[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 50 (Monday, May 2, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: May 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          IMPLICATIONS OF LIFTING ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I would like to address the Senate on 
two subjects. First, a letter which I am sending today to the Secretary 
of State and an identical letter to the Secretary of Defense. Both 
letters contain a series of questions relating to the implications of a 
lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.
  The distinguished Republican leader, together with a distinguished 
group of cosponsors, last week put before the Senate a bill that would 
have the effect of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. The 
cosponsors interpreted that lifting as possibly being unilateral for 
the United States.
  First, I commend the Republican leader and each of the cosponsors 
because this is a critical issue. It is one that should be thoroughly 
debated by the Senate and then a vote held. I am pleased that their 
leadership--individually and collectively--appears to be bringing this 
important debate to the Senate for a second time this week. I hope to 
participate actively as I did during the course of the last debate.
  I feel very strongly, Madam President--and I speak for myself and I 
think some other Members of the body--that we have not given, either 
individually or through committee work, adequate attention to all of 
the many ramifications of lifting the embargo, and therefore I have set 
forth in this letter a series of questions. These questions were 
prompted, first, by a meeting in my office last week with Ambassador 
Kampelman, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Secretary Wolfowitz, and Secretary 
Richard Perle, the last two previously serving the Department of 
Defense.
  They take a view that this embargo, first, is not legal, and, 
secondly, that it should be withdrawn. I urge Members of the Senate to 
avail themselves of the opportunity to meet with this distinguished 
group. They are well informed. As yet, however, I am not in concurrence 
with all of their viewpoints. Perhaps the legalities are arguable that 
this embargo was not put on in a proper manner under international law. 
To me that is a secondary issue compared with the importance of the 
implications that would flow from a lifting of this embargo.
  Second, I then took it upon myself to go out to the Central 
Intelligence Agency where I met with a group of about five individuals 
who have been designated for some extensive period of time as the task 
force on Bosnia. Each day they study every development and collect 
viewpoints from around the world and gather intelligence from our own 
sources. They have put together an excellent briefing. I hope Senators 
could avail themselves of this briefing, because I found that their 
depth of knowledge pointed to a number of issues which I felt required 
further clarification, and I have included them in this letter.
  I next met with members of the Department of Defense Bosnia task 
force team. Each of the Departments, State, Defense, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, has a team designated to follow this issue full 
time.
  Then, last, I went over to the Department of State, concluding my 
briefings on this subject with the head of their Balkan conflict group. 
I am going to urge committee chairmen here and ranking members and, 
indeed, the leadership to avail themselves of the briefings from these 
three entities. Some take different perspectives on this, and that I 
think is very helpful to provoke a more complete understanding of the 
complications here.
  By and large, the consensus among the three entities in the 
administration is that we should not unilaterally lift the embargo. I 
am inclined to be of that same view, thus far, from my own independent 
research. And second, not even lift the embargo in the context of 
working with our allies.
  I reserve judgment on that for a period of time until we get further 
into the debate, because if there were a collective judgment with our 
allies, primarily Great Britain and France, then I think it is a matter 
that should be considered very seriously. I feel this way because 
history is going to record that this embargo in effect tied one arm 
behind the back of the Moslems and allowed the principal combatants, 
the Serbs, to avail themselves of whatever arms they could find 
throughout the world.
  Now, of course, Serbia proper and, indeed, the Moslems have certain 
embargoes against them. The United States has a major role in the 
embargo at sea. However, in my visits with other Members of this body 
to certain areas around the Danube, that is a leaky embargo as you go 
inland from the sea. The sea I think has been fairly effective. It has 
been a NATO operation, primarily U.S. Naval Forces. But the embargo 
that is also in the Danube has not been as effective, in my judgment.
  Nevertheless, history will record as having tied the arm behind the 
Bosnian's back in this tragic conflict, and therefore I think 
periodically we should study--and this is one of those moments--as to 
whether or not that embargo should be lifted. In so doing, I hope each 
Member would fully understand, and I am gaining a full understanding, 
the far-reaching ramifications of the lifting of this embargo.
  May I acquaint the Chair with some of the questions that I have 
proposed to both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense:

       If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were 
     unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would 
     such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the 
     broad range of UN Security Council-imposed embargoes, such as 
     economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against Iraq?
       Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is 
     not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against 
     the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia is not a successor state; 
     and because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of self-
     defense under Article 51 of the U.N. charter. What is the 
     administration's legal opinion on this issue?

  As I said, the group that visited me, Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and 
Kampelman, and Secretaries Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, strongly viewed 
that the current embargo is illegal.
  Next question:

       How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect 
     our relations with our NATO allies and the Russian 
     Federation?

  Next question:

       If the arms embargo were lifted, what types of weapons 
     would the Bosnian Government forces need to achieve a degree 
     of weapon equivalence?

  I constructed this phrase, ``degree of weapon equivalence.'' In 
current order of battle, the Bosnian Serbs have perhaps as many as 
three times the tanks, maybe four times, three or four times the heavy 
artillery pieces as have the Moslems, so there is a very severe 
imbalance. But if we were to equip the Moslem forces with an equal 
amount of heavy artillery and tanks, is that for purposes of their 
beginning a more aggressive role to take back some of their lost 
territory, or is that what is needed to maintain the integrity of the 
six safe zones today together with the central part? I do not know. 
Those are questions that, in my judgment, need to be asked and 
answered.
  Then, of course, such heavy equipment given to the Moslems would 
require, first, maintenance. Considerable infrastructure is 
necessitated to maintain this heavy military equipment. Training. How 
do they operate the weapons? Of course, they depend on the origin, but 
by and large this armed force has not had experience with weapons, such 
as tanks and major artillery pieces, of European or U.S. origin.
  Then, after you learn to operate the weaponry, you have to have what 
we call combined arms training. For example, a tank is very effective 
when it is employed with infantry, together with artillery, and you do 
not learn those tactics overnight. It takes time. Our Armed Forces 
train extensive periods of time on the combined arms tactic.
  Next question:

       How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported 
     to the Bosnian Government forces? What are the various access 
     routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes 
     to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a 
     military force would it take to guard and maintain these 
     logistical routes?

  Maps were spread before me during the course of these briefings.
  There are two ports on the Adriatic which would lend themselves to 
disembarking this heavy equipment, but then it must travel a 
considerable distance on narrow, winding roads in order to get up to 
the central part where the Moslem forces are located.
  The bridges and the narrow roads are highly exposed to what we call 
sapper attack. If the bridge goes out, the road then becomes 
dysfunctional for an indeterminate period of time. So you would have to 
put in literally a corridor, in my judgment, of forces to protect this 
road and then have other forces available to make immediate repairs 
occasioned by sapper attack.
  Next question: How would the Serbs or other belligerents react in the 
interim period between the announcement of a lifting of the embargo and 
the transportation of equipment and training? And that period of time 
ranges anywhere, from estimates that are given to me, from 6 weeks to 
as far as 6 months depending on how complicated some of the equipment 
is.
  What are the hostile forces, primarily the Serbs, going to do? Sit 
idly by? I am doubtful that that would take place.
  I add other hostile forces because there is always a question mark 
about the Croatian forces. From time to time they have been in a state 
of belligerency with the Moslems. Currently they are operating under an 
agreement which enables the hostilities to be suspended. But agreements 
in that part of the world have a very short lifetime. So I think that 
is an issue.
  There is also the collateral issue: If we are going to assist the 
Moslems with rearmament, are we going to assist the Croatians? They, 
likewise, have an embargo at the present time. In order to get the 
heavy weaponry from seaport into the Moslem territory, you have to 
traverse Croatian territory. What sort of agreement must be negotiated 
with those forces beforehand? Would part of that agreement be the 
lifting of the embargo against Croatia and likewise the willingness to 
supply their armed forces?
  If there is an increase in fighting, should air power be used against 
the Serbs during this period between the announced lifting of the 
embargo and the transportation of weapons and training?
  What are the military risks associated with air delivery of the new 
weapons? There are two airports, Sarajevo and Tuzla. I have had the 
opportunity to fly into Sarajevo. It is in a basin. When I was there 18 
months ago, it was literally touch and go. The airport closed while I 
was there for several hours. And it periodically closed. It is highly 
vulnerable to weapons fired from the hostile forces. So I question 
whether or not heavy military equipment could be flown in by air either 
to the Sarajevo airport or the Tuzla airport.
  But these, again, are questions that should be addressed because if--
this is my concern--we consider raising, lifting, whatever phrase is 
used, this embargo, it is going to be an enormous signal of hope to 
those Moslem forces that have fought so bravely and that have taken so 
many casualties both among the military and the civilians. I question 
whether or not we could act to raise it and not deliver having raised 
those hopes.
  Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior to lifting the arms 
embargo? Thus far in my briefings, it is clear to me that they would be 
at risk once the decision was made. And, therefore, they would have to 
be engaged in a retrograde movement to pull them into areas where they 
could be safe and out of exposed areas that many of them are serving in 
today. How long would such a withdrawal take of the UNPROFOR forces? 
What would be the consequences of their not being able to perform the 
mercy missions that they perform today with food and medicine? And, 
indeed, we read in today's paper of an actual military engagement by 
UNPROFOR forces.
  Would the Serbs likely intercept the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR 
forces and once again take hostages?
  These are questions that we must answer.
  Then, what is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia proper to a 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable to assume that 
they would come to the assistance of the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian 
government begins to recapture territory in the wake of lifting the 
embargo? Would the lifting of the embargo now help or hinder efforts to 
achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict? I think, most of us 
realize there is no military solution to this tragic conflict, a 
conflict that is embedded into literally hundreds of years, if not a 
thousand years, of strife for the same basic differences of culture, 
ethnic background, religion. Those are important questions.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The hour of 3:30 arrived about 3 
minutes ago. Because the Members participating in the discussion 
scheduled were not present, I allowed the Senator to go on.


                           ORDER OF PROCEDURE

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I wonder if I could inquire of the 
Members who were about to initiate the next phase of Senate business if 
I could take another 7 or 8 minutes to introduce a very important bill 
on behalf of the President.
  Mr. BRYAN. Madam President, responding through the Chair to my 
distinguished colleague from Virginia, I would have no objection if 
that is propounded as a unanimous consent request. I would certainly 
agree.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may 
proceed as if in morning business for another 10 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank the Chair. I thank the Members.
  (The remarks of Mr. Warner pertaining to the introduction of S. 2056 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')

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