[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 57 (Wednesday, May 11, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 11, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
           LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

  Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, as we reflect on whether to arm the 
Bosnians, there are some important questions that should guide our 
deliberations. This has been a frequently discussed option in Congress, 
as well as the constant request of the Bosnian Government for the past 
year. Bosnian Moslem forces have been outmatched by the stronger Serb 
forces, which benefited from most of the supplies left over from the 
former federal Yugoslav army. Some believe that the current arms 
embargo only reinforces that disparity. They also believe that arming 
the Bosnians would not only equalize the conflict, but would lead to 
the Serbs accepting a permanent cease-fire, if not a political 
settlement. On the other side, opponents of lifting the embargo--most 
of our European allies and Russia among them--would say that instead of 
``leveling the playing field,'' lifting the arms embargo would ``level 
the killing fields,'' increasing the violence without coming any closer 
to a diplomatic solution.
  As it now stands, the Serbs control about 70 percent of the land in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there has been very little resistance so 
far to the advancing Serb army. We have to ask ourselves if it is not 
too later for a newly armed resistance in Bosnia to take back any of 
this land, or bring any measurable success to the Bosnians, especially 
since other nations will inevitably come to the aid of the Serbs if we 
begin backing the Moslems militarily. Will the fighting and killing 
only escalate?
  There are several logistical issues that must be raised here as well. 
The most important are the questions of what types of arms should be 
provided and how they could be delivered with certainty and relative 
safety to Bosnian forces. These forces have no suitable access to the 
coast; high altitude airdrops, as demonstrated with the food and 
medicine flights, run the risk of some military supplies falling into 
the wrong hands; and low altitude airdrops, while minimizing this risk, 
increase the likelihood of American casualties. Croatia would 
necessarily play a crucial role in any such arms supply effort. 
Although there is currently a Moslem-Croat alliance, it is shaky at 
best.
  Beyond these basic logistical concerns, there are more profound 
political issues to be considered. What would be the purpose of the 
arms supplies? If the answer is simply to equalize the fighting, the 
most likely immediate result would be increased violence and casualties 
on all sides, destroying any remaining hope for a negotiated settlement 
in the near term. Some believe strongly that equalization would be 
sufficient in itself to force the Serbs to accept a cease-fire, but we 
have no way of knowing or testing such a hypothesis. Is it a gamble 
worth taking? Would the implementation of other resolutions, including 
ones imposing sanctions on Serbia and other former Yugoslavia 
republics, be undermined by lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia? 
Would current humanitarian efforts be underminded?
  How long would arms be supplied? If the Serbs were to accept a 
ceasefire, it might prove necessary to continue arming the Bosnians to 
guard against the possible breakdown of the truce. If, on the other 
hand, Serbian militia forces continue to be successful militarily, then 
we face three options: Continue arms supplies to Bosnian forces in the 
continued hope of equalizing the conflict; intervene militarily, 
probably with ground forces; or discontinue arms supplies based on the 
view that arming the Bosnians has not worked. Are any of these options 
palatable or politically acceptable?
  Although arming the Bosnian Moslems is likely to be overt rather than 
covert, the resulting options are strikingly similar to those the 
United States has faced in past large-scale paramilitary operations. 
Unless the operation shows demonstrable success, the only remaining 
courses of action are a marked increase in intervention or a 
willingness to end the operation, often without being able to safeguard 
those forces that have been supported. Again, we would be faced with 
rather unpalatable options.
  Opponents of any expanded United States role in stopping the fighting 
in Bosnia say the end of the cold war has reduced Yugoslavia's 
strategic importance to the United States. They argue that the United 
States should leave the solution of the crisis to the Europeans, whose 
interests are far more directly concerned than ours.
  But most of the European leaders I have spoken with in my role as 
chairman of the Senate delegation to the parliamentary arm of NATO 
would like to see more intervention by NATO and the United Nations, two 
organizations whose dependence upon the United States is obvious. They 
support air strikes and perhaps would even be in favor of land-force 
intervention, but continue to oppose arming the Bosnians out of fear 
that the conflict would spill over to other areas of the Balkans that 
have not been touched by fighting, thus destabilizing a wide area of 
Europe.
  Opponents also compare the crisis to Lebanon or Northern Ireland, two 
areas where deeply rooted ethnic and religious conflicts are not 
amenable to military solutions. They believe it unlikely that even a 
massive bombing campaign could by itself stop the Serb forces or force 
them to give up the land they have captured. It is not inconceivable 
that the Serbs could draw on their history of resistance to outside 
forces and dig in their heels, drawing the United States into a 
guerilla war like the one fought against the Germans in mountainous 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during World War II. Additionally, the intervening 
force would have to do much of the work largely on its own, since 
Bosnian Croat forces have proven dubious in their loyalty to the 
Bosnian Government in the past.

  Our bottom line is that we have absolutely no idea--logistically, 
politically, diplomatically, or militarily--what would occur as a 
result of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. There are any number of 
possible outcomes, most of which are bad. The only good one--a victory 
for the Bosnian Moslems--is highly unlikely, even with weapons. Since 
this is the case, it is clear that if we err at all, it should be on 
the side of caution, as terrible as the status quo is. The potential 
cost of erring on the side of chance is simply too great in this case.
  As sad as it may be, American and other leaders may be left with a 
situation where there are no suitable diplomatic venues or military 
plans that are acceptable. If this is the case, we will have to decide 
whether we can live with the status quo--largely accepting the 
partition of Bosnia, and perhaps then turn our attention to policies 
designed to contain the conflict within its present borders. What we 
may be faced with at this late stage in the game is a choice between 
living with the status quo throughout containment, or arming the 
Bosnian Moslems so they can have the honor of going down fighting.
  Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally, as the Dole 
resolution calls for, would set a dangerous precedent. It would, in 
effect, ``Americanize'' the fighting in the Balkans and possibly lead 
to more extensive United States involvement later. The public clearly 
does not support this, and it does not appear that it is in our 
national interests to do so. Senator Mitchell's language provides 
safeguards against making this a strictly American operation.
  In my judgment, it would be in Congress's best interest to get a 
formal briefing and detailed analysis from military and intelligence 
officials concerning some of these questions. We need to know what the 
professionals think. Is this a good move? What is our timeframe for 
involvement? Are the Bosnians sufficiently trained to operate the 
weaponry once they get it? What kinds of weapons would be effective?
  While I will support the Mitchell amendment, I do so with grave 
reservation, since any arming of the Bosnians may be too little too 
late, even if done through the auspices of the United Nations, and 
NATO. Regardless of what measure we adopt relative to Bosnia, I think 
it is vital for the relevant committees to get a formal briefing from 
Pentagon and intelligence officials to help answer some of the 
logistical and political questions which have been raised.

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