[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 10, 1994]
LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is S. 2042.
Who seeks recognition?
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] is
recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I find myself in the unenviable position
of opposing my distinguished Republican leader, Mr. Dole, and an
equally distinguished group of cosponsors.
Let me review my basic position which I have set forth on the floor
here in previous debates in the last week or so.
The lifting of the embargo is something that has a great deal of
appeal to me and, I am sure, many others. I am willing to stipulate
that there are certain legalities about the placing of the embargo that
lend themselves to a ground that we did it in a collection of nations,
indeed with the United States, in an illegal fashion. But,
nevertheless, we are where we are now.
Candidly, I would like to see the embargo lifted, but I cannot find
to my satisfaction the answers to a set of questions that I believe
require answering and understanding by the Members of the Senate before
we act.
I wrote the Secretaries of Defense and State a detailed letter on the
April 29 setting forth a series of questions that I felt were germane
to the issue. I would like to repeat some of those questions for
purposes of this debate. Then on May 4, the Department of State, under
the Acting Secretary at that time, Mr. Talbott, replied to my series of
questions.
Mr. President, I will go through the questions and provide the
answers as given by the Departments of State and Defense in
collaboration together, the two Departments.
So, I repeat, while lifting the embargo has a great deal of appeal to
me, in all probability it was put on illegally, at least there is a
legitimate argument to that effect; and it is advanced by very
responsible individuals, two ambassadors who came in to see me and two
former Deputy Undersecretaries of Defense. I found their arguments very
cogent as to the legalities. But we are where we are today.
This is a map that depicts the relative locations of the combatants
today. I will use this in the context of trying to provide the Senate
with answers to the questions that concern me.
My first question.
If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were
unilaterally lifted by the United States--
And that issue, in my judgment, is implicit in Senator Dole's
amendment, and it was acknowledged as being a part of that amendment by
one or more of his cosponsors in a prior debate in this Chamber.
If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were
unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would
such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the
broad range of U.N. Security Council-imposed embargoes, such
as economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against
Iraq?
The administration replies:
There is a clear danger that other nations would use the
U.S. precedent as a pretext to unilaterally ``lift''
sanctions against regimes that they found inconvenient or
opposed for political or economic reasons. This could lead to
a total breakdown in the ability of the United Nations to
enforce sanctions against Serbia, Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and,
over time, could limit the power of the U.N. to affect
international behavior through binding resolutions.
And I would like to add also North Korea, a situation that is
extremely serious, extremely serious to the whole world. Unless the
issues in North Korea are handled, it will result in an entire new
dimension to the nuclear balance in the world today. Japan will have to
reconsider its stance; Taiwan, its stance; China, its stance; and
indeed we may see the emergence of a whole new series of nations in the
Pacific Rim area that, by necessity, for their own national security
reasons would be required to rethink past policies against nuclear
forces in light of developments in North Korea.
This is the main reason I am against the Dole amendment; that it has
this unilateral feature that the United States would be acting
unilaterally in such a way as to send a signal of hope to the people of
Bosnia, that with the lifting of this embargo the whole combat
situation could be changed. And I will address the specifics
momentarily.
Does the Dole amendment imply that the United States will be
forthcoming in the shipment of arms? Does it imply other nations will
join? Those are the questions that have to be answered.
And, of course, I am deeply troubled by the historical context, quite
apart from sanctions, that our Nation, throughout this century, has
stood solidly with Great Britain and France. In World War I and World
War II, they were our principal allies. They are the principal
participants in the UNPROFOR forces, those forces currently in the
former State of Yugoslavia, primarily Bosnia, that are providing such
humanitarian relief and economic relief as can be given to those people
suffering so tragically.
What will the precedent be for our having acted unilaterally with
respect to our two most valued allies in this century?
My next question.
Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is
not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against
the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia is not a successor state and
because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of self-defense
under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. What is the
administration's legal opinion on this issue?
And the reply:
The arms embargo was imposed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia by U.N. Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) and
reaffirmed in later resolutions (e.g., Resolutions 724, 727,
740, 743, and 787). Resolution 713 is a mandatory decision
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and expressly provides
that the embargo will remain in effect ``until the Security
Council decides otherwise.'' The Council has also made clear
that the embargo applies throughout the territory of the
former Yugoslavia notwithstanding its breakup into separate
states (see Resolution 727 (1992)). Thus it applies to
Bosnia.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the
administration's argument on this issue be printed at this point in the
Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The embargo does not violate Bosnia's right of self-defense
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Any self-defense right
that may exist to receive arms from other states under
Article 51 is subject to the authority of the Security
Council, which may take action affecting it. Thus, under
Article 51, measures taken in self-defense ``shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the [UN] Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.''
The Security Council may take various actions--imposition
of cease-fires, limits on armaments, and establishment of
protected or demilitarized zones--that affect a state's right
of self-defense. For example, the Council may impose a cease-
fire even though its immediate effect may leave an aggressor
in temporary occupation of part of the defender's territory.
Article 51 takes as its premise the principle that the
Security Council may impose such sanctions when it judges
them to be necessary, and this is an essential part of the
Council's authorities to maintain and restore peace.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am not going to get deeply involved in
the legalities, because I am more concerned about the situation here
today and tomorrow and to project it into the future. This is the
principal concern I have about lifting the embargo.
My next question:
How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect
our relations with the NATO allies and the Russian
Federation?
Answer:
Our allies and the Russians are extremely concerned about
the prospect of unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo.
They would argue that our behavior encouraged an erosion of
the U.N. sanctions regime as an instrument of international
policy. If they came to believe that unilateral U.S. lifting
of the embargo had more than a symbolic effect, they might
decide to pull some or all of their forces out of UNPROFOR,
leading to the collapse of the humanitarian relief effort.
This is an answer that must be addressed. What are the consequences
if UNPROFOR has to withdraw in the face of a lifting of the embargo,
particularly unilateral lifting by the United States?
Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa, which are
surrounded by Serb forces, would be cut off from most of the
relief supplies. Should the Bosnian Serbs attack any
remaining European forces or take them hostage, the Europeans
would hold the United States accountable.
This conflict could suddenly transcend from an international one with
many parties involved to a conflict that could be said was ``Made in
the U.S.A'' from the moment the embargo is lifted. That is my concern.
Should the, as I said, Bosnian Serbs attack any remaining European
forces or take them, the Europeans would hold us accountable.
Nations like Iran, who have standing offers to provide
troops to the Bosnian Government, might elect to do so,
arguing that the United States has set a precedent for
ignoring a U.N. resolution.
Next question: ``If the arms embargo were lifted, what types of
weapons would the Bosnian Government forces need to achieve a degree of
weapon equivalence?'' That phrase, ``a degree of weapon equivalence,''
is one that I just worked up as a baseline to try to develop a question
and an answer to this issue--``a degree of weapon equivalence with the
Bosnian Serb forces. Which nations would train the Bosnian forces in
these new weapons?''
The answer: ``We presume that the Bosnian Government would require
large-caliber heavy weapons to match the capabilities of the Bosnian
Serbs.'' It is acknowledged now that in the area of tanks and heavy
artillery, the Bosnian Serbs have a ratio of 4 to 1, 5, sometimes 8 to
1 in some of these heavy armaments. It is clear that the Bosnian Serbs
have stronger weaponry.
In contrast, it is argued that the Moslems have more people. To a
degree, they are motivated better and, to some degree, trained better,
even though it is largely a citizen army. That is an offset. But,
indeed, it is not an offset in the face of heavy tanks and heavy
artillery.
This could include medium and heavy artillery, medium tanks
and long-range antitank weapons, such as the Tube Launched,
Optically Tracked Antitank Weapons system. Personnel familiar
with weapons provided, usually the supplier, Government or
industry, generally train recipients in the use, tactical
employment, and maintenance of systems procured. Potential
suppliers/trainers span the globe.
So if you are going to send in tanks--and I will address the
difficulty of getting them in--and heavy artillery, once there, there
is a period of time that will have to elapse to train the Moslem forces
in the use of this equipment, and particularly the combination of tank-
infantry warfare is a very complicated skill and could well take time,
given there is no historical participation with tanks of any magnitude
by the Moslem forces today. This will not be overnight. Again, another
period of time within which the Serb forces could consolidate their
gains further, take hostages, and be on the aggressive move in many
areas in this region.
But, again, there is no clear answer as to who will ship what, who
will train the Moslem forces to use these weapons. And, also, heavy
weapons require a great deal of maintenance and resupply. So the
infrastructure issue, in my judgment, is an important one as it relates
to the heavy weapons.
Next question:
How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported
to the Bosnian Government forces? What are the various access
routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes
to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a
military force would it take to guard and maintain these
logistical routes?
And the answer: I sat down with individuals--it is interesting--some
U.S. officers, some foreign officers. I gained a great deal of
knowledge from the Austrian military officers. As you know, this area
of the world at one time was under the Austro-Hungarian empire. The
Austrians have quite a bit of knowledge about this area.
There are basically two ports through which this heavy traffic can
move. One is the Port of Split and the other in the Port of Ploce.
Here is the official answer: ``If the arms embargo were lifted by
U.S. action and Croatia cooperated''--and this is a key question
because you have to move across land that is now under the control of
Croatian forces, so their cooperation is essential, and you do not know
what price you might pay for that cooperation. Are you to lift the
embargo against arms to Croatia? So is there another faction in this
war that will be armed? What price is to be paid and how stable can we
rely on the Croatian participation? Will it be on one day and off the
next? These are subquestions.
``If the arms embargo were lifted by U.N. action and Croatia
cooperated, heavy weapons could be brought into Bosnia through Croatian
Adriatic ports,'' this being the Adriatic Sea. ``It would be difficult
to deliver substantial amounts of equipment by air since all major
Bosnian Government airstrips are within Serb artillery range, and
aircraft would be subject to surface-to-air missile fire.'' That is
primarily in Sarajevo and Tuzla.
I made a trip to Sarajevo many months ago, and it is down in sort of
a bowl surrounded by high terrain. If an individual crept up on to that
terrain, he or she could command that airfield very easily with quite
simple weapons.
Likewise, Tuzla airport is within range of a lot of the current
Serbian military equipment. So it is unlikely, in the judgment of the
experts, that either of these airports could be used. I certainly think
this country would think long and hard before we send in C-5's or
141's, indeed 130's. Having lifted the embargo and trying to get
military equipment in, we put our forces at severe risk.
``Shipment by sea would require weeks and perhaps months, depending
on how long it took the Bosnian Government to purchase or otherwise
procure the weapons. If the United States unilaterally''--and I repeat
unilaterally--``lifted the arms embargo, heavy weapons could not be
shipped to Bosnia without a willingness on the part of other nations to
violate the U.N. arms embargo.''
That is a very interesting point, and I hope the proponents of this
amendment will address that.
``If Croatia were to cooperate with the United States in violating
the U.N. embargo, and the Bosnian Government was able to purchase or
otherwise obtain weapons, arms could begin reaching Bosnia in some
weeks or months.'' A lot of if's. ``It is quite possible that most, if
not all, UNPROFOR forces would probably have departed by then, perhaps
having had to fight its way out, and would not be available to secure
routes for arms imports. The Serbs would naturally take advantage of
any lag-time between international lifting of the arms embargo and
provision of the weapons to the Bosnian Government.''
And as I pointed out also the time to properly train and logistically
support the heavy weapons system.
``The incentive for the Serbs to launch an all-out final offensive
before their forces were put at some disadvantage would be great. Thus
the U.S. might have to undertake air strikes''--of a greater intensity
than are now programmed--``in this case, without the participation of
our NATO allies.''
Now, that is a key point. If we unilaterally lift the embargo, are we
beginning to lay the foundation that such tactical air that continues
to be employed to hold in place Serb forces--those strikes would now
again become exclusively those of the United States? Currently, other
nations are participating in the air cover and air operations and air
strikes. But this amendment, it seems to me, opens the door for our
allies to say, you lift the embargo unilaterally, we no longer are
going to participate in that one military action thus far that seems to
have had some--I underline some--deterrent effect against the Serb
forces. I would hope the proponents would address that question.
My next question: ``How long would it take to effectively train the
Bosnian Government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this training
require the presence of U.S. military personnel in Bosnia or are other
nations capable of training Bosnians on the U.S. military equipment
that may be provided''--if in fact it is our equipment--``if the
embargo is lifted? Should this training take place in Bosnia or out of
country?''
Incidentally, in talking to military men, particularly the Austrians,
who really understand this terrain, this is not considered tank
terrain. It is very hilly, narrow passages, weak bridges, and it is
questionable how valuable the tanks could be certainly in their
conventional role of being an aggressor offensive force with infantry,
because the terrain severely limits their use.
Now, of course, they could be utilized as portable artillery pieces,
but that is limiting the value of a tank. So bear in mind, in the
opinion of the experts who discussed this with me, it is not tank
country. And as I mentioned, if you are going in by sea to bring in
this equipment, you have got very narrow roads, roads which cannot
support, in many instances, the heavy weight of a tank, particularly in
this time of year where the roads are quite damp due to inclement
weather. There are a number of bridges that cannot sustain the weight
of a tank or a tank carrier. So you are limited.
I have looked at the one route, together with the experts, that was
used before when one of the UNPROFOR forces did bring in some tanks.
And it was estimated that it would take perhaps as much as two or three
regiments of forces, friendly to our cause, to guard the roadway that
would carry the tanks in because but a handful of aggressor forces
could slip in under the cover of night and sever the road or take out
the bridges, and then you would find your logistic route to bring in
the heavy equipment is stymied.
And I asked the question: Well, if they took out a bridge, what would
then happen? Obviously, you have to repair the bridge, and that
requires another group of expert military--construction engineers,
combat engineers--to go in and rebuild such bridges as might be taken
out by hostile forces. I mention hostile forces. Clearly Serb. You do
not know what the fractions will be in the Croatian forces, and their
many warlords and other groups around here. So this is not exactly a
neat structure of military forces with tight command and control within
all the combat elements.
To the contrary, there is quite a disparate arrangement of command
and control throughout all the various combatants in this region.
Always remember, I come back to the fact that this tragic conflict has
its origins that go back hundreds and hundreds of years in the history
of the world, rooted in religious and cultural differences and, indeed,
hatred. Our forces going in there really, or whatever friendly force
were to go in and help the Muslims would literally be surrounded by 360
degrees of hostility in many areas.
So I go back to the question:
How long would it take to effectively train the Bosnian
Government forces to use heavy weapons? Would this training
require the presence of U.S. military personnel in Bosnia or
are there nations capable of training Bosnians in the U.S.
military equipment that may be provided if the embargo is
lifted? Should this training take place in Bosnia or out of
country?
The answer: ``Estimating the time required to train a force to use,
tactically deploy, and maintain sophisticated weapons is difficult
without exact knowledge of the capabilities of the forces''--that is,
the Bosnian Government forces--``to be trained. As a rough estimate,
the Department of Defense notes that training time of 1 to 6 months is
required to train soldiers to survive on the battlefield and properly
use rudimentary weapons. Until there is a definitive plan to train a
particular force, it is not possible to estimate where the training
might take place.''
Or indeed the length of the training.
Next question:
What is required in terms of logistics and maintenance to
service heavy weapons that the Bosnian forces would receive?
Are the Bosnian Government forces capable of maintaining this
equipment without outside assistance?
Response: ``The more sophisticated the weapons system, the more
lengthy and complicated the maintenance and supply system. The
following factors, inter alia, would have a direct impact on both
substance and tempo of operations: the complexity of the weapons
system; number of units to be operated; skill of the operators; level
of training, equipment's exposure to hostilities and weather, and
logistics--ammunition, parts, transportation--and infrastructure--lines
of communication, facilities--capacities. If the Bosnian Government
acquired weapons and equipment compatible with its existing indigenous
armaments production capabilities''--and they have managed very
skillfully to build one or two plants in here to manufacture some of
their weapons--``it could possibly maintain the new weapons without
outside assistance.''
But again, when it comes to spare parts and other, it would have to
be compatible with whatever very modest logistics setup they have in
place today.
Next question: ``How would the Serbs--or other belligerents--react in
that interim period between announcement of lifting and the adequate''
transportation and training of the new weapons--be they heavy or modest
weapons, light weapons?
Reply:
Any formal lifting of the embargo by the U.N. prior to a
peace settlement would give the Serbs an obvious incentive to
exploit their current military superiority before foreign
arms begin to be used effectively by the Bosnian forces,
assuming that UNPROFOR stayed in place the soldiers could
face attack by Bosnian Serb forces. The Serbs could also be
expected to halt the humanitarian relief effort. While relief
could still flow into central Bosnia from the Adriatic coast
through Croatia, the Serbs are currently capable of cutting
off all land routes into Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and
Srebrenica.
They could also close Sarajevo and Tuzla airports. The only
possibility of supply to these areas would be through airdrops.
I would suggest that the proponents get the same briefing I have had
on what large military equipment can be successfully airdropped. I
assure this body that it is a very small number of weapons.
While these might sustain some of the outlining enclaves, they would
be insufficient for a city the size of Sarajevo which has at most a 3-
week supply of food on hand.
In addition, airdrop aircraft would be susceptible to antiaircraft
fire. That is, in order to airdrop heavy equipment, you have to go to
altitudes where surface-to-air ordnance becomes a factor.
The eastern enclaves and other isolated areas like Maglaj and Bihac
would probably fall, and Sarajevo would be in serious risk even if the
population did not face starvation.
Question. If there is an increase in fighting, should air
power be used against the Serbs during their period? What are
the military risks associated with air delivery of the new
weapons? Is it likely the airfields in the government-
controlled areas can be kept open for such deliveries? Should
Allied aircraft be expected to participate in such a air
operation if we unilaterally lift the embargo? If not, would
U.S. air controllers have to be put on the ground to control
air strikes?
Answer. The only possible way to discourage large-scale
Serb attacks on the Bosnian government or on UNPROFOR forces,
or to prevent the Serbs from halting the continued supply of
Sarajevo via the airport, would be through the threat of
military invasion or a massive bombing campaign aimed at
Bosnian Serb military and strategic infrastructure targets.
Unless we were prepared to undertake such actions, the
destruction of Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, and other
isolated Bosnian government positions before the arrival of
weaponry would become a distinct possibility. This is why the
U.S. has always linked the lifting of the arms embargo to a
bombing campaign, as exemplified in the ``lift and strike''
proposals of May, 1993.
Question. Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior
to the lifting of the arms embargo? How long would such a
withdrawal take and what are the risks involved? Would the
Serbs intercept the withdrawal and endeavor to take hostages?
Reply: Our understanding is that the key UNPROFOR contributors, most
of them are our NATO allies, would not be prepared to stay in Bosnia if
the arms embargo were lifted. I repeat that. Our understanding is that
the key UNPROFOR contributors, most of them are our NATO allies, would
not be prepared to stay in Bosnia if the arms embargo were lifted.
If a UNPROFOR force departure were unopposed by Bosnian Serbs, all
UNPROFOR forces could probably leave within several weeks.
The primary impediments would be logistical. If the Bosnian Serbs
retaliated to a formal or unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by
targeting UNPROFOR, the departure of the troops might be difficult or
impossible. UNPROFOR troops, civil affairs officers--in other words,
there are a lot of individuals in addition to just the UNPROFOR troops.
There are volunteers from all over the world. When I visited there--and
I have made now three visits to the region--I was impressed at how many
volunteers, police, relief forces, all types in addition to the
UNPROFOR forces, and indeed all of this cadre of volunteers from all
over the world suddenly become potential hostages in a unilateral
withdrawing of the embargo. That is my judgment.
UNPROFOR troops, civil affairs officers and military observers, are
deployed widely and could not defend themselves against a concentrated
attack.
I hasten to point out that we have seen pictures of U.N. forces
deploying some military equipment. But it was never the intention of
the United Nations or the UNPROFOR forces to go in with such equipment
as is needed for a heavy defense action as contemplated by those
analyzing the consequence of the lifting of the embargo.
Say they end up with just basic equipment to sort of defend
themselves from sporadic hostile action, not such equipment as you need
to defend yourself against a consolidated attack from an aggressor
force. So they literally lack the necessary military equipment.
Allies might call on the United States to join them in sending ground
forces in to rescue their troops or to launch a massive bombing
campaign aimed at getting the Serbs to stop an impending UNPROFOR
departure.
Next question: What impact would an UNPROFOR withdrawal have on the
people now receiving this assistance?
Reply: If UNPROFOR were to leave before the Bosnian Government was in
a position to take the offensive on the battlefield, Sarajevo, Gorazde,
Srebrenica and Zepa, which have already surrendered, would be cut off
from supply via a land route.
The Serbs could also cut resupply to Sarajevo by closing down the
airports. Any assistance delivery to either Sarajevo or the eastern
enclaves would have to be by airdrops. Sarajevo could not survive on
airdrops alone. With only a week of supply of food, disaster could set
in.
It is interesting, if you look at these enclaves here, and if you
measure the distances, you can see the close proximity to Serbia
proper. And to hit these zones with airdrops, the experts inform me
that you have to have a lot of luck. The chances are that much of the
airdrop equipment is going to fall into the hands of the hostile Serb
forces in the area. So even airdrops to sustain these enclaves is very
iffy.
Question: If the arms embargo were lifted against Bosnia, would it
also have to be lifted against Croatia since Croatian cooperation is
essential to transporting weapons to the Bosnians? What impact would
lifting the embargo against Croatia have on the situation in the
Krajina What is the likely Serb reaction?
Reply: The only reliable way to deliver heavy weapons to Bosnia in
large quantity is through the territory now held by Croatia. If the
U.N. Security Council lifted the embargo against Bosnia alone, Croatia
might be permitted by resolution to have arms transit its territory.
Thanks to the federation agreement signed in March, relations between
the Croatian and Bosnian Governments are relatively good. That is
today. We all know the transitory and unstable nature of the agreements
connected with this frightful conflict over the past 2 years. They are
signed one day, and they are often broken the next.
Still, it is likely that weapons bound for Bosnia through Croatia
would only reach their final destination if Croatia also received arms
either openly or covertly.
So you are really talking about practically speaking rearming two
factions in this horrible conflict, both the Muslims--that is the
Bosnian Government--and the Croatian forces.
If the arms embargo were also lifted against Croatia, and the Croats
use these weapons against Krajina, the Serbs there, who currently
control almost one-third of Croatian territory, it is possible and
perhaps likely that Serbia proper would intervene in this conflict
leading to an outbreak of war between Croatia and Serbia broadening in
many ways this tragic conflict.
Lifting the embargo against Croatia would also raise questions on
whether the embargo should remain in effect against Slovenia, and other
adjoining nations.
(Mr. LIEBERMAN assumed the chair.)
Question: What is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia to a
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable to assume that
they would come to the assistance of the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian
Government began to recapture territory in the wake of the lifting of
the embargo?
Reply:
The Russian reaction would be similar to that of our NATO
allies. A Russian withdrawal from UNPROFOR would be likely. A
U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would
certainly play into the hands of the pro-Serbian extremists
in Russia, who could make political decisions even more
difficult for the Yeltsin government. The Belgrade reaction
would depend on how seriously the threat were perceived. If a
humanitarian disaster in Sarajevo could be avoided and the
Bosnian Government survived long enough for the situation on
the battlefield to change, the Serbian Government could be
prompted to intervene on behalf of their Bosnian Serb
brethren. Milosevic would certainly be under tremendous
domestic pressure to do so. The threat or use of NATO
military actions, either on the ground or from the air, might
be needed to deter him.
Next question:
Would the lifting of the arms embargo help or hinder
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict?
Is it an option for future consideration? Under what
circumstances?
Time and time again, the experts certainly have told this Senator--
and I think many of you have heard it from others--that there is no
military solution to this tragic conflict. The solution rests with the
combatant forces and their ability to somehow reconcile their
differences and agree on some type of a structure for a cease-fire, and
maybe an eventual peace.
The reply of the administration to my question:
Unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo would probably
have a chilling effect on the negotiating process. The
Bosnian Government might feel less inclined to seek a
negotiated solution in the hope that it could achieve a
better solution on the battlefield. The Bosnian Serbs, for
their part, would be less inclined than ever to accept a U.S.
mediating role in the conflict, depriving us, the United
States, of the ability to serve as an honest broker for any
type of settlement. If the Serbs perceived an immediate
physical threat to themselves as a result of the U.S.
decision, they could attack the Bosnian Government or
UNPROFOR forces, or close down the humanitarian relief supply
to Sarajevo and the eastern enclave, thus, making a
negotiated settlement even more remote.
Question:
If the lifting of the arms embargo does not give the
Bosnian Government forces a degree of military equivalence
with Bosnian Serb forces, what would be the next step?
Reply:
Assuming that UNPROFOR has departed, or needs to be
rescued, and that Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves are at
grave risk, the U.S. might have no choice but to intervene
massively in the conflict--
ground, air, and sea--
or acquiesce in a humanitarian and political disaster.
That is a tough reply.
I say to my colleagues that these are the questions that occur to me.
I am sure each of you have many more questions. I took it upon myself
to personally go out and visit the CIA, the Department of Defense, and
the Department of State, not necessarily talking to the top
policymakers, the President's appointees; no, I sought out the
professional civil servants, who work in these agencies, who meet the
challenge, who sit there day after day and, indeed, year after year and
look at the situation and provide their own analysis, not affected by
politics, concerned about the humanitarian--certainly, every individual
is deeply touched and concerned about the humanitarian problems in this
area. But these analysts are individuals who understand, in great
detail, the facts, the balance of military forces, the historical roots
of this conflict. I spent one fascinating evening, several hours, at
the Department of Defense, finishing up late at night, talking to
individuals who studied the history in this region of the world, going
back 1,000 years and tracing for me the roots of this conflict that
were planted in this region 1,000 years ago. Who is to say that those
same roots of conflict and antagonism will not be present in this
region 1,000 years hence?
You get down to the bottom question: What can the United States do in
this conflict? Mr. President, I researched this. As of this moment,
there are 35 nations in our world today experiencing, to one degree or
another, conflict. They spring up unexpectedly. There is Burundi and
Rwanda in the African conflict, which is seen by hundreds of thousands
nightly on our television. Many people had no idea where these two
nations were before. But we sit there absolutely appalled at the loss
of human life on this African continent.
I come back to my point, which is that 35 nations are experiencing
conflict. This country, in my judgment--no matter how strongly we feel,
by means of compassion, to become involved, we have to always come down
on what our national security interest is in these regions of the
world. What is our security interest? We have to use that as a
guidepost to determine whether or not we become involved.
I question our national security interest in this region. I have
always said it is primarily a European situation. If you go back to
World War I, starting right here in Sarajevo, right here, with the
assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, it was many years
before President Wilson and the Congress decided that this conflict in
Europe, World War I, had indeed become a conflict in which the United
States had a national security interest. We did not jump in in 1914.
Again, in World War II, September 1939, when Nazi forces crossed the
border into Poland, it took a period of time before this Nation became
involved. We were under the leadership of a very courageous President
and, indeed, a Congress that passed a draft by a single vote in the
early 1940's, showing the lack of commitment we had at that period of
time to World War II.
So I think this is primarily a European situation, and the United
States, as of today, is a very active partner. We are the primary naval
force offshore, enforcing, to the extent we can, the embargo against
Serbia and, to a lesser extent, against Croatia. We are the primary
military force in the air working, again, with our allies. So it is not
as if we have turned our back to this conflict.
Some lives of American service personnel have already been lost. But
I always come down on: What is the price that the mothers and the
fathers, the brothers and the sisters are willing to pay to get more
heavily involved in this situation? And I have outlined several
scenarios that might evolve if we unilaterally lift this embargo in
which the world would look to the United States to come to the rescue
of a greater conflict in this region.
I question whether we have a national security interest certainly to
employ our military in, should we say, risks far greater than those now
at sea and in the air. Let it be said there is risk associated with the
use of military equipment either at sea or in the air, but certainly on
the ground the risk would be far greater. There is no one here today
advocating the use of ground forces. But, as I pointed out, there are
several scenarios. If we are perceived or in actuality lift this
embargo unilaterally, this conflict could bear the stamp now, ``Made in
the U.S.A.'' and we would be required to become involved far greater
militarily.
I do not find the national security interests. The humanitarian
interest, yes, but not the national security interests for greater
involvement.
So I just point out that I did not sit down in the abstract and draw
up these questions. I did it based on close consultation with
professionals, the CIA, Department of Defense and Department of State,
and, indeed, in consultation with, as I pointed out, a delegation of
Austrian military professionals who know this region, who know the
history, who understand the people, who traced for me the situation
during World War II when Hitler's forces ostensibly had this area
secured but, nevertheless, a civil war primarily between Serbia and
Croatia, again engulfing Bosnia, took place right during World War II
and Nazi occupation, a civil war that in the estimate of many
historians took a million lives of Croatians, Serbians, and Moslems
right at the time when Hitler had this half-dozen--I have heard as high
as 12--divisions trying to maintain security in this region.
So I hope that my colleagues, as we proceed with this debate, will
look at the questions and answers that I have posed, questions that are
being discussed, questions that are being analyzed by our professional
infrastructure in those departments and agencies of our Government with
primary responsibility of following this part of the world, will look
at these questions and answers, point out to this Senator where I am in
error. I do not claim to be infallible. I do not claim to be an expert.
But I have undertaken, at considerable investment of time, the
responsibility to go out and talk with others far more intelligent than
I to determine the questions and their viewpoints which directly relate
to the issue before this body at this precise moment: Should the Senate
of the United States support a unilateral withdrawing of the embargo
against the Government of Bosnia as it relates to armaments?
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Marc
Nickelson, a Pearson fellow, from my staff, be granted the privilege of
the floor during the course of this legislation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I would like to present my statement on
the question of Bosnia. Mr. President, I rise in support of lifting the
U.S. arms embargo on Bosnia, and I am pleased to be a co-sponsor of the
bill introduced by the distinguished minority leader for that purpose.
The failure to exempt the new state of Bosnia from the arms embargo
earlier imposed on Yugoslavia was a well-intentioned, but tragic
mistake. Serbia, whose aggression had prompted the embargo, was in no
way inhibited by it. The Serbs already possessed a bulging arsenal
inherited from the Yugoslav armed forces, as well as the lion's share
of arms manufacturing facilities in ex-Yugoslavia. Bosnia, on the other
hand, was virtually without arms. The embargo condemned its people to
confront Serbian tanks and heavy artillery with little more than small
arms and infantry.
Nor was the embargo equally enforceable against both sides. Serbia's
long land border with neutral states is difficult to seal off the
clandestine arms shipments. Supply routes to Bosnia, on the other hand,
are ultimately reliant on transit of goods through NATO states or
across the Adriatic Sea--all of which have been effectively
interdicted, in no small part with the support of the U.S. Navy. An
unequal embargo, made worse by unequal enforcement, has served not to
prevent Serbian aggression but to favor it.
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has raged now for over 2 years.
It has taken a dreadful toll in human lives and suffering for the
people of this region and particularly for those in Bosnia. But it has
taken an equal toll on the credibility and integrity of the
international community, and above all the West. For we have remained
essentially passive in the face of the most flagrant aggression in
Europe since the end of World War II.
I say passive, because the Western response to the tragedy of Bosnia
has consistently sought to skirt the main issue and ignore a basic
lesson of history. That lesson is that only by the use of force, or the
credible threat of its use, can a determined aggressor be stopped.
Expansionist Fascist states will not be dissuaded by appeals to reason,
justice, or due regard for the decent opinions of mankind. Such regimes
live by forces and respect only strength.
Yet rather than act, or give Bosnia the means to act in its own
defense, the international community ducked the issue and ducked down
four blind alleys.
First, it sustained an arms embargo which, by favoring the aggressor,
served only to whet his appetite. Second, it imposed an economic
embargo against Serbia which, though certainly appropriate, has not and
will not alone be sufficient to bring the Milosevic regime or its
Bosnian-Serb proxies to heel. Third, it has attempted to broker a
negotiated settlement. But so long as the West is unwilling to either
assist Bosnia or allow it to arm itself against a massive Serbian
arsenal, negotiations can have only one result. That result is a sham
settlement which ratifies the current situation on the battlefield by
acknowledging Serbian conquests and splintering the Bosnian State along
ethnic fault lines. The Bosnians have been unwilling to acquiesence in
this disguised surrender. Attempts by some Western negotiators and
Governments to pressure them into doing so are a disgrace reminiscent
of the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia to Hitler's Germany in 1938.
Lastly, the international community, through the United Nations, has
sought to bring humanitarian relief to the victims of the conflict. The
effort is noble but, again, the motives have been less than pure. Mixed
with altruism has been the desire of some to salve a guilty conscience
and put a cosmetic bandaid over the grisly spectacle, the better to
excuse the failure of their governments individually or collectively to
confront aggression.
Serbia has shown itself more than willing to use unarmed relief
workers and lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers as hostages. Consequently,
their presence in zones of conflict now serves more to deter decisive
Western military action than to limit Serbian atrocities. United
Nations representatives have become, in effect, guarantors of Serbian
impunity. At the same time, their presence as monitors separating the
sides in selected ceasefire areas has frozen in place Serbian gains
while freeing up Serbian units and heavy weapons to undertake new
offensives elsewhere which whittle away at Bosnia. Thus, U.N.
representatives have also become guarantors of Serbian conquests.
Let it be clearly stated, Mr. President, that the fault in this lies
not with the United Nations as an organization. The United Nations is
not an independent body, but an instrument of the member states and, in
this case, of the Security Council, which has set the mandate and the
limits on United Nation actions. It is the failure of judgment and the
failure of will in chanceries and national capitals, not in New York,
which has led to this sorry spectacle. And only by changing those
policies, and first and foremost the course of the United States in
this conflict, that we can begin to recover the situation in Bosnia and
our own sense of honor.
For the United States, more than just honor is at stake. We have a
vital interest in the stability of Europe and the peaceful evolution of
democratic States out of the ruins of the former Soviet Union and its
allies. The collapse of communism has unleashed new possibilities but
also old hatreds. From Eastern Europe to central Asia, the emerging
democracies are a tangle of overlapping ethnic groups with competing
claims and little history of mutual accommodation. Democracy and the
guarantee of minority rights and political participation offers one
model for addressing those differences. Servia's war of ethnic
aggression offers another. If that aggression and ethnic cleansing are
allowed to go unchecked, setting an example for others, both peace and
democracy will be at great risk in an enormous area bordering on the
Atlantic alliance. Neither we nor Western Europe will escape the
consequences.
The risk of war and chaos will be greatest precisely again in the
Balkans. For make no mistake about it, an unjust peace imposed on
Bosnia would not long endure. Rather, it would sow the seeds of renewed
conflict as soon as the Bosnians could bind up their wounds, overcome
their fatigue, and arm themselves, as they eventually would.
Let me be brutally frank. The hatreds unleashed in this war, and the
desire of the victims of aggression for justice--and, yes, for
vengeance--assure that no peace settlement will last which does not
rest on a durable balance of power. Such a balance does not now exist.
It has been artificially tipped in Serbia's favor by the one-sided
effect of the arms embargo. It is the tremendous disparity of firepower
between the two sides which, more than anything else, accounts for
Serbian successes. The arms embargo will begin to wither away, in
substance if not in form, as soon as a settlement is concluded.
Serbia's military advantage will erode along with it. An unjust
settlement imposed on the basis of that military advantage will be
challenged by Bosnia as the letter gains in relative strength, and the
stage will have been set for a second Balkan war.
Mr. President, apart from our political and security interests in
acting effectively against Serbian aggression, I believe we have an
equally vital moral stake in doing so. For what is happening in Bosnia
is not merely a war of conquest. It is a war of annihilation, designed
to wipe an entire people off the map by forced displacement or
extermination. I recently visited the Holocaust Museum in Washington,
and could not help but be moved by the parallels between the horrors
perpetrated by the Nazis 50 years ago and what Serbian fascism is
achieving in the Balkans today. No one can claim now, as some asserted
50 years ago, that they do not know the full enormity of the atrocities
taking place. And there is no escaping the moral responsibility for our
actions--or inaction--in the face of those horrors. After the
Holocaust, the world said ``Never again.'' Are we now tho say, ``Just
one more time?'' Moral authority lies at the foundation of this Nation
and buttresses our position of world leadership and global power. We
are mortgaging that authority by our failure to exercise either
adequate leadership or power to oppose this modern day version of the
Holocaust. A world community prepared to tolerate it would be willing
to tolerate anything; and that is not the kind of world we want to live
in or bequeath to our children.
So, Mr. President, what should be done? The first step, the very
minimum step, is to remove an arms embargo which has denied the Bosnian
people the means to exercise the inherent right of any individual, and
any nation, to self-defense. Worse, it is an embargo which, buy its
lopsided and adverse impact on Bosnia, has effectively favored the
aggressors in the conflict while punishing their victims. This bill
will eliminate that absurdity.
But while removal of the embargo is an important first step, it
should not be the last. If Serbian aggression is to be checked, more
needs to be done and, yes, we will have to pay a price, albeit a
relatively modest one. The Bosnians are not asking anyone for infantry
troops and are more than willing to absorb the principal cost in blood
by tending to their own defense on the ground. They ask only for tools
to aid that defense. The United States should respond not merely by
lifting the arms embargo, but by providing them weapons on a grant
basis out of U.S. stocks. A majority of this body is already clearly on
record in support of that proposition.
Second, we should urge our NATO allies, and be prepared ourselves, to
use Western air power to assist Bosnian defenders and raise the costs
to Serbia if it continues to pursue its aggression. The application of
NATO air power to date has been meager, half-hearted, and undermined by
a hesitancy to make good on ultimatums when the latter have been first
tested, then flouted, by the Serbs. As a result, the credibility of our
word and of our threats has been weakened, and with it our ability to
deter the Serbs--or any other rogue states who detect in this record a
lack of United States firmness or resolve in defending our interests
and principles. It is time to end those doubts, to end the bluffing,
and to put an end to the free ride the Serbs have enjoyed in Bosnia. If
Serbian attacks continue, we should be prepared to strike key Serb
military targets anywhere in Bosnia and, if necessary, in Serbia
itself. This is particularly important in the wake of any decision to
life the embargo, for the Serbs may respond initially with stepped up
attacks to take maximum advantage of their current advantage in arms
before it evaporates.
Finally, we must recognize that the time may have come to reduce or
remove the U.N. presence in Bosnia. Events in ex-Yugoslavia have
demonstrated and senior U.N. officials have acknowledged that relief
and peacekeeping on the one hand, and peace enforcement on the other,
are difficult if not impossible to reconcile in the same place at the
same time. The time comes when you have to choose between the two. When
relief efforts intended to shield the victims of war are cynically
exploited by an aggressor army to shield itself, that shield may have
to be withdrawn. When peacekeepers become, in effect, a surrogate
occupying force for conquered territory, they have become as much a
part of the problem as its solution. That is where we are today in
Bosnia.
Little wonder that the Bosnian Government has made it clear that it
prefers to see U.N. relief workers and peacekeepers withdrawn if
Western concerns for the safety of their personnel in Bosnia are the
principal obstacle preventing a lifting of the arms embargo. Would
withdrawal of the U.N. presence result in an increase in the fighting
in the near term? Perhaps, although Serb capabilities to expand an
already vigorous military effort are open to question. Could it lead to
greater suffering among civilians in the short run? The answer is
probably yes, particularly given Serbian conduct to date, particularly
when no witnesses are present to encourage occasional restraint.
But to acknowledge these consequences is only to restate the choice
that has faced every nation and every people in history who have been
the victims of attack. Should they surrender their freedom, their
homes, their way of life, their country's existence, and their
children's future? Or should they resist and fight, even if resistance
brings suffering and death to many of their countrymen?
That is a choice for each nation and each people to make for
themselves. The heroic resistance of the Bosnian people against great
odds over the last 2 years is eloquent testimony that they have made
their choice. They wish to defend their homes and their country and to
lay down their lives for it, if need be. It is not for us to deny them
that right, and I can only hope that we ourselves will always be
willing to exercise it in our own defense, as we have in the past. Mr.
President, during the long struggle against Soviet expansionism, a
phrase was coined to advance a rationale for surrender to force. That
phrase was ``better Red than dead.'' Even at the height of the cold
war, when the possibilities of a nuclear Armageddon cast a long shadow
over our Nation, the people of the United States rejected that
philosophy with the contempt it deserves. Even with the best of
intentions, we cannot now in good conscience impose on a small nation
what we have never been prepared to choose for ourselves.
The time has come, Mr. President, for the United States to lift the
arms embargo on Bosnia and to aid in its defense.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to called roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). Without objection it is so ordered.
lead, follow, or get out of the way
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, there is an old saying which bears
repeating with regard to the United States policy position on Bosnia.
The administration needs to lead, follow, or get out of the way. Each
day that passes offers astonishing proof that the President of the
United States and his national security team cannot or will not decide
whether to lead or follow, engage or evade, or just ignore the whole
darn mess. The only time we see any decisive action is when public
opinion surveys issue ominous warnings about Presidential approval
ratings.
With yet another poll showing a steady drop in his foreign policy
rating, once again, the President turned on the telegenic charm in a
media event beamed to over 200 countries courtesy of CNN. According to
the New York Times, the event was designed to ``reassert control over
the sliding ratings by demonstrating a tough stance toward American
problems overseas.'' Once again, we were bombarded with tough sounding
rhetoric--once again, we heard we must stay engaged around the world.
But, sadly, once again, we were offered little detail as to the
President's specific plans or thinking about the rapidly
changing international landscape.
Mr. President, I want to believe there is an American strategy for
Bosnia, for Korea, for Haiti, and a half dozen other trouble spots
which the international community must tackle. I want to believe that
the President and his national security team have given serious thought
to problems not just poll ratings. But, there is little evidence to
support my hope.
The events in Bosnia since the Senate first took up this amendment
demonstrate the contradictions and confusion which bedevil our policy.
Every newspaper and magazine in the Nation has run stories chronicling
the disastrous decline of the United States as the competent, decisive,
inspirational leader of the free world.
Let me offer a quick tour of some headlines--
The Wall Street Journal says ``There is no Clinton Foreign Policy'';
The Baltimore Sun claims the ``U.S. stumbles for Lack of Foreign
Policy'';
The Louisville Courier-Journal eulogizes: ``Clinton Talks Tough as
Goradze Dies'';
The Lexington Herald Leader denounces ``Foggy, Wobbly Foreign
Policy'';
A Washington Post columnist calls our foreign policy: ``Inept to
Disgraceful''; and
Time magazine held the President responsible for ``Dropping the
Ball.''
I do not think Members of the Senate are any more confident than
columnists and reporters about the state of American foreign policy, or
our international credibility, image and leadership. While I agree with
the President that problems at home demand our attention and require
solutions, if we fail to define and defend our interests abroad, now,
we will pay a much higher price in the long run.
While President Clinton came into office as the domestic policy
President, this administration may well turn foreign policy into a
campaign issue.
There was another moment in history when the American people told
their leaders they were weary of the world--they wanted our undivided
attention here at home. It was a time which Winston Churchill captured
well. He looked around the free world and observed, we were ``Decided
only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift,
solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent.'' Churchill's words--
the ghost of 1936--haunts this administration's policy.
What should the public think when the Secretary of Defense declares
we have no interests in defending Goradze, and is joined in that view
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who says air power is irrelevant.
Then within days the President threatens NATO air strikes if the Serbs
do not withdraw from Goradze. Does Goradze matter? Why? Will air power
work as the President claims--or not, as General Shalikashvili says?
It is not just a question of a bewildering public message. In
private, senior officials seem perplexed. When I asked Deputy Secretary
Talbott, what happens next? What are our policy options if we cannot
bomb the Serbs back to the negotiating table? There was long pause, and
an honest, however troubling response, ``Senator, I don't have a
persuasive answer for you.''
The administration can offer no persuasive answer nor define and
sustain a strategy as the situation in Bosnia just gets worse and
worse. I was truly discouraged by the Washington Post story which
suggested that our inconsistency and policy swerving has resulted in
losses both in territory and peace prospects. As described by John
Pomfret, the Bosnian Serbs have been encouraged to ``push and probe the
United Nations with everything appearing to be negotiable.''
The Serbs are clearly taking advantage of our weakness and
inconsistency. In Goradze, the shelling has stopped, but the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugee Affairs representative describes the situation
as ``tense and deteriorating.''
In spite of early public assurances by the U.N.'s General Rose that
the Serbians were in compliance with demands to withdraw completely
from Goradze, we know that Serbians continue to occupy a hamlet within
the exclusion zone with between 100 and 200 forces. U.N. peacekeepers
have been denied access to the area, and 10 days ago, British
peacekeepers on patrol in the exclusion zone found themselves under
repeated Serbian fire. According to the U.N., the British troops were
forced to return fire in their attempt to withdraw, killing five
Serbians in the process.
Sarajevo offers a similar mixed picture of success.
Although the shelling has stopped, the Serbs have blocked access to
U.N. observers, forcibly removed heavy weapons from U.N. depots and
redeployed at least 15 heavy weapons, including five tanks, around that
city.
Mr. President, the story is the same in Tuzla. As in Sarajevo and
Gorazde, the U.N. and NATO ultimatums have been blatantly violated at
absolutely no cost--no cost--to the Serbs.
The consequences for the United States, on the other hand, are both
immediate and unfortunate. As a direct result of issuing ultimatums we
cannot or will not enforce, we have squandered NATO's credibility and
compromised any opportunity to negotiate a reasonable, durable peace
agreement.
I was truly discouraged when I learned that, last week, the Bosnian
Serb leader told American, European and Russian diplomats that he would
no longer support an earlier agreement calling on the Serbs to give up
nearly a third of captured Bosnian territory. As one negotiator noted,
``This is most depressing. Our troubles in Gorazde obviously did not
help the cause of peace.''
The Serbs have figured out that we may talk tough, but we simply do
not follow through. The air strikes so far have been characterized as
largely ineffective. Even the President acknowledged during his
international town meeting that air strikes could not change the
outcome.
The administration seems to be engaged in a dangerous guessing game
of Serbian intentions. Unfortunately, the stakes keep escalating,
American lives are in jeopardy; yet, decisionmaking is out of direct
American control.
A year ago, it was just the credibility of a revived and reinvented
United Nations that was on the line. It was up to the Secretary General
to solve the problem in the Balkans. Now we find U.S. pilots and planes
involved in NATO missions, which at any point a U.N. civilian official
can block, override, suspend, or terminate.
Because of the tragic events in Somalia, the administration would
prefer to deny that American lives now hang in the balance of a U.N.
bureaucrat's decision. But the events of the past 2 weeks warn that we
are repeating the mistakes of Somalia. We are subcontracting U.S.
interests and U.S. lives to U.N. whims. I repeat, Mr. President, we are
subcontracting U.S. interests and U.S. lives to U.N. whims.
Let me offer just one example: On April 23, as Serbian troops slammed
shells into the heart of Gorazde, NATO prepared to launch air strikes,
consistent with the terms of an international ultimatum. NATO was
deliberately blocked from carrying out a military mission by a United
Nations civilian and bureaucrat, Special Envoy Akashi. Secretary
Christopher tried to protest the U.N. decision, but was told Boutros
Ghali was not available to take his call--not available to take his
call.
We have now had a week of public bickering and criticism between
senior U.N. and United States officials over who is more responsible
for botching up Bosnia--all of which only reinforces my view that it is
a mistake to let the United Nations run United States foreign policy.
Frankly, Ambassador Albright may feel better by firing off a testy
letter to the Secretary General demanding an apology for some
bureaucratic indiscretion, but demanding apologies is a far cry from
directing policy. It all strikes me as petty and suggests America may
have sunk to a new, record low in international esteem.
Mr. President, it is not just Bosnia that is taking a pounding.
American credibility is shellshocked. It is this portrait of policy
weakness that has brought me slowly but irreversibly to the point where
I believe the arms embargo against the Bosnians simply must be lifted.
I think sound legal arguments may have been made that the embargo has
been illegally enforced against Bosnia. No one disputes the right to
self-defense, as enunciated in the U.N. Charter, and no one claims that
the embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia, which can only logically and
legally mean that it does not apply to any of the nations which have
emerged as independent successor states.
But, legal arguments aside, I think the choice really is whether as a
nation we continue to drift slowly but surely toward expanded and
direct involvement in the war in Bosnia, or whether we let the Bosnian
Moslems fight for themselves. That decision does not take much time for
me to make.
Although the analogy may cause some of the Members of the Senate
consternation, I think this is a choice like those we had to make in
Nicaragua and Afghanistan. By giving the Bosnian Moslems a chance to
defend themselves, we are leveling the battlefield with a view toward
creating conditions that will produce a truce and a settlement. By
lifting the arms embargo, we are voting to support the victims of
aggression, with no loss of American lives. It is obvious, Mr.
President, that the Serbs only seem to respond to the steady, decisive
use of force--a course the administration is unable or unwilling to
support. Policy flip-flops will only assure that this war drags on,
potentially engulfing Europe in flames and eventually drawing us in.
For more than four decades, NATO served as a strong, effective
deterrent to Soviet aggression and as the most important stabilizing
force in Europe. We now find its credibility and capabilities being
squandered and misdirected by U.N. bureaucrats. I think this is a
serious, serious mistake. If this course continues, sooner or later, we
are going to hear the administration make the argument that having put
NATO at risk, we must now rescue the alliance from our mistake.
More than 40 years of stability--more than 40 years of security in
Europe are being compromised by confusion at the White House. There is
an alternative. The administration has demonstrated that it will not
lead the international community. The United States should not follow
the United Nations. So the Senate must decide to get out of the way.
The time has come to let the Bosnian Moslems defend what is left of
Bosnia.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from New
Mexico, Senator Domenici.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may
proceed for 15 minutes as if in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized as if in morning
business for up to 15 minutes.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Domenici pertaining to the introduction of S.
2096 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the President pro
tempore, Senator Byrd.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, has the Pastore rule
expired for the day?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, it has expired.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
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