[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 52 (Wednesday, May 4, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 4, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       A CRITIQUE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT CLINTON

  Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, I rise today to discuss a topic of 
growing frustration to myself and many other Americans: the President's 
handling of this Nation's foreign affairs. Increasingly, the 
President's lack of attention, lack of interest, and lack of fortitude 
in foreign affairs and national security concerns is hurting this 
Nation's prestige overseas and this will, in turn, come back to hurt us 
in the future.
  There has been a spate of articles detailing the President's 
inactivity in the foreign policy field. The outgoing American 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raymond Seitz, was quoted in the May 
9, 1994 edition of U.S. News & World Report, as saying that:

       There's no confidence in Europe that the administration, or 
     the United States, has adapted to the big changes in the 
     world, identified what is important and what is not important 
     and what the priorities are * * *.

  Joe Klein, in Newsweek's May 9, 1994 edition, also commented on the 
President's handling of foreign affairs. Klein, wrote:

       A president's every word, the nuances of each position he 
     takes, must be carefully considered. There is no room for 
     carelessness--or promiscuity; positions can't be casually 
     struck as negotiating ploys and then indiscriminately 
     abandoned.

  These statements are instructive, for they are symbolic of the 
President's problem with foreign affairs: he seems to think that 
foreign policy by trial balloon will work--as he does with domestic 
policy by trial balloon. This idea is simply wrong. When an 
administration official makes a statement or doesn't make one, misses a 
meeting, or comes late, someone gets offended and we have a problem. 
When a President breaks his promise, the problem becomes infinitely 
bigger. Foreign policy is not a practice in which promises can be made 
and then broken. Foreign policy is also a practice which requires 
attention, not wholesale abandonment. While there certainly are 
domestic concerns, there are also foreign ones that require the 
President's constant, not casual attention.
  Thus far, the President, has, in Ambassador Seitz's word, lost the 
confidence of the world. This situation reflects badly upon us not only 
because of its existence, but through lack of attention, we can miss 
some event that can start off small, but snowball into a crisis.
  Beyond lack of attention to foreign affairs, the President seems all 
too willing to appease rogue nations only feeding their appetite. He 
offered economic aid to North Korea in order to convince it to allow 
nuclear inspections. This is ludicrous. He also offered to cancel 
military exercises to influence it. This too is wrong. The only thing 
this brutal communist dictatorship understands is a firm stance, backed 
up with the willingness to enforce its word. Bosnia is another clear 
example of waffling and appeasing to avoid the problem.
  Moreover, the President thinks that multilateralism is the wave of 
the future. In reality, he is foregoing American leadership in favor of 
the United Nations, which has never really proven itself in collective 
action. Somalia is a proven example of this case. In Bosnia, the 
President claimed to have not even have been informed that American 
jets were being used to bomb Serb positions. Where is Presidential 
leadership? He has allowed American forces to be commanded by foreign 
entities and commanders, without any input by our own commanders. This 
is embarrassing and exceedingly dangerous.
  Clearly the situation cannot proceed as it has. If it does, the world 
will continue to mistrust us and we will be left to face a crisis, 
perhaps without friends. Worse yet, a crisis can evolve that will 
overwhelm us simply because we did not pay the proper attention to the 
problem in its infancy.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the following 
chronology of significant foreign policy events of the Clinton 
administration, be included in the Record following the conclusion of 
my remarks.
  There being no objection, the chronology was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Clinton Foreign Policy: Chronology of Significant Events From January 
                           1993 to March 1994


                                  1993

                            January 14, 1993

       Haitian Policy.--President-elect Clinton reverses his 
     present campaign position, announcing he will continue the 
     Bush Administration policy of interdicting and returning 
     Haitians found on the high sea. Clinton is consulted before 
     the Jan. 15 placement of Coast Guard ships around Haiti to 
     prevent a massive migration from there. March: Clinton names 
     Lawrence Pezzullo special adviser on Haiti, meets with 
     President Aristide. June: Clinton increases sanctions against 
     Haiti. July: Aristide and Cedras sign Governors Island accord 
     to restore Aristide to office. October: Haitians block 
     landing of U.S. ship with U.N. military training mission 
     aboard, Clinton reimposes sanctions, stations ships around 
     Haiti to enforce U.N. embargo. March 1994: Clinton 
     Administration proposes new plan to restore Aristide to 
     office, which critics charge does not put enough pressure on 
     the military regime to relinquish power.
       To this date, the Administration has made no progress on 
     returning Aristide to power. The Administration has even 
     conceded that Aristide might not be able to return to power. 
     Yet, under pressure, the Administration has taken to issuing 
     threats of military action to return Aristide to power. It 
     has also suggested that U.S. ``trainers'' would be sent to 
     Haiti. Who will they train?

                           February 26, 1993

       World Trade Center Bombing.--A huge bomb was detonated in a 
     garage of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing 6 
     people and injuring more than a thousand others. A group of 
     Muslim extremists living in the New York City area were 
     arrested several days later and charged with the crime, 
     raising questions about possible complicity in the plot by 
     terrorist countries in the Middle East. Sudan was named as a 
     prime suspect. President Clinton in his weekly radio address 
     on 2-28, said that he had called New York Governor, Mario 
     Cuomo and New York City Mayor, David Dinkins, and promised 
     ``full support of federal law enforcement resources to 
     investigate the blast.'' Subsequent Congressional hearings 
     criticized the State Department's procedures for screening 
     visa applicants in overseas missions.
       On April 14, 1994, INS announces that it will no longer 
     require fingerprint checks on immigrants. Under public and 
     Congressional pressure, on April 19, 1994, INS rescinds this 
     policy.

                             March 12, 1993

       North Korea ``Suspends'' Withdrawal From NPT.--North Korea 
     announced that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after the International Atomic 
     Energy Commission (IAEA) demanded a ``special inspection'' of 
     hidden nuclear facilities. North Korea ``suspended'' its 
     withdrawal after the Clinton Administration decided to 
     negotiate bilaterally with North Korea--the first negotiation 
     occurring in June 1993. However, North Korea refused to allow 
     any IAEA inspection until March 1994. That inspection was 
     aborted when North Korean officials barred inspectors from 
     carrying out key functions that North Korea had agreed to in 
     a note to the IAEA on February 15, 1994. The U.N. Security 
     Council has taken up the issue. The Council has passed an 
     initial resolution and will consider sanctions against North 
     Korea, probably in May 1994, if Pyongyang does not allow the 
     IAEA to complete the March inspection. China's position on 
     sanctions may be the key of future Security Council 
     decisions.
       U.S. negotiations offered cancellation of joint U.S.-South 
     Korean military exercises, and offered economic aid in an 
     effort to persuade the North Koreans to allow inspections. 
     The Administration was even willing to accept limited 
     inspections, appearing to be appeasing Kim II-Sung.

                             March 27, 1993

       Export Administration Act Extension.--The President signed 
     a bill extending the act unchanged until June 1994. The 
     authorities in the act had been kept in force by executive 
     order since the fall of 1990 following a pocket veto of the 
     bill extension in November 1990, and the failure of Congress 
     to agree upon an acceptable replacement in 1991 and 1992. The 
     15 month extension was intended to allow some sort of 
     consensus to be reached on the terms of export controls in an 
     era characterized by the end of the Cold War and increased 
     concern over proliferation.
       The core of the U.S. proposal for a successor regime to 
     CoCom is that supplier nations agree on a list of military 
     critical products and technologies that would be denied to a 
     handful of rogue regimes. Many of our allies opposed this 
     principle and instead proposed that such controls be left to 
     ``national discretion'', effectively replacing multilateral 
     export controls with a loose collection of unilateral export 
     control policies. This approach would obviously be adverse 
     for the United States security and economic interests. CoCom 
     went out of existence on April 1, 1994. To this date, there 
     is a no successor regime. With CoCom gone and no 
     comprehensive multilateral controls in place, Iran, Iraq, 
     North Korea, Libya and other rogue regimes will be able to 
     accumulate the technology to build weapons of mass 
     destruction with increased speed and greater quality.

                             April 27, 1993

       Plot to Assassinate Former President Bush.--Kuwaiti 
     authorities arrested a group of Iraqis who had intended to 
     assassinate former President Bush during an official visit to 
     Kuwaiti April 14-16. The President was accompanied by his 
     wife and former members of his cabinet. After a lengthy 
     investigation and conviction of the conspirators by the 
     government of Kuwait, President Clinton, on June 27, ordered 
     a missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in 
     Baghdad in retaliation for the plot. Ambassador Albright 
     presented evidence of the plot at the United Nations.
       This nighttime attack resulted in the destruction of the 
     Iraqi intelligence agency's building, but by no means could 
     be seen as retaliatory for it only put the agency's assets 
     out of service. This was a hollow gesture.

                          April 1993-May 1993

       Bosnia-Hercegovina.--The Clinton Administration came out in 
     favor of lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
     government and threatening air strikes against the Bosnian 
     Serbs. Secretary Christopher travelled to Europe to consult 
     with European allies and Russian leaders on the U.S. 
     proposals, but met with resistance from European countries. 
     On May 22, the United States, Russia, France, the United 
     Kingdom, and Spain agreed on a ``joint action program from 
     Bosnia.'' The United States also pledged to contribute some 
     U.S. forces to the U.N. peacekeeping operations in Macedonia.
       While claiming that it favored lifting the arms embargo, 
     the Administration's lack of foreign policy credibility and 
     its waffling on the issue, has created a situation whereby 
     the Europeans will not go along with our diplomacy.

                              May 28, 1993

       China's MFN Eligibility.--President Clinton issued an 
     executive order which made China's eligibility for MFN 
     beginning July 3, 1994, contingent upon its making 
     significant progress on a number of human rights conditions.
       Despite campaign pledges to condition MFN on human rights 
     improvements and denunciations of President Bush for 
     ``turning its back on those struggling for democracy in 
     China,'' the President Clinton renewed MFN for China, by 
     executive order, not through legislation.

                             June 24, 1993

       Plot to blow-up critical sites in NYC.--The FBI arrested 9 
     men, all described as Muslim Fundamentalists on charges of 
     plotting a series of terrorist bombings of prominent sites in 
     and around New York City. Targets included UN Headquarters, 
     the Lincoln and Holland tunnels and busy thoroughfares 
     linking New York City and New Jersey. The case was 
     complicated by the implication of a prominent Muslim cleric, 
     Sheik Abdel Rahman.
       Attorney General Reno's decision not to arrest the sheik 
     met with wide criticism. Public pressure ultimately led to 
     his arrest and initiation of deportation action which is 
     still unresolved.

                            August 18, 1993

       Sudan placed on terrorism list.--The U.S. State Department 
     placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorists. 
     The action restricted U.S. trade with Sudan and prohibited 
     U.S. aid other than humanitarian aid. The action was taken in 
     response to reports that the Sudanese government was allowing 
     its territory to be used as sanctuary for terrorists and to 
     train extremists who commit terrorist acts in other 
     countries. Furthermore, eight individuals linked with the 
     Sudanese government were arrested and charged with planning 
     to bomb the United Nations and other headquarters in New York 
     City.

                            August 24, 1993

       Missile sanctions against China.--The United States 
     determined that China in 1992 had transferred M-II missile-
     related technology to Pakistan in violation of MTCR 
     guidelines, which China has promised to honor. As a result, 
     the Clinton Administration announced it was imposing 
     sanctions against China. The effect of the August 24 
     sanctions is to deny for 2 years U.S. Government contracts 
     with the sanctioned entity, and licenses for transfer to the 
     sanctioned entity, for missile equipment or technology listed 
     in the MTCR Annex.

                           September 10, 1993

       Israel-PLO mutual recognition.--Following 9 months of 
     secret negotiations in Norway, Israel and the Palestine 
     Liberation Organization exchanged letters of recognition. The 
     next day, President Clinton announced that the United States 
     would resume the dialogue with the PLO that it had broken off 
     after a June 1990 terrorist incident.
       The secret negotiations took place in Norway, and according 
     to the Administration, took them by ``surprise.'' The U.S., 
     to the surprise of many, had no role in this agreement, other 
     than hosting the ceremony.

                           September 27, 1993

       Non-proliferation policy.--The President declared a 
     ``higher priority'' for non-proliferation, while seeking to 
     expand trade and to build a new consensus to promote 
     effective non-proliferation efforts. He also set a 
     restrictive policy on fissile material, emphasized the 
     importance of extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     in 1995, reaffirmed support for the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime, pledged to promote measures to prevent the 
     proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, placed a 
     new emphasis on proliferation issues in regional affairs and 
     in intelligence collection and analysis, and indicated the 
     Administration would review conventional arms transfer 
     policy.
       Despite this, the Administration failed to persuade its 
     allies in Cocom to renew that organization. Having gone out 
     of existence on April 1, 1994, export policies of former 
     Cocom member countries, while nominally adhering to the 
     Old Cocom export restriction lists, will revert to 
     individual national discretion. This policy will in turn 
     amount to increased proliferation and the U.S. will have 
     little or no leverage with its allies to stem the flow of 
     dangerous technology to rogue regimes such as Libya, Iran, 
     Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba. In essence, while talking 
     non-proliferation, the Administration is actually 
     proliferating with its ineffective export control 
     policies.

                           September 27, 1993

       Peacekeeping.--President Clinton, addressing the U.N. 
     General Assembly, noted that ``U.N. peacekeeping holds the 
     promise to resolve many of this era's conflicts.'' At the 
     same time, he stated that the ``United Nations simply cannot 
     become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts.'' This 
     seeming disparity in his remarks expresses only a small 
     portion of the debate within the Administration over the past 
     year as it sought to develop a coordinated U.S. policy 
     guidance on the use and support of peacekeeping. That policy 
     guidance, in the form of Presidential Decision Directive 13, 
     is expected to be signed shortly.
       After the disastrous U.S. debacle in Somalia, on October 3, 
     1993, coupled with the string of U.S. casualties leading up 
     to the failed raid, Congress forced the Administration to 
     agree to withdraw from Somalia by March 31, 1994. Not 
     learning from its mistakes, the Administration tried to land 
     peacekeeping troops in Haiti, but they were not allowed to 
     land, having been scared off by crowds of Haitian thugs. 
     Nevertheless, the Administration is still contemplating 
     sending up to 25,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia, and is again 
     talking about sending ``U.S. military trainers'' to Haiti.

                           September 30, 1993

       National Export Strategy Report.--The Clinton 
     Administration released a report to Congress from the Trade 
     Promotion Coordinating Committee on the measures needed to 
     increase exports. Under the heading ``Regulatory Obstacles to 
     Exports'' the report focused on export controls and product 
     standards. The report asserted that the telecommunications 
     and computer sectors were most affected by exports controls, 
     and several recommendations were made to liberalize export 
     controls over these commodities.
       It is painfully obvious that the Administration is catering 
     to the technology center in Southern California, and this 
     type of export strategy, with an emphasis on erasing export 
     restrictions in these areas will provide more support for a 
     State very important in 1996. The lack of intention to U.S. 
     national security is quite evident.

                            October 6, 1993

       Computer Export Decontrols.--The Commerce Department took 
     the first of several steps to greatly reduce controls on the 
     export of computers and telecommunications equipment. In the 
     first step, exports of computers with an operational speed of 
     195 MTOPS (Millions Theoretical Operations Per Second) were 
     to be allowed to most free-world destinations with little 
     restriction. The previous speed for control had been 20 
     MTOPS. At the same time, the Administration announced it 
     would attempt to change the definition of supercomputer from 
     195 MTOPS to 2000 MTOPS, and to raise the allowed speed to 
     most COCOM proscribed destinations to 500 MTOPS. Machines 
     defined as supercomputers required much more stringent 
     operational and end-use monitoring. Further liberalizations 
     concerning allowable speeds and destinations took place at 
     the end of December 1993, and in February and March 1994.
       Even Japan objected to liberalizing the controls to these 
     levels. If the Administration had non-proliferation as a 
     goal, than this decontrol will again run counter to its 
     states policy. Faster and more available computers will 
     allow rogue states to acquire weapons of mass destruction 
     only faster. This is proliferation, not counter-
     proliferation.

                            October 11, 1993

       Greek National Election.--In a sweeping victory, Socialist 
     Andreas Papandreou, known for his anti-American rhetoric 
     during his 1981-89 term, was returned to power. President 
     Clinton congratulated Papandreou and invited him to the 
     United States. Papandreou had never before been invited and, 
     in his maiden address to parliament, expressed his hope for 
     warm U.S.-Greek relations.
       In March 1994, the United States provided diplomatic 
     recognition to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
     clearly offending Greece, and millions of Greek-Americans, 
     whom the President promised while campaigning in October 
     1992, that he would not recognize Macedonia until it 
     satisfied numerous Greek concerns.

                            October 28, 1993

       Kashmir Initiatives.--In a background briefing for South 
     Asian journalists in Washington, U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
     State for South Asia Robin Raphel stated the longstanding 
     U.S. view that Kashmir is disputed territory and also 
     questioned the finality of Kashmir's accession to India in 
     1947. In response, the Indian government lodged a protest and 
     the Indian press exploded with anti-American rhetoric. 
     Raphel's comments and subsequent statements by President 
     Clinton and other Administration officials were part of 
     Administration efforts to promote progress on the decades-
     old, increasingly dangerous Indo-Pakistani standoff over 
     Kashmir. Such efforts, however, continued to fuel vitriolic 
     reactions in India, where any comments on sensitive subjects 
     such as Kashmir, Punjab, or human rights are viewed as a tilt 
     toward Pakistan in the zero-sum game of South Asian politics. 
     In late March 1994, Raphel held three days of talks in New 
     Delhi in a partially successful effort to ease tensions.
       Nevertheless, the Administration offended Indian-Americans, 
     and broke a long-standing American policy by making these 
     statements. Additionally, Administration has offered to sell 
     F-16 fighters to Pakistan, only complicating the situation.

                           November 22, 1993

       South Asia Nuclear Proliferation Initiatives.--In search of 
     avenues to progress on the South Asia nuclear proliferation 
     issue, the Clinton Administration sent to Congress a 
     ``discussion draft'' of a proposal to eliminate various 
     ``country specific'' provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     (FAA) of 1961, including Sec. 620E(e), the so-called 
     ``Pressler Amendment,'' under which aid and most arms sales 
     to Pakistan remain cut off since October 1990. The 
     Administration later dropped the proposal as a result of 
     strenuous objections from some Members of Congress. Early in 
     1994, the Administration began floating a proposal to release 
     F-16 fighter aircraft paid for by Pakistan but blocked 
     because of the Pressler Amendment. In return Pakistan 
     reportedly would be required to agree to cap their nuclear 
     program and open their facilities to inspection by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.
       This policy only adds more acrimony to U.S.-Indian 
     relations and could in fact, fuel the dispute, perhaps 
     stimulating an arms race in the region, forcing India to seek 
     plans to counter this sale.


                                  1994

                            February 3, 1994

       U.S. Trade Embargo Against Vietnam Lifted.--President 
     Clinton lifted the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam that 
     had been in effect since 1975. Administration officials cited 
     as justification continued progress with Vietnam in 
     accounting for American missing in action (MIAs) from the 
     Vietnam War. U.S. companies, eager for business opportunities 
     in Vietnam, supported the Administration's decision. Groups 
     representing the families of MIAs were critical, asserting 
     that Vietnam needed to do much more to account for the MIAs. 
     The Vietnamese Government praised the decision and called on 
     the Clinton Administration to grant Vietnam Most Favored 
     Nation (MFN) trade status; but Vietnamese officials warned 
     that they would reject any future U.S. pressure related to 
     human rights conditions inside Vietnam.
       Again, the Administration was more concerned with potential 
     business ties, than the lack of total cooperation from 
     Vietnam on the issue of the MIA's.

                            February 7, 1994

       Release of National Drug Control Strategy.--The 
     Administration released its National Drug Control Strategy. 
     The strategy represents a shift in emphasis from 
     international programs to domestic ones. The international 
     strategy constitutes a diminution in the importance of drug 
     trade destruction in relation to other foreign policy issues 
     such as democracy, market-based economic growth, and human 
     rights. It continues to define cocaine as the primary threat 
     and envisions a shift of resources from interdiction beyond 
     U.S. borders and territorial seas towards host nation 
     enforcement programs. The new Federal Drug Control Budget 
     requests $13.18 billion in budget authority for FY1995, an 
     8.6% increase ($104 billion) over the amount enacted in 
     FY1994. Also, it reflects the Administration's decision to 
     increase funding for demand reduction (prevention and 
     treatment). The FY1995 split for supply reduction and demand 
     reduction is 59% and 41%, respectively, as compared to a 63% 
     and 37% split in FY1994. The FY1995 budget request seeks to 
     restore FY1994 congressional cuts for funding of 
     international narcotics control programs. The new budget 
     request seeks $231.8 million for international programs, a 
     21.7% increase over FY1994 appropriations levels.
       The report that National Drug Control Policy Director Lee 
     Brown released is, just as its title suggests, ``interim''. 
     This report is full of what ``should'' be done, and what 
     ``can'' be done, with few suggestions of what ``will'' be 
     done. It is more a promotion for the Administration's Health 
     Care proposal and its recently passed National Service bill, 
     than any real plan to carry on the Drug fight. While stating 
     that it is the Administration's goal to fight drugs through 
     crime control, the strategy offers the ill-conceived strategy 
     of gun control, not real crime control.

                            February 9, 1994

       NATO Ultimatum.--After the February 5 mortar attack on the 
     Sarajevo market, the Clinton Administration decided to take 
     further action. Weeks of diplomatic negotiations, had seen 
     the United States and France find common ground on the issue 
     of air strikes. They jointly proposed the February 9 NATO 
     ultimatum, which threatened air attacks against Serbian guns 
     position if the siege continued. President Clinton outlined 
     U.S. strategic and humanitarian interests in taking this 
     action, including preventing the conflict from becoming a 
     wider war, maintaining the credibility of the NATO alliance, 
     curbing destabilizing refugee flows, and responding to the 
     dire humanitarian situation. He also emphasized that only a 
     political solution would end the conflict.
       This threat was one of many issued by the Administration. 
     In this case threats worked and forced Serb gunners to pull 
     back from Sarajevo, but only after nearly two years of 
     inaction by the Administration in Bosnia. Further threats by 
     the Administration were ignored and not backed up with 
     force giving the further impression of a U.S. foreign 
     policy weakness.

                           February 24, 1994

       Export Administration Act Proposal.--The Clinton 
     Administration submitted a 99 page draft proposal for 
     extension of the Export Administration Act. According to 
     administration officials, the bill integrated foreign policy, 
     national security and export promotion interests. Its major 
     objectives were supposedly to increase discipline on the 
     imposition of unilateral export controls; establish a 
     preference for multilateral export controls; improve the 
     ability to pursue non-proliferation goals; streamline export 
     license processing; limit controls that would have an 
     ``unfair impact'' on U.S. exports; and strengthen enforcement 
     mechanisms.
       This proposal abandons the idea of protecting U.S. national 
     security, in favor of business. There is no balance between 
     the two in the proposal.

                           February 26, 1994

       Hebron Mosque Massacre.--An Israeli settler killed 30 
     Palestinian worshippers in a mosque in the West Bank town of 
     Hebron. In protest, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the PLO 
     suspended their participation. President Clinton issued a 
     statement deploring the violence and, to prevent the peace 
     process from derailing, invited Israel and the PLO to send 
     delegations to expedited peace talks in Washington. The 
     United States abstained on votes for 2 paragraphs of U.N. 
     Security Council Resolution 904 condemning the massacre that 
     referred to Jerusalem as ``occupied territory.'' Israel and 
     the PLO subsequently resumed to talks in Egypt.
       Amazingly, the Administration did not veto this odious 
     paragraph. They could have done so without endangering the 
     entire resolution, but the Administration was afraid of 
     offending Arafat and the PLO.

                             March 25, 1994

       U.S. Withdrawal From Somalia.--Remaining U.S. military 
     forces withdrew from Somalia. Approximately 50 Marines stayed 
     in Mogadishu to protect the U.S. Embassy there, and about 12 
     U.S. personnel were still serving in the U.N. headquarters. 
     President Clinton had announced on October 7, 1993 that U.S. 
     forces would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994. The announcement 
     followed the combat deaths of 18 American soldiers in clashes 
     with forces loyal to faction leader Mohammed Farah Aideed on 
     October 3-4.

                          ____________________