[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 47 (Tuesday, April 26, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: April 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
MOVING BEYOND TIANANMEN: LEARNING THE LESSONS OF CHINA POLICY
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Clayton). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of February 11, 1994, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman]
is recognized during morning business for 5 minutes.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Speaker, tomorrow the country buries Richard
Nixon, the President who will be remembered both for his far-sighted
foreign policy and his disastrous involvement in the Watergate scandal.
Today I wish to talk for a few minutes about our country's China
policy, recognizing that the timing of Mr. Nixon's death provides a
unique opportunity to focus the future of United States-China
relations.
Few would have predicted, 5 years ago, the changes that have reshaped
the world. The Berlin Wall is a museum piece; former Warsaw Pact states
apply to join NATO, but the cold-war paradigms and 5-year-old memories
of Tiananmen Square still define United States-Chinese relations.
Ironically, the first post-cold-war administration has yet to
articulate a clear post-cold-war policy toward China. The
administration correctly elevated Asia to the more prominent position
it deserves in U.S. foreign policy. A sampling of the geopolitical
landscape illustrates that as important as Tokyo and Seoul are to the
United States, the fate of United States-Asian interests will rest on
Beijing.
China may not be able to dissuade the North Koreans from their
nuclear ambitions, but its leverage over North Korea will be essential
for defusing the Korean nuclear problem. It will take China's
cooperation to cool the arms race between India and Pakistan as well as
deal with the simmering instability in the central Eurasian states of
the former Soviet Union, as well as taking into account the great
instability faced by the Russian Government itself.
A stable China is a necessary element for stability in all these
regions. The administration is not alone in recognizing China's
importance to the United States. Iran has already approached Beijing,
proposing an Iranian-Chinese alliance to counter the United States, as
well as, no doubt, to give Iran a freer hand for its regional
expansionism. Although the first entreaty was rebuffed, it ought to
send a signal to us that the United States runs a risk in putting off
China and keeping China separate from us. If the United States can make
peace with the old Soviet Union, the archenemy we faced on the brink of
nuclear annihilation for nearly five decades, surely we can bring
ourselves to move beyond the searing images of Tiananmen Square that
seem to exclusively drive China policy. To do less threatens not only
the complexity of the geopolitical interests in the world but
jeopardizes an incredible opportunity to participate in China's
economic and political revolution and help to moderate their political
system and help to moderate their human rights treatment.
MFN status--most favored nation status--the cold war relic underlying
our China policy, should not be the basis for the entire United States-
Chinese relationship. That was created constructively to pry exit visas
out of the hands of the Soviets. Moreover, there was little risk to
United States interests denying MFN to Russia. Contemporary China,
which beckons a rush of eager investment from dozens of countries, is
much different.
The President, during his campaign, stitched together a winning
coalition addressing basic economic themes and resisting the pressures
of certain interests who for years damaged the Democratic Party
credibility with the public on issues of foreign policy and national
security. NAFTA is perhaps the greatest example of this.
The fact of the matter is that China has been an exception. In spite
of the fact that China's economy is the most robust in the world right
now, China is not the enemy. Instead of threatening Beijing with the
trade equivalent of a nuclear strike, we should be promoting measures
to build confidence into the relationship as well as throughout the
region. The most immediate objective should be addressing regional
security and stability, weapons proliferation, and strengthening trans-
Pacific economic ties. These directly threaten United States lives and
interests just as much as Chinese human rights policies do.
Rather than pursuing a policy based exclusively on human rights, a
nonlinear approach to bilateral relations that respects China's role as
an emerging world leader will do far more to improve China's bleak
record on human rights than a relationship exclusively focused on
China's dissidents.
The United States has a special role in insisting that governments
respect the dignity of their citizenry. But given the torturous history
of China's relations with Western nations and its historic antipathy
toward both Russia and Japan, success with China will depend on a whole
range of factors beyond specific performance standards, preconditions,
and expanding trade relationships.
Let me close by saying the following: Richard Nixon recognized that a
strong China allied with the United States could divide the Communist
world and perhaps lead to the breakup of the world Communist system. We
need to recognize that China is a powerful moderating force against a
nuclear Korea, against an unstable Russia, and against a worldwide
unpredictable terrorist threat, not even taking into account the
exploring economic growth in East Asia.
Finally, it is absolutely clear to me that Chinese treatment of its
citizens does need serious attention. But treating China as an equal
partner of the world will give us much greater moral authority to
improve their domestic human rights than the current policy being
proposed by many people throughout this country.
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