[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 55 (Monday, May 9, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                    UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, as the world focuses on the continuing 
tragedy in Bosnia, we should not forget the importance of events 
elsewhere in the world. My distinguished colleague from Kentucky, Mitch 
McConnell, recently spoke on United States-Russian relations. Senator 
McConnell, the ranking member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations, is one of our leading voices on foreign policy--
especially on relations with Russia. I guess that is why the New York 
Times and Washington Post accuse him of being a bear-baiter and a cold 
warrior.
  As Senator McConnell's speech makes clear, there is certainly an 
alternative to the ``Russia first policy followed by the United States 
under the direction of Strobe Talbott. Senator McConnell's speech lays 
out a number of specific proposals for reshaping our policies--a new 
focus for assistance, moving beyond Moscow, opposing Russian 
imperialism. I was impressed by Senator McConnell's analysis, and by 
his recommendations.
  I urge my colleagues, and those responsible for foreign policy in 
this administration, to review Senator McConnell's remarks and ask 
unanimous consent that his speech be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 [From the Harvard-Columbia Arden House Conference on American-Soviet 
                       Relations, Apr. 16, 1994]

                      Commitment--Not Capitulation

                      (By Senator Mitch McConnell)


                              INTRODUCTION

       A funny thing happened to me on the way to give this 
     speech: I was mugged by the New York Times. You may have seen 
     it, two days ago, where the Times criticized my recent 
     statements on Russia policy, characterizing them as ``bear-
     baiting,'' ``confrontational,'' and ``thinking in cold war 
     categories.''
       Of course, in my line of work, the only thing worse than 
     being pilloried is being ignored, so I took some comfort in 
     reading about myself in the Times--especially since I had 
     some rather illustrious company: the editorial lumped my 
     views together with those of former National Security Advisor 
     Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has played a major role in the 
     development of this program.
       But, there was another reason why I am pleased by the New 
     York Times editorial, because it affirmed that there is more 
     than one point of view when it comes to U.S. policy toward 
     the New Independent States. There is, in fact, a wide-ranging 
     debate going on about how we should deal with this part of 
     the world; and I believe that serious discussion of these 
     divergent viewpoints is healthy for our foreign policy.
       With that in mind, I welcome the opportunity to share with 
     you my view of the situation in the former Soviet states, and 
     the proper course this country should take in response. 
     First, I would like to review the remarkable changes and 
     current trends; then focus on the Administration's priorities 
     and policies; and finally, make some recommendations on how 
     we must correct our course if the U.S. is to play a 
     constructive role in advancing common interest in regional 
     stability and the prospects for political liberty and 
     economic prosperity.


                         the changing landscape

       Although there is a common chord which resonates through 
     the changes occurring in all fifteen republics, I want to 
     focus attention on Russia. For all of us, it has been 
     convenient to refer to the dramatic events of the last half-
     decade in broad, sweeping terms. We speak of the collapse of 
     communism, the birth of democracy, and the triumph of free-
     market capitalism. We are comfortable pigeon-holing complex 
     trends with buzz-words like ``glasnost'' and ``perestroika.'' 
     But if our policy in the region is to be effective, we must 
     realize that there are three very distinct transitions 
     underway: one political, one economic, and one relating to 
     Russia's definition of her security.
       The Russian people, no longer dominated by a totalitarian 
     dictatorship, have had the opportunity to elect their 
     President and Parliament. Nevertheless, elections in and of 
     themselves are no guarantee of basic individual liberties or 
     political freedom, both essential to the endurance of a 
     democracy. Further, it remains to be seen whether hopes for 
     democracy will be corrupted by chauvinism--or undermined by 
     ethnic nationalism, failed political leadership, or lack of 
     consensus on the principles of good government. While 
     President Yeltsin and his ministers express concern about the 
     status of Russian minorities abroad, the real test of their 
     commitment to democracy and civil rights is their willingness 
     to protect religious and ethnic minorities at home. 
     Zhirinovsky has been spreading a lethal strain of anti-
     semitism--and it remains to be seen whether Russia as a 
     nation will embrace or repudiate those views.
       Russia's economic transition presents an even murkier 
     picture. Beginning with Gorbachev, the Russian political 
     leadership has declared its desire to relax the controls of a 
     state-planned economy. But while free markets, private 
     enterprise and open trade are very much part of the public 
     lexicon, they remain as goals rather than functional reality. 
     Corruption, government subsidies, organized crime, the 
     absence of a rational commercial code, and limited banking 
     facilities all dampen the prospects for a flourishing free 
     market.
       The third uncertain transition can best be described as 
     Russia's own sense of itself. An inchoate identity emerged as 
     early as February 1993, when President Yeltsin called upon 
     the U.N. and other international organizations ``to grant 
     Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and security in 
     the regions of the USSR.'' Variations on this theme have been 
     enunciated by a number of senior officials, but most clearly 
     by Foreign Minister Kozyrev when he addressed the U.N. 
     General Assembly last fall. His explication of Russia's 
     rights in the so-called ``near abroad'' unquivocally signaled 
     the subordination of the territorial integrity and political 
     independence of the regional republics to Russian interests. 
     Here again, I believe the transition is in flux, with the 
     prospects for regional stability hanging in the balance.


                           the u.s. response

       So far, I have emphasized that the changes we have seen in 
     Russia are far from being settled or complete. This dynamic 
     state of play raises two obvious questions. First, should the 
     U.S. commit its political and economic resources to obtain 
     the most positive outcome on each transition track? And 
     second, if the answer to the first question is yes, then how?
       As the Senate Republican manager of the 1994 foreign 
     operations appropriations bill, which included President 
     Clinton's request for $2.5 billion in aid to NIS, I have 
     given my preliminary, affirmative answer to the first 
     question. We can and we should make a serious commitment to 
     promote free markets, democracy and respect for national 
     sovereignty. As former President Richard Nixon has pointed 
     out, ``Russia is the only nation in the world which can 
     destroy the United States. Therefore, Russia remains our 
     highest foreign policy priority.''
       Although the nuclear nightmare could stand alone as 
     justification for active engagement, I believe it serves a 
     number of interests to open Russian markets and minds to the 
     virtues of our 208-year-old experiment.
       At the same time, I must part company with this 
     Administration in answering the second question of how we 
     should proceed. As the architect of the President's Russia 
     policy. Strobe Talbott has advocated a point of view which is 
     notable only for its unrelenting consistency, regardless of 
     the facts. For more than twenty years, Mr. Talbott has 
     advanced the notion that a reform-minded, moderate corps of 
     political leaders are the guardians of democratic, free-
     market hopes. Presently, Boris Yeltsin stands at the top of 
     this political pyramid, and has become the symbol of success 
     for Russian-American policy. The Administration is bound by 
     the notion that any criticism of Yeltsin or his policies 
     fuels dangerous hard-line fires. I have diagnosed this 
     syndrome as ``Moscow myopia.''
       Unfortunately, the harmful consequences of this myopia are 
     fairly evident on all three transition tracks. Let me review 
     the problems I see, and on each track outline some 
     constructive alternatives.


                supporting principles vs. personalities

       First of all, it was obvious that the Administration was 
     caught off-guard by the results of Russia's November 
     elections. In a series of contradictory and confusing 
     statements, Administration officials characterized the 
     results--especially Zhirinovsky's ascendancy, as an 
     inconsequential protest vote, an indication that we ought to 
     ``go slow'' on reform, and evidence that we are on the right 
     course. Nevertheless, the President and his advisors seemed 
     to realize that something was happening which they had not 
     anticipated. Even though the Administration still seems 
     obliged to apologize to Yeltsin's erratic performance, the 
     November elections were a useful wake-up call for everyone.
       Further, it's becoming clearer every day that Boris Yeltsin 
     is not the only Russian leader who both has a following at 
     home and is friendly to the United States. Just as Boris 
     Yeltsin came on the scene as a relative unknown, dozens of 
     other capable Russians are emerging who have political vision 
     and leadership potential.
       Some, like Nikolai Travkin and Gregory Yavlinsky--who spoke 
     here yesterday--have expressed presidential ambitions. Recent 
     history provides ample evidence that there is no shortage of 
     charismatic figures--both good and bad--who can capture 
     popular political attention.
       If only for that reason alone, it seems obvious to me that 
     we must extend our official reach beyond Moscow circles. We 
     also must continue to support programs that train 
     parliamentarians in constitutional and legislative processes. 
     We have increased funding for such programs--as well as for 
     efforts to develop grassroots organizations that give 
     citizens a voice on issues as far ranging as education and 
     health care. Building participatory political institutions 
     increases the prospects for democracy's survival.


                       promoting economic growth

       On the other hands, our traditional economic assistance to 
     Russia continues to suffer acutely from Moscow myopia. 
     Although the Administration has emphasized that 75% of our 
     aid flows through non-government spigots, the troubling fact 
     is the largest single commitment of U.S. resources has been 
     to high-priced American consultants involved in the mass 
     privatization voucher program based on Moscow.
       So far, privatization has merely involved a transfer of 
     ownership of assets. Since they cannot produce statistics on 
     how many of these privatized concerns are still viable, 
     Administration witnesses concede that most of them continue 
     to be subsidized by the state. In a harsh inflationary 
     economy, the higher unemployment which might be triggered by 
     eliminating these subsidies is a risk which the Russian 
     government has been understandably unwilling to take.
       Private enterprise also has been frustrated by a weak 
     regulatory infrastructure to protect investments, trade and 
     commercial transactions. To date, U.S. policy has emphasized 
     transfer of ownership without adequate attention to the 
     commercial setting in which business is attempting to 
     function.
       If we are to assist the transition from communism to 
     capitalism, our aid program must change. It is my view the 
     Administration must accept the premise that the private 
     sector will be largely responsible for the pace and scope of 
     economic change. No amount of grants or loans from the U.S. 
     or international institutions can independently keep Russia 
     afloat. To invest, create jobs, and expand growth, the 
     business community must have confidence in the commercial 
     environment, including fair tax treatment, timely payment for 
     services, and respect for contractual obligations.
       The conference report on foreign operations last year 
     recommended that our assistance be made conditional on such 
     key assurances. This year, I think we should make certain 
     that these conditions have been met and take further steps to 
     promote economic growth.
       Specifically, I believe U.S. assistance must target three 
     areas. First, we should help draft a national tax and 
     commercial code which encourages private enterprise. Yes, I 
     am suggesting we send Russia more lawyers. After all, it's 
     basic economic rule that when you have a surplus of 
     something, you should export it.
       Seriously, though, let me give you just one example of how 
     urgent this need is: I recently learned that an American 
     company's $116 million investment was in jeopardy because the 
     Russian tax code was changing on a monthly basis, local taxes 
     consumed a fifth of its revenues, the company was required to 
     convert half of its dollars to rubles, it paid a separate tax 
     on any profit, a 28% value-added tax and a 60% corporate 
     income tax. That ought to put in perspective the anguish we 
     all felt yesterday!
       In connection with making Russia's tax and commercial laws 
     more palatable to private enterprise, we should help the 
     government strengthen its enforcement system. Good laws mean 
     nothing in the absence of a viable, independent judicial 
     system.
       Second, we should assist in the development of independent 
     and stable financial institutions, including banks and credit 
     unions. Obviously, this issue is tied up with macroeconomic 
     issues like currency stabilization and monetary policy. 
     Nevertheless, we should be laying a foundation to help 
     businesspeople who complain that they have to carry suitcases 
     full of cash because there are no facilities to secure 
     deposits.
       Third, our development aid should be coordinated with major 
     private equity investments to maximize our impact on the 
     growth of free enterprise and the quality of life of average 
     citizens. Let me describe how this would work. Let's assume 
     an oil company has agreed to a major investment in Western 
     Siberia. In most rural areas there are serious inadequacies 
     in transportation, water and food supply, social services, 
     education, and housing. An impoverished infrastructure, in 
     turn, dampens a community's productivity and prospects for 
     revenue generation.
       I propose that the Agency for International Development 
     should work side-by-side initially with the top ten U.S. 
     corporations with major equity investments. A.I.D. would 
     assume a three- to five-year diminishing investment in a 
     community's infrastructure, with the aid curve declining as 
     expectations of corporate production and local revenue grow. 
     In other words, as a community prospers, it would 
     ``graduate'' from U.S. aid.
       We are all aware of the growing anti-American sentiment 
     rippling through Russian society. To some extent, this a 
     reaction of disappointed expectations: when the press 
     reported we would deliver $2.5 billion, many in Russia 
     wondered when their personal check from Uncle Sam would 
     arrive in the mail. But simmering anti-Americanism is also a 
     reaction to intolerably difficult living conditions. I am not 
     sure there is misery index adequate to express what it must 
     be like to live in a country where half the water is 
     undrinkable and 75 percent of the average Moscow family's 
     income is spent on food. It's my hope that the joint ventures 
     we intend to create between A.I.D. and the private sector 
     would go a long way toward improving the Russian quality of 
     life, as well as Russian perceptions about the value of 
     American aid.
       One final concern about our economic aid program has been 
     the Administration's Russia-first bias. Of the $2.5 billion 
     in aid appropriated last year, just over $1 billion has been 
     committed to projects, though not actually disbursed. Despite 
     legislative recommendation that at least a third of the $2.5 
     billion be spent in the fourteen other republics--and a 
     requirement that not less than $300 million be made available 
     to Ukraine--virtually all of the $1 billion has been 
     committed to activities in Russia alone.
       When it comes time to slice the foreign aid pie next year, 
     I will insist that we meet our legislative commitments to the 
     fourteen other republics. Not only can we have an immediate, 
     meaningful effect in nations with smaller populations and 
     economies, but such a shift is essential to demonstrate our 
     commitment and further our interests in the region.


                u.s. response to russian foreign policy

       Money is not the only issue, however. Russia has enjoyed 
     first place not only in our apportionment of foreign aid, but 
     also in our acquiescence to Russia's ever-expanding 
     definition of its national interest in the region. As I 
     mentioned earlier, Russian leaders began to reclaim 
     superpower status a year ago. Two factors have framed and 
     expanded these designs.
       First, a complex amalgam of history, national pride, 
     economic hardship--and legitimate concern about ethnic 
     Russians who have been suddenly exiled by a redefinition of 
     borders--have enabled some leaders--most notably 
     Zhirinovosky--to twist nostalgia for security into spirited 
     neo-imperialism. Although this strain of malignant 
     nationalism has attracted some support, it is still 
     relatively shallow. Steady economic growth is the best cure 
     for this particular political virus.
       But there is a second, potentially more troubling factor 
     which is fueling Russia's expansionist rhetoric and policy. 
     During the February ``Group of Seven'' meeting, Economic 
     Minister Alexander Shokin drew attention to Russia's recent 
     diplomatic efforts in Sarajevo. He argued that Russia's 
     superpower status should be the decisive factor in according 
     Russia equal treatment and membership in the G-7. While 
     acknowledging the need for economic reforms, Shokin was 
     clearly leveraging Russia's security role to buy economic 
     status.
       This purposeful linkage between security and economic 
     status was echoed twice this week. Presidential spokesman 
     Kostikov told journalists that joining the Partnership for 
     Peace should be tied to Russian acceptance in the G-7. On 
     Wednesday, President Yeltsin himself indicated that Russia 
     may not join the Partnership, partly because of ruffled 
     feathers over consultation on the Bosnian air strikes. But, 
     he also linked the Partnership question to access to Western 
     markets, and complained about ``discrimination.''
       The fact that Russia is apparently leveraging its nuclear 
     status for economic advantage should be considered in the 
     context of the Clinton Administration's accommodationist 
     policy toward Moscow.
       For the past year, the U.S. has taken a course of 
     overbearing regard for Russian sensitivity about its security 
     position. We overlooked direct Russian military support for 
     Abkhazi rebels, effectively destabilizing Georgia. During 
     that time, President Shevardnadze wrote me with an urgent 
     plea for help. He had earlier asked the Administration to 
     intervene, urging President Clinton to salvage hope for 
     democracy in Georgia by pressing Russia to cease and desist. 
     While the Administration chose to ignore him, I offered an 
     amendment to the foreign operations bill linking U.S. aid to 
     the recipient country's respect for national sovereignty and 
     territorial integrity. My amendment passed--despite the 
     Administration's objections that it would offend Moscow.
       When Shevardnanze came to see me last month, we discussed 
     where we needed to go from here. He shared my concerns about 
     Russia's aggressive role in the region and our government's 
     deferential response. Let me give you a few more examples. 
     When we had the opportunity to expand NATO's security 
     umbrella by welcoming the admission of former Warsaw Pact 
     nations, the Administration deliberately punted, citing 
     concerns about the ascendancy of reactionary forces in the 
     Russian Parliament. Instead, President Clinton came up with 
     the Partnership for Peace--or, as I call it, ``NATO-Lite.'' 
     As a result, we missed a major opportunity to establish peace 
     and security in Eastern Europe on our terms, and we once 
     again allowed Moscow to effectively shape our foreign policy.
       Another example: we took no umbrage at Russia's 
     intentional, crippling withholding of energy to Ukraine; in 
     fact, we collaborated with Moscow by insisting that U.S. aid 
     was exclusively linked to Ukraine's turning over its nuclear 
     weapons More recently, when asked if it was reasonable for 
     the Russians to link troop withdrawal from the Baltics to the 
     status of Russian minorities, Secretary Christopher's reply 
     was astonishing: the Russians' concern was ``understandable 
     and legitimate,'' and they should be treated with 
     ``generosity.''
       As Russia turns up its neo-imperialist rhetoric, the 
     Clinton Administration's acquiescence is both disappointing 
     and destabilizing. Our failure to challenge Russian regional 
     ambitions only heightens the anxiety in the Baltics, the new 
     republics and all of Europe, which in turn aggravates ethnic 
     and national tensions.
       Moreover, the lack of any predictability to Russia's 
     exercise of its special status could compromise our interests 
     beyond the European theater. No one was more surprised than 
     Prime Minister Rabin when Foreign Minister Kozyrev arrived in 
     Israel, unplanned and unannounced, to promote the PLO 
     negotiations.
       Yet the Administration has obstinately refused to challenge 
     Russia's growing hubris or to decouple the three policy 
     tracks, fearing that any perceptible shift would weaken 
     Yeltsin and his like-minded reformers. Any change in policy 
     could cause us to lose Russia altogether, they claim.
       However, this argument blurs the line between Russia's 
     legitimate interest in political and economic reforms--which 
     merit our support--and emerging neo-imperial goals which 
     clearly do not. We have incorrectly linked Yeltsin's survival 
     to giving him free regional rein and nothing less than 
     unconditional political and economic support.
       The record over the past year suggests that appeasement may 
     only strengthen the hand of extremists, exacting further 
     concessions from Yeltsin and jeopardizing the course of 
     reform. I have said before, as has Henry Kissinger and 
     others, that it is not the drawing the bright lines that 
     provokes and inflames nationalism, it is ambiguity about our 
     principles and commitments that invites extremists to test 
     the limits of our interests and our resolve.
       For that reason, I believe it is extremely important that 
     our policy in the New Independent States place a premium on 
     the territorial integrity and economic and political 
     sovereignty of each the new democracies. That is why I 
     recently amended the Budget Resolution to include language 
     expressing U.S. opposition to Russia's efforts to establish a 
     sphere of influence in Europe through economic coercion, 
     political intimidation, or force. In both Eastern and Central 
     Europe, I believe independence is the key to stability, and 
     therefore to our own interests in the region.


                      securing american interests

       Now, to answer the question that Shevardnadze and I 
     discussed last month: where do we go from here?
       First, we should expand NATO to include the Visegrad 
     nations. Now, I am enough of a realist to know that this is 
     unlikely to happen soon. In the interim, a common framework 
     agreement should be developed so that all nations understand 
     precisely what is expected of them in order to join. The 
     agreement should specify not only the type and frequency of 
     joint military activities, but also NATO's political 
     expectations such as the submission of transparent defense 
     budgets and civilian control of the armed services. At 
     present, the Administration has encouraged each nation to 
     negotiate separate agreements for participation. This 
     piecemeal approach will only lead to confusion, competition, 
     and friction down the road.
       Second, to bridge the gap between NATO and the current 
     military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact nations and the new 
     republics, we should substantially expand our military 
     education and training programs, known as IMET. Training 
     should include exposure to our traditions of professionalism, 
     as well as more technical education in areas such as military 
     planning, command and control, and equipment maintenance and 
     operations. I found it interesting that the Administration is 
     planning to give Georgia only $75,000 in IMET--a nation where 
     we have vital strategic interests--compared with $100,000 in 
     IMET for Benin, where I am somewhat unclear of our mission.
       Third, once countries are committed to the Partnership, we 
     can being to establish eligibility standards for obtaining 
     NATO excess defense articles, and equipment ``cascaded'' as a 
     result of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty. Obviously, 
     this does not mean that we begin by providing F-16s to 
     Bulgaria, but there are prudent ways to proceed. Let me cite 
     one example. Currently, Germany possesses millions of rounds 
     of Soviet-style weapons ammunition, stored in former East 
     German warehouses. The nation of Latvia, whose army carries 
     Soviet-made firearms, is issuing its soldiers just five 
     rounds of ammunition monthly for training purposes. There 
     ought to be some kind of clearinghouse or other mechanism for 
     the coordinated--and controlled--transfer of useful supplies.
       I recently met with Poland's Minister of Defense, who 
     mentioned the need for standardizing communications systems 
     if the Partnership is truly going to work. I'm sure there are 
     a number of other areas where we could transfer equipment to 
     bolster both confidence and coordination.
       Each of these security initiatives represents an 
     opportunity to enhance stability and cooperation in Europe 
     and the NIS. Obviously, they depend upon recognition of the 
     fact that the U.S. can pursue its security interests parallel 
     with the promotion of economic and political progress in 
     Russia. The tracks should be separate, but they are certainly 
     not mutually exclusive.
       For the past year, U.S. foreign policy and funding 
     priorities have focused exclusively on Russia and 
     unconditional support for Yeltsin's government. This approach 
     has at least temporarily forfeited economic and political 
     opportunities in the fourteen other nations of the NIS. Our 
     failure to challenge Russia's regional ambitions has 
     contributed to instability from Crimea to the Baltics. And we 
     have poorly served our interest in European stability by 
     giving Moscow a veto over NATO participation.
       Russia needs and deserves our political and economic help. 
     The vast changes that are continuing to reverberate through 
     Russia and the rest of the NIS clearly require a flexible 
     approach. But, helping to improve prospects for democracy and 
     prosperity should not be at the expense of American concern 
     for regional stability and security. In international 
     affairs, our interests are clear, our resolve must be firm, 
     and our cooperation should be conditional.

                          ____________________