[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 45 (Thursday, April 21, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: April 21, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1993
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I also wanted to comment on the subject that
the Senator from Nebraska just talked about, and that is the pending
resolution.
Mr. President, the President of the United States made a statement
yesterday that all of us have listened to and listened to very
carefully. There were really three parts of his statement about Bosnia.
He made it clear that he felt the economic embargo should be tightened
on Serbia, and he made it clear that was going to be a position the
United States would take in our meetings that are taking place now and
will take place tomorrow and perhaps over the next 2 or 3 days with our
allies. I completely agree with that.
The embargo on Serbia should be as tight as possible, because of the
activity of the Bosnian Serbs and because of the influence of Serbian
authorities on the Bosnian Serbs. I think that that is a strong
viewpoint, and I believe that the President is correct in asserting it.
The second point the President made is that he is going to do
everything he can to have emergency humanitarian assistance going to
the safe haven called Gorazde. That I think is very important. That
safe haven has become a slaughterhouse. Gorazde has become a place
where international law, where every sign of respect for humanity has
been thrown out the window. So I think the President is absolutely
correct in that.
The third point the President made is that he was going to advocate
extending the overall air campaign, if required. If assaults continued
in Gorazde and the other safe havens, he was going to extend, or
advocate extending the Sarajevo formula to those other safe havens.
Mr. President, I think that subject deserves some very careful
attention because it has implications that I think are broad and very
significant. That debate has occurred on the floor today in some
respects but not, I think, in all respects.
The first thing I think we need to realize, if we do extend the air
campaign, is that the primary mission to date has been to deploy U.N.
forces. Our own forces are not on the ground in Bosnia proper, although
we have forces in the area; we are participating in the air safe zone;
we are participating in the overall embargo; we have thousands of
troops on ships; we have forces in Macedonia; we have humanitarian
forces going out; we have airdrops going on. So America has
participated very vigorously, very vigorously in this overall effort.
I think we need to understand, though, that we have already reached,
or we are about to reach a point where the United Nations and NATO and
the United States, as a member of those bodies, has to make a decision.
The mission of humanitarian relief, the mission of helping supplies get
through by truck convoy, the mission of helping protect those supplies,
the mission of having forces on the ground lightly armed to basically
help escort those supplies to people starving--that mission has already
been severely disrupted and almost completely halted because of the
limited air strikes that have occurred. And those air strikes have been
completely justified. So we are not talking about justification. We are
talking about mission.
When you have two missions, one mission humanitarian, the other
mission to basically take offensive action against those who are
defying certain U.N. mandates, when you are perceived as a party to the
conflict, and that increasingly is the way we are going to be
perceived, then that is in conflict with the humanitarian mission.
This does not mean we should not take these actions. It does not mean
they are not justified. It means that at some point we have to make a
choice. To try to carry out both missions, which we are doing now, we
being the United Nations and NATO--I am not speaking about the United
States unilaterally--is to increasingly risk both missions. The first
mission, humanitarian, has already been disrupted severely.
If we are going into a more extensive bombing campaign, which again I
think is totally justified by Serbian actions, then we have to begin
thinking seriously about pulling out those humanitarian relief workers,
those U.N. personnel, and the other foreign nationals who are there on
missions of mercy. We should not fool ourselves, because we are moving
into a very high-risk policy.
So that is one observation. Those two missions do not go together. We
should have learned that in Lebanon. We should have learned it in
Somalia. We may not believe that we are justifiably perceived as a
party to the conflict, and I do not think it is justifiable, but we
will be perceived that way, and we have literally thousands of people
who are at risk and in harm's way. I do not think any of us want to
wake up tomorrow morning and find that there has been a massive
disaster relating to a large number of people who are highly motivated
on a mercy mission.
So that is point one. These two missions at some point will come into
conflict, and I think we are reaching that point.
My second observation about the air campaign is that once we start a
more extensive air campaign in Bosnia--if it works, fine. That is
wonderful. In Sarajevo, it did work; at least for the time being. But
once we start it, it is not enough to plan step one with our allies and
say let us take these limited targets, because we have to think through
steps two, three, four, and five. At least in our planning, we must
anticipate there will be a reaction and, when there is a reaction, for
us to then have to go through a whole other set of meetings lasting
several days or weeks increasingly makes the United Nations and even
NATO itself look inept and look as if these organizations basically are
unable to execute any kind of comprehensive strategy. My point is there
has to be a strategy, not simply a tactical move.
When the bombing occurs, if it does, around some of the other safe
havens, then we have to understand we are not the ones who are
controlling the escalation unless we have an overall strategy. The
escalation will be in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. They can take
hostages. They can retaliate. They can kill people. They can kidnap
people. They can further shell other areas. They have the bulk of the
initiative and we have very little unless we have a strategy.
So we have to understand, we being NATO, that the allies--while they
do not necessarily have to announce this publicly--have to think and
they have to discuss and they have to have some implicit understanding
about a willingness to escalate the air campaign, a willingness to go
forward with it pursuant to steps two, three, and four. I do not think
Serbia itself can be exempt, in terms of targeting, from this air
campaign.
So that is the second observation I wish to make. The third point I
wish to make is that we are increasingly reversing what I call the
Nixon doctrine coming out of Vietnam. Many people in this body were not
here after Vietnam, but following that experience there was an
announcement by President Nixon that the United States policy was going
to be, first of all, to arm those who were the victims, who had become
the victims of aggression. That was the first resort, to help them help
themselves. And where they were not willing to help themselves, then we
had to examine very carefully whether they deserved help.
In this case, what the United Nations has done, with good intention
but I think with disastrous results, is just the opposite.
We have denied arms to those who are increasingly the victims of this
conflict. They are not able to help themselves. They are trapped in
Gorazde with the Bosnian Serbs, outside the city, in some cases right
in the city in tanks, lobbing in shells and killing innocent people,
hitting hospitals, hitting U.N. headquarters, basically taking a city
that has been declared a safe haven by the United Nations and turning
go it into a slaughterhouse. That is what they are doing. Why are they
able to do that? Is it because there is nobody there to oppose them?
No. The Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Moslems, and others in the
Government--it is not limited to Moslems, they also have some Serbs and
some Croats as part of that Government--does not have tanks. It does
not have artillery. And the mortars it has are of very limited range.
So you see very relaxed Bosnian Serbs sitting there knowing they
cannot be hit, lobbing artillery and tank shells in whenever they
choose.
Mr. President, I think this embargo on arms to those who are the
victims is a policy that is not only counterproductive politically and
militarily. I think it prolongs the conflict, and I believe it is an
immoral policy, preventing us from helping those who are there ready to
help themselves.
Does the United States need to put ground forces into Bosnia? No. I
am opposed to that. That would be the ultimate reversal of the Nixon
doctrine, putting ground forces in to help protect those who we are
denying the ability to protect themselves.
So is the arms embargo counterproductive? I think it is
counterproductive. I think it is prolonging the war. I would
acknowledge that it is not easy. Whatever steps you advocate, it is not
easy. Anybody who thinks there is a clear-cut answer here and it is
going to be easy with no risk I think is fooling themselves. But
putting arms in is not easy. Yet it can be done.
Mr. President, I proposed this morning--and I repeat here--that if
our allies are not willing to lift the embargo completely, at least let
us have a selective lifting of the embargo. Let us say to the Bosnian
Serbs and to the Serbian Serbs, if you continue to display aggression
against the safe havens that have been so declared by the United
Nations, we are going to look at each safe haven and very quickly we
are going to level the playing field. We are going to get arms into
those safe havens so the people there will at least be able to exercise
the right to defend themselves. They may not win. But they will not be
helpless. They will not be sitting there with short-range rifles while
their enemy lobs in long-range artillery and comes in with tanks.
What kind of weapons do they need? I can understand the argument the
people would make in Europe and other places against offensive weapons.
There is a danger here. It is not a no-risk policy. There is a danger,
if you put in offensive weapons, that the people we are helping, who
are now the victims, could become the aggressors. We have a long way to
go, however, before that will happen.
What kind of weapons can we put in that are defensive? We can put it
in antitank weapons. We can put in weapons that will allow them to stop
the tanks. It does not take months and months of training. People who
are desperate, people who are being invaded by tanks, people who are
risking their lives can learn to shoot an antitank missile pretty
darned quickly. We can even airdrop those in there, if necessary,
although it is my hope that the Croatians would cooperate in this kind
of effort if the United Nations and the allies will begin at least to
lift the embargo selectively. In effect, we would be saying to the
Bosnian Serbs, you continue to shell a safe haven, whichever one it is,
we are going to look at that safe haven and we are going to put the
kind of arms in there immediately that will allow the people there to
defend themselves.
Mr. President, air strikes alone, even if we are willing to
escalate--which I think we have to be willing to do--are not enough.
That is not a strategy. At some point, if there is any hope for there
to be a Bosnian Government, they have to be able to defend themselves.
I think that point is long past. It should happen now.
So I think we need to press very hard with our allies on this. I
think the President of the United States should be urged by the Senate
of the United States not to go over and say this is one of our options,
but to say this is something we believe in militarily, we believe in it
strategically, we believe in tactically, and we believe in morally.
Mr. President, one other thought. I believe, even though I agree with
about 95 percent of what the people have said who support this
resolution before us now--which is in the second degree and as I
understand it not amendable--the other 5 percent is very important.
I am at a point of real dilemma because as I have indicated I think
the arms embargo is counterproductive--militarily, morally--in trying
to end the war. On the other hand, this resolution calls for America to
do this independent of our allies, without consulting with our allies,
without discussing it with our allies, without having a forceful effort
with our allies to see if they will go along, without consulting with
Russia, without consulting with China--they are on the United Nations
Security Council--without consulting with Britain, with France or with
anybody.
Understand where that is coming from, because the President has
brought up the issue of lifting the arms embargo before. He has made an
effort before. The Secretary of State has made an effort before to ask
our allies to support lifting the embargo. But we have never made an
effort with a precisely defined set of arms we are willing to put in
there. It is time to be precise. It is time to be assertive. It is time
to say we want these arms in for this purpose. It is defensive, not
offensive. This is a limited lifting, a selective lifting. I would
favor the full lifting. But I think it is time to give our allies a
chance to remedy what I think is a grave error.
Mr. President, what is wrong with acting unilaterally? I tell you
what is wrong with acting unilaterally, and I think all of us need to
think about it before we vote on this. And I have not decided how I am
going to vote. I hope we have an alternative other than what is before
us.
What is wrong with a unilateral approach? We tend in this body and in
this country, when there is a problem in Bosnia, to forget other places
in the world. Four or Five days ago we had a terrible tragedy over
northern Iraq. We had U.S. aircraft shoot down our own helicopter, and
26 people were killed. That was the headline for 2 or 3 days. Now it is
Bosnia. What is it going to be tomorrow? In Iraq, Mr. President,
without the support of Turkey--and Turkey is a key member of NATO--we
cannot protect the Kurds. We have flown more air sorties with our
United States Air Force over Iraq since the Persian Gulf war in
protecting the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south than we
did during the war. That would shock most Americans. We are putting our
pilots at risk every day protecting people in the north, and in the
south.
How are we doing that? Because Turkey is cooperating. The Turks have
a war going on with the Kurds. By one vote several months ago Turkey
decided to let the United States continue to utilize their territory
for purposes that they believe is not consistent with all of their
interests--by one vote. If we take this action today, and say, to the
United Nations, that the United States is going to act alone, we had
better think what it is going to do to our policy in Iraq. We had
better think about that.
We also better think about another place where a lot of American
lives are involved, more than in Iraq, more than in Bosnia where we
have a vital interest--not an important interest or a humanitarian
interest but a vital interest, and have had it for years--and that is
the Korean Peninsula.
What are we faced with in Korea? I tell you what we are faced with.
We are faced with a regime that is isolated, that is heavily armed,
that is dug in, that has 8,000 to 9,000 artillery tubes sitting near
the DMZ, dug into caves looking down over the capital city of Seoul,
where 45 percent of the South Korean population is located.
The best estimates are by our people that, if there is a war in
Korea--forget the nuclear side of it, just the conventional war, even
though we will prevail, and I have no doubt about that--North Korea
would be decimated. It would be the end of that regime. There will be
several hundred thousand people killed, several hundred thousand
people, and a lot of them will be Americans. A lot of them will be
South Koreans. But a number of them will be Americans. We have 38,000
Americans stationed in Korea.
Why is this relevant to this resolution? If we are going to have a
peaceful end to the North Korea nuclear questions, whose support do we
have to have?
We do not trade with North Korea. We cannot shake our fists at them
and say we are going to cut off their trade rights, their MFN. They do
not have any of that. We do not trade with them. Who does trade with
them? The Chinese trade with them. The Chinese are on the Security
Council. The Russians trade with them, and the Russians are on the
Security Council. The Japanese are not on the Security Council, but
they have extensive economic relationships with South Korea.
Mr. President, my point is this, and I will conclude with these
remarks:
We have a world out there that is not limited to whatever CNN focuses
on today. We have a lot of problems out there. We have a lot of danger
spots out there, and we have a lot of Americans in harm's way. I am the
first to say that we cannot rely on the United Nations to do all of our
business. We have to protect our own security interests. But I also
believe we ought to think long and hard about whether America is going
to say: Forget about what we voted for ourselves in the United Nations,
we are going to do everything unilaterally, and we are going to forget
about every other place in the world where we need help from our allies
and friends on the Security Council and United Nations; we are going to
do it unilaterally. That is not the way to proceed.
So I am torn here, Mr. President. Do we continue a counterproductive
and immoral arms embargo, or do we take unilateral action? I think we
have to search for some other formula to express our determination that
the President and our whole Government be forceful in urging the end of
this embargo. There has to be a better way than jeopardizing American
interests and America's position in other key parts of the world.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. I know the Senator from California is waiting, and I do
not intend to take very long.
I want to say this while the Senator from Georgia is here. First of
all, I appreciate enormously the comments he has made, which I am in
agreement with, and which are not dissimilar to some made on the floor
previously.
I ask the Senator this--we are trying to work out compromise language
here that, hopefully, will allow some, with reservations about the
current language, to be able to join in--does the Senator from Georgia
think that, if we embrace language within an amendment that contains
the concept of making an effort to get a multilateral response from the
U.N. but that, even if that effort fails, because Russia, for instance,
vetoes it, that there would be an automatic lifting of the embargo; or
if, in the event the President gets an agreement among the NATO allies
but is blocked somehow, does the Senator feel that those three
different constructs of multilateral effort are sufficient that even if
the Russians were to block it, that we have kept faith, and that at
that point we could proceed forward and lift the embargo?
Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I think this
is why we have a President and executive branch. I believe it is very
difficult to legislate here on the floor of the Senate enough
contingencies on a piece of legislation to take care of that situation.
I think we have to do everything we can to urge the President to be
as forceful as possible, to put forward the position that we are not
going to sit by and let these people continue to have no way of
defending themselves, without deciding yet what we do when our allies
come back. I think we ought to put a complete strategy on the table,
not simply bombing. That is part of a possible strategy, but it has to
be much more complete. It has to involve the air campaign, the
willingness to escalate the air campaign, the lifting of the arms
embargo, perhaps selectively.
This has never been tabled with our allies yet, not even the
Russians. The Russians may agree to it in one safe haven, because the
Russians are fed up with what the Bosnian Serbs have done in the safe
haven that is now becoming a slaughterhouse--Gorazde.
I think the Senate needs to take it a step at a time. The Senate
likes to legislate completely and say: Here is what we do in foreign
policy. But you cannot really do that very well. That has to be part of
the tactic.
I also say that, if the allies do not agree, it is time to say, look,
we want a complete strategy from you. We do not want any more of this
piecemeal business. The Russians owe us that. These are smart people.
They know the score, and they know what is going on. We need a complete
strategy. They may have something we have not thought of. We need to
listen to them. I do not think here on the floor of the Senate we
should try to anticipate all of that and write it into a piece of
legislation.
Mr. KERRY. I agree with the Senator, and that is what I am trying to
a get at. I assume the Senator would agree that, if the Senate today
were to pass a requirement that the President lift the embargo, but, as
a result of other efforts that the President is making, the President
succeeds in getting the safe areas adhered to, and suddenly the dynamic
shifts, I assume the Senator would agree if, notwithstanding that, the
embargo is going to be lifted by action of the Senate, you might in
fact wind up undoing what the President had succeeded in doing. Is that
not fair to say?
Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct. I think we need to give the
President some direction with some kind of resolution, but also some
support and some flexibility.
I know the President of the United States wants to lift the embargo.
I do fear that over time we have not been assertive enough in that, and
I would include as part of the overall strategy that we also need some
carrots out there. The people of Serbia are suffering badly because of
the embargo. I think we need to be much more aggressive, as the Senator
from Michigan has said, about giving them some information about what
their own Government is doing and what is going on in their name in
Bosnia.
So I think there is a whole set of strategies here that could be
employed. And in dealing with the Russians, they may be willing to deal
with both sticks and carrots--sticks being a selective lifting of the
arms embargo against Bosnia, carrots being if the Serbian Serbs begin
to put the kind of pressure on that must be put on the Bosnian Serbs--
then perhaps some selective lifting of the economic embargo against
Serbia--although at this point in time I do not think that ought to be
on the table.
There are a lot of things that could be done here, but I believe that
the Senate of the United States is simply not capable, on a piece of
legislation, of getting the nuances right, because we cannot anticipate
the reaction of all of our allies. We need to give the President
direction, but we need to also give him some flexibility.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator from Georgia, and I thank the Senator
from California for her indulgence.
Mr. NUNN. I yield the floor. I am interested in hearing what the
Senator from California has to say.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein]
is recognized.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the
comments made by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn]. I agree with his
comments on mixed missions not being successful. I agree with his
comment that no legislative strategy is going to be able to solve the
problem. And I agree with his conclusion that we need an executive
strategy.
I think the issue has been joined on the floor of the U.S. Senate. I
was in the chair at 9 o'clock this morning, and I listened to the
Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown]. He was eloquent, forceful, and
compassionate, and I felt he had a real element of truth underlying his
statements. I think that has been added to by the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee as he indicated his concerns.
It might be helpful just to take a look at what has happened today in
Gorazde. I would like to read from a wire story of earlier today:
Scorning the United States' tough talk, Bosnian Serb forces
shelled a hospital annex and Red Cross refugee center in
besieged Gorazde on Thursday. Dozens of people were reported
killed.
Doctors and town officials contacted by ham radio said
Thursday's bombardment was the worst of the three-week Serb
offensive against the Muslim enclave.
``Counting the dead and wounded doesn't make sense
anymore,'' said a local official.
This local official said:
``Four wire-guided rockets landed near a building that
houses U.N. aid workers and military observers, killing or
wounding 25 people. There was no word on whether U.N. staff
were hurt.''
The Serb offensive against Gorazde, one of six U.N.-
declared ``safe areas'' in Bosnia, has continued in defiance
of world condemnation and even of their own cease-fire
agreements.
(Mrs. MURRAY assumed the chair.)
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. It goes on to say:
On Wednesday, President Clinton urged NATO to ``make the
Serbs pay a higher price'' for the continued carnage by
authorizing air strikes to protect civilians in Gorazde and
the other safe areas. He also called for tighter sanctions
against Serbia.
If these wire service stories are correct, Madam President, I think
the issue is clearly being joined at the present time, and I think the
administration must come forward with a full strategy. There may be
some hints in today's debate as to what that strategy might entail.
Yesterday, according to the New York Times, the President of Russia
came forward with what I would consider a definitive statement. He
said:
Despite all the efforts of Russia, the United Nations and
the world community, the conflict is on the verge of a very
dangerous escalation. The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs
should stop attacking Gorazde and leave the town.
Then he calls for an international summit to coordinate the
international response to the Bosnian situation.
The article continues:
``Serbian leadership must fulfill the obligation it has
given to Russia,'' Mr. Yeltsin said today in the strongest
anti-Serbian remarks he has made on the siege. ``Stop the
attacks. Withdraw from Gorazde.'' He also insisted that the
Serbs permit United Nations forces to enter the city.
This may very well be a key turning point. Many of us heard a Russian
envoy last week denounce the Serbs by saying that he has never in his
lifetime seen more Serbian promises broken. In fact, in the last 2 days
alone, three cease-fire agreements have been broken by the Serbs.
Clearly, there is an escalation in violence taking place, and it must
be met by a new policy.
The question, it seems to me, that is before this body today, is
whether the United States of America unilaterally sets that policy or
whether we are willing to accept some leadership on the part of Russia
and our NATO allies, which seems to me to make good sense. Russia is
the historic ally of Serbia. If Russia gets a bellyful, and she may
well have, we may be able to put together the kind of international
coalition which can be effective. Perhaps, Madam President, perhaps the
idea of an international summit on the present situation is not a bad
idea.
The United States was a leader in initiating the Security Council
resolution that banned arms to the region. Therefore, we do have weight
in saying what should happen with respect to those arms now.
I find myself in agreement with Senator Nunn's comments that it is
almost a catch-22. If one takes the action unilaterally, one can expect
other unilateral actions to take place in other areas of the world on
which we may not find welcome or even agreement. It would seem to me
that what an executive strategy must answer is, first of all, why do we
prevent people from defending themselves against aggressors, and yet
are not willing to defend them ourselves?
I cannot adequately answer that question, and it troubles me deeply.
We have sent mixed signals, beginning with the Chief of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, when he announced what we would or would not do.
It seems to me that these unilateral actions carry with them great
trepidation. They put forward a position when perhaps a position should
not be put forward.
It seems to me the best course of action is, first of all, that a
long-term executive strategy be devised quickly; that that strategy be
devised in consultation with Russia and our NATO allies; and that that
strategy be able to answer tough questions.
The time has come where either we unilaterally lift the arms embargo
or we must take some united action.
On the face of it, I do think this amendment is something that every
Member of this body would like to vote for. Howver, it becomes more
relevant the longer we handcuff people from defending themselves when
they are clearly in the slaughterhouse and makes us vulnerable to
international condemnation since we were the ones that were a leader in
instituting the Security Council resolution instituting the arms
embargo.
Let me just summarize, in just the 3 weeks since March 30, when the
attack on Gorazde commenced, there have been daily promises by the
Serbs to stop shooting, to allow food convoys in, and to allow convoys
of wounded out. These promises have been broken on a daily basis. The
world who has a conscience cannot stand by.
Maybe the time has come for an international summit to be held. Maybe
the time has come for the NATO nations to sit down with Russia and
evolve an executive policy which can include an East-West alliance for
the first time that might very well be able to solve this very
complicated and tragic problem.
Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
____________________