[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 40 (Thursday, April 14, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: April 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ACTION ON THE NOMINATION OF ADM. FRANK 
                                 KELSO

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this afternoon the Committee on Armed 
Services favorably reported the nomination of Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, 
U.S. Navy, to retire in grade as a four-star admiral. The committee 
carefully considered this nomination and I want to share with my 
colleagues the statement I made at the time the committee voted on 
Admiral Kelso's nomination.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Opening Statement of Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed 
 Services, to Consider the Nomination of Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN, 
                        Thursday, April 14, 1994

       The Committee meets to vote on the nomination of Admiral 
     Frank B. Kelso II to retire in grade as a four-star admiral. 
     At a meeting earlier today, the Committee decided we needed 
     no additional witnesses and that was unanimous and I have 
     received no request for additional testimony and were ready 
     to vote.
       Admiral Kelso is completing 38 years of distinguished 
     service in the U.S. Navy. He has been serving as the Chief of 
     Naval Operations since June 1990 and prior to that he served 
     as Commander, SIXTH Fleet; as Commander in Chief, U.S. 
     Atlantic Fleet; and as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and 
     Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.
       Admiral Kelso was serving as the Chief of Naval Operations 
     at the time of the 1991 Tailhook Symposium, and he attended 
     the symposium. Allegations of misconduct at the Tailhook 
     Symposium, as well as allegations relating to the conduct of 
     subsequent investigations, resulted in various well-
     publicized reports and disciplinary proceedings.
       I would like to reiterate at this point the steps taken by 
     the Committee in connection with alleged improper conduct by 
     naval officers at the 1991 Tailhook Symposium. At the outset, 
     it must be noted that the Committee proceeded very carefully 
     in this area in order not to interfere with ongoing 
     investigations and disciplinary proceedings.
       After receipt of the report of investigation of the Navy 
     Inspector General, the Committee wrote to then Secretary of 
     Defense, Dick Cheney, to ensure the Committee was property 
     informed in connection with the confirmation process of Navy 
     and Marine Corps officers. We made it clear that the 
     Committee would not consider any nominee from the Navy or 
     Marine Corps until the Department had answered specific 
     questions on each nominee relating to Tailhook. We worked 
     with the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
     ensure that we established a fair and reasonable system under 
     which the Committee would receive necessary information and 
     the promotions of officers who were not involved in Tailhook 
     could be accomplished without undue delay.
       As a result, there was a necessary delay in the Committee's 
     action on all pending Navy and Marine Corps officer promotion 
     boards while the Department of the Navy gathered the 
     information required by the Committee. Additionally, a number 
     of nominations of flag and general officers were held up 
     resulting in a major impact on the normal summer of 1992 
     reassignment plan in the Navy and Marine Corps.
       At the same time, the Committee wrote to then Secretary of 
     the Navy, Lawrence Garrett, expressing our concerns over the 
     results of the Navy's investigations and suggesting that a 
     more formal process might be in order. Our concerns were 
     obviously well placed as shortly thereafter, Secretary 
     Garrett requested the Inspector General of the Department of 
     Defense to review the Navy's investigations and to conduct 
     such additional investigation as may be necessary.
       The DoD Inspector General then conducted a detailed 
     investigation and issued two reports. Ultimately, Tailhook 
     and its aftermath led to the resignation of the Secretary of 
     the Navy, early retirement for a number of senior admirals, 
     and administrative and nonjudicial punishment for a number of 
     naval officers.
       On Tuesday, the Committee received testimony in open 
     session from Secretary of Defense, William Perry; Secretary 
     of the Navy, John Dalton; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, General John Shalikashvili concerning the nomination 
     of Admiral Kelso. I want to note for the record that the 
     Committee has not received a request from Admiral Kelso to 
     testify before us and that if we had, we would have been 
     prepared to have him testify had he requested.
       I will vote to recommend to the Senate that Admiral Kelso 
     be retired in grade as a four-star admiral. I do so on the 
     basis of the following:
       First, the testimony we received on Tuesday, from Secretary 
     Perry, Secretary Dalton, and General Shalikashvili, each of 
     whom had concluded that Admiral Kelso did not personally 
     witness misconduct during the Tailhook Symposium and that he 
     did not manipulate the investigative process to shield 
     himself and senior naval officers.
       While the testimony we received on Tuesday differed from 
     the findings of Judge Vest, it is important to note the 
     different responsibilities of the judge and of senior DoD 
     officials. The judge was charged with the responsibility of 
     determining whether, as a matter of law, there was a basis 
     for dismissing the allegations against three defendants in 
     prosecutions related to Tailhook. Although the judge made 
     certain findings about Admiral Kelso, Admiral Kelso was not a 
     party to those proceedings and did not have personal 
     representation by counsel or the opportunity to confront or 
     cross-examine adverse witnesses.
       Secretary Dalton and Secretary Perry had the independent 
     duty to assess the evidence, to determine whether 
     administrative or disciplinary proceedings should be brought 
     against Admiral Kelso, and whether he should be retired in 
     grade. In exercising that duty, they took into account--but 
     were not bound by--the ruling of the military judge. They 
     also took into account five other sources of information 
     according to their testimony:
       First, the conclusion by the Department of Defense 
     Inspector General--who has statutory independence--that 
     Admiral Kelso did not observe misconduct and did not thwart 
     the investigation.
       Second, their own review of the material compiled by the 
     Inspector General.
       Third, their personal knowledge of Admiral Kelso and their 
     view of his veracity, based upon their experiences with him 
     and the views of others.
       Fourth, Secretary Dalton's interviews with Admiral Kelso 
     and others involved in the Tailhook matter.
       Fifth, their personal knowledge of the facts surrounding 
     the custody of the investigative files on flag officers, 
     including the file on Admiral Kelso.
       Based upon all those sources of information, they concluded 
     that Admiral Kelso did not witness misconduct, did not 
     manipulate the process, and should be retired in grade.
       In my view, the information cited by Secretary Perry and 
     Secretary Dalton provides a reasonable basis for reaching 
     findings that differ from those rendered by the military 
     judge.
       In addition, there are a number of other points which I 
     believe are worth considering.
       In making a judgment about a nomination, it is appropriate 
     to consider your own observations about a person and their 
     behavior. I have known Admiral Kelso since the 1970s. I have 
     always found him to be an individual of the highest integrity 
     and veracity. Based upon my own personal observations, 
     moreover, I believe Admiral Kelso to be one of the least 
     manipulative persons I have ever known in the military. It 
     would be totally out of character for him to deliberately 
     deceive the investigators or to manipulate the investigative 
     process.
       I note that Secretary Perry and Secretary Dalton believe 
     that there was a failure of leadership by Admiral Kelso that:
       Prior to the Symposium when he could have made a more 
     diligent effort to find out what had happened there in the 
     past;
       During the Symposium, when he could have interceded during 
     the flag panel, even though he was not on the panel, when 
     some junior officer did not show the proper respect for the 
     flag officers on the panel;
       After the Symposium, when he could have been more forceful 
     in overseeing the Navy Inspector General and Naval 
     Investigative Service investigations even though he was not 
     in the chain of command of the Navy IG and even though the 
     Under Secretary of the Navy was personally overseeing those 
     investigations.
       I find it important that Admiral Kelso was the first to go 
     to the Secretary of the Navy after he read the Navy IG's 
     report and to recommend that an independent body come in and 
     investigate the matter.
       I am aware that Admiral Kelso received a non-punitive 
     administrative letter of reprimand from Secretary Dalton for 
     his failure of leadership. I am also aware that other flag 
     officers, whom Secretary Dalton decided were guilty of 
     specific acts of failure of leadership, received punitive 
     letters, and one three-star admiral was retired as a two-star 
     admiral with the attendant loss of pay.
       I am aware that former Secretary of the Navy, Larry 
     Garrett, resigned from that position as a direct result of 
     the Tailhook incident.
       I am aware that Secretary Dalton attempted to have Admiral 
     Kelso retired earlier but I accept his statement that he did 
     not ever intend for Admiral Kelso to retire as anything but a 
     four-star admiral, which is consistent with Secretary 
     Dalton's decision not to award a punitive letter to Admiral 
     Kelso.
       I believe it is important that Admiral Kelso was not a 
     party to the trials that led to the military judge's ruling 
     and thus he was not represented by counsel, did not have the 
     right to cross examine witnesses, did not have the right to 
     have witnesses called on his behalf, did not have the right 
     to have an argument made on his behalf, and so forth. The 
     prosecutor in that trial did have an interest in presenting 
     evidence to attempt to establish that Admiral Kelso did not 
     witness improper conduct at Tailhook and did not manipulate 
     the investigative process. It is obvious, however, that he 
     did not produce available evidence--evidence that would have 
     been very important to rebut the suggestion that Admiral 
     Kelso manipulated the process--which would have shown that 
     Admiral Kelso did not have custody of the so called ``flag 
     files.'' Secretary Perry and Secretary Dalton from personal 
     knowledge established that fact and clearly rebutted that 
     important part of the military judge's findings with respect 
     to Admiral Kelso. The judge was limited to the evidence 
     presented in his court in reaching his conclusions and 
     making his ruling.
       I believe it is important that the DoD Inspector General, 
     whose investigators interviewed hundreds of people and who 
     reviewed the evidence adduced at trial as well as the 
     voluminous evidence in the IG's files, concluded that Admiral 
     Kelso did not personally witness any Tailhook misconduct and 
     did not manipulate the investigative process.
       I am aware of Admiral Kelso's 38 years of outstanding 
     service to the nation, of which 14 years have been as a flag 
     officer and the last 8 of those years have been in the four-
     star admiral grade.
       I am also aware of Admiral Kelso's leading role in 
     enhancing the ability of women in the Navy to serve at sea 
     and in combat aviation positions and in ensuring the proper 
     treatment of all Navy members. I doubt that there is any 
     member of this Committee whom Admiral Kelso has not explained 
     what he is doing in this regard.
       I do not believe that we should deny retirement in grade to 
     Admiral Kelso solely on the basis that he was the Chief of 
     Naval Operations at the time of Tailhook. I do not subscribe 
     to what I might call the ``absolute accountability'' rule.
       Based upon my knowledge of Admiral Kelso, I am confident 
     that he would rather sustain severe personal injury rather 
     than have to retire early as a result of Tailhook, with the 
     facts not fully resolved. That he has chosen to retire a 
     couple of months early demonstrates to me that he is putting 
     the needs of the Navy before his personal desires.
       Finally, I have thought about the message we will send if 
     we confirm this nomination. I have thought about Senator 
     Hutchison's excellent and very thoughtful opening statement 
     and the several problems that have occurred in the Navy 
     during Admiral Kelso's watch as the CNO. By the way, I might 
     clarify the record with respect to the Navy's investigation 
     of the tragic explosion on board USS IOWA. The Senate Armed 
     Service's activities in bringing Sandia National Laboratories 
     into that matter and Sandia's demonstration of an alternative 
     theory for the explosion served as the catalyst for the 
     decision by Admiral Kelso to reopen that investigation and to 
     ultimately overturn the previous conclusions and to apologize 
     to the family of the sailor who had been charged with 
     responsibility for the explosion. I am sure that Admiral 
     Kelso took a lot of heat from many active and retired Navy 
     officers for his decision in that matter. But he did so and 
     did so courageously.
       I am proud of the men and women in our armed forces. 
     However, I realize that people in the military will continue 
     to commit criminal offenses, including sexual harassment. I 
     hope there will never again be a case involving sexual 
     harassment on as wide a scale as occurred at Tailhook. I do 
     not believe that every problem of misconduct in the 
     Department of Defense can be attributed to poor leadership.
       Finally, I would like to make a few observations about the 
     issue of accountability. Military commanders and their 
     civilian leaders have responsibility for the operation and 
     maintenance of the awesome arsenal of America's armed forces. 
     Their actions--and their omissions--can have enormous 
     consequences in terms of life, property, and the very 
     security or our nation. As a result, we hold them to a very 
     high level of accountability.
       We do not, however, subject our leaders to discipline or 
     demotion for every problem that occurs during their tenure. 
     We have more than 2.5 million men and women in our armed 
     forces, and nearly a million civilians in the Department of 
     Defense. Given the large, complex, and dangerous activities 
     of the Department, not a day goes by without something going 
     wrong. As we graphically learned today, the consequences can 
     be very tragic, as we have seen in northern Iraq.
       As Secretary Perry noted on Tuesday, when something goes 
     wrong, the primary issue with respect to accountability 
     involves the question of due diligence. Given the 
     individual's position, scope of responsibilities, and 
     relationship to the incident, we must ask whether the 
     individual acted with due diligence and, if not, how serious 
     was the individual's deficiency. As the senior uniformed 
     officer in the Navy, Admiral Kelso had supervisory 
     responsibility for those who planned and conducted the 
     Tailhook Symposium, and for those who conducted the 
     investigations. The responsibility, however, was also and 
     ultimately in the hands of his civilian superiors. While he 
     could have done better, it is clear in my own personal view 
     that he was not made aware of misconduct before or during 
     Tailhook, and did not impede or interfere with the subsequent 
     investigations. On the other hand, there is substantial 
     evidence that he intended the Navy to undertake proper 
     investigation, and that he acted vigorously to combat the 
     problems that were at the root of the Tailhook misconduct. 
     Therefore, I personally agree with the judgment of Secretary 
     Perry and Secretary Dalton that while early retirement is an 
     appropriate measure in terms of his accountability, a two 
     grade reduction in rank would not be appropriate. There is 
     certainly room for people to have honest disagreements on the 
     accountability issue in this case, however.

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Stevens pertaining to the introduction of S. 2023 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')

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