[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order previously entered, the
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 2042, which the clerk will
report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2042) to remove the United States arms embargo
of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Republican leader.
Amendment No. 1692
(Purpose: To propose a substitute for S. 2042)
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a substitute amendment
and amendments in the first and second degree.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator is
authorized to offer a substitute amendment and first- and second-degree
amendments and a modification to the second-degree amendment thereto.
Mr. DOLE. I send the modification to the desk. I might say, this has
been cleared by the other side.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the substitute
amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole] proposes an amendment
numbered 1692.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SEC. . UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.
(a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of a request
for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term `United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina' means the application to the government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the
Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 Fed. Reg. 33322) under
the heading `Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to
Yugoslavia'; and
(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States
Government as of the date of receipt of the request described
in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is routinely
denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services
to the former Yugoslavia.
amendment no. 1693 to amendment no. 1692
(Purpose: To propose a 1st degree amendment to the substitute amendment
for S. 2042)
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the amendment in the
first degree.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole] proposes an amendment
numbered 1693 to amendment No. 1692.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place, add the following:
SEC. . UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.
(a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of a request
for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term `United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina' means the application to the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the
Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 Fed. Reg. 33322) under
the heading `Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to
Yugoslavia'; and
(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States
Government as of the date of receipt of the request described
in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is routinely
denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services
to the former Yugoslavia.
Amendment No. 1694 to Amendment No. 1693
(Purpose: To propose a second-degree amendment to the first-degree
amendment to the substitute amendment for S. 2042)
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will now read the second-degree
amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], for himself, Mr.
Lieberman, Mr. Mack, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Levin, Mr. McCain, Mr.
Hatch, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Helms,
Mr. Simpson, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Gorton, Mr.
Kempthorne, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Roth, Mr. Brown,
Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Wallop, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr.
Moynihan, Mr. Robb, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Packwood,
Mr. Reid, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Campbell, and Mr. Murkowski,
proposes an amendment numbered 1694 to amendment No. 1693.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the word ``SEC.'' and insert the
following:
``. UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA.
``(a) Prohibition.--Neither the President nor any other
member of the Executive Branch of the United States
Government shall interfere with the transfer of arms to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
``(b) Termination.--The President shall terminate the
United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of a request
for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
``(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
`United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina' means the application to the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
``(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in
the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 Fed. Reg. 33322)
under the heading `Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to
Yugoslavia'; and
``(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States
Government as of the date of receipt of the request described
in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is routinely
denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services
to the former Yugoslavia.
``(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
authorization for deployment of U.S. forces in the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, including
training, support or delivery of military equipment.
Amendment No. 1694 to Amendment No. 1693, As Modified
(Purpose: To modify the proposed second-degree amendment to the first-
degree amendment to the substitute amendment for S. 2042)
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair inquires to which amendment the
modification is addressed.
Mr. DOLE. The modification is to the second-degree amendment.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the modification.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I will explain what the modification is.
This is a simple modification to address the concern raised by some
that the language prohibiting the executive branch from enforcing the
arms embargo could inadvertently allow the transfer of nuclear or other
advanced weapons to Bosnia.
The modification makes clear only conventional weapons appropriate to
the self-defense of Bosnia would be allowed. That is the only purpose
of the amendment.
As I understand it, I have a right to make that modification.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has that right.
The amendment, with its modification, is as follows:
Strike all after the word ``SEC.'' and insert the
following:
``. UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA.
``(a) Prohibition.--Neither the President nor any other
member of the Executive Branch of the United States
Government shall interfere with the transfer of conventional
arms appropriate to the self-defense needs of the Government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
``(b) Termination.--The President shall terminate the
United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of a request
for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
``(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
`United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina' means the application to the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
``(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in
the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 Fed. Reg. 33322)
under the heading `Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to
Yugoslavia'; and
``(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States
Government as of the date of receipt of the request described
in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is routinely
denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services
to the former Yugoslavia.
``(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
authorization for deployment of U.S. forces in the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, including
training, support or delivery of military equipment.''
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that until the
Senate recesses for the party conferences today, that there be debate
only on S. 2042, the Bosnia arms embargo legislation.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears no
objection. It will be so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. That is the request of the leaders on both sides.
Mr. President, I know with all the things that may be happening
around the world today in South Africa--and some of our colleagues are
there for the inauguration of President Mandela--we read about the
tragedy in Rwanda, we look at the Mideast with some hope, there are a
number of areas I know have the focus of the administration and the
Congress and the President.
But I know of no area that deserves more consideration by this body
than Bosnia. So what we are attempting to do in a bipartisan way--we
have more than 30 cosponsors, myself and Senator Lieberman, so it is
bipartisan, a number of Democrats, a number of Republicans--all we are
attempting to do with our amendment is to lift the arms embargo on
Bosnia on a unilateral basis.
And I might say at the outset, we prefer that it be lifted by our
allies at the same time. But if they are not persuaded, then I think
America should take the high moral ground so the world may know that at
least the United States, if we do nothing else, we are not going to
prevent people from defending themselves. That is essentially what we
are doing now. We are telling the Bosnians, you cannot defend
yourselves; you cannot have defensive weapons; you cannot have antitank
weapons. They are now fighting tanks with rifles.
I met, along with Senator Lieberman, with the Vice President of
Bosnia, Mr. Ganic. He told us they had 8 tanks and the Serbs have over
300. He told us they had one rifle for every 4 men. Now, it is not a
fair fight. The Serbs have most of the weapons that the Yugoslav army
had. And I know that some say, well, if you lift the arms embargo, you
escalate the violence; you permit the Bosnians to inflict some pain on
the Serbs and we would rather have it one way; we would just as soon
have only the Serbs inflict the pain because it is less violence.
My view is that that violates article 51 of the U.N. charter which
provides for the right of self-defense. Bosnia is an independent
nation. It is a member of the United Nations. They have already lost a
half or more of their territory, some say 70 percent. We will have to
make a decision here someday, if there is a peace accord, whether we
should send 5,000, 10,000, 25,000 Americans to Bosnia. To do what? To
enforce a peace agreement that favors the Serbs, because they have been
the aggressors. The Bosnians have not been the aggressors. The Croats
have not been the aggressors. It has been the Serbs.
For 2 years now we have facilitated Serbian aggression and ethnic
cleansing because we have prevented the Bosnians from defending
themselves.
And again I would say that the Vice President of Bosnia said that all
we want is a limited quantity of defensive weapons, not for offensive
purposes but for survival, survival.
When President Clinton was candidate Clinton and campaigning across
America he correctly said, ``In effect, we're giving a big advantage to
the Serbians when there can't be any arms sales'' to any Balkan States.
``We can't get involved in a quagmire,'' Governor Clinton said, ``but
we must do what we can.''
And I think at the outset it was my hope, and I think Senator
Lieberman's hope, that we would strengthen the President's hand. We did
not offer this to have any confrontation with the administration or
with the President. But we thought we should help the President do what
is morally right in this case and help provide the leadership. In my
view, unless the United States is providing the leadership, nothing of
any import is going to happen.
So they have 8 tanks to 300, 1 gun to every 4 Bosnian soldiers. They
are not asking for American troops. They are not asking for offensive
weapons. They are ready to defend themselves, if only they had the
means to protect themselves, their homes, and their families.
We have witnessed on CNN shelling of an emergency room, the Red
Cross, shooting children in front of their parents, killing children in
front of their parents. It seems to me that as Americans we have a
special history and a special understanding for the plight of the
Bosnian people. America was once a colony, and we struggled against the
odds for our independence. So I think we can certainly sympathize, but
we need more than sympathy, for the Bosnians; all they want is their
freedom and their independence.
But they have had their fate snatched from their hands and placed in
the hands of the U.N. Security Council. No doubt about it, I think even
the President acknowledged and our Ambassador to the United Nations has
acknowledged that in a sense--the international community approach has
been one of weakness and hypocrisy. Genocide has not been halted; it
has been managed. Aggression has not being halted; it is being
supervised.
The international community's policy has been a failure, and the
American people know it. A CNN/Time magazine poll conducted last week
indicates that only 19 percent of those polled believe United States
policy in Bosnia has been a success, while 59 percent believe it has
been a failure.
The United Nations and NATO say that genocide will not be tolerated
in U.N. ``safe havens,'' but outside those areas ethnic cleansing rages
on. In Gorazde, one of those U.N.-declared safe havens, limited action
was taken but only after the city was nearly destroyed and hundreds
were killed. Now Bosnian Serbs are massing their forces in the Brcko
area for a new offensive, but this region is not protected even in
theory by NATO air strikes.
Last week, two planes were hit by gunfire on the way to Sarajevo and
Bosnian Serbs blocked a convoy bound for the beleaguered people of
Gorazde. Nevertheless, negotiators were in Sarajevo at the end of the
week talking peace.
The latest news reports are more shocking. Pursuant to a deal cut by
U.N. Special Representative Akashi, U.N. Protection Forces allowed
Bosnian Serb tanks to have free passage through the Sarajevo exclusion
zone, in blatant violation of the February NATO ultimatum.
In addition to assisting Bosnian Serbs in violating the NATO
ultimatum, the U.N. Protection Forces helped the Bosnian Serbs to
redeploy their tanks, no doubt, so they can begin new offensives
elsewhere--and we are picking up a big part of the UNPROFOR tab.
Today's reports indicate that some of these tanks are now missing
within the Sarajevo exclusion zone.
Moreover, this morning there are reports that UNPROFOR officials are
finally admitting that the Bosnian Serbs are still violating the NATO
ultimatum on Gorazde, with troops and heavy equipment.
Prime Minister Silajdzic has demanded U.N. Special Representative
Akashi's resignation, and I think he is correct. In fact, Senator
Lieberman and I last week had a telephone conversation with the Prime
Minister, and again he made the case that all we want is defensive
weapons, antitank weapons, whatever we can get to defend ourselves.
I have also called repeatedly for Akashi's resignation. Akashi's
approach is one of appeasement. He meets with war criminals and calls
them friends. And when the United States refuses to send soldiers under
U.N. command he calls us timid. Akashi should be sent packing to a post
far away where his weakness and indecisiveness will not cost lives.
Tragically, the international community has shown consistence--in its
weakness and lack of principle. As innocent civilians are slaughtered
daily, international leaders invite war criminals to Geneva to discuss
peace. U.N. officials speak of the need for neutrality, as though they
are referees in a sporting match. The problem is that this game is
aggression and the referees are creating an unlevel playing field.
Remember, the United Nations was established to protect member states
against aggression, not to help foster it, not to choose up sides and
not to make excuses for the aggressors as they have done in nearly
every case, either Boutros Boutros-Ghali or his representative, Mr.
Akashi.
Mr. President, how do we bring an end to this multilateral madness? I
would have preferred not to have had to offer this legislation. I would
have preferred that the President call the congressional leadership to
tell us of the decision to lift the U.S. embargo. But this issue has
waited long enough. The Bosnians have waited long enough. The war has
gone on for 25 months, and we have passed resolutions and the U.N.
passed resolutions. There has been international hand-wringing and
tough talk and tough rhetoric and nothing ever happens. We have had
pilots flying over certain zones where they might have had air strikes,
waiting for somebody in the United Nations to tell NATO it is all right
for the pilots to take action.
And it confuses me, I might say, and confuses most of the people in
America. That is why those who support our policy in a recent policy
are at about 19 percent.
President Clinton says he wants to lift the embargo but only
multilaterally. But do not get me wrong; the Bush administration, too,
deserves its fair share of this policy. But the Clinton administration
has been in charge now for more than a year. And I made the same
statements during the Bush administration. During the Bush
administration, we kept talking about an undivided Yugoslavia even
after free elections in Slovenia, after free elections in Croatia, even
after it was obvious that Milosevic was moving for this greater Serbia,
obvious that 2 million Albanians in Kosova were probably going to be
the next target, or maybe Macedonia or maybe somewhere else.
So we gave them the caution light, and kept talking about not
dividing Yugoslavia when it was obvious it was going to be divided in
any event.
But this administration is continuing the Bush policy of denying the
Bosnians the ability to defend themselves. Mr. President, this bill is
about leadership--U.S. leadership in doing what is just and what is in
the U.S. interest. Lifting the arms embargo is in both Bosnia's
interest and in the United States interest. But the arms embargo will
not be lifted if America waits for a consensus to miraculously emerge
either within the U.N. Security Council or in NATO. The United States
must act first.
Many of us are going to go over to Italy and Normandy in 2 or 3
weeks. We are going to talk about a lot of things. It is going to be a
very emotional ceremony. But what is going to be indelibly imprinted on
our minds again is how important American leadership is.
What would have happened in the last 50 years had America not entered
World War II? I am not suggesting we enter into any armed conflict in
Bosnia. But, what would have happened if we had not provided the
leadership? Where would we be today? Would we be meeting in the U.S.
Senate under the charge of somebody Hitler passed on?
Only when American leadership is provided, only when the world
understands that America is providing leadership and we are serious
about what we intend to do, can we have cooperation, because, whether
we like it or not, we have the burden of world leadership. We may not
fully appreciate it. We are respected around the world, with some
exceptions. They respect our leadership because historically America
stood its ground. We have taken the high moral ground. What we are
saying is, OK, we are not going to do anything in Bosnia, but we
certainly are not going to deprive the people of a right to defend
themselves. We would not do that if we had a street fight somewhere if
somebody was unfairly matched. We might at least give them a right to
defend themselves.
That does not risk any American lives, and that does not risk any
American capital. It just says to these poor people, children, and
innocent women and men, who have been slaughtered, that you have a
right to defend yourselves. Once the Serbs understand that the Bosnians
are going to be allowed to defend themselves, then I think you will see
some real negotiations and maybe a peaceful settlement.
So my hope still is that we will pass this bill. I know the
administration is opposed to it. I know some of my colleagues are
opposed to it, unless it can be done with our allies. We are not
France. We are not Britain. We are the United States of America. We are
the world's leader. We ought to take that position, and we ought to do
it proudly. And we ought to say we are going to lift the arms embargo.
You can remove all the U.N. troops. We do not want any lives
endangered. But we are the United States of America. We are the United
States of America. We want to stop the slaughter. We want to give them
at least an even chance. If the British do not like it and if the
French do not like it, that is too bad. Because history is going to
take a look at this era in the next 10, 15, or 20 years. And unless I
am totally wrong, they are going to say this was a sad and tragic
chapter in international history. And if we participate in it by just
going along waiting for some consensus to develop, then we are going to
be criticized for our lack of leadership.
So, Mr. President, I think the legal arguments are clear, too. We
have to keep in mind that the arms embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia no longer exists. How can we have an arms embargo in a
country which no longer exists? This was all done before Bosnia was
recognized and admitted into the United Nations as a member state.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the victim of international aggression and
is guaranteed the right to self-defense under article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. One of the cosponsors of this bill, the distinguished Senator
from New York [Mr. Moynihan] is a former Ambassador to the United
Nations and has perhaps the deepest understanding of the international
legal questions associated with this matter. Another former U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, has also
extensively discussed and written on this issue--and supports this
bill. Even our current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
Ambassador Albright, stated a few days ago that: ``The bottom line here
is that this is not a legal issue, it is a political issue.''
It is not a legal issue because the arms embargo is illegal, which
brings me back to the leadership. The political issue is U.S.
leadership. Is the United States going to continue to go along with and
subsidize failed U.N. Security Council policies--including an illegal
arms embargo?
If we are going to do this, I may offer an amendment to cut off any
funding. Why should we subsidize it? Why should the taxpayers subsidize
it if only 19 percent approve of the policy? Are we going to break the
cycle of failure which has left Bosnia in ruins and which threatens to
drag us into the quagmire of implementing a peace settlement which
rewards aggression?
That is some precedent I do not think we wish to be a part of. So
they say, OK, go ahead and take their country. Take 60 percent of it.
Take 70 percent of it. We will send American troops to make certain
they do not get any of it back.
I do not really believe that is going to be an easy sell in the
Congress of the United States or with the American people, again, when
59 percent do not support our present policy.
In my view, it is not in the U.S. interest to send thousands of U.S.
troops to implement an unjust and unworkable settlement. The
administration is now participating in a contact group which includes
the British, French, Germans, and Russians whose main objective is to
persuade the Bosnian Government to accept 51 percent of Bosnia, while
allowing the Bosnian Serbs to retain 49 percent of Bosnia.
Is that supposed to be something they would welcome? You get to keep
51 percent. What are you complaining about?
This is a peace-at-any-price policy. In a recent meeting, Jean
Kirkpatrick made the point that the United States does not have a stake
in where borders are drawn, but how they are drawn. At present, the map
of Bosnia is a map of aggression. The negotiators' map is one of
slightly reduced aggression.
So you have major aggression. So, OK, you cannot have 70 percent, but
we will give you 49 percent. So everybody wants to end the war. The
President does. The Congress does. The people do, and particularly the
people in Bosnia who have been pummeled, who have suffered and been
shelled and whatever for the last 25 months.
But how can anyone reasonably argue that this sort of resolution will
serve U.S. interests? Are we really going to place our troops in harm's
way to police the division of Bosnia? Are we talking now about sending
troops?
The only viable solution to the war in Bosnia is to lift the arms
embargo on Bosnia. Last week, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
once again made the case for lifting the embargo, in an op-ed in the
New York Times. Lady Thatcher cites four reasons why the United States
and Europe have important interests at stake in Bosnia and they are:
First, the credibility of the West--and we do not have very much--NATO,
and the United Nations; second, the message our weakness sends to other
would-be aggressors; third, the expansion of Serbian aggression that
would lead to a wider Balkan War; fourth, the potential for a wider war
to create floods of refugees across Europe. Yesterday, Albert
Wohlstetter, in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal called the present
policy toward Bosnia, ``Genocide by Embargo.''
In other words, we are not going to stand by and watch it. We do not
want to call it genocide.
So it seems to me that wherever you look, there are rather compelling
reasons for the United States to act, not by sending ground troops, not
even with air strikes at this point--though I would support air strikes
if the President suggested that--but by helping the Bosnians defend
themselves. And I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1994]
Genocide by Embargo
(By Albert Wohlsetter)
Since June 1991, the United States has used its own
diplomacy and the U.N. Security Council in a grim charade of
``neutral mediation'' between a Serbian genocidal aggressor
and his victims. France and Britain have done likewise using
the Security Council and the European Community.
They have used the brave efforts of private humanitarian
agencies to excuse their own failure to stop the Serbs,
ignoring the fact that this enormous human catastrophe is not
the unintended byproduct of war: It is ethnic cleansing, the
deliberate slaughter of innocent civilians, the destruction
of their private homes and public places of worship and
assembly, and the systematic rape of women to inspire terror
and flight for the strategic purpose of creating Slobodan
Milosevic's Greater Serbia. Western leaders have sponsored
the use of peacekeeping forces where there is no peace but
only an ongoing genocidal war.
Such mediation, misuse of relief efforts, and peacekeeping
encouraged Mr. Milosevic's genocidal war and its
continuance. The U.S. did not bring about such horrors as
those in Rwanda, but the U.S. and the other democracies have
played a major role in bringing on the genocide in the
Balkans. They have much to make up for. Most obviously, they
have an obligation to disavow and erase the persistent
effects of their diplomatic moves that first deprived the
victims of recognition and so the right to acquire arms for
self-defense and, second, in a largely covert and totally
invalid maneuver, kept the victims from defending their
independence even after we and the rest of the world
recognized it.
open war
Mr. Milosevic started his open war in Slovenia when Western
statesmen told Slovenian and Croatian leaders--and Mr.
Milosevic--they would not recognize the results of
an internationally monitored plebiscite they themselves had
asked for in Slovenia and Croatia. The results were
overwhelming for independence, or for at least a looser
federation.
By refusing recognition, Western leaders made clear at that
point that they would continue to prevent Croats and Slovenes
from getting the means of defending their independence
against Mr. Milosevic's heavily armed proxies. Then, in
September 1991, the U.N. Security Council, at Mr. Milosevic's
request and with U.S. backing, put through an arms embargo to
keep Croatia outgunned. After that, much internal negotiation
within the European Community led to a scheduled European
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on Jan. 10, 1992.
On a mission to Yugoslavia shortly before that, however,
the representative of U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali simply ``told all interlocutors'' that the embargo
would continue to apply to all countries formed on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia, even after they became
recognized as independent nations by the international
community, including the EC and the U.N. This was a
deliberately obscure maneuver, nowhere overtly visible in the
labyrinth of words in U.N. Security Council Resolution 727,
which was passed on Jan. 8, 1992. Resolution 727,
nevertheless, has been taken as continuing the embargo.
In effect, Resolution 727, coming barely two days before
the European Community recognized Slovenia and Croatia, was a
ploy to empty of any operational meaning the coming world
recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.
Besides violating Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
acknowledges that the right of individual and collective
self-defense is ``inherent,'' the ploy violated the Geneva
Convention on Genocide as well. The U.N. mediator had no
authority from the Security Council. And, as many experts on
international law have shown, the Security Council had and
has no authority to change the U.N. Charter.
The U.S. should not simply declare that there is no valid
embargo on the sovereign nations who are the victims of
continuing Serbian genocide. That declaration would not (as
has been suggested) even remotely endanger the operation of
the embargo against Iraq. The embargo against Iraq applies
not to its victims but to the genocidal invader of Kuwait,
which was defeated by a U.S.-led coalition of some willing
NATO members and other interested countries. The embargo
resulted from the defeat and surrender of Iraq. It was a
condition of the coalition's ceasing to fire. Unlike the
embargo against the ex-Yugoslav republics, it is embodied in
the explicit language of a U.N. resolution. The credibility
of the U.N. as an impartial body is threatened by the
continuance of the embargo against former Yugoslav republics
under siege.
The U.S. need not and should not condition its declaration
on an agreement by the U.N. Security Council (the General
Assembly has already called for a lifting of the embargo) or
even all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Russia, as a permanent member of the Security
Council, has said it would veto a council vote to lift the
embargo. So have Britain and France, who are both permanent
members of the Security Council and members of NATO.
However, in lifting the embargo, the U.S. will be joined by
many in the General Assembly majority who, like President
Clinton, have long called for lifting it.
One standard argument for continuing the embargo which has
been repeated mindlessly and endlessly is that ending it
would lengthen and widen the war. But depriving Serbia's
victims of the arms that would have enabled them to stop the
aggression has ensured the continuance of the war for nearly
three years, and invited the Serbs to widen it when they were
defeated by Slovenian guerrillas who were better prepared
than the Croats, and especially the Bosnians, for a Serb
onslaught. The Serbs widened the war to Croatia and then to
Bosnia and have already started further widening by their
operations in the Sandjak.
grotesque argument
Another argument for allowing the Serbs to continue their
genocide with minimal opposition runs that arming the victims
might endanger humanitarian relief. But in spite of the
bravery and selflessness of the relief workers and of many of
the U.N. soldiers, humanitarian relief is no substitute for
stopping the genocidal assaults on the civilians. It is
grotesque to argue that the use of force to stop the Serbian
shelling of hospitals, marketplaces, churches, homes, etc.
must be abandoned because it would put at risk the convoys of
humanitarian aid. A convoy that brought bandages and
anesthetics for surgeons who are forced to amputate the legs
of children can hardly substitute for stopping attacks that
continue to blow off the legs of children.
Nearly three years of craven meddling by the democracies
have led only to continuing disaster. Hopeful claims after
the latest near-ceasefires in Sarajevo and Gorazde that
``diplomacy is working''--like the dashed hopes after each
broken ceasefire for three years--are deadly. But the
administration recently helped to broker an essential
alliance between the Croats and Bosnians to resist Serbian
aggression. Let that alliance defend itself. Lift the
embargo.
____
[From the New York Times, May 4, 1994]
Stop the Serbs--Now--for Good
(By Margaret Thatcher)
We have been here so many times before in the Bosnian saga:
acts of barbarism by the Serbs, the mobilization of a shocked
international conscience, threats of air strikes (or actual
air strikes, of the most limited kind), a tactical Serbian
withdrawal, more talks aimed at persuading the warring
parties to accept a carving up of territory that rewards
aggression. Then the Serbs move on to yet another Bosnian
community, applying the same mixture of violence and
intimidation to secure their aim of an ethnically pure
Greater Serbia.
The tragedy of Gorazde may for now at least be over. But
there are other towns of equal strategic interest on which
the Serbs are now free to concentrate their forces. Yesterday
the U.N. intervened to head off a Serbian attempt to expand
the Breko corridor in northern Bosnia, but such interventions
merely divert Serbian aggression. It is time to halt it--
late, but not too late. We have the justification, the
interest and the means.
A sovereign state, recognized by the world community, is
under attack from forces encouraged and supplied by another
power. This is not a civil war but a war of aggression,
planned and launched from outside Bosnia though using the
Serbian minority within it. The principle of self-defense
precedes and underlies the United Nations Charter. The
legitimate Government of Bosnia has every right to call upon
our assistance in defending its territory. That is ample
justification for helping the victims of aggression.
And both the United States and Europe have real and
important strategic interests in Bosnia. Let me note four of
them.
First, after all that the West, NATO and the U.N. have now
said, the credibility of our international stance on every
security issue from nuclear nonproliferation to the Middle
East is now at stake.
Second, would-be aggressors are waiting to see how we deal
with the Serbs. Our weakness in the Balkans would have
dangerous and unpredictable consequences in the former Soviet
Union, which has Slavic nationalist forces that closely
parallel those of Greater Serbianism. And throughout Eastern
and Central Europe there are minorities that aggressive
mother-states might be tempted to manipulate to provoke
conflict, if that is allowed to pay in the case of Serbia.
Third, Serbia's own ambitions are by no means necessarily
limited to Croatia and Bosnia. Kosovo is a powder keg.
Macedonia is fragile. Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Albania and
Turkey all have strong interests that could drag them into a
new Balkan war if Serbian expansion and oppression continue
unchecked.
Fourth, the floods of refugees that would cross Europe--
particularly in the event of such a wider conflict--would
further inflame extremist tendencies and undermine the
stability of Western governments.
The West has the means--the technology and the weapons--to
change the balance of military advantage against the
aggressor in Bosnia. Since the beginning of the Serbian war
of aggression, which began in the summer of 1991 in Slovenia,
intensified in Croatia and is now consuming Bosnia, I have
opposed the sending of ground troops to the former
Yugoslavia. But I have said that humanitarian aid without a
military response is a misguided policy. Feeding or
evacuating the victims rather than helping them resist
aggression makes us accomplices as much as good Samaritans.
So I have consistently called for action of two sorts: the
launching of air strikes against Serb forces, communication
centers and ammunition dumps; and the lifting of the arms
embargo and Bosnia and Croatia so that the Muslims and Croats
can defend themselves on more equal terms against the Serbs,
who inherited the massive armaments of the Yugoslavian Army.
If such a policy had been pursued when I first proposed it
on this page in the summer of 1991, at a time when Sarajevo
and Gorazde were under serious assault, thousands of people
would now be alive and in all probability the Milosevic
regime in Belgrade would have fallen. Because this approach
was not adopted, we now find ourselves in a far more complex
and dangerous situation: trying to defend almost indefensible
safe havens; maintaining a facade of neutrality when all our
decisions are based on the knowledge that the Serbs are the
threat, and with a large contingent of U.N. personnel whom
the Serbs may choose to use as hostages.
The new joint effort by Russia and the West to persuade the
Serbs to settle for 49 percent of Bosnian territory (down
from the 72 percent they have now occupied) is hardly less
rife with dangers. The Serbs will almost certainly not
withdraw, and once the guns are quiet the Russians may not
wish them to do so--nor may the West be prepared to revive
the threat of bombing to force them. Even if they were to
withdraw, their 49 percent of Bosnia would still represent a
reward for aggression. And in either event, the ensuing peace
would be an unjust and fragile one requiring a large
contingent of Western (including U.S.) ground troops to
enforce it on the victims. If hostilities resume, as is all
too likely, these troops would become the target for attack.
So the formula of air strikes and lifting the arms of
embargo is still the right one to apply. NATO already has the
mandate from the U.N. Security Council not just to defend
U.N. personnel but to deter attacks on the safe havens. This
mandate gives full authority for the requisite launching of
repeated large-scale air strikes against Serb military
targets wherever these may prove effective. It is a matter
for consideration whether strikes should go into Serbia
itself.
Air strikes are effective, as long as they are not on a
small scale, hedged with political hesitations and
qualifications. They can inflict severe and ultimately
unsustainable damage. But they have to be part of a clear
strategy to shift the advantage against the aggressor. The
Serbs must know that they will be carried out with swiftness
and determination. Nor may Russian objections be allowed to
stand in their way. If the Russians are prepared to support
such action, all well and good. But NATO cannot have its
policies entirely shaped by Russian sensibilities.
Lifting the arms embargo, as Senators Bob Dole and Joseph
Biden have courageously proposed (the Senate is to take up
the resolution tomorrow), is also crucial. That embargo was
imposed before Bosnia and Croatia were internationally
recognized, and its legal standing is at least questionable.
The U.S., Britian and France--or if necessary, the U.S.
acting alone--should formally state that they do not intend
to continue with it.
Such statements might also be supported by a resolution of
the U.N. General Assembly. The confederation between Bosnia
and Croatia, so skillfully brokered by the United States, now
means that supplies of arms will be used against the common
aggressor, not against each other, and that they can easily
be shipped in through Croatia. A well-armed Muslim-Croation
alliance would confront the Serbs with a quite new and
unwelcome challenge. It might even prompt the Serbs to
settle.
I do not claim that this approach is without dangers. It
would require diplomatic and military skills of a high order.
It is unlikely to bring immediate peace--through it might.
Some disruption of the aid effort is inevitable. But what the
people of Bosnia now need is a permanent peace that allows
them to return to their homes and live without fear. What the
West needs is to restore its reputation and secure its
interests. This is the only way those aims can be realized.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I would like to take a few moments to review
the other arguments made by some who question lifting the arms embargo
and to respond to them.
First, lifting the embargo would stop the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. Albert Wohlstetter described this argument as grotesque. In
my view Margaret Thatcher said it best, ``Feeding or evacuating the
victims rather than helping them resist aggression makes us accomplices
as much as good samaritans.'' If the Bosnians are armed, they have
enough manpower to deliver their own convoys of food. Moreover, as the
recent GAO report on the effectiveness of U.N. operations in Bosnia
discovered, the United Nations has had only limited success in
delivering humanitarian aid because it has not been consistently
assertive.
Second, we cannot do it. There are all of these technical problems
associated with arming the Bosnians. Some say it will not be easy to
deliver arms or that the Bosnians will need training. It seems to me
that these same arguments were made before we decided to arm the Afghan
resistance.
I remember a lot of debate we had in here on the Afghan resistance or
to provide arms to the Salvadorans. In any event, the Bosnians are
better trained overall than the Afghans were. While logistics may be
difficult, they are not impossible, since the Bosnians and Croatians
managed to bring in some arms themselves. The bottom line is that the
Bosnians have not asked us to solve these problems. They have not asked
us to do that.
If the embargo is lifted, other friendly countries will also have the
opportunity to assist the Bosnians, not just the United States, if we
so choose.
The third reason is French and British opposition. The participation
of the British and French in the U.N. Protection Forces is the main
reason the British and French object to lifting the embargo. Well, the
answer is simple: Take out the troops. Take out the U.N. protection
forces. And until all troops have been evacuated, threaten the Bosnian
Serbs with NATO airstrikes if any troops are taken hostage or harmed,
and then be prepared to follow through. We do not want anybody hurt. We
just want the Bosnians to exercise the right for self-defense.
The final, most ridiculous argument is that if we lift this embargo,
it will undermine all the other U.N. embargoes. We have stated--and
apparently the administration does not disagree--that the arms embargo
against Bosnia is illegal and cannot be compared to the legal ones
against Iraq and Libya. We need to remember that Iraq, like Serbia, is
an aggressor state, while Bosnia is the victim of aggression. This is a
major, major difference. We are imposing an embargo on somebody who is
being subjugated--or whatever the term may be--by the aggressors, the
Serbs.
So, Mr. President, it seems to me that all these questions--and there
may be others, and there may be some that should be addressed, and we
are going to have a rather lengthy debate on this very important
issue--I think the real question, again, comes back to leadership. Are
we prepared as a country, as the world leader--which no question about
it is the United States--to exert the leadership necessary to end this
illegal and immoral embargo in Bosnia and allow the Bosnians to defend
their homes and families?
Whether or not it is too late or too difficult is not a decision for
us or the international community to make. I have a feeling it is not
too late. I have a feeling there are going to be a lot more atrocities
committed and many other things are going to happen in that part of the
world, in Bosnia, maybe in Kosova, maybe Macedonia, or somewhere else.
I think this is a decision the Bosnians ought to make. We should not
make up their minds and say, ``Oh, it is too late,'' or too this, or
not enough, or whatever.
Again, I will go back to the conversation we had with Prime Minister
Silajdzic, when we were told--and this startled me; I did not know
this--they had one rifle for every four men, and eight tanks in 300. It
seems to me that the moral position is fairly clear.
I have to say, finally, it is their country and their independence
and their future, and all they want us to do is to give them their
right to defend themselves. I do not see that as anything that should
require a great deal of debate. I mean, just because we might somehow
offend the sensibilities of the French and British--who can take out
their troops--or we can persuade them to lift the arms embargo, too. In
my view, if this legislation passed, it would so strengthen the
President's hand, that he would be in a very strong position to go to
the British and French and say: Wait a minute, let us see if we cannot
do something here, the right thing.
I will say, in conclusion, as I said in at the outset several weeks
ago: It was our hope that this was going to support the President; not
in any way undermine him, but strengthen his hand. And based on former
decisions and personal discussions with the President, I think he
agrees with us.
I hope this legislation will pass, and if it passes, that it will be
with strong bipartisan support and for the right reasons.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pell]
is recognized.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, last Friday, the Senate began debate on a
bill that directs the President to lift the United States arms embargo
against Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we continue this debate today, I
would like to review for my colleagues the points made in opposition to
the Dole-Lieberman bill.
In January, the Senate voted to adopt a sense-of-the-Senate amendment
to the State Department authorization bill calling on the President to
lift the United States arms embargo against Bosnia. I was one of a few
Members who voted against that provision, and I continue to hold to
that position today.
As I said last Friday, I, in fact, found many of the arguments in
favor of lifting the arms embargo to be quite compelling. Clearly, the
people of Bosnia are suffering greatly, and Bosnian Government forces
are outgunned by the Bosnian Serb aggressors, as we saw most recently
in Gorazde. Although the NATO ultimatum of April 22 appears to have
relieved the Serb bombing of Gorazde, regrettably, in other parts of
Bosnia, the reckless violence against civilians continues.
As my esteemed colleague Lee Hamilton and I wrote in a piece in last
Thursday's New York Times, lifting the embargo appears to be a way of
showing support and sympathy for the beleaguered government and people
of Bosnia. It seems like an easy, cost-free solution.
It may make us feel better, but I believe it is bad policy that could
yield disastrous results. I ask unanimous consent that at the end of my
remarks, the piece from the Times be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PELL. Now, however, I would like to touch upon several of the
reasons why I believe unilaterally lifting the embargo is a bad idea.
First, it would put the United States in the position of abrogating a
United Nations Security Council Resolution, and in essence, breaking
international law. Second, it could begin a process of unilateral
United States involvement in the Bosnia conflict--or as some Senators
have put it--start us down the slippery slope to greater engagement in
the crisis. Third, unilaterally lifting the arms embargo could actually
leave the Bosnian Government forces vulnerable to further Serbian
obstruction of humanitarian assistance and brutal attack. Fourth,
lifting the embargo at this time could upset the delicate peace process
underway.
Many of my colleagues have made the point that the international
community may be contributing to the problem by denying the Bosnian
Government the right to defend itself. We have heard many times that we
owe it to the people of Bosnia to ``level the playing field.'' Some of
my colleagues have made powerful arguments to that affect. I believe,
however, that if steps are to be taken, the United Nations, not the
United States going it alone, should take them. The embargo is in place
as a result of a binding U.N. Security Council resolution and can only
be abrogated by a subsequent U.N. Security Council action. A unilateral
lifting of the arms embargo would set a dangerous precedent. Other
countries could choose to ignore Security Council resolutions that we
consider important--such as the embargo against Iraq and sanctions
against Libya.
There have been recent reports that the international consensus on
the embargo against Iraq may be at risk. Apparently, Turkey, France,
Russia, China, and perhaps others are ready to support a lifting of the
embargo on Iraqi oil sales. Some countries or companies may even be
contemplating deals that violate the current sanctions regime. If the
Senate were to signal its approval of a unilateral abrogation of a U.N.
embargo, we would be giving a green light to those who may be looking
for an excuse to violate the embargo against Iraq. In the long run, I
would argue that containing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is a
higher United States priority than supplying arms to Bosnia. If the
United States lifts the embargo on Bosnia--a step which by no means
guarantees success--we would assuredly undermine international resolve
on Iraq. In my opinion, taking a gamble on Bosnia is not worth
destroying the coalition, the consensus we have worked so hard to
build, on Iraq.
As many said in the previous discussion, U.S. integrity is on the
line. I agree wholeheartedly. If the United States were to break the
embargo on its own, we would destroy our credibility as a trustworthy
leader in international affairs. A unilateral lifting of the arms
embargo would undoubtedly strain our relations with Britain, France,
Russia, and other countries with troops on the ground in Bosnia--and
would undermine our trustworthiness in other international negotiations
completely unrelated to the Bosnian tragedy.
I find myself in agreement with the sentiments expressed by other
Senators 2 weeks ago that a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo
could be perceived as the beginning of a United States decision to go
alone in Bosnia. It is naive to think we can unilaterally lift the arms
embargo, and then walk away. We instead would assume responsibility for
Bosnia not only in terms of our moral obligation, but in practical
terms as well. Delivering weapons to Bosnia would likely require
sending in United States personnel. Granted, this legislation states
that nothing should be construed as authorizing the deployment of
United States forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose. But I
want to emphasize that this would be a U.S. decision to dismantle the
embargo. It would not be a U.N. decision, nor a NATO decision, nor a
decision made with the support of other countries with a stake in the
conflict. I therefore do not see how we can lift the embargo on our own
without sending in the personnel to carry out the policy.
Lifting the embargo without international support would increase
American responsibility for the outcome of the conflict. If we take
unilateral action, we will assume the lead international role in
Bosnia. If we were to take the initiative and supply arms on our own,
our allies, who I admit, have not always been the most cooperative,
could step back even further and say, ``It may be our continent, but
it's your job now to see this through; it's America's problem to
solve.''
Before we take any step that could lead to greater U.S. action--and I
argue that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo would do just that--we
need to answer some serious questions. A year ago this month, I wrote
an op-ed piece in which I stated:
Terrible human-rights abuses--torture, rape and slaughter--
run rampant in Bosnia. But as horrible as the situation is
there, other parts of the world--Kashmir, Cambodia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Sudan, and Liberia--are also experiencing reckless
violence and grave abuses that breed instability.
Sadly, in the year that has passed since I wrote those words, the
carnage in Bosnia has continued, and more countries have been added to
my list--Rwanda, Haiti, Yemen.
A year ago, I asked: ``Why should we intervene in Bosnia? Why is
Bosnia different from other places of conflict in the world? What are
American interests in Bosnia?'' Regrettably, we are no closer to having
answers to those questions today than we were a year ago. Without those
answers, I cannot support any action that would launch us headlong into
a military quagmire.
I am concerned too, about the negative impact that lifting the arms
embargo could have on the Bosnian people. I know that the Bosnian
Government has asked that the arms embargo be lifted, and it may appear
rather presumptuous for us to tell the Bosnian Government that we know
what is best for it. But if the United States were to lift the embargo
on our own, our allies with troops on the ground would very likely pull
out of portions of Bosnia, leaving the Moslem enclaves even more
vulnerable to Bosnian Serb attacks and the obstruction of the delivery
of humanitarian relief supplies.
There would likely be a lagtime too--anywhere from 6 weeks to 6
months by many estimates--for weapons to be delivered to Bosnia. During
that lagtime, the Serbs will undoubtedly move swiftly to crush Bosnian
Government forces. Moreover, the United States will receive the brunt
of the blame when hundreds, if not thousands, of Bosnians die from lack
of basic supplies.
Finally, a unilateral lifting of the embargo could endanger progress
on the international negotiations underway and jeopardize the gains
made to date through diplomacy. If we were to lift the arms embargo,
all parties to the negotiations would lose incentive to reach a
negotiated settlement. In characteristic fashion, the Bosnian Serbs
would likely rush to grab even more land before arms could be delivered
to the Bosnians; the Bosnian Government may take the lifting of the
arms embargo as a signal that the United States intends to intervene,
and may lose interest in a negotiated settlement; Croatia, currently in
a fragile alliance with Bosnia, would either prevent the transit of the
arms across its territory or insist upon its own cut, potentially
upsetting the delicate negotiations occurring between Serbia and
Croatia over the status of the U.N. protected areas in Croatia.
Admittedly, the diplomatic process in the Balkans has not been
perfect. There continue to be setbacks, but there also have been some
important accomplishments, including the breaking of the siege of
Sarajevo and the signing of a peace agreement between Moslems and
Croats in Bosnia. If we build upon these and other accomplishments, we
have the hope of a comprehensive peace. I, for one, believe it unwise
to upset the sensitive negotiation process now underway.
I acknowledged earlier that I see merit in some of the arguments of
the bill's proponents. This is a difficult problem that cuts across
partisan lines and that slices to the heart of issues related to U.S.
influence and power abroad. We are, as public servants, called upon to
exercise our best judgment on this very difficult issue. My conscience
tells me that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo is the wrong thing
to do, and I therefore must oppose this bill.
Exhibit 1
[From the New York Times, May 5, 1994]
Don't Arm Bosnia
(By Claiborne Pell and Lee H. Hamilton)
Washington.--When the Bosnian Serbs unleashed their fierce
attacks on Gorazde last month, sentiment grew for the United
States to lift the embargo that is keeping arms from reaching
the Bosnian Muslims. The Senate is to take up that debate
today.
Bosnia has suffered much in this vicious war. Lifting the
embargo would be a way of showing support and sympathy for
its beleaguered Government and people. It seems like an easy,
cost-free solution. But it is a bad idea. Lifting the embargo
will neither level the playing field, as proponents argue,
nor help the Bosnian cause.
While President Clinton says he wants to lift the embargo,
he has also repeatedly said that he will not do so
unilaterally. No permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council supports lifting the embargo. Yet some
members of Congress now advocate unilateral action.
What would happen if the U.S. acted alone to lift the arms
embargo? First, it would Americanize the war, signaling that
the U.S. was entering on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. We
would become responsible for Bosnia's fate.
Second, unilateral action would encourage others to violate
sanctions elsewhere, in particular the embargoes on Iraq and
Libya. To Bosnia's detriment, it would encourage other
countries to violate trade and financial sanctions against
Serbia.
Third, to lift the embargo now would send exactly the wrong
signal at a fragile and pivotal moment in the peace talks.
For the Muslims, it would hold out the unrealistic prospect
of better weapons, U.S. intervention--even victory. The
Bosnian Government would lose interest in a negotiated
settlement. The Serbs, understanding that the Muslims might
get more arms, would move swiftly to crush Bosnian Government
forces. Both sides would be tempted to intensify a war that
neither can win. Peace elsewhere in the Balkans would be
undermined.
That's not all. The U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia would
come under fire. Those with troops on the ground, including
Britain, France and Canada, would come under heavy domestic
pressure to withdraw. If the U.N. forces left, the
humanitarian mission in Bosnia--on which two out of three
Bosnians depend--would be at risk, and the U.S. would be
blamed.
NATO, meanwhile, is working closely with the United States
on a strategy of force and diplomacy for a peace settlement
in Bosnia. If we lifted the embargo unilaterally, that
strategy would fall apart, opening a serious rift in the
alliance. And relations with Russia would suffer, since
Moscow would find itself under great pressure to provide arms
to the Serbs.
Lifting the embargo is not as easy as it sounds. Who would
provide the weapons, and how would they be delivered to the
landlocked Bosnian forces? And who would train the Bosnians?
The legal basis for lifting the embargo is shaky, too.
Proponents selectively cite the U.N. Charter, saying it
guarantees the right of ``individual or collective self-
defense.'' But it also says this right cannot negate Security
Council action to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Despite setbacks, we now have our best opportunity in three
years to try to end this war. Diplomacy is working: since
February there has been an end to the sieges of Sarajevo and
Tuzla, a peace agreement between Muslims and Croats in
Bosnia, a formal ceasefire between the Croatian Government
and Serbs in Croatia, a dramatic overall reduction in
fighting throughout Bosnia and an end to the shelling of
Gorazde. Talks on a comprehensive peace are at a delicate
stage. Only those talks can end the fighting.
The U.S. does not want to become a party to this war. We do
not have vital national interests; what we do have are
pressing humanitarian and political interests in ending the
fighting. A negotiated settlement is precisely what the
Administration, NATO, the European Union and the U.N. are
trying to pursue. Our frustration with the peace process
should not compel us to choose a course that would prolong,
intensify and widen the war.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, last week I had intended to speak and vote
in support of the legislation offered by Senators Dole and Lieberman to
end the arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia. However, as we
all know, debate was postponed until today. The parliamentary situation
is a little confused at the moment, but as I understand it, the Senate
will be asked to consider not only the Dole-Lieberman bill, but
subsequent legislation offered by the distinguished majority leader.
The details of the majority leader's legislation are unclear at
present, but they may include authorization for the President to use
American air power to enforce the United Nations exclusion zones in
Bosnia.
I have in the recent past called for the opportunity to vote on such
authorization. So, if we are to do so, I am pleased to begin that
debate now. And I am pleased that the Senate can vote on the arms
embargo question and the use of force question separately. I would not
have liked the fate of the former to depend on the fate of the latter,
for I think one course is just and the other foolish.
As my colleagues know, I support lifting the arms embargo and oppose
using American force in Bosnia. The Dole-Lieberman legislation requires
the President to lift the embargo, but does not authorize the use of
force. The last draft of the majority leader's resolution which I saw
does not compel the President to lift the embargo, it only urges him to
promptly consider such action.
Mr. President, I want to commend Senators Dole and Lieberman for
sponsoring this bill. Lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians--
multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if necessary--is the only
action which the United States and the United Nations can take that
might help the Bosnians achieve a more equitable settlement of this
terrible conflict without deploying massive numbers of ground troops to
roll back Serb territorial gains.
Better armed and better able to defend themselves, the Bosnians might
be able to present a more credible, long-term threat to Serb conquests,
and by so doing convince the Serbs to re-think their refusal to
relinquish any substantial portion of their gains or risk those gains
in a more protracted war.
Besides addressing the sound argument that territory is not conquered
or held by air forces, but by infantries, this amendment has the
additional attraction of being just. I think we all believe that the
cause of the Bosnians is just. And if we do not believe our own
interests are sufficiently at risk to warrant the intervention of
United States ground forces and the sacrifice of American lives to
defend the Bosnians--and I do not believe they are--then to impede the
rights of Bosnians to defend themselves is a gross injustice.
As others have observed, the United Nations embargo was imposed in
July 1991 against Yugoslavia. At that time, Bosnia was part of
Yugoslavia. Today, Bosnia is an independent nation, and recognized as
such by the United States and the United Nations. As an independent
state and member of the United Nations, Bosnia has an inherent right to
self-defense.
Bosnian independence has rendered the arms embargo outdated. It is
without legal standing, and, in fact, violates the sovereign rights of
a United Nations member state that is under attack by forces supported
by a neighboring state.
Article 2 of the charter states:
The inherent right to self-defense is a pre-eminent right
of international law, and may not be abridged by actions of
the Security Council.
Article 51 of the charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.
Mr. President, it is clear, in my view, that the Security Council has
not taken ``measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.'' As I have already implied, to do so would require the
deployment of sufficient numbers of ground troops to defeat the Serb
aggressors on the battlefield. Understandably, the United Nations has
no intention of making that kind of commitment.
Opponents of the Dole-Lieberman resolution argue that were the United
States to unilaterally violate the arms embargo, other countries would
be emboldened to violate other U.N. embargoes--specifically, the very
necessary embargo currently imposed on Iraq. The differences between
these two situations are so obvious that I am a little surprised that
such a false comparison is even raised.
Bosnia is a victim state whose sovereignty has been attacked by an
externally supported aggressor. Iraq, is an aggressor state that
violated the territorial integrity of a neighbor, and would do so again
if given half a chance. Thus, the embargo imposed against Iraq has
sound standing in international law. The embargo against Bosnia is
unlawful.
Should any nation use the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia
as an excuse to violate the embargo against Iraq--and France has been
identified as a possible violator of the Iraqi embargo under this
circumstance--then they would be in violation of international law, and
should be held accountable for their transgression.
I would like to believe, Mr. President, that American diplomacy still
possesses enough force and credibility that we could prevent a close
ally from taking such an unlawful action--an action that would so
clearly be in neither the national interest of France or any other
nation with regard for international peace and security.
Mr. President, I have also heard the argument that if the United
States and the United Nations want to economize the violence in Bosnia,
and bring the war to its quickest possible conclusion then we should
not lift this embargo. If the embargo remains in effect, then the
Bosnian Government will have little choice but to accept the very
unfair terms that the Serbs will impose on them to settle the conflict
now.
Mr. President, such a forced settlement may hold for awhile. But the
ancient enmities will not die. The aspirations of the Bosnian people to
restore to their children a viable sovereignty will not long be
suppressed. Nationalism for good or for ill is a durable--a very
durable--yearning. War would return to Bosnia.
By supporting the Bosnians inherent right to self-defense, I cannot
predict that the Bosnian Government will prevail in this war. I cannot
predict that the Bosnians will even recover significant amounts of
territory from the Serbs to make an eventual settlement of the conflict
more equitable. But they have the right to try. They have the right to
try. And the United States should do nothing to interfere with that
right unless we take it upon ourselves to defend with force the
national interests of Bosnians. And that, Mr. President, is something I
sincerely hope we will not do.
We have already done just that to a small extent, and I believe it
was a mistake.
When the United States commits its prestige and the lives of our
young to resolving a conflict militarily then we must be prepared to
see the thing through to the end. If you start from the premise--and I
have heard no voice in Congress in opposition to this premise--that the
United States will not deploy ground forces in Bosnia, then you
identify to the enemy the circumstances under which the United States
can be defeated. You have indicated the conditionality, the half
heartedness of our commitment. And you have told the Serbs: we may bomb
you, but if you can withstand that, Bosnia is yours.
The feckless pinprick air strikes of a few weeks ago surely indicated
to the Serbs that they could probably withstand the limit of our
commitment to Bosnia. No one, no one in this Chamber, no one in this
administration, no one in the U.S. Armed Forces can tell me with any
degree of confidence that air strikes alone will determine the outcome
of this war.
Mr. President, the American people and their elected representatives
have already made the most important decision governing United States
involvement in Bosnia. As a nation, we have decided--correctly, in my
view--that the tragedy in Bosnia--as terrible as it is, as unjust as it
is, as despicably brutal as it is--the tragedy in Bosnia does not
directly affect the vital national security interests of the United
States. We made that decision, Mr. President, when we decided, as a
nation, not to send American infantry into that conflict.
Some of the proponents of using American air power in Bosnia have
argued that the Bosnian civil war does threaten our vital national
security interests to the extent that it has the potential to spread
throughout the Balkans, and even to provoke open hostilities between
two NATO allies--Greece and Turkey. I happen to believe that we can
contain that conflict. But, for the sake of argument, let me concede
that the war in Bosnia directly affects our vital national interests.
If the Government of the United States feels our national interests
are gravely at risk in that conflict then let's do the honest thing,
let's do the militarily sound thing, let's do the courageous thing. Let
us say to Bosnian Serbs and to Serbia: You have threatened the vital
interests of the most powerful nation on Earth. The United States
intends to defend those interests by all means necessary, and you can
expect the invasion of Bosnia--and Serbia, if necessary--by American
ground forces supported with all available air and sea power.
If our vital interests are at risk, then we would be grossly
negligent if we did not take all actions necessary to secure those
interests.
Mr. President, bombing tents and trucks may not dissuade the Serbs.
Bombing bridges, fuel supply lines and ammo depots may not dissuade the
Serbs. We do not even know with any degree of confidence that bombing
Belgrade will dissuade the Serbs. What do we do then, Mr. President,
when our interests remain at risk? We must either sacrifice those
interests and withdraw in abject defeat. Or we must bring the full
power of the United States down upon the enemy and slug it out from
town to town, from hill to hill, from battle to battle until we defeat
the enemy utterly and secure the interests of this great Nation.
So. Mr. President, let us authorize the President to use all means
necessary to protect the interests of the country we are sworn to
defend. Let us tell the President: Mr. President, you have identified a
grave threat to our security, now use the force necessary to defeat
that threat decisively. Use American ground troops to defeat the
Serbian aggressors who have challenged our security.
But the fact is, Mr. President, that neither Congress nor the
President intends to deploy ground troops in Bosnia. Why? Because we
cannot make a plausible argument to the American people that our
security is so gravely threatened in Bosnia that it requires the
sacrifice of our sons and daughters to defend. As I said a few minutes
ago, America has already ruled on the question of whether our vital
interests are at stake in Bosnia. We have determined that they are not.
We made that determination when we decided as a nation that we would
not use ground forces to settle the conflict.
So let us not dissemble any longer about how the war in Bosnia
threatens the security of the United States or NATO. It does not, and
we all know it. What the President has decided, and what Congress may
now authorize, is that by incremental escalation--starting with the
most minimal use of force imaginable--we can intimidate or bluff the
Serbs into ceasing their aggression.
We threatened air strikes to protect the safe zone around Sarajevo.
Serb forces then redeployed to Gorazde where they brought that
unfortunate city under siege. We then initiated two air strikes to
protect U.N. peacekeepers in Gorazde. We destroyed a tent, a truck, and
two armored personnel carriers. The Serbs intensified their barrage
against Gorazde, and for good measure began shelling the city of
Tuzla--another declared safe area.
We have now extended the threat of more destructive air strikes to
Gorazde, and all the U.N. declared safe areas. The Serbs continued
shelling for a period, while United Nation officials in Bosnia refused
NATO permission to launch air strikes. The Serbs have not resumed
shelling Gorazde for a while now, but they are in violation of the
ultimatum by keeping armed militia and artillery within the exclusion
zone. They have also intensified fighting in Brcko (Birchko), where we
are now contemplating establishing another safe area. They have fought
two pitched battles with U.N. peacekeepers. They have continued
shelling areas near Tuzla. And the United Nations has granted
permission for several Serb tanks to transit through the Sarajevo
exclusion zone on their way, presumably, to shell some other Muslim-
held area.
Mr. President, if it weren't for the terrible cost in lives, U.N. and
NATO actions would turn this tragedy into low comedy. All the while,
the United States and NATO, to say nothing of the United Nations, are
bleeding credibility. Yet, by threatening widespread air strikes, we
expect the Serbs to refrain from the further use of force, and for the
Moslems to believe that we can convince the Serbs to agree to a more
equitable peace settlement.
I have my doubts, Mr. President, I have my doubts.
I hear quite often now, that we expect Serb acquiescence in our
demands because they fear NATO's resolve to launch a campaign of
strategic bombing. Some of my colleagues may not appreciate what
strategic bombing, in its broadest definition, entails. In short,
unrestrained strategic bombing requires that we fill the skies with our
bombers and lay waste to a country. In past conflicts, we called it
carpet bombing.
Mr. President, no one seriously believes that the President of the
United States is contemplating such an action. The civilian casualties
which such a campaign would unavoidably incur would be devastating.
Hospitals, schools, friendly forces, Moslems, Croats and Serbs, men,
women, and children would perish. Strategic bombing is the most
cataclysmic event in modern warfare with the exception of a nuclear
detonation.
What I believe the proponents of air strikes mean when they refer to
strategic bombing is really widespread tactical bombing--attacking
again and again as many of the enemy's bridges, or ammunition depots,
or supply lines as possible. We have that capability, of course. But
such strikes will surely incur heavy civilian casualties as well.
I must also point out that a committed foe--and I have no reason to
believe that the Serbs are not committed--can and will resist such a
campaign. In Vietnam, we bombed the Than Hoa bridge over a hundred
times and we never broke North Vietnam's will to fight. We unleashed
the awesome destructive power of B-52's on Hanoi, a devastation I
personally witnessed, and still the Vietnamese did not lose their will
to fight.
We have sufficient cause to fear that the Serbs will endure whatever
air strikes NATO undertakes and fight on, especially, if the Serbs know
that at the end of air strikes, all of Bosnia is theirs for the taking.
We have cause to fear this, Mr. President, because the Serbs know in
advance the limits of our commitment. They know that we will not send
ground troops to force a resolution of the conflict. They know that
there are certainly limits to the escalation of any bombing campaign we
are prepared to undertake.
Neither will the air strikes we are contemplating be, as I have heard
them described, a piece of cake. Under the best of conditions, to fly
into a combat zone, find a legitimate target, strike it without doing
collateral damage, while all the while evading surface-to-air missiles
is terribly exacting, immensely dangerous, and as frightening an
experience as human beings can be expected to endure.
The tactical problems posed by the chronic poor weather and the very
difficult, mountainous terrain in Bosnia greatly increase the risks of
missed targets, collateral damage, and the loss of allied pilots. We
saw a pretty good indication of the problem and its costs during the
air strikes in Gorazde. Low cloud cover requires us to fly in low, well
within range of Serb SA7's. We will lose planes, Mr. President;
possibly quite a few planes. Artillery, tanks, even field command
centers will be hard to find and easy to move. Harder targets, like
bridges and ammo dumps will be defended by surface-to-air missiles.
We must also consider the welfare of the U.N. peacekeepers currently
deployed in Bosnia before we launch these air strikes. Will we withdraw
them in advance of the strikes or will we leave them in place, hostages
to the terrible fortunes of war?
Mr. President, I will close by reiterating a sentiment I have
expressed before: I hope every subsequent development in Bosnia proves
me wrong. I hope the Serbs feel they have consumed enough of Bosnia
that the capture of additional territory is not worth risking their
lives and equipment in anticipated NATO air strikes. I hope U.S.
actions precipitate a just and lasting settlement to this terrible
conflict. I hope the entire world is impressed by the courage and
wisdom of American leaders.
I may be wrong, Mr. President. But on a question of such importance
to my country, I must use all of my experience to guide my judgment. I
must use all of the lessons I have learned in a lifetime about when and
how our Nation should go to war. And all of my experience tells me that
this is not the place, and this is not the time for the United States
to intervene militarily in the defense of another people's sovereignty.
For very sound reasons I fear greatly that will not be proved wrong,
Mr. President. I fear that the United States is about to embark on an
undefined military adventure where the limits to our force have been
clearly revealed to the enemy in advance of its use; where out of
concern for our prestige we will be drawn deeper and deeper into war or
compelled to sacrifice that prestige and many lives to a cause we were
not prepared to win; where the aggrieved party has been prevented by us
from fighting in their own defense; where television and the best of
intentions have made us squander that most valuable of diplomatic
tools--credibility; where American foreign policy is crippled for the
duration of this administration.
If I am wrong, Mr. President, I will gladly admit to the error. But
even if I am wrong, I would still counsel against the use of force by
similar means and under similar circumstances. Let us not draw the
wrong lesson from what would be nothing more than extraordinary good
luck and engage in such recklessness elsewhere. This is grim, dangerous
business we are about to authorize. It has not been well planned, and
it may not end well, and, irrespective of its outcome, it was not--I
repeat, not--undertaken in the best interests of this country.
Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Dole and Senator
Lieberman's legislation. I strongly feel that we must allow these
people to defend themselves. As the Vice President of Bosnia said in my
office 3 weeks ago, ``We are dying. At least let us die fighting.'' If
we do not lift this embargo with or without--hopefully with--the
agreement of the United Nations, we will have a blot on the history of
this Nation which will take a long time to erase because we failed to
allow a decent and honorable people to defend themselves.
I would like to make an additional comment, Mr. President, about the
impact that has not been discussed on the floor of this situation in
Bosnia. Throughout the Moslem world today, Moslems are wondering and
asking the question: Would the United States and the United Nations be
so loath to lift this embargo if these people were not Moslems?
A couple of weeks ago, there were large-scale demonstrations in
Ankara, Istanbul. Islamic fundamentalism, which is a great threat to
peace and freedom throughout the world, is using the cause of the
Moslems in Bosnia as a way to inflame and, indeed, enrage the passions
of Moslem peoples throughout the world.
Mr. President, it is an unjust charge that the United States of
America and the United Nations is discriminating against Moslem
peoples. But believe me, it is real and it can have far-reaching
consequences as well.
Mr. President, I have confidence that this body will vote
overwhelmingly in favor of lifting the embargo. There is no other just
course. Now I hope that that action will embolden this administration
to go to the United Nations, seek the lifting of the embargo and use
the position of leadership in the world to see that that happens so
that we are not faced with a distasteful likelihood of violating a
United Nations resolution.
At the same time, we should make it very clear that if other nations
do not choose to follow our leadership, then we, as the most powerful
nation in the world, which has stood for the rights of man for over 200
years, will exercise in a unilateral fashion what we know is right and
just.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina [Mr.
Thurmond].
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the able Senator
from Arizona for his fine interest in this subject and the sound
position he has taken in regard to it.
Mr. President, I supported the Dole amendment to lift the Bosnian
arms embargo when it first came before the Senate a few weeks ago.
Nothing has happened since then to change my mind. If anything, the
situation in Bosnia demands more than ever that we end the embargo on
the Bosnian Moslems.
Many of my colleagues have already argued eloquently in favor of the
current bill offered by Senators Dole and Lieberman. It enjoys broad
support, and has 32 cosponsors. I will not take the Senate's time to
repeat all the arguments. But I would like to make two points that I
feel have not been adequately considered during this debate.
First, opponents of this legislation seem to be equating a decision
to lift the embargo with a commitment to arm and train Bosnian
Government forces. I believe this view is a mistake. In fact, I believe
this confusion may be the reason some Senators oppose it, in particular
those who do not want to see the United States dragged deeper into the
Bosnian quagmire.
I do not want to see the United States more deeply involved either.
But lifting the embargo does not necessarily involve us more deeply. It
does not obligate America to undertake the immense logistical
challenges of providing heavy weapons to the Bosnian Moslems. It does
not require us to incur the political risks of sending in U.S.
trainers, thereby becoming active participants in the war, and putting
American lives in jeopardy.
What the bill does achieve is to stake out an indisputable moral
position. America is not obligated to intervene militarily on the side
of the Bosnians, or remedy their lack of tanks and artillery. But if we
are not going to defend the Bosnians or protect their noncombatants
from indiscriminate slaughter, it is immoral for us to deny them access
to the means to defend themselves.
Passing this amendment by Senator Dole and Senator Lieberman simply
means that the United States will no longer use its military or naval
units to enforce the embargo. It will allow the Bosnians on their own
to acquire the arms they are seeking--primarily light infantry weapons,
antitank weapons, and mortars--to defend their villages, and engage the
Serbs more effectively at longer ranges.
My second point is this. In addition to the moral principle involved,
S. 2042 embodies an important legal principle. Its passage will
reaffirm the traditional American principle that every state has the
right to defend itself. The inherent right of self-defense is a
fundamental right, enshrined in the U.N. Charter itself. It may not be
overturned or abrogated by subsequent acts or resolutions of any
international body, especially the United Nations. If the United
Nations wants to regain a measure of its lost credibility and moral
authority, it must act in accord with its own charter.
In effect, this bill would correct a serious legal error by
committing the United States to the position that U.N. Resolution 713
imposing the embargo was misapplied. The newly independent states that
emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia--states whose sovereignty we
recognized--should not have been subjected to an embargo in the first
place.
Mr. President, I am under no illusions that this step or any other
will bring about a lasting peace settlement. The West has tried to
broker a negotiated peace without success, and some Senators argue that
lifting the embargo will only prolong the agony. But everything else we
have tried to end the aggression of the Serbs has failed. Now the
situation has deteriorated to the point that a new factor is needed to
change the military dynamics in this largely one-sided war. Now that we
have been drawn into the Bosnian conflict, we have some degree of
responsibility. We will pay a penalty for doing nothing, although none
of the options open to us are attractive.
Mr. President, even if lifting the embargo does not achieve peace, I
do not feel we can continue a policy that forces the Bosnian Moslems to
remain defenseless against Serbian tanks and heavy artillery, with no
means to protect their old and helpless, their women and children. Our
current policy has proven to be neither practical nor moral. We have to
try something else, and I believe that S. 2042 is a proper and
necessary step in that direction.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, as I yield the floor, I wish to congratulate Senator
Dole and Senator Lieberman for sponsoring this amendment. They are on
the right track, and I hope we can pass their resolution.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr.
Lieberman].
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my distinguished
colleague from South Carolina for his support of this amendment and for
his words of praise at the end of his statement.
Privilege of the floor
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at the outset that Debra
Shelton, a congressional fellow on my staff, have access to the Senate
floor during consideration of S. 2042.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I am honored to join with the Senator from Kansas in
introducing S. 2042, the aim of which, as has been stated, is to lift
the arms embargo on Bosnia. I am pleased, also, that Senator Dole and I
have 31 other cosponsors from both parties. This is genuinely a
bipartisan expression of not just opinion, but a call for action and
leadership on this vexing problem of what we can do to fulfill our
strategic interests and moral responsibilities in the conflict in
Bosnia.
I want to say, Mr. President, in terms of the bipartisanship of this
effort, that the Senator from Kansas and I did not begin working on
this matter during the Democratic administration of President Clinton.
We worked side by side during the Republican administration of
President Bush where the Senator from Kansas was equally as direct and
outspoken and, in that case, opposed to a policy that was being pursued
by the then Republican administration. So this is truly a bipartisan
effort, and as the Senator from Kansas said, it is an effort that we
have conceived to do at least two things procedurally apart from what
it does substantively.
The first is to create a common ground on this complicated question
of our policy in Bosnia. There are those of us who favor the limited
use of allied air power to even the battle and to bring the parties to
the peace table more quickly. There are many other colleagues who do
not support the use of air power in Bosnia. But as the Senator from
Kansas and I discussed the conflict in Bosnia with our colleagues, we
felt that there was a common, bipartisan ground on the baseline
question of lifting the arms embargo to allow the Bosnians to defend
themselves--not to send American soldiers to Bosnia. As the Senator
from Arizona indicated earlier, nobody that I have heard in the
Congress has suggested that sending United States troops to Bosnia is a
good idea. Certainly this Senator does not feel that way.
Even though there is some opposition to this bill calling for the
United States to lift the arms embargo multilaterally if possible, but
unilaterally if necessary, our hope was, and still is, that there is a
common ground on which a lot of us can come together and fulfill our
national interests and the moral imperative in this conflict.
The second procedural goal of this bill, as Senator Dole has
indicated, is that the passage of this measure would strengthen the
hand of President Clinton in dealing with the conflict in Bosnia and in
working with our allies in NATO in dealing with the conflict.
Mr. President, it was just a little more than a year ago that the
Clinton administration adopted a two-part policy regarding Bosnia, the
so-called ``lift and strike policy''--lift the arms embargo to give the
Bosnians the weapons with which they could defend themselves, and,
along with our allies, to strike from the air at minimal risk to
American personnel to hit aggressive Serbian targets. All of this was
aimed at bringing the parties to the peace table because without this
lift and strike policy the Serbs--who in this Senator's opinion are the
aggressors and who have carried out genocidal acts--are free to
continue not just to roam but to carry out acts of aggression without
fear of consequence.
This bill follows on the heels of the administration's successful
convincing of our allies in the aftermath of the Serbian attack on
civilians in Sarajevo in February of this year to use air power
selectively. This effort helped bring peace to Sarajevo which has been
torn by war throughout so many of the preceding months, and led to
another ultimatum concerning Gorazde. After the very limited use of air
strikes, we saw significant--although not total--adherence by the Serbs
to the exclusion zones.
So now we have the strike policy. I accept the point that the Senator
from Arizona has made that conflicts are not won with air power alone;
that it is necessary to create some power on the ground, but not by
sending in U.S. soldiers. Soldiers are already there; they are Bosnian-
Moslem soldiers. But they do not have the arms to fight with. Give them
those arms by lifting this arms embargo.
This Senator certainly sees this amendment as supporting the policy
of lift and strike that the President of the United States adopted more
than a year ago and giving him the leverage of a measure passed by the
Senate of the United States to take with him to negotiate with our
allies in NATO and others in the United Nations, hopefully, to convince
them to lift the arms embargo multilaterally.
Mr. President, this measure that we are debating today is similar to
an amendment that Senator Dole and I and many others cosponsored to the
bankruptcy bill that was before the Senate more than 2 weeks ago. Many
Senators came to the floor that day and voiced their support for our
proposal. Others, of course, came and expressed concerns, reservations,
and opposition. But I thought that the debate which took place that day
was an important one, and was characterized by an honest desire of all
parties to bring the slaughter and the conflict in Bosnia to an end.
I fully expect the exchange of views that we have here today on this
bill will be similarly direct and constructive as they certainly have
been so far as I have listened to the debate this morning. It is
appropriate that the Senate of the United States should be considering
these critical matters.
Mr. President, it is obvious that we are at a difficult time, an
unclear and unsettling time, in world events. The cold war is over. We
have achieved an extraordinary victory in the victory of freedom over
tyranny, of capitalism over communism, of free economies over state-
controlled economies. Yet, the world that we find today is
characterized, in many ways by greater instability. The cold war
position of two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union,
each with an enormous nuclear capacity against one another, imposed an
order of sorts to global affairs. It was easier to choose sides. In
regional conflicts throughout the world, the forces of freedom tended
to be arrayed against the forces of tyranny and communism. Most
regional conflicts had a side that expressed our values and required us
to act to protect our national interests. Behind those conflicts,
however, was always the looming fear of a nuclear confrontation between
the two great powers.
All that is essentially gone. In the conflicts that occur in the
world today and that are brought not only to us but to our constituents
through the power of the electronic media, we must determine where
American policy should attempt to work its will, and where, if
anywhere, we should join force with that policy to protect America's
strategic interests and to uphold our principles; to be true to our
moral traditions which have always distinguished this country.
These decisions are not easy. I understand that in this case they are
not easy for many Members of this Chamber. In the opinion of this
Senator, the conflict in Bosnia is one in which the United States has
strategic and moral interests; strategic interests in part because of
our historic connection to Europe: not just because this country was
settled by Europeans, but because we have seen in this century how
conflict in Europe has drawn us twice into world war.
We also have a strategic interest in the conflict in Bosnia because
it will set a standard for the resolution of those many other ethnic
and national conflicts that have been unleashed by the dissolution of
the Soviet Union.
Further, I believe we have humanitarian and moral interests as once
again we have watched genocidal acts carried out against a people
simply because of their religion--in this case, because they are
Moslem.
Are these interests that we have-- strategic and moral--enough to
justify sending American soldiers to fight in Bosnia? My answer is no.
Is it enough of an interest for us to be involved in the policy of lift
and strike that the administration articulated more than a year ago? My
answer is yes. That is why I am cosponsoring this amendment with the
Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole].
There is a strong moral argument here, because in lifting the arms
embargo we will be restoring to the sovereign and legitimate government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the right to defend its people, its
territory, and, in fact, its very existence. What right can be more
basic to a state than the right to defend its own continued existence?
This embargo denies the Bosnians that fundamental right.
The argument here is both moral and legal. The moral argument is, in
my view, the more powerful argument. The moral argument says that when
a people want to fight to protect their families, their homes, their
country, it is immoral to deny them the means by which they can do
that.
It is a moral argument to lift this embargo because the Bosnians are
the victims. They have been the victims of aggression. They have been
the victims of genocidal acts. It is wrong for us to stand by and turn
a deaf ear and a closed eye to the fervent and direct appeals of duly
elected leaders of Bosnia to us, to this Government, to this Congress,
to this Senate, to so many of us individually, ``Please, send us the
weapons with which we can defend ourselves.''
Mr. President, there is also a legal argument. I think to explore
that legal argument we have to go back to the beginnings of this
process.
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution No. 713 on September 25,
1991.
This resolution imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. What is
interesting, as we look back at the history here, is that this
resolution was passed at the request of the then government of
Yugoslavia, centered in Belgrade and dominated by the Serbs. The
resolution was part of an overall policy expressed by the United
Nations, in which the United Nations adopted a series of goals that
were aimed at avoiding war and conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
The reality is, of course, that that United Nations policy failed.
And in the 2\1/2\ years since that original resolution was adopted, a
bloody, savage war has ensued. I think it is important to remember that
the premise of the arms embargo was to keep arms from flowing into the
former Yugoslavia, as part of an overall policy to avoid war there;
this policy failed. Thus, the political premise of the arms embargo,
let alone the legal premises, no longer exist.
To continue with the legal argument, we must note that at the time of
the 1991 resolution, Bosnia had not yet received independent statehood;
it was a part of Yugoslavia.
On January 4, 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations
submitted a report to the Security Council arguing that the arms
embargo against Yugoslavia should continue in force and would continue
to apply to all areas of Yugoslavia, notwithstanding any decisions
which were pending at that time on the question of the recognition of
the independence of certain republics that had been part of Yugoslavia.
On January 8, 4 days later, the Security Council adopted Resolution
No. 727, which referenced the Secretary General's report that I have
just mentioned, and determined that the arms embargo should apply as
the report suggested. At that time, it is important to point out from a
legal perspective, Bosnia still had not achieved statehood and remained
a constituent entity of Yugoslavia. Thus, when adopted on January 8,
1992, this resolution did apply to Bosnia since it was not an
independent state and was not entitled, therefore, to a right of self-
defense.
From February 29 to March 1, 1992, Bosnia held a historic referendum
on the question of whether it should become an independent state, and,
of course, the people voted that they did want to establish themselves
as an independent state. In fact, Bosnia was recognized just a little
bit more than a month later, on April 7, 1992, by the Government of the
United States, and became a member of the United Nations on May 22,
1992.
Since Bosnia became a member of the United Nations, there have been
no Security Council resolutions which impose the arms embargo on Bosnia
itself. Subsequent resolutions refer to previous acts as a matter of
course, but it seems to me that the mere reference to the earlier
resolutions which were passed before Bosnia became a state are not
relevant to the situation that exists today not only on the ground but
in international law.
When Bosnia became an independent state and a United Nations member
in 1992, it became entitled to the right of self defense, which is
enshrined in the U.N. Charter. In that sense, I believe that the
embargo against the former Yugoslavia ceased to be valid when Bosnia
became an independent state with membership in the United Nations, with
the right to self defense under the U.N. Charter. This is a right which
I believe supersedes the previous resolution, Resolution No. 713, of
the Security Council.
Mr. President, the United States is a nation of laws. That is one of
the characteristics that distinguishes us. The world is not a world of
laws, but we try, to the extent we can, to express and respect
principles of law in our international deliberations. I believe that in
that context there is no legal basis for the arms embargo on Bosnia. It
is, in that sense, irrelevant and invalid.
So to terminate the embrgo, as this measure before the Senate does
today, is essentially stepping away from an act which is invalid. It is
a return to the basic legal right of a nation to defend itself. In that
sense, I think by ending the arms embargo, we are returning to a
consistency between principles of international law, America's respect
for those principles of law, and the facts, both legal and political,
as they exist in the former Yugoslavia.
I have already spoken about the moral argument. I need not repeat
that, although it is very important, except to say this: It does seem
to me that insofar as we continue this embargo on arms to Bosnia--not
only failing to send arms, but preventing arms from being delivered, in
spite of the Serbian aggression and genocidal acts which the people of
Bosnia have been the targets and victims of--the United States is not
maintaining a policy of neutrality. The United States is, in effect,
choosing sides in this conflict, because we are effectively saying to
the Serbs, who are the aggressors, that you can continue to use your
weapons, your tanks, your artillery, which, as I will explain in a
moment, they have special access to, against the people of Bosnia,
while we refuse to allow the victims of their aggression the means to
defend themselves.
The Senator from Kansas referred to some of the numbers that Vice
President Ganic and Prime Minister Silajdzic gave to both him and me
regarding the tanks that are on the ground between the two sides.
Let me quote some statistics from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies [IISS], Military Balance for 1993-94, on the weapons
strength of both sides. They report that the Bosnian Serb army has 330
tanks. The Bosnians told us it was around 300 now. The Serbs have 400
armored personnel carriers, 800 artillery pieces, and over 400
antiaircraft guns that are usable in a direct fire role. The Bosnian
Moslem army, on the other hand, can field only 20 tanks. Prime Minister
Silajdzic recently told us there were only 8 left. So that is 8 Bosnian
tanks against 300 Serbian tanks. There are 30 armored personnel
carriers for the Moslems against 400 armored personnel carriers for the
Serbs. There are 30 artillery pieces against 800 artillery pieces for
the Serbs; and 400 antiaircraft guns that the Serbs have and I do not
see that the Moslems have any. Of the 180,000 Bosnian troops available,
only 60,000 are in organized units, with the remainder constituting a
reserve to fill losses. Most of these reserves have no weapons at all
or they have only small, light-arms or hunting rifles. This was the
tragic imbalance of the conflict around Gorazde as we were hearing.
Serbian tank, were moving into the city and all the Moslems in the city
in this ``safe haven'' were lightly armed against the tanks. More than
one of the Bosnians who has come here has expressed to us how much he
hoped that someday the Bosnian Moslems would have the kind of antitank
weapons that we have supplied in other conflicts that would allow them
to make this a fair fight.
The few arms which are available to the Bosnians are supported by a
very uncertain home-made ammunition supply system. Most of the former
Yugoslavia's arms industry in Bosnia, that is the part of the arms
industry of the former Yugoslavia, which was considerable, was
concentrated in areas which have either fallen under Serb control, such
as Banja Luka, or have been destroyed or deprived of sufficient raw
materials and power supply to operate.
Bosnian troops must collect their spent cartridges to have them
refilled at makeshift ammunition factories. In contrast, factories in
Serbia have been immune from attack and are producing arms and
ammunition at a feverish pace. Then they are delivered across an
international border to Serbs engaged against the Bosnian Government.
The Bosnian people are doing their best to defend themselves and
their country with the meager resources they have. But it is wrong to
perpetuate this unfair fight. We must stop denying the Bosnians the
right to defend themselves. We must lift the arms embargo. I listened
very carefully 2 weeks ago when the distinguished chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, my colleague Senator Nunn, spoke on this issue.
While he expressed many concerns about our strategy in Bosnia--many
which I share--he spoke clearly and eloquently on this point when he
said:
I think this embargo on arms to those who are the victims
is a policy that is not only counter-productive politically
and militarily. I think it prolongs the conflict, and I
believe it is an immoral policy, preventing us from helping
those who are there ready to help themselves.
My colleague described the post-Vietnam policy developed by President
Richard Nixon where the United States made clear its willingness to arm
those who were the victims of aggression so that they could help
themselves. He went on to say:
In this case, what the United Nations has done, with good
intention but I think with disastrous results, is just the
opposite. We have denied arms to those who are increasingly
the victims of this conflict.
Mr. President, there are serious concerns about where we are going in
Bosnia. We have ample cause for concern about what our inability to end
the aggression in Bosnia says about the future role of NATO, the United
Nations, and the United States in Europe and in the world community.
Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
addressed these concerns in an article which appeared in the New York
Times on May 4. She wrote:
Lifting the arms embargo * * * is also crucial. That
embargo was imposed before Bosnia and Croatia were
internationally recognized, and its legal standing is at
least questionable. The U.S., Britain, and France--or if
necessary, the U.S. acting alone--should formally state that
they do not intend to continue with it. * * * A well-armed
Muslim-Croatian alliance would confront the Serbs with a
quite new and unwelcome challenge. It might even prompt the
Serbs to settle.
Mrs. Thatcher concludes--
I do not claim that this approach is without dangers. * * *
It is unlikely to bring immediate peace--though it might.
Some disruption of the aid effort is inevitable. But what the
people of Bosnia now need is a permanent peace that allows
them to return to their homes and live without fear.
I could not agree more. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that
this article be printed as part of the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I do not want to see Bosnian men,
women, and children die at the hands of naked aggression because they
don't have the weapons to defend themselves. This debate today and the
decision each of us makes when we vote on this issue are critical to
the way we defend American leadership in the world community.
I hope we have not come to a point where we are unwilling to assert
the simple, strong, moral leadership necessary to arm the victims of
aggression to fight for themselves. That, in my opinion, is the least
we should do.
Exhibit 1
[From the Washington Post, May 4, 1994]
Stop the Serbs--Now--for Good
(By Margaret Thatcher)
We have been here so many times before in the Bosnian saga:
acts of barbarism by the Serbs, the mobilization of a shocked
international conscience, threats of air strikes (or actual
air strikes, of the most limited kind), a tactical Serbian
withdrawal, more talks aimed at persuading the warring
parties to accept a carving up of territory that rewards
aggression. Then the Serbs move on to yet another Bosnian
community, applying the same mixture of violence and
intimidation to secure their aim of an ethnically pure
Greater Serbia.
The tragedy of Gorazde may for now at least be over. But
there are other towns of equal strategic interest on which
the Serbs are now free to concentrate their forces. Yesterday
the U.N. intervened to head off a Serbian attempt to expand
the Brcko corridor in northern Bosnia, but such interventions
merely divert Serbian aggression. It is time to halt it--
late, but not too late. We have the justification, the
interest and the means.
A sovereign state, recognized by the world community, is
under attack from forces encouraged and supplied by another
power. This is not a civil war but a war of aggression,
planned and launched from outside Bosnia though using the
Serbian minority within it. The principle of self-defense
precedes and underlies the United Nations Charter. The
legitimate Government of Bosnia has every right to call upon
our assistance in defending its territory. That is ample
justification for helping the victims of aggression.
And both the United States and Europe have real and
important strategic interests in Bosnia. Let me note four of
them.
First, after all that the West, NATO and the U.N. have now
said, the credibility of our international stance on every
security issue from nuclear nonproliferation to the Middle
East is now at stake.
Second, would-be aggressors are waiting to see how we deal
with the Serbs. Our weakness in the Balkans would have
dangerous and unpredictable consequences in the former Soviet
Union, which has Slavic nationalist forces that closely
parallel those of Greater Serbianism. And throughout Eastern
and Central Europe there are minorities that aggressive
mother-states might be tempted to manipulate to provoke
conflict, if that is allowed to pay in the case of Serbia.
Third, Serbia's own ambitions are by no means necessarily
limited to Croatia and Bosnia. Kosovo is a powder keg.
Macedonia is fragile. Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Albania and
Turkey all have strong interests that could drag them into a
new Balkan war if Serbian expansion and oppression continue
unchecked.
Fourth, the floods of refugees that would cross Europe--
particularly in the event of such a wider conflict--would
further inflame extremist tendencies and undermine the
stability of Western governments.
The West has the means--the technology and the weapons--to
change the balance of military advantage against the
aggressor in Bosnia. Since the beginning of the Serbian war
of aggression, which began in the summer of 1991 in Slovenia,
intensified in Croatia and is now consuming Bosnia, I have
opposed the sending of ground troops to the former
Yugoslavia. But I have said that humanitarian aid without a
military response is a misguided policy. Feeding or
evacuating the victims rather than helping them resist
aggression makes us accomplices as much as good Samaritans.
So I have consistently called for action of two sorts: the
launching of air strikes against Serb forces, communications
centers and ammunition dumps; and the lifting of the arms
embargo on Bosnia and Croatia so that the Muslims and Croats
can defend themselves on more equal terms against the Serbs,
who inherited the massive armaments of the Yugoslavian Army.
If such a policy had been pursued when I first proposed it
on this page in the summer of 1991, at a time when Sarajevo
and Gorazde were under serious assault, thousands of people
would now be alive and in all probability the Milosevic
regime in Belgrade would have fallen. Because this approach
was not adopted, we now find ourselves in a far more complex
and dangerous situation: trying to defend almost indefensible
safe havens; maintaining a facade of neutrality when all our
decisions are based on the knowledge that the Serbs are the
threat, and with a large contingent of U.N. personnel whom
the Serbs may choose to use as hostages.
The new joint effort by Russia and the West to persuade the
Serbs to settle for 49 percent of Bosnian territory (down
from the 72 percent they have now occupied) is hardly less
rife with dangers. The Serbs will almost certainly not
withdraw, and once the guns are quiet the Russians may not
wish them to do so--nor may the West be prepared to revive
the threat of bombing to force them. Even if they were to
withdraw, their 49 percent of Bosnia would still represent a
reward for aggression. And in either event, the ensuing peace
would be an unjust and fragile one requiring a large
contingent of Western (including U.S.) ground troops to
enforce it on the victims. If hostilities resume, as is all
too likely, these troops would become the target for attack.
So the formula of air strikes and lifting the arms embargo
is still the right one to apply. NATO already has the mandate
from the U.N. Security Council not just to defend U.N.
personnel but to deter attacks on the safe havens. This
mandate gives full authority for the requisite launching of
repeated large-scale air strikes against Serb military
targets wherever these may prove effective. It is a matter
for consideration whether strikes should go into Serbia
itself.
Air strikes are effective, as long as they are not on a
small scale, hedged with political hesitations and
qualifications. They can inflict severe and ultimately
unsustainable damage. But they have to be part of a clear
strategy to shift the advantage against the aggressor. The
Serbs must know that they will be carried out with swiftness
and determination. Nor may Russian objections be allowed to
stand in their way. If the Russians are prepared to support
such action, all well and good. But NATO cannot have its
policies entirely shaped by Russian sensibilities.
Lifting the arms embargo, as Senators Bob Dole and Joseph
Biden have courageously proposed (the Senate is to take up
the resolution tomorrow), is also crucial. That embargo was
imposed before Bosnia and Croatia were internationally
recognized, and its legal standing is at least questionable.
The U.S., Britain and France--or if necessary, the U.S.
acting alone--should formally state that they do not intend
to continue with it.
Such statements might also be supported by a resolution of
the U.S. General Assembly. The confederation between Bosnia
and Croatia, so skillfully brokered by the United States, now
means that supplies of arms will be used against the common
aggressor, not against each other, and that they can easily
be shipped in through Croatia. A well-armed Muslim-Croatian
alliance would confront the Serbs with a quite new and
unwelcome challenge. It might even prompt the Serbs to
settle.
I do not claim that this approach is without dangers. It
would require diplomatic and military skills of a high order.
It is unlikely to bring immediate peace--though it might.
Some disruption of the aid effort is inevitable. But what the
people of Bosnia now need is a permanent peace that allows
them to return to their homes and live without fear. What the
West needs is to restore its reputation and secure its
interests, This is the only way those aims can be realized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Chair if there is
a time that is part of the unanimous-consent agreement.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is an order, and under the order the
Senate will recess at the hour of 12 o'clock noon until 2:30 p.m.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield the floor. I thank the Chair.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to voice my support for the Dole-
Lieberman measure to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, of which I
am a cosponsor, and my opposition to diminishing the full force of its
language.
Mr. President, we continue to have before us in Bosnia a grievous and
tragic situation. For the past couple of years, we have repeatedly seen
temporary resurgences of hope dashed by returns to brutality and
slaughter.
All of us who would criticize the handling of this crisis must
acknowledge that the situation there does not admit of easy solutions.
The mistakes made were not made in the course of passing up options of
obvious preference. There are none.
When we review the policy choices that have been available to us, we
see that they all pose their dangers, and risks of failure. There is of
course the negotiating track. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen shouldered that
burden in good faith, but there was no question but that negotiations
were doomed to be fruitless to the extent that the military situation
rarely encouraged all of the warring parties to agree to a fair
settlement.
At one extreme was the option of declaring the Serbs to be the
aggressors, and either unilaterally or with such allies as would follow
us, shedding the mantle of peace-broker and becoming full participants
in the conflict. I think my colleagues would agree with me that the
American people would not have been willing to become so fully engaged.
At the other extreme was the option of simply turning away and
abandoning Bosnia to its fate. There are some who would advocate
precisely that, but most of us would have found this to be morally
intolerable.
Faced with unacceptable options at both ends of the spectrum, we have
tried to steer a middle course. We have tried to retain a perception of
our neutrality that will allow us to deliver relief unmolested. And we
have applied military force on occasion, chiefly through the air, to
address specific violations of cease fires and U.N. safe havens.
This policy has not produced peace, except on a local and sporadic
basis. We have found that threats of air strikes may deter a specific
assault in one place, but that too often we merely see a displacement
of the aggression into another region.
We should not be surprised by this. We have made bold references to
the international will and the international conscience, and crowed
loudly about what we will not tolerate. But our actions, in the form of
our reliance on military half-measures, show that our will is lacking,
a fact that is not lost on Serb militia, who make their calculations
accordingly.
We should not pretend that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia is
a substitute for a properly coordinated international policy. But at
the very least we would by this action permit the people of Bosnia to
be less completely at the mercy of our failure to develop a solution.
If the West had determined how it was to save Bosnia, I would not be
here arguing for a lifting of the arms embargo. It would not be
necessary. But if we will not defend Bosnia, then Bosnians must be
permitted to do so.
The facts are stark. The international community dithers,
deliberates, and dawdles. The Bosnian Serbs have enjoyed access to
equipment that once was the property of the Yugoslav Federal Army. We
have been resolute only in denying arms to those who have too often
been the victims of military aggression. I do not excuse the atrocities
that have been committed by Croats and Muslims any more than those
committed by Serbs--but there is no doubt that many of the latter were
made possible because the victims were too often defenseless.
I understand and appreciate the sentiment that we should not take so
bold a step without the approval of our European allies. I would say to
my colleagues that in this matter we have allowed our actions to be too
much guided by a rigorous insistence on multinational agreement. It has
become a prescription for doing nothing. The Western nations, with all
their power and might, have shown themselves less willing to enforce
their will than the Serbs, simply because the Serbs, unlike the West,
have been able to effectively translate desire into action. This is the
danger of multilateral processes. It is why Congresses do not command
Armed Forces. It is hard to get several independent voices to sing from
the same songsheet.
So I am not overly troubled if we do not allow other nations to veto
this action. We are not sending Americans to fight in Bosnia if we pass
this measure. We are merely permitting Bosnians to defend themselves.
Surely we ought to be able to accomplish this without again retreating
to the passivity that has thus far characterized our behavior.
____________________