[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  LENGTH OF VOTES ON THURSDAY, MAY 12

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when these 
votes occur on Thursday--and under the current schedule, there will be 
three votes beginning at noon on Thursday--the first vote be for 15 
minutes and the succeeding votes be for 10 minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I understand that Senator Dole's 
amendment is at the desk. I am about to send my amendment to the desk, 
and I will then explain my amendment and address the subject briefly.


                           Amendment No. 1696

(Purpose: To approve and authorize the use of United States airpower to 
implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] exclusion zones 
around the U.N. designated safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to protect 
  UNPROFOR forces, and to seek the removal of the arms embargo of the 
                   Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina)

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, pursuant to the agreement just reached, 
I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated by the clerk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Mitchell] for himself, Mr. 
     Pell, Mr. Nunn, and Mr. Bumpers proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1696.

       At the appropriate place insert the following:
       (a) Purpose.--To approve and authorize the use of the 
     United States airpower to implement the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization (NATO) exclusion zones around United Nations 
     designated safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to 
     protect United Nations forces.
       (b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) the war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
     claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced more than 
     two million citizens;
       (2) the Senate supports as a policy objective a peace 
     settlement that provides for an economically, politically and 
     militarily viable Bosnian state, capable of exercising its 
     rights under the United Nations Charter;
       (3) United Nations Security Council Resolutions 836 and 844 
     call on member states, acting nationally or through regional 
     organizations, to take all necessary measures to deter 
     attacks against safe areas identified in Security Council 
     resolution 824.
       (4) On February 9, 1994 the North Atlantic Council 
     authorized the use of air strikes to end the siege of 
     Sarajevo and on April 22, 1994 to end the siege of Gorazde 
     and to respond to attacks on the safe areas of Bihac, 
     Srebrenica, Tuzla or Zepa or to the threatening presence of 
     heavy weapons within a radius of 20 kilometers of those areas 
     (with Bosnia and Herzegovina);
       (5) The Congress in the FY 1994 State Department 
     Authorization bill expressed its sense that the President 
     should terminate the United States arms embargo on the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (c) Policy.--
       (1) The Senate authorizes and approves the decision by the 
     President to join with our NATO allies in implementing the 
     North Atlantic Council decisions:
       (A) of June 10, 1993 to support and protect UNPROFOR forces 
     in and around U.N. designated safe areas and,
       (B) of February 9, 1994 to use NATO's airpower in the 
     Sarajevo region of Bosnia and Herzegovina and,
       (C) of April 22, 1994 to authorize CINCSOUTH to conduct air 
     strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military 
     targets within a 20 kilometers radius of the center of 
     Gorazde, and Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla or Zepa (within the 
     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) if these safe areas are 
     attacked or threatened by Bosnian Serb heavy weapons.
       (2) The Congress favors the termination of the arms embargo 
     against the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
     President shall seek immediately the agreement of NATO allies 
     to terminate the international arms embargo on the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with Administration 
     policy following such consultations the President or his 
     representative shall promptly propose or support a resolution 
     in the United Nations Security Council to terminate the 
     international arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the 
     Security Council fails to pass such a resolution the 
     President shall within 5 days consult with Congress regarding 
     unilateral termination of the arms embargo on the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Upon termination of the 
     international embargo the President shall ensure that 
     appropriate military assistance be provided expeditiously to 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of 
     such a request in exercising its right of self-defense.
       (3) Unless previously authorized by the Congress no United 
     States ground combat forces should be deployed in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina. Any request by the President for such 
     authorization should include:
       (A) an explanation of the United States interests involved 
     in such commitments or actions;
       (B) the specific objectives of the commitments or actions;
       (C) the likely duration of the operation;
       (D) the size, composition, command and control 
     arrangements, rules of engagement, contributions of allied 
     nations, and other details of the force needed to meet the 
     objectives;
       (E) specific measurements of success, particularly the end 
     point of the U.S. involvement, and what follow-on security 
     arrangements would be needed; and
       (F) an estimate of financial costs, including burdensharing 
     arrangements, and non-financial costs as can be determined.
       (4) Nothing in this legislation restricts the prerogative 
     of Congress to review the arms embargo on Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I believe that every Member of the U.S. 
Senate is deeply concerned with the events of recent years in the 
former Yugoslavia. I believe that every Member of the Senate joins in 
condemning the atrocities that have occurred, the so-called ethnic 
cleansing, and the aggression which has left millions of people 
displaced from their homes and has torn apart villages and families.
  I believe that every Member of the Senate would like to see the 
fighting there come to a close and a peaceful resolution of the 
conflicts which have existed for centuries and which are a tangle of 
ethnic, religious, and other differences.
  So I think there is not much, if any, disagreement in the Senate 
about the goal we share. The disagreement, as always, is over the best 
way to achieve that goal, and especially the best way to achieve it 
consistent with the national interest of the United States.
  The Senate now has before it two different approaches to this 
problem. The amendment which I have proposed with and on behalf of 
Senator Pell, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee; Senator Nunn, the distinguished chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee; and Senator Bumpers, the distinguished chairman of 
the Small Business Committee, sets forth one alternative. The other 
amendment proposed by Senator Dole for himself and a number of other 
Senators sets forth a different alternative.
  What are the differences between them?
  The major difference is whether or not the United States should now, 
on its own, simply terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia, as Senator 
Dole and his colleagues propose, or whether the United States should 
immediately and aggressively seek to support the concurrence of our 
allies in NATO and the United Nations to end the arms embargo on 
Bosnia.
  There are other differences as well, and I will detail those now. 
Then I will come back to the major difference and set forth my reasons 
for urging support for the alternative Senators Pell, Nunn, Bumpers, 
and I have presented.
  Among the other differences, our amendment expresses support for the 
decisions made by the President and NATO to support and protect the 
United Nations forces in and around the U.N. designated safe areas, to 
use NATO's air power in the Sarajevo region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and to authorize air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and 
other military targets within specified areas. No mention is made of 
those in the alternative resolution.
  Therefore, I think those who believe that the United States and the 
United Nations should be more aggressive in dealing with this situation 
should support the alternative we are presenting because the other 
alternative is silent on those matters on the principal difference.
  Mr. President, less than 2 years ago I visited the region. I toured 
refugee camps. I met and talked with people who had seen members of 
their family murdered. I met and talked with the leaders of the 
countries of the region, most of those who are involved in the ongoing 
conflict.
  Upon our return from the visit, which I made with a bipartisan group 
of Senators, and following further discussion in this country, I 
expressed my support for an end to the arms embargo on Bosnia.
  I reached that conclusion reluctantly, because I recognized that it 
could trigger a much more widespread and more destructive conflict than 
has occurred. But I believed then, and believe now, on balance it would 
be the right thing to do.
  But what I do not believe is that it would be the right thing for 
anyone, the people of the region, or the national interests of the 
United States, or the future efforts to get countries to join together 
in collective action--it would not be in any of those interests for the 
United States now to unilaterally, on its own, without regard to the 
views of our allies or the safety of citizens and troops of our allies, 
to simply unilaterally discontinue this embargo.
  Why is that? Mr. President, right at this time there are several 
multilateral actions imposing sanctions or other collective actions in 
other parts of the world and in this part of the world. Right now there 
is a concerted effort by several countries to impose economic sanctions 
on Iraq, and they have been imposed there since the time of the Persian 
Gulf war.
  Right now, there is collective action to impose economic sanctions on 
Cuba, and they have been in effect there for some time.
  Right now, there is a collective effort to impose sanctions on Haiti, 
as we all know from the announcements of recent days. And, as all of us 
know, there is a possibility, perhaps a probability, that there will be 
collective action to impose sanctions on North Korea if that country 
persists in its refusal to permit inspection of its atomic facilities.
  In addition, there is right now collective action imposing economic 
sanctions on Serbia, who all concede has aided and abetted the 
fundamental aggressors in this conflict, the Bosnian Serbs.
  Well, Mr. President, ask ourselves this question: if the United 
States is to unilaterally on its own select those combined actions 
which it will drop out of when it wants to, then what is to prevent 
every other country from doing so on collective actions in which we 
want them to participate?
  We cannot have it both ways. We cannot say that there must be 
collective action when we choose, but when there is collective action 
that we do not agree with, we are going to drop out and not try to get 
it changed by the other countries involved.
  A few months ago, in my office, I met with the Prime Minister of 
Turkey. She made a powerful, impassioned argument as to the adverse 
economic effects on her country, Turkey, that are resulting from the 
sanctions against Iraq. They do not hurt the American economy very 
much, because we did not have a large volume of trade with Iraq, but 
they hurt the Turkish economy substantially because Turkey borders on 
Iraq and they had substantial trade with them.
  In my view, it is a near certainty that if the United States now 
unilaterally drops out of the arms embargo on Bosnia, the Turkish 
Government and others in the region will unilaterally drop out of the 
economic sanctions on Iraq. Is that something that the Senate wants? 
And the same is true of the sanctions against Cuba, the same is true of 
the sanctions against Haiti, and the same is surely true of the 
sanctions against Serbia.
  Indeed, by a coincidence and a curious irony, less than 2 weeks ago, 
Senator Dole and I met in my office with the Prime Minister of Greece 
and the Foreign Minister of Greece. In the course of the discussion, 
the Foreign Minister of Greece described at some length the adverse 
effects on the economy of his country because of the sanctions being 
imposed against Serbia.
  The sanctions against Serbia are directly related to the subject 
matter that we are now discussing, the conflict in Bosnia. Because of 
the Serbian actions with respect to Bosnia, economic sanctions have 
been imposed upon Serbia. They are a collective action. And, as always, 
the pain of these is not equally felt. We are not feeling much pain in 
this country from the sanctions against Serbia, but those countries 
which border on Serbia are --Greece, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine.
  Those countries which had extensive trade and are now on the front 
line of the conflict are being asked to bear the burden. They are not 
going to continue to do that if they see that the United States picks 
and chooses which collective action it will participate in. In that 
event, they will pick and choose which collective action they will 
participate in.
  And so we can anticipate an effect felt around the world and for some 
time to come if the United States takes the position that we are for 
collective action and we will participate in collective action when we 
want to, and when we do not want to, we will drop out. If we do that, 
we can expect others to adopt the same standard.
  Mr. President, the supporters of the alternative have argued and will 
argue that ``this case is different,'' and legal and technical 
arguments will be presented in an effort to distinguish this action. 
But we are not the only place in the world with lawyers and technicians 
who can make up these arguments. There are lawyers and technicians in 
Turkey who will make up equally compelling and perhaps more compelling 
arguments as to why they should no longer participate in the sanctions 
against Iraq. There are lawyers and technicians in many other countries 
who will make similar arguments, and the result that will be there will 
be few, if any, collective actions possible of this type.
  I think this is a consequence that is to be avoided. I urge those who 
are considering these resolutions to ponder very carefully the 
implication for future policy. Because, Mr. President, the number of 
requests for the United States to intervene unilaterally in trouble 
spots around the world is going to grow and grow and grow. I would 
like, if I might, to ask my colleagues to think about that aspect of 
this debate.
  We now approach the 21st century, with the United States in a 
position relative to other nations that I believe is unique in history. 
The United States is today the dominant military and economic power in 
the world.
  There have been other dominant powers in prior history. But I ask my 
colleagues to think back and try to recall a situation in which the 
dominant military power has also possessed the moral authority and the 
trust which the United States now possesses. Prior empires--the Roman 
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the French under 
Napoleon, the British at the peak of the empire, they all had to fight 
their way on to the soil of other countries. They were constantly at 
war with hostile nations who resisted their drive for domination.
  The United States is not in that position today. We have no 
territorial ambitions. And, as a result, our situation is the opposite. 
Not only do we not have to fight to get on to other people's soil, 
other people are constantly after us to send our military forces to 
their countries. They do not want us to bring our forces back.
  Mr. President, in the last 2 years, I have spoken with the leaders of 
almost every government in Europe. I have asked each of them this 
question: now that the Soviet Union no longer exists and its forces are 
being withdrawn to Russia, should the United States withdraw its 
military forces from Europe back to the United States?
  Without exception, the answer every time was no; not even a maybe, 
including the Russians, the Germans, the French, the Italians, the 
Scandinavians, everybody; they want American military forces in Europe.
  In fact, in several of the countries which I visited, in the 
governments where American forces are not presently located, the 
governments requested that we send them there. This is a situation 
without parallel in history. People know the United States does not 
have territorial ambitions. They know we are not trying to conquer 
other countries and so they trust us and they constantly are after us 
not to bring our forces back from where they are now located and, in 
fact, to send them to even more places.
  Mr. President, you combine that unique circumstance with the fact 
that the demise of communism and the rise of ethnic conflict and 
nationalism have created the certainty of turmoil in various places 
around the world and we are going to be asked over and over again to 
send American forces to solve every problem in the world. And the 
question we must ask ourselves as we debate this amendment is: Are we 
now to say that every problem in the world is going to be an American 
problem that requires an American solution? Or are we going to say, as 
I believe we should, that the United States is the world leader but it 
cannot by itself solve every problem in the world and we are going to 
ask others to join with us in dealing with problems, especially those 
distant from our shores?
  I think common sense, prudence, and our national interest all combine 
to say that, facing this rising chorus of requests for Americans to 
intervene everywhere in the world, that we have to lead but do it in a 
way that involves other countries. Europeans should be involved in 
European problems. Africans should be involved in African problems. 
Asians should be involved in Asian problems. We cannot go into the 21st 
century asking for collective action to deal with problems around the 
world if we say now that in this case we do not like this collective 
action and so without any regard to the views of our allies we are just 
going to drop out, we are going to unilaterally end this embargo, and 
never mind what the British think or feel, never mind what the French 
think or feel, never mind what the other countries think or feel--we 
are going to drop out.
  If we are going to drop out on this, others are going to drop out on 
other things and the necessity of collective action will be even 
greater and made even more difficult for a long time to come as a 
result of our actions here today or when we vote on this during the 
week.
  I think this is a very unwise course for us to take, even as I 
understand and sympathize with the motives of those who have introduced 
this alternative. They are frustrated, they are horrified by what has 
occurred, and they want action. Mr. President, I also am frustrated. I 
also am horrified. And I also want action. But let us take action which 
is consistent with our national interest not just in this case. Let us 
think about the consequences of this action in other situations in the 
future. All too often in this body and in the legislative process, we 
view problems as though with blinders and we do not think about the 
implications beyond the immediate question. Let us do so in this case.
  For years to come, Members of this Senate are going to be confronted 
over and over again with requests for Americans to solve every problem 
in the world, with requests for Americans to intervene here, to 
intervene there. I say to you, Mr. President, we cannot do it by 
ourselves now or at any time in the foreseeable future. We can lead and 
we must lead as the dominant military, economic, and I would say 
cultural power in the world. But we have to have help and support from 
other countries as is appropriate and we are not going to get much help 
or support from them in other instances if we say that we do not care 
about their views in this instance.
  Look right now at the French and the British. We do not have better 
allies than that, except for the possibility of our immediate neighbors 
with whom we share this continent. We have a long history of close 
relations with the French and British. Right now they have thousands of 
their troops in Bosnia in danger. We do not have any. And now we are 
about to say we are going to drop out of this embargo, taking action 
that endangers the lives of the thousands of British and French troops 
who are there without first seeking aggressively and actively and 
appropriately to enlist the support of the French and British 
Governments in a multilateral action. We should be taking this step but 
we should not be taking it alone. That is my point. We should be doing 
it in concert with our allies.
  The amendment which I proposed sets forth a process for doing so. Let 
me describe just briefly the heart of the amendment.
  It states first that the Congress favors the termination of the arms 
embargo.
  Second, it directs the President to seek immediately the agreement of 
NATO allies to terminate the embargo.
  Third, in accordance with administration policy, following such 
consultations the President or his representative is directed to 
propose or support a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to 
terminate the embargo.
  And finally, if the Security Council fails to pass such a resolution, 
the President shall within 5 days consult with the Congress regarding 
unilateral termination of the arms embargo.
  If we are going to take this step, why not do it after an orderly and 
rational and prudent process of trying to involve our allies? Of first 
seeking immediately the agreement of the NATO allies; of second, 
presenting the matter at the U.N. Security Council and seeking its 
approval; and then and only then, if that fails, to come back and 
consider unilateral termination at that time? That to me is the best 
thing we could do with respect to the situation in Bosnia and with 
respect to our own national interests--not just our national interests 
in this case but our national interests for the foreseeable future.
  I will have more to say on the subject in the debate on Thursday. For 
now, I hope that my colleagues will join me in approving the 
alternative amendment which I presented with my colleagues, and I 
encourage them to read both amendments carefully, to listen to the 
debate, and in the end cast the vote that I believe is most consistent 
with the interests of the United States. That, after all, should be the 
foremost standard of consideration of any matter. And, secondly, the 
one best designed to be helpful to a resolution of the conflict that is 
now raging--that has raged for so long--in the region.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and I thank my colleague, Senator 
Pell, for his support and assistance in this matter.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I join with the distinguished majority 
leader and others in sponsoring this legislation. I must say that 
although I am not completely comfortable with this legislation, I have 
agreed to cosponsor it as an alternative to the Dole-Lieberman 
legislation.
  The Dole-Lieberman bill would require the President to lift 
unilaterally the arms embargo against Bosnia and Hercegovina. For 
reasons I outlined earlier today, and that I discussed together with 
Chairman Lee Hamilton in a New York Times piece last week, I will 
oppose that legislation. I favor the majority leader's alternative not 
as a matter of philosophy, but rather out of expediency.
  One reason, I am not completely comfortable with this alternative 
legislation is that it endorses the termination of the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and it instructs the President to seek the agreement of 
NATO allies in ending the arms embargo. For me, the jury is still out 
on whether the United States should seize the lead in seeking a 
multilateral lifting of the embargo. That issue aside, the resolution 
comes too close for my comfort in suggesting that the President 
consider lifting the embargo unilaterally if he cannot achieve a 
multilateral consensus on this issue. I am pleased, however, that the 
Mitchell amendment calls upon the President to consult with Congress 
regarding terminating the embargo unilaterally.
  To date, the President has held steady in his opposition to 
unilaterally lifting the embargo. I welcome that decision. I trust the 
President recognizes that there is not unanimous congressional view on 
lifting the embargo unilaterally. I hope that President Clinton will 
continue to keep in mind the reservations that Congressman Hamilton and 
I, among others, have expressed. If this bill passes, and the President 
comes to Congress to consult, I, for one, would continue to urge the 
President not to lift the embargo unilaterally, and regrettably, would 
have to oppose a Presidential decision to do so.
  Nonetheless, I support the legislation before us as an alternative to 
the Dole-Lieberman language. There is a groundswell of support for 
taking some congressional action on Bosnia, but I do not believe that 
legislation mandating a lifting of the arms embargo, the Dole-Lieberman 
approach, need be the only outlet for congressional action.
  The legislation before us offers congressional input on a number of 
crucial elements of United States policy toward Bosnia. It authorizes 
the President's decision to join our NATO allies in using airpower to 
implement several specific United Nations and NATO decisions; it states 
that before taking further military action in the former Yugoslavia, 
the President should seek prior congressional support, it specifies the 
information the Congress would like the President to provide with 
regard to any further United States military action; and finally, it 
instructs the President to seek the agreement of NATO and United 
Nations allies to terminate the arms embargo against Bosnia.
  I agreed to cosponsor this legislation for three main reasons: it 
offers an alternative to the Dole-Lieberman legislation, which in my 
view would be damaging to United States policy; it endorses a 
multilateral approach to ending the conflict in Bosnia; and it signals 
that Congress intends and expects to be involved in authorizing any 
further United States military activity in Bosnia. I urge my colleagues 
to join me in voting for this legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous agreement, the Dole 
amendment No. 1695 and the Mitchell amendment No. 1696 are now pending 
to S. 2042.
  Mr. PRESSLER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South 
Dakota [Mr. Pressler].
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 5 
minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________