[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 53 (Thursday, May 5, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 5, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTION IN HAITI
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, press reports indicate the administration
is considering deployment of United States military forces to Haiti--
either as trainers or as an invasion force. The apparent purpose is to
put exiled President Aristide back in power. Before we act hastily, let
us look at the facts.
Haiti poses no strategic threat to the United States. There has been
no massive exodus of migrants from Haiti. Yes, the thugs and murderers
running the country have committed horrible human rights violations--
but they have not threatened Americans in Haiti. But, if human rights
violations were enough reason for United States intervention, we would
be invading most countries in the world--Rwanda, Sudan, China, Syria,
and many more.
Last October 21, the Senate passed an amendment I drafted by a vote
of 98 to 2. That amendment is now section 8147 of Public Law 103-139.
The amendment calls on the administration to seek the authorization of
Congress before deploying military force to Haiti. While it is a sense-
of-Congress provision, it expresses the views of the overwhelming
majority of Members. If President Clinton wants to use force in Haiti,
he should make his case before Congress and before the American people.
That is what President Bush did before Operation Desert Storm. Haiti
should be no different.
We tried invading Haiti once this century--after a sustained period
of political violence in 1915. After 19 years of marine occupation, and
34 years of controlling Haiti's finances, the United States left. After
all the effort, the end result was the Duvalier regime, and he started
out by getting elected too.
I agree with former President Bush: ``The time has come for a
significant shift in United States policy toward Haiti.'' President
Bush, who was criticized for spending too much time on foreign policy,
supported the return of President Aristide, but now argues that we can
and should support democracy in Haiti, without supporting the return of
Aristide to power.
Haiti's problems will not be solved by outside military intervention.
One election in 1990 did not make Haiti a democracy--there was no rule
of law, no functioning court system, or accountability of rulers to the
ruled. President Aristide's actions in power and in exile raise serious
doubts about the wisdom of risking U.S. lives to install him in power.
And any invasion force would have to stay in Haiti to protect Aristide
from his opponents. Any intervention would be costly, long-term, and
very unlikely to result in stable democracy.
Under the administration's latest policy shift, any effort to forge
political compromise among Haitians has been abandoned, leaving
President Clinton's former special representative to Haiti to observe
that the United States has taken on full responsibility for Haiti's
future. Ambassador Pezzullo points out: ``This is no favor to President
Aristide, the Haitian people, or the Americans who will be sacrificed
in the attempt.''
The latest policy not only rejects any pressure on Aristide to
compromise, it will further improverish the poorest country in the
hemisphere. Tightening sanctions, when Haiti has already has 65 percent
of its economy shut down, will increase suffering among the poor while
the military regime prospers--especially when the United States Embassy
buys its fuel from their black marketeers. This seems to be the
administration's version of destroying a country in order to save it.
Madam President, turning Haiti into a United States colony is not
wise policy. Sending American troops on ill-defined training missions
in Haiti is not wise policy. Tigthening sanctions is not wise policy.
And invading Haiti to put Aristide back in power would be a tragic
mistake. I urge the administration not to ignore the clear will of
Congress and to seek prior congressional authorization for any United
States military action in Haiti.
I also think it is time for a fresh look at the situation in Haiti--
what the democratically elected parliamentarians think, why Prime
Minister Malval resigned in frustration, whether a peaceful solution is
possible. An independent fact-finding commission should be created to
review cricumstances in Haiti. It should be bipartisan, and appointed
by the President and by congressional leadership. When the most basic
facts are in dispute--as made clear by Ambassador Pezzullo's article
today--such a commission could provide important answers before U.S.
lives are risked. Allowing such a commission to examine the best course
to national reconciliation in Haiti before any additional action is a
modest step. I hope to work with the President and his advisers in
forming such a commission.
I ask unanimous consent that the statement of President Bush,
Ambassador Pezzullo's resignation letter, and, an article from the
Washington Post, and the Dole-Mitchell amendment be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, May 5, 1994]
Our Haiti Fiasco
(By Lawrence A. Pezzullo)
The Clinton administration, after three weeks of a declared
policy review toward Haiti, has produced the wrong answer
and--more regrettable--has done so for the wrong reason. The
new so-called policy seriously risks further hurting the
suffering people of that wounded nation. Meanwhile,
compounding it all, there now is unwise talk of U.S. military
intervention.
The administration's divided approach to the Haitian
impasse will give priority to an action--expansion of
international sanctions--that the White House specifically
ruled out in January. It will thus substitute a tactic for a
strategy, turning a mere means into an end.
Without question the Haiti policy review was driven as much
as anything by criticism, from media and Congress, of the
administration's mishandling of Haitian refugees seeking
asylum in this country. But while the plight of refugees is
central to the Haiti problem, it is something best dealt with
separately from the political strategy needed to enforce a
workable agreement on Haiti's future--that agreement being
essentially the one reached at Governors Island last July.
The policy behind the Governors Island Accord was sound then
and remains so. The putative new policy will almost certainly
aggravate the refugee problem.
Last January, in the face of media criticism to the effect
that sanctions were causing increased malnutrition, the
Clinton administration could not bring itself to follow
through on its own threat to the military: the threat that it
must meet its commitments under the Governors Island Accord
by Jan. 15 or else. The ``or else'' was comprehensive U.N.
trade sanctions, a ban on noncommercial air flights and a
recommendation to U.N. member states to adopt targeted
sanctions (freezing personal assets and revoking visas)
against the military regime and its supporters. The key
element in the January sanctions proposal was that it was
tied to a political strategy of strengthening Haiti's
democratic elements and isolating the military.
Now, in the face of mounting media and congressional
criticism that its policy has ``failed,'' the administration
has resurrected the same position it refused to implement in
January, but with one key difference: Now there is no
political strategy for the comprehensive sanctions to
support. How did we get to this place?
The decision not to seek the comprehensive sanctions wasn't
the first time the administration had lost credibility with
both the Haitian military and President Aristide. Earlier,
there was the infamous retreat of the U.S.S. Harlan County,
in October 1993, when it was met by a small group of toughs
on the dock. Those of us who supported keeping the ship there
were confronted with a decision that had already been made.
This incident has widely been cited--correctly, I think--as
the key reason the Governors Island Accord failed. our
retreat emboldened the military and strengthened the neo-
Duvalierist party, the FRAPH.
After this major setback, the United States tried yet again
to resurrect a strategy and bring about the restoration of
democracy and President Aristide. It imposed a tight fuel
embargo in October, which has all but shut down Haiti's
economy. On the political front, Aristide's own prime
minister and political ally, Robert Malval, took the
initiative, convincing Aristide that his political alliance
should be broadened to include legitimate political parties
represented in the legitimate parliament. But Aristide soon
reversed himself, and rejected Malval's idea as ``power-
sharing'' with the military. Malval resigned in December.
At the urging of the ``Four Friends of Haiti'' (Canada,
France, Venezuela and the United States), President Aristide
next took the initiative to move the political process
forward by holding a conference in Miami with members of
parliament and other political figures from Haiti. The
conference came up with a plan similar to Malval's: name a
new prime minister who can form a broadly based government of
national concord.
This is in fact the key to a lasting solution. To isolate
the military from its traditional backers (the extreme right
and the older, more conservative, business class), true
democrats in Haiti need to unite around a new government of
national consensus. Moves toward creating such a centrist
force were already helping to fragment the army: In February
and March we saw legitimate parliamentarians who previously
had opposed Aristide's return join forces with pro-Aristide's
return join forces with pro-Aristide legislators to call for
his return. We saw conservative businessmen joining more
progressive younger businessmen and pro-Aristide labor unions
in calling for the departure of the country's military head.
Unfortunately, this movement fell victim to intensive
lobbying campaigns by both the extreme right, who saw the
threat to their power, and Aristide's expatriate entourage,
which incorrectly labeled the idea of a coalition with the
majority of parliament ``power sharing'' with the military.
Ultimately, the extremes succeeded in killing the center.
The United States helped bring this about. Despite initial
support for the parliamentary proposal, the U.S. government
was once again unable to stay the course on Haiti. A week
after Vice President Al Gore advised Aristide of our
considered position of support for the proposal, the U.S.
administration was in full retreat. Why? Quite simply, the
administration could not withstand domestic pressures against
the proposal emanating from congressional supporters of
President Aristide.
Thus, having begun to split the Haitian army and to unite
the democratically elected parliament in support of U.S.
objectives, the administration suddenly and unwittingly
reunited the army and polarized the political situation anew.
The reality in Haiti, whether President Aristide likes it
or not, is that he is stuck with a very decentralized form of
government known as a parliamentary system. And like it or
not, he does not have a working majority in his own
parliament. He needs allies. Without true reconciliation
among democratic elements in Haiti, there will be no true
democracy.
The administration's inability to stay the course on
something as fundamental as building a political coalition in
a parliamentary democracy does not provide much hope that it
will be able to stay any course. It has now adopted a policy
line--sanctions without any political track--that has no
prospect of returning democracy of Aristide to Haiti. It is
clear that with the administration's decision not to push
Aristide on the political front, political negotiations for
his restoration are dead. Already those who came out for a
political, nonviolent solution have left the center and are
moving to the extremes.
If the U.S. administration is serious about returning
Aristide now, it will have to do so on the backs of U.S.
soldiers. But in fact, intervention would not serve this
country or the Haitians. Democracy isn't build on foreign
intervention; it is built on reconciliation--as has been
proved recently in South Africa and El Salvador.
By abandoning the track of multilateral negotiations, which
was forcing the Haitians to take political responsibility for
effecting change in their country, we have taken on full
responsibility for Haiti's future. This is no favor to
Aristide, the Haitian people or the Americans who will be
sacrificed in the attempt. The administration is trying to
force a new policy by responding to domestic pressures rather
than setting a steady course based on our interests and
responsive to the reality on the ground.
____
Dole-Mitchell Amendment
Sec. 8147. Sense of Congress on the Use of Funds for United
States Military Operations in Haiti.--(a) Statement of
Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) all parties should honor their obligations under the
Governors Island Accord of July 3, 1993 and the New York Pact
of July 16, 1993;
(2) the United States has a national interest in preventing
uncontrolled emigration from Haiti; and
(3) the United States should remain engaged in Haiti to
support national reconciliation and further its interest in
preventing uncontrolled emigration.
(b) Limitation.--It is the sense of Congress that funds
appropriated by this Act should not be obligated or expended
for United States military operations in Haiti unless--
(1) authorized in advance by the Congress; or
(2) the temporary deployment of United States Armed Forces
into Haiti is necessary to order to protect or evacuate
United States citizens from a situation of imminent danger
and the President reports as soon as practicable to Congress
after the initiation of the temporary deployment, but in no
case later than forty-eight hours after the initiation of the
temporary deployment; or
(3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti
is vital to the national security interests of the United
States, including but not limited to the protection of
American citizens in Haiti, there is not sufficient time to
seek and receive Congressional authorization, and the
President reports as soon as practicable to Congress after
the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than
forty-eight hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
(4) the President transmits to the Congress a written
report pursuant to subsection (c).
(c) Report.--It is the sense of Congress that the
limitation in subsection (b) should not apply if the
President reports in advance to Congress that the intended
deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti--
(1) is justified by United States national security
interests;
(2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been
taken to ensure the safety and security of United States
Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States
Armed Forces will not become targets due to the nature of
their rules of engagement;
(3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
(A) the proposed mission and objectives are most
appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than
civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
(B) that the United States Armed Forces proposed for
deployment are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the
objectives of the proposed mission;
(4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the
deployment are established;
(5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for
ending the deployment has been identified; and
(6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of
the deployment are estimated.
(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United
States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued
deployment, introduction or reintroduction of United States
Armed Forces into the land territory of Haiti, irrespective
of whether those Armed Forces are under United States or
United Nations command, but does not include activities for
the collection of foreign intelligence, activities directly
related to the operations of United States diplomatic or
other United States Government facilities, or operations to
counter emigration from Haiti.
____
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, April 28, 1994.
Hon. Warren Christopher,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: As I take my leave, I wanted to express
my grave concern that we are heading irrevocably down a path
toward unilateral military intervention in Haiti. That would
be a terrible mistake.
Perhaps if I had had your full support in docking the USS
Harlan County last October, in seeking comprehensive
sanctions in January, and in pressing President Aristide
harder to work together with his own democratically-elected
parliamentarians we might have succeeded in overturning the
coup and restoring President Aristide despite the odds.
Now, in abandoning the multilateral negotiation track which
was forcing the Haitians to take political responsibility for
effecting changes in their country, we have unwittingly taken
on full responsibility for Haiti's future. This is no favor
to President Aristide, the Haitian people or the Americans
who will be sacrificed in the attempt.
Sincerely,
Lawrence Fezzullo.
____
Statement of President Bush, May 2, 1994
I think the time has come for a significant shift in U.S.
policy towards Haiti.
First, I think we should rule out the use of U.S. force in
Haiti. We suffered an enormous black eye to our prestige
around the world when, a few months ago, our ship was turned
back by a group of thugs on the dock at Port au Prince, but
use of U.S. ground forces in Haiti would, in my view, be a
tremendous mistake. We can easily put our forces in, but when
would they come home?
In making decisions of this nature we must think not just
of Haiti but of the rest of the Caribbean and South America.
I certainly could not support the use of U.S. troops under
existing conditions in Haiti. No U.S. lives are at risk in
Haiti today.
Further, I believe most of our friends in this hemisphere
would strongly disapprove of our using U.S. troops.
No one in the area can doubt President Clinton's support of
democracy. Nor can they doubt his strong backing, up to now,
of Father Aristide; but Aristide has proved to be totally
unable to help facilitate his own return. He has been
unwilling to compromise and, in attacking President Clinton's
policy, he is attacking those who have been trying hard to
help him.
The time has come to change policy.
We should use our diplomatic best efforts to restore
democracy, to have new elections scheduled and to wrench
concessions from Haiti's military; but I am now satisfied
that we must separate ``backing democracy'' from ``backing
Aristide''.
We must never waiver in our support for democracy. As
President, I felt that the way to support democracy in Haiti
was to insist on the return of Aristide to power. Given
recent events and Aristide's demonstrated instability the
time has come to break that linkage.
Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
____________________