[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 55 (Monday, May 9, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, as the world focuses on the continuing
tragedy in Bosnia, we should not forget the importance of events
elsewhere in the world. My distinguished colleague from Kentucky, Mitch
McConnell, recently spoke on United States-Russian relations. Senator
McConnell, the ranking member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, is one of our leading voices on foreign policy--
especially on relations with Russia. I guess that is why the New York
Times and Washington Post accuse him of being a bear-baiter and a cold
warrior.
As Senator McConnell's speech makes clear, there is certainly an
alternative to the ``Russia first policy followed by the United States
under the direction of Strobe Talbott. Senator McConnell's speech lays
out a number of specific proposals for reshaping our policies--a new
focus for assistance, moving beyond Moscow, opposing Russian
imperialism. I was impressed by Senator McConnell's analysis, and by
his recommendations.
I urge my colleagues, and those responsible for foreign policy in
this administration, to review Senator McConnell's remarks and ask
unanimous consent that his speech be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Harvard-Columbia Arden House Conference on American-Soviet
Relations, Apr. 16, 1994]
Commitment--Not Capitulation
(By Senator Mitch McConnell)
INTRODUCTION
A funny thing happened to me on the way to give this
speech: I was mugged by the New York Times. You may have seen
it, two days ago, where the Times criticized my recent
statements on Russia policy, characterizing them as ``bear-
baiting,'' ``confrontational,'' and ``thinking in cold war
categories.''
Of course, in my line of work, the only thing worse than
being pilloried is being ignored, so I took some comfort in
reading about myself in the Times--especially since I had
some rather illustrious company: the editorial lumped my
views together with those of former National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has played a major role in the
development of this program.
But, there was another reason why I am pleased by the New
York Times editorial, because it affirmed that there is more
than one point of view when it comes to U.S. policy toward
the New Independent States. There is, in fact, a wide-ranging
debate going on about how we should deal with this part of
the world; and I believe that serious discussion of these
divergent viewpoints is healthy for our foreign policy.
With that in mind, I welcome the opportunity to share with
you my view of the situation in the former Soviet states, and
the proper course this country should take in response.
First, I would like to review the remarkable changes and
current trends; then focus on the Administration's priorities
and policies; and finally, make some recommendations on how
we must correct our course if the U.S. is to play a
constructive role in advancing common interest in regional
stability and the prospects for political liberty and
economic prosperity.
the changing landscape
Although there is a common chord which resonates through
the changes occurring in all fifteen republics, I want to
focus attention on Russia. For all of us, it has been
convenient to refer to the dramatic events of the last half-
decade in broad, sweeping terms. We speak of the collapse of
communism, the birth of democracy, and the triumph of free-
market capitalism. We are comfortable pigeon-holing complex
trends with buzz-words like ``glasnost'' and ``perestroika.''
But if our policy in the region is to be effective, we must
realize that there are three very distinct transitions
underway: one political, one economic, and one relating to
Russia's definition of her security.
The Russian people, no longer dominated by a totalitarian
dictatorship, have had the opportunity to elect their
President and Parliament. Nevertheless, elections in and of
themselves are no guarantee of basic individual liberties or
political freedom, both essential to the endurance of a
democracy. Further, it remains to be seen whether hopes for
democracy will be corrupted by chauvinism--or undermined by
ethnic nationalism, failed political leadership, or lack of
consensus on the principles of good government. While
President Yeltsin and his ministers express concern about the
status of Russian minorities abroad, the real test of their
commitment to democracy and civil rights is their willingness
to protect religious and ethnic minorities at home.
Zhirinovsky has been spreading a lethal strain of anti-
semitism--and it remains to be seen whether Russia as a
nation will embrace or repudiate those views.
Russia's economic transition presents an even murkier
picture. Beginning with Gorbachev, the Russian political
leadership has declared its desire to relax the controls of a
state-planned economy. But while free markets, private
enterprise and open trade are very much part of the public
lexicon, they remain as goals rather than functional reality.
Corruption, government subsidies, organized crime, the
absence of a rational commercial code, and limited banking
facilities all dampen the prospects for a flourishing free
market.
The third uncertain transition can best be described as
Russia's own sense of itself. An inchoate identity emerged as
early as February 1993, when President Yeltsin called upon
the U.N. and other international organizations ``to grant
Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and security in
the regions of the USSR.'' Variations on this theme have been
enunciated by a number of senior officials, but most clearly
by Foreign Minister Kozyrev when he addressed the U.N.
General Assembly last fall. His explication of Russia's
rights in the so-called ``near abroad'' unquivocally signaled
the subordination of the territorial integrity and political
independence of the regional republics to Russian interests.
Here again, I believe the transition is in flux, with the
prospects for regional stability hanging in the balance.
the u.s. response
So far, I have emphasized that the changes we have seen in
Russia are far from being settled or complete. This dynamic
state of play raises two obvious questions. First, should the
U.S. commit its political and economic resources to obtain
the most positive outcome on each transition track? And
second, if the answer to the first question is yes, then how?
As the Senate Republican manager of the 1994 foreign
operations appropriations bill, which included President
Clinton's request for $2.5 billion in aid to NIS, I have
given my preliminary, affirmative answer to the first
question. We can and we should make a serious commitment to
promote free markets, democracy and respect for national
sovereignty. As former President Richard Nixon has pointed
out, ``Russia is the only nation in the world which can
destroy the United States. Therefore, Russia remains our
highest foreign policy priority.''
Although the nuclear nightmare could stand alone as
justification for active engagement, I believe it serves a
number of interests to open Russian markets and minds to the
virtues of our 208-year-old experiment.
At the same time, I must part company with this
Administration in answering the second question of how we
should proceed. As the architect of the President's Russia
policy. Strobe Talbott has advocated a point of view which is
notable only for its unrelenting consistency, regardless of
the facts. For more than twenty years, Mr. Talbott has
advanced the notion that a reform-minded, moderate corps of
political leaders are the guardians of democratic, free-
market hopes. Presently, Boris Yeltsin stands at the top of
this political pyramid, and has become the symbol of success
for Russian-American policy. The Administration is bound by
the notion that any criticism of Yeltsin or his policies
fuels dangerous hard-line fires. I have diagnosed this
syndrome as ``Moscow myopia.''
Unfortunately, the harmful consequences of this myopia are
fairly evident on all three transition tracks. Let me review
the problems I see, and on each track outline some
constructive alternatives.
supporting principles vs. personalities
First of all, it was obvious that the Administration was
caught off-guard by the results of Russia's November
elections. In a series of contradictory and confusing
statements, Administration officials characterized the
results--especially Zhirinovsky's ascendancy, as an
inconsequential protest vote, an indication that we ought to
``go slow'' on reform, and evidence that we are on the right
course. Nevertheless, the President and his advisors seemed
to realize that something was happening which they had not
anticipated. Even though the Administration still seems
obliged to apologize to Yeltsin's erratic performance, the
November elections were a useful wake-up call for everyone.
Further, it's becoming clearer every day that Boris Yeltsin
is not the only Russian leader who both has a following at
home and is friendly to the United States. Just as Boris
Yeltsin came on the scene as a relative unknown, dozens of
other capable Russians are emerging who have political vision
and leadership potential.
Some, like Nikolai Travkin and Gregory Yavlinsky--who spoke
here yesterday--have expressed presidential ambitions. Recent
history provides ample evidence that there is no shortage of
charismatic figures--both good and bad--who can capture
popular political attention.
If only for that reason alone, it seems obvious to me that
we must extend our official reach beyond Moscow circles. We
also must continue to support programs that train
parliamentarians in constitutional and legislative processes.
We have increased funding for such programs--as well as for
efforts to develop grassroots organizations that give
citizens a voice on issues as far ranging as education and
health care. Building participatory political institutions
increases the prospects for democracy's survival.
promoting economic growth
On the other hands, our traditional economic assistance to
Russia continues to suffer acutely from Moscow myopia.
Although the Administration has emphasized that 75% of our
aid flows through non-government spigots, the troubling fact
is the largest single commitment of U.S. resources has been
to high-priced American consultants involved in the mass
privatization voucher program based on Moscow.
So far, privatization has merely involved a transfer of
ownership of assets. Since they cannot produce statistics on
how many of these privatized concerns are still viable,
Administration witnesses concede that most of them continue
to be subsidized by the state. In a harsh inflationary
economy, the higher unemployment which might be triggered by
eliminating these subsidies is a risk which the Russian
government has been understandably unwilling to take.
Private enterprise also has been frustrated by a weak
regulatory infrastructure to protect investments, trade and
commercial transactions. To date, U.S. policy has emphasized
transfer of ownership without adequate attention to the
commercial setting in which business is attempting to
function.
If we are to assist the transition from communism to
capitalism, our aid program must change. It is my view the
Administration must accept the premise that the private
sector will be largely responsible for the pace and scope of
economic change. No amount of grants or loans from the U.S.
or international institutions can independently keep Russia
afloat. To invest, create jobs, and expand growth, the
business community must have confidence in the commercial
environment, including fair tax treatment, timely payment for
services, and respect for contractual obligations.
The conference report on foreign operations last year
recommended that our assistance be made conditional on such
key assurances. This year, I think we should make certain
that these conditions have been met and take further steps to
promote economic growth.
Specifically, I believe U.S. assistance must target three
areas. First, we should help draft a national tax and
commercial code which encourages private enterprise. Yes, I
am suggesting we send Russia more lawyers. After all, it's
basic economic rule that when you have a surplus of
something, you should export it.
Seriously, though, let me give you just one example of how
urgent this need is: I recently learned that an American
company's $116 million investment was in jeopardy because the
Russian tax code was changing on a monthly basis, local taxes
consumed a fifth of its revenues, the company was required to
convert half of its dollars to rubles, it paid a separate tax
on any profit, a 28% value-added tax and a 60% corporate
income tax. That ought to put in perspective the anguish we
all felt yesterday!
In connection with making Russia's tax and commercial laws
more palatable to private enterprise, we should help the
government strengthen its enforcement system. Good laws mean
nothing in the absence of a viable, independent judicial
system.
Second, we should assist in the development of independent
and stable financial institutions, including banks and credit
unions. Obviously, this issue is tied up with macroeconomic
issues like currency stabilization and monetary policy.
Nevertheless, we should be laying a foundation to help
businesspeople who complain that they have to carry suitcases
full of cash because there are no facilities to secure
deposits.
Third, our development aid should be coordinated with major
private equity investments to maximize our impact on the
growth of free enterprise and the quality of life of average
citizens. Let me describe how this would work. Let's assume
an oil company has agreed to a major investment in Western
Siberia. In most rural areas there are serious inadequacies
in transportation, water and food supply, social services,
education, and housing. An impoverished infrastructure, in
turn, dampens a community's productivity and prospects for
revenue generation.
I propose that the Agency for International Development
should work side-by-side initially with the top ten U.S.
corporations with major equity investments. A.I.D. would
assume a three- to five-year diminishing investment in a
community's infrastructure, with the aid curve declining as
expectations of corporate production and local revenue grow.
In other words, as a community prospers, it would
``graduate'' from U.S. aid.
We are all aware of the growing anti-American sentiment
rippling through Russian society. To some extent, this a
reaction of disappointed expectations: when the press
reported we would deliver $2.5 billion, many in Russia
wondered when their personal check from Uncle Sam would
arrive in the mail. But simmering anti-Americanism is also a
reaction to intolerably difficult living conditions. I am not
sure there is misery index adequate to express what it must
be like to live in a country where half the water is
undrinkable and 75 percent of the average Moscow family's
income is spent on food. It's my hope that the joint ventures
we intend to create between A.I.D. and the private sector
would go a long way toward improving the Russian quality of
life, as well as Russian perceptions about the value of
American aid.
One final concern about our economic aid program has been
the Administration's Russia-first bias. Of the $2.5 billion
in aid appropriated last year, just over $1 billion has been
committed to projects, though not actually disbursed. Despite
legislative recommendation that at least a third of the $2.5
billion be spent in the fourteen other republics--and a
requirement that not less than $300 million be made available
to Ukraine--virtually all of the $1 billion has been
committed to activities in Russia alone.
When it comes time to slice the foreign aid pie next year,
I will insist that we meet our legislative commitments to the
fourteen other republics. Not only can we have an immediate,
meaningful effect in nations with smaller populations and
economies, but such a shift is essential to demonstrate our
commitment and further our interests in the region.
u.s. response to russian foreign policy
Money is not the only issue, however. Russia has enjoyed
first place not only in our apportionment of foreign aid, but
also in our acquiescence to Russia's ever-expanding
definition of its national interest in the region. As I
mentioned earlier, Russian leaders began to reclaim
superpower status a year ago. Two factors have framed and
expanded these designs.
First, a complex amalgam of history, national pride,
economic hardship--and legitimate concern about ethnic
Russians who have been suddenly exiled by a redefinition of
borders--have enabled some leaders--most notably
Zhirinovosky--to twist nostalgia for security into spirited
neo-imperialism. Although this strain of malignant
nationalism has attracted some support, it is still
relatively shallow. Steady economic growth is the best cure
for this particular political virus.
But there is a second, potentially more troubling factor
which is fueling Russia's expansionist rhetoric and policy.
During the February ``Group of Seven'' meeting, Economic
Minister Alexander Shokin drew attention to Russia's recent
diplomatic efforts in Sarajevo. He argued that Russia's
superpower status should be the decisive factor in according
Russia equal treatment and membership in the G-7. While
acknowledging the need for economic reforms, Shokin was
clearly leveraging Russia's security role to buy economic
status.
This purposeful linkage between security and economic
status was echoed twice this week. Presidential spokesman
Kostikov told journalists that joining the Partnership for
Peace should be tied to Russian acceptance in the G-7. On
Wednesday, President Yeltsin himself indicated that Russia
may not join the Partnership, partly because of ruffled
feathers over consultation on the Bosnian air strikes. But,
he also linked the Partnership question to access to Western
markets, and complained about ``discrimination.''
The fact that Russia is apparently leveraging its nuclear
status for economic advantage should be considered in the
context of the Clinton Administration's accommodationist
policy toward Moscow.
For the past year, the U.S. has taken a course of
overbearing regard for Russian sensitivity about its security
position. We overlooked direct Russian military support for
Abkhazi rebels, effectively destabilizing Georgia. During
that time, President Shevardnadze wrote me with an urgent
plea for help. He had earlier asked the Administration to
intervene, urging President Clinton to salvage hope for
democracy in Georgia by pressing Russia to cease and desist.
While the Administration chose to ignore him, I offered an
amendment to the foreign operations bill linking U.S. aid to
the recipient country's respect for national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. My amendment passed--despite the
Administration's objections that it would offend Moscow.
When Shevardnanze came to see me last month, we discussed
where we needed to go from here. He shared my concerns about
Russia's aggressive role in the region and our government's
deferential response. Let me give you a few more examples.
When we had the opportunity to expand NATO's security
umbrella by welcoming the admission of former Warsaw Pact
nations, the Administration deliberately punted, citing
concerns about the ascendancy of reactionary forces in the
Russian Parliament. Instead, President Clinton came up with
the Partnership for Peace--or, as I call it, ``NATO-Lite.''
As a result, we missed a major opportunity to establish peace
and security in Eastern Europe on our terms, and we once
again allowed Moscow to effectively shape our foreign policy.
Another example: we took no umbrage at Russia's
intentional, crippling withholding of energy to Ukraine; in
fact, we collaborated with Moscow by insisting that U.S. aid
was exclusively linked to Ukraine's turning over its nuclear
weapons More recently, when asked if it was reasonable for
the Russians to link troop withdrawal from the Baltics to the
status of Russian minorities, Secretary Christopher's reply
was astonishing: the Russians' concern was ``understandable
and legitimate,'' and they should be treated with
``generosity.''
As Russia turns up its neo-imperialist rhetoric, the
Clinton Administration's acquiescence is both disappointing
and destabilizing. Our failure to challenge Russian regional
ambitions only heightens the anxiety in the Baltics, the new
republics and all of Europe, which in turn aggravates ethnic
and national tensions.
Moreover, the lack of any predictability to Russia's
exercise of its special status could compromise our interests
beyond the European theater. No one was more surprised than
Prime Minister Rabin when Foreign Minister Kozyrev arrived in
Israel, unplanned and unannounced, to promote the PLO
negotiations.
Yet the Administration has obstinately refused to challenge
Russia's growing hubris or to decouple the three policy
tracks, fearing that any perceptible shift would weaken
Yeltsin and his like-minded reformers. Any change in policy
could cause us to lose Russia altogether, they claim.
However, this argument blurs the line between Russia's
legitimate interest in political and economic reforms--which
merit our support--and emerging neo-imperial goals which
clearly do not. We have incorrectly linked Yeltsin's survival
to giving him free regional rein and nothing less than
unconditional political and economic support.
The record over the past year suggests that appeasement may
only strengthen the hand of extremists, exacting further
concessions from Yeltsin and jeopardizing the course of
reform. I have said before, as has Henry Kissinger and
others, that it is not the drawing the bright lines that
provokes and inflames nationalism, it is ambiguity about our
principles and commitments that invites extremists to test
the limits of our interests and our resolve.
For that reason, I believe it is extremely important that
our policy in the New Independent States place a premium on
the territorial integrity and economic and political
sovereignty of each the new democracies. That is why I
recently amended the Budget Resolution to include language
expressing U.S. opposition to Russia's efforts to establish a
sphere of influence in Europe through economic coercion,
political intimidation, or force. In both Eastern and Central
Europe, I believe independence is the key to stability, and
therefore to our own interests in the region.
securing american interests
Now, to answer the question that Shevardnadze and I
discussed last month: where do we go from here?
First, we should expand NATO to include the Visegrad
nations. Now, I am enough of a realist to know that this is
unlikely to happen soon. In the interim, a common framework
agreement should be developed so that all nations understand
precisely what is expected of them in order to join. The
agreement should specify not only the type and frequency of
joint military activities, but also NATO's political
expectations such as the submission of transparent defense
budgets and civilian control of the armed services. At
present, the Administration has encouraged each nation to
negotiate separate agreements for participation. This
piecemeal approach will only lead to confusion, competition,
and friction down the road.
Second, to bridge the gap between NATO and the current
military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact nations and the new
republics, we should substantially expand our military
education and training programs, known as IMET. Training
should include exposure to our traditions of professionalism,
as well as more technical education in areas such as military
planning, command and control, and equipment maintenance and
operations. I found it interesting that the Administration is
planning to give Georgia only $75,000 in IMET--a nation where
we have vital strategic interests--compared with $100,000 in
IMET for Benin, where I am somewhat unclear of our mission.
Third, once countries are committed to the Partnership, we
can being to establish eligibility standards for obtaining
NATO excess defense articles, and equipment ``cascaded'' as a
result of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty. Obviously,
this does not mean that we begin by providing F-16s to
Bulgaria, but there are prudent ways to proceed. Let me cite
one example. Currently, Germany possesses millions of rounds
of Soviet-style weapons ammunition, stored in former East
German warehouses. The nation of Latvia, whose army carries
Soviet-made firearms, is issuing its soldiers just five
rounds of ammunition monthly for training purposes. There
ought to be some kind of clearinghouse or other mechanism for
the coordinated--and controlled--transfer of useful supplies.
I recently met with Poland's Minister of Defense, who
mentioned the need for standardizing communications systems
if the Partnership is truly going to work. I'm sure there are
a number of other areas where we could transfer equipment to
bolster both confidence and coordination.
Each of these security initiatives represents an
opportunity to enhance stability and cooperation in Europe
and the NIS. Obviously, they depend upon recognition of the
fact that the U.S. can pursue its security interests parallel
with the promotion of economic and political progress in
Russia. The tracks should be separate, but they are certainly
not mutually exclusive.
For the past year, U.S. foreign policy and funding
priorities have focused exclusively on Russia and
unconditional support for Yeltsin's government. This approach
has at least temporarily forfeited economic and political
opportunities in the fourteen other nations of the NIS. Our
failure to challenge Russia's regional ambitions has
contributed to instability from Crimea to the Baltics. And we
have poorly served our interest in European stability by
giving Moscow a veto over NATO participation.
Russia needs and deserves our political and economic help.
The vast changes that are continuing to reverberate through
Russia and the rest of the NIS clearly require a flexible
approach. But, helping to improve prospects for democracy and
prosperity should not be at the expense of American concern
for regional stability and security. In international
affairs, our interests are clear, our resolve must be firm,
and our cooperation should be conditional.
____________________