[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 58 (Thursday, May 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
           LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am endeavoring to work with the 
distinguished leadership of the Senate--with the majority leader and 
the Republican leader--in resolving the dilemma that the Senate now has 
with respect to a most unusual development. The Senate has acted 
earlier today on two amendments, and by a margin of one vote passed 
both amendments. As we well understand, the amendments are quite 
different, resulting in a confused signal being sent at the moment from 
this Chamber not only to the House of Representatives, but to the 
President, the administration and, most significantly to the people in 
Bosnia. Indeed, this signal is being carried across the ocean to the 
people throughout the former Yugoslavia who have suffered enough, and 
listened to by our allies as well.
  I think it is incumbent upon this body to reconcile this situation, 
and I know that our leadership is endeavoring to do so.
  Earlier, the leadership indicated to me an option that was being 
studied. I interposed an objection to that option being brought to the 
floor. I now lift my objection to that option, subject to no other 
Senator imposing his or her objection. If that occurs, then I wish to 
have my rights reinstated.
  I think the Senate has the time to make a better informed decision. 
Press reports indicate that our allies are pursuing several options 
diplomatically, wherein the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Russia, and perhaps others will sit down and devise a course of action.
  I urge that adequate time be taken to let that process run its 
course. There is no need to rush to judgment, certainly in terms of 
days on this issue.
  I recognize that for at least 2 years we have watched the 
negotiators, primarily from Great Britain, France, and others wrestle 
with this problem. Indeed, our own distinguished former Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and others have struggled and have 
withdrawn from that struggle. Others have remained.
  We have had several distinguished U.N. commanders. I have met with 
two of those--Generals McKenzie and Moreau--in my visits to that 
region.
  So I think if we can allow a short time in which to deliberate this 
matter further, it would be my hope that the leadership could devise a 
plan whereby those committees designated with responsibilities for 
issues such as this--primarily, Foreign Affairs, the Armed Services, 
and Intelligence Committees--could avail ourselves of a reservoir of 
knowledge that exists not just with the policymakers but among the 
senior civil servants in CIA, State, and Defense.
  I have had the privilege of spending long hours with the senior 
staffs of these three agencies and have listened with great interest to 
their analyses of this complex problem.
  I would think our committees would learn a lot and quickly prepare 
reports to bring to the floor of the Senate permitting Senators to be 
better informed. I was concerned today in the latter part of the vote. 
All of us who have been here a few years understand the complex 
procedures. Therefore, I am not pointing fingers at any Senator. But 
towards the end of the vote, it was interesting to see how the votes 
were being cast. Votes were withheld, then later cast. It reflected a 
certain measure of indecision--indecision springing from a clear 
question in the conscience of Senators as to which way they should go.
  We should not have a matter of this importance and magnitude decided 
in those brief, closing minutes of a vote. Many Senators were 
cloistered in the well, trying to make their final decision without 
much time to do so.
  Nevertheless, I urge that reasonable time be given to the Senate to 
listen and learn. I feel I would like to learn more about this issue. I 
opposed both Leader Mitchell and Leader Dole's amendments. I stated 
earlier in brevity, and I will momentarily state with greater detail, 
my concern about both amendments. I do not feel comfortable with the 
amount of time given to this institution to make a decision regarding 
Bosnia. I seek time within which my colleagues and I can become better 
informed.
  It was suggested that we as a body should package both amendments and 
send them to the House. That disturbs me greatly. The constitutional 
framers delegated specific constitutional powers to the U.S. Senate, 
primarily to advise and consent. These specific powers and 
responsibilities were delegated as they relate to the foreign relations 
and Armed Forces of this country. We should not abdicate that 
responsibility and send to the other body a package reflecting the 
indecision reached today.
  I urge the leadership to look for other options whereby this body can 
further consider the matter. If the two leaders cannot have a meeting 
of the minds on a single instrument, let us again address both 
amendments. The allies are trying to put together some coalitions to 
work on this problem. Let us not send this mixed signal in this very 
fragile period of current negotiations.
  Last, the Senate Armed Services Committee today conducted its second 
hearing on Somalia, in the context: We are there to learn. Were there 
mistakes made by the policymakers? By the on-scene commanders? We 
suffered tragic losses in that situation--loss of life, loss of limb. 
We also suffered another loss, in my judgment. That is with our allies. 
We all remember the debate in this body in November and December. Men 
and women of clear conscience asking us to bring our troops home from 
Somalia by Christmas. Others, including myself said no. That decision 
should be left to the President of the United States, the Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces, the chief architect of our foreign policy. 
Eventually a compromise was structured and the troops were brought home 
at the end of March.
  I point that out because the world saw the United States not sticking 
with its commitment. The United States committed to a situation, 
invited our allies to go in as partners, put at risk their military 
units, and then somewhat abruptly said: We are departing. The problem 
remains yours.
  I would not like to see that repeated. I would not like to see that 
repeated again in Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia. We are there today 
as partners in air operations. We are there today as partners in sea 
operations. So we can hold our head high. We may not have the measure 
of ground troops serving either with UNPROFOR or in other capacities, 
but we, the United States, are there, assuming our fair measure of that 
responsibility.
  I visited those troops, as have other Members of this body. We are 
very proud of what they have done, what they are doing today, and what 
they are willing to do in the future.
  I refer again to Somalia. We do not want to have another situation 
where the United States might go into Bosnia, as either of these 
amendments might entail, and then pull out again. Given the measure of 
indecision reflected today by these votes; given the brevity of this 
debate, I am not certain that this country fully understands these 
amendments, and the potential further commitment by the United States.
  I recognize the leadership gave us an opportunity on Monday and 
Tuesday to debate this issue. I availed myself of that opportunity on 
Monday.
  I do not detect, as I travel through my State, that level of 
understanding and commitment that would justify a further military 
involvement in Bosnia. And that military involvement could come about 
as a result of lifting the embargo. Several scenarios indicate the 
possibility of further military involvement.
  The distinguished majority leader, in commenting on his concern, 
which I share, about the unilateral features of the distinguished 
Republican leader's amendment, asked a hypothetical question, ``Is 
there a Senator here who would vote for the commitment of ground troops 
if the unilateral lifting of the embargo and a certain amount of 
rearming led to a greater conflagration, fighting, by more and more 
people? There was silence in the Chamber. So I think this matter bears 
further study.
  But I come back to Somalia for a reason. We had before us today at an 
Armed Services Committee hearing two fathers, both veterans of previous 
military operations; both veterans of Vietnam. One had lost a leg. Both 
fathers lost their sons in Somalia in the Ranger raid of October 3. 
They gave some of the most poignant, compassionate, yet important 
testimony that I have heard in the many years that I have been here.
  Earlier, I read a portion from Colonel Joyce's testimony. I would 
like to reread that now that we have time and are not rushed. Colonel 
Joyce said today--as a matter of fact, he said it about an hour and 20 
minutes ago--to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

       We should also let everyone, especially the policymakers, 
     know the consequences of foreign policy that is developed 
     haphazardly and implemented by amateurs. Too frequently, 
     policymakers are insulated from the misery they create. If 
     they could be with the chaplain who rings a doorbell at 6:20 
     in the morning to tell a 22-year-old woman she is now a 
     widow, they would develop their policies more carefully.

  I could not state it more clearly. This is really all I have to say 
in urging the leadership to guide this distinguished body to further 
contemplated, thorough study of the issues before us today, followed by 
such deliberation as is necessary. Then a decision, a decision I would 
hope that would speak for the majority view in this body and not send 
out a misleading signal, as the matter now stands.

  A second father, James H. Smith, Captain U.S. Army concluded:

       It is probable that America's military will be called to 
     battle in the future. However, our men and women in uniform 
     must never again be placed in a ``Somalia'' situation. A 
     quarter of a century ago my generation was ground up in the 
     rice paddies and jungles of Vietnam. We must not allow the 
     next generation to suffer the same fate. If additional 
     hearings are not held----

  That is on Somalia.

       I fear that more Americans will suffer the fate of Vietnam 
     and Somalia.

  That is an American citizen whose wife was there, and the widow of 
this soldier was there in our hearing room today addressing this body 
of decisionmakers. Her message was: Take your time, think this through 
carefully, and do not develop haphazard foreign policy.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statements of 
Lieutent Colonel Joyce and Captain Smith be printed in the Record 
following my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I opposed both amendments today because 
there is a certain ambiguity in each that could result in a much deeper 
involvement of our country in Bosnia. This is a conflict in Bosnia, or 
the former Yugoslavia, that is rooted in hundreds of years of history. 
It is religious; it is ethnic; it relates to borders. There is an 
instability among the peoples in that region that is almost without 
parallel.
  I was not present, but I am sure there are those here who witnessed 
the Olympics in Sarajevo several years ago. The same people who in the 
past 2 years have hacked each other to bits, danced in the streets, 
dined in the restaurants and enjoyed the good life. I have no 
explanation for why they have fallen upon each other in such a savage 
way.
  Historically, in World War II, Hitler's divisions occupied this part 
of the world. During the course of that occupation, the German forces 
had a very precarious hold on that geographic area. During the very 
period that they had a dozen or more divisions there, there was a civil 
war between the Croatian people, the Moslem people, and the Serbian 
people, which raged on for more than a year. Over 1 million casualties 
and deaths resulted from that civil war, at the very time that Europe 
was aflame in the battles of World War II. That is why we have to take 
our time and be very, very cautious as we make further commitments.
  I urge that committees look at the two amendments considered today. 
They have not been looked at by any committee; we have only looked at 
bits and pieces. I attended almost every briefing relating to the 
former Yugoslavia in the past 2 years. I am sure other Senators have 
done likewise. I have yet to sit down, except when I personally went 
out to the three agencies, in a committee or briefing structure and 
discuss and go through and discuss the consequences of lifting the 
embargo. Whether we lift it unilaterally or in the context of an 
agreement with our allies.
  What are the consequences? I spelled out on Monday, where would the 
weapons come from that go to the Moslems? How do they get there? What 
period of time is involved? Who will train the Moslems in the use of 
these weapons? Who will supply the spare parts?
  Look at the roads, the means of conveying weapons to various areas of 
that country. They are quite precarious, narrow, unpaved roads, with 
weak bridges. Can they carry the heavy equipment? It is highly 
vulnerable to insurgents who could blow out a bridge or destroy a piece 
of a road. Would this damage cut off the logistic influx of these 
weapons? It can be done in a moment. We would have to put in, or 
someone would have to put in, security along almost the entire route. 
Repairs would require a heavy commitment of forces, both combat and 
combat engineers. I have not yet seen the document put forth by the 
distinguished Republican leader; it is about how Croatia favors lifting 
the embargo. I have not had time to read it; maybe others have. It was 
produced just this morning.
  What is the quid pro quo to Croatia for allowing the transport of 
these weapons across their territory?
  As I was walking in the hall, I met a member of my own committee, a 
very seasoned and knowledgeable member. He said, ``Oh, John, you could 
airdrop.''
  I said, ``Just a minute, just a minute. Let's talk about 
airdropping.''
  There are some heavy artillery pieces that cannot be airdropped. You 
cannot airdrop a tank. These are the things that at this moment create 
the strong imbalance between the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian 
Moslem forces. Airdropping those is not easy.
  Then he said, ``Oh, but we can airdrop a number of other small 
weapons.'' I said, ``That is true, but you can't drop them accurately 
into those small enclaves.'' And there are three of them right there on 
the border of Serbia proper, a diameter of not more than 25, 30 miles, 
in some cases, and less than that. Airdropping is difficult. Try and 
drop in one of those zones.
  An expert army officer in airdropping took a map, showed me those 
isolated areas designated as NATO safe areas and said, ``The closer you 
bring the airplane dropping it to the ground, the greater the danger to 
that aircraft from shoulder-fired air defense weapons.''
  And he said further, ``Your climatic conditions are critical. Even if 
they were perfect, you'd have a hard time hitting that small piece of 
geography in that isolated area with a successful airdrop.''
  And what happens if your airdrop is inaccurate? The supplies fall 
into the hands of the Serbian forces, and we would then, in fact, be 
arming them.
  These are the types of questions that I hope we will spend some time 
on so that each Senator fully understands these issues.
  We had a good debate earlier today about the unilateral feature of 
Senator Dole's amendment. I have spoken to that. I am firmly of the 
opinion that the security arrangements that face this country today, as 
they have in the past from World War I to World War II, are predicated 
on credible relationships with our allies. Security relationships in 
the future will continue to be dependent on the maintenance of those 
credible relationships. We know the problem if we were to unilaterally 
lift the embargo: It would jeopardize our future partnership with our 
allies. That was covered very carefully today.
  We entered this partnership in the Bosnian conflict with our allies. 
I say we should continue that partnership and, under no circumstances, 
in my judgment, should we break that partnership.
  Because I was concerned that the majority leader's amendment states 
that it is to protect the UNPROFOR, I asked him the following 
questions: How much time have any of us spent in individual briefings 
or in groups or in committee studying the consequences of removing the 
UNPROFOR? Can they safely be withdrawn from their advance positions 
where they are commingled now with factions on all sides? How much time 
would be required? Suppose they are trapped in their retrograde or 
withdrawal movement, supposing they are taken as hostages, what happens 
to the members of UNPROFOR--not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but 
throughout the region, indeed, in the remote parts of Croatia and 
elsewhere? What happens to the victims of the former Yugoslavia who are 
dependent on the food and medicine that is now getting through? What 
happens when the UNPROFOR pulls out? What happens to those people?
  The Mitchell amendment restricts the use of NATO air strikes to only 
the safe zones. Those safe zones, six in number, are but a fraction of 
the area of conflict. What happens if war breaks out in those zones? 
Are we restricted from using air power as a deterrent? It is 
inexplicit. We should not have any of these measures passed in a manner 
that is inexplicit.
  Of course, the Mitchell amendment calls for lifting the embargo and 
``assistance be provided expeditiously,'' implying that weaponry is 
going to come from the United States. I think the cautionary marker was 
laid down; no one would go with the equipment to explain how it 
operates; no one would be there to help repair it or to provide the 
spare parts. You cannot arm a military force without equipment and 
logistics training--another question that should be answered carefully.
  What happens after a measure of armament reaches the Bosnian 
Government? Is there any condition put on it: You will use it only for 
defense of the current geography as it exists? What happens if they 
utilize this military equipment to begin reclaiming some of the areas 
that were wrongfully taken from them by the Serbian forces? Do we say 
``stop''? Do we use air power to block their aggression?
  I asked the distinguished majority leader, reading through his 
amendment, if we fail to get concurrence among the allies, does that 
bring our efforts to an end? I think he forthrightly said, ``No, if 
they don't get that concurrence, we go to the U.N.'' I was not given 
the time to ask him: Well, suppose the United Nations does not concur. 
Then what do we do? Then it reads we go to Congress. And you can walk 
through a chain of events under the amendment of the distinguished 
majority leader which, in my judgment, brings you back again to the 
unilateral question.
  So I do not look at his solution as one that precludes eventual 
unilateral action. But I would like to have that spelled out.
  The last paragraph of the amendment of the distinguished majority 
leader relates only to the use of air power, and I hope that if future 
iterations are brought before the Senate they would apply the same 
degree of protection to our Air Force and naval personnel that are 
currently being employed as afforded by the last paragraph of the 
amendment of the distinguished majority leader, as that provision would 
accord future ground forces.
  Mr. President, I thank the distinguished managers of the current 
pending legislation for the opportunity to speak to this issue. As I 
said, if there is no other Senator who has an objection when the 
leadership brings forth a proposed course of action, I withdraw my 
objection. I shall not interpose one. But if another Senator objects, 
then I wish to have my objection reinstated and reserve the right to 
evaluate that Senator's objection.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

               Testimony of Larry E. Joyce, May 12, 1994

       Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my wife, Gail, and my daughter-
     in-law, DeAnna, both of whom are here with me today--as well 
     as the rest of our family who are anxiously following the 
     actions of this committee--thank you, first of all, for 
     calling this hearing.
       I firmly believe my son, Casey, and his 17 brave comrades 
     who gave their lives in Mogadishu last October are looking 
     down on us right now and saying, ``well done.''
       Secondly, I'm sure I'm speaking for all the families of 
     those 18 courageous young men when I say ``thank you'' for 
     ordering the thorough and conscientious investigation that 
     your staff has recently completed.
       We only hope that the Committee's inquiry into the policies 
     and decisions that led to the tragedy that robbed our 
     families and the nation of these incredibly dedicated young 
     men will not end today.
       We hope you will agree with us that the implications of 
     those ill-fated policies and decisions also pose ominous 
     threats for this country.
       Only a thorough review and corrective action can prevent 
     future Somalias.
       I served two combat tours in Vietnam.
       I survived the 1968 Tet Offensive.
       And I want to tell the President and his administration: 
     Now it's MY turn to protest.
       Because my Ranger son and I, both, served the same bogus 
     policy--a generation apart.
       I want them to know that I am pointing at that beautiful 
     but sad memorial at the other end of the Mall--the one that 
     carries the names of 58,191 of my comrades--and I'm asking, 
     ``When will we ever learn that committing troops to enforce 
     an invalid foreign policy leads to disaster.''
       I wrote President Clinton on October 22 and asked to meet 
     with him so I could implore him to get the foreign policy 
     side of his administration in order.
       I told him I didn't seek retribution, but only wanted to 
     see future military disasters are avoided.
       I wanted him to see for himself the grim parallel between 
     the ill-fated policies of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that 
     I survived, and his Somalia policy that Casey did not 
     survive.
       The President called me on November 10 and told me he 
     wanted to meet and discuss what I had learned during my 
     informal investigation.
       I followed up several times, only to be told he was too 
     busy to meet with me.
       He still hasn't fulfilled his promise.
       So, Mr. Chairman, I'm doubly glad you fulfilled yours.
       Our purpose here should be to tell every American who and 
     what contributed to this tragic episode--no matter how much 
     the President and his advisers would like us to forget it 
     along with the heroes who gave their lives in Mogadishu last 
     October.
       We should also let everyone--especially the policy makers--
     know the consequences of foreign policy that is developed 
     haphazardly and implemented by amateurs.
       Too frequently, policy makers are insulated from the misery 
     they create.
       If they could be with the chaplain who rings a doorbell at 
     6:20 in the morning to tell a 22-year-old woman she's now a 
     widow, they'd develop their policies more carefully.
       This is why this hearing and, hopefully, future hearings on 
     Somalia are so important. This is why you must not stop here.
       Call in the National Security Adviser. Ask him to explain 
     his role.
       Call in the Secretary of State and his key staff. Call in 
     the Ambassador to the U.N. Call former and current DOD 
     officials--military and civilian.
       Find out what role the President played.
       In other words, don't just examine the actions of military 
     field commanders. They had the unenviable task of having to 
     implement a flawed mission.
       They cannot answer the questions the White House has left 
     unresolved;
       And these are questions I would want asked:
       Who changed our mission in Somalia from one of humanitarian 
     relief to one of direct combat?
       Why did they do it?
       Why did we reduce our forces in Somalia from 30,000 to less 
     than 5,000, and then launch offensive operations?
       As you know, the vast majority of those remaining troops 
     were in support units--not combat units.
       Who decided capturing Mohammed Farah Aidid was in our 
     national interest?
       Was it President Clinton, or did the Secretary General of 
     the United Nations manipulate that decision?
       If Bourtos Boutros-Ghali extracted that decision from the 
     administration--if he put out a contract on Aidid and 
     President Clinton took it--then I contend that the President 
     abdicated his constitutional and moral responsibility as 
     commander-in-chief.
       Why was only one company of Rangers sent to capture Aidid
       How would they be reinforced?
       Why was Specter gunship not available to them?
       Why were they denied armor?
       In short, this was an inadequate force structure from Day 
     One. Why?
       Did field commanders and staff officers advise against the 
     frivolous mission the Ranger task force was eventually given?
       I have enough faith in my old comrades-in-arms to say, 
     ``Yes they did.'' I hope I'm not wrong.
       Surely, they said it would be virtually impossible to track 
     down an expert in urban guerrilla warfare in the alleys of 
     Mogadishu--where he was once the police chief.
       Surely, they said the intelligence apparatus in Somalia was 
     inadequate to support such a mission.
       And surely, they advised the administration that light 
     infantry should never be committed into a situation where 
     they are likely to become decisively engaged, with no way to 
     reinforce or extract them.
       Was this advice given? If not, why not? If it was, why was 
     it ignored?
       In late September, I wrote Casey and predicted that he and 
     his fellow Rangers would be coming home in October because it 
     was clear to me that the President had decided on a 
     diplomatic rather than a military solution.
       It was much later that I learned former President Carter 
     had been in contact with Aidid and had reported back to 
     President Clinton in September that a diplomatic solution was 
     the only solution for Somalia.
       I felt it was obvious that any political settlement would 
     have to involve Aidid because he was the most stabilizing, if 
     not the only stabilizing, influence in Somalia.
       So, my question is a simple one; If the President had 
     already decided, in September, to seek a diplomatic solution 
     with Aidid, why were Rangers ordered on October 3 to conduct 
     a raid that, by its very nature, would be the most dangerous 
     mission yet?
       If we were going to negotiate with Aidid, why did we 
     continue to put our soldiers at risk by trying to capture him 
     and his henchmen?
       And did we negotiate and collaborate with Aidid? We sure 
     did. We didn't just negotiate, we catered to him.
       Senators, I can't tell you how angry I was when I learned, 
     two months after my son was killed, that the American mission 
     in Somalia ordered American soldiers to provide Aidid an 
     armed escort from his headquarters to the Mogadishu airport 
     so he could be flown to Addis Ababa aboard a U.S. Army 
     airplane.
       It was Amateur Hour all over again!
       And it's going to be hard to convince me that amateurs are 
     not the cause of my son's death--and the deaths of every 
     soldier who was killed in Somalia last October.
       Now, if he's listening, and I hope he is, I have a question 
     for President Clinton.
       Mr. President, if capturing Aidid was so important on 
     August 22 when you ordered the Rangers task force to Somalia, 
     why was capturing him suddenly so unimportant on October 4?
       How do I explain to my family that Casey didn't die in 
     vain?
       Mr. President, he did die in vain because the mission you 
     sent him on was seriously flawed and you were not even 
     committed to it.
       He and his fellow Rangers, and the soldiers who fought to 
     rescue them, were betrayed by an administration that gave 
     them a no-win mission and didn't provide them the resources 
     and moral support they desperately needed.
       Mr. Chairman, if we learn nothing else from this foreign 
     policy debacle it should be this: Before we send American 
     troops into combat, three questions must be asked?
       1. Is the mission attainable?
       2. Are American national interests at stake? And perhaps 
     most critical--
       3. Are we willing to stay the course?
       Now, apply those questions to Desert Storm and then to 
     Somalia.
       Desert Storm gets three thumbs up.
       Somalia gets three thumbs down.
       Maybe some of you remember where you were and what you were 
     doing last October 3. I certainly do--as do all those who 
     were closely associated with the events in Somalia that day.
       My life was as close to being perfect as it had ever been--
     or will ever be again. I had a 7:30 tee time at a public 
     course that runs along Lake Michigan.
       It was a cool and beautiful Sunday morning in Chicago.
       But--half way around the world--it was a hot and dusty 
     Sunday afternoon in Mogadishu where Casey and his Ranger and 
     Delta Force comrades were taking off in helicopters.
       While I was putting on the third green, Casey was dodging 
     AK-47 rounds as he was rescuing PFC Todd Blackburn.
       As I was trying to get out of the rough and on to the fifth 
     fairway, Casey was fighting his way to the crash site where 
     Warrant Officer Briley and Warrant Officer Wolcott were 
     pinned in the wreckage.
       As I was walking off the ninth green, some of Casey's 
     buddies were fighting their way back to the Mogadishu airport 
     in a Humvee with Casey's lifeless body on board.
       In the time it takes to play nine holes of golf, a tragedy 
     of enormous proportions had unfolded. Lives--including my 
     son's--had been taken.
       Other lives--including my wife's, my daughter-in-law's, and 
     my own life--had been destroyed.
       And yet, we are more fortunate than some. My heart aches 
     for those mothers and fathers who know the bodies of their 
     sons fell into Somali hands.
       I emphasize with Jim and Carol Smith who live every waking 
     moment wondering if Jamie would be alive today if he could 
     have been evacuated before he bled to death.
       I want to help Carmen Houston of Mobile, Alabama who can't 
     get a straight answer on how her husband, SGT Cornell 
     Houston, died.
       He was assigned to C Company, 41st Engineer Battalion from 
     Ft. Drum.
       She can't even get an autopsy report.
       If any member of this committee wants to help Carmen, 
     please let me know.
       The Rangers and the wives of the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger 
     Regiment have been a great source of comfort and support to 
     Gail, DeAnna and me.
       They have my undying gratitude.
       I'm grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for your kindness when 
     you met with Gail, the Smiths, and me last month at Ft. 
     Benning.
       Thank you, also, for inviting us to testify here today.
       I'm also indebted to Rick DeBobes of this committee's staff 
     for his candor and his responsiveness to my questions.
       To certain members of this committee, especially Senator 
     Hutchinson, and the other members of Congress, like Senator 
     Gramm and Congressman Dornan, who reached out to us in those 
     first few terrible weeks--thank you for your compassion and 
     your support.
       But, to those who wish the nation would just forget what 
     happened on October 3--forget those ``unfortunate losses'' 
     President Clinton referred to last October when he was trying 
     to get Somalia behind him--let me close by reading the eulogy 
     I gave my son so you, like I ask President Clinton, to do, 
     can put a face on at least one of those ``unfortunate 
     losses.''
       I might add that our pack is stronger now. It's been 
     strengthened by the thousands of Americans who have expressed 
     their support for us over the past seven months.
       To each of them, thank you.
       Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, please take an 
     important step so that Casey, Jamie Smith, Dominick Pilla, 
     Cornell Houston and all the other brave young men who died 
     and were wounded in Somalia did not do so in vain. Don't let 
     this be your last hearing. You can make sure the mistakes of 
     Somalia don't happen again.
                                  ____


               Testimony of James H. Smith, May 12, 1994

       Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, I wish to express my 
     appreciation for the opportunity to testify at this committee 
     hearing. I would also like to take this opportunity to 
     express my gratitude for the committee's diligent work in 
     investigating the events preceding, during and after the 
     Mogadishu battle of October 3, 1993.
       My name is James H. Smith. I am joined today by my wife 
     Caroline. Immediately after graduating from high school in 
     1965, I enlisted in the Army. I was only 17 years old, but I 
     wanted to be a Paratrooper. I responded to the challenge of 
     military life and was fortunate to attend Officers Candidate 
     School. I was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the 
     Infantry and served in Vietnam with the 4th Infantry Division 
     and the 25th Infantry Division. In July 1967, as member of 
     the 3rd Brigade Task Force (Tropic Lightning), I was severely 
     wounded in a firefight. I spent the next two years in an Army 
     Hospital recovering. I survived, but my left leg was 
     amputated just below the knee.
       In the early evening of October 4, 1993, my wife Carol 
     arrived home from work to be met by two Army officers. The 
     officers performed their obligation with professionalism and 
     compassion. Our son Jamie had been killed in action. Carol 
     called me at work and I immediately left a business meeting 
     to be with my family. That evening I met with the press. 
     After the expected questions of: ``How would you describe 
     your son?'', and, ``What were his hobbies?'' I was asked two 
     very pointed questions: ``Did my son's death serve a 
     purpose?''--and--``Am I angry or do I blame anyone? My answer 
     was also direct: ``If my son's death can keep Somali children 
     from starving, my son's death had a purpose'', ``No, I am not 
     angry. My son was a Ranger. He knew the risks and so did I. I 
     do not blame anyone!''
       On October 12, 1993 Jamie was buried at Fort Benning. 
     Immediately after the services I met with some of the 
     veterans of the Mogadishu battle. They had bandaged arms, 
     casts on their legs, walked with crutches and were in 
     wheelchairs. We talked for several hours. I left that meeting 
     with three firm beliefs:
       First: My son's death served no purpose. His courage and 
     sacrifice had been wasted.
       Second: The Rangers had been betrayed. Denied proper combat 
     support and unreliable U.N. allies, disaster was preordained. 
     There must be accountability.
       Third: I was angry. As a disabled Vietnam Veteran I had the 
     responsibility, the obligation, to insure that my son's 
     generation did not suffer the fate of his father's 
     generation.
       My meeting, on October 12th, with the veterans of the 
     Mogadishu battle was to be the first of many meetings and 
     conversations. These contacts would be in the barracks, 
     hospital, headquarters, on the telephone and in our home. I 
     have spoken with virtually every veteran of that battle and 
     the entire command structure--from the squad leader to 
     commanding general. Unknown to me at that time, Larry Joyce 
     was proceeding on a parallel inquiry. When Larry and I met at 
     the 3rd Ranger Battalion memorial service in November 1993, 
     we compared our findings. We had independently come to the 
     same conclusions.
       I am in complete agreement with Larry's comments. However, 
     I would add that beyond the failures of the White House 
     leadership to supply proper combat support and mismanaging 
     the Somalia policy; the unacceptable conditions that existed 
     in Somalia with the United Nations officials and peacekeeping 
     forces, as they negatively affected our troops, must be 
     investigated.
       Although the concept of a U.N. multinational peacekeeping 
     force appears the appropriate direction for U.S. involvement 
     in such conflict situations, the conditions in Somalia 
     resulted in the Rangers being placed in a situation without 
     reliable allies and, in certain cases, U.N. peacekeeping 
     forces actually supporting the enemy. Specifically:
       U.N. peacekeeping forces were fragmented by geographic 
     areas of responsibility. Forces from one country routinely 
     refused to come to the aid of another nation's military unit 
     that was under attack if the battle was outside their 
     geographic area of responsibility. For example: the Italians 
     did not come to the aid of the Nigerians. Therefore, when the 
     Americans required assistance the Malaysians had no desire to 
     support the Americans--since the battle was not their 
     concern.
       Aidid's informers or sympathizers had completely 
     infiltrated the U.N. bureaucracy, the peacekeeping forces and 
     charitable organizations. Additionally there were numerous 
     examples of U.N. officials and peacekeeping forces actively 
     or tacitly supporting Aidid. Therefore, secrecy in military 
     operations was impossible. For example: there were numerous 
     reports of Aidid's forces using U.N. or charitable 
     organization's radios and telephone as his military 
     communications network.
       Other than the U.S. forces, there was no effort on the part 
     of other U.N. peacekeeping units to disarm the militia and 
     maintain order. For example: Egyptian peacekeeping forces, 
     rather than disarm the militia, would give receipts for 
     weapons so that when the militia left their area the weapon 
     could be returned.
       Except for U.S. forces, the multinational peacekeeping 
     units ignored their responsibilities to secure their areas 
     and eliminate the flow of weapons into Mogadishu. Trucks 
     would enter the Italian sector from outside the city and the 
     Italian peacekeepers would only direct traffic and not 
     inspect the trucks. The result was a buildup of weapons by 
     Aidid's militia and the ability of this force to attack the 
     Rangers with superior numbers and firepower.
       These conditions could not be resolved by our military 
     field commanders. These problems are strictly political in 
     nature. Their resolution could only come from our political 
     leaders demanding that the U.N. leadership correct the 
     situation. This was never done, and to the best of my 
     knowledge, correcting these conditions was never attempted. 
     The result was my son's Commander-in-Chief allowed American 
     troops into a combat situation that at best had unreliable 
     allies, or at worse, allies that actively supported the man 
     who had already killed American soldiers.
       This condition is unacceptable. It is imperative that these 
     issues be investigated and resolved. This resolution can only 
     be satisfied by holding those in elected and appointed 
     positions of authority accountable for their inaction or 
     dereliction. This requires that additional hearings be held 
     by the Armed Services Committee for these issues can only be 
     answered by the White House staff members involved in the 
     decision making process.
       Specifically we must learn: What was the decision making 
     process in the White House? Who was involved? When were they 
     involved? To what extent was the President, Vice President, 
     National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of 
     State and the Ambassador to the United Nations involved? 
     Additionally, what input did U.N. Envoy Jonathan Howe and 
     U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali have on the 
     deployment, combat support and rules of engagement decisions. 
     To determine the cause of the Somalia fiasco these concerns 
     must be clarified.
       Our men and women in uniform deserve better than the 
     ``disaster waiting to happen conditions'' that existed in 
     Somalia. As a disabled Vietnam veteran, I do not want any 
     young man or woman to experience my pain when wounded; nor as 
     a parent of a soldier killed in action, do I want other loved 
     ones to experience my grief--because of a flawed foreign 
     policy or a failure to support our troops in battle.
       Additional hearings must beheld. Not as a witch hunt to 
     blame field commanders. The officers made no tactical errors 
     and the troops perform magnificently. Nor as revenge or 
     retribution for past mistakes by elected or appointed 
     officials. But as a quest for the truth so that future 
     Vietnams and Somalias are avoided.
       Last weekend my wife and I visited Arlington National 
     Cemetery, not as tourists, but to honor the grave of Sergeant 
     James C. Joyce. I had prepared myself emotionally for this 
     pilgrimage, but I was not prepared for the reality. As I 
     stood saying a silent prayer at Casey's grave, I noticed that 
     to the left of Casey's grave was the grave of MSG Timothy 
     Martin, and to the left of his grave was the grave of PFC 
     Richard Kowalewski. With tears streaming down my face I 
     remembered my first visit to the Vietnam Memorial. Over 
     58,000 names carved in stone. Now I was gazing upon three 
     more names carved in stone--soldiers who gave the last full 
     measure. Sadly, like the generation before them, the 
     sacrifice of these three brave soldiers had been wasted.
       It is probably that America's military will be called to 
     battle in the near future. However, our men and women in 
     uniform must never again be placed in a ``Somalia'' 
     situation. A quarter of a century ago my generation was 
     ground up in the rice paddies and jungles of Vietnam. We must 
     not allow the next generation to suffer the same fate. If 
     additional hearings are not held, I fear that more Americans 
     will suffer the fate of Vietnam and Somalia.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). The Senator from Nebraska is 
recognized.

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