[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             JAMES A. BAKER'S WOODROW WILSON CENTER LECTURE

 Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, last night I heard former 
Secretary of State James A. Baker III deliver the following speech for 
the 25th anniversary lecture series of the Woodrow Wilson Center. It 
benefits us all to hear what he has to say about current events and our 
Nation's role in world affairs. I ask that they be printed in the 
Record as a contribution not only to the current debate on Bosnia, but 
also to our larger responsibility to define and protect American 
interests abroad.
  The speech follows:

                 Is History Repeating Itself in Europe?

                        (By James A. Baker III)

       It is a privilege for me to be here this evening on behalf 
     of The Wilson Center, an institution with which I have been 
     proudly associated for over 17 years, and a pleasure to see 
     around the room the faces of so many old friends and 
     colleagues.
       Since leaving government I have been deeply involved in the 
     development of an institute for public policy at Rice 
     University in my hometown of Houston, Texas. Like all new 
     endeavors, the Institute is looking for examples of 
     excellence to emulate, and I can assure you that The Woodrow 
     Wilson Center for International Scholars ranks high among 
     them. I only hope that the Baker Institute will be half as 
     successful as the Center has been in attracting our nation's 
     most distinguished scholars and practitioners of public 
     policy.
       My subject tonight is Europe in the post-Cold War era and, 
     in specific, an appropriate American response to the 
     strategic, political, and economic changes that are (for 
     better or for worse) still transforming the region that 
     comprises the former Soviet bloc.
       All of us can remember the euphoria we felt when the Berlin 
     Wall fell and freedom surged, first through Central and 
     Eastern Europe and then into the heart of the Soviet Empire 
     itself. It seemed for a moment as if Woodrow Wilson's great 
     vision of a liberal international order, based on the shared 
     values of democratic societies, might come to pass.
       Those days seem long ago. Today, euphoria has been replaced 
     by the somber realization that history--the history of human 
     conflict and cruelty--has not, in fact ended.
       In the former Yugoslavia, Europe has witnessed its worst 
     human savagery and suffering since the end of World War II. 
     The nightmare in Bosnia has revealed both the strength of 
     ethnic animosity and the impotence of the international 
     community in addressing it, prompting some pessimists to 
     describe it as the model of future conflict throughout the 
     former communist bloc.
       In Russia, economic reform seems stalled, if not yet 
     reversed, and, day-by-day, evidence of a more assertive, some 
     say aggressive, Russian foreign policy towards its neighbors 
     accumulates. There is, not surprisingly, already talk in the 
     West of ``losing'' Russia. I believe that events in Moscow, 
     like the war in Bosnia, represent only part of broader trends 
     in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
       I am convinced that these trends, if not slowed, promise a 
     continent far-removed from the Europe whole and free which 
     seemed so close when the Cold War peacefully concluded.


          post-revolutionary trends in the former soviet bloc

       Perhaps the most disturbing of these trends, and certainly 
     the most costly in human terms, has been the rise of communal 
     conflict throughout much of the former communist bloc.
       In some places, conflict has boiled over into outright 
     violence. This is true, not just in Bosnia, but also in 
     Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. 
     Elsewhere, conflict simmers just below the surface, 
     especially in Ukraine, with its large, restive, and 
     increasingly militant Russian minority. And Russia itself is 
     a country within which there are many ethnic, linguistic, and 
     sectarian differences.
       Also worrisome is an emerging pattern of setbacks for 
     economic reform. The eclipse of reformers in Yeltsin's 
     government, notably former Prime Minister Gaidar and Finance 
     Minister Fydorov, and their replacement by apparatchiks have 
     parallels elsewhere. In Moldova, Belarus, and, Ukraine, the 
     forces of reform, never robust, are in retreat. In last 
     month's parliamentary elections in Ukraine, for instance, 
     reformers won only 35 of 338 seats. In contrast, over 100 
     former communists were elected. Not even Poland, one of 
     Eastern Europe's free market successes, has proven immune. 
     Even there, former communists have been able to capitalize on 
     the hardships associated with economic reform for electoral 
     gain--as they appear to have done in yesterday's elections in 
     Hungary.
       Simultaneous with this movement away from economic reform 
     has been a trend towards political radicalism. Communist 
     totalitarianism may have met defeat, but the victory of 
     liberal democracy has been far from complete. Today, 
     ideological struggle continues, but along a different front.
       After fifty years of near silence in Europe, fascism has 
     found its voice again--an ugly, menacing voice of anti-
     semitism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism. This development 
     has been most striking in Russia, where Vladimir 
     Zhirinovsky's success in last December's election 
     demonstrates the powerful appeal of reaction to the 
     economically hard-pressed.
       But Zhirinovsky is not alone in his appeal, nor is Russia 
     unique in its temptation. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosovic has 
     already put much of Zhirinovsky's theory into practice, 
     prosecuting a war in the name of a Greater Serbia without 
     consideration of basic human rights or international norms of 
     behavior. Elsewhere in the region, there are those prepared 
     to follow his and Zhirinovsky's lead.
       Even some Western Europeans, presumably far more 
     sophisticated politically than their brethren to the East, 
     have yielded to reactionary temptation, turning to the 
     political extremism of neo-fascists in Italy and Germany or 
     to the street violence of skinheads in Great Britain and 
     elsewhere.
       A final worrisome trend, now subject of intense debate in 
     the United States and in Europe, is Russia's reassertion of 
     its traditional sphere of influence. President Yeltsin and 
     Foreign Minister Kozyrev have staked public claim to a 
     special Russian relationship with the states of the so-called 
     ``near abroad.'' As Russian military involvement in Georgia 
     and Moldova already demonstrates, this relationship 
     presumably includes the right to intervene in its neighbors' 
     affairs.
       Whatever Russia's intent, the nations around it, 
     particularly those, like Ukraine, with sizeable ethnic 
     Russian minorities, are plainly apprehensive.
       So are the Eastern European countries that have endured 
     Moscow's imperial yoke in the past. Russia's introduction of 
     peacekeepers into Bosnia has so far marked a positive 
     contribution to peace in that volatile region. It 
     nevertheless raises concerns in the Balkans and elsewhere 
     about the reemergence of a pan-Slavism that led, at least in 
     part, to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.


                        Liberalism and Reaction

       All these trends, from the trend toward reversal of reform, 
     to the rise of fascism to the risk--if not yet the reality, 
     of a new Russian imperialism are interrelated. All, I 
     believe, reflect a fundamental rejection of the principles of 
     liberalism, principles first delineated in the works of 
     Enlightenment theoreticians like Locke, Montesquieu, and 
     Kant, and embodied by the modern societies of Western Europe 
     and the United States.
       Free enterprise, democratic government, civic identity 
     based on voluntary association rather than communal 
     solidarity, and the peaceful resolution of international 
     disputes are all great liberal ideals. All today are under 
     assault in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
     Union.
       Whether the anti-liberal trends I have discussed represent 
     a true counterrevolution, or simply temporary reverses 
     understandable given the enormous tasks confronting reformers 
     in the East, is unclear. Some observers have gone so far as 
     to suggest that the Cold War itself marked an anomaly in 
     European history, and that, with its conclusion, the 
     traditional continental struggle between liberalism and 
     reaction dating back to the 19th century will resume.
       Clearly, the great Eastern debate over modernization 
     continues. The division between Russia's Slavophiles and 
     Westernizers, apparent at least since the time of Peter the 
     Great, can be seen today in the contest between men like 
     Zhirinovsky and Gaidar, who possess not just different, but 
     mutually exclusive, visions of their nation's nature and 
     international role.


                       The Western (Non-)Response

       The Western response to developments in the former 
     communist bloc has been mixed at best, and marked, in the 
     United States and elsewhere, by near manic-depressive swings 
     between optimism and gloom. This is particularly true in the 
     case of Russia, where opinion is sharply divided.
       Some observers seem prepared to countenance any Russian 
     backsliding at home or bellicosity abroad for fear of 
     prompting a reaction from the Russian right. Many in the 
     current Administration appear to fall into this camp.
       Others, in contrast, seem ready to declare Russia already 
     lost. Some members of my own political party have seized on 
     the recent US-Russian spy scandal to call, not just for a 
     termination of American aid to Russia, but, at least by 
     inference, for the creation of a new anti-Russian alliance.
       In my opinion, the first point-of-view is naive, the second 
     premature. Yet both, ironically, suffer from the same 
     intellectual affliction: Russo-centrism.
       This is not to deny the importance of Russia and 
     developments there, not just for its neighbors, but for 
     Western Europe and the United States.
       Indeed, I will later argue that it is precisely this 
     importance which makes it imperative for the West to maintain 
     assistance to Russian reform and reformers.
       But I believe it is also critical to recall that Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic, to name just three, possess 
     importance to the West in their own right, as fellow 
     democracies, diplomatic partners, and potential markets. Our 
     policies towards them must be dictated by American interest, 
     not by domestic Russian politics.
       What the West needs, I submit, is a European approach to 
     European problems, one that addresses unfolding events in 
     Russia in a broader continental context. I believe that the 
     West should pursue a four-part strategy towards Central and 
     Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.


                           a western strategy

       First, the West must make irreversible our past progress on 
     strategic arms control and non-proliferation.
       Lost in today's headlines is a fact of extraordinary 
     importance: tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, enough to 
     destroy humanity several times over, remain in Russia, 
     Belarus, and Ukraine.
       Plainly, the United States should continue to monitor 
     closely the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons pursuant 
     to arms control agreements. As we have since 1991, we should 
     support this effort with technical assistance. In addition, 
     the United States and its allies must intensify pressure on 
     Ukraine to meet all its commitments under agreements it 
     negotiated and signed with us and other countries--
     commitments that the government of Ukraine has solemnly made, 
     frequently reiterated, but not yet fulfilled.
       Our willingness to compromise with Ukraine, rather than 
     insist on full compliance with these commitments is why we 
     have been on the receiving end of an ever-escalating series 
     of demands for economic and security assistance.
       Lest anyone be tempted to forget, the missiles in Ukraine 
     are aimed at Washington, not Moscow. This vital fact should 
     outweigh any consideration of domestic politics and we should 
     demand that Ukraine fulfill its two-year-old commitments to 
     us.
       But the West must worry about more than the nuclear weapons 
     that remain in the former Soviet Union, dangerous as they 
     are. We must also be concerned about the illicit export of 
     unconventional arms, technology, and expertise from the 
     former Soviet Union to parts unknown, or rather suspected: 
     locations like Tehran, Tripoli, Pyongyang, or Baghdad. Given 
     the profound economic hardship reigning in the former Soviet 
     bloc, and particularly the extreme shortage of foreign 
     exchange, the temptation to proliferate will be considerable.
       But it must be resisted, if necessary with the 
     reinforcement of Western sanctions against violators. With 
     the Clinton Administration's decision to lift remaining COCOM 
     restrictions on sensitive exports to the former Soviet Union, 
     the risk of diversion of technologies has, in fact, 
     increased. As we call for discipline on the part of the 
     former Soviet Union, it is important that the United States 
     and our allies meet the same test of responsibility.
       Second, the West must reinvigorate the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization. This begins with a refocussed mission 
     for NATO. Russia's military is in disrepair. Manpower is down 
     to only a quarter of that of the former Soviet Union. 
     Readiness is poor, with military exercises regularly 
     cancelled for lack of ammunition or equipment.
       And morale, as evidenced by a recent draft call in Moscow 
     where only 5 percent of inductees turned up, is low. In 
     short, though large in comparison to its neighbors', Russia's 
     armed forces today, and for the foreseeable future, represent 
     no conventional threat to Western Europe.
       Nonetheless, the disappearance of an immediate threat to 
     Western Europe should not lead to the demise of the West's 
     premier political and security organization: NATO. I am 
     convinced that NATO must still play a vital role in the 
     future of European security. It is, quite simply, the world's 
     foremost military alliance. There is simply no replacement 
     for it on even the most distant of horizons.
       The relative success of NATO's recent, if overdue, action 
     in Bosnia demonstrates, I believe, its unique capability and 
     credibility. Both should be put more aggressively to use in 
     containing the Bosnian conflict from expanding into a general 
     Balkan War that could draw in Albania, Greece, Hungary, or 
     even Turkey.
       Macedonia, in particular, remains a potential flashpoint, 
     despite the presence of American and other observers. Highly 
     vulnerable to possible Serbian aggression, it has also been, 
     since February, the victim of an unwarranted Greek trade 
     embargo.
       Explicit warnings to anyone tempted toward adventurism in 
     Macedonia, including the government in Belgrade, backed up, 
     if necessary, by the deployment of substantial NATO forces, 
     should be part of our approach to the Macedonian problems. 
     So, too, must be a clear message to Athens from all its NATO 
     and EU partners that its embargo of Macedonia, however 
     popular domestically, runs the real risk of further 
     destabalizing an already war-ravaged region and should be 
     reversed.
       Central to NATO's reinvigoration is expanding membership 
     eastward. I believe that the Alliance should offer full 
     membership to former Soviet bloc states that demonstrate a 
     commitment to democracy, free markets, and responsible 
     security policies. By so doing, NATO can extend powerful 
     incentives for reform. In my opinion, Poland, Hungary, and 
     the Czech Republic are ready for membership now. The 
     Administration's ``Partnership for Peace'' is, at best, a 
     half-hearted response--and last January's NATO Summit marked 
     a missed historic opportunity. Broadening full Alliance 
     membership will enhance security in Central and Eastern 
     Europe as it did in Western Europe after World War II, and 
     send a message of Western resolve to would-be Russian 
     imperialists.
       Moreover, I am convinced that NATO membership can be 
     expanded eastward without prompting an extreme and 
     irreversible Russian reaction. True, Russia is on record as 
     opposing full NATO membership for the Czech Republic, 
     Hungary, and Poland, but Russia herself has also shown 
     interest in some association with NATO. I believe that 
     Russia, like the other former bloc states, should be offered 
     full Alliance membership when and if it, too, meets the 
     criteria I have mentioned. In the final analysis, however, 
     expanding NATO membership must be NATO's decision. A Russian 
     veto on this is simply unacceptable.
       Third, the West should sustain support for reform in 
     Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
       It is crucial to remember that Russia has not yet been 
     lost. Reform, though slowed, continues. The economic hardship 
     being endured today by the Russian people should not obscure 
     the remarkable strides they have made in just a few years. A 
     new free economy may not have arrived, but the old command 
     economy is clearly a thing of the past.
       Already, more than 75 percent of Russian small business is 
     in individual hands and more than 25 percent of the labor 
     force works in the private sector.
       Prices have been freed on all but 10 percent of goods. 
     Inflation, though still unacceptably high, continues to 
     decline. And, most importantly of all, Russia already 
     possesses a dynamic entrepreneurial class.
       Nor, we should remember, is Russia in any real sense the 
     West's to lose. Russia remains a great power. It is a vast, 
     populous nation with a rich culture and extraordinary 
     economic potential. Russians, and Russians alone, will 
     determine their country's future, for better or for worse.
       That said, assistance to reform in Russia remains the 
     West's best international investment, with potential returns, 
     both political and economic, of historic magnitude. Western 
     aid to Russia has never approached a fraction of the cost 
     associated with deterring the Soviet Union. That aid, 
     however, should be more narrowly focused on encouraging 
     private sector development and promoting the institutions, 
     such as political parties, that are preconditions to a civil 
     society. Above all, Western donors and institutions like the 
     International Monetary Fund must continue to remind Russia 
     and others of an unpleasant economic truth: deferring reform 
     will only delay the day of final reckoning. There can be no 
     ``therapy'' without some ``shock.''
       Equally vital, however, is a good faith effort by the West 
     to open its markets to Eastern goods. Here, the record of the 
     European Community has failed abysmally to match is rhetoric. 
     Indeed, certain EU policies, particularly tariffs on key 
     Eastern products such as steel and agricultural goods, have 
     been positively punitive towards the East.
       The urge to protect Western European producers, especially 
     given the lingering recession on much of the continent, is 
     understandable. Unemployment is high, growth feeble. 
     Nevertheless, it would be truly tragic were Europe to pull 
     down the Iron Curtain only to erect a trade wall between the 
     ``haves'' of the West and the ``have-nots'' of the East. In 
     this regard, Chancellor Kohl's recent call for a roll-back of 
     tariffs against Eastern goods is a positive sign and one that 
     the United States should encourage.
       But we here in America must also go further to open our 
     markets to trade with the East. As a first step, we should 
     stop protecting our own domestic producers of commodities, 
     like uranium, which Russia needs to export to generate 
     critical foreign exchange. We should also reach out to former 
     communist bloc countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
     and Poland, to negotiate free trade agreements. Trade and 
     investment between East and West can help ensure mutual 
     security and shared prosperity in ways that massive armies or 
     foreign assistance cannot.
       The fourth and final element of a Western strategy for 
     Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union must 
     be American leadership.
       This does not mean that the United States should become 
     Europe's policeman. We have fought three wars in Europe 
     during this century--two hot ones and a cold one--and that is 
     quite enough. Still, the United States is a European power, 
     with enduring interests there, and we must act as one.
       As it has for four decades, European unity remains in 
     America's national interest. We should look forward to the 
     day when the United States can work with a united Europe as a 
     full diplomatic, economic, and strategic partner.
       That day, however, has not yet arrived. Even economic 
     union, a far less daunting task than political unity, has 
     proven more difficult than many European enthusiasts had 
     predicted. ``EC 92'' has come and gone and the states of 
     Western Europe still struggle with coordination. Monetary 
     union remains as ephemeral as it has always been.
       Diplomatic coordination has proven, if anything, even more 
     difficult for the EU to achieve. Anyone who doubts the 
     imperative of American leadership need only review the tragi-
     comic history of Europe's ``common policy'' towards the 
     former Yugoslavia.


                          Selective Engagement

       The end of the Cold War has created extraordinary freedom 
     of action for the United States, in Europe and elsewhere. We 
     no longer face a single overwhelming threat. We no longer 
     confront a single global enemy. The decades of East-West 
     confrontation, when every conflict, no matter how minor, 
     could become a zero-sum contest between the two blocs, are, 
     gratifyingly, over. American engagement is no longer 
     compulsory.
       Instead, today the United States can afford to engage 
     selectively. This selective engagement requires us to assess 
     our interests and seek policies that are proportionate to 
     them. We must choose the appropriate instrumentality, 
     multilateral or unilateral, to pursue those policies. And, 
     above all, we should husband that most important of 
     intangibles, our credibility, in the service of our national 
     interests.
       To be blunt, I believe that the Administration--by missteps 
     in Haiti and Somalia, a diminution of American leadership 
     within NATO, and a ``stop-and-go'' policy towards Bosnia that 
     can only charitably be labeled ``confused''--has called that 
     credibility into doubt.
       In foreign policy, far more than in domestic policy, words 
     are the currency of the realm. If promises to allies are kept 
     and threats against enemies carried out, our currency will 
     rise in value. But if promises are betrayed, threats are 
     unfulfilled, and rhetoric and reality don't match, then the 
     currency of our foreign relations will be dangerously 
     devalued. And right now, the run against the dollar pales in 
     comparison to the devaluation that has taken place in our 
     foreign relations.
       In short, the Administration has indulged in Wilsonian 
     rhetoric without backing it up with Wilsonian resolve. As 
     Michael Mandelbaum, foreign policy expert and, ironically, 
     advisor to the Clinton campaign in 1992, puts it succinctly: 
     ``If you're not going to pull the trigger, don't point the 
     gun.''
       The impression today in inescapable: the nation's 
     leadership is fundamentally uncomfortable with the concept of 
     America power, which of course is a sine qua non of its 
     proper exercise. In the wake of the Cold War, the scope for 
     that exercise is without parallel. The United States finds 
     itself in a unique and ironic set of circumstances. With our 
     emergence as the world's sole superpower, the United States 
     can do so much that we are tempted to attempt everything--or 
     do nothing at all.
       It is clear that the United States must avoid both 
     temptation and their attendant false choices. If we are to 
     protect our interests and promote our values, as I believe we 
     must, then we must get beyond empty either/or's and engage 
     selectively. Fundamentally, the question is not if the United 
     States should remain engaged in world affairs, but when, 
     where, and how.


                         Embracing Uncertainty

       This is nowhere truer than in Central and Eastern Europe 
     and the former Soviet Union, a region where history is still 
     being made at a revolutionary pace. The strategy I have 
     sketched tonight--a strategy of selective engagement--
     embraces the uncertainty of the current moment around the 
     world, but especially in Europe.
       No simple analysis will yield the truth about a region as 
     vast, complex, and rich with history as the former communist 
     bloc. And no single policy will permit the West to meet the 
     challenges of the post-Cold War Europe.
       Still, I believe that the approach which I have outlined 
     maximizes opportunity and minimizes risk not just for the 
     West, but for the nations of the former Soviet bloc 
     themselves. It reinforces liberalization where possible but 
     prepares against the eventuality of reaction. It hedges our 
     strategic bets. It is a strategy, in short, that combines 
     both hope and realism.


                               conclusion

       If my remarks this evening lack the optimism of a few years 
     ago or the pessimism we hear so much nowadays, it is for a 
     reason. Today, we stand neither on the verge of the 
     millennium nor on the eve of Armageddon.
       Indeed, we are, on balance, rather further from Armageddon 
     than we were just a few years ago, when Europe was still 
     divided by barbed wire and armies bristling with weapons.
       And lest we forget it, hundreds of millions of individuals 
     today throughout the former communist bloc have a chance they 
     did not just five years ago: an opportunity to live free and 
     prosperous lives in a world made safer for them and their 
     children. Woodrow Wilson's dream may not yet be universally 
     realized, but it is enjoyed today by more people than at any 
     time in human history.
       We are ending human history's most brutal century on a note 
     of hope, however tentative. That we and the world do so is 
     attributable above all, I believe, to American leadership on 
     the international stage. And that leadership remains as vital 
     today as it ever was.
       No, Russian is not yet lost. Nor, whatever happens there, 
     is Europe. The continent is not ready--yet--to repeat its 
     tragic history of the 1930s and '40s.
       Nonetheless, I do believe that the United States and its 
     allies today run the real risk of losing a unique historical 
     opportunity to shape Europe in a way that will protect our 
     interests and promote our values for years, and, indeed, 
     decades to come.

                          ____________________