[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 57 (Wednesday, May 11, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 11, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
OPPOSITION TO DEATH ROW QUOTAS
(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, recently the California District Attorneys
Association, an organization which includes all of the elected district
attorneys of California's 58 counties unanimously adopted a resolution
expressing adamant opposition to the Racial Justice Act provisions
included by the House as part of the crime bill. If adopted, those
provisions would effectively establish racial quotas for the death
penalty. The 58 county prosecutors believe that these provisions will
produce a number of damaging effects on California's and the Nation's
ability to control crime.
I agree.
These officials--who have frontline responsibility for prosecuting
California's criminals--oppose any version of this so-called racial
justice legislation for the following reasons:
First, enactment of these provisions would result in effectively
abolishing capital punishment. The language requires that each State
show that the death penalty was sought in all cases involving a capital
offense.
Second, there would be even further clogging of California's and
other States' desperately overcrowded court system. The retroactive
application of the Racial Justice Act would permit people already
convicted of capital crimes to petition to have their cases reopened.
In California alone, there are 376 such individuals on death row.
Third, this Act disregards the fundamental principle of our criminal
justice system that an individuals tried on the facts of his or her
case.
Fourth, it eliminates the traditional deference to State-court
findings and places them under Federal guidelines.
Fifth, most seriously, it encourages a quota system based on race for
deciding capital punishment cases.
Sixth, and finally, under this Racial Justice Act, the costs to
taxpayers and to local governments would be absolutely exorbitant
amounts of money to retry these cases, and the endless appeals that the
habeas corpus system provides.
I join with the California District Attorneys Association in the
belief that the many positive elements of the crime bill are undermined
by the inclusion of this racial justice provision. It opposes
fundamental notions of our criminal justice system. It must not be
included in the final conference report.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the following resolution of
April 29, 1994, from the California District Attorneys Association:
California District Attorneys Association--Adopted April 29, 1994,
Concerning the Racial Justice Act
Whereas, the California District Attorneys Association is
an organization composed of the elected District Attorneys of
California's fifty-eight counties and 3,000 deputy district
attorneys and city prosecutors;
Whereas, on April 21, 1994, the U.S. House of
Representatives adopted the omnibus crime bill, H.R. 4092,
which included in Title IX legislation, referred to, and
known as, the Racial Justice Act (or the Racially
Discriminatory Capital Sentencing Act);
Whereas, on April 20, 1994, the U.S. House of
Representatives narrowly defeated the McCollum Amendment to
strike the Racial Justice Act from the House crime bill and
substitute in its place the Equal Justice Act. [The vote was
an effective 212 to 212 tie, after the votes of the five
Delegate members were excluded under recent House Rules.];
Whereas, the Racial Justice Act would, first, permit a
capital case defendant to make a statistical showing that
death sentences are being imposed or administered in a
disproportionate manner upon (1) persons of one race or (2)
as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one
race, and, second, require the prosecutor to rebut this
statistical showing ``by a preponderance of the evidence'';
Whereas, in the 102d Congress, on June 20, 1991, the U.S.
Senate voted to strike a similar measure entitled the Racial
Justice Act out of the omnibus crime measure by a bipartisan
vote of 55 to 41 (this was the third successive Congress in
which the U.S. Senate rejected the Racial Justice Act), and
on October 22, 1991, the U.S. House of Representatives voted
to strike a similar measure by a bipartisan vote of 223 to
191;
Whereas, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a discrimination
claim founded solely upon statistics, in McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Now, therefore, be it resolved that in light of the urgency
and importance of this matter, all 58 California district
attorneys, having been polled, unanimously:
(1) oppose any version of the Racial Justice Act, for the
following reasons:
(a) The Racial Justice Act would result in the effective
abolition of capital punishment.
This would result because of the inherent evidentiary
difficulties and inevitable vast expenditures of time and
money in litigation in every post-conviction capital case, to
prove by at least a preponderance of the evidence a negative,
to wit, that race was not the basis for any of the
prosecutor's, jury's, or judge's decisions. [The Racial
Justice Act contains a virtually impossible rebuttal burden:
``Unless [the prosecutor or State] can show that the death
penalty was sought in all cases fitting the statutory
criteria for imposition of the death penalty, the government
cannot rely on mere assertions that it did not intend to
discriminate or that the cases in which death was imposed fit
the statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty.];
(b) moreover, as to adjudicated cases, the retroactive
application of the Racial Justice Act would permit convicted
capital defendants to reopen their cases by presenting
discrimination claims (regardless of whether such claims had
previously been rejected). In California, there are currently
376 individuals on death row. The retroactive provision in
the Racial Justice Act as passed by the House would
potentially affect these cases as well as others around the
nation;
(c) the statistical premise of any version of the Racial
Justice Act is unsound, for several reasons, including:
(i) it disregards the fundamental precept of our criminal
justice system that an individual is tried on the facts of
his or her case, not on the facts or circumstances or
statistics from unrelated cases;
(ii) it overturns the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of
such a statistical premise, where the Court noted with regard
to the Baldus study: ``Even Professor Baldus does not contend
that his statistics prove that race enters into any capital
sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's
particular case. Statistics at most may show only a
likelihood that a particular factor entered into some
decisions.'' McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987)
(emphasis in original); and
(iii) its statistical showing fails to establish that the
imposition of capital punishment in a particular case is
predicated on any bias; and
(d) the Racial Justice Act would permit the ``second-
guessing'' of capital case decisions by prosecutors, defense
counsel, judges and juries based upon the information and
statistics required to be maintained under the Act;
(e) the Racial Justice Act eliminates the traditional
deference to state-court findings of fact, 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), if the
state fails to collect or maintain adequate records required
under the Act, and causes the individual conviction, though
lawfully and justifiably imposed, to be unduly placed in
jeopardy;
(f) the potential cost of compliance on states and local
entities would be exorbitant, as demonstrated by one
California case (In re Earl Jackson) which took three years
to prepare for an evidentiary hearing and cost more than
$1,000,000. The evidentiary hearing was never held, after the
McCleskey v. Kemp ruling was rendered;
(g) the Racial Justice Act encourages a quota system for
capital punishment cases by in effect introducing ``race
consciousness'' into capital case decisions.
(2) opposes any legislation which would undermine or
otherwise modify the holding in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987);
(3) calls upon the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate to reject any version of the Racial Justice Act as
part of any package of federal habeas corpus reform or any
crime bill;
(4) opposes any legislation, including the omnibus crime
bill to be reported by the conference committee, which
includes any version of the Racial Justice Act. Any
meaningful provisions contained in the crime bill are
completely undermined by inclusion of the Racial Justice Act,
which is antithetical to fundamental notions under our
criminal justice system. If the omnibus crime bill contains
any version of the Racial Justice Act, we recommend it be
voted down until this legislation is removed.
Be it further resolved by the California District Attorneys
Association that its Executive Director shall transmit a copy
of this resolution to the U.S. Senators and Representatives
in the California delegation and to members of the Senate and
House Committees on the Judiciary.
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