[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 47 (Tuesday, April 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: April 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                          U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Good morning, Mr. President. I appreciate your 
greetings this morning. It is a lovely day out there. I am afraid I 
have a little hay fever, but, obviously, survival is the instinct we 
all have, so I will defer to my prepared remarks.
  Mr. President, I would like to speak briefly today on matters 
concerning our country's foreign policy. I am particularly concerned 
over a number of issues that have been brought up on this floor of 
late, but I think nothing presents more of a threat to world peace than 
the current situation in North Korea.
  I find a rather curious set of circumstances associated with our 
policy in encouraging the North Koreans to abide by the international 
atomic inspection agency. It is rather interesting to note that, back 
in 1992, the North Koreans signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Safeguards Agreement which requires regular inspections of its nuclear 
facilities. But 2 years have elapsed without the North Koreans ever 
fully complying with the mandates of the treaty. The North Koreans 
allowed the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to conduct 
sporadic inspection in 1992, but then flatly denied the IAEA permission 
to inspect the suspected nuclear sites in late 1992.
  In early 1993, North Korea announced its intentions to withdraw from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At this point the United States 
initiated negotiations with the North Koreans, on behalf of the South 
Koreans and the international community. The Clinton administration has 
held two rounds of high-level negotiations with the North Koreans over 
the last year.
  The question I have is whether these negotiations have moved us any 
closer to a resolution of this dangerous problem? In my view, they have 
not. It has been more than 1 year since North Korea threatened to pull 
out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and IAEA inspectors have 
not successfully completed any inspection of either the seven declared 
nuclear sites or the two undeclared nuclear sites.
  The bottom line is that the North Koreans have not complied with 
their obligations. We have lost some 2 years--1992 through 1994--during 
which there has been a series of excuses, a series of negotiations, but 
no concrete results to show. Time has passed and the North Koreans have 
gained valuable time to develop their nuclear arsenal. To what extent 
they have developed that capacity to date, obviously, we have no public 
knowledge--because of the lack of inspections. But we do have 
intelligence reports that suggest that they have, indeed, embarked on 
achieving a nuclear capability.
  My criticism of the administration's policy is that they have offered 
the North Koreans concessions to encourage them to comply with their 
obligations, but have not been effective in mandating compliance. It 
has been an approach of all carrots and no stick. In response to North 
Korean demands, the United States agreed to high-level talks, suspended 
joint military exercises with the South Koreans, and delayed sending 
Patriot missiles to South Korea. In return, the North Koreans have 
refused inspections, delayed the visas for IAEA inspectors, and then 
denied the inspectors the access requested to verify nuclear activity.
  To the administration's credit, it did send the Patriot missiles 
after the North Koreans refused to allow full access to the IAEA 
inspectors.
  However, just last week Defense Secretary William Perry announced 
that the joint military exercises would again be delayed as a ``gesture 
of good will'' to the North Koreans. It seems to me it should be the 
North Koreans who should be making a gesture of good will by allowing 
IAEA inspectors to complete their inspections.
  The U.S. problem seems to be a lack of leverage. The United States 
has no trade or diplomatic ties with North Korea. If we look at those 
countries that have leverage with North Korea through commercial and 
other relations with North Korea, then we are faced with the reality 
that we have to depend, to a large degree, on China and Japan to exert 
pressure on North Korea.
  China provides North Korea with about 75 percent of its oil and a 
goodly portion of its food, somewhere in excess of 70 percent. The 
appropriateness of our encouraging the People's Republic of China to 
encourage the North Koreans to comply with the international inspection 
teams seems quite reasonable, but, indeed, we seem to have run afoul of 
the ability to use our leverage with China.
  I am referring, of course, to the continuing rift that we have with 
the PRC over our demands that China show more advancement in human 
rights activity and their response that this is an internal matter 
within the purview of the People's Republic of China.
  So as a consequence, Mr. President, we are somewhat at a loss to 
utilize our leverage on China. In June, the administration faces the 
decision of whether to renew most-favored-nation status for the PRC. 
There will likely be an extended debate before this body on this issue. 
But in the meantime we are left with a situation where we would like 
China to exert its influence, but China has not seen fit to do so, and 
the administration has not pushed them on the point. Time marches on, 
and the North Koreans continue to develop a nuclear capability.
  Our friends in Japan are also trading partners, to some extent, with 
North Korea. Various reports indicate that between $600 million and 
$1.2 billion of foreign currency enters North Korea from Japan. 
Curiously, it comes from the operation of the Pachinko parlors in 
Japan. Pachinko is a game that many Japanese play during their leisure 
hours. But surprisingly enough, most of these Pachinko parlors are 
owned by North Koreans who have lived in Japan for an extended period 
of time. They have funneled the proceeds back to North Korea, and this 
represents a significant supply of foreign capital for the North 
Koreans.
  Why can we not simply ask our friends in Japan to exert their 
influence in encouraging the North Koreans to agree to inspections? One 
of the problems there, as you might imagine, Mr. President, is that we 
have threatened sanctions in trade matters against Japan. In addition, 
Japan is, again, going through a change of government. So our influence 
there is limited as well.
  Again, I want to highlight the reality that time passes.
  Because our policy has had no teeth, the North Koreans have reached a 
greater ability to develop whatever nuclear capability they would like 
to achieve.
  I do not think it is appropriate that our Nation use a soft approach 
on North Korea. I think the North Koreans have observed our 
inconsistencies to the point that they feel that we do not mean 
business. As evidence, they continue to stall and continue to buy time 
to develop this capability.
  So, Mr. President, I think we should go back and revisit our foreign 
policy with regard to how and through what means we are going to urge 
the North Koreans to curtail their commitment to develop a nuclear 
device. If that means calling on our allies with greater firmness and 
more meaningful demands, then I think we should do so. The North 
Koreans should understand that the United States will no longer 
maintain a policy of inconsistency with regard to an issue that is so 
important to peace and prosperity for the whole world.
  Of course, with the threat of a nuclear capability in the hands of 
the North Koreans, one can only suspect what their objective might be. 
One thing is certain, Mr. President. I know you will recall the 
uncertainty associated with the Government of North Korea. This is the 
same regime that assassinated 16 members of the Cabinet of South Korea. 
This is the same regime that sanctioned the terrorist attack on Korean 
Air Flight 707 that killed 115 innocent victims.
  We are dealing with people who have shown a track record of 
inconsistency, and as a consequence of that one can only imagine if 
they carry a nuclear capability what the prospects might be.
  Mr. President, I have some additional points I would like to make to 
bring up to date my remarks concerning the situation in North Korea. 
This is a chronology of events that have occurred since last week.
  The North Koreans have notified the International Atomic Energy 
Agency that they plan to remove nuclear fuel from their biggest reactor 
by early next month. The significance of that step is that it will 
allow the North Koreans to greatly expand their nuclear weapons arsenal 
unless the material is placed under strict international inspection. 
Thus, the North Koreans gain another bargaining chip.
  It is also significant because the United States administration has 
told this Senator and others that the delay by the North Koreans has 
``not been harmful because their nuclear weapons program was frozen.'' 
Well, with the extraction of this the nuclear fuel, it is clear that 
the program is not frozen.
  The North Koreans have indicated that they would allow inspectors to 
witness the withdrawals but the details of that are unclear. It appears 
that the North Koreans are trying to pressure the inspection agency 
into accepting conditions such as a limited 10-day visit. Inspectors 
have indicated that this would be insufficient time to complete the 
inspections that were ordered last month.
  Further, the North Koreans are also demanding that the United States 
resume the third round of negotiations before allowing full inspections 
to go forward.
  It is clear that the North Koreans continue to toy with us on this 
matter to the point that I think this body and its membership should 
express its indignation at the inconsistent manner in which we have 
dealt with North Korea.

                          ____________________