[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 50 (Monday, May 2, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: May 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
IMPLICATIONS OF LIFTING ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I would like to address the Senate on
two subjects. First, a letter which I am sending today to the Secretary
of State and an identical letter to the Secretary of Defense. Both
letters contain a series of questions relating to the implications of a
lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.
The distinguished Republican leader, together with a distinguished
group of cosponsors, last week put before the Senate a bill that would
have the effect of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. The
cosponsors interpreted that lifting as possibly being unilateral for
the United States.
First, I commend the Republican leader and each of the cosponsors
because this is a critical issue. It is one that should be thoroughly
debated by the Senate and then a vote held. I am pleased that their
leadership--individually and collectively--appears to be bringing this
important debate to the Senate for a second time this week. I hope to
participate actively as I did during the course of the last debate.
I feel very strongly, Madam President--and I speak for myself and I
think some other Members of the body--that we have not given, either
individually or through committee work, adequate attention to all of
the many ramifications of lifting the embargo, and therefore I have set
forth in this letter a series of questions. These questions were
prompted, first, by a meeting in my office last week with Ambassador
Kampelman, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Secretary Wolfowitz, and Secretary
Richard Perle, the last two previously serving the Department of
Defense.
They take a view that this embargo, first, is not legal, and,
secondly, that it should be withdrawn. I urge Members of the Senate to
avail themselves of the opportunity to meet with this distinguished
group. They are well informed. As yet, however, I am not in concurrence
with all of their viewpoints. Perhaps the legalities are arguable that
this embargo was not put on in a proper manner under international law.
To me that is a secondary issue compared with the importance of the
implications that would flow from a lifting of this embargo.
Second, I then took it upon myself to go out to the Central
Intelligence Agency where I met with a group of about five individuals
who have been designated for some extensive period of time as the task
force on Bosnia. Each day they study every development and collect
viewpoints from around the world and gather intelligence from our own
sources. They have put together an excellent briefing. I hope Senators
could avail themselves of this briefing, because I found that their
depth of knowledge pointed to a number of issues which I felt required
further clarification, and I have included them in this letter.
I next met with members of the Department of Defense Bosnia task
force team. Each of the Departments, State, Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, has a team designated to follow this issue full
time.
Then, last, I went over to the Department of State, concluding my
briefings on this subject with the head of their Balkan conflict group.
I am going to urge committee chairmen here and ranking members and,
indeed, the leadership to avail themselves of the briefings from these
three entities. Some take different perspectives on this, and that I
think is very helpful to provoke a more complete understanding of the
complications here.
By and large, the consensus among the three entities in the
administration is that we should not unilaterally lift the embargo. I
am inclined to be of that same view, thus far, from my own independent
research. And second, not even lift the embargo in the context of
working with our allies.
I reserve judgment on that for a period of time until we get further
into the debate, because if there were a collective judgment with our
allies, primarily Great Britain and France, then I think it is a matter
that should be considered very seriously. I feel this way because
history is going to record that this embargo in effect tied one arm
behind the back of the Moslems and allowed the principal combatants,
the Serbs, to avail themselves of whatever arms they could find
throughout the world.
Now, of course, Serbia proper and, indeed, the Moslems have certain
embargoes against them. The United States has a major role in the
embargo at sea. However, in my visits with other Members of this body
to certain areas around the Danube, that is a leaky embargo as you go
inland from the sea. The sea I think has been fairly effective. It has
been a NATO operation, primarily U.S. Naval Forces. But the embargo
that is also in the Danube has not been as effective, in my judgment.
Nevertheless, history will record as having tied the arm behind the
Bosnian's back in this tragic conflict, and therefore I think
periodically we should study--and this is one of those moments--as to
whether or not that embargo should be lifted. In so doing, I hope each
Member would fully understand, and I am gaining a full understanding,
the far-reaching ramifications of the lifting of this embargo.
May I acquaint the Chair with some of the questions that I have
proposed to both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense:
If the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government were
unilaterally lifted by the United States, what impact would
such a move have on the compliance of other nations with the
broad range of UN Security Council-imposed embargoes, such as
economic sanctions against Serbia and sanctions against Iraq?
Some have argued that the arms embargo against Bosnia is
not legally binding, since the embargo was imposed against
the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia is not a successor state;
and because the embargo violates Bosnia's right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. charter. What is the
administration's legal opinion on this issue?
As I said, the group that visited me, Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and
Kampelman, and Secretaries Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, strongly viewed
that the current embargo is illegal.
Next question:
How would a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo affect
our relations with our NATO allies and the Russian
Federation?
Next question:
If the arms embargo were lifted, what types of weapons
would the Bosnian Government forces need to achieve a degree
of weapon equivalence?
I constructed this phrase, ``degree of weapon equivalence.'' In
current order of battle, the Bosnian Serbs have perhaps as many as
three times the tanks, maybe four times, three or four times the heavy
artillery pieces as have the Moslems, so there is a very severe
imbalance. But if we were to equip the Moslem forces with an equal
amount of heavy artillery and tanks, is that for purposes of their
beginning a more aggressive role to take back some of their lost
territory, or is that what is needed to maintain the integrity of the
six safe zones today together with the central part? I do not know.
Those are questions that, in my judgment, need to be asked and
answered.
Then, of course, such heavy equipment given to the Moslems would
require, first, maintenance. Considerable infrastructure is
necessitated to maintain this heavy military equipment. Training. How
do they operate the weapons? Of course, they depend on the origin, but
by and large this armed force has not had experience with weapons, such
as tanks and major artillery pieces, of European or U.S. origin.
Then, after you learn to operate the weaponry, you have to have what
we call combined arms training. For example, a tank is very effective
when it is employed with infantry, together with artillery, and you do
not learn those tactics overnight. It takes time. Our Armed Forces
train extensive periods of time on the combined arms tactic.
Next question:
How long would it take for heavy weapons to be transported
to the Bosnian Government forces? What are the various access
routes and means of delivery? How vulnerable are these routes
to attack by Serb or other hostile forces? How large a
military force would it take to guard and maintain these
logistical routes?
Maps were spread before me during the course of these briefings.
There are two ports on the Adriatic which would lend themselves to
disembarking this heavy equipment, but then it must travel a
considerable distance on narrow, winding roads in order to get up to
the central part where the Moslem forces are located.
The bridges and the narrow roads are highly exposed to what we call
sapper attack. If the bridge goes out, the road then becomes
dysfunctional for an indeterminate period of time. So you would have to
put in literally a corridor, in my judgment, of forces to protect this
road and then have other forces available to make immediate repairs
occasioned by sapper attack.
Next question: How would the Serbs or other belligerents react in the
interim period between the announcement of a lifting of the embargo and
the transportation of equipment and training? And that period of time
ranges anywhere, from estimates that are given to me, from 6 weeks to
as far as 6 months depending on how complicated some of the equipment
is.
What are the hostile forces, primarily the Serbs, going to do? Sit
idly by? I am doubtful that that would take place.
I add other hostile forces because there is always a question mark
about the Croatian forces. From time to time they have been in a state
of belligerency with the Moslems. Currently they are operating under an
agreement which enables the hostilities to be suspended. But agreements
in that part of the world have a very short lifetime. So I think that
is an issue.
There is also the collateral issue: If we are going to assist the
Moslems with rearmament, are we going to assist the Croatians? They,
likewise, have an embargo at the present time. In order to get the
heavy weaponry from seaport into the Moslem territory, you have to
traverse Croatian territory. What sort of agreement must be negotiated
with those forces beforehand? Would part of that agreement be the
lifting of the embargo against Croatia and likewise the willingness to
supply their armed forces?
If there is an increase in fighting, should air power be used against
the Serbs during this period between the announced lifting of the
embargo and the transportation of weapons and training?
What are the military risks associated with air delivery of the new
weapons? There are two airports, Sarajevo and Tuzla. I have had the
opportunity to fly into Sarajevo. It is in a basin. When I was there 18
months ago, it was literally touch and go. The airport closed while I
was there for several hours. And it periodically closed. It is highly
vulnerable to weapons fired from the hostile forces. So I question
whether or not heavy military equipment could be flown in by air either
to the Sarajevo airport or the Tuzla airport.
But these, again, are questions that should be addressed because if--
this is my concern--we consider raising, lifting, whatever phrase is
used, this embargo, it is going to be an enormous signal of hope to
those Moslem forces that have fought so bravely and that have taken so
many casualties both among the military and the civilians. I question
whether or not we could act to raise it and not deliver having raised
those hopes.
Would UNPROFOR troops have to be withdrawn prior to lifting the arms
embargo? Thus far in my briefings, it is clear to me that they would be
at risk once the decision was made. And, therefore, they would have to
be engaged in a retrograde movement to pull them into areas where they
could be safe and out of exposed areas that many of them are serving in
today. How long would such a withdrawal take of the UNPROFOR forces?
What would be the consequences of their not being able to perform the
mercy missions that they perform today with food and medicine? And,
indeed, we read in today's paper of an actual military engagement by
UNPROFOR forces.
Would the Serbs likely intercept the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR
forces and once again take hostages?
These are questions that we must answer.
Then, what is the likely reaction of Russia and Serbia proper to a
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo? Is it reasonable to assume that
they would come to the assistance of the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian
government begins to recapture territory in the wake of lifting the
embargo? Would the lifting of the embargo now help or hinder efforts to
achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict? I think, most of us
realize there is no military solution to this tragic conflict, a
conflict that is embedded into literally hundreds of years, if not a
thousand years, of strife for the same basic differences of culture,
ethnic background, religion. Those are important questions.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The hour of 3:30 arrived about 3
minutes ago. Because the Members participating in the discussion
scheduled were not present, I allowed the Senator to go on.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I wonder if I could inquire of the
Members who were about to initiate the next phase of Senate business if
I could take another 7 or 8 minutes to introduce a very important bill
on behalf of the President.
Mr. BRYAN. Madam President, responding through the Chair to my
distinguished colleague from Virginia, I would have no objection if
that is propounded as a unanimous consent request. I would certainly
agree.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may
proceed as if in morning business for another 10 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank the Chair. I thank the Members.
(The remarks of Mr. Warner pertaining to the introduction of S. 2056
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
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