[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 42 (Monday, April 18, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: April 18, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
  APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2333, STATE DEPARTMENT, USIA, AND 
     RELATED AGENCIES AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the 
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2333) to authorize appropriations for 
the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and related 
agencies, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, 
disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by 
the Senate.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Indiana?
  There was no objection.


                motion to instruct offered by mr. gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.

  The Clerk read as follows:
       Mr. Gilman moves that the managers on the part of the House 
     at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
     on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 2333 be instructed 
     to insist upon the provision contained in section 132(f) of 
     the House bill relating to the continuation of the Office of 
     the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of 
     State.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] 
will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Hamilton] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  My motion to instruct is very simple. It is my intent to have the 
conferees instructed to insist on language in the House bill that 
requires the State Department to retain the independent Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
  The language prevents the implementation of a proposed State 
Department reorganization plan that would downgrade the Office of 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the level of a Deputy Assistance 
Secretary of State.
  The Senate's language will permit this reorganization and thus the 
elimination of this important office.
  My bipartisan amendment to H.R. 2333, agreed to by the House last 
June, creates a permanent statutory office maintaining this 
counterterrorism function at the highly visible equivalency level of 
Assistant Secretary of State.
  I was especially pleased that my good friend and colleague from New 
York, Mr. Nadler, who represents lower Manhattan, where the Trade 
Center terrorist bombing occurred, joined in supporting the amendment 
that passed the House last June.
  Under the proposed reorganization plan, the current Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism will be eliminated unless we act.
  Unless this language is retained by the conference, the 
counterterrorism function will be delegated down to that of a midlevel 
Deputy Assistant Secretary. It will be part of a new multiple function 
office whose responsibilities also will include narcotics and 
international crime.
  The international narcotics function alone, as we know, could easily 
consume the entire time, focus and attention of the Assistant Secretary 
of the proposed new multifunction bureau.
  Since early last year, the United States has seen an increased level 
of international terrorism directed at American political leaders, 
citizens, their property, and their very safety.
  For example, the New York World Trade Center bombing took the lives 
of 6 Americans, including a constituent of mine, injured 1,000 people 
and cost over $600 million in property damage and business disruption.
  We have seen reports of the terrorist plot against commuter tunnels, 
other Government facilities, and political leaders in New York.
  Given these incidents here in the United States, the rise of new, 
loosely knit terrorist groups, and other forces promoting terrorism 
around the globe, this is not the time for America to lower its guard 
against the horrors and threats of international terrorism.
  We must make international terrorism a national priority in our 
foreign policy plans, and structure as well.
  The State Department proposal to diminish the counterterrorism 
function sends the wrong signal at the wrong time, both to our friends 
and foes alike, the world over.
  Former career Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism Paul Bremer, 
an expert in this area, said it best when he told Congress:

       * * * I am disappointed, indeed, dismayed by the 
     administration's decision to downgrade the bureaucratic level 
     of the State Department's office for combatting terrorism.

  Further, he said, and I quote:

       This will not only make interagency coordination more 
     difficult and problematic in our Government, but will make us 
     much less effective when we go to our allies or to State 
     sponsors and ask them for help. In my experience, other 
     governments are not often persuaded by importuning deputy 
     assistant secretaries.

  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this motion to instruct 
our House conferees. The Nation and the victims of the Trade Center 
bombing would expect nothing less from their elected representatives 
here in the Congress than the maintenance of this critical office in 
the battle against international terrorism.
  Let us today go firmly on the record in favor of continuing the high 
priority the United States places on combating international terrorism.

                              {time}  1650

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I just want to say to the gentleman from New York that 
it is not my intention to oppose his motion. I want to commend him for 
the work that he has done in the whole field of counterterrorism. He 
has made that quite a specialty, and he has made constructive 
suggestions to our policy on counterterrorism over a period of several 
years.
  I think he knows the Department of State does oppose his amendment, 
so what I will say to him this evening is simply that we will not 
oppose his motion to instruct. He understands the administration 
opposes the content of his motion to instruct, and I will try to work 
with him and the administration and the Department of State in the 
conference to work out an acceptable solution for both parties.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HAMILTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his comments, our 
distinguished chairman.
  I certainly look forward to working with him in the conference to see 
if we can arrive at a practical solution to this problem.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], the distinguished chairman of 
the Subcommittee on International Operations.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, as the chairman, the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. Hamilton], indicated, I do not rise to oppose this amendment and 
will not seek a rollcall vote on this amendment.
  I think it is fair though to elaborate on this administration's 
feelings about how this office should be organized.
  The gentleman from Indiana, the chairman of the full committee, made 
reference to the work that the gentleman from New York, the sponsor of 
this motion, had done in the area of counterterrorism. I am happy to 
have worked with him on a number of these causes. I would be terribly 
concerned if I thought that this administration, through its 
organizational changes, was in any way eroding its commitment to do 
what it can at diplomatic levels, at technological levels, and at all 
levels against terrorism. I would join him enthusiastically in a 
second.
  I do not think that is the case. The administration's plan is 
designed to revitalize the counterterrorism office to make it more 
active, to make it less reactive. The coordinator for counterterrorism 
will be an Assistant Secretary of State, not a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary. He will be in the mainstream chain of command within the 
State Department, not an adjunct office lost in a big bureaucracy.
  The coordinator will be the official in the Department responsible 
for counterterrorism.
  Under the amendment of the junior Senator from New York, which is in 
the Senate's version of this bill and which the administration does not 
oppose, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism, who will 
have a day-to-day responsibility for counterrorism, would have the rank 
of ambassador subject to Senate confirmation. The new bureau will 
combine all of the State Department's counterrorism capabilities into a 
single bureau. In a crisis or emergency, there will be wider resources 
to draw upon to support counterterrorism efforts.
  That, by the way, Assistant Secretary, the person who will take over 
the responsibility for coordinator, who will have a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary whose full responsibility will be in counterrorism, will be 
reporting to the Under Secretary that is being created by the 
administration's reorganization, our former colleague from Colorado, 
Mr. Wirth, who under the processes now existing in the State Department 
on a regular basis meets with the Secretary, avoiding the problem that 
we saw too many times in the past where the issue of counterterrorism 
is shunted off to the side, and the inputs from that office do not come 
into play in the geographic bureaus and, therefore, are not given 
sufficient credence in policy determinations.

  Counterterrorism under the reorganization plan of the administration 
will remain a separate function within the reorganized Bureau of 
Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime. It will not be folded into 
counternarcotics operations. However, given the close ties between drug 
trafficking and terrorism around the world, it makes sense to bring the 
resources of the Department on these important issues into one bureau.
  Moreover, the new bureau will mirror the organization of some of our 
key allies who are focusing on terrorism, narcotics, and crime. 
Furthermore, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, who was recently confirmed to 
be Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, would 
become, under the reorganization plan, the Assistant Secretary for 
Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime and the coordinator for 
counterterrorism. Ambassador Gelbard has both a professional and a 
personal interest in counterterrorism, professionally as a 
distinguished career diplomat with 27 years in the Foreign Service, and 
long experience in counterterrorism and narcotics issues. He is an 
expert in this field. He will bring enormous experience and energy to 
combating terrorism around the world.
  It has been alleged and asserted by our former Ambassador at Large 
for Counterterrorism, Paul Bremer, that the administration has somehow 
by this reorganization gutted the current Office of Counterterrorism by 
cutting 40 percent of the staff. This claim is simply not true.
  According to the State Department, the number of personnel in the 
Office of Counterterrorism at the working level is the same as it 
always has been and will remain that way under the reorganization plan.
  Mr. Speaker, I think in the end the best argument I can make as to 
why we should not build too much hopes on how we particularly decide to 
reorganize this office within the executive branch is to recall that at 
the time when the Assistant Secretary ambassadorial rank Office of 
Counterterrorism existed in earlier years during the 1980's, there was 
a complete failure of that bureau to be able to impact on the policies 
of the geographic bureau, so you saw, for instance, the Bureau of Near 
East Affairs, and the gentleman from New York pointed out this problem 
many times during that time, the Bureau of Near East Affairs, 
notwithstanding Iraq and Saddam Hussein's continuous support for 
terrorism, having tremendous influence on the Secretary of State and on 
the whole executive branch in urging that Iraq be taken off the list of 
countries supporting terrorism, and resisting all efforts to put Iraq 
back on that list and not effectively denying Iraq the kind of 
materials and exports that a country on the terrorism list would 
otherwise have been eligible for even though we had a freestanding 
office headed by an Assistant Secretary, a distinguished ambassador; he 
could not infiltrate, he could not make his voice heard. He knew. He 
briefed us on the problems in Iraq, but he could not get his own Bureau 
of Near East Affairs to do anything about it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Just on that point with regard to Iraq being allowed to 
be taken off the terrorist list, I have been informed that removal was 
in 1982 before the office was created in 1985. So it was before there 
was an independent office.
  Mr. BERMAN. The gentleman is correct. Iraq was taken off the list of 
countries supporting terrorism in 1982. The gentleman may remember the 
bill he cosponsored that I introduced to place Iraq back on the list of 
countries supporting terrorism. The gentleman, I know, had many of the 
same briefings I had from that terrorism office in 1985 and afterwards 
about the work of Abu Nidal, who had been based in Baghdad, about the 
fact that the Achille Lauro hijacking, that the individual who 
perpetrated that terrorism act was given safe haven in Baghdad, about 
the support of Ibu Abrahim, the suitcase bomber in Baghdad during that 
time. That terrorism office was telling us these problems with Iraq, 
and notwithstanding that, the Secretary of State and the administration 
were opposing our mutual efforts to put Iraq back on the list of 
countries supporting terrorism.

                              {time}  1700

  My point is it does not matter how you organize it; it is how much 
weight you give to it and how you organize so that policies that focus 
on counterterrorism can permeate the Department.
  I would suggest that the structure that this administration has 
proposed, which would have the Undersecretary who meets with the 
Secretary on a daily basis, on a regular basis, bringing the concerns 
of the terrorism unit to the Secretary of State, can have more impact 
in the fight on terrorism than we did the old way, where you had a 
freestanding official who was floating around without the kind of 
access that allowed him to do that.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, is it not true that under the existing 
structure, the Office of Counterterrorism is a separate entity; is that 
not true?
  Mr. BERMAN. It is.
  Mr. GILMAN. It is not folded into any other organization. And the 
present person who coordinates that office is known as a coordinator 
with Assistant Secretary responsibilities.
  Mr. BERMAN. That is right.
  Mr. GILMAN. And what we are doing now under the reorganization plan 
is taking that coordinator in a separate office with ambassadorial 
title and Assistant Secretary status and folding him in with an office 
where we have crime responsibilities and narcotics responsibilities; is 
that accurate?
  Mr. BERMAN. It is correct. The coordinator for counterterrorism will 
also have responsibilities, overall responsibilities, for narcotics and 
for crime.
  Mr. GILMAN. That is why I am concerned that this is hardly the time 
to essentially downgrade our Government's attention to terrorism. There 
is no efficiency and no symbiosis to be gained for either policy by 
lumping these two disparate functions together.
  And finally, the administration's proposal, I think, is a blueprint 
for bureaucratic incompetence. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counterterrorism will not have the bureaucratic muscle to pursue 
aggressive counterterrorism policies, at home or abroad. And so it will 
not be able to get its work done.
  Since 1986, the agency, in developing and implementing our 
Government's counterterrorism policy, has been a separate entity. This 
it can do only when the Department's Office on Counterterrorism has 
sufficient bureaucratic clout within the Department of State and with 
other agencies.
  It is for that reason that I have this letter before me signed by 
Ambassador Paul Bremer III, former Ambassador-at-Large for 
Counterterrorism; Peter C.W. Flory, former Associate Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism in the State Department; John P. Walters, former 
Deputy Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy; and William J. 
Olson, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics 
Matters, Department of State--all saying that their concern is not 
partisan. In fact, the reorganization plan, they state, was first 
prepared in the previous administration; rather, they are united in 
their professional concern that the Department of State not make a 
mistake certain to be costly to American security and Americans lives 
in the years to come.

               Don't Gut Our Counter-Terrorism Capability

       Dear Senator: As the Senate prepares to debate the State 
     Department authorization bill (S. 1281), we respectfully urge 
     you to support the House position retaining a strong U.S. 
     counter-terrorism capability. The House bill would maintain 
     an independent office of the Coordinator for Counter-
     Terrorism (S/CT), and underline the importance our country 
     continues to place on fighting the scourge of terrorism.
       Today the State Department is implementing a reorganization 
     plan that would downgrade the Coordinator for Counter-
     Terrorism from an independent Assistant Secretary-level 
     position to one among several Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 
     under a new Assistant Secretary responsible for narcotics and 
     international crime as well as terrorism.
       This plan is deeply flawed.
       1. This is hardly the time to downgrade our government's 
     attention to terrorism.
       The Administration's plan seems to assume that terrorism is 
     no longer a serious threat. It is. Just in the past year, 
     terrorism has arrived at America's shores in the World Trade 
     Center bombing and the subsequent plots to assassinate a U.S. 
     Senator and bomb other targets in New York City. President 
     Saddam Hussein planned to assassinate former President Bush. 
     Meanwhile, radical Shiite terrorism sponsored by Iran 
     continues and is ominously joined by growing Sunni terror. 
     Ethnic conflicts are expanding across the world, spawning 
     more terror from which the U.S. will not be immune. 
     Hijackings, which had been brought largely under control, 
     have staged a dramatic return in Russia and China.
       2. There is no efficiency and no symbiosis to be gained for 
     either policy by lumping these two disparate functions 
     together.
       The plan's concept of linking counter-terrorism to counter-
     narcotics is superficial and flawed. While much has been 
     written about the overlap of terrorism and narcotics 
     trafficking, in fact these connections are limited and 
     unimportant. True, some Latin American narcotics traffickers 
     have used terrorism. Some terrorists, like Peru's Shining 
     Path, have sold drugs. But the overwhelming majority of 
     terrorist attacks against American targets has always been 
     and remains rooted in political issues. Lumping these two 
     unrelated functions together as proposed will eviscerate our 
     counter-terrorism policy and needlessly undermine our 
     counter-narcotics efforts. Proposing to friendly governments 
     joint meetings of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics 
     agencies, as the Administration has done, will only confuse 
     both the issues and our foreign interlocutors.
       3. Finally, the Administration's proposal is a blueprint 
     for bureaucratic impotence. The Deputy Assistant Secretary 
     for Counter-Terrorism will not have the bureaucratic muscle 
     to pursue aggressive counter-terrorism policies, at home or 
     abroad. And so it will not get done.
       The measures required to fight terrorism are never popular 
     with vested interests, whether in the American or other 
     countries' bureaucracies. It can only be done well with a 
     relentless, high-level push, at home and overseas. Since 
     1986, the State Department has served as the lead agency in 
     developing and implementing our government's counter-
     terrorism policies. This it could do only when the 
     Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism had sufficient 
     bureaucratic clout, within the State Department, with other 
     agencies in Washington, and abroad. Until now, the head of 
     the State Department Counter-Terrorism office reported 
     directly to the Secretary of State and had the appropriate 
     rank to insist on seeing responsible foreign government 
     officials.
       Instead, the Administration proposes to bury the job in a 
     new bureau, lowering its level to Deputy Assistant Secretary. 
     The incumbent will report to the new Assistant Secretary, who 
     will report to an Undersecretary--whose other global 
     responsibilities include international population control, 
     environmental matters, refugees, human rights, 
     democratization, labor, oceans policy, and crime--who in turn 
     will report to the Secretary of State. This long, cumbersome 
     chain will fool no one, not least terrorists and foreign 
     governments. It can only undermine our ability to pursue an 
     effective counter-terrorism policy, and signal that the 
     United States has decided terrorism is no longer a priority 
     issue.
       This mistake has been made before, for it was into 
     precisely this bureaucratic morass that America's counter-
     terrorism policy had fallen in the early 1980s. Recognizing 
     the need for better high-level coordination of counter-
     terrorism policy, in 1985 the President directed the State 
     Department to upgrade the terrorism position to Ambassador-
     at-Large, with direct access to the Secretary of State. It 
     worked. The policy was taken seriously by other agencies and 
     governments.
       Some have suggested resolving this bureaucratic flaw by 
     designating the Assistant Secretary ``Coordinator for 
     Counter-Terrorism.'' But fighting terrorism and fighting 
     narcotics is each a full time job. The new Assistant 
     Secretary will necessarily devote most of the time to the 
     demanding day-to-day budgetary, administrative, inter-
     agency, diplomatic and Congressional demands of the 
     counter-narcotics portfolio. So the reality is that the 
     Deputy Assistant Secretary will be the most senior person 
     with time to focus on terrorism. Denying this person the 
     title ``Coordinator'' will only compound the mistake of 
     downgrading the job.
       The solution to this deeply flawed plan is to leave things 
     as they were a year ago, which is the specific intent of the 
     House version of the State authorization bill.
       Our concern is not partisan. In fact, the reorganization 
     plan was first prepared in the previous administration. 
     Rather we are united in a professional concern that the 
     Department of State not make a mistake certain to be costly 
     to American security and American lives, in the years to 
     come.
           Sincerely,
     Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III,
         Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, 
           Department of State.
     Peter C.W. Flory,
         Former Associate Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 
           Department of State.
     John P. Walters,
         Former Deputy Director, Office of National Drug Control 
           Policy.
     William J. Olson,
         Former Deputy Assistant, Secretary for Int'l Narcotics 
           Matters, Department of State.

  Mr. BERMAN. If I may reclaim my time, I want to make it very clear 
that I do not think that the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] is 
motivated by partisan concerns; I know that he passionately believes in 
an effective counterterrorism operation and that he also believes his 
suggested way of achieving it makes the most sense organizationally.
  The only thing sillier for me to do than to get worked up on a motion 
that I do not intend to vote against is to keep the body here much 
longer getting worked up about a motion that I do not intend to oppose 
or vote against.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished ranking member of the Committee 
on Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, you know, as the World Trade Center bombing last year so 
clearly displayed, terrorism remains a major threat to America and to 
her citizens. That is why I joined last year with our colleagues, the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Nadler], a Democrat, and the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Molinari], 
a Republican, in offering an amendment to H.R. 2333, which would have 
preserved the Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism at the 
State Department.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. BERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, at the time of the World Trade Center bombing, we had an 
assistant secretary solely responsible, and the head of, the Office of 
Counterterrorism.
  Mr. SOLOMON. The gentleman is absolutely right.
  Let me just say that this Office has been in the forefront of our 
fight against this menace, and it must be preserved at all costs. The 
cost is not that great; as a matter of fact, it is a minus.
  Mr. Speaker, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the 
terrorist threat is so diminished that we can afford to do away with 
that Office. Without question, without question, this is precisely the 
wrong time to send a signal to the world that we are downgrading our 
counterterrorist effort.
  The language of the Senate in this bill would do just that. I 
therefore urge support of the Gilman motion to instruct conferees to 
maintain this vital Office that will save the Federal Government money. 
It will actually save the Federal Government money in the long run; but 
more importantly, Mr. Speaker, it will save American lives.
  I do not know how many Members have taken the time to be briefed by 
the various intelligence agencies, whether it is the CIA or the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, or any of the agencies about the potential threat 
which is there. You know, you hate to even mention this on the floor 
for public consumption, but one simple little act in the water supply 
of a metropolis like the city of New York, with 8 million people, could 
kill 2 million people in a matter of minutes. Yet here we are going to 
deemphasize this terribly, terribly important Office. I do not like to 
play politics either, but the same thing came up this year when we 
talked about trying to preserve the drug czar's office and to zero in 
on the deadly drugs being brought into this country and being sold in 
schools right next door in Baltimore, where we have one individual 
bringing in a ton of cocaine and then using fifth graders to distribute 
it for them.
  The Drug Czar's Office, in order to cut back like we did on our own 
staffs here, they laid of three-fourths of the Drug Czar's Office and 
hardly anybody else. Now that whole issue is being deemphasized.
  I say to my good friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], 
I know he is sincere and not politically motivated in any way, but I am 
afraid that is what is going to happen to this office. We cannot afford 
to let that happen.
  So, please vote for the motion to instruct.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his poignant 
remarks.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Saxton].
  Mr. SAXTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I have enjoyed the colloquy taking place here between 
Mr. Berman, Mr. Gilman, and Mr. Solomon. I guess all of us have to 
decide for ourselves whether the language in the Senate bill represents 
a downgrading of the effort carried out by the Office of 
Counterterrorism.
  It appears to me, and the people who have been advising me, that it 
does constitute at least a potential downgrading of the Office of 
Counterterrorism, and I think everybody who has participated in the 
discussion and debate here to date this afternoon has agreed on that 
point. If it is a downgrading, certainly the State Department proposal 
would reduce the Office of Counterterrorism, which now focuses strictly 
on terrorism, to a lower level, Deputy Assistant Secretary, who would 
be responsible for 3 areas, as was pointed out by the gentlemen from 
New York, Mr. Solomon and Mr. Gilman, and of course they are crime, 
narcotics, and terrorism.

                              {time}  1710

  So, Mr. Speaker, there are two reasons, I think two very distinct 
reasons, why I believe this is ill-conceived and that the Gilman motion 
should be supported.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for one 
clarification?
  Mr. SAXTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. The Deputy Assistant Secretary under the administration's 
proposal would be responsible only for counterterrorism. It is the 
Assistant Secretary that would have the responsibilities for terrorism, 
narcotics, and----
  Mr. SAXTON. That is correct; I am sorry if I misspoke. The gentleman 
is correct. But in effect we would have three departments rolled into 
one under one leader, and of course that is what those of us who think 
that this is ill-advised object to, and there are two reasons for this.
  Mr. Speaker, the first and very distinct one is that the downgrading 
of this office would bury counter- terrorism in the battle against 
drugs. It would all be rolled into the same department.
  The second distinct reason is that by downgrading this office, Mr. 
Speaker, the Clinton administration would send a signal that we have 
forgotten, to some degree at least, the bombings of the Marines in 
Lebanon and that we are not concerned, as much at least, with the 
future acts of Hamas, the Hezbollah, and Fatah, and others in our 
country and around the world.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is very clear that those are two very 
distinct concerns that we need to address in conference. The threat of 
terrorism in the United States today is greater than it has ever been 
before.
  The State Department, I believe, is wrong to focus on the number of 
terrorist incidents in this country and say that this move is OK 
because that number has not been great. As a matter of fact, one of the 
reasons that that number has been kept low is because we have been 
able, through our efforts, to uncover potential acts of terrorism, 
planned acts of terrorism, before they have taken place.
  So, Mr. Speaker, by downgrading this office we send a message to the 
families of the victims of Pan Am 103, a bombing, that we are not 
interested in pursuing the perpetuators of these brutal murders as we 
perhaps at one time were. This is not a time to be scaling back on our 
efforts against terrorism, and so I believe we must bolster our efforts 
to prevent terrorist acts against Americans both here and abroad as in 
the Gilman language, and the Gilman motion, I believe, moves in that 
direction.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Saxton] for his supporting remarks.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to note in response to the remarks of the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] that an equivalent assistant 
secretary for counterterrorism was extremely helpful in being able to 
bring back to our country one of the defendants from Egypt to stand 
trial in New York for the World Trade Center bombing, and I would like 
to submit, Mr. Speaker, that this is the first recorded vote on our 
Government's position and posture toward international terrorism since 
the New York World Trade Center bombing occurred last February.
  Mr. Speaker, this motion will help us maintain the independent, high 
level office of the coordinator for counterterrorism in the State 
Department, and without this amendment the State Department will reduce 
the counterterrorism office to a low-level deputy assistant secretary 
in an office handling both international narcotics and crime, and 
without it the State Department would downgrade the counterterrorism 
function at the very time the terrorism has come to American soil.
  Do not let the State Department send a wrong signal to friends and 
foes alike around the globe that the threat of international terrorism 
is not a top priority of our own Government and our State Department. 
Please support the Gilman-Nadler-Solomon-Molinari amendment to H.R. 
2333.
  Mr. Speaker, I am waiting for another speaker who is supposed to be 
on his way.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry that I cannot oblige the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], but I have no more speakers.
  Mr. GILMAN. Then, Mr. Speaker, at this time I would like to insert in 
the Record a letter from the Anti-Defamation League that was dated 
January 25, 1994. It is from the Klinghoffers, and we may recall that 
they were victims of terrorism, and they state on behalf of the Leon 
and Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation 
League:

       * * * we are writing to express our concern over the 
     proposed State Department reorganization that would eliminate 
     the independent office of the Coordinator for 
     Counterterrorism.

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I gather the gentleman is waiting for 
someone to come to the floor. I just want to say with all due respect, 
I think it is a little tortured to use the Klinghoffers' letter or the 
World Trade Center bombing, both of which occurred while there was a 
``high level coordinator of counterterrorism,'' the halcyon days which 
you are seeking to go back to, as an argument for why we should go back 
to them when these horrible incidents happened during that time. I 
think that buttresses the point that how you organize it is less 
important than what we do.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Berman] for his remarks. there is no question that organization within 
the agency is the most effective way to approach it, but we do not want 
to bury it in with the massive problems that an office on crime and an 
office on narcotics would have which would detract from the time that 
would be taken from an administrator on counterterrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the letter to which I 
referred from the Klinghoffer Foundation be made part of the Record.
  The Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Hayes). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  The letter in its entirety is as follows:

                                            Anti-Defamation League


                                              of B'nai B'rith,

                                   New York, NY, January 25, 1994.
       Dear Senator, on behalf of the Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer 
     Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation League, we are 
     writing to express our concern over the proposed State 
     Department reorganization that would eliminate the 
     independent office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
       We welcome the President's demonstrated commitment to the 
     fight against terrorism and respect to changing budgetary and 
     political realities that pose new challenges to the State 
     Department operations. However, we are concerned that the 
     country's counterterrorism mission may be weakened when one 
     Assistant Secretary is also responsible for such critical 
     national priorities as narcotics and international crime--two 
     areas that, individually, demand very substantial resources 
     and attention.
       At a time when the threat of international and domestic 
     terrorism is growing, and at a time when terrorists have 
     carried out attacks against the United States on our soil, 
     the proposed delegation of responsibility for the Coordinator 
     for Counterterrorism to a Deputy Assistant Secretary sends 
     the wrong signal. We must avoid any suggestion that 
     combatting terrorism is a diminishing national priority. We 
     must do all we can to maintain U.S. credibility and 
     effectiveness in dealing with foreign officials on this 
     issue.
       We urge the Senate to vote to maintain the integrity of a 
     separate Office of Counterterrorism, headed by an Assistant 
     Secretary-level official, to ensure the most effective 
     implementation of the administration's counterterrorism 
     policies and initiatives.
           Sincerely,

                                          Lisa Klinghoffer and

                                                 Ilsa Klinghoffer,
     Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation of the Anti-
                                                Defamation League.

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, they concluded that they urge a vote to 
maintain the integrity of a separate office of counterterrorism headed 
by an assistant-secretary level official to make certain that there 
would be most effective implementation of the administration's 
counterterrorism policies and initiatives.
  Mr. Speaker, having no further requests for time, I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I, too, yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the motion 
to instruct.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct 
offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the nays appeared to have it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 357, 
nays 2, not voting 73, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 113]

                               YEAS--357

     Abercrombie
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (CA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Clayton
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Huffington
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lloyd
     Long
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Myers
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaugther
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                                NAYS--2

     Kanjorski
     Penny
       

                             NOT VOTING--73

     Ackerman
     Baesler
     Baker (LA)
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Blackwell
     Burton
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clement
     Coleman
     Cooper
     DeLay
     Doolittle
     Engel
     English
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Foglietta
     Ford (TN)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Goodling
     Grandy
     Gunderson
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Houghton
     Jefferson
     Kaptur
     Kleczka
     Klug
     Lehman
     Lewis (FL)
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lowey
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     McCollum
     McDade
     McHugh
     Mfume
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Owens
     Payne (NJ)
     Peterson (FL)
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Ridge
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Slattery
     Stark
     Stokes
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Thornton
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Valentine
     Walsh
     Washington
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1738

  Mr. PENNY changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. SKEEN changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the motion to instruct was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
    

                          ____________________