[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 57 (Wednesday, May 11, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 11, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
BOSNIA
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, yesterday, and in days preceding it, there
has been an ongoing debate about Bosnia. I would like to take a few
moments, if I may, to discuss the amendment which is pending on the
floor and to add some thoughts to this debate. This is an important
debate for the U.S. Senate to have, and one which will have very far-
reaching ramifications for the people of Bosnia, for the diplomatic
efforts of the international community and, particularly, for U.N.
peacekeepers on the ground.
I think it is fair to say that there is not one of us in the U.S.
Senate, in this country, or among civilized people around the world,
who has not been distressed or horrified by the atrocities that have
been perpetrated by the Serbs against the Bosnian people: the wholesale
violation of the rules of war, the emptying of whole villages through
ethnic cleansing, the orphanization of children, and the rape of
countless young women and girls as a systematic strategy of war. Many
people had hoped the civilized world had put these things behind, or
failing that, that the international community would be able to do more
about them or prevent them entirely.
We also are outraged by the defiance of the Bosnian Serbs in
attacking civilians as well as international peacekeepers in the U.N.-
declared ``safe havens.'' They have demonstrated a reckless disregard
for the norms of international law and warfare by shelling hospitals,
holding relief workers hostage, and attacking peacekeepers who are
trying to protect innocent civilians.
We are angered by the violations of cease-fires by Bosnian Serb
commanders and by the intransigence of those who represent the Bosnian
Serbs at the negotiating table. We are frustrated by the collective
failure of the international community to bring an end to this
conflict, which has the potential of spreading to Kosovo, Albania,
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, or Turkey. In light of that potential, we
need to think very carefully about the idea of unilateral lifting.
The transgressions of the Bosnian Serbs are so heinous that the
international community, long ago, should have summoned a greater
response for its outrage. Had we done this, the situation might be
different today. But we did not, and that is why we suddenly find
ourselves discussing the possibility of unilaterally lifting the arms
embargo.
In the wake of our frustration, outrage, and anger, we want to take
some action that will make a difference. That is the American
instinct--to want to respond to this kind of problem and to make it
clear to the world that we have a different standard of behavior. It is
not just an American standard; it is a universal standard embodied in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
We want to level the playing field. We want to give the Bosnian
Moslems a fair chance to ``defend'' themselves against this enemy that
is more powerful and better equipped.
We know that there is an inequity in the embargo that was put into
effect by the United Nations because it has allowed the Bosnian Serbs
to be supplied while denying the Bosnian Moslems the weapons that they
need. That is why so many of us pressed more than a year ago for the
lifting of the embargo, to give the Bosnian Moslems a chance to defend
themselves. The problem is that you cannot take the response that was
appropriate a year or more ago and transfer it to the situation you
have today and necessarily have the same result, or even the result
that you want to achieve, which is to minimize the fighting and end the
killing.
I would respectfully submit to my colleagues, whom I know feel as
passionately as I about this situation, that to move at this particular
moment to lift the embargo unilaterally will work counter to their
intentions and may indeed have the far more dangerous effect of
escalating the violence, increasing the killing, prolonging the war,
and involving the United States in ways which we have assiduously tried
to avoid.
The pending amendment mandates that the President terminate the
United States arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia upon
receipt of a request from that Government for assistance in exercising
its right of self-defense.
The right of self-defense, which has been used to justify this
particular step, is in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
The first part of that article suggests that every nation has a right
of self-defense and that the United Nations cannot take that away from
them. However, the article also suggests that where the United Nations
is involved in an international peacekeeping effort, a state cannot
invoke the right of self-defense in contravention of those efforts.
We have conflict in Bosnia but we also have an international effort
to restore the peace. The troops on the ground are not our troops, but
they are troops of some of our key NATO allies, and they are at risk.
Our allies do not want to lift this embargo at this moment. By voting
for the pending amendment, we are telling the very nations that have
their troops on the ground that we, who have no troops on the ground,
are willing to lift the embargo and put their troops at risk.
Moreover, like it or not, we have been, and are viewed as, a neutral
party vis-a-vis the current conflict. We are not viewed as having
chosen a side, except the side of the United Nations. We are viewed as
neutrally trying to press for peace. Given our role in the negotiations
and our position over the last year and a half, lifting the embargo
unilaterally will wipe away the neutrality and send the message to the
Bosnian Serbs that all of a sudden the United States has decided we are
coming in on the side of the Bosnian Moslems. The effect of that, as
Senator Glenn has well pointed out, is to pave the way for the delivery
of military assistance.
If you are a Bosnian Serb and all of a sudden you see a lot of
weapons coming in from the United States, which has suddenly decided to
help the Bosnian Moslems, your response is going to be: ``We better
take them out fast before they learn how to use those weapons. We
better start augmenting our campaign. And since the United States is
willing to alter the balance of power and to abandon its neutrality, to
hell with the safe havens and the exclusion zones. We are now going to
have to fight this to the bitter end.''
So, unilateral lifting would not advance the negotiating process.
Rather, it would have the unfortunate impact of putting the troops of
our allies in jeopardy, forcing our allies to consider whether or not
to withdraw their forces from UNPROFOR altogether, and ending the
humanitarian relief efforts.
It does not make sense. We are going to deny ourselves the very
things we have been struggling, through the United Nations, to achieve
over the course of the past months.
I have heard my colleagues come to the floor and plead for lifting
the embargo now in order to allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend
themselves. I agree that they should have had that right long ago. But
in May 1994, that plea has a different meaning. That plea does not
really just mean ``Give us the right to defend ourselves.'' It really
means ``We want the weapons to be able to fight, to roll back the gains
made by the Bosnian Serbs.''
The same intransigence that the Bosnian Serbs have demonstrated at
the bargaining table would now grow within the Bosnian Moslems. They
would not negotiate to a conclusion because they would suddenly say:
``Now we've got the weapons; now we can fight back. We are going to get
this corridor back, and we are going to get this town back, and we are
not going to go to the negotiating table until we have achieved what we
want in terms of a bargaining position.'' So the war will go on, not
end.
If we lift the embargo unilaterally, as the pending amendment
contemplates, Bosnian Moslems, rightly so, will regard us as their
patron and protector. They will see themselves as our client. The
Bosnian Serbs, their supporters in Belgrade and Moscow, and others in
the international community will see it this way too.
The request from the Government of Bosnian will be coming across our
fax machine within minutes if this amendment is approved. Who is going
to deliver the weapons? The CIA or will they be sent through some back
channel? And what happens to those weapons ultimately? Do we really
want to start loading up this area with more weapons at this point in
time?
I believe that unilateral lifting of the embargo would sound the
death knell for diplomacy, for the time being. It would send a message
to the warring parties, to the United Nations, and to our NATO allies
that we, the United States, have given up on the negotiations. It would
send a message that we believe our collective strategy is falling apart
at the very moment, incidentally, that the Croats and the Bosnians have
signed an agreement and are moving to a confederation and at the very
moment that we have achieved, through the threat of air strikes, the
safety of Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Zepa.
All of a sudden we would be saying, ``To hell with it. We are going
to let them fight it out.'' The result would be that the negotiations
would be deterred, not advanced.
I would respectfully suggest that the approach of the Senator from
Maine, the majority leader, is the sensible approach, because it asks
that we go on record in favor of lifting the embargo in conjunction
with others in the international community, particularly those with
people at risk on the ground.
It is no secret that our NATO allies are not in favor of lifting the
arms embargo at this time. They would regard our doing so as a
deliberate attempt to undermine the sanctions regime imposed by the
United Nations--a regime which we supported and voted for.
I would remind my colleagues again--and this is not a small matter--
that our allies are the ones with the peacekeepers on the ground. They
are the ones whose soldiers are at risk. It is not America that has had
the courage to come forward and say we will put people on the ground.
If we lift the embargo and peacekeepers get killed because of
intensified fighting, our allies will hold us accountable. If we lift
the embargo and our allies have the perception that the danger to their
forces has substantially increased, they may pull some or all of their
forces out of UNPROFOR. That could lead to the collapse of the
humanitarian relief effort in towns like Sarajevo, Goradze, Srebrenica
and Zepa, where Bosnian civilians are surrounded by Serb forces. As a
result, we would wind up in the totally contradictory position of
trying to help the Moslems defend themselves while at the same time
contributing to the demise of the international effort that is helping
them to survive. Who, then, would bear the responsibility for
protecting and feeding threatened civilians? Many would point to us!
I might add there is another factor that our colleagues who want to
move unilaterally have not considered--Russia. In recent weeks the
Russians have played a very responsible role vis-a-vis the Serbs. If we
act unilaterally at a time when our allies in Moscow oppose this
lifting, we run the risk of alienating the Russians, putting enormous
pressure on Boris Yeltsin, and encouraging them to dig in their heels
in support of their ethnic kin, the Serbs. Zhirinovsky and others will
have a field day pointing to the fickle United States of America, which
operates unilaterally because of its own grand designs on the people of
that region. He and his supporters will press Yeltsin to help the
Bosnian Serbs.
I think we should also recognize that lifting the arms embargo
unilaterally would encourage many of our allies who have supported
other embargos to say, ``Well, if the United States can unilaterally do
this, we can unilaterally pull out of this other embargo,'' most
particularly the embargo on Iraq. Unilateral termination of the United
States embargo on Bosnia ultimately could undo our own policy with
respect to Iraq.
Proponents of lifting the embargo now argue that it would bring an
end to the conflict because the Bosnian Serbs would be deterred from
fighting further once the Moslems have access to heavy weapons. Well, I
respectfully suggest that the history of that war and the history of
the Balkans defy that presumption.
Heavy weapons in the hands of the Moslems would provide a strong
incentive for Belgrade to decide that more people ought to become
involved. Then, we will be asking ourselves what to do now? Do we
commit NATO to this conflict in a whole-hog fashion to roll back
territorial gains by the Serbs? I have no doubt about who would win,
but I am just questioning whether that is the next step we want to
take.
Over the last 25 months, the Bosnian Serbs have proven their
determination to fight and fight and fight in the face of extraordinary
odds. They have won a lot of territory on the battlefield. I think most
people agree, and the President has again and again said, that this is
not going to be resolved ultimately on the battlefield; it is going to
be resolved at the bargaining table. We are at that table and we should
not give people an incentive to leave it.
According to the State Department, the Bosnian Government would
probably need very large, heavy-caliber weapons, including medium and
heavy artillery, medium-tanks and long-range antitank weapons,
including the TOW. No doubt these weapons would increase the firepower
of the Bosnian Government forces, but be assured they would increase
the level and the intensity of fighting as well.
Mr. President, the distinguished leaders of this body have given us a
choice. The minority leader's amendment offers us the opportunity to go
on record in support of unilateral lifting of the embargo in the very
near term, as soon as the request for assistance comes in from the
Government of Bosnia. The majority leader's amendment allows us to
support the air strike option and to recognize the desire of the Senate
to move forward to lift the embargo as part of a multilateral effort. I
think the latter is the better approach and the more responsible
choice.
Multilateral lifting would keep us in league with our allies. It
would send a stronger signal of international disapproval of Bosnian
Serb behavior because it would be a multilateral action not a
unilateral action. It would enhance our ability to bring pressure to
bear on the Bosnian Serbs.
Mr. President, as I have said again and again, unilateral lifting
might have been the right option at the outset of this conflict because
it would have equalized the situation. The fighting and the victories
on the battlefield would have occurred under a different balance of
power. However, if we lift now, unilaterally, we run the risk of
jeopardizing all of our efforts to resolve this conflict.
Progress at the negotiating table has been slow and painstaking.
Nevertheless in recent weeks diplomacy has paid off. Agreements have
been reached between the Bosnian Moslems and Bosnian Croats. The
Governments of Bosnia and Croatia have now concluded an agreement on
confederation.
The diplomatic process has been reinvigorated through the so-called
contact group, that is Russia, the United States, and the European
Community. With NATO poised to strike Bosnian Serb forces that attack
safe havens or violate the exclusion zones, the contact group is now in
a much stronger position to press for movement at the table than at any
other time in the past.
And since the establishment of an exclusion zone around Goradze, the
fighting on the ground has almost calmed down. People said weeks ago,
``How are we going to save Goradze? Lift the embargo.'' Lifting the
embargo would not have saved Goradze. We did not lift the embargo but
we did save Goradze. It proves that we have alternatives that are
working at this moment in time.
Although the Bosnian Serbs have failed to comply completely with the
United Nations requirements for the removal of weapons from the
exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Goradze, the establishment of the
zones, coupled with the threat of NATO air power, has improved the
situation for civilians trapped within those towns.
The shelling has stopped, civilians are no longer being hurt or
killed, and humanitarian aid is once again being delivered. Why one
would want to make the move that undoes those accomplishments is beyond
me.
Undoubtedly the deterrent value of NATO air power depends on the
willingness of the United Nations to use it. I believe we have to
streamline the command and control and eliminate the reluctance of Mr.
Akashi to support those commanders on the ground who ought to have the
right to protect their troops when needed. We have a command and
control problem and we ought to solve it. But it is important to
recognize, this problem aside, that the international community does
have a strategy today for penalizing the Bosnian Serbs for violations.
That strategy ought to be given a chance to work.
If it does not work, if our allies decide there is no other course,
we have the leverage under the Mitchell amendment to empower the
President and the allies to move on the embargo. I would support that.
But I do not think that at this particular moment, alone, with the
restoration of the safe havens and the progress on the diplomatic
effort, that this unilateral move is sensible or advisable.
For the United States, as the leader of the international community,
to go its own way with an effort that has so many downsides measured
against the upsides, is not only dangerous but it flies against our own
efforts to encourage others to cooperate and to resolve disputes in
multilateral fora. I hope my colleagues will agree and that we will
adopt the position of the majority leader and reject a move that flies
against our own diplomatic efforts, our own history in terms of
multilateral approaches, the dictates of the situation on the ground,
and the current diplomatic-military structure that we find ourselves
in.
I yield whatever time I have left.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kohl). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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