[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 51 (Tuesday, May 3, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         SECTION 531 OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, on Saturday, President Clinton signed 
the State Department authorization bill. I rise this morning to speak 
about a particular provision of that bill, section 531.
  Section 531 is an important statement of United States policy toward 
our friends in Taiwan.
  Madam President, back in July of last year, I added an amendment to 
the State Department bill that reaffirmed the primacy of the Taiwan 
Relations Act, as the law of the land, over the 1982 joint United 
States-China communique known as the Shanghai Communique, a statement 
of policy.
  The Foreign Relations Committee voted 20 to 0 to reaffirm the primacy 
of the Taiwan Relations Act as the law of the land by accepting my 
amendment.
  I would remind this body that the Taiwan Relations Act was passed 
back in 1979 by a greater than two-thirds vote of each House. The TRA, 
as it is known, is really the cornerstone of our relationship with 
Taiwan. The Shanghai Communique, on the other hand, was the result of 
Executive communications that were never ratified by this body. I think 
the difference speaks for itself.
  Last week, the House and Senate conferees accepted a substitute of my 
original amendment that retained the intent of the original language to 
specifically reaffirm the primacy of the Taiwan Relations Act over the 
statements of policy, that is, the Shanghai Communique.
  The language adopted in the conference is significant because it 
reasserts Congress' role, together with that of the President, in 
determining the extent of defensive arm sales to Taiwan
  Madam President, to understand this amendment, I think it is 
important to look at the relevant language--because, as we have heard 
around here for a long time, the devil is in the details--of the Taiwan 
Relations Act as compared to the Shanghai Communique.
  I have two charts that highlight the important distinctions between 
the TRA and the Shanghai Communique. The first chart refers to section 
3 of the Taiwan Relations Act which was adopted by the U.S. Congress on 
April 10, 1979. Section 3(a) says:

       The United States will make available to Taiwan such 
     defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may 
     be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
     defense capability.

  I want to underline ``sufficient self-defense capability.'' That does 
not read ``offense.'' It means that the United States will help Taiwan 
maintain its defensive, not offensive, capabilities.
  Further, section 3(b) says: ``The President and the Congress'' --you 
notice the Congress is identified with the President--``shall determine 
the nature and quantity of such defense articles and defense services 
based solely upon their judgments of the needs of Taiwan.'' ``Their 
judgment'' means the President in consultation with the Congress.
  Now, the other chart shows the specific differences between the TRA 
and the Shanghai Communique. What we have here is the joint communique 
dated August 17, 1982, and it is quite specific. It says that the 
administration pledged ``to reduce gradually its sales of arms to 
Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.''
  That is paragraph 6 of the communique.
  The language which was accepted by the conference, my amendment, 
simply reasserts the primacy of domestic law over nontreaty 
understandings. The United States-China Joint Communique is a nontreaty 
understanding. The Taiwan Relations Act is still the binding law of the 
land.
  Section 531 not only reasserts the primacy of the domestic law over 
the nontreaty understandings, but it gives notice--and I think this is 
important, Madam President--to the administration that the Congress has 
not been properly consulted over the continuing refinement of United 
States arms sales policy toward Taiwan.
  This congressional statement, which was adopted by the conference, 
reflects the concern on the part of myself and many of our colleagues 
over China's military modernization, its increased military spending, 
and its territorial claims. If one questions whether there is an 
increased threat from China, I would suggest that you examine the 
undisputed facts. China is the only declared nuclear power increasing 
its defense budget and military capabilities; an estimated increase of 
about 22 percent over last year. That is very significant in a world 
where other major powers are decreasing their defense budgets.
  In addition, China has reaffirmed its right to use force against 
Taiwan in a white paper on the Taiwan question.
  Section 531 also calls on the President to assess changes in the 
PRC's--People's Republic of China--capabilities and intentions on a 
regular basis in considering whether it is appropriate to adjust arms 
sales to Taiwan.
  So the President is required to monitor the changes and make 
adjustments either upward or downward.
  The language of the amendment makes clear that the U.S. Congress, 
this body along with the House, is committed to providing Taiwan the 
defensive means necessary to ensure its safety.
  My intent in pushing for this amendment was simply to point out the 
inconsistency between telling the Taiwanese that we would provide for 
their defense needs but then arbitrarily limiting what we would sell to 
them.
  I am referring here to the so-called defense bucket amendment. As a 
result of the Shanghai Communique, the bucket of defensive articles and 
defensive services that we will sell to Taiwan has been declining over 
a period of time from about $820 million in 1982 to approximately $580 
million in 1993. Now, these numbers suggest that there will be less in 
the bucket, but if we want to make sales that are in our interest, 
perhaps our political interest--for example, F-16 sales--it can be 
considered outside the bucket. So nobody knows what is in the bucket or 
outside the bucket except the State Department, and the negotiating 
process is, to me at least, hard to understand. The loss of exports to 
Taiwan that has resulted from the inconsistencies in our policy is 
staggering.
  But the Taiwan Relations Act is explicit that the nature and quantity 
of defensive arms transferred to Taiwan would be based solely upon the 
judgment of the President and Congress of the needs of Taiwan, not on 
political decisions.
  Thus, whether we are talking about sales of United States 
manufacturing equipment on third-country frigates in to the Taiwanese 
navy or ballistic missile systems, the decision must be based on 
Taiwan's needs and not on arbitrary principles. And that is an 
important requirement.
  I am pleased, Madam President, that our Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, has sent me a letter as part of our discussion of this 
amendment, which reaffirms the administration's commitment to the 
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, including acknowledging the 
Taiwan Relations Act's legal precedence over the Shanghai Communique.
  But more changes are needed in United States policy toward Taiwan to 
treat Taiwan with the respect that they deserve.
  Taiwan has the world's 14th largest economy and is the United States' 
sixth largest trading partner. Taiwan holds the world's largest foreign 
reserves. Moreover, Taiwan is a dependable friend and a good 
international citizen.
  Many United States policies are simply out of date, out of line with 
the practice of our major Europian allies, and out of touch with 
current realities in East Asia, including the fact that Taiwan and the 
PRC are themselves exchanging citizens and trading and that Taiwan has 
invested over $10 billion in the Peoples' Republic of China.
  Let me give you a few examples before I close:
  The administration should change its policy prohibiting high-level 
contacts. Our President attended a meeting between Vice President Gore 
and the Dalai Lama, Tibet's exiled ruler. Just last week Hong Kong's 
Chief Secretary, Mrs. Anson Chan, paid official visits to the State 
Department and the National Security Council. We have Yasser Arafat 
going to the White House. None of these individuals have official U.S. 
diplomatic status. But the White House has made policy decisions to 
have contacts. But President Lee Teng-hui cannot land in my State of 
Alaska nor can he land in Hawaii to visit.
  Carla Hills, the USTR under President Bush, was the last Cabinet-
level officer to visit Taiwan and, I might add, the only one. The 
administration should send Secretary of Commerce Brown or USTR Kantor 
to Taiwan. The administration should allow Taiwan's Economic Minister 
to visit his counterpart in the United States.
  The administration should allow the Taiwanese to change the name of 
their representative office here. Currently, the Taiwanese conducting 
nondiplomatic activities in the United States are forced to live with 
an acronym more appropriate for perhaps a basketball league.
  CCNAA--the Coordinating Council of North American Affairs. Who could 
make that connection with Taiwan? This is simply silly. Let us get on 
it with it and let the Taiwanese change the name to something that at 
least identifies the office and the country.
  Then there is the matter of the visa stamp. When a visa is obtained 
in Taiwan, it bears a Hong Kong stamp. What are we going to do in 1997 
when Hong Kong reverts to China? The policy must be changed. Let us do 
it now out of respect for friends in Taiwan.
  Finally, and perhaps most important, let us support Taiwanese 
membership in multilateral institutions like the GATT, APEC and the 
United Nations.
  Madam President, I have been told that the administration is 
conducting an interagency review of its Taiwan policy, and that is 
good. But the fact is, Madam President, that review started last July 
and it is still going on and we are still waiting for an announcement 
of what the policy is so everyone will understand the game rules.
  I hope the administration will listen to some of these 
recommendations. I know that many of my colleagues will support many of 
these changes, and I ask them to communicate their views directly to 
the administration.
  I would like to conclude by thanking my colleagues in the Senate--
particularly on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, and 
Senator Helms--for their support in the conference of my amendment.
  And I want to thank National Security Advisor Tony Lake, Ambassador 
Winston Lord, Congressman Hamilton and their staffs for working with 
me, and Deanna Okun of my staff, as well, and those who helped in 
reaching an agreement in conference on the language of the substitute 
amendment. I think it is long overdue and most appropriate as we deal 
with our friends in Taiwan.
  Madam President, I yield the floor, and wish you a good day.

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