security Council, Chinese cooperation is vital 
for the American global agenda from Bosnia to Iraq.

  I strongly agree with those who contend that we have an important 
national interest in improving the living conditions of China's 1.2 
billion people. Support for the dignity of the individual is part of 
who we are as a nation. However, the MFN-human rights linkage has 
provided too narrow a path to try to influence Beijing's human rights 
practices. We need a more multi-faceted approach that works with the 
forces shaping China, not against them.
  An effective human rights policy must be based on measures to 
increase China's exposure to the outside world. Expanding Voice of 
America and Radio Free Asia broadcasts would swell the flow of unbiased 
information into China, including much-needed information about Tibet. 
Increasing educational and cultural exchanges would expose more 
Chinese, especially in the younger generation, to our example as a 
multiethnic, multicultural, stable, and prosperous democracy. The more 
United States delegations go to China with open access to factories, 
farms, and businesses, the deeper will be the human rights message, 
coming from many Americans, not simply from the Government.
  Human rights policy must also seek to expand trade. Trade is the 
motive force behind China's opening to the world. That is why I support 
China's membership in the World Trade Organization. China's obligations 
as a WTO member would require Beijing to replace party with law in the 
economic sphere even as it encouraged China's continued economic 
dynamism. Growth alone will not democratize China. But it does create 
the fluid political and social environment, the exposure to the outside 
world, and the emergence of a class of economically prosperous Chinese, 
which are the prerequisites for democratization and improved human 
rights practices.
  The alternative, disrupting trade in support of human rights goals, 
would work against the forces that are liberalizing China. It would run 
counter to the efforts of the Chinese people themselves to better their 
lives. It would create an ``American recession'' in south China that 
could turn individual Chinese against us.
  A third element of human rights policy is genuine dialog. All too 
often, the United States-China human rights dialog consists of American 
officials presenting Chinese counterparts with a list of demands. 
China, supported by other Asians, has responded that Western human 
rights standards are not applicable in Asia. The result has been an 
empty exchange of monologs.
  The alternative is genuine exchange with the Chinese and other Asians 
on human rights. While we will not agree with Asian assertions about 
the relativity of human rights, we can hear them out with the aim of 
finding common ground on which to build. We can begin by framing some 
essential human rights principles, such as rule of law, in positive 
terms. Rule of law is not only in the interest of China, it is in the 
interest of whoever is governing China. How can China be governed or 
China's economy be managed without rule of law?
  Fourth, as we wait for the last members of the Long March generation 
to pass from the scene, we must continue our efforts to protect 
individual Chinese dissidents, such as Wei Jingsheng, by raising their 
cases at every opportunity and working to improve conditions in 
detention. As part of this process, it is vital that China and the 
International Red Cross conclude their negotiations on prison access.
  Tough talk on individual cases does not contradict my call for 
genuine dialog. Rather, once we are talking effectively with the 
Chinese, appeals on behalf of individual dissidents will have greater 
impact as part of this genuine dialog. There are many ways to 
institutionalize such a dialog, such as by creating binational human 
rights commission or exchanging parliamentary delegations to 
investigate human rights practices, as the Chinese and Australians 
already do today.
  China's craving for international legitimacy provides additional 
influence, opportunities to influence. As part of our human rights 
framework, we must make it clear to Beijing that we will work to deny 
China the symbols of full international legitimacy as long as China 
fails to uphold basic human rights standards. That is why I worked to 
deny China the 2000 Olympics and will, if necessary, work to deny China 
the 2004 Olympics. China should not host APEC or U.N. agency meetings 
as long as it abuses its people. For example, China is slated to host 
the Fourth World Conference on Women next year in Beijing. This is the 
kind of meeting we must deny or attempt to deny Beijing getting until 
its human rights practices improve.
  Sixth, we must ask business to help by supporting voluntary ethical 
investor principles, preferably as part of an APEC investment code. The 
distinguished Senator from Montana alluded to this in his own remarks. 
This would harness international business in pursuit of practices that 
encourage China's liberalization, without putting our firms at a 
competitive disadvantage. This code would not be, as business may fear, 
a unilateral requirement for business to bear the brunt of Washington's 
human rights agenda. Nor would it imply that business was the problem. 
Instead, it would acknowledge that business is a key part of the 
solution.
  Notice how many of the steps I have outlined call for action in a 
multilateral context. This is no coincidence. For our credibility and 
impact, we must eliminate the appearance that human rights is only a 
kind of American preoccupation and actively seek out ways to exert 
concerted Asian and international pressure on Beijing.
  Proposals for partial or targeted revocation of MFN have no place in 
this framework.
  Conceptually, such an approach is wrong because it would maintain the 
trade-human rights link. It would hurt United States business and 
consumers, run counter to the forces transforming China, and still 
leave the administration looking weak.
  Tactically, there is no reason to believe China would cave in to 
partial revocation if the threat of full revocation was not effective.
  Practically, given the structure of the Chinese economy, withdrawal 
of MFN from state-owned firms would be an administrative nightmare as 
the Chinese authorities kept restructuring ownership one step ahead of 
our customers' officers.
  That does not mean there is no place for sanctioning specific Chinese 
products. Products made with prison label should be sanctioned. If the 
administration wants to exclude the Chinese-made AK-47's that are 
coming into this country as so-called sporting rifles, it should, by 
all means, do so. But link specific sanctions to specific problems, not 
to human rights in general.
  Mr. President, a decision to revoke or continue to condition China's 
MFN status would be a blunder of historic proportions.
  Let me repeat that. Mr. President, a decision to revoke or continue 
to condition China's MFN status would be a blunder of historic 
proportions.
  Unlike 1949, when the United States could ignore Red China, in the 
Asia of 1994 we would be isolating ourselves from the world's most 
dynamic region. We would be standing alone against the forces 
transforming China, Asia, and the world.
  Mr. President, the cold war is over. Let us put it behind us, delink 
MFN from human rights and begin to realize the real potential of a 
U.S.-Chinese relationship.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey yields 
the floor.
  Mr. BAUCUS and Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Montana is 
recognized.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in 
morning business, and I will soon yield to the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from New Jersey for that 
very fine statement. He has thought long and hard about this issue. It 
is not an easy issue to resolve, and I compliment the Senator on his 
statement. It is a far-reaching statement. It is one with vision. It is 
one with a perspective on the issue, and his statement reflects, as the 
Senator very often does, a long-term view of what is in the best 
interest of this country.
  I might say, Mr. President, he made many very good points. One that 
particularly struck home to me is when he said it is important with 
respect to China--probably with respect to any country--to deal less 
with abstractions and much more with specifics. He mentioned names of 
individual prisoners and individual dissidents, for example. The more 
we give a list of individual dissidents with their names and ask for an 
accounting, the more likely we will see progress on that issue rather 
than just saying ``better human rights in China.''
  I say this from my own experience because I found that it works. Last 
August, I spent some time in China trying to get a better idea of what 
the right policy should be. I met with the wife of a dissident, a man 
who was very actively involved in Tiananmen, been in prison since 
Tiananmen, almost 5 years now, in solitary confinement and very ill. 
She was desperately concerned about her husband, as any wife, any 
spouse, as would be any loved one.
  When we talked about it, I told her I would do what I could to get 
his release. I met later with President Jiang Zemin, the President of 
China, and other Chinese officials, and I gave them a letter asking for 
the release of this particular person.
  Mr. President, I was very heartened, and it meant a lot to me, to see 
him; he was in my office just last week. He has been released. He is in 
the United States now, getting medical care.
  It was proof to me that if you are specific about something, if you 
push for something, you can get results. I say that only as an example 
of the kinds of efforts I think will work again not only with China but 
with any country. We can be specific about Voice of America not being 
jammed. We can be specific about suggesting that the International Red 
Cross be allowed to visit. We can be specific about a whole list of 
items. I do think we should not only be specific, but we also should be 
very firm about it but be firm with a lower profile. Because the more 
we publicize the areas in which we are firm, the more we dramatize it, 
the more it is in the public arena, the more psychologically difficult 
it is for China, for any country, because it wants to save face from 
following up and accommodating us in a way that seems to be a good 
resolution of the issue.
  I again thank the Senator from New Jersey. It was a very good 
statement. It is one to which I hope all Senators pay close attention.
  Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey is 
recognized.
  Mr. BRADLEY. I thank the distinguished Senator from Montana. It was a 
great pleasure for me this morning to follow his own statement. He has 
clearly played a very constructive leadership role in this whole area, 
and so I was very pleased to be able to follow his statement today 
which called for the granting of MFN without condition to China. We 
hope that is what will be the result. If it is, I think the Senator 
from Montana can take a great deal of credit for that end.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period for 
morning business be extended.
  Before the Senator from New Jersey departs the floor, let me say that 
I join in the sentiments expressed so eloquently by the Senator from 
New Jersey. I have attempted to articulate a vision similar to that 
outlined but with less eloquence and less thoroughness. I applaud the 
Senator from Montana for his ongoing leadership in this area and the 
Senator from New Jersey for the clearest exposition of views and a 
realistic assessment of what the situation is and what needs to be done 
to address that situation as I have heard in a long time.
  I am going to ask the permission of the Senator from New Jersey to 
communicate the text of his statement directly to Winston Lord, the 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who is in the 
process as we speak this morning of formulating a recommendation to the 
Secretary of State, who in turn will forward a recommendation to the 
President on this particular topic. I think that the position and the 
vision as to how to address a very thorny issue in the international 
arena has been addressed by the Senator from New Jersey, in my opinion, 
in precisely the way we ought to address this particular question.
  As the chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, I held a hearing a little over a week 
ago to talk about it, but as a member of the Finance Committee, with 
its original jurisdiction, I think the statement the Senator from New 
Jersey made this morning is extremely important and right on the money. 
I am very pleased to join in seconding the suggestion the distinguished 
Senator has made, as he frequently does on important topics, with a 
very thoughtful review of the facts and some suggestion as to where we 
might go in the future.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia for his comments. His comments, given his position on the 
Foreign Relations Committee, are as important as the statement itself. 
I am very pleased that he sees the direction the same as I do, and I 
thank him very much for his own leadership on this issue and for his 
clear-sightedness. I appreciate it very much.

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