[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 58 (Thursday, May 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am endeavoring to work with the
distinguished leadership of the Senate--with the majority leader and
the Republican leader--in resolving the dilemma that the Senate now has
with respect to a most unusual development. The Senate has acted
earlier today on two amendments, and by a margin of one vote passed
both amendments. As we well understand, the amendments are quite
different, resulting in a confused signal being sent at the moment from
this Chamber not only to the House of Representatives, but to the
President, the administration and, most significantly to the people in
Bosnia. Indeed, this signal is being carried across the ocean to the
people throughout the former Yugoslavia who have suffered enough, and
listened to by our allies as well.
I think it is incumbent upon this body to reconcile this situation,
and I know that our leadership is endeavoring to do so.
Earlier, the leadership indicated to me an option that was being
studied. I interposed an objection to that option being brought to the
floor. I now lift my objection to that option, subject to no other
Senator imposing his or her objection. If that occurs, then I wish to
have my rights reinstated.
I think the Senate has the time to make a better informed decision.
Press reports indicate that our allies are pursuing several options
diplomatically, wherein the United States, Great Britain, France,
Russia, and perhaps others will sit down and devise a course of action.
I urge that adequate time be taken to let that process run its
course. There is no need to rush to judgment, certainly in terms of
days on this issue.
I recognize that for at least 2 years we have watched the
negotiators, primarily from Great Britain, France, and others wrestle
with this problem. Indeed, our own distinguished former Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and others have struggled and have
withdrawn from that struggle. Others have remained.
We have had several distinguished U.N. commanders. I have met with
two of those--Generals McKenzie and Moreau--in my visits to that
region.
So I think if we can allow a short time in which to deliberate this
matter further, it would be my hope that the leadership could devise a
plan whereby those committees designated with responsibilities for
issues such as this--primarily, Foreign Affairs, the Armed Services,
and Intelligence Committees--could avail ourselves of a reservoir of
knowledge that exists not just with the policymakers but among the
senior civil servants in CIA, State, and Defense.
I have had the privilege of spending long hours with the senior
staffs of these three agencies and have listened with great interest to
their analyses of this complex problem.
I would think our committees would learn a lot and quickly prepare
reports to bring to the floor of the Senate permitting Senators to be
better informed. I was concerned today in the latter part of the vote.
All of us who have been here a few years understand the complex
procedures. Therefore, I am not pointing fingers at any Senator. But
towards the end of the vote, it was interesting to see how the votes
were being cast. Votes were withheld, then later cast. It reflected a
certain measure of indecision--indecision springing from a clear
question in the conscience of Senators as to which way they should go.
We should not have a matter of this importance and magnitude decided
in those brief, closing minutes of a vote. Many Senators were
cloistered in the well, trying to make their final decision without
much time to do so.
Nevertheless, I urge that reasonable time be given to the Senate to
listen and learn. I feel I would like to learn more about this issue. I
opposed both Leader Mitchell and Leader Dole's amendments. I stated
earlier in brevity, and I will momentarily state with greater detail,
my concern about both amendments. I do not feel comfortable with the
amount of time given to this institution to make a decision regarding
Bosnia. I seek time within which my colleagues and I can become better
informed.
It was suggested that we as a body should package both amendments and
send them to the House. That disturbs me greatly. The constitutional
framers delegated specific constitutional powers to the U.S. Senate,
primarily to advise and consent. These specific powers and
responsibilities were delegated as they relate to the foreign relations
and Armed Forces of this country. We should not abdicate that
responsibility and send to the other body a package reflecting the
indecision reached today.
I urge the leadership to look for other options whereby this body can
further consider the matter. If the two leaders cannot have a meeting
of the minds on a single instrument, let us again address both
amendments. The allies are trying to put together some coalitions to
work on this problem. Let us not send this mixed signal in this very
fragile period of current negotiations.
Last, the Senate Armed Services Committee today conducted its second
hearing on Somalia, in the context: We are there to learn. Were there
mistakes made by the policymakers? By the on-scene commanders? We
suffered tragic losses in that situation--loss of life, loss of limb.
We also suffered another loss, in my judgment. That is with our allies.
We all remember the debate in this body in November and December. Men
and women of clear conscience asking us to bring our troops home from
Somalia by Christmas. Others, including myself said no. That decision
should be left to the President of the United States, the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, the chief architect of our foreign policy.
Eventually a compromise was structured and the troops were brought home
at the end of March.
I point that out because the world saw the United States not sticking
with its commitment. The United States committed to a situation,
invited our allies to go in as partners, put at risk their military
units, and then somewhat abruptly said: We are departing. The problem
remains yours.
I would not like to see that repeated. I would not like to see that
repeated again in Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia. We are there today
as partners in air operations. We are there today as partners in sea
operations. So we can hold our head high. We may not have the measure
of ground troops serving either with UNPROFOR or in other capacities,
but we, the United States, are there, assuming our fair measure of that
responsibility.
I visited those troops, as have other Members of this body. We are
very proud of what they have done, what they are doing today, and what
they are willing to do in the future.
I refer again to Somalia. We do not want to have another situation
where the United States might go into Bosnia, as either of these
amendments might entail, and then pull out again. Given the measure of
indecision reflected today by these votes; given the brevity of this
debate, I am not certain that this country fully understands these
amendments, and the potential further commitment by the United States.
I recognize the leadership gave us an opportunity on Monday and
Tuesday to debate this issue. I availed myself of that opportunity on
Monday.
I do not detect, as I travel through my State, that level of
understanding and commitment that would justify a further military
involvement in Bosnia. And that military involvement could come about
as a result of lifting the embargo. Several scenarios indicate the
possibility of further military involvement.
The distinguished majority leader, in commenting on his concern,
which I share, about the unilateral features of the distinguished
Republican leader's amendment, asked a hypothetical question, ``Is
there a Senator here who would vote for the commitment of ground troops
if the unilateral lifting of the embargo and a certain amount of
rearming led to a greater conflagration, fighting, by more and more
people? There was silence in the Chamber. So I think this matter bears
further study.
But I come back to Somalia for a reason. We had before us today at an
Armed Services Committee hearing two fathers, both veterans of previous
military operations; both veterans of Vietnam. One had lost a leg. Both
fathers lost their sons in Somalia in the Ranger raid of October 3.
They gave some of the most poignant, compassionate, yet important
testimony that I have heard in the many years that I have been here.
Earlier, I read a portion from Colonel Joyce's testimony. I would
like to reread that now that we have time and are not rushed. Colonel
Joyce said today--as a matter of fact, he said it about an hour and 20
minutes ago--to the Senate Armed Services Committee:
We should also let everyone, especially the policymakers,
know the consequences of foreign policy that is developed
haphazardly and implemented by amateurs. Too frequently,
policymakers are insulated from the misery they create. If
they could be with the chaplain who rings a doorbell at 6:20
in the morning to tell a 22-year-old woman she is now a
widow, they would develop their policies more carefully.
I could not state it more clearly. This is really all I have to say
in urging the leadership to guide this distinguished body to further
contemplated, thorough study of the issues before us today, followed by
such deliberation as is necessary. Then a decision, a decision I would
hope that would speak for the majority view in this body and not send
out a misleading signal, as the matter now stands.
A second father, James H. Smith, Captain U.S. Army concluded:
It is probable that America's military will be called to
battle in the future. However, our men and women in uniform
must never again be placed in a ``Somalia'' situation. A
quarter of a century ago my generation was ground up in the
rice paddies and jungles of Vietnam. We must not allow the
next generation to suffer the same fate. If additional
hearings are not held----
That is on Somalia.
I fear that more Americans will suffer the fate of Vietnam
and Somalia.
That is an American citizen whose wife was there, and the widow of
this soldier was there in our hearing room today addressing this body
of decisionmakers. Her message was: Take your time, think this through
carefully, and do not develop haphazard foreign policy.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statements of
Lieutent Colonel Joyce and Captain Smith be printed in the Record
following my statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I opposed both amendments today because
there is a certain ambiguity in each that could result in a much deeper
involvement of our country in Bosnia. This is a conflict in Bosnia, or
the former Yugoslavia, that is rooted in hundreds of years of history.
It is religious; it is ethnic; it relates to borders. There is an
instability among the peoples in that region that is almost without
parallel.
I was not present, but I am sure there are those here who witnessed
the Olympics in Sarajevo several years ago. The same people who in the
past 2 years have hacked each other to bits, danced in the streets,
dined in the restaurants and enjoyed the good life. I have no
explanation for why they have fallen upon each other in such a savage
way.
Historically, in World War II, Hitler's divisions occupied this part
of the world. During the course of that occupation, the German forces
had a very precarious hold on that geographic area. During the very
period that they had a dozen or more divisions there, there was a civil
war between the Croatian people, the Moslem people, and the Serbian
people, which raged on for more than a year. Over 1 million casualties
and deaths resulted from that civil war, at the very time that Europe
was aflame in the battles of World War II. That is why we have to take
our time and be very, very cautious as we make further commitments.
I urge that committees look at the two amendments considered today.
They have not been looked at by any committee; we have only looked at
bits and pieces. I attended almost every briefing relating to the
former Yugoslavia in the past 2 years. I am sure other Senators have
done likewise. I have yet to sit down, except when I personally went
out to the three agencies, in a committee or briefing structure and
discuss and go through and discuss the consequences of lifting the
embargo. Whether we lift it unilaterally or in the context of an
agreement with our allies.
What are the consequences? I spelled out on Monday, where would the
weapons come from that go to the Moslems? How do they get there? What
period of time is involved? Who will train the Moslems in the use of
these weapons? Who will supply the spare parts?
Look at the roads, the means of conveying weapons to various areas of
that country. They are quite precarious, narrow, unpaved roads, with
weak bridges. Can they carry the heavy equipment? It is highly
vulnerable to insurgents who could blow out a bridge or destroy a piece
of a road. Would this damage cut off the logistic influx of these
weapons? It can be done in a moment. We would have to put in, or
someone would have to put in, security along almost the entire route.
Repairs would require a heavy commitment of forces, both combat and
combat engineers. I have not yet seen the document put forth by the
distinguished Republican leader; it is about how Croatia favors lifting
the embargo. I have not had time to read it; maybe others have. It was
produced just this morning.
What is the quid pro quo to Croatia for allowing the transport of
these weapons across their territory?
As I was walking in the hall, I met a member of my own committee, a
very seasoned and knowledgeable member. He said, ``Oh, John, you could
airdrop.''
I said, ``Just a minute, just a minute. Let's talk about
airdropping.''
There are some heavy artillery pieces that cannot be airdropped. You
cannot airdrop a tank. These are the things that at this moment create
the strong imbalance between the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian
Moslem forces. Airdropping those is not easy.
Then he said, ``Oh, but we can airdrop a number of other small
weapons.'' I said, ``That is true, but you can't drop them accurately
into those small enclaves.'' And there are three of them right there on
the border of Serbia proper, a diameter of not more than 25, 30 miles,
in some cases, and less than that. Airdropping is difficult. Try and
drop in one of those zones.
An expert army officer in airdropping took a map, showed me those
isolated areas designated as NATO safe areas and said, ``The closer you
bring the airplane dropping it to the ground, the greater the danger to
that aircraft from shoulder-fired air defense weapons.''
And he said further, ``Your climatic conditions are critical. Even if
they were perfect, you'd have a hard time hitting that small piece of
geography in that isolated area with a successful airdrop.''
And what happens if your airdrop is inaccurate? The supplies fall
into the hands of the Serbian forces, and we would then, in fact, be
arming them.
These are the types of questions that I hope we will spend some time
on so that each Senator fully understands these issues.
We had a good debate earlier today about the unilateral feature of
Senator Dole's amendment. I have spoken to that. I am firmly of the
opinion that the security arrangements that face this country today, as
they have in the past from World War I to World War II, are predicated
on credible relationships with our allies. Security relationships in
the future will continue to be dependent on the maintenance of those
credible relationships. We know the problem if we were to unilaterally
lift the embargo: It would jeopardize our future partnership with our
allies. That was covered very carefully today.
We entered this partnership in the Bosnian conflict with our allies.
I say we should continue that partnership and, under no circumstances,
in my judgment, should we break that partnership.
Because I was concerned that the majority leader's amendment states
that it is to protect the UNPROFOR, I asked him the following
questions: How much time have any of us spent in individual briefings
or in groups or in committee studying the consequences of removing the
UNPROFOR? Can they safely be withdrawn from their advance positions
where they are commingled now with factions on all sides? How much time
would be required? Suppose they are trapped in their retrograde or
withdrawal movement, supposing they are taken as hostages, what happens
to the members of UNPROFOR--not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but
throughout the region, indeed, in the remote parts of Croatia and
elsewhere? What happens to the victims of the former Yugoslavia who are
dependent on the food and medicine that is now getting through? What
happens when the UNPROFOR pulls out? What happens to those people?
The Mitchell amendment restricts the use of NATO air strikes to only
the safe zones. Those safe zones, six in number, are but a fraction of
the area of conflict. What happens if war breaks out in those zones?
Are we restricted from using air power as a deterrent? It is
inexplicit. We should not have any of these measures passed in a manner
that is inexplicit.
Of course, the Mitchell amendment calls for lifting the embargo and
``assistance be provided expeditiously,'' implying that weaponry is
going to come from the United States. I think the cautionary marker was
laid down; no one would go with the equipment to explain how it
operates; no one would be there to help repair it or to provide the
spare parts. You cannot arm a military force without equipment and
logistics training--another question that should be answered carefully.
What happens after a measure of armament reaches the Bosnian
Government? Is there any condition put on it: You will use it only for
defense of the current geography as it exists? What happens if they
utilize this military equipment to begin reclaiming some of the areas
that were wrongfully taken from them by the Serbian forces? Do we say
``stop''? Do we use air power to block their aggression?
I asked the distinguished majority leader, reading through his
amendment, if we fail to get concurrence among the allies, does that
bring our efforts to an end? I think he forthrightly said, ``No, if
they don't get that concurrence, we go to the U.N.'' I was not given
the time to ask him: Well, suppose the United Nations does not concur.
Then what do we do? Then it reads we go to Congress. And you can walk
through a chain of events under the amendment of the distinguished
majority leader which, in my judgment, brings you back again to the
unilateral question.
So I do not look at his solution as one that precludes eventual
unilateral action. But I would like to have that spelled out.
The last paragraph of the amendment of the distinguished majority
leader relates only to the use of air power, and I hope that if future
iterations are brought before the Senate they would apply the same
degree of protection to our Air Force and naval personnel that are
currently being employed as afforded by the last paragraph of the
amendment of the distinguished majority leader, as that provision would
accord future ground forces.
Mr. President, I thank the distinguished managers of the current
pending legislation for the opportunity to speak to this issue. As I
said, if there is no other Senator who has an objection when the
leadership brings forth a proposed course of action, I withdraw my
objection. I shall not interpose one. But if another Senator objects,
then I wish to have my objection reinstated and reserve the right to
evaluate that Senator's objection.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
Testimony of Larry E. Joyce, May 12, 1994
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my wife, Gail, and my daughter-
in-law, DeAnna, both of whom are here with me today--as well
as the rest of our family who are anxiously following the
actions of this committee--thank you, first of all, for
calling this hearing.
I firmly believe my son, Casey, and his 17 brave comrades
who gave their lives in Mogadishu last October are looking
down on us right now and saying, ``well done.''
Secondly, I'm sure I'm speaking for all the families of
those 18 courageous young men when I say ``thank you'' for
ordering the thorough and conscientious investigation that
your staff has recently completed.
We only hope that the Committee's inquiry into the policies
and decisions that led to the tragedy that robbed our
families and the nation of these incredibly dedicated young
men will not end today.
We hope you will agree with us that the implications of
those ill-fated policies and decisions also pose ominous
threats for this country.
Only a thorough review and corrective action can prevent
future Somalias.
I served two combat tours in Vietnam.
I survived the 1968 Tet Offensive.
And I want to tell the President and his administration:
Now it's MY turn to protest.
Because my Ranger son and I, both, served the same bogus
policy--a generation apart.
I want them to know that I am pointing at that beautiful
but sad memorial at the other end of the Mall--the one that
carries the names of 58,191 of my comrades--and I'm asking,
``When will we ever learn that committing troops to enforce
an invalid foreign policy leads to disaster.''
I wrote President Clinton on October 22 and asked to meet
with him so I could implore him to get the foreign policy
side of his administration in order.
I told him I didn't seek retribution, but only wanted to
see future military disasters are avoided.
I wanted him to see for himself the grim parallel between
the ill-fated policies of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that
I survived, and his Somalia policy that Casey did not
survive.
The President called me on November 10 and told me he
wanted to meet and discuss what I had learned during my
informal investigation.
I followed up several times, only to be told he was too
busy to meet with me.
He still hasn't fulfilled his promise.
So, Mr. Chairman, I'm doubly glad you fulfilled yours.
Our purpose here should be to tell every American who and
what contributed to this tragic episode--no matter how much
the President and his advisers would like us to forget it
along with the heroes who gave their lives in Mogadishu last
October.
We should also let everyone--especially the policy makers--
know the consequences of foreign policy that is developed
haphazardly and implemented by amateurs.
Too frequently, policy makers are insulated from the misery
they create.
If they could be with the chaplain who rings a doorbell at
6:20 in the morning to tell a 22-year-old woman she's now a
widow, they'd develop their policies more carefully.
This is why this hearing and, hopefully, future hearings on
Somalia are so important. This is why you must not stop here.
Call in the National Security Adviser. Ask him to explain
his role.
Call in the Secretary of State and his key staff. Call in
the Ambassador to the U.N. Call former and current DOD
officials--military and civilian.
Find out what role the President played.
In other words, don't just examine the actions of military
field commanders. They had the unenviable task of having to
implement a flawed mission.
They cannot answer the questions the White House has left
unresolved;
And these are questions I would want asked:
Who changed our mission in Somalia from one of humanitarian
relief to one of direct combat?
Why did they do it?
Why did we reduce our forces in Somalia from 30,000 to less
than 5,000, and then launch offensive operations?
As you know, the vast majority of those remaining troops
were in support units--not combat units.
Who decided capturing Mohammed Farah Aidid was in our
national interest?
Was it President Clinton, or did the Secretary General of
the United Nations manipulate that decision?
If Bourtos Boutros-Ghali extracted that decision from the
administration--if he put out a contract on Aidid and
President Clinton took it--then I contend that the President
abdicated his constitutional and moral responsibility as
commander-in-chief.
Why was only one company of Rangers sent to capture Aidid
How would they be reinforced?
Why was Specter gunship not available to them?
Why were they denied armor?
In short, this was an inadequate force structure from Day
One. Why?
Did field commanders and staff officers advise against the
frivolous mission the Ranger task force was eventually given?
I have enough faith in my old comrades-in-arms to say,
``Yes they did.'' I hope I'm not wrong.
Surely, they said it would be virtually impossible to track
down an expert in urban guerrilla warfare in the alleys of
Mogadishu--where he was once the police chief.
Surely, they said the intelligence apparatus in Somalia was
inadequate to support such a mission.
And surely, they advised the administration that light
infantry should never be committed into a situation where
they are likely to become decisively engaged, with no way to
reinforce or extract them.
Was this advice given? If not, why not? If it was, why was
it ignored?
In late September, I wrote Casey and predicted that he and
his fellow Rangers would be coming home in October because it
was clear to me that the President had decided on a
diplomatic rather than a military solution.
It was much later that I learned former President Carter
had been in contact with Aidid and had reported back to
President Clinton in September that a diplomatic solution was
the only solution for Somalia.
I felt it was obvious that any political settlement would
have to involve Aidid because he was the most stabilizing, if
not the only stabilizing, influence in Somalia.
So, my question is a simple one; If the President had
already decided, in September, to seek a diplomatic solution
with Aidid, why were Rangers ordered on October 3 to conduct
a raid that, by its very nature, would be the most dangerous
mission yet?
If we were going to negotiate with Aidid, why did we
continue to put our soldiers at risk by trying to capture him
and his henchmen?
And did we negotiate and collaborate with Aidid? We sure
did. We didn't just negotiate, we catered to him.
Senators, I can't tell you how angry I was when I learned,
two months after my son was killed, that the American mission
in Somalia ordered American soldiers to provide Aidid an
armed escort from his headquarters to the Mogadishu airport
so he could be flown to Addis Ababa aboard a U.S. Army
airplane.
It was Amateur Hour all over again!
And it's going to be hard to convince me that amateurs are
not the cause of my son's death--and the deaths of every
soldier who was killed in Somalia last October.
Now, if he's listening, and I hope he is, I have a question
for President Clinton.
Mr. President, if capturing Aidid was so important on
August 22 when you ordered the Rangers task force to Somalia,
why was capturing him suddenly so unimportant on October 4?
How do I explain to my family that Casey didn't die in
vain?
Mr. President, he did die in vain because the mission you
sent him on was seriously flawed and you were not even
committed to it.
He and his fellow Rangers, and the soldiers who fought to
rescue them, were betrayed by an administration that gave
them a no-win mission and didn't provide them the resources
and moral support they desperately needed.
Mr. Chairman, if we learn nothing else from this foreign
policy debacle it should be this: Before we send American
troops into combat, three questions must be asked?
1. Is the mission attainable?
2. Are American national interests at stake? And perhaps
most critical--
3. Are we willing to stay the course?
Now, apply those questions to Desert Storm and then to
Somalia.
Desert Storm gets three thumbs up.
Somalia gets three thumbs down.
Maybe some of you remember where you were and what you were
doing last October 3. I certainly do--as do all those who
were closely associated with the events in Somalia that day.
My life was as close to being perfect as it had ever been--
or will ever be again. I had a 7:30 tee time at a public
course that runs along Lake Michigan.
It was a cool and beautiful Sunday morning in Chicago.
But--half way around the world--it was a hot and dusty
Sunday afternoon in Mogadishu where Casey and his Ranger and
Delta Force comrades were taking off in helicopters.
While I was putting on the third green, Casey was dodging
AK-47 rounds as he was rescuing PFC Todd Blackburn.
As I was trying to get out of the rough and on to the fifth
fairway, Casey was fighting his way to the crash site where
Warrant Officer Briley and Warrant Officer Wolcott were
pinned in the wreckage.
As I was walking off the ninth green, some of Casey's
buddies were fighting their way back to the Mogadishu airport
in a Humvee with Casey's lifeless body on board.
In the time it takes to play nine holes of golf, a tragedy
of enormous proportions had unfolded. Lives--including my
son's--had been taken.
Other lives--including my wife's, my daughter-in-law's, and
my own life--had been destroyed.
And yet, we are more fortunate than some. My heart aches
for those mothers and fathers who know the bodies of their
sons fell into Somali hands.
I emphasize with Jim and Carol Smith who live every waking
moment wondering if Jamie would be alive today if he could
have been evacuated before he bled to death.
I want to help Carmen Houston of Mobile, Alabama who can't
get a straight answer on how her husband, SGT Cornell
Houston, died.
He was assigned to C Company, 41st Engineer Battalion from
Ft. Drum.
She can't even get an autopsy report.
If any member of this committee wants to help Carmen,
please let me know.
The Rangers and the wives of the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger
Regiment have been a great source of comfort and support to
Gail, DeAnna and me.
They have my undying gratitude.
I'm grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for your kindness when
you met with Gail, the Smiths, and me last month at Ft.
Benning.
Thank you, also, for inviting us to testify here today.
I'm also indebted to Rick DeBobes of this committee's staff
for his candor and his responsiveness to my questions.
To certain members of this committee, especially Senator
Hutchinson, and the other members of Congress, like Senator
Gramm and Congressman Dornan, who reached out to us in those
first few terrible weeks--thank you for your compassion and
your support.
But, to those who wish the nation would just forget what
happened on October 3--forget those ``unfortunate losses''
President Clinton referred to last October when he was trying
to get Somalia behind him--let me close by reading the eulogy
I gave my son so you, like I ask President Clinton, to do,
can put a face on at least one of those ``unfortunate
losses.''
I might add that our pack is stronger now. It's been
strengthened by the thousands of Americans who have expressed
their support for us over the past seven months.
To each of them, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, please take an
important step so that Casey, Jamie Smith, Dominick Pilla,
Cornell Houston and all the other brave young men who died
and were wounded in Somalia did not do so in vain. Don't let
this be your last hearing. You can make sure the mistakes of
Somalia don't happen again.
____
Testimony of James H. Smith, May 12, 1994
Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, I wish to express my
appreciation for the opportunity to testify at this committee
hearing. I would also like to take this opportunity to
express my gratitude for the committee's diligent work in
investigating the events preceding, during and after the
Mogadishu battle of October 3, 1993.
My name is James H. Smith. I am joined today by my wife
Caroline. Immediately after graduating from high school in
1965, I enlisted in the Army. I was only 17 years old, but I
wanted to be a Paratrooper. I responded to the challenge of
military life and was fortunate to attend Officers Candidate
School. I was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the
Infantry and served in Vietnam with the 4th Infantry Division
and the 25th Infantry Division. In July 1967, as member of
the 3rd Brigade Task Force (Tropic Lightning), I was severely
wounded in a firefight. I spent the next two years in an Army
Hospital recovering. I survived, but my left leg was
amputated just below the knee.
In the early evening of October 4, 1993, my wife Carol
arrived home from work to be met by two Army officers. The
officers performed their obligation with professionalism and
compassion. Our son Jamie had been killed in action. Carol
called me at work and I immediately left a business meeting
to be with my family. That evening I met with the press.
After the expected questions of: ``How would you describe
your son?'', and, ``What were his hobbies?'' I was asked two
very pointed questions: ``Did my son's death serve a
purpose?''--and--``Am I angry or do I blame anyone? My answer
was also direct: ``If my son's death can keep Somali children
from starving, my son's death had a purpose'', ``No, I am not
angry. My son was a Ranger. He knew the risks and so did I. I
do not blame anyone!''
On October 12, 1993 Jamie was buried at Fort Benning.
Immediately after the services I met with some of the
veterans of the Mogadishu battle. They had bandaged arms,
casts on their legs, walked with crutches and were in
wheelchairs. We talked for several hours. I left that meeting
with three firm beliefs:
First: My son's death served no purpose. His courage and
sacrifice had been wasted.
Second: The Rangers had been betrayed. Denied proper combat
support and unreliable U.N. allies, disaster was preordained.
There must be accountability.
Third: I was angry. As a disabled Vietnam Veteran I had the
responsibility, the obligation, to insure that my son's
generation did not suffer the fate of his father's
generation.
My meeting, on October 12th, with the veterans of the
Mogadishu battle was to be the first of many meetings and
conversations. These contacts would be in the barracks,
hospital, headquarters, on the telephone and in our home. I
have spoken with virtually every veteran of that battle and
the entire command structure--from the squad leader to
commanding general. Unknown to me at that time, Larry Joyce
was proceeding on a parallel inquiry. When Larry and I met at
the 3rd Ranger Battalion memorial service in November 1993,
we compared our findings. We had independently come to the
same conclusions.
I am in complete agreement with Larry's comments. However,
I would add that beyond the failures of the White House
leadership to supply proper combat support and mismanaging
the Somalia policy; the unacceptable conditions that existed
in Somalia with the United Nations officials and peacekeeping
forces, as they negatively affected our troops, must be
investigated.
Although the concept of a U.N. multinational peacekeeping
force appears the appropriate direction for U.S. involvement
in such conflict situations, the conditions in Somalia
resulted in the Rangers being placed in a situation without
reliable allies and, in certain cases, U.N. peacekeeping
forces actually supporting the enemy. Specifically:
U.N. peacekeeping forces were fragmented by geographic
areas of responsibility. Forces from one country routinely
refused to come to the aid of another nation's military unit
that was under attack if the battle was outside their
geographic area of responsibility. For example: the Italians
did not come to the aid of the Nigerians. Therefore, when the
Americans required assistance the Malaysians had no desire to
support the Americans--since the battle was not their
concern.
Aidid's informers or sympathizers had completely
infiltrated the U.N. bureaucracy, the peacekeeping forces and
charitable organizations. Additionally there were numerous
examples of U.N. officials and peacekeeping forces actively
or tacitly supporting Aidid. Therefore, secrecy in military
operations was impossible. For example: there were numerous
reports of Aidid's forces using U.N. or charitable
organization's radios and telephone as his military
communications network.
Other than the U.S. forces, there was no effort on the part
of other U.N. peacekeeping units to disarm the militia and
maintain order. For example: Egyptian peacekeeping forces,
rather than disarm the militia, would give receipts for
weapons so that when the militia left their area the weapon
could be returned.
Except for U.S. forces, the multinational peacekeeping
units ignored their responsibilities to secure their areas
and eliminate the flow of weapons into Mogadishu. Trucks
would enter the Italian sector from outside the city and the
Italian peacekeepers would only direct traffic and not
inspect the trucks. The result was a buildup of weapons by
Aidid's militia and the ability of this force to attack the
Rangers with superior numbers and firepower.
These conditions could not be resolved by our military
field commanders. These problems are strictly political in
nature. Their resolution could only come from our political
leaders demanding that the U.N. leadership correct the
situation. This was never done, and to the best of my
knowledge, correcting these conditions was never attempted.
The result was my son's Commander-in-Chief allowed American
troops into a combat situation that at best had unreliable
allies, or at worse, allies that actively supported the man
who had already killed American soldiers.
This condition is unacceptable. It is imperative that these
issues be investigated and resolved. This resolution can only
be satisfied by holding those in elected and appointed
positions of authority accountable for their inaction or
dereliction. This requires that additional hearings be held
by the Armed Services Committee for these issues can only be
answered by the White House staff members involved in the
decision making process.
Specifically we must learn: What was the decision making
process in the White House? Who was involved? When were they
involved? To what extent was the President, Vice President,
National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State and the Ambassador to the United Nations involved?
Additionally, what input did U.N. Envoy Jonathan Howe and
U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali have on the
deployment, combat support and rules of engagement decisions.
To determine the cause of the Somalia fiasco these concerns
must be clarified.
Our men and women in uniform deserve better than the
``disaster waiting to happen conditions'' that existed in
Somalia. As a disabled Vietnam veteran, I do not want any
young man or woman to experience my pain when wounded; nor as
a parent of a soldier killed in action, do I want other loved
ones to experience my grief--because of a flawed foreign
policy or a failure to support our troops in battle.
Additional hearings must beheld. Not as a witch hunt to
blame field commanders. The officers made no tactical errors
and the troops perform magnificently. Nor as revenge or
retribution for past mistakes by elected or appointed
officials. But as a quest for the truth so that future
Vietnams and Somalias are avoided.
Last weekend my wife and I visited Arlington National
Cemetery, not as tourists, but to honor the grave of Sergeant
James C. Joyce. I had prepared myself emotionally for this
pilgrimage, but I was not prepared for the reality. As I
stood saying a silent prayer at Casey's grave, I noticed that
to the left of Casey's grave was the grave of MSG Timothy
Martin, and to the left of his grave was the grave of PFC
Richard Kowalewski. With tears streaming down my face I
remembered my first visit to the Vietnam Memorial. Over
58,000 names carved in stone. Now I was gazing upon three
more names carved in stone--soldiers who gave the last full
measure. Sadly, like the generation before them, the
sacrifice of these three brave soldiers had been wasted.
It is probably that America's military will be called to
battle in the near future. However, our men and women in
uniform must never again be placed in a ``Somalia''
situation. A quarter of a century ago my generation was
ground up in the rice paddies and jungles of Vietnam. We must
not allow the next generation to suffer the same fate. If
additional hearings are not held, I fear that more Americans
will suffer the fate of Vietnam and Somalia.
Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). The Senator from Nebraska is
recognized.
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