[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 40 (Thursday, April 14, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: April 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         AIRSTRIKES IN GORAZDE

  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, one of the bitter lessons of the Vietnam 
war was that before engaging in any military conflict, the United 
States should be clear in its objectives and assure that it has the 
support of the American people. This lesson served us well in the gulf 
war, but was forgotten during our operations in Somalia.
  Over the last several days, the Clinton administration seems again to 
have ignored that lesson, this time in an area that could be far more 
dangerous to American servicemen than was Somalia. Our airstrikes in 
Gorazde pursue vague goals, which by themselves do not seem worthy of 
American lives.
  Earlier this week, President Clinton said that the United States 
provided airstrikes in order to protect endangered peacekeepers, but 
peacekeepers have been endangered in a number of earlier instances, and 
neither the United States or any other country has provided air 
support. Instead, it appears that the administration has begun a wider 
campaign to use airstrikes to bring a peace settlement in Bosnia, and 
may be on the verge of increasing our engagement in a conflict in which 
victory is likely to be elusive, and in which we can discern no vital 
national interest.
  Last weekend's strikes appear to have increased Serb aggression in 
Gorazde. The Washington Post reported one Gorazde city official as 
saying, ``As a result of the NATO airstrikes, the Serbs are destroying 
everything * * * this is the worst day since the offensive started.'' 
Many military analysts predicted this outcome. A week ago, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikshavili, warned that the 
threat of airstrikes may not be as effective in U.N.-mandated safe 
havens as they were in Sarajevo.
  This raises the question of how the United States, or United Nations, 
should respond. Does the Clinton administration increase the number of 
airstrikes, or should it avoid a larger engagement, in the face of 
increasing hostilities? If we have, in fact, worsened the fighting, can 
we simply leave? These are questions that we hope the administration 
has considered.
  The administration openly admits, however, that it has not done so. 
Rather, it has abdicated these decisions to the United Nations. So far, 
it has used airstrikes only at the request of the British lieutenant 
general in charge, Michael Rose. The Secretary of State has said that 
he is comfortable with General Rose's abilities, and will execute any 
of his requested airstrikes. He had better be comfortable, because 
apparently he is not only deciding logistics, but other foreign policy 
issues as well; for example, whether we should continue in the face of 
worsening hostilities, or how the United States or NATO will end their 
engagement. This circumstance bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the 
situation 10 months ago when the administration left its foreign policy 
in the hands of the United Nations and lost nearly two dozen marines in 
Mogadishu.
  Also as in Somalia, it is unclear that we are risking our servicemen 
for a worthwhile goal. If we are to take the administration at its 
word, we are protecting peacekeepers that the Bosnians themselves would 
prefer be absent if it afforded them the ability to defend themselves. 
In Gorazde, we are hoping only to stop the siege; we have no plans of 
removing the troops surrounding the city. And we have no plan at all to 
help the Bosnians gain the lands that have been stolen from them in 
this 2-year civil war. At our most optimistic, we hope that the 
airstrikes will bring the Serbs to agree to a partition that will 
ratify the gains of their aggression.
  Mr. President, this operation is indicative of many of the foreign 
affairs problems of this administration: we have relinquished much of 
our decisionmaking to the United Nations, and have not explained how 
the operation relates to our national interests.
  But it also appears to be the sort of incrementalism that we most 
hoped to avoid after the Vietnam war. With our support the United 
Nations has taken intermediate steps, and is now considering expanding 
its role. It has not defined a clear objective and it does not 
understand how this conflict will end. The United States, for its part, 
has offered its services without knowing whether the American people 
support its risks and its expense. All we really know is that a great 
majority of the American people oppose our direct intervention in this 
conflict.
  It is perhaps just because of this, that the U.N.-arms embargo 
represents such bad policy, that it approaches and surpasses the 
boundary between pure policy and immorality. As recently as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan we provided billions of dollars in aid to 
people expressing ideas with which we did not agree, except for their 
desire to be free and to be independent. Yet, almost from the time that 
the United Nations recognized Bosnia, we have accepted the notion that 
its citizens were not entitled to fight for their own independence with 
arms secured, not just from the United States, but from anyplace in the 
world.
  Rather than begin these misplaced and dangerous efforts at ending 
aggression through airstrikes, the United States should lift this 
embargo, through the United Nations or unilaterally if necessary, and 
give the people of Gorazde, and other besieged towns, the opportunity 
to defend themselves, and the hope for a lasting and just peace.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] 
is recognized.

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