[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 10, 1994]



           LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is S. 2042.
  Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] is 
recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I find myself in the unenviable position 
of opposing my distinguished Republican leader, Mr. Dole, and an 
equally distinguished group of cosponsors.
  Let me review my basic position which I have set forth on the floor 
here in previous debates in the last week or so.
  The lifting of the embargo is something that has a great deal of 
appeal to me and, I am sure, many others. I am willing to stipulate 
that there are certain legalities about the placing of the embargo that 
lend themselves to a ground that we did it in a collection of nations, 
indeed with the United States, in an illegal fashion. But, 
nevertheless, we are where we are now.
  Candidly, I would like to see the embargo lifted, but I cannot find 
to my satisfaction the answers to a set of questions that I believe 
require answering and understanding by the Members of the Senate before 
we act.
  I wrote the Secretaries of Defense and State a detailed letter on the 
April 29 setting forth a series of questions that I felt were germane 
to the issue. I would like to repeat some of those questions for 
purposes of this debate. Then on May 4, the Department of State, under 
the Acting Secretary at that time, Mr. Talbott, replied to my series of 
questions.
  Mr. President, I will go through the questions and provide the 
answers as given by the Departments of State and Defense in 
collaboration together, the two Departments.
  So, I repeat, while lifting the embargo has a great deal of appeal to 
me, in all probability it was put on illegally, at least there is a 
legitimate argument to that effect; and it is advanced by very 
responsible individuals, two ambassadors who came in to see me and two 
former Deputy Undersecretaries of Defense. I found their arguments very 
cogent as to the legalities. But we are where we are today.
  This is a map that depicts the relative locations of the combatants 
today. I will use this in the context of trying to provide the Senate 
with answers to the questions that concern me.
  My first question.

       If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were 
     unilaterally lifted by the United States--

  And that issue, in my judgment, is implicit in Senator Dole's 
amendment, and it was acknowledged as being a part of that amendment by 
one or more of his cosponsors in a prior debate in this Chamber.

       If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were 
     unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would 
     such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the 
     broad range of U.N. Security Council-imposed embargoes, such 
     as economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against 
     Iraq?

  The administration replies:

       There is a clear danger that other nations would use the 
     U.S. precedent as a pretext to unilaterally ``lift'' 
     sanctions against regimes that they found inconvenient or 
     opposed for political or economic reasons. This could lead to 
     a total breakdown in the ability of the United Nations to 
     enforce sanctions against Serbia, Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and, 
     over time, could limit the power of the U.N. to affect 
     international behavior through binding resolutions.

  And I would like to add also North Korea, a situation that is 
extremely serious, extremely serious to the whole world. Unless the 
issues in North Korea are handled, it will result in an entire new 
dimension to the nuclear balance in the world today. Japan will have to 
reconsider its stance; Taiwan, its stance; China, its stance; and 
indeed we may see the emergence of a whole new series of nations in the 
Pacific Rim area that, by necessity, for their own national security 
reasons would be required to rethink past policies against nuclear 
forces in light of developments in North Korea.
  This is the main reason I am against the Dole amendment; that it has 
this unilateral feature that the United States would be acting 
unilaterally in such a way as to send a signal of hope to the people of 
Bosnia, that with the lifting of this embargo the whole combat 
situation could be changed. And I will address the specifics 
momentarily.
  Does the Dole amendment imply that the United States will be 
forthcoming in the shipment of arms? Does it imply other nations will 
join? Those are the questions that have to be answered.
  And, of course, I am deeply troubled by the historical context, quite 
apart from sanctions, that our Nation, throughout this century, has 
stood solidly with Great Britain and France. In World War I and World 
War II, they were our principal allies. They are the principal 
participants in the UNPROFOR forces, those forces currently in the 
former State of Yugoslavia, primarily Bosnia, that are providing such 
humanitarian relief and economic relief as can be given to those people 
suffering so tragically.
  What will the precedent be for our having acted unilaterally with 
respect to our two most valued allies in this century?
  My next question.

       Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is 
     not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against 
     the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not a successor state and 
     because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of self-defense 
     under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. What is the 
     administration's legal opinion on this issue?

  And the reply:

       The arms embargo was imposed on the territory of the former 
     Yugoslavia by U.N. Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) and 
     reaffirmed in later resolutions (e.g., Resolutions 724, 727, 
     740, 743, and 787). Resolution 713 is a mandatory decision 
     under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and expressly provides 
     that the embargo will remain in effect ``until the Security 
     Council decides otherwise.'' The Council has also made clear 
     that the embargo applies throughout the territory of the 
     former Yugoslavia notwithstanding its breakup into separate 
     states (see Resolution 727 (1992)). Thus it applies to 
     Bosnia.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the 
administration's argument on this issue be printed at this point in the 
Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       The embargo does not violate Bosnia's right of self-defense 
     under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Any self-defense right 
     that may exist to receive arms from other states under 
     Article 51 is subject to the authority of the Security 
     Council, which may take action affecting it. Thus, under 
     Article 51, measures taken in self-defense ``shall not in any 
     way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
     Council under the [UN] Charter to take at any time such 
     action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
     international peace and security.''
       The Security Council may take various actions--imposition 
     of cease-fires, limits on armaments, and establishment of 
     protected or demilitarized zones--that affect a state's right 
     of self-defense. For example, the Council may impose a cease-
     fire even though its immediate effect may leave an aggressor 
     in temporary occupation of part of the defender's territory. 
     Article 51 takes as its premise the principle that the 
     Security Council may impose such sanctions when it judges 
     them to be necessary, and this is an essential part of the 
     Council's authorities to maintain and restore peace.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am not going to get deeply involved in 
the legalities, because I am more concerned about the situation here 
today and tomorrow and to project it into the future. This is the 
principal concern I have about lifting the embargo.
  My next question:

       How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect 
     our relations with the NATO allies and the Russian 
     Federation?

  Answer:

       Our allies and the Russians are extremely concerned about 
     the prospect of unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo. 
     They would argue that our behavior encouraged an erosion of 
     the U.N. sanctions regime as an instrument of international 
     policy. If they came to believe that unilateral U.S. lifting 
     of the embargo had more than a symbolic effect, they might 
     decide to pull some or all of their forces out of UNPROFOR, 
     leading to the collapse of the humanitarian relief effort.

  This is an answer that must be addressed. What are the consequences 
if UNPROFOR has to withdraw in the face of a lifting of the embargo, 
particularly unilateral lifting by the United States?

       Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa, which are 
     surrounded by Serb forces, would be cut off from most of the 
     relief supplies. Should the Bosnian Serbs attack any 
     remaining European forces or take them hostage, the Europeans 
     would hold the United States accountable.

  This conflict could suddenly transcend from an international one with 
many parties involved to a conflict that could be said was ``Made in 
the U.S.A'' from the moment the embargo is lifted. That is my concern.
  Should the, as I said, Bosnian Serbs attack any remaining European 
forces or take them, the Europeans would hold us accountable.

       Nations like Iran, who have standing offers to provide 
     troops to the Bosnian Government, might elect to do so, 
     arguing that the United States has set a precedent for 
     ignoring a U.N. resolution.

  Next question: ``If the arms embargo were lifted, what types of 
weapons would the Bosnian Government forces need to achieve a degree of 
weapon equivalence?'' That phrase, ``a degree of weapon equivalence,'' 
is one that I just worked up as a baseline to try to develop a question 
and an answer to this issue--``a degree of weapon equivalence with the 
Bosnian Serb forces. Which nations would train the Bosnian forces in 
these new weapons?''
  The answer: ``We presume that the Bosnian Government would require 
large-caliber heavy weapons to match the capabilities of the Bosnian 
Serbs.'' It is acknowledged now that in the area of tanks and heavy 
artillery, the Bosnian Serbs have a ratio of 4 to 1, 5, sometimes 8 to 
1 in some of these heavy armaments. It is clear that the Bosnian Serbs 
have stronger weaponry.
  In contrast, it is argued that the Moslems have more people. To a 
degree, they are motivated better and, to some degree, trained better, 
even though it is largely a citizen army. That is an offset. But, 
indeed, it is not an offset in the face of heavy tanks and heavy 
artillery.

       This could include medium and heavy artillery, medium tanks 
     and long-range antitank weapons, such as the Tube Launched, 
     Optically Tracked Antitank Weapons system. Personnel familiar 
     with weapons provided, usually the supplier, Government or 
     industry, generally train recipients in the use, tactical 
     employment, and maintenance of systems procured. Potential 
     suppliers/trainers span the globe.

  So if you are going to send in tanks--and I will address the 
difficulty of getting them in--and heavy artillery, once there, there 
is a period of time that will have to elapse to train the Moslem forces 
in the use of this equipment, and particularly the combination of tank-
infantry warfare is a very complicated skill and could well take time, 
given there is no historical participation with tanks of any magnitude 
by the Moslem forces today. This will not be overnight. Again, another 
period of time within which the Serb forces could consolidate their 
gains further, take hostages, and be on the aggressive move in many 
areas in this region.
  But, again, there is no clear answer as to who will ship what, who 
will train the Moslem forces to use these weapons. And, also, heavy 
weapons require a great deal of maintenance and resupply. So the 
infrastructure issue, in my judgment, is an important one as it relates 
to the heavy weapons.
  Next question:

       How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported 
     to the Bosnian Government forces? What are the various access 
     routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes 
     to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a 
     military force would it take to guard and maintain these 
     logistical routes?

  And the answer: I sat down with individuals--it is interesting--some 
U.S. officers, some foreign officers. I gained a great deal of 
knowledge from the Austrian military officers. As you know, this area 
of the world at one time was under the Austro-Hungarian empire. The 
Austrians have quite a bit of knowledge about this area.
  There are basically two ports through which this heavy traffic can 
move. One is the Port of Split and the other in the Port of Ploce.
  Here is the official answer: ``If the arms embargo were lifted by 
U.S. action and Croatia cooperated''--and this is a key question 
because you have to move across land that is now under the control of 
Croatian forces, so their cooperation is essential, and you do not know 
what price you might pay for that cooperation. Are you to lift the 
embargo against arms to Croatia? So is there another faction in this 
war that will be armed? What price is to be paid and how stable can we 
rely on the Croatian participation? Will it be on one day and off the 
next? These are subquestions.
  ``If the arms embargo were lifted by U.N. action and Croatia 
cooperated, heavy weapons could be brought into Bosnia through Croatian 
Adriatic ports,'' this being the Adriatic Sea. ``It would be difficult 
to deliver substantial amounts of equipment by air since all major 
Bosnian Government airstrips are within Serb artillery range, and 
aircraft would be subject to surface-to-air missile fire.'' That is 
primarily in Sarajevo and Tuzla.
  I made a trip to Sarajevo many months ago, and it is down in sort of 
a bowl surrounded by high terrain. If an individual crept up on to that 
terrain, he or she could command that airfield very easily with quite 
simple weapons.
  Likewise, Tuzla airport is within range of a lot of the current 
Serbian military equipment. So it is unlikely, in the judgment of the 
experts, that either of these airports could be used. I certainly think 
this country would think long and hard before we send in C-5's or 
141's, indeed 130's. Having lifted the embargo and trying to get 
military equipment in, we put our forces at severe risk.
  ``Shipment by sea would require weeks and perhaps months, depending 
on how long it took the Bosnian Government to purchase or otherwise 
procure the weapons. If the United States unilaterally''--and I repeat 
unilaterally--``lifted the arms embargo, heavy weapons could not be 
shipped to Bosnia without a willingness on the part of other nations to 
violate the U.N. arms embargo.''
  That is a very interesting point, and I hope the proponents of this 
amendment will address that.
  ``If Croatia were to cooperate with the United States in violating 
the U.N. embargo, and the Bosnian Government was able to purchase or 
otherwise obtain weapons, arms could begin reaching Bosnia in some 
weeks or months.'' A lot of if's. ``It is quite possible that most, if 
not all, UNPROFOR forces would probably have departed by then, perhaps 
having had to fight its way out, and would not be available to secure 
routes for arms imports. The Serbs would naturally take advantage of 
any lag-time between international lifting of the arms embargo and 
provision of the weapons to the Bosnian Government.''

  And as I pointed out also the time to properly train and logistically 
support the heavy weapons system.
  ``The incentive for the Serbs to launch an all-out final offensive 
before their forces were put at some disadvantage would be great. Thus 
the U.S. might have to undertake air strikes''--of a greater intensity 
than are now programmed--``in this case, without the participation of 
our NATO allies.''
  Now, that is a key point. If we unilaterally lift the embargo, are we 
beginning to lay the foundation that such tactical air that continues 
to be employed to hold in place Serb forces--those strikes would now 
again become exclusively those of the United States? Currently, other 
nations are participating in the air cover and air operations and air 
strikes. But this amendment, it seems to me, opens the door for our 
allies to say, you lift the embargo unilaterally, we no longer are 
going to participate in that one military action thus far that seems to 
have had some--I underline some--deterrent effect against the Serb 
forces. I would hope the proponents would address that question.
  My next question: ``How long would it take to effectively train the 
Bosnian Government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this training 
require the presence of U.S. military personnel in Bosnia or are other 
nations capable of training Bosnians on the U.S. military equipment 
that may be provided''--if in fact it is our equipment--``if the 
embargo is lifted? Should this training take place in Bosnia or out of 
country?''
  Incidentally, in talking to military men, particularly the Austrians, 
who really understand this terrain, this is not considered tank 
terrain. It is very hilly, narrow passages, weak bridges, and it is 
questionable how valuable the tanks could be certainly in their 
conventional role of being an aggressor offensive force with infantry, 
because the terrain severely limits their use.
  Now, of course, they could be utilized as portable artillery pieces, 
but that is limiting the value of a tank. So bear in mind, in the 
opinion of the experts who discussed this with me, it is not tank 
country. And as I mentioned, if you are going in by sea to bring in 
this equipment, you have got very narrow roads, roads which cannot 
support, in many instances, the heavy weight of a tank, particularly in 
this time of year where the roads are quite damp due to inclement 
weather. There are a number of bridges that cannot sustain the weight 
of a tank or a tank carrier. So you are limited.
  I have looked at the one route, together with the experts, that was 
used before when one of the UNPROFOR forces did bring in some tanks. 
And it was estimated that it would take perhaps as much as two or three 
regiments of forces, friendly to our cause, to guard the roadway that 
would carry the tanks in because but a handful of aggressor forces 
could slip in under the cover of night and sever the road or take out 
the bridges, and then you would find your logistic route to bring in 
the heavy equipment is stymied.
  And I asked the question: Well, if they took out a bridge, what would 
then happen? Obviously, you have to repair the bridge, and that 
requires another group of expert military--construction engineers, 
combat engineers--to go in and rebuild such bridges as might be taken 
out by hostile forces. I mention hostile forces. Clearly Serb. You do 
not know what the fractions will be in the Croatian forces, and their 
many warlords and other groups around here. So this is not exactly a 
neat structure of military forces with tight command and control within 
all the combat elements.
  To the contrary, there is quite a disparate arrangement of command 
and control throughout all the various combatants in this region. 
Always remember, I come back to the fact that this tragic conflict has 
its origins that go back hundreds and hundreds of years in the history 
of the world, rooted in religious and cultural differences and, indeed, 
hatred. Our forces going in there really, or whatever friendly force 
were to go in and help the Muslims would literally be surrounded by 360 
degrees of hostility in many areas.
  So I go back to the question:

       How long would it take to effectively train the Bosnian 
     Government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this training 
     require the presence of U.S. military personnel in Bosnia or 
     are there nations capable of training Bosnians in the U.S. 
     military equipment that may be provided if the embargo is 
     lifted? Should this training take place in Bosnia or out of 
     country?

  The answer: ``Estimating the time required to train a force to use, 
tactically deploy, and maintain sophisticated weapons is difficult 
without exact knowledge of the capabilities of the forces''--that is, 
the Bosnian Government forces--``to be trained. As a rough estimate, 
the Department of Defense notes that training time of 1 to 6 months is 
required to train soldiers to survive on the battlefield and properly 
use rudimentary weapons. Until there is a definitive plan to train a 
particular force, it is not possible to estimate where the training 
might take place.''
  Or indeed the length of the training.
  Next question:

       What is required in terms of logistics and maintenance to 
     service heavy weapons that the Bosnian forces would receive? 
     Are the Bosnian Government forces capable of maintaining this 
     equipment without outside assistance?

  Response: ``The more sophisticated the weapons system, the more 
lengthy and complicated the maintenance and supply system. The 
following factors, inter alia, would have a direct impact on both 
substance and tempo of operations: the complexity of the weapons 
system; number of units to be operated; skill of the operators; level 
of training, equipment's exposure to hostilities and weather, and 
logistics--ammunition, parts, transportation--and infrastructure--lines 
of communication, facilities--capacities. If the Bosnian Government 
acquired weapons and equipment compatible with its existing indigenous 
armaments production capabilities''--and they have managed very 
skillfully to build one or two plants in here to manufacture some of 
their weapons--``it could possibly maintain the new weapons without 
outside assistance.''
  But again, when it comes to spare parts and other, it would have to 
be compatible with whatever very modest logistics setup they have in 
place today.
  Next question: ``How would the Serbs--or other belligerents--react in 
that interim period between announcement of lifting and the adequate'' 
transportation and training of the new weapons--be they heavy or modest 
weapons, light weapons?
  Reply:

       Any formal lifting of the embargo by the U.N. prior to a 
     peace settlement would give the Serbs an obvious incentive to 
     exploit their current military superiority before foreign 
     arms begin to be used effectively by the Bosnian forces, 
     assuming that UNPROFOR stayed in place the soldiers could 
     face attack by Bosnian Serb forces. The Serbs could also be 
     expected to halt the humanitarian relief effort. While relief 
     could still flow into central Bosnia from the Adriatic coast 
     through Croatia, the Serbs are currently capable of cutting 
     off all land routes into Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and 
     Srebrenica.

  They could also close Sarajevo and Tuzla airports. The only 
possibility of supply to these areas would be through airdrops.
  I would suggest that the proponents get the same briefing I have had 
on what large military equipment can be successfully airdropped. I 
assure this body that it is a very small number of weapons.
  While these might sustain some of the outlining enclaves, they would 
be insufficient for a city the size of Sarajevo which has at most a 3-
week supply of food on hand.
  In addition, airdrop aircraft would be susceptible to antiaircraft 
fire. That is, in order to airdrop heavy equipment, you have to go to 
altitudes where surface-to-air ordnance becomes a factor.
  The eastern enclaves and other isolated areas like Maglaj and Bihac 
would probably fall, and Sarajevo would be in serious risk even if the 
population did not face starvation.

       Question. If there is an increase in fighting, should air 
     power be used against the Serbs during their period? What are 
     the military risks associated with air delivery of the new 
     weapons? Is it likely the airfields in the government-
     controlled areas can be kept open for such deliveries? Should 
     Allied aircraft be expected to participate in such a air 
     operation if we unilaterally lift the embargo? If not, would 
     U.S. air controllers have to be put on the ground to control 
     air strikes?
       Answer. The only possible way to discourage large-scale 
     Serb attacks on the Bosnian government or on UNPROFOR forces, 
     or to prevent the Serbs from halting the continued supply of 
     Sarajevo via the airport, would be through the threat of 
     military invasion or a massive bombing campaign aimed at 
     Bosnian Serb military and strategic infrastructure targets. 
     Unless we were prepared to undertake such actions, the 
     destruction of Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, and other 
     isolated Bosnian government positions before the arrival of 
     weaponry would become a distinct possibility. This is why the 
     U.S. has always linked the lifting of the arms embargo to a 
     bombing campaign, as exemplified in the ``lift and strike'' 
     proposals of May, 1993.
       Question. Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior 
     to the lifting of the arms embargo? How long would such a 
     withdrawal take and what are the risks involved? Would the 
     Serbs intercept the withdrawal and endeavor to take hostages?

  Reply: Our understanding is that the key UNPROFOR contributors, most 
of them are our NATO allies, would not be prepared to stay in Bosnia if 
the arms embargo were lifted. I repeat that. Our understanding is that 
the key UNPROFOR contributors, most of them are our NATO allies, would 
not be prepared to stay in Bosnia if the arms embargo were lifted.
  If a UNPROFOR force departure were unopposed by Bosnian Serbs, all 
UNPROFOR forces could probably leave within several weeks.
  The primary impediments would be logistical. If the Bosnian Serbs 
retaliated to a formal or unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by 
targeting UNPROFOR, the departure of the troops might be difficult or 
impossible. UNPROFOR troops, civil affairs officers--in other words, 
there are a lot of individuals in addition to just the UNPROFOR troops. 
There are volunteers from all over the world. When I visited there--and 
I have made now three visits to the region--I was impressed at how many 
volunteers, police, relief forces, all types in addition to the 
UNPROFOR forces, and indeed all of this cadre of volunteers from all 
over the world suddenly become potential hostages in a unilateral 
withdrawing of the embargo. That is my judgment.
  UNPROFOR troops, civil affairs officers and military observers, are 
deployed widely and could not defend themselves against a concentrated 
attack.
  I hasten to point out that we have seen pictures of U.N. forces 
deploying some military equipment. But it was never the intention of 
the United Nations or the UNPROFOR forces to go in with such equipment 
as is needed for a heavy defense action as contemplated by those 
analyzing the consequence of the lifting of the embargo.
  Say they end up with just basic equipment to sort of defend 
themselves from sporadic hostile action, not such equipment as you need 
to defend yourself against a consolidated attack from an aggressor 
force. So they literally lack the necessary military equipment.
  Allies might call on the United States to join them in sending ground 
forces in to rescue their troops or to launch a massive bombing 
campaign aimed at getting the Serbs to stop an impending UNPROFOR 
departure.
  Next question: What impact would an UNPROFOR withdrawal have on the 
people now receiving this assistance?
  Reply: If UNPROFOR were to leave before the Bosnian Government was in 
a position to take the offensive on the battlefield, Sarajevo, Gorazde, 
Srebrenica and Zepa, which have already surrendered, would be cut off 
from supply via a land route.
  The Serbs could also cut resupply to Sarajevo by closing down the 
airports. Any assistance delivery to either Sarajevo or the eastern 
enclaves would have to be by airdrops. Sarajevo could not survive on 
airdrops alone. With only a week of supply of food, disaster could set 
in.
  It is interesting, if you look at these enclaves here, and if you 
measure the distances, you can see the close proximity to Serbia 
proper. And to hit these zones with airdrops, the experts inform me 
that you have to have a lot of luck. The chances are that much of the 
airdrop equipment is going to fall into the hands of the hostile Serb 
forces in the area. So even airdrops to sustain these enclaves is very 
iffy.
  Question: If the arms embargo were lifted against Bosnia, would it 
also have to be lifted against Croatia since Croatian cooperation is 
essential to transporting weapons to the Bosnians? What impact would 
lifting the embargo against Croatia have on the situation in the 
Krajina What is the likely Serb reaction?
  Reply: The only reliable way to deliver heavy weapons to Bosnia in 
large quantity is through the territory now held by Croatia. If the 
U.N. Security Council lifted the embargo against Bosnia alone, Croatia 
might be permitted by resolution to have arms transit its territory. 
Thanks to the federation agreement signed in March, relations between 
the Croatian and Bosnian Governments are relatively good. That is 
today. We all know the transitory and unstable nature of the agreements 
connected with this frightful conflict over the past 2 years. They are 
signed one day, and they are often broken the next.
  Still, it is likely that weapons bound for Bosnia through Croatia 
would only reach their final destination if Croatia also received arms 
either openly or covertly.
  So you are really talking about practically speaking rearming two 
factions in this horrible conflict, both the Muslims--that is the 
Bosnian Government--and the Croatian forces.
  If the arms embargo were also lifted against Croatia, and the Croats 
use these weapons against Krajina, the Serbs there, who currently 
control almost one-third of Croatian territory, it is possible and 
perhaps likely that Serbia proper would intervene in this conflict 
leading to an outbreak of war between Croatia and Serbia broadening in 
many ways this tragic conflict.
  Lifting the embargo against Croatia would also raise questions on 
whether the embargo should remain in effect against Slovenia, and other 
adjoining nations.
  (Mr. LIEBERMAN assumed the chair.)
  Question: What is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia to a 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable to assume that 
they would come to the assistance of the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian 
Government began to recapture territory in the wake of the lifting of 
the embargo?
  Reply:

       The Russian reaction would be similar to that of our NATO 
     allies. A Russian withdrawal from UNPROFOR would be likely. A 
     U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would 
     certainly play into the hands of the pro-Serbian extremists 
     in Russia, who could make political decisions even more 
     difficult for the Yeltsin government. The Belgrade reaction 
     would depend on how seriously the threat were perceived. If a 
     humanitarian disaster in Sarajevo could be avoided and the 
     Bosnian Government survived long enough for the situation on 
     the battlefield to change, the Serbian Government could be 
     prompted to intervene on behalf of their Bosnian Serb 
     brethren. Milosevic would certainly be under tremendous 
     domestic pressure to do so. The threat or use of NATO 
     military actions, either on the ground or from the air, might 
     be needed to deter him.

  Next question:

       Would the lifting of the arms embargo help or hinder 
     efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict? 
     Is it an option for future consideration? Under what 
     circumstances?

  Time and time again, the experts certainly have told this Senator--
and I think many of you have heard it from others--that there is no 
military solution to this tragic conflict. The solution rests with the 
combatant forces and their ability to somehow reconcile their 
differences and agree on some type of a structure for a cease-fire, and 
maybe an eventual peace.
  The reply of the administration to my question:

       Unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo would probably 
     have a chilling effect on the negotiating process. The 
     Bosnian Government might feel less inclined to seek a 
     negotiated solution in the hope that it could achieve a 
     better solution on the battlefield. The Bosnian Serbs, for 
     their part, would be less inclined than ever to accept a U.S. 
     mediating role in the conflict, depriving us, the United 
     States, of the ability to serve as an honest broker for any 
     type of settlement. If the Serbs perceived an immediate 
     physical threat to themselves as a result of the U.S. 
     decision, they could attack the Bosnian Government or 
     UNPROFOR forces, or close down the humanitarian relief supply 
     to Sarajevo and the eastern enclave, thus, making a 
     negotiated settlement even more remote.

  Question:

       If the lifting of the arms embargo does not give the 
     Bosnian Government forces a degree of military equivalence 
     with Bosnian Serb forces, what would be the next step?

  Reply:

       Assuming that UNPROFOR has departed, or needs to be 
     rescued, and that Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves are at 
     grave risk, the U.S. might have no choice but to intervene 
     massively in the conflict--

ground, air, and sea--

     or acquiesce in a humanitarian and political disaster.

  That is a tough reply.
  I say to my colleagues that these are the questions that occur to me. 
I am sure each of you have many more questions. I took it upon myself 
to personally go out and visit the CIA, the Department of Defense, and 
the Department of State, not necessarily talking to the top 
policymakers, the President's appointees; no, I sought out the 
professional civil servants, who work in these agencies, who meet the 
challenge, who sit there day after day and, indeed, year after year and 
look at the situation and provide their own analysis, not affected by 
politics, concerned about the humanitarian--certainly, every individual 
is deeply touched and concerned about the humanitarian problems in this 
area. But these analysts are individuals who understand, in great 
detail, the facts, the balance of military forces, the historical roots 
of this conflict. I spent one fascinating evening, several hours, at 
the Department of Defense, finishing up late at night, talking to 
individuals who studied the history in this region of the world, going 
back 1,000 years and tracing for me the roots of this conflict that 
were planted in this region 1,000 years ago. Who is to say that those 
same roots of conflict and antagonism will not be present in this 
region 1,000 years hence?
  You get down to the bottom question: What can the United States do in 
this conflict? Mr. President, I researched this. As of this moment, 
there are 35 nations in our world today experiencing, to one degree or 
another, conflict. They spring up unexpectedly. There is Burundi and 
Rwanda in the African conflict, which is seen by hundreds of thousands 
nightly on our television. Many people had no idea where these two 
nations were before. But we sit there absolutely appalled at the loss 
of human life on this African continent.
  I come back to my point, which is that 35 nations are experiencing 
conflict. This country, in my judgment--no matter how strongly we feel, 
by means of compassion, to become involved, we have to always come down 
on what our national security interest is in these regions of the 
world. What is our security interest? We have to use that as a 
guidepost to determine whether or not we become involved.
  I question our national security interest in this region. I have 
always said it is primarily a European situation. If you go back to 
World War I, starting right here in Sarajevo, right here, with the 
assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, it was many years 
before President Wilson and the Congress decided that this conflict in 
Europe, World War I, had indeed become a conflict in which the United 
States had a national security interest. We did not jump in in 1914.
  Again, in World War II, September 1939, when Nazi forces crossed the 
border into Poland, it took a period of time before this Nation became 
involved. We were under the leadership of a very courageous President 
and, indeed, a Congress that passed a draft by a single vote in the 
early 1940's, showing the lack of commitment we had at that period of 
time to World War II.
  So I think this is primarily a European situation, and the United 
States, as of today, is a very active partner. We are the primary naval 
force offshore, enforcing, to the extent we can, the embargo against 
Serbia and, to a lesser extent, against Croatia. We are the primary 
military force in the air working, again, with our allies. So it is not 
as if we have turned our back to this conflict.
  Some lives of American service personnel have already been lost. But 
I always come down on: What is the price that the mothers and the 
fathers, the brothers and the sisters are willing to pay to get more 
heavily involved in this situation? And I have outlined several 
scenarios that might evolve if we unilaterally lift this embargo in 
which the world would look to the United States to come to the rescue 
of a greater conflict in this region.
  I question whether we have a national security interest certainly to 
employ our military in, should we say, risks far greater than those now 
at sea and in the air. Let it be said there is risk associated with the 
use of military equipment either at sea or in the air, but certainly on 
the ground the risk would be far greater. There is no one here today 
advocating the use of ground forces. But, as I pointed out, there are 
several scenarios. If we are perceived or in actuality lift this 
embargo unilaterally, this conflict could bear the stamp now, ``Made in 
the U.S.A.'' and we would be required to become involved far greater 
militarily.
  I do not find the national security interests. The humanitarian 
interest, yes, but not the national security interests for greater 
involvement.
  So I just point out that I did not sit down in the abstract and draw 
up these questions. I did it based on close consultation with 
professionals, the CIA, Department of Defense and Department of State, 
and, indeed, in consultation with, as I pointed out, a delegation of 
Austrian military professionals who know this region, who know the 
history, who understand the people, who traced for me the situation 
during World War II when Hitler's forces ostensibly had this area 
secured but, nevertheless, a civil war primarily between Serbia and 
Croatia, again engulfing Bosnia, took place right during World War II 
and Nazi occupation, a civil war that in the estimate of many 
historians took a million lives of Croatians, Serbians, and Moslems 
right at the time when Hitler had this half-dozen--I have heard as high 
as 12--divisions trying to maintain security in this region.
  So I hope that my colleagues, as we proceed with this debate, will 
look at the questions and answers that I have posed, questions that are 
being discussed, questions that are being analyzed by our professional 
infrastructure in those departments and agencies of our Government with 
primary responsibility of following this part of the world, will look 
at these questions and answers, point out to this Senator where I am in 
error. I do not claim to be infallible. I do not claim to be an expert. 
But I have undertaken, at considerable investment of time, the 
responsibility to go out and talk with others far more intelligent than 
I to determine the questions and their viewpoints which directly relate 
to the issue before this body at this precise moment: Should the Senate 
of the United States support a unilateral withdrawing of the embargo 
against the Government of Bosnia as it relates to armaments?
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Marc 
Nickelson, a Pearson fellow, from my staff, be granted the privilege of 
the floor during the course of this legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I would like to present my statement on 
the question of Bosnia. Mr. President, I rise in support of lifting the 
U.S. arms embargo on Bosnia, and I am pleased to be a co-sponsor of the 
bill introduced by the distinguished minority leader for that purpose.

  The failure to exempt the new state of Bosnia from the arms embargo 
earlier imposed on Yugoslavia was a well-intentioned, but tragic 
mistake. Serbia, whose aggression had prompted the embargo, was in no 
way inhibited by it. The Serbs already possessed a bulging arsenal 
inherited from the Yugoslav armed forces, as well as the lion's share 
of arms manufacturing facilities in ex-Yugoslavia. Bosnia, on the other 
hand, was virtually without arms. The embargo condemned its people to 
confront Serbian tanks and heavy artillery with little more than small 
arms and infantry.
  Nor was the embargo equally enforceable against both sides. Serbia's 
long land border with neutral states is difficult to seal off the 
clandestine arms shipments. Supply routes to Bosnia, on the other hand, 
are ultimately reliant on transit of goods through NATO states or 
across the Adriatic Sea--all of which have been effectively 
interdicted, in no small part with the support of the U.S. Navy. An 
unequal embargo, made worse by unequal enforcement, has served not to 
prevent Serbian aggression but to favor it.
  The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has raged now for over 2 years. 
It has taken a dreadful toll in human lives and suffering for the 
people of this region and particularly for those in Bosnia. But it has 
taken an equal toll on the credibility and integrity of the 
international community, and above all the West. For we have remained 
essentially passive in the face of the most flagrant aggression in 
Europe since the end of World War II.
  I say passive, because the Western response to the tragedy of Bosnia 
has consistently sought to skirt the main issue and ignore a basic 
lesson of history. That lesson is that only by the use of force, or the 
credible threat of its use, can a determined aggressor be stopped. 
Expansionist Fascist states will not be dissuaded by appeals to reason, 
justice, or due regard for the decent opinions of mankind. Such regimes 
live by forces and respect only strength.
  Yet rather than act, or give Bosnia the means to act in its own 
defense, the international community ducked the issue and ducked down 
four blind alleys.
  First, it sustained an arms embargo which, by favoring the aggressor, 
served only to whet his appetite. Second, it imposed an economic 
embargo against Serbia which, though certainly appropriate, has not and 
will not alone be sufficient to bring the Milosevic regime or its 
Bosnian-Serb proxies to heel. Third, it has attempted to broker a 
negotiated settlement. But so long as the West is unwilling to either 
assist Bosnia or allow it to arm itself against a massive Serbian 
arsenal, negotiations can have only one result. That result is a sham 
settlement which ratifies the current situation on the battlefield by 
acknowledging Serbian conquests and splintering the Bosnian State along 
ethnic fault lines. The Bosnians have been unwilling to acquiesence in 
this disguised surrender. Attempts by some Western negotiators and 
Governments to pressure them into doing so are a disgrace reminiscent 
of the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia to Hitler's Germany in 1938.
  Lastly, the international community, through the United Nations, has 
sought to bring humanitarian relief to the victims of the conflict. The 
effort is noble but, again, the motives have been less than pure. Mixed 
with altruism has been the desire of some to salve a guilty conscience 
and put a cosmetic bandaid over the grisly spectacle, the better to 
excuse the failure of their governments individually or collectively to 
confront aggression.
  Serbia has shown itself more than willing to use unarmed relief 
workers and lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers as hostages. Consequently, 
their presence in zones of conflict now serves more to deter decisive 
Western military action than to limit Serbian atrocities. United 
Nations representatives have become, in effect, guarantors of Serbian 
impunity. At the same time, their presence as monitors separating the 
sides in selected ceasefire areas has frozen in place Serbian gains 
while freeing up Serbian units and heavy weapons to undertake new 
offensives elsewhere which whittle away at Bosnia. Thus, U.N. 
representatives have also become guarantors of Serbian conquests.
  Let it be clearly stated, Mr. President, that the fault in this lies 
not with the United Nations as an organization. The United Nations is 
not an independent body, but an instrument of the member states and, in 
this case, of the Security Council, which has set the mandate and the 
limits on United Nation actions. It is the failure of judgment and the 
failure of will in chanceries and national capitals, not in New York, 
which has led to this sorry spectacle. And only by changing those 
policies, and first and foremost the course of the United States in 
this conflict, that we can begin to recover the situation in Bosnia and 
our own sense of honor.
  For the United States, more than just honor is at stake. We have a 
vital interest in the stability of Europe and the peaceful evolution of 
democratic States out of the ruins of the former Soviet Union and its 
allies. The collapse of communism has unleashed new possibilities but 
also old hatreds. From Eastern Europe to central Asia, the emerging 
democracies are a tangle of overlapping ethnic groups with competing 
claims and little history of mutual accommodation. Democracy and the 
guarantee of minority rights and political participation offers one 
model for addressing those differences. Servia's war of ethnic 
aggression offers another. If that aggression and ethnic cleansing are 
allowed to go unchecked, setting an example for others, both peace and 
democracy will be at great risk in an enormous area bordering on the 
Atlantic alliance. Neither we nor Western Europe will escape the 
consequences.

  The risk of war and chaos will be greatest precisely again in the 
Balkans. For make no mistake about it, an unjust peace imposed on 
Bosnia would not long endure. Rather, it would sow the seeds of renewed 
conflict as soon as the Bosnians could bind up their wounds, overcome 
their fatigue, and arm themselves, as they eventually would.
  Let me be brutally frank. The hatreds unleashed in this war, and the 
desire of the victims of aggression for justice--and, yes, for 
vengeance--assure that no peace settlement will last which does not 
rest on a durable balance of power. Such a balance does not now exist. 
It has been artificially tipped in Serbia's favor by the one-sided 
effect of the arms embargo. It is the tremendous disparity of firepower 
between the two sides which, more than anything else, accounts for 
Serbian successes. The arms embargo will begin to wither away, in 
substance if not in form, as soon as a settlement is concluded. 
Serbia's military advantage will erode along with it. An unjust 
settlement imposed on the basis of that military advantage will be 
challenged by Bosnia as the letter gains in relative strength, and the 
stage will have been set for a second Balkan war.

  Mr. President, apart from our political and security interests in 
acting effectively against Serbian aggression, I believe we have an 
equally vital moral stake in doing so. For what is happening in Bosnia 
is not merely a war of conquest. It is a war of annihilation, designed 
to wipe an entire people off the map by forced displacement or 
extermination. I recently visited the Holocaust Museum in Washington, 
and could not help but be moved by the parallels between the horrors 
perpetrated by the Nazis 50 years ago and what Serbian fascism is 
achieving in the Balkans today. No one can claim now, as some asserted 
50 years ago, that they do not know the full enormity of the atrocities 
taking place. And there is no escaping the moral responsibility for our 
actions--or inaction--in the face of those horrors. After the 
Holocaust, the world said ``Never again.'' Are we now tho say, ``Just 
one more time?'' Moral authority lies at the foundation of this Nation 
and buttresses our position of world leadership and global power. We 
are mortgaging that authority by our failure to exercise either 
adequate leadership or power to oppose this modern day version of the 
Holocaust. A world community prepared to tolerate it would be willing 
to tolerate anything; and that is not the kind of world we want to live 
in or bequeath to our children.
  So, Mr. President, what should be done? The first step, the very 
minimum step, is to remove an arms embargo which has denied the Bosnian 
people the means to exercise the inherent right of any individual, and 
any nation, to self-defense. Worse, it is an embargo which, buy its 
lopsided and adverse impact on Bosnia, has effectively favored the 
aggressors in the conflict while punishing their victims. This bill 
will eliminate that absurdity.
  But while removal of the embargo is an important first step, it 
should not be the last. If Serbian aggression is to be checked, more 
needs to be done and, yes, we will have to pay a price, albeit a 
relatively modest one. The Bosnians are not asking anyone for infantry 
troops and are more than willing to absorb the principal cost in blood 
by tending to their own defense on the ground. They ask only for tools 
to aid that defense. The United States should respond not merely by 
lifting the arms embargo, but by providing them weapons on a grant 
basis out of U.S. stocks. A majority of this body is already clearly on 
record in support of that proposition.
  Second, we should urge our NATO allies, and be prepared ourselves, to 
use Western air power to assist Bosnian defenders and raise the costs 
to Serbia if it continues to pursue its aggression. The application of 
NATO air power to date has been meager, half-hearted, and undermined by 
a hesitancy to make good on ultimatums when the latter have been first 
tested, then flouted, by the Serbs. As a result, the credibility of our 
word and of our threats has been weakened, and with it our ability to 
deter the Serbs--or any other rogue states who detect in this record a 
lack of United States firmness or resolve in defending our interests 
and principles. It is time to end those doubts, to end the bluffing, 
and to put an end to the free ride the Serbs have enjoyed in Bosnia. If 
Serbian attacks continue, we should be prepared to strike key Serb 
military targets anywhere in Bosnia and, if necessary, in Serbia 
itself. This is particularly important in the wake of any decision to 
life the embargo, for the Serbs may respond initially with stepped up 
attacks to take maximum advantage of their current advantage in arms 
before it evaporates.
  Finally, we must recognize that the time may have come to reduce or 
remove the U.N. presence in Bosnia. Events in ex-Yugoslavia have 
demonstrated and senior U.N. officials have acknowledged that relief 
and peacekeeping on the one hand, and peace enforcement on the other, 
are difficult if not impossible to reconcile in the same place at the 
same time. The time comes when you have to choose between the two. When 
relief efforts intended to shield the victims of war are cynically 
exploited by an aggressor army to shield itself, that shield may have 
to be withdrawn. When peacekeepers become, in effect, a surrogate 
occupying force for conquered territory, they have become as much a 
part of the problem as its solution. That is where we are today in 
Bosnia.
  Little wonder that the Bosnian Government has made it clear that it 
prefers to see U.N. relief workers and peacekeepers withdrawn if 
Western concerns for the safety of their personnel in Bosnia are the 
principal obstacle preventing a lifting of the arms embargo. Would 
withdrawal of the U.N. presence result in an increase in the fighting 
in the near term? Perhaps, although Serb capabilities to expand an 
already vigorous military effort are open to question. Could it lead to 
greater suffering among civilians in the short run? The answer is 
probably yes, particularly given Serbian conduct to date, particularly 
when no witnesses are present to encourage occasional restraint.
  But to acknowledge these consequences is only to restate the choice 
that has faced every nation and every people in history who have been 
the victims of attack. Should they surrender their freedom, their 
homes, their way of life, their country's existence, and their 
children's future? Or should they resist and fight, even if resistance 
brings suffering and death to many of their countrymen?
  That is a choice for each nation and each people to make for 
themselves. The heroic resistance of the Bosnian people against great 
odds over the last 2 years is eloquent testimony that they have made 
their choice. They wish to defend their homes and their country and to 
lay down their lives for it, if need be. It is not for us to deny them 
that right, and I can only hope that we ourselves will always be 
willing to exercise it in our own defense, as we have in the past. Mr. 
President, during the long struggle against Soviet expansionism, a 
phrase was coined to advance a rationale for surrender to force. That 
phrase was ``better Red than dead.'' Even at the height of the cold 
war, when the possibilities of a nuclear Armageddon cast a long shadow 
over our Nation, the people of the United States rejected that 
philosophy with the contempt it deserves. Even with the best of 
intentions, we cannot now in good conscience impose on a small nation 
what we have never been prepared to choose for ourselves.
  The time has come, Mr. President, for the United States to lift the 
arms embargo on Bosnia and to aid in its defense.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to called roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). Without objection it is so ordered.


                  lead, follow, or get out of the way

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, there is an old saying which bears 
repeating with regard to the United States policy position on Bosnia. 
The administration needs to lead, follow, or get out of the way. Each 
day that passes offers astonishing proof that the President of the 
United States and his national security team cannot or will not decide 
whether to lead or follow, engage or evade, or just ignore the whole 
darn mess. The only time we see any decisive action is when public 
opinion surveys issue ominous warnings about Presidential approval 
ratings.
  With yet another poll showing a steady drop in his foreign policy 
rating, once again, the President turned on the telegenic charm in a 
media event beamed to over 200 countries courtesy of CNN. According to 
the New York Times, the event was designed to ``reassert control over 
the sliding ratings by demonstrating a tough stance toward American 
problems overseas.'' Once again, we were bombarded with tough sounding 
rhetoric--once again, we heard we must stay engaged around the world.
  But, sadly, once again, we were offered little detail as to the 
President's specific plans or thinking about the rapidly 
changing international landscape.

  Mr. President, I want to believe there is an American strategy for 
Bosnia, for Korea, for Haiti, and a half dozen other trouble spots 
which the international community must tackle. I want to believe that 
the President and his national security team have given serious thought 
to problems not just poll ratings. But, there is little evidence to 
support my hope.
  The events in Bosnia since the Senate first took up this amendment 
demonstrate the contradictions and confusion which bedevil our policy. 
Every newspaper and magazine in the Nation has run stories chronicling 
the disastrous decline of the United States as the competent, decisive, 
inspirational leader of the free world.
  Let me offer a quick tour of some headlines--
  The Wall Street Journal says ``There is no Clinton Foreign Policy'';
  The Baltimore Sun claims the ``U.S. stumbles for Lack of Foreign 
Policy'';
  The Louisville Courier-Journal eulogizes: ``Clinton Talks Tough as 
Goradze Dies'';
  The Lexington Herald Leader denounces ``Foggy, Wobbly Foreign 
Policy'';
  A Washington Post columnist calls our foreign policy: ``Inept to 
Disgraceful''; and
  Time magazine held the President responsible for ``Dropping the 
Ball.''
  I do not think Members of the Senate are any more confident than 
columnists and reporters about the state of American foreign policy, or 
our international credibility, image and leadership. While I agree with 
the President that problems at home demand our attention and require 
solutions, if we fail to define and defend our interests abroad, now, 
we will pay a much higher price in the long run.
  While President Clinton came into office as the domestic policy 
President, this administration may well turn foreign policy into a 
campaign issue.
  There was another moment in history when the American people told 
their leaders they were weary of the world--they wanted our undivided 
attention here at home. It was a time which Winston Churchill captured 
well. He looked around the free world and observed, we were ``Decided 
only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, 
solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent.'' Churchill's words--
the ghost of 1936--haunts this administration's policy.
  What should the public think when the Secretary of Defense declares 
we have no interests in defending Goradze, and is joined in that view 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who says air power is irrelevant. 
Then within days the President threatens NATO air strikes if the Serbs 
do not withdraw from Goradze. Does Goradze matter? Why? Will air power 
work as the President claims--or not, as General Shalikashvili says?
  It is not just a question of a bewildering public message. In 
private, senior officials seem perplexed. When I asked Deputy Secretary 
Talbott, what happens next? What are our policy options if we cannot 
bomb the Serbs back to the negotiating table? There was long pause, and 
an honest, however troubling response, ``Senator, I don't have a 
persuasive answer for you.''
  The administration can offer no persuasive answer nor define and 
sustain a strategy as the situation in Bosnia just gets worse and 
worse. I was truly discouraged by the Washington Post story which 
suggested that our inconsistency and policy swerving has resulted in 
losses both in territory and peace prospects. As described by John 
Pomfret, the Bosnian Serbs have been encouraged to ``push and probe the 
United Nations with everything appearing to be negotiable.''

  The Serbs are clearly taking advantage of our weakness and 
inconsistency. In Goradze, the shelling has stopped, but the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugee Affairs representative describes the situation 
as ``tense and deteriorating.''
  In spite of early public assurances by the U.N.'s General Rose that 
the Serbians were in compliance with demands to withdraw completely 
from Goradze, we know that Serbians continue to occupy a hamlet within 
the exclusion zone with between 100 and 200 forces. U.N. peacekeepers 
have been denied access to the area, and 10 days ago, British 
peacekeepers on patrol in the exclusion zone found themselves under 
repeated Serbian fire. According to the U.N., the British troops were 
forced to return fire in their attempt to withdraw, killing five 
Serbians in the process.
  Sarajevo offers a similar mixed picture of success.
  Although the shelling has stopped, the Serbs have blocked access to 
U.N. observers, forcibly removed heavy weapons from U.N. depots and 
redeployed at least 15 heavy weapons, including five tanks, around that 
city.
  Mr. President, the story is the same in Tuzla. As in Sarajevo and 
Gorazde, the U.N. and NATO ultimatums have been blatantly violated at 
absolutely no cost--no cost--to the Serbs.
  The consequences for the United States, on the other hand, are both 
immediate and unfortunate. As a direct result of issuing ultimatums we 
cannot or will not enforce, we have squandered NATO's credibility and 
compromised any opportunity to negotiate a reasonable, durable peace 
agreement.
  I was truly discouraged when I learned that, last week, the Bosnian 
Serb leader told American, European and Russian diplomats that he would 
no longer support an earlier agreement calling on the Serbs to give up 
nearly a third of captured Bosnian territory. As one negotiator noted, 
``This is most depressing. Our troubles in Gorazde obviously did not 
help the cause of peace.''
  The Serbs have figured out that we may talk tough, but we simply do 
not follow through. The air strikes so far have been characterized as 
largely ineffective. Even the President acknowledged during his 
international town meeting that air strikes could not change the 
outcome.
  The administration seems to be engaged in a dangerous guessing game 
of Serbian intentions. Unfortunately, the stakes keep escalating, 
American lives are in jeopardy; yet, decisionmaking is out of direct 
American control.
  A year ago, it was just the credibility of a revived and reinvented 
United Nations that was on the line. It was up to the Secretary General 
to solve the problem in the Balkans. Now we find U.S. pilots and planes 
involved in NATO missions, which at any point a U.N. civilian official 
can block, override, suspend, or terminate.
  Because of the tragic events in Somalia, the administration would 
prefer to deny that American lives now hang in the balance of a U.N. 
bureaucrat's decision. But the events of the past 2 weeks warn that we 
are repeating the mistakes of Somalia. We are subcontracting U.S. 
interests and U.S. lives to U.N. whims. I repeat, Mr. President, we are 
subcontracting U.S. interests and U.S. lives to U.N. whims.
  Let me offer just one example: On April 23, as Serbian troops slammed 
shells into the heart of Gorazde, NATO prepared to launch air strikes, 
consistent with the terms of an international ultimatum. NATO was 
deliberately blocked from carrying out a military mission by a United 
Nations civilian and bureaucrat, Special Envoy Akashi. Secretary 
Christopher tried to protest the U.N. decision, but was told Boutros 
Ghali was not available to take his call--not available to take his 
call.
  We have now had a week of public bickering and criticism between 
senior U.N. and United States officials over who is more responsible 
for botching up Bosnia--all of which only reinforces my view that it is 
a mistake to let the United Nations run United States foreign policy.
  Frankly, Ambassador Albright may feel better by firing off a testy 
letter to the Secretary General demanding an apology for some 
bureaucratic indiscretion, but demanding apologies is a far cry from 
directing policy. It all strikes me as petty and suggests America may 
have sunk to a new, record low in international esteem.
  Mr. President, it is not just Bosnia that is taking a pounding. 
American credibility is shellshocked. It is this portrait of policy 
weakness that has brought me slowly but irreversibly to the point where 
I believe the arms embargo against the Bosnians simply must be lifted.
  I think sound legal arguments may have been made that the embargo has 
been illegally enforced against Bosnia. No one disputes the right to 
self-defense, as enunciated in the U.N. Charter, and no one claims that 
the embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia, which can only logically and 
legally mean that it does not apply to any of the nations which have 
emerged as independent successor states.
  But, legal arguments aside, I think the choice really is whether as a 
nation we continue to drift slowly but surely toward expanded and 
direct involvement in the war in Bosnia, or whether we let the Bosnian 
Moslems fight for themselves. That decision does not take much time for 
me to make.
  Although the analogy may cause some of the Members of the Senate 
consternation, I think this is a choice like those we had to make in 
Nicaragua and Afghanistan. By giving the Bosnian Moslems a chance to 
defend themselves, we are leveling the battlefield with a view toward 
creating conditions that will produce a truce and a settlement. By 
lifting the arms embargo, we are voting to support the victims of 
aggression, with no loss of American lives. It is obvious, Mr. 
President, that the Serbs only seem to respond to the steady, decisive 
use of force--a course the administration is unable or unwilling to 
support. Policy flip-flops will only assure that this war drags on, 
potentially engulfing Europe in flames and eventually drawing us in.
  For more than four decades, NATO served as a strong, effective 
deterrent to Soviet aggression and as the most important stabilizing 
force in Europe. We now find its credibility and capabilities being 
squandered and misdirected by U.N. bureaucrats. I think this is a 
serious, serious mistake. If this course continues, sooner or later, we 
are going to hear the administration make the argument that having put 
NATO at risk, we must now rescue the alliance from our mistake.
  More than 40 years of stability--more than 40 years of security in 
Europe are being compromised by confusion at the White House. There is 
an alternative. The administration has demonstrated that it will not 
lead the international community. The United States should not follow 
the United Nations. So the Senate must decide to get out of the way. 
The time has come to let the Bosnian Moslems defend what is left of 
Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from New 
Mexico, Senator Domenici.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may 
proceed for 15 minutes as if in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized as if in morning 
business for up to 15 minutes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Domenici pertaining to the introduction of S. 
2096 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced 
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the President pro 
tempore, Senator Byrd.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, has the Pastore rule 
expired for the day?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, it has expired.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

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