[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 60 (Monday, May 16, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 16, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   ESTABLISHMENT OF A BASELINE DESIGN

   Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, the early establishment of a 
baseline design is an essential element of any successful aircraft 
production program. Without a baseline design, workers are building to 
anomaly. No two aircraft are alike.
  The Air Force establishes a baseline design by putting one of the 
first aircraft off a new production line through physical and function 
configuration audits [PCA/FCA]. A PCA compares engineering drawings to 
parts to check whether the parts conform with design specifications. An 
FCA certifies that parts function as specified. After passing the 
audits, the design is fixed and alterations require engineering change 
proposals. This enables the Air Force to maintain configuration 
control.
  With the C-17 program, P-5, the fifth production aircraft, was to 
have gone through the PCA/FCA. No longer. Instead, the Air Force is 
conducting the physical and functional configuration audits on a 
piecemeal basis. P-11, incorporating the wing, flap, slat, landing 
gear, and fuel system fixes required by test failures, is being 
characterized as a production representative aircraft. That sounds 
good, but the fact remains that we are custom building C-17's, that we 
are, in effect, buying a collection of Faberge eggs for Air Mobility 
Command. This will remain true at least through P-29 when the last 
major fix required by failures in test--the redesigned wing--will be 
chopped into the production line.
  I am deeply disturbed by the apparent lack of a baseline design for 
the C-17, and have posed a number of questions to Under Secretary 
Deutch about it:
  Is P-29 the baseline design aircraft? Will the Air Force rework P-1 
through P-28 to bring up the first 29 C-17's to a standard 
configuration? If so, what will this cost? If not, how will the lack of 
configuration control through P-29 influence C-17 performance, life 
cycle costs, and reliability, maintainability, and availability? Has 
the Air Force considered a pause in production to allow engineering to 
catch up with production? What are the costs and benefits of such a 
pause?
  Upon receipt of answers to these questions, I will be happy to share 
them with my colleagues.

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