[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 54 (Friday, May 6, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                                 RUSSIA

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, as Russia continues to work through the 
wrenching transition from the Soviet era, the debate over how to help 
shape the direction of Russia's future policital course continues to 
preoccupy United States foreign policymakers. And well it should.
  Alarmed by the pattern of Russian pressure on its neighbors, and 
disturbed by the slowdown of economic reform and the success of 
hardliners in December's parliamentary election, some have sounded the 
alarm that Russia cannot be our partner or ally, but is our rival, or 
even our foe. This view holds that Russia will essentially remain a 
strategic threat to the United States, regardless of the collapse of 
communism.
  I lean in a different direction. I believe the present and future 
status of United States relations with Russia are simply unclear and 
unpredictable. It is premature to draw conclusions about these 
relations and neatly condense them into a one-word sound bite of a foe, 
or an ally, or a friend, or an adversary.
  Depending on one's prejudices, hopes, or expectations, any one of the 
words that have punctuated the debate about our relations with Russia--
ally, partner, rival, foe--is reasonable. The danger is that the policy 
we favor will depend on the word we prefer, and that word may change on 
a regular basis.
  I think it is safe to project that Russia will at times cooperate 
with us, and at other times will not. This should not surprise or 
frighten us, since we have bitter disputes even with nations that have 
been our allies for decades.
  What should concern us is that Russia accept and act in accordance 
with certain internationally accepted standards of behavior. Our 
strategy toward Russia must not only focus on gaining Russian 
cooperation in specific cases, but on encouraging Russia to play 
according to the rules of the game. These rules set limits, especially 
on the use or threat of force, and demand respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of other states.
  So while the nature of post-Communist Russia is very much a work in 
progress, and it is too early to decide once and for all whether she is 
friend or foe, it is not too early to sound the alarm about certain 
tendencies in Russian politics. I refer, in particular to the 
deliberate destabilization of its neighbors as a means of regaining 
control over them.
  Russian military support for Abkhazai has led to the de facto 
dismemberment of Georgia, which has been forced to seek entry into the 
Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and to agree to the stationing 
of Russian soldiers on its territory. Somewhat less blatantly, Russian 
forces clearly connived in the coup d'etat that took place last June 
against the democratically elected president of Azerbaijan and 
pressured his successor to bring the oil-rich country into the CIS. 
There is no doubt about that.
  In Moldova, the Russian 14th Army appears to be digging in for the 
duration, even though Russian Government spokesmen speak supportively 
of a CSCE initiative to resolve the dispute between Moldova's 
Government and secessionist Trans-Dniestria that envisions the 
withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldova. In Tajikstan, there is a very 
murky line between peacekeeping and keeping the old nomenklatura in 
power.
  In my view, Russia's behavior in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
violates the Helsinki accords and other international agreements--
documents which Russia has freely signed and agreed to abide by. We are 
entitled to expect and, I think, demand that Russia honor its 
international commitments.
  In the Baltic States, after long and arduous negotiations, Russia has 
finally reached agreement with Latvia on an August 31, 1994, withdrawal 
date for Russian troops. But Russia continues to delay serious 
negotiations about a timely withdrawal of its 2,600 troops from Estonia 
and has added additional terms for withdrawal, including a demand for 
$23 million to build housing for these troops in Russia from that 
country. This breaches the July 1992 Helsinki CSCE document calling for 
complete and timely withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Baltics. 
We should all keep in mind that much of our aid program to Russia is 
contingent upon significant progress toward removal of Russian troops 
from the Baltics.
  Equally ominous are Russian efforts to manipulate the peacekeeping 
issue. In Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere, Russia has been 
seeking international agreement to the stationing of Russian forces in 
these regions. President Yeltsin, in his February 24 speech, stated 
that ``a strong Russia can become the guarantee of stability all over 
the territory of the former Soviet Union.'' But stability must never be 
an excuse for establishing hegemony over neighboring states against the 
latter's will, or violating CSCE and U.N. provisions on territorial 
integrity of member states. If one of Russia's neighbors wishes to 
enter into a military alliance with Russia, that decision is certainly 
not ours to contest--in the United States or elsewhere. But uninvited 
army bases, deployment of military forces on another Nation's territory 
or refusal to withdraw forces within a reasonable timeframe are quite 
another thing. And these activities cannot be justified simply by 
appeals to ``peacekeeping.''
  One of the issues I find most worrisome is Moscow's tendency to 
exploit Russian minorities, and Russian-speaking minorities, in the 
other republics. Official Russian rhetoric about protecting Russian 
speakers--regardless of where they actually live and their ethnic 
background--increasingly seems like a pretext to reestablish a sphere 
of influence throughout the entire former U.S.S.R. This understandably 
alarms Russia's neighbors, and we should not accept at face value 
Russian arguments about the need for Moscow to protect Russians 
wherever they may be physically and geographically located. Many of 
these Russians know full well, and they have said so to Helsinki 
Commission staff, that Moscow is pursuing its own interests when it 
asserts the right to defend these Russians. Several Foreign Ministry 
papers over the last few years have clearly spelled out this policy 
perception.

  Russia would be the dominant player in the region no matter what, 
because of its size, because of its economy, et cetera. But it is one 
thing for a giant country to use its economic muscle in negotiations; 
it is quite another to demand cooperation by threatening to tear a 
small country apart, or, worse, actually stripping its sovereignty of 
all meaning.
  So what are we to do? First, we must recognize that our leverage is 
limited. Especially in today's atmosphere of aggrieved nationalism, 
Russia cannot simply dance to our tune, or be seen as bowing to 
American dictates. But we can insist on Russian compliance with 
standard rules that bind all other nations.
  Along these lines, talks and projects on the denuclearization of 
Russia and the United States must continue. These lines to 
communication are important and can bring about a very positive effect. 
While we will certainly not eliminate the causes of war, the United 
States and Russia must work together to reduce our reliance on weapons 
of mass destruction, and must prevent their proliferation. This is an 
investment which is clearly in our national interest, and in the 
interests of the world.
  I am not convinced, however, that all aspects of our overall 
assistance program to Russia are in our national interest or help the 
Russians. I remain troubled, for example, by the extension of loans to 
Russia by the IMF, to which the United States is one of the main 
contributors. Absent evidence of any meaningful financial reform, these 
loans may well be wasted. Worse still, these loans may indeed serve to 
perpetuate the old Soviet-style economy.
  We must work more actively with our G-7 partners to insure that our 
multilateral aid is tied to demonstrated compliance with the IMF 
guidelines instead of continually extending loans which, so, far, have 
been based on empty promises of reform within Russia.
  But from a national perspective, I am, frankly, more concerned about 
our bilateral assistance programs to Russia. Too many of our tax 
payers' dollars are wasted on high-priced consultants whose transient 
appearances in Moscow often leave a residue of resentment. We should 
instead focus on training managers and public officials capable of 
replacing Communist institutions and attitudes with democratically-
oriented reforms. We need hands-on programs that help people develop 
production and infrastructure.
  We have all recently heard many horror stories about the rampant, 
systemic corruption throughout the CIS. This is an extremely serious 
phenomenon which requires attention from the international community. 
We only exacerbate it by funding programs which are not meticulously 
screened to ensure they are having their intended effect. This means, 
in my view, a greater concentration on quality rather than quantity.

  One component of our assistance program about which I have had 
serious misgivings is the export guarantee program of the Department of 
Agriculture. During 1991 and 1992, this program guaranteed nearly $5 
billion of United States commodities exported to the former Soviet 
Union. I realize this is important to our farm and agricultural 
business here. But this is taxpayers' guarantees. If they are not paid 
the U.S. Government will do it.
  This program has done little more than permit Russia to avoid 
reforming its agricultural sector, and it looks as though the American 
taxpayer may have to pick up the tab for the nearly $3 billion that 
remains of this Russian debt to the United States.
  I opposed these loans from the beginning because I feared they would 
not be repaid and would act as a deterrent for the reform of the 
Russian agricultural sector. It seems like that is going to happen on 
both tracks. I believe that the previous administration missed an 
important opportunity to help direct Russian economic policy toward a 
market economy by not attaching conditions to these loans, which could 
have encouraged establishment of a genuinely market-oriented 
agricultural sector. It is clear to me that that has not occurred in 
Russia and is not occurring today or in the near future. Unless 
meaningful standards of credit worthiness and IMF compliance are 
attached to future loan guarantees, this type of aid will benefit 
neither the Russian people nor the American taxpayer.
  A few of our programs are worthwhile. Some of our humanitarian 
assistance, for example, such as medical supplies and training, are 
desperately needed and have gone to the people who need them. I also 
favor the farmer-to-farmer concept in which experienced U.S. farmers 
provide hands-on training on a long-term basis. I have been impressed 
with the caliber of experienced managers and technicians who are 
participating in the CIS. Peace Corps projects. These types of programs 
provide training for a sustained period and, more importantly, do not 
consist of commodities or funds which wind up in the pockets of corrupt 
former Communist leaders. As a British journalist wrote, ``Every time 
you Americans give aid to some Russian city, a half dozen more Mercedes 
show up in front of city hall.'' I am sorry to say, but that is 
becoming more apparent on a day-to-day basis.
  Apart from scaling back and prioritizing United States aid to Russia, 
we must provide more assistance to the other newly independent states 
on the same kind of basic programs that work. Some might object that we 
cannot afford to help everyone, but we cannot afford a Russo-centric 
approach to aid from the United States. It is strategically and 
politically critical that Ukraine and the countries of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia remain independent of Russia and make greater progress 
toward democratic reforms. I might say, we have some very good programs 
that are operating there without massive billions of dollars of 
agricultural credits. Properly targeted training programs can help 
ensure this.
  President Yeltsin himself has lamented that ``the Russian state 
hasn't taken its proper place in the world community.'' It is the 
proper and needed role of United States foreign policy to insist that 
Russia's place in the global community be based on its respect for 
international norms of accepted behavior.

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