[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 53 (Thursday, May 5, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 5, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                 UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTION IN HAITI

  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, press reports indicate the administration 
is considering deployment of United States military forces to Haiti--
either as trainers or as an invasion force. The apparent purpose is to 
put exiled President Aristide back in power. Before we act hastily, let 
us look at the facts.
  Haiti poses no strategic threat to the United States. There has been 
no massive exodus of migrants from Haiti. Yes, the thugs and murderers 
running the country have committed horrible human rights violations--
but they have not threatened Americans in Haiti. But, if human rights 
violations were enough reason for United States intervention, we would 
be invading most countries in the world--Rwanda, Sudan, China, Syria, 
and many more.
  Last October 21, the Senate passed an amendment I drafted by a vote 
of 98 to 2. That amendment is now section 8147 of Public Law 103-139. 
The amendment calls on the administration to seek the authorization of 
Congress before deploying military force to Haiti. While it is a sense-
of-Congress provision, it expresses the views of the overwhelming 
majority of Members. If President Clinton wants to use force in Haiti, 
he should make his case before Congress and before the American people. 
That is what President Bush did before Operation Desert Storm. Haiti 
should be no different.
  We tried invading Haiti once this century--after a sustained period 
of political violence in 1915. After 19 years of marine occupation, and 
34 years of controlling Haiti's finances, the United States left. After 
all the effort, the end result was the Duvalier regime, and he started 
out by getting elected too.

  I agree with former President Bush: ``The time has come for a 
significant shift in United States policy toward Haiti.'' President 
Bush, who was criticized for spending too much time on foreign policy, 
supported the return of President Aristide, but now argues that we can 
and should support democracy in Haiti, without supporting the return of 
Aristide to power.
  Haiti's problems will not be solved by outside military intervention. 
One election in 1990 did not make Haiti a democracy--there was no rule 
of law, no functioning court system, or accountability of rulers to the 
ruled. President Aristide's actions in power and in exile raise serious 
doubts about the wisdom of risking U.S. lives to install him in power. 
And any invasion force would have to stay in Haiti to protect Aristide 
from his opponents. Any intervention would be costly, long-term, and 
very unlikely to result in stable democracy.
  Under the administration's latest policy shift, any effort to forge 
political compromise among Haitians has been abandoned, leaving 
President Clinton's former special representative to Haiti to observe 
that the United States has taken on full responsibility for Haiti's 
future. Ambassador Pezzullo points out: ``This is no favor to President 
Aristide, the Haitian people, or the Americans who will be sacrificed 
in the attempt.''
  The latest policy not only rejects any pressure on Aristide to 
compromise, it will further improverish the poorest country in the 
hemisphere. Tightening sanctions, when Haiti has already has 65 percent 
of its economy shut down, will increase suffering among the poor while 
the military regime prospers--especially when the United States Embassy 
buys its fuel from their black marketeers. This seems to be the 
administration's version of destroying a country in order to save it.
  Madam President, turning Haiti into a United States colony is not 
wise policy. Sending American troops on ill-defined training missions 
in Haiti is not wise policy. Tigthening sanctions is not wise policy. 
And invading Haiti to put Aristide back in power would be a tragic 
mistake. I urge the administration not to ignore the clear will of 
Congress and to seek prior congressional authorization for any United 
States military action in Haiti.
  I also think it is time for a fresh look at the situation in Haiti--
what the democratically elected parliamentarians think, why Prime 
Minister Malval resigned in frustration, whether a peaceful solution is 
possible. An independent fact-finding commission should be created to 
review cricumstances in Haiti. It should be bipartisan, and appointed 
by the President and by congressional leadership. When the most basic 
facts are in dispute--as made clear by Ambassador Pezzullo's article 
today--such a commission could provide important answers before U.S. 
lives are risked. Allowing such a commission to examine the best course 
to national reconciliation in Haiti before any additional action is a 
modest step. I hope to work with the President and his advisers in 
forming such a commission.
  I ask unanimous consent that the statement of President Bush, 
Ambassador Pezzullo's resignation letter, and, an article from the 
Washington Post, and the Dole-Mitchell amendment be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, May 5, 1994]

                            Our Haiti Fiasco

                       (By Lawrence A. Pezzullo)

       The Clinton administration, after three weeks of a declared 
     policy review toward Haiti, has produced the wrong answer 
     and--more regrettable--has done so for the wrong reason. The 
     new so-called policy seriously risks further hurting the 
     suffering people of that wounded nation. Meanwhile, 
     compounding it all, there now is unwise talk of U.S. military 
     intervention.
       The administration's divided approach to the Haitian 
     impasse will give priority to an action--expansion of 
     international sanctions--that the White House specifically 
     ruled out in January. It will thus substitute a tactic for a 
     strategy, turning a mere means into an end.
       Without question the Haiti policy review was driven as much 
     as anything by criticism, from media and Congress, of the 
     administration's mishandling of Haitian refugees seeking 
     asylum in this country. But while the plight of refugees is 
     central to the Haiti problem, it is something best dealt with 
     separately from the political strategy needed to enforce a 
     workable agreement on Haiti's future--that agreement being 
     essentially the one reached at Governors Island last July. 
     The policy behind the Governors Island Accord was sound then 
     and remains so. The putative new policy will almost certainly 
     aggravate the refugee problem.
       Last January, in the face of media criticism to the effect 
     that sanctions were causing increased malnutrition, the 
     Clinton administration could not bring itself to follow 
     through on its own threat to the military: the threat that it 
     must meet its commitments under the Governors Island Accord 
     by Jan. 15 or else. The ``or else'' was comprehensive U.N. 
     trade sanctions, a ban on noncommercial air flights and a 
     recommendation to U.N. member states to adopt targeted 
     sanctions (freezing personal assets and revoking visas) 
     against the military regime and its supporters. The key 
     element in the January sanctions proposal was that it was 
     tied to a political strategy of strengthening Haiti's 
     democratic elements and isolating the military.
       Now, in the face of mounting media and congressional 
     criticism that its policy has ``failed,'' the administration 
     has resurrected the same position it refused to implement in 
     January, but with one key difference: Now there is no 
     political strategy for the comprehensive sanctions to 
     support. How did we get to this place?
       The decision not to seek the comprehensive sanctions wasn't 
     the first time the administration had lost credibility with 
     both the Haitian military and President Aristide. Earlier, 
     there was the infamous retreat of the U.S.S. Harlan County, 
     in October 1993, when it was met by a small group of toughs 
     on the dock. Those of us who supported keeping the ship there 
     were confronted with a decision that had already been made. 
     This incident has widely been cited--correctly, I think--as 
     the key reason the Governors Island Accord failed. our 
     retreat emboldened the military and strengthened the neo-
     Duvalierist party, the FRAPH.
       After this major setback, the United States tried yet again 
     to resurrect a strategy and bring about the restoration of 
     democracy and President Aristide. It imposed a tight fuel 
     embargo in October, which has all but shut down Haiti's 
     economy. On the political front, Aristide's own prime 
     minister and political ally, Robert Malval, took the 
     initiative, convincing Aristide that his political alliance 
     should be broadened to include legitimate political parties 
     represented in the legitimate parliament. But Aristide soon 
     reversed himself, and rejected Malval's idea as ``power-
     sharing'' with the military. Malval resigned in December.
       At the urging of the ``Four Friends of Haiti'' (Canada, 
     France, Venezuela and the United States), President Aristide 
     next took the initiative to move the political process 
     forward by holding a conference in Miami with members of 
     parliament and other political figures from Haiti. The 
     conference came up with a plan similar to Malval's: name a 
     new prime minister who can form a broadly based government of 
     national concord.
       This is in fact the key to a lasting solution. To isolate 
     the military from its traditional backers (the extreme right 
     and the older, more conservative, business class), true 
     democrats in Haiti need to unite around a new government of 
     national consensus. Moves toward creating such a centrist 
     force were already helping to fragment the army: In February 
     and March we saw legitimate parliamentarians who previously 
     had opposed Aristide's return join forces with pro-Aristide's 
     return join forces with pro-Aristide legislators to call for 
     his return. We saw conservative businessmen joining more 
     progressive younger businessmen and pro-Aristide labor unions 
     in calling for the departure of the country's military head.
       Unfortunately, this movement fell victim to intensive 
     lobbying campaigns by both the extreme right, who saw the 
     threat to their power, and Aristide's expatriate entourage, 
     which incorrectly labeled the idea of a coalition with the 
     majority of parliament ``power sharing'' with the military. 
     Ultimately, the extremes succeeded in killing the center.
       The United States helped bring this about. Despite initial 
     support for the parliamentary proposal, the U.S. government 
     was once again unable to stay the course on Haiti. A week 
     after Vice President Al Gore advised Aristide of our 
     considered position of support for the proposal, the U.S. 
     administration was in full retreat. Why? Quite simply, the 
     administration could not withstand domestic pressures against 
     the proposal emanating from congressional supporters of 
     President Aristide.
       Thus, having begun to split the Haitian army and to unite 
     the democratically elected parliament in support of U.S. 
     objectives, the administration suddenly and unwittingly 
     reunited the army and polarized the political situation anew.
       The reality in Haiti, whether President Aristide likes it 
     or not, is that he is stuck with a very decentralized form of 
     government known as a parliamentary system. And like it or 
     not, he does not have a working majority in his own 
     parliament. He needs allies. Without true reconciliation 
     among democratic elements in Haiti, there will be no true 
     democracy.
       The administration's inability to stay the course on 
     something as fundamental as building a political coalition in 
     a parliamentary democracy does not provide much hope that it 
     will be able to stay any course. It has now adopted a policy 
     line--sanctions without any political track--that has no 
     prospect of returning democracy of Aristide to Haiti. It is 
     clear that with the administration's decision not to push 
     Aristide on the political front, political negotiations for 
     his restoration are dead. Already those who came out for a 
     political, nonviolent solution have left the center and are 
     moving to the extremes.
       If the U.S. administration is serious about returning 
     Aristide now, it will have to do so on the backs of U.S. 
     soldiers. But in fact, intervention would not serve this 
     country or the Haitians. Democracy isn't build on foreign 
     intervention; it is built on reconciliation--as has been 
     proved recently in South Africa and El Salvador.
       By abandoning the track of multilateral negotiations, which 
     was forcing the Haitians to take political responsibility for 
     effecting change in their country, we have taken on full 
     responsibility for Haiti's future. This is no favor to 
     Aristide, the Haitian people or the Americans who will be 
     sacrificed in the attempt. The administration is trying to 
     force a new policy by responding to domestic pressures rather 
     than setting a steady course based on our interests and 
     responsive to the reality on the ground.
                                  ____


                        Dole-Mitchell Amendment

       Sec. 8147. Sense of Congress on the Use of Funds for United 
     States Military Operations in Haiti.--(a) Statement of 
     Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) all parties should honor their obligations under the 
     Governors Island Accord of July 3, 1993 and the New York Pact 
     of July 16, 1993;
       (2) the United States has a national interest in preventing 
     uncontrolled emigration from Haiti; and
       (3) the United States should remain engaged in Haiti to 
     support national reconciliation and further its interest in 
     preventing uncontrolled emigration.
       (b) Limitation.--It is the sense of Congress that funds 
     appropriated by this Act should not be obligated or expended 
     for United States military operations in Haiti unless--
       (1) authorized in advance by the Congress; or
       (2) the temporary deployment of United States Armed Forces 
     into Haiti is necessary to order to protect or evacuate 
     United States citizens from a situation of imminent danger 
     and the President reports as soon as practicable to Congress 
     after the initiation of the temporary deployment, but in no 
     case later than forty-eight hours after the initiation of the 
     temporary deployment; or
       (3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti 
     is vital to the national security interests of the United 
     States, including but not limited to the protection of 
     American citizens in Haiti, there is not sufficient time to 
     seek and receive Congressional authorization, and the 
     President reports as soon as practicable to Congress after 
     the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than 
     forty-eight hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
       (4) the President transmits to the Congress a written 
     report pursuant to subsection (c).
       (c) Report.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     limitation in subsection (b) should not apply if the 
     President reports in advance to Congress that the intended 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti--
       (1) is justified by United States national security 
     interests;
       (2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been 
     taken to ensure the safety and security of United States 
     Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States 
     Armed Forces will not become targets due to the nature of 
     their rules of engagement;
       (3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       (A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than 
     civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
       (B) that the United States Armed Forces proposed for 
     deployment are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the 
     objectives of the proposed mission;
       (4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the 
     deployment are established;
       (5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       (6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are estimated.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued 
     deployment, introduction or reintroduction of United States 
     Armed Forces into the land territory of Haiti, irrespective 
     of whether those Armed Forces are under United States or 
     United Nations command, but does not include activities for 
     the collection of foreign intelligence, activities directly 
     related to the operations of United States diplomatic or 
     other United States Government facilities, or operations to 
     counter emigration from Haiti.
                                  ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                   Washington, DC, April 28, 1994.
     Hon. Warren Christopher,
     Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: As I take my leave, I wanted to express 
     my grave concern that we are heading irrevocably down a path 
     toward unilateral military intervention in Haiti. That would 
     be a terrible mistake.
       Perhaps if I had had your full support in docking the USS 
     Harlan County last October, in seeking comprehensive 
     sanctions in January, and in pressing President Aristide 
     harder to work together with his own democratically-elected 
     parliamentarians we might have succeeded in overturning the 
     coup and restoring President Aristide despite the odds.
       Now, in abandoning the multilateral negotiation track which 
     was forcing the Haitians to take political responsibility for 
     effecting changes in their country, we have unwittingly taken 
     on full responsibility for Haiti's future. This is no favor 
     to President Aristide, the Haitian people or the Americans 
     who will be sacrificed in the attempt.
           Sincerely,
                                                Lawrence Fezzullo.
                                  ____


                Statement of President Bush, May 2, 1994

       I think the time has come for a significant shift in U.S. 
     policy towards Haiti.
       First, I think we should rule out the use of U.S. force in 
     Haiti. We suffered an enormous black eye to our prestige 
     around the world when, a few months ago, our ship was turned 
     back by a group of thugs on the dock at Port au Prince, but 
     use of U.S. ground forces in Haiti would, in my view, be a 
     tremendous mistake. We can easily put our forces in, but when 
     would they come home?
       In making decisions of this nature we must think not just 
     of Haiti but of the rest of the Caribbean and South America. 
     I certainly could not support the use of U.S. troops under 
     existing conditions in Haiti. No U.S. lives are at risk in 
     Haiti today.
       Further, I believe most of our friends in this hemisphere 
     would strongly disapprove of our using U.S. troops.
       No one in the area can doubt President Clinton's support of 
     democracy. Nor can they doubt his strong backing, up to now, 
     of Father Aristide; but Aristide has proved to be totally 
     unable to help facilitate his own return. He has been 
     unwilling to compromise and, in attacking President Clinton's 
     policy, he is attacking those who have been trying hard to 
     help him.
       The time has come to change policy.
       We should use our diplomatic best efforts to restore 
     democracy, to have new elections scheduled and to wrench 
     concessions from Haiti's military; but I am now satisfied 
     that we must separate ``backing democracy'' from ``backing 
     Aristide''.
       We must never waiver in our support for democracy. As 
     President, I felt that the way to support democracy in Haiti 
     was to insist on the return of Aristide to power. Given 
     recent events and Aristide's demonstrated instability the 
     time has come to break that linkage.

  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

                          ____________________