[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 51 (Tuesday, May 3, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             AIRLINE SAFETY

  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, a very important matter has come up that I 
hope the Senate and the House of Representatives will address itself 
to. Under the leadership of our great Secretary of Transportation, 
Secretary Pena, we should be alerted to the fact that we have a ticking 
time bomb going on with regard to airline safety.
  The Secretary of Transportation has taken the recommendation of a 
previously structured national commission to ensure competitiveness in 
the airline industry that this Senator was a part of, to change and 
challenge the competition, increase safety, and modernize our traffic 
control system in the United States.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my 
remarks there be printed in the Record for the information of all, a 
report to the President and Congress of August 1993 entitled ``Change, 
Challenge, and Competition,'' by the National Commission to Ensure a 
Strong and Competitive Airline Industry; and two articles of the last 2 
days, yesterday and this morning, Tuesday, from the Washington Post, by 
two excellent writers, with regard to the Federal administration's 
case, supported by the Secretary of Transportation with regard to the 
need to do something and to plan to do something now before the present 
situation becomes chaotic.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I salute the great safety record of the 
Federal Aviation Administration. Certainly, if you look at the record, 
you will see that with the diligence, the tenacity, and the 
determination of the dedicated air traffic controllers of the United 
States of America, we fly an unbelievable amount of aircraft and flying 
hours to the benefit of the traveling public. Their record has been 
exemplary.
  The fact of the matter is that something needs to be done with regard 
to planning for the future. If you will take the time to look firsthand 
today at the equipment that is available to the air traffic controller, 
which all of us as the traveling public and all of the employees of the 
airlines rely on to keep track of and keep the proper distance between 
the mass of air traffic today, particularly at certain of our more 
heavily controlled airports, you will begin to realize the enormity of 
the situation.
  In addition, Mr. President, this has a national security implication 
because, in addition to the private aircraft and the commercial 
aircraft, all of the aircraft flown by the military of the United 
States of America in at least our airways and our skies in the United 
States of America are, once again, controlled and kept separated by the 
Air Traffic Controllers Association and their dedicated people.
  If you take the time to look at the equipment that they use, you will 
find, Mr. President, that in all too many cases the computers, the 
viewing screens, the communications facilities that make and bring all 
this together are older than any of the aircraft and in many instances 
older than any of the air traffic controllers that are now using them. 
In the days of yesteryear we relied basically on the vacuum tube from 
the standpoint of being the heart and soul of radio, including, in the 
early days, television. The vacuum tube is a thing of the past. The 
vacuum tubes that we are using in our air traffic control system today 
are not, by and large, manufactured in the United States but abroad, 
because the computer chips and other technologies have made the vacuum 
tube obsolete. When you realize that certain parts of our air traffic 
control system are relying on a vacuum tube, you realize how far behind 
we are.
  Mr. President, the Secretary of Transportation has suggested that a 
new type of corporation, which would be owned and controlled by the 
Federal Government not unlike the Tennessee Valley Authority, should be 
enacted as recommended by the Airline Commission in order to 
streamline, to speed up, to enhance, if you will, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, and to move the Federal Aviation Administration from 
its present status to the new corporation. This would contribute a 
great deal to the advance that has been made to speed up and modernize 
our air traffic control system.
  Why is this necessary? I simply submit for the Record that there are 
currently 19,000 scheduled airline flights a day in the United States. 
Air traffic control systems are being stretched to their absolute limit 
and, as I referenced earlier, have done an excellent job. In 1980, 
there were 300 million passengers flying. Last year, there were more 
than 500 million passengers flying. By the year 2005, there will be 800 
million passengers flying in the United States. The number of flights 
per year is expected to increase from 60 million in 1993 to 74 million 
by the year 2005.
  I simply say that, of the budget of the United States, 80 percent of 
the current Federal Aviation Administration budget goes to the air 
traffic control situation. Restructuring the Federal Aviation 
Administration could save, according to the recommendations and belief 
of the Secretary, about $7 billion over 10 years. Rapid response to new 
technology and a relief from present procurement rules are an absolute 
necessity if we are to be able to keep pace with the obligation that we 
have to better serve the public.
  I simply say, Mr. President, that there may be some changes that 
should be made. Possibly those of us responsible for this in the 
Government could come up with something better, but I simply salute the 
Secretary of Transportation for his forthrightness, for his looking 
into the future, for his citing the safety problems that are likely to 
accrue, not now, not today, but tomorrow, unless we take some action.
  Therefore, I recommend the reading of these articles that I have 
submitted for the Record to the Members of the House and the Senate. 
While there seems to be some opposition in some parts of the Congress 
today to any change whatsoever, this Senator is taking a totally open 
mind on this proposition, and I hope that my other colleagues will not 
only take an open mind but work collectively together to try to address 
this problem that is with us today and is going to be more serious 
unless we attack it now and begin to change what I think is a very 
dangerous precedent that we have been setting by having the air traffic 
control system not keep pace with the traveling public and its needs.

                               Exhibit 1

         [A report to the President and Congress, August 1993]

Change, Challenge and Competition--The National Commission to Ensure a 
                  Strong Competitive Airline Industry


                           restructuring faa

       To ensure the timely and efficient implementation of state-
     of-the-art technology for the operation and funding of the 
     air traffic control system, the FAA must be established as an 
     independent government corporation and removed from the 
     federal budget process. That process provides neither a 
     stable, predictable source of revenue nor the ability to 
     leverage that revenue, both of which are required to fund the 
     high-technology capital improvement program needed for a 
     state-of-the-art air traffic control system. Put simply, the 
     federal budget process cannot be relied on to provide 
     adequate, continuing funds for FAA's operations or capital 
     programs. The improvements we believe are necessary in our 
     air traffic control system cannot be accomplished without a 
     stable, predictable source of revenues and the ability to use 
     those revenues to secure long-term financing.
       The Airport and Airway Trust Fund was designed to provide a 
     dedicated source of user funding to pay for airport and 
     airspace improvements. It should not serve as a general fund 
     asset for the federal government. User demand and the 
     stability and growth of user revenues must drive air traffic 
     control operations and modernization. A recent Office of 
     Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum contemplates hundreds 
     of millions of dollars in operating and maintenance budget 
     reductions for FAA in fiscal year 1995. These cuts would have 
     a devastating impact and illustrate how the vagaries of the 
     federal budget undermine the funding stability necessary to 
     provide efficient air traffic control services.
       Few high-technology, capital-intensive businesses attempt a 
     pay-as-you-go approach to major capital investment projects. 
     The existing user-fee revenue stream must be used rationally 
     to fund the massive capital projects needed to keep our air 
     transportation system the most efficient and technologically 
     advanced in the world.
       Unfortunately, federal agencies like the FAA operate under 
     severe limitations. These include total dependence on a 
     political and unpredictable budgetary process; a cumbersome 
     procurement system designed to prevent fraud but even better 
     at thwarting the timely and efficient acquisition of 
     sophisticated and rapidly evolving high technology goods and 
     services, and, a federal personnel system that makes it 
     unnecessarily difficult to attract and retain a talented and 
     technically sophisticated work force.
       The FAA must be restructured fundamentally if we are to 
     take full advantage of new developments in air traffic 
     control technology. If it is, the U.S. can ensure that its 
     air traffic control system remains efficient and the world's 
     best, and provides an important export opportunity in a high-
     technology, high-wage sector.
       Adoption of the following recommendations would create a 
     self-funding and leading-edge system capable of meeting the 
     needs of travelers, shippers and airlines in a high-
     technology environment. The Commission also emphasizes that 
     it believes the federal government should maintain policy 
     control of the air traffic control system and its oversight 
     of system safety.
       Specifically, we recommend: Creation of an independent 
     federal corporate entity within the DOT to manage and fund 
     air traffic control and related functions, including system 
     development, procurement and maintenance. Policy control of 
     the air traffic control system and safety oversight should 
     stay with the federal government;
       Establishment of a panel of FAA and industry experts, with 
     the participation of the Department of Defense, which will 
     report in 90 days on the specific structure and method of 
     implementation, and which will draft legislative proposals 
     for creation of the corporate entity; and,
       The following principles should be embodied in the federal 
     corporate entity's implementing act:
       Ability of the corporate entity to create and use a 
     predictable, stable source of revenue for operations, 
     maintenance and capital investment;
       Ability of the corporate entity to issue long-term bonds 
     for capital purchases;
       Removal of current expenditures and revenues from the 
     federal budget in equal amounts for a fiscally neutral 
     effect;
       Sufficient management flexibility and compensation to 
     attract and retain high-caliber leadership and staff;
       Flexibility to create systems for procurement, staff and 
     budget consistent with best practices in the private sector:
       Flexibility in an orderly transfer of operating functions 
     to the reorganized entity; and,
       Continued air traffic control service to the Defense 
     Department, meeting national security requirements.


                      other system capacity issues

       The Commission gave high priority to examining ways to make 
     our air transportation system more efficient and 
     technologically advanced. Our recommendations to restructure 
     the FAA and accelerate the use of GPS for air traffic control 
     are critical to achievement of the goal.
       The Commission also examined other options for improving 
     system capacity issues and developed these recommendations. 
     We recommend
       FAA review the rule that limits operations at ``high 
     density'' airports with the aim of either removing these 
     artificial limits or raising them to the highest practicable 
     level consistent with safety requirements. (Washington 
     National Airport's legislated limits would not be affected.)
       Congress fully fund system capacity elements--facilities 
     and equipment; airports; research, engineering and 
     development, and FAA operations--as long as these remain 
     within the federal budget process.
       Finally, the Commission urges the FAA and the Department of 
     Defense to cooperate actively to make maximum possible joint 
     use of airspace and military airfields. In addition, we 
     believe costs related to system capacity improvements could 
     be lowered significantly if airport bonds were classified as 
     public-purpose bonds, as recommended by the Anthony 
     Commission.
                                  ____


                [From the Washington Post, May 2, 1994]

           United States To Shake Up Air Traffic Bureaucracy

               (By Richard M. Weintraub and John Burgess)

       The Clinton administration has decided that the vast 
     network of computers and people who guide 19,000 scheduled 
     airline flights a day across the country is so 
     bureaucratically encrusted that both safety and efficiency 
     will be threatened unless a new way is found to run it.
       An administration proposal to remove the air traffic 
     service from the Federal Aviation Administration and turn it 
     over to a government corporation, long sought by the airline 
     industry, will be officially announced this week, according 
     to government sources.
       Thousands of aircraft fly at hundreds of miles an hour 
     through crowded skies without bumping into each other in 
     large measure because of 38,000 air traffic controllers, 
     technicians and managers who operate the system's radars and 
     computers.
       But, despite huge expenditures and a major improvement 
     program dating from 1981, some of those computers run in part 
     on technologically extinct vacuum tubes that until recently 
     could be acquired only from factories in Poland and 
     Czechoslovakia. Others come from China.
       At sprawling Los Angeles International Airport, the radars 
     that monitor planes on the ground on often fog-enshrouded 
     runways depend on tubes made only in a British factory. The 
     FAA has no way to test them other than by plugging them in.
       The FAA's premier project, a multibillion-dollar program to 
     replace its entire aircraft-tracking computer system, is so 
     burdened by mismanagement that officials have concluded that 
     it probably never can be completed as presently designed.
       According to both the statistics and safety specialists, 
     the air traffic control system is safe today. But the 
     argument for reinventing it insists that, if it is to stay 
     safe and efficient as air travel grows, it must escape the 
     snail-like decision-making and procurement that many feel 
     have characterized FAA management.
       ``The plan to establish an air traffic control corporation 
     is a model of our reinventing government effort,'' said Vice 
     President Gore, who brushed aside the most recent internal 
     opponents to the concept at a White House meeting last month.
       ``The plan will cut red tape and make it easier to procure 
     the most up-to-date equipment. By improving working 
     conditions through the use of updated equipment, the plan 
     allows air traffic employees to focus on the business of 
     ensuring safer air travel for everyone.''
       Not everyone agrees, and when Gore and Transportation 
     Secretary Federico Pena announce their plan to split the 
     agency, it will set off a battle on Capitol Hill, where key 
     congressmen are questioning whether the administration's 
     solution is the safest path to follow.


                         difference of opinion

       The aviation community has many more players than the 
     airlines, and they do not all agree on what, if anything, 
     should be done.
       ``We need a system that will keep up with the industry it 
     serves,'' Pena told a group of air traffic controllers at a 
     recent meeting in Leesburg. ``We've been talking about this 
     for 10 years. Let's do it!''
       But Rep. James L. Oberstar (D-Minn.), chairman of the House 
     aviation subcommittee, said: ``This is just the wrong course 
     and it would take years to recover from it. . . . Shake up 
     the agency; don't dismember it.''
       Oberstar said the sheer disruption of massive change to the 
     FAA that a new corporation would create threatens the 
     excellent safety record.
       Other key congressional figures are split, although most 
     are withholding comment until the administration delivers its 
     proposal.
       Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), chairman of the Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation Committee, and Sen. Wendell H. 
     Ford (D-Ky.), chairman of the Senate aviation subcommittee, 
     have serious doubts about the idea, according to aides.
       But the transportation appropriations committee chairman, 
     Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg (D-N.J.) and Rep. Bob Carr (D-
     Mich.), are leaning in favor.
       Interestingly, Pena and Oberstar and most everyone in 
     between agree that something is broken at the FAA. It's how 
     to fix it that creates the differences.
       Just as the Federal Communications Commission allocates 
     what frequencies can be used by radio and television 
     stations, the FAA tells airplanes where they can fly.
       There's one big difference. After the FCC makes its 
     decisions, its functional role is over. Radio and television 
     stations maintain and operate their own transmission 
     equipment. The FAA maintains and runs a multibillion-dollar 
     system that interacts tens of thousands of times daily with 
     commercial flights, corporate jets, recreational pilots and 
     the military.
       Air traffic controllers, aided by an elaborate web of radar 
     antennas and computers, direct those 19,000 commercial 
     flights every day, but the closest a passenger gets to this 
     network is an announcement from the cockpit that ``we're 
     number one for takeoff'' or, in times of bad weather, ``air 
     traffic control has told us to hold here.''
       Such delays translate directly into dollars. American 
     Airlines Executive Vice President Robert W. Baker said that a 
     15-minute delay for the airline's smallest plane, the Fokker-
     100, costs $1,800, while the same delay for its biggest, the 
     McDonnell-Douglas MD-11, costs $8,024. These are the kinds of 
     numbers that have led a financially beleaguered industry to 
     argue for change.
       Pena said that tinkering around the edges will not fix the 
     FAA. To bring about the transformation, the administration 
     would send the air traffic control functions to a government-
     owned corporation, something like the Tennessee Valley 
     Authority.
       Of the agency's 52,000 employees, 38,000 would go into ATC 
     Corp. These are the controllers who work in the towers and 
     regional radar centers, and the computer specialists, the 
     electricians, mechanics and others who maintain the system.
       What's left of the FAA would continue to be responsible for 
     regulating aviation safety by setting standards for aircraft 
     and aircraft parts and writing the rules for everything from 
     pilot and flight attendant training to airport security to 
     grants for airport improvement.
       A suggestion to take the entire FAA into the corporation 
     was rejected by the White House, as was a proposal to create 
     a fully privatized corporation instead of a government-
     controlled one.
       While the administration's corporation would be a 
     ``business'' in the technical sense, the government would be 
     the only shareholder. The secretaries of transportation and 
     defense would sit on its board, along with representatives of 
     unions, the general public, the business community, the 
     airline industry, recreational pilots and other users of the 
     system.
       The board would hire a chief executive and set policy 
     guidelines, as any corporate board would, although the FAA 
     would continue to monitor ATC Corp. for safety compliance, 
     just as it monitors aircraft manufacturers. The safety 
     guidelines by which controllers operate still would be 
     written by the FAA.
       Initial funding would come from the 10 percent ticket tax 
     all airline passengers pay. Since about 80 percent of the 
     FAA's current $9.1 billion budget goes to air traffic 
     control, 80 percent of the ticket tax would go to ATC Corp., 
     except that it would be called a fee rather than a tax. 
     Administration officials estimate savings for taxpayers over 
     a 10-year period would be several billion dollars.


                         easier access to funds

       An important difference--and one that would theoretically 
     make it possible for ATC Corp. to move more quickly on a 
     major procurement than the FAA can today--is that the 
     corporation could borrow money or float bonds rather than 
     await the annual congressional appropriation from the 
     aviation trust fund, which is regularly held hostage to 
     deficit control.
       The remaining ticket tax funds would flow into the trust 
     fund to support airport projects, which would remain under 
     the control of the FAA. The FAA's safety functions would be 
     covered by general fund appropriations as they are now.
       Congressional critics question the administration's funding 
     assumptions. Other critics of the proposal ask whether a 
     corporation is necessary at all.
       ``Air traffic control is a natural monopoly, and the only 
     way to protect the public interest is to maintain it as a 
     government function with broad, informed oversight,'' the 
     Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) told the task 
     force that drew up the proposal. The AOPA, long powerful on 
     Capital Hill in part because many members of Congress also 
     are private pilots, represents 324,000 general aviation 
     pilots.
       The association expressed fears of an increase in taxes and 
     fees accompanying a deterioration in safety and efficiency, 
     especially during a transition period.
       John Olcott, head of the National Business Aircraft 
     Association (NBAA), which represents companies that use 
     aircraft for business purposes, argued that the ``checks and 
     balances provided by Congressional oversight should be 
     maintained so that political agendas of the executive branch 
     . . . and the vested interests of any single user group do 
     not compromise system safety or service to all users.''
       Oberstar, like the AOPA and the NBAA, favors change within 
     the existing government structure.
       ``There has been no effort to fix what is there while 
     proposing radical surgery. Will they just fire people? That 
     is terribly disruptive,'' Oberstar said, recalling the 
     turmoil tht followed the firing of 11,400 illegally striking 
     controllers by President Reagain in 1981.
       The corporation, Oberstar argues, is being designed to 
     serve the interests of airlines. In hard times, they may push 
     to cut fees, to cut the number of controllers. That could 
     lead to . . . precariousness for safety.''
       ``Oberstar's argument . . . assumes that the industry will 
     `own' this corporation. It won't,'' Pena counters. ``All the 
     stock will be owned by the government and we think we will 
     actually increase safety because we can bring on technology 
     sooner.''
       Adds FAA Administrator David Hinson: ``Even today, we 
     oversee safety for thousands of operations at [aircraft 
     manufacturers like] McDonnel-Douglas and Boeing. It wouldn't 
     be any different with air traffic control.''


                          committed to safety

       Some controllers bristle at the suggestion safety would 
     suffer. ``Why do these people in Congress think I am going to 
     be any less safe under a corporation? That burns me!'' said 
     Mark Meuwissen, a controller at Detroit.
       And the controllers want that new equipment. ``I've been 
     here for years and I've never seen anything done in less than 
     three years with regular procurement,'' said Paul Jester, who 
     is in charge of computer and radar maintenance at the 
     regional air traffic control center at Leesburg. ``Everything 
     is maxed out in this facility. We are at capacity.''
       His lament is heard often in air traffic control 
     facilities, whether older ones such as in St. Louis and 
     Chicago or one like Detroit, where a new control tower is 
     filled with equipment dating from the 1960s and 1970s.
       For now, even proponents are waiting on the sidelines for 
     the administration to fill in the blanks on the details.
       When Pena told top executives of the airlines recently that 
     it was time to stand up and be counted, the answer was: We 
     are for it in principle but first show us how this 
     corporation will be funded.
       ``Whatever fixes the system, I'm in favor of,'' said Randy 
     Babbitt, head of the Air Line Pilots Association. ``But we 
     have concerns over how certain components now within the FAA 
     that work well together because they are part of the same 
     unit'' will interface. ``Today they work very closely.''
       In meetings with controllers in the past, Pena was peppered 
     with questions about pensions, job protection and the like. 
     Time and again, the answer was: it's under study. At one 
     point a controller exploded: ``I'm hearing only vague 
     references. . . . Sounds to me like it hasn't been thought 
     through.''
       The drafters of the plan said they will fill in the details 
     in days and weeks to come.
       Pena said, ``What I ask is, hear us out. The burden of 
     proof is on us. . . . If we can't answer questions, we ought 
     not pass it.''
                                  ____


                [From the Washington Post, May 3, 1994]

FAA's Case Study in Computer Chaos--Snarled Air Traffic Control Project 
                    Points Up Risks of Big Projects

               (By John Burgess and Richard M. Weintraub)

       The team would call at Federal Aviation Administration 
     offices with lengthy requests for reports and interviews 
     related to a single question: How far behind and over cost 
     was the agency's multibillion-dollar program to modernize the 
     nation's air traffic control computers?
       Team members often worked nights and weekends, meeting in 
     an 8th-floor room at the FAA's Independence Avenue 
     headquarters. In the end, they decided that the agency's 
     pledge to finish the job for $6 billion was fanciful.
       ``We came to the view that you just can't get there from 
     here,'' said Mark Gerchick, a member of the inhouse FAA group 
     that sorted through the project's debris.
       The ``Advanced Automation System'' contract offers lessons 
     for big government computer jobs everywhere. It shows how 
     they tend to bloat, how agencies and contractors can grow too 
     close, how officials dither on decision-making in a quest for 
     the system that is perfect rather than the one that is 
     possible now.
       It shows that however good the intentions, creating the 
     complex codes that drive the computer age--software--always 
     exacts greater time and expense than their creators predict. 
     Programmers at times must scale back ambitious plans and 
     settle for the equivalent of paving a cow path--making an 
     established system a little better than creating a 
     revolutionary new one.
       The tale also offers a window into the often-mysterious 
     work of the many software companies that ring the Capital 
     Beltway and win work from the federal government. Close to 
     1,000 people in this area, most of them working in Rockville, 
     earn their livings from the air traffic control contract 
     alone.
       Their assignment was bold from the start. They were to 
     create, essentially from scratch, one of the largest and most 
     complex computer networks in history. It would link thousands 
     of computers at hundreds of facilities, processing and 
     transmitting radar images from all over the country where 
     each day 165,000 aircraft take off and land.
       To ensure that none of those airplanes collided, it would 
     have extremely high reliability: It would fail for not more 
     than three seconds per year.
       Now the contract's future is in question. FAA Administrator 
     David R. Hinson has suspended work on parts of it and thrown 
     into question the entire plan, one of the biggest civilian 
     contracts in federal history. Promising to set things right 
     once and for all, Hinson transferred the project's manager 
     and opened the door to canceling other parts or giving them 
     to other companies.
       While specialists agree that the air traffic system is 
     basically safe, no one denies that the computers must be 
     replaced to keep things that way and allow air traffic to 
     grow. Further, the FAA's handling, or mishandling, of the 
     contract is providing ammunition for the Clinton 
     administration's push to turn the air traffic service into a 
     government corporation, divorced from the FAA. The 
     administration is schedule to issue a formal proposal for the 
     split today.
       Everyone in the industry has a tale of how old the 
     equipment is. Randy Babbitt, head of the Air Line Pilots 
     Association, recalls his shock at visiting a control tower 
     recently and finding that the radar screens were essentially 
     the same ones he had encountered as a new pilot at Eastern 
     Airlines in 1966.
       The FAA was thinking of a grand modernization as long ago 
     as the late 1970s. But it was the 1981 strike by most of the 
     nation's air traffic controllers that moved the agency to 
     act.
       As conceived, the Advanced Automation System would operate 
     with a small work force. It would have intelligence that 
     would safely place aircraft closer together in the skies to 
     reduce costly delays and chart out routes that would produce 
     big fuel savings to the airlines.
       The price tag estimate in 1981: $2 billion.
       By the time the contract was let in 1988 to International 
     Business Machines Corp., the FAA had already spent close to 
     $700 million in research and development and the contract had 
     become quite a bit bigger as new features were added. The 
     estimated cost was $4.3 billion, but that was just a guess 
     because officials had left unanswered questions about whether 
     to add many features.
       The first big-ticket phase was the replacement of aging 
     consoles that controllers use in the FAA's 22 regional 
     centers--such as one at Leesburg--that guide planes between 
     airports. Plans called for controllers to get modern 
     ``workstation'' computers and displays that would be more 
     reliable, color-code traffic and let them select radio 
     frequencies by touching screen buttons instead of dialing 
     dials or switching switches.
       Most of the hardware being used was standard commercial 
     equipment. The cost was in sofware--computer instructions 
     that would tie the hundreds of sites together. It entailed 
     writing and testing more than 1.2 million lines of computer 
     instructions, each of which had to fit perfectly with the 
     rest or risk bringing the entire system to a halt.
       To write those instructions, IBM had chosen a relatively 
     rare computer language called Ada. Early on, work was slowed 
     because the market lacked a good selection of Ada 
     ``development tools''--essentially software that engineers 
     use to write more software. IBM had to create many of the 
     tools.
       Moreover, the FAA continued to dither about what it really 
     wanted. A key question that caused endless delays: How would 
     the system accommodate ``flights strips,'' pieces of paper 
     that controllers use to keep track of information about 
     individual flights? The FAA at first wanted to replicate the 
     strips electronically on the display screen. Later, after 
     controllers had been shown prototypes, it opted to store the 
     information out of sight so that controllers could ``call it 
     up'' as needed.
       ``They never wanted to close the door, because they were 
     always afraid that better technology would pass them by,'' 
     said Clark Onstad, a Washington aviation attorney and former 
     FAA chief counsel. His clients include Loral Corp., which 
     recently bought the IBM division handling the air traffic 
     job.
       Changing FAA positions over the number of air traffic 
     control facilities also complicated the job. When the agency 
     backed way from an ambitious plan to consolidate many 
     facilities into regional ones, software code had to be 
     rewritten.
       With the schedule slipping, IBM began cutting corners, 
     putting software into use before it had passed the company's 
     usual battery of tests, IBM said. In an interview last year, 
     Gerald Ebker, then chairman of the Bethesda-based IBM unit 
     handling the job, put it this way: ``The problem is key 
     individuals in key slots who didn't do their jobs.'' The 
     company replaced its team leaders and brought in more talent 
     from outside the area.
       In the fall of 1992, things came to a head. IBM officially 
     informed the FAA that another 14-month delay was likely. With 
     the airline industry pushing for a faster, more flexible 
     system and Congress looking over its shoulder, the FAA 
     responded by sending IBM a ``cure letter,'' which demanded a 
     fix and functioned as the first step for a potential 
     revocation of the contract.
       IBM and FAA people met constantly in the spring of 1993 and 
     reached a plan. IBM would demonstrate the basic soundness of 
     the software for the regional centers by September 1994. It 
     would be allowed to add certain key layers of software after 
     that, rather than before as previously planned. The software 
     would be tested simultaneously.
       The agreement laid out a series of ``milestones'' that IBM 
     would pass to ensure that the job stayed on schedule for an 
     October 1996 opening at the Seattle regional center.
       John Burt, at the time the FAA's top systems acquisition 
     officer, argues that this was a feasible approach: Unless 
     firm deadlines were created, he said, people would never get 
     the job done. Testing the software sequentially, as was 
     originally planned, would take longer and would ensure that 
     when the ultimate system was finally turned on, it would be 
     much closer to obsolescence.
       By now the total estimated cost was $4.7 billion. Members 
     of Congress wrung their hands but took no action. Things 
     seemed settled--until a new secretary of transportation, 
     Federico Pena, and a new FAA administrator, Hinson took 
     office. Their people began nosing around the program and 
     found out late last year that the official estimate had grown 
     again, this time to $5.9 billion.
       So Hinson created a team of FAA people who had taken no 
     direct role in the project. Their job: to do a ``reality 
     check,'' sort through the mountain of paper and charts that 
     had been generated and give their own best estimate.
       In ensuing weeks, the team conducted roughly 100 interviews 
     at the FAA and at contracting companies. They pored over a 
     stack of paper 25 feet high.
       They did not always feel welcome. ``There was some mistrust 
     that we couldn't really understand, that we hadn't walked a 
     mile'' with the contract team, said John Cassady, FAA deputy 
     chief counsel and staff director of the task force.
       In the end, the task force concluded that IBM and FAA 
     officials had made unrealistic assumptions about progress. It 
     was ``as if wishing would make it so,'' said one member of 
     the inquiry team.
       Particularly troubling was that under the revised schedule, 
     IBM would be officially credited with having demonstrated 
     basic feasibility in September 1994 even though key pieces of 
     software would not be finished. They would be developed later 
     as what had been finished was tested. That was asking for 
     trouble, the group thought.
       Another warning sign: There was no letup in the project's 
     generation of ``problem reports''--official notice of 
     something that needed fixing. IBM was eliminating about 300 a 
     month, but generating roughly the same number. Unless 
     something gave, about 3,000 problem reports would still be 
     pending this September, when IBM would supposedly demonstrate 
     the system's fitness.
       Another problem: Engineers were still having to go back 
     into line after line of software code to fix past mistakes or 
     incorporate new FAA design changes. Virtually all lines were 
     being reworked; IBM's target had been 40 percent, the task 
     force said. As of February of this year, the contract team 
     had pending requests for changes in close to 650,000 lines of 
     instructions.
       Buried in the report was a finding that the FAA had given 
     IBM almost $19 million in ``award fees,'' special incentive 
     payments granted when a contractor has shown ``exceptional 
     performance in such areas as schedule, performance, program 
     and contract management.''
       In March, the team reported these and other findings to 
     Hinson. Its best judgment was that under a ``moderate risk 
     scenario,'' the ultimate cost would come to $7 billion; 
     delivery would likely be 20 months later than the schedule 
     the FAA had negotiated with IBM. In response, Hinson replaced 
     the project manager and commissioned an outside study to 
     decide how to proceed.
       In a hearing last month, members of Congress needled Hinson 
     about imposing some kind of punishment for the delays, either 
     on FAA officials or on IBM. Hinson fended them off. ``I am 
     less interested in affixing blame for the past poor showings 
     than I am with shaping and managing a program that will 
     accomplish what we need,'' he said.
       Now a new player has entered the scene. In March, defense 
     conglomerate Loral bought the IBM division handling the job. 
     To date, however, the FAA has not formally transferred the 
     job to Loral
       While Loral lobbies to preserve as much of the work as it 
     can, companies such as Hughes Aircraft Co., BDM International 
     Inc., Raytheon Co. and Unisys Corp., which all make air 
     traffic control equipment, are telling Congress that their 
     products could be substituted for parts of what Loral is 
     supposed to develop.
       At a recent hearing, Loral Chairman Bernard Schwartz 
     proposed pushing the testing schedule back to give more time 
     to ensure soundness of the software.
       Hinson has promised decisions by the end of May. But in the 
     hearing, he gave a hint of his direction: ``To the extent 
     feasible,'' he said, ``high-risk activities will be minimized 
     and the use of available, off-the-shelf technology will be a 
     preferred option.''
       Doing so may entail junking some of the advanced features 
     of the system but getting something sooner and at lower 
     costs. After years of promises and failed commitments, many 
     top officials think that's not a bad trade-off.

  Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon] 
suggests the absence of a quorum.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Under the previous order, the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] is 
recognized for not to exceed 10 minutes.
  Mr. COHEN. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Cohen and Mr. Ford pertaining to the submission 
of Senate Resolution 208 are printed in today's Record under 
``Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.'')
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Feinstein). The Senator from South 
Carolina [ Mr. Thurmond].
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed 
to speak for 7 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] is recognized for not to 
exceed 7 minutes.

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