[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 45 (Thursday, April 21, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: April 21, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1993

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I also wanted to comment on the subject that 
the Senator from Nebraska just talked about, and that is the pending 
resolution.
  Mr. President, the President of the United States made a statement 
yesterday that all of us have listened to and listened to very 
carefully. There were really three parts of his statement about Bosnia. 
He made it clear that he felt the economic embargo should be tightened 
on Serbia, and he made it clear that was going to be a position the 
United States would take in our meetings that are taking place now and 
will take place tomorrow and perhaps over the next 2 or 3 days with our 
allies. I completely agree with that.
  The embargo on Serbia should be as tight as possible, because of the 
activity of the Bosnian Serbs and because of the influence of Serbian 
authorities on the Bosnian Serbs. I think that that is a strong 
viewpoint, and I believe that the President is correct in asserting it.
  The second point the President made is that he is going to do 
everything he can to have emergency humanitarian assistance going to 
the safe haven called Gorazde. That I think is very important. That 
safe haven has become a slaughterhouse. Gorazde has become a place 
where international law, where every sign of respect for humanity has 
been thrown out the window. So I think the President is absolutely 
correct in that.
  The third point the President made is that he was going to advocate 
extending the overall air campaign, if required. If assaults continued 
in Gorazde and the other safe havens, he was going to extend, or 
advocate extending the Sarajevo formula to those other safe havens.
  Mr. President, I think that subject deserves some very careful 
attention because it has implications that I think are broad and very 
significant. That debate has occurred on the floor today in some 
respects but not, I think, in all respects.
  The first thing I think we need to realize, if we do extend the air 
campaign, is that the primary mission to date has been to deploy U.N. 
forces. Our own forces are not on the ground in Bosnia proper, although 
we have forces in the area; we are participating in the air safe zone; 
we are participating in the overall embargo; we have thousands of 
troops on ships; we have forces in Macedonia; we have humanitarian 
forces going out; we have airdrops going on. So America has 
participated very vigorously, very vigorously in this overall effort.
  I think we need to understand, though, that we have already reached, 
or we are about to reach a point where the United Nations and NATO and 
the United States, as a member of those bodies, has to make a decision. 
The mission of humanitarian relief, the mission of helping supplies get 
through by truck convoy, the mission of helping protect those supplies, 
the mission of having forces on the ground lightly armed to basically 
help escort those supplies to people starving--that mission has already 
been severely disrupted and almost completely halted because of the 
limited air strikes that have occurred. And those air strikes have been 
completely justified. So we are not talking about justification. We are 
talking about mission.
  When you have two missions, one mission humanitarian, the other 
mission to basically take offensive action against those who are 
defying certain U.N. mandates, when you are perceived as a party to the 
conflict, and that increasingly is the way we are going to be 
perceived, then that is in conflict with the humanitarian mission.
  This does not mean we should not take these actions. It does not mean 
they are not justified. It means that at some point we have to make a 
choice. To try to carry out both missions, which we are doing now, we 
being the United Nations and NATO--I am not speaking about the United 
States unilaterally--is to increasingly risk both missions. The first 
mission, humanitarian, has already been disrupted severely.
  If we are going into a more extensive bombing campaign, which again I 
think is totally justified by Serbian actions, then we have to begin 
thinking seriously about pulling out those humanitarian relief workers, 
those U.N. personnel, and the other foreign nationals who are there on 
missions of mercy. We should not fool ourselves, because we are moving 
into a very high-risk policy.
  So that is one observation. Those two missions do not go together. We 
should have learned that in Lebanon. We should have learned it in 
Somalia. We may not believe that we are justifiably perceived as a 
party to the conflict, and I do not think it is justifiable, but we 
will be perceived that way, and we have literally thousands of people 
who are at risk and in harm's way. I do not think any of us want to 
wake up tomorrow morning and find that there has been a massive 
disaster relating to a large number of people who are highly motivated 
on a mercy mission.
  So that is point one. These two missions at some point will come into 
conflict, and I think we are reaching that point.
  My second observation about the air campaign is that once we start a 
more extensive air campaign in Bosnia--if it works, fine. That is 
wonderful. In Sarajevo, it did work; at least for the time being. But 
once we start it, it is not enough to plan step one with our allies and 
say let us take these limited targets, because we have to think through 
steps two, three, four, and five. At least in our planning, we must 
anticipate there will be a reaction and, when there is a reaction, for 
us to then have to go through a whole other set of meetings lasting 
several days or weeks increasingly makes the United Nations and even 
NATO itself look inept and look as if these organizations basically are 
unable to execute any kind of comprehensive strategy. My point is there 
has to be a strategy, not simply a tactical move.
  When the bombing occurs, if it does, around some of the other safe 
havens, then we have to understand we are not the ones who are 
controlling the escalation unless we have an overall strategy. The 
escalation will be in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. They can take 
hostages. They can retaliate. They can kill people. They can kidnap 
people. They can further shell other areas. They have the bulk of the 
initiative and we have very little unless we have a strategy.
  So we have to understand, we being NATO, that the allies--while they 
do not necessarily have to announce this publicly--have to think and 
they have to discuss and they have to have some implicit understanding 
about a willingness to escalate the air campaign, a willingness to go 
forward with it pursuant to steps two, three, and four. I do not think 
Serbia itself can be exempt, in terms of targeting, from this air 
campaign.
  So that is the second observation I wish to make. The third point I 
wish to make is that we are increasingly reversing what I call the 
Nixon doctrine coming out of Vietnam. Many people in this body were not 
here after Vietnam, but following that experience there was an 
announcement by President Nixon that the United States policy was going 
to be, first of all, to arm those who were the victims, who had become 
the victims of aggression. That was the first resort, to help them help 
themselves. And where they were not willing to help themselves, then we 
had to examine very carefully whether they deserved help.
  In this case, what the United Nations has done, with good intention 
but I think with disastrous results, is just the opposite.
  We have denied arms to those who are increasingly the victims of this 
conflict. They are not able to help themselves. They are trapped in 
Gorazde with the Bosnian Serbs, outside the city, in some cases right 
in the city in tanks, lobbing in shells and killing innocent people, 
hitting hospitals, hitting U.N. headquarters, basically taking a city 
that has been declared a safe haven by the United Nations and turning 
go it into a slaughterhouse. That is what they are doing. Why are they 
able to do that? Is it because there is nobody there to oppose them? 
No. The Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Moslems, and others in the 
Government--it is not limited to Moslems, they also have some Serbs and 
some Croats as part of that Government--does not have tanks. It does 
not have artillery. And the mortars it has are of very limited range.
  So you see very relaxed Bosnian Serbs sitting there knowing they 
cannot be hit, lobbing artillery and tank shells in whenever they 
choose.
  Mr. President, I think this embargo on arms to those who are the 
victims is a policy that is not only counterproductive politically and 
militarily. I think it prolongs the conflict, and I believe it is an 
immoral policy, preventing us from helping those who are there ready to 
help themselves.
  Does the United States need to put ground forces into Bosnia? No. I 
am opposed to that. That would be the ultimate reversal of the Nixon 
doctrine, putting ground forces in to help protect those who we are 
denying the ability to protect themselves.
  So is the arms embargo counterproductive? I think it is 
counterproductive. I think it is prolonging the war. I would 
acknowledge that it is not easy. Whatever steps you advocate, it is not 
easy. Anybody who thinks there is a clear-cut answer here and it is 
going to be easy with no risk I think is fooling themselves. But 
putting arms in is not easy. Yet it can be done.
  Mr. President, I proposed this morning--and I repeat here--that if 
our allies are not willing to lift the embargo completely, at least let 
us have a selective lifting of the embargo. Let us say to the Bosnian 
Serbs and to the Serbian Serbs, if you continue to display aggression 
against the safe havens that have been so declared by the United 
Nations, we are going to look at each safe haven and very quickly we 
are going to level the playing field. We are going to get arms into 
those safe havens so the people there will at least be able to exercise 
the right to defend themselves. They may not win. But they will not be 
helpless. They will not be sitting there with short-range rifles while 
their enemy lobs in long-range artillery and comes in with tanks.
  What kind of weapons do they need? I can understand the argument the 
people would make in Europe and other places against offensive weapons. 
There is a danger here. It is not a no-risk policy. There is a danger, 
if you put in offensive weapons, that the people we are helping, who 
are now the victims, could become the aggressors. We have a long way to 
go, however, before that will happen.
  What kind of weapons can we put in that are defensive? We can put it 
in antitank weapons. We can put in weapons that will allow them to stop 
the tanks. It does not take months and months of training. People who 
are desperate, people who are being invaded by tanks, people who are 
risking their lives can learn to shoot an antitank missile pretty 
darned quickly. We can even airdrop those in there, if necessary, 
although it is my hope that the Croatians would cooperate in this kind 
of effort if the United Nations and the allies will begin at least to 
lift the embargo selectively. In effect, we would be saying to the 
Bosnian Serbs, you continue to shell a safe haven, whichever one it is, 
we are going to look at that safe haven and we are going to put the 
kind of arms in there immediately that will allow the people there to 
defend themselves.
  Mr. President, air strikes alone, even if we are willing to 
escalate--which I think we have to be willing to do--are not enough. 
That is not a strategy. At some point, if there is any hope for there 
to be a Bosnian Government, they have to be able to defend themselves. 
I think that point is long past. It should happen now.
  So I think we need to press very hard with our allies on this. I 
think the President of the United States should be urged by the Senate 
of the United States not to go over and say this is one of our options, 
but to say this is something we believe in militarily, we believe in it 
strategically, we believe in tactically, and we believe in morally.
  Mr. President, one other thought. I believe, even though I agree with 
about 95 percent of what the people have said who support this 
resolution before us now--which is in the second degree and as I 
understand it not amendable--the other 5 percent is very important.
  I am at a point of real dilemma because as I have indicated I think 
the arms embargo is counterproductive--militarily, morally--in trying 
to end the war. On the other hand, this resolution calls for America to 
do this independent of our allies, without consulting with our allies, 
without discussing it with our allies, without having a forceful effort 
with our allies to see if they will go along, without consulting with 
Russia, without consulting with China--they are on the United Nations 
Security Council--without consulting with Britain, with France or with 
anybody.
  Understand where that is coming from, because the President has 
brought up the issue of lifting the arms embargo before. He has made an 
effort before. The Secretary of State has made an effort before to ask 
our allies to support lifting the embargo. But we have never made an 
effort with a precisely defined set of arms we are willing to put in 
there. It is time to be precise. It is time to be assertive. It is time 
to say we want these arms in for this purpose. It is defensive, not 
offensive. This is a limited lifting, a selective lifting. I would 
favor the full lifting. But I think it is time to give our allies a 
chance to remedy what I think is a grave error.
  Mr. President, what is wrong with acting unilaterally? I tell you 
what is wrong with acting unilaterally, and I think all of us need to 
think about it before we vote on this. And I have not decided how I am 
going to vote. I hope we have an alternative other than what is before 
us.
  What is wrong with a unilateral approach? We tend in this body and in 
this country, when there is a problem in Bosnia, to forget other places 
in the world. Four or Five days ago we had a terrible tragedy over 
northern Iraq. We had U.S. aircraft shoot down our own helicopter, and 
26 people were killed. That was the headline for 2 or 3 days. Now it is 
Bosnia. What is it going to be tomorrow? In Iraq, Mr. President, 
without the support of Turkey--and Turkey is a key member of NATO--we 
cannot protect the Kurds. We have flown more air sorties with our 
United States Air Force over Iraq since the Persian Gulf war in 
protecting the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south than we 
did during the war. That would shock most Americans. We are putting our 
pilots at risk every day protecting people in the north, and in the 
south.
  How are we doing that? Because Turkey is cooperating. The Turks have 
a war going on with the Kurds. By one vote several months ago Turkey 
decided to let the United States continue to utilize their territory 
for purposes that they believe is not consistent with all of their 
interests--by one vote. If we take this action today, and say, to the 
United Nations, that the United States is going to act alone, we had 
better think what it is going to do to our policy in Iraq. We had 
better think about that.
  We also better think about another place where a lot of American 
lives are involved, more than in Iraq, more than in Bosnia where we 
have a vital interest--not an important interest or a humanitarian 
interest but a vital interest, and have had it for years--and that is 
the Korean Peninsula.
  What are we faced with in Korea? I tell you what we are faced with. 
We are faced with a regime that is isolated, that is heavily armed, 
that is dug in, that has 8,000 to 9,000 artillery tubes sitting near 
the DMZ, dug into caves looking down over the capital city of Seoul, 
where 45 percent of the South Korean population is located.
  The best estimates are by our people that, if there is a war in 
Korea--forget the nuclear side of it, just the conventional war, even 
though we will prevail, and I have no doubt about that--North Korea 
would be decimated. It would be the end of that regime. There will be 
several hundred thousand people killed, several hundred thousand 
people, and a lot of them will be Americans. A lot of them will be 
South Koreans. But a number of them will be Americans. We have 38,000 
Americans stationed in Korea.
  Why is this relevant to this resolution? If we are going to have a 
peaceful end to the North Korea nuclear questions, whose support do we 
have to have?
  We do not trade with North Korea. We cannot shake our fists at them 
and say we are going to cut off their trade rights, their MFN. They do 
not have any of that. We do not trade with them. Who does trade with 
them? The Chinese trade with them. The Chinese are on the Security 
Council. The Russians trade with them, and the Russians are on the 
Security Council. The Japanese are not on the Security Council, but 
they have extensive economic relationships with South Korea.
  Mr. President, my point is this, and I will conclude with these 
remarks:
  We have a world out there that is not limited to whatever CNN focuses 
on today. We have a lot of problems out there. We have a lot of danger 
spots out there, and we have a lot of Americans in harm's way. I am the 
first to say that we cannot rely on the United Nations to do all of our 
business. We have to protect our own security interests. But I also 
believe we ought to think long and hard about whether America is going 
to say: Forget about what we voted for ourselves in the United Nations, 
we are going to do everything unilaterally, and we are going to forget 
about every other place in the world where we need help from our allies 
and friends on the Security Council and United Nations; we are going to 
do it unilaterally. That is not the way to proceed.
  So I am torn here, Mr. President. Do we continue a counterproductive 
and immoral arms embargo, or do we take unilateral action? I think we 
have to search for some other formula to express our determination that 
the President and our whole Government be forceful in urging the end of 
this embargo. There has to be a better way than jeopardizing American 
interests and America's position in other key parts of the world.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. I know the Senator from California is waiting, and I do 
not intend to take very long.
  I want to say this while the Senator from Georgia is here. First of 
all, I appreciate enormously the comments he has made, which I am in 
agreement with, and which are not dissimilar to some made on the floor 
previously.
  I ask the Senator this--we are trying to work out compromise language 
here that, hopefully, will allow some, with reservations about the 
current language, to be able to join in--does the Senator from Georgia 
think that, if we embrace language within an amendment that contains 
the concept of making an effort to get a multilateral response from the 
U.N. but that, even if that effort fails, because Russia, for instance, 
vetoes it, that there would be an automatic lifting of the embargo; or 
if, in the event the President gets an agreement among the NATO allies 
but is blocked somehow, does the Senator feel that those three 
different constructs of multilateral effort are sufficient that even if 
the Russians were to block it, that we have kept faith, and that at 
that point we could proceed forward and lift the embargo?
  Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I think this 
is why we have a President and executive branch. I believe it is very 
difficult to legislate here on the floor of the Senate enough 
contingencies on a piece of legislation to take care of that situation.
  I think we have to do everything we can to urge the President to be 
as forceful as possible, to put forward the position that we are not 
going to sit by and let these people continue to have no way of 
defending themselves, without deciding yet what we do when our allies 
come back. I think we ought to put a complete strategy on the table, 
not simply bombing. That is part of a possible strategy, but it has to 
be much more complete. It has to involve the air campaign, the 
willingness to escalate the air campaign, the lifting of the arms 
embargo, perhaps selectively.
  This has never been tabled with our allies yet, not even the 
Russians. The Russians may agree to it in one safe haven, because the 
Russians are fed up with what the Bosnian Serbs have done in the safe 
haven that is now becoming a slaughterhouse--Gorazde.
  I think the Senate needs to take it a step at a time. The Senate 
likes to legislate completely and say: Here is what we do in foreign 
policy. But you cannot really do that very well. That has to be part of 
the tactic.
  I also say that, if the allies do not agree, it is time to say, look, 
we want a complete strategy from you. We do not want any more of this 
piecemeal business. The Russians owe us that. These are smart people. 
They know the score, and they know what is going on. We need a complete 
strategy. They may have something we have not thought of. We need to 
listen to them. I do not think here on the floor of the Senate we 
should try to anticipate all of that and write it into a piece of 
legislation.
  Mr. KERRY. I agree with the Senator, and that is what I am trying to 
a get at. I assume the Senator would agree that, if the Senate today 
were to pass a requirement that the President lift the embargo, but, as 
a result of other efforts that the President is making, the President 
succeeds in getting the safe areas adhered to, and suddenly the dynamic 
shifts, I assume the Senator would agree if, notwithstanding that, the 
embargo is going to be lifted by action of the Senate, you might in 
fact wind up undoing what the President had succeeded in doing. Is that 
not fair to say?
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct. I think we need to give the 
President some direction with some kind of resolution, but also some 
support and some flexibility.
  I know the President of the United States wants to lift the embargo. 
I do fear that over time we have not been assertive enough in that, and 
I would include as part of the overall strategy that we also need some 
carrots out there. The people of Serbia are suffering badly because of 
the embargo. I think we need to be much more aggressive, as the Senator 
from Michigan has said, about giving them some information about what 
their own Government is doing and what is going on in their name in 
Bosnia.
  So I think there is a whole set of strategies here that could be 
employed. And in dealing with the Russians, they may be willing to deal 
with both sticks and carrots--sticks being a selective lifting of the 
arms embargo against Bosnia, carrots being if the Serbian Serbs begin 
to put the kind of pressure on that must be put on the Bosnian Serbs--
then perhaps some selective lifting of the economic embargo against 
Serbia--although at this point in time I do not think that ought to be 
on the table.
  There are a lot of things that could be done here, but I believe that 
the Senate of the United States is simply not capable, on a piece of 
legislation, of getting the nuances right, because we cannot anticipate 
the reaction of all of our allies. We need to give the President 
direction, but we need to also give him some flexibility.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator from Georgia, and I thank the Senator 
from California for her indulgence.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield the floor. I am interested in hearing what the 
Senator from California has to say.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein] 
is recognized.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the 
comments made by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn]. I agree with his 
comments on mixed missions not being successful. I agree with his 
comment that no legislative strategy is going to be able to solve the 
problem. And I agree with his conclusion that we need an executive 
strategy.
  I think the issue has been joined on the floor of the U.S. Senate. I 
was in the chair at 9 o'clock this morning, and I listened to the 
Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown]. He was eloquent, forceful, and 
compassionate, and I felt he had a real element of truth underlying his 
statements. I think that has been added to by the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee as he indicated his concerns.
  It might be helpful just to take a look at what has happened today in 
Gorazde. I would like to read from a wire story of earlier today:

       Scorning the United States' tough talk, Bosnian Serb forces 
     shelled a hospital annex and Red Cross refugee center in 
     besieged Gorazde on Thursday. Dozens of people were reported 
     killed.
       Doctors and town officials contacted by ham radio said 
     Thursday's bombardment was the worst of the three-week Serb 
     offensive against the Muslim enclave.
       ``Counting the dead and wounded doesn't make sense 
     anymore,'' said a local official.

  This local official said:

       ``Four wire-guided rockets landed near a building that 
     houses U.N. aid workers and military observers, killing or 
     wounding 25 people. There was no word on whether U.N. staff 
     were hurt.''
       The Serb offensive against Gorazde, one of six U.N.-
     declared ``safe areas'' in Bosnia, has continued in defiance 
     of world condemnation and even of their own cease-fire 
     agreements.

  (Mrs. MURRAY assumed the chair.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. It goes on to say:

       On Wednesday, President Clinton urged NATO to ``make the 
     Serbs pay a higher price'' for the continued carnage by 
     authorizing air strikes to protect civilians in Gorazde and 
     the other safe areas. He also called for tighter sanctions 
     against Serbia.

  If these wire service stories are correct, Madam President, I think 
the issue is clearly being joined at the present time, and I think the 
administration must come forward with a full strategy. There may be 
some hints in today's debate as to what that strategy might entail.
  Yesterday, according to the New York Times, the President of Russia 
came forward with what I would consider a definitive statement. He 
said:

       Despite all the efforts of Russia, the United Nations and 
     the world community, the conflict is on the verge of a very 
     dangerous escalation. The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs 
     should stop attacking Gorazde and leave the town.

  Then he calls for an international summit to coordinate the 
international response to the Bosnian situation.
  The article continues:

       ``Serbian leadership must fulfill the obligation it has 
     given to Russia,'' Mr. Yeltsin said today in the strongest 
     anti-Serbian remarks he has made on the siege. ``Stop the 
     attacks. Withdraw from Gorazde.'' He also insisted that the 
     Serbs permit United Nations forces to enter the city.

  This may very well be a key turning point. Many of us heard a Russian 
envoy last week denounce the Serbs by saying that he has never in his 
lifetime seen more Serbian promises broken. In fact, in the last 2 days 
alone, three cease-fire agreements have been broken by the Serbs. 
Clearly, there is an escalation in violence taking place, and it must 
be met by a new policy.
  The question, it seems to me, that is before this body today, is 
whether the United States of America unilaterally sets that policy or 
whether we are willing to accept some leadership on the part of Russia 
and our NATO allies, which seems to me to make good sense. Russia is 
the historic ally of Serbia. If Russia gets a bellyful, and she may 
well have, we may be able to put together the kind of international 
coalition which can be effective. Perhaps, Madam President, perhaps the 
idea of an international summit on the present situation is not a bad 
idea.
  The United States was a leader in initiating the Security Council 
resolution that banned arms to the region. Therefore, we do have weight 
in saying what should happen with respect to those arms now.
  I find myself in agreement with Senator Nunn's comments that it is 
almost a catch-22. If one takes the action unilaterally, one can expect 
other unilateral actions to take place in other areas of the world on 
which we may not find welcome or even agreement. It would seem to me 
that what an executive strategy must answer is, first of all, why do we 
prevent people from defending themselves against aggressors, and yet 
are not willing to defend them ourselves?
  I cannot adequately answer that question, and it troubles me deeply. 
We have sent mixed signals, beginning with the Chief of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, when he announced what we would or would not do.
  It seems to me that these unilateral actions carry with them great 
trepidation. They put forward a position when perhaps a position should 
not be put forward.
  It seems to me the best course of action is, first of all, that a 
long-term executive strategy be devised quickly; that that strategy be 
devised in consultation with Russia and our NATO allies; and that that 
strategy be able to answer tough questions.
  The time has come where either we unilaterally lift the arms embargo 
or we must take some united action.
  On the face of it, I do think this amendment is something that every 
Member of this body would like to vote for. Howver, it becomes more 
relevant the longer we handcuff people from defending themselves when 
they are clearly in the slaughterhouse and makes us vulnerable to 
international condemnation since we were the ones that were a leader in 
instituting the Security Council resolution instituting the arms 
embargo.
  Let me just summarize, in just the 3 weeks since March 30, when the 
attack on Gorazde commenced, there have been daily promises by the 
Serbs to stop shooting, to allow food convoys in, and to allow convoys 
of wounded out. These promises have been broken on a daily basis. The 
world who has a conscience cannot stand by.
  Maybe the time has come for an international summit to be held. Maybe 
the time has come for the NATO nations to sit down with Russia and 
evolve an executive policy which can include an East-West alliance for 
the first time that might very well be able to solve this very 
complicated and tragic problem.
  Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

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