[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 51 (Tuesday, May 3, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 3, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
  GERMAN AND RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE D-DAY COMMEMORATION AND IN 
   POST-COLD WAR EUROPE: DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ON NORMANDY INVASION

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                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                          Tuesday, May 3, 1994

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, last evening, the House of Representatives 
unanimously approved House Joint Resolution 303--a joint resolution 
designating June 6, 1994, as D-day National Remembrance Day. It is 
highly appropriate that we mark the 50th anniversary of this critical 
military turning point in World War II by appropriate ceremonies and 
events to commemorate the allied landings at Normandy.
  In this connection, Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the 
attention of my colleagues in the House to a particularly perceptive 
opinion article which appeared in today's issue of the Washington Post 
by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor to President 
Carter and currently Counselor at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies [CSIS] here in Washington. Dr. Brzezinski is one 
of the brightest and most original and insightful minds focusing on the 
security issues that face the United States, and this particular 
article is one of his best.
  Dr. Brzezinski focuses on the practical political symbolism of the 
exclusion of Germany and Russia from the D-day commemorative activities 
planned for Normandy next month. He rightfully emphasizes the vital 
importance of strengthening the political, economic, intellectual, and 
security links of Germany and Russia with the United States and Western 
Europe. It is vital that we take the long-term perspective that Dr. 
Brzezinski has articulated.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask that Dr. Brzezinski's article be placed in the 
Congressional Record. I urge my colleagues to read that thoughtful 
article and seriously consider its message. We live in a new world that 
has emerged following the end of the cold war, and it is vital that we 
reconsider the nature of that new world.

                [From the Washington Post, May 3, 1994]

                            Normandy Evasion

                        (By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

       The exclusion of both Germany and Russia from the 
     approaching D-day commemorations is highly inappropriate. Not 
     only did millions of Russians die defeating Hitler but 
     millions of Germans have been born and have grown up in a 
     democratic Germany that is now a solid part of the West. It 
     is especially inappropriate because the quality of Europe's 
     security will be determined largely by the degree to which 
     Germany remains permanently anchored in an integrating Europe 
     and the extent to which Russia is linked constructively to a 
     bigger and more secure Europe.
       Both these countries are destined to continue playing major 
     roles in European affairs. But neither is likely to play 
     constructively if the geopolitical context creates tempting 
     options for national self-assertion, especially if 
     nationalistic temptations are exacerbated by a sense of 
     exclusion.
       Germany has been a good citizen of Europe for decades now. 
     It has loyally and generously supported Europe's security and 
     is the only NATO member with all its forces fully integrated 
     into the joint command. It has been willing to propriate 
     French pride in order to foster a far-reaching French-German 
     reconciliation, which in turn became foundation and catalyst 
     for unification in Europe.
       At the same time, Germany has managed to serve as the 
     linchpin for a continued U.S. military presence on the 
     continent. The Washington-Bonn connection has not been 
     diluted by Franco-German political leadership in promoting 
     Europe's integration. Last but by no means least, Germany has 
     demonstrated a genuine commitment to democracy; for example, 
     no country has more humane, liberal immigration laws.
       But Germany's circumstances--and psychological mood--are 
     changing. The leadership will soon be renewed. The 
     approaching 50th anniversary of the end of World War II will 
     mark a milestone in generational change. This year will see 
     departure of the last Russian soldier from German soil.
       Might not some Germans soon begin to resent the presence of 
     American troops, claiming that Germany is the only European 
     country still ``occupied''? Will growing numbers of Germans 
     then begin to take exception to the remaining limitations on 
     their national sovereignty? And what will be the German--and 
     Russian--reaction to a central Europe that remains a 
     geopolitical vacuum? Is that what Russia's minister of 
     Foreign affairs had in mind when last December he enticed his 
     German counterpart with the vision of a special ``axis 
     between Germany and Russia [in] the construction of a new 
     Europe''?
       If Europe enlarges, deepens its unity and widens its 
     security perimeter, there are good prospects for Germany to 
     remain a good citizen as well as the leader of a Europe that 
     becomes more truly European. The best design would be an 
     enlarged European Union embracing the European Free Trade 
     Area countries and eventually also reaching into central 
     Europe to include at least the three Visegrad nations: 
     Czechia, Hungary and Poland. NATO should also enroll these 
     three countries.
       A Europe along those lines would envelop Germany while 
     enhancing the German role within it. Attaining that goal will 
     require continued exercise of political leadership by France 
     and Germany. It will call for genuine German-Polish 
     reconciliation matching the existing German-French 
     reconciliation.
       A French-German-Polish coalition would provide a mighty 
     inner core for a larger Europe. It would affirm a positive 
     role for a powerful, constructive and European Germany. Such 
     a trilateral strategic coalition--incorporating 175 million 
     citizens--would be economically driven by Germany and 
     politically balanced by France and Poland.
       German leaders are aware of this opportunity. That is why 
     some have taken the lead in urging the eastward expansion of 
     the European Union and NATO. France and Germany are actively 
     exploring Polish membership in the Western European Union, 
     military arm of the European Union. The gutsy German minister 
     of defense, Volker Ruehe, said early this year that it is in 
     Europe's interest to admit Poland to NATO and the West should 
     firmly state that it is no provocation against Russia. That 
     is very much the case now that NATO no longer views Russia as 
     an adversary and has opened its Partnership for Peace to 
     Russian participation.
       However, Russia--unlike Germany--has yet to demonstrate 
     that it truly means to be a good citizen of Europe. True, its 
     leading politicians often speak of Russia as belonging to 
     Europe and even possibly joining NATO. But at the same time 
     they make outlandish statements about Russia's ``unique 
     Eurasian mission'' and assert a special right to use military 
     force anywhere within the entire space of the defunct Soviet 
     Union. Simultaneously they clamor for status as a global 
     power and America's co-equal ``strategic partner'' (even 
     while pleading for more financial assistance).
       Clearly, Russia cannot be all these things at the same 
     time. Being a part of Europe and NATO is not compatible with 
     pursuing a unique Eurasian destiny and seeking to operate as 
     a global counterpart of the United States.
       Unfortunately, this is not something that can be settled by 
     a choice. The politically decisive fact is that Russia bulks 
     too large, is too backward currently and too powerful 
     potentially to be assimilated as simply yet another member of 
     the European Union or NATO. It would dilute the Western 
     character of the European community and the American 
     preponderance within the alliance.
       A Eurasian Union would be an oxymoron. NATO with Russia 
     would become simply another version of the Conference on 
     Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose credibility has 
     been undermined by a pretense of being able to operate 
     effectively from Vancouver to Vladivostok among 53 nations in 
     diverse stages of democratization and development. Instead of 
     perpetuating the illusion that Russia--someday, somehow--will 
     join West's core political institutions, it is more important 
     to define what it means for Russia to become a good neighbor 
     for Europe and eventually a partner for the United States.
       Russia should:
       Withdraw its troops from the Baltic republics on schedule, 
     without claiming special privileges for its colonists.
       Accept the reality of Ukraine as a secure, friendly 
     neighbor, sovereign politically but a close partner 
     economically.
       Similarly, respect the political sovereignty of the new 
     republics of the ex-Soviet Union while pursuing deeper 
     economic cooperation with them.
       Tolerate rather than obstruct the desire of central 
     Europeans to belong to both the European Union and NATO.
       A Russia that embraces such a non-imperial approach will 
     automatically be a good neighbor to Europe, a solid regional 
     and global trading partner and the beneficiary of growing 
     Eurasia-wide economic activity, transportation networks and 
     cultural ties.
       Even if not part of the more integrated European Union, a 
     good-neighbor Russia can and should be associated with 
     Europe-wide cooperative undertakings. That would reinforce 
     the aspects of Russia's history and culture that make it an 
     extension of European civilization. In addition, this Russia 
     can be America's colleague in the wider quest for 
     international security. A Russia willing to become a good 
     neighbor should be given other incentives:
       An offer by NATO of a special treaty of friendship and 
     alliance with Russia, even as the alliance expands its 
     membership eastward into central Europe. The treaty between 
     NATO and Russia (even if Russia falls short of U.S. hopes for 
     its democratic evolution) would embrace Russia within a wider 
     framework of military and political cooperation, 
     consolidating security within Europe and even extending it 
     into Eurasia.
       An invitation to join the G-7 forum of leading industrial 
     nations.
       These initiatives would provide the Russians a gratifying 
     recognition of their country's status as a major power. They 
     amount to a significant Western option for Russia, making it 
     more worthwhile for Moscow to eschew imperial ambitions. 
     However, Russia will be more likely to pursue the good-
     neighbor option if a larger, more secure Europe promptly 
     fills the potentially destabilizing geopolitical no-man's 
     land between Russia and the European Union. With German and 
     French leadership, Europe should set a realistically early 
     timetable for incorporating the countries of central Europe 
     into the European Union, including its WEU security arm.
       A European initiative of this sort might reawaken American 
     policy toward Europe from the generally dormant condition 
     that has existed since the Soviet Collapse. George Bush found 
     his crowning achievement in overcoming Soviet objections to 
     inclusion of a united Germany in NATO. So President Bill 
     Clinton could make his principal legacy in foreign affairs 
     the inclusion of central Europe in a larger NATO, with Russia 
     linked to the alliance by a special treaty.
       Early this year the Senate, by a vote of 94 to 3, adopted a 
     resolution favoring NATO's eastward expansion. The upcoming 
     congressional elections are already starting to generate 
     further demands along these lines.
       Absent though they may be from the Normandy festivities, 
     the Germans and the Russians are likely to loom large in the 
     thoughts of President Clinton and other leaders gathered 
     there. They will provide a timely reminder about the need for 
     greater geopolitical imagination in shaping Europe's 
     security.

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