[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 40 (Thursday, April 14, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: April 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). Pursuant to House Resolution
401 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration
of the bill, H.R. 4092.
{time} 1140
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the
bill (H.R. 4092) to control and prevent crime, with Mr. Torricelli in
the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, the
amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] had
been disposed of.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 1 of
House Report 103-474.
amendment offered by mr. duncan
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Duncan: At the end of title VII,
add the following:
SEC. . KIDNAPPING.
Section 1201(g)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``to the penalty of death if the death
of the victim results and, in any other case,'' after ``shall
be subject''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr.
Duncan] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be
recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Duncan].
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is a very simple and noncontroversial
amendment which conforms to language in the committee bill.
At the beginning of this session I introduced a bill that would
allow, but not require, juries to impose the death sentence for
federally prescribed kidnaping charges when the death of a minor
results. I am very pleased that the committee has reported a bill which
would allow the death sentence in these cases by amending section
1201(a) of title 18 U.S. Code.
However, because section 1201(g) of title 18 deals specifically with
children, I believe that further clarification should be made so that
there will be no doubt that cases covered under section 1201(a) will
also be covered by section 1201(g) relating specifically to children.
My amendment will make it clear that juries will have the option of
imposing the death sentence in these instances.
Last year Americans were shocked by the case of 12-year-old Polly
Klaas who was kidnaped from her home in Petuluma, CA, and later
murdered. The suspect was a twice-convicted kidnaper who had been in
police hands twice during the search for Polly.
Families are no longer safe in their own homes because violent
criminals are not concerned about the consequences of their actions or
the possibility of severe punishment. It is estimated that this year
over 1,100 murderers will not go to prison and those that do will serve
only an average of 8.7 years. Although many kidnaping cases are
unreported, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has
estimated that between 1984 and 1993 a total of 34,814 children were
missing.
We cannot continue to send criminals the message that they will not
be severely punished, and people who systematically prey on children
must know that if they are caught and found guilty they could receive
the death penalty.
I believe that this fear does not exist in the minds of many
potential murderers and kidnapers. This amendment will change that, and
I hope that my colleagues will support it.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DUNCAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the amendment
and thank the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Duncan] for offering it. It
clarifies the Federal death penalty for kidnaping presently contained
in title VII, also applies to kidnaping of a minor that results in the
death of that minor. That was always the intent of the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for clarifying this. I would urge
support of the amendment.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I think the chairman for that kind offer. I
certainly appreciate his support.
Mr. Chairman, I urge support of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. There being no Member in opposition to the amendment
who has requested the time, the question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Duncan].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2, printed
in part 1 of House Report 103-474.
amendment offered by mr. watt
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendments offered by Mr. Watt: Page 36, line 11, insert
``or'' after the semicolon.
Page 37, strike line 12 and all that follows through line 7
on page 38.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from North Carolina
[Mr. Watt] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will
be recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] will be
recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the effect of this amendment would be to strike the
provision in the bill which provides for a death penalty for drug
kingpins. I am an opponent of the death penalty, but that is not what
this argument is about.
I would say that if I were to support a death penalty, it would
certainly be a death penalty for drug kingpins. One might wonder then
why am I here offering this amendment. I would say to this body that
there are three reasons.
No. 1, this language in the bill, which provides for a death penalty
when death does not result from the underlying crime, is
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has indicated that a death must result in order for
a death penalty to be applicable. And the drug kingpin statute, of
course, results in no death.
No. 2, although I would probably favor a death penalty for drug
kingpins, the history of application of the existing drug kingpin
statute has indicated that it will be applied in a racially
discriminatory way. There have been 37 prosecutions since 1988, when
the drug kingpin statute was passed. Thirty-three of those prosecutions
have been against black or Hispanic individuals.
I do not think there is anybody in this country who could argue with
any degree of credibility that blacks and hispanics are the drug
kingpins in this country. So the underlying proposition is, we are
passing a drug kingpin statute that gets to the drug kingpins. If that
were so, that would be fine. But unfortunately, that has not been the
history of application of the drug kingpin statute.
Finally, I would say that this particular provision in the bill may
well end up defeating more death penalty prosecutions than it
encourages. Most foreign governments will not extradite individuals to
this country to be subjected to the death penalty. Many of the drug
kingpins, we believe and the evidence has shown, are not resident in
the United States. So to have a death penalty statute for drug kingpins
is going to make it more difficult to get those drug kingpins into the
country to be prosecuted.
I would ask my colleagues to take our responsibility seriously as
Members of Congress. Do not just say we are going to be tough on crime
and let the Supreme Court declare this provision unconstitutional. It
is our responsibility, in the context of the constitutional government,
to pass laws that are constitutional. It is our responsibility to be
responsible to the people of this country.
I submit to my colleagues that in this particular case, we are being
irresponsible to include this language in the bill. I would ask my
colleagues to support my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1150
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, first of all I have great respect for the gentleman who
is offering the amendment, but I strenuously disagree with his decision
to do so or his position on this amendment.
The provision in the bill that he wishes to strike is one that I
offered in committee. It is a drug kingpin death penalty for those who
are organizers and leaders of a continuing criminal enterprise
trafficking in extremely large quantities of narcotics; for example,
300,000 grams of cocaine or 60,000 grams of heroin. We are not talking
about the everyday, average street trafficker.
The drug kingpin death penalty that is in this bill passed the House
as part of the conference report during the 102d Congress in precisely
the language that is here. Major drug traffickers do commit murders as
a result of trafficking in very large quantities of narcotics. There is
no question in my mind or in the minds of many reputable analysts and
former attorneys general that such a drug kingpin death penalty would
be upheld as constitutional.
Former Attorney General Bill Barr, former Attorney General Ed Meese,
former Solicitor General Ken Starr, Ted Olson, and Paul Cassell, a very
famous professor, have all said in letters to us that they believe that
the Supreme Court of the United States would uphold this as
constitutional under the standards that now exist.
We have had death penalties in the past which have been upheld where
there has been no murder or death proven directly. One good example of
that is treason.
Another good example of that is espionage. In 1790 Congress passed
the treason law, in 1917 the espionage law, and in 1946 passed a
separate law that had a death penalty for the release of sensitive
information concerning nuclear technology.
I think a recent Federal court decision probably stated it pretty
well when Judge Gee said, and I quote:
Except in rare cases, the murderer's red hand falls on one
victim only, however grim the blow; but the foul hand of the
drug dealer blights life after life and, like the vampire of
fable, creates others in its owner's evil image--others who
create others still, across our land and down our
generations, sparing not even the unborn.
It is for this reason, because of the grave public harm which
trafficking activities in large quantities cause, and because of the
culpable state of mind of the individuals required under this drug
kingpin death penalty proposal, that most of us and the experts I have
cited believe the Supreme Court would uphold this as constitutional.
Congress has the right to speak the will of the people when danger to
society is great enough, and certainly when we have drug kingpins,
danger to society is great enough. The proportionality rule under the
Eighth amendment is met, the blameworthiness of the offender is clear,
and I would urge that the Watt amendment be defeated, that we enact
once and for all the drug kingpin death penalty in this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks], and point out to the
body that this provision was not in the original bill; it was added in
committee, and it won by only one vote in the committee.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt]. I am deeply concerned about
the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty in any case where
death does not directly result, a concern shared by the Department of
Justice.
That concern is based on the 1977 Supreme Court case, Coker versus
Georgia, in which the Court held that the death penalty for rape was
unconstitutional unless the victim was actually killed. Imposing the
death penalty in these non-death drug kingpin cases thus is of
questionable constitutionality.
I have absolutely no use for drug kingpins and I support the life
imprisonment penalties they currently face under existing law. Drug
kingpins clearly are a scourge upon our Nation and are repugnant to
every law-abiding citizen. As you are all aware, I very much support
the death penalty in appropriate cases. I have no compunction about the
ultimate punishment when heinous violent acts are committed. But, when
we move down a path to passing an unconstitutional provision, we must
proceed with care.
The amendment by the gentleman from North Carolina restores the
constitutionality of title 7, while leaving in place the existing life
imprisonment penalties for drug kingpins. I urge support for this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr.
Watt] has expired.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Schumer].
Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I believe that
if anybody is appropriate for the ultimate sentence, which is death,
drug kingpins are. To me they are far more culpable and carry far
greater burdens of creating turmoil in our society and ultimate death
than the mule who may be at the bottom of the rung and pulls the
trigger.
We have had instances where it is not unconstitutional to have a
capital crime for those who do not pull the trigger: Spies, treason,
espionage. When the Nation wants to show its ultimate opprobrium for
those who may put in danger tens of thousands of individuals, of young
lives, this is appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge support for the gentleman from Florida
[Mr. McCollum], defeat the Watt amendment, and keep the drug kingpin
statute in the capital punishment parts of our bill.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time remains?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] has 1\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt] has
no time remaining.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Burton].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, 70 percent of all crime in this country is drug
related. We are not going to do anything with this crime bill if we do
not address the drug problem. It is the major cause of crime in this
country, and here is a major section of the bill they want to kill. It
makes no sense. Drug kingpins are killing our kids, they are killing
our society, they are costing the society billions and billions of
dollars a year, and this is an essential part of this bill.
Mr. Chairman, this is not a white issue, a black issue, a red issue,
a pink issue. This is an American issue. If we are going to solve the
crime problem in America, we have to deal with the drug problem. If we
do not have a strong provision in this bill, it is not worth the paper
it is written on.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment should be defeated. In fact, I think
this section should be have even stronger. There should be lower limits
for the death penalty for major drug dealers. They are ruining this
society.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out in the decision that the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] pointed out regarding rape that there
were clearly exceptions made by the Supreme Court in that decision
stating that this was not a focus on the death penalty generally, where
there were no murders or killings. It certainly says that wherever
somebody has committed a crime heinous enough for Congress and for the
public to be outraged, and to find public opprobrium, that the death
penalty is appropriate, and those cases are there for us to define.
That is what we are doing today.
The death penalty for drug kingpins and those who are leaders in
trafficking in extremely large quantities of narcotics surely is
appropriate. Hundreds of people, thousands of people, potentially are
killed.
Mr. Chairman, I urge defeat of this amendment to allow the drug
kingpin death penalty to stay in the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from North
Carolina [Mr. WATT].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was
ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 108,
noes 316, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 106]
AYES--108
Andrews (ME)
Barca
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Berman
Blackwell
Bonior
Boucher
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
DeFazio
Dellums
Dixon
Edwards (CA)
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Ford (MI)
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gonzalez
Hamburg
Hastings
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoekstra
Hoyer
Hughes
Inslee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kildee
Kleczka
Klug
Kopetski
LaFalce
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Markey
Mazzoli
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Mollohan
Nadler
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Penny
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Synar
Thompson
Towns
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
Young (AK)
NOES--316
Abercrombie
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Brewster
Browder
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Emerson
English
Everett
Faleomavaega (AS)
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Foglietta
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kreidler
Kyl
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Machtley
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Martinez
Matsui
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meehan
Menendez
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Minge
Moakley
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Royce
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Valentine
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wolf
Wyden
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Owens
NOT VOTING--12
Ackerman
Dornan
Ewing
Fish
Gallo
Grandy
Gutierrez
Rangel
Roth
Roukema
Washington
Waxman
{time} 1218
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Ackerman for, with Mr. Grandy against.
Mr. Rangel for, with Mrs. Roukema against.
Ms. BROWN of Florida and Ms. ENGLISH of Arizona changed their vote
from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. BERMAN, BECERRA, and SERRANO changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, during the vote on the Watt amendment
rollcall 106, striking the crime bill's death penalty provision for
drug kingpins, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would
have voted ``no.''
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed
in part 1 of House Report 103-474.
amendment offered by mr. scott
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment made in order by the
rule.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Scott: Page 62, strike line 6 and
all that follows through line 10 and redesignate succeeding
subsections accordingly.
Page 69, strike line 17 and all that follows through line
22 on page 70.
{time} 1220
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Scott] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member in opposition
will be recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott] will be
recognized for 5 minutes, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]
will be recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott].
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment strikes from the bill the death penalty
crimes in which the States are far better suited to handle, murders
committed during carjackings, drive-by shootings, drug and gun crimes.
A vote for this amendment is a vote against unnecessary and
burdensome federalization of crimes.
Mr. Chairman, the Chair of the Judicial Conference on Criminal Law,
in a letter to the Committee on the Judiciary, wrote,
Our Nation's judicial system is premised on the principle
that the Federal and State courts together comprise an
integrated system for the administration of justice.
Federalization of these crimes may result, paradoxically, in
less rather than more effective law enforcement. Scarce
judicial resources needed by the Federal courts to try major
crimes, such as complex bank fraud and embezzlement cases and
to provide forums for the prosecution of national and
international drug and money-laundering conspiracies, will be
diluted by a variety of cases that State courts are better
equipped to handle.
Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, the director of the FBI testified, ``The
facts are that right now, I don't think I am fully staffed to fulfill
all of my current responsibilities.'' If this bill passes, Mr.
Chairman, the FBI will have to investigate local carjacking murders,
drive-by shootings, drug and gun crimes, in addition to the espionage,
drug kingpin, and racketeering cases.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
First of all, this is not a provision in the bill that deals with
carjacking itself; it deals with murder when you have carjackings. I
think the problem that is important here is how many crimes are being
committed today all over this country involving interstate
transportation of cars and kidnapping of people and murders that go
along with them. There is no question there is a Federal concern when
we have people who are brutally and heinously murdered in various and
sundry locations in the process of a carjacking operation. That is a
very common trait interstate and it is very appropriate for the Federal
Government to be involved.
I would urge my colleagues to sustain the position of the committee
and leave the murder of carjacking as a death penalty in this bill.
That is all that we are about today. The effort is to strike the death
penalty for murders committed during the course of a carjacking.
Mr. Chairman, I urge defeat of the amendment. There is really very
little else that can be said on it. I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Mr. Scott's
amendment because I think it puts the responsibility for these crimes
where it belongs--with the States.
I support the Federal death penalty and I support Federal law
enforcement enforcing the Federal law to the fullest. But we cannot
make every offense into a Federal death penalty offense.
These offenses that are in this amendment are already covered by
State law--murders from cars by carjackers and by drug dealers or
gunrunners are already crimes in every State.
For instance there is absolutely no Federal connection in the driveby
shootings provision in this bill. There is no requirement that any
driveby shooting occur on Federal property, or even across State lines
and we have made it a Federal death penalty offense. Why? There's no
reason.
And then we have added murders committed during Federal gun or drug
crimes to the Federal death penalty list. So if a person commits a
murder and uses an illegally possessed firearm that has been in
interstate commerce, the Federal system now becomes involved in the
murder prosecution. The Federal Government cannot handle the Federal
criminals it already has to deal with.
The States are better equipped and better able to deal with these
crimes, they are traditional responsibilities and we should not
overload the Federal system with them. FBI Director Freeh recently said
that they are already understaffed for the current workload. We are
doing a disservice by adding these nonconnected Federal death penalty
offenses.
Let us support the Federal death penalty, but let us support offenses
that belong there, not those that do not.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
I wish to thank my colleague on the Committee on the Judiciary, the
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott], for bringing this point to us,
because it has been made so ably by our colleague from Kansas as well
as the author of this provision that the federalization of State
crimes, because they are heinous, is no more rational than for us to
make any other local crimes we do not like a Federal crime.
We do not have places to put the people that we would convict. We do
not have a system set up.
So I would merely join in strongly urging support for the Scott
amendment.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for
yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I think what the gentleman said is entirely correct. We
have fewer than 700 Federal judges. They have important constitutional
issues. We should not turn them into police court judges. We should not
keep federalizing these State crimes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
I wish simply to point out that while I respect the arguments being
made on the other side, carjacking does involve, frequently, a Federal
nexus; it does involve frequently interstate transportation of those
vehicles; it involves, oftentimes, matters which are a Federal concern.
The implementation of this requires some discretion so that not every
carjacking murder is going to wind up being in Federal court. I would
think this is an appropriate thing to keep in the bill for use in
appropriate cases by Federal authorities. It is again, in my judgment,
appropriate to have a death penalty for murder, and that is all this
is, for murder in carjackings.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment to strike it
from the bill.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Just very briefly, the passage of this amendment will avoid
jurisdictional confusion and rivalries between local police and the
FBI, local prosecutors, and U.S. attorneys.
I would hope we would leave this matter to the States. All of these
are crimes in the States.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. All time having expired, the question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Scott].
The amendment was rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4, printed
in part 1 of House Report 103-474.
amendment offered by mr. kopetski
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Kopetski: At the end of title VII,
insert the following:
SEC. . SUBSTITUTION OF PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR
DEATH PENALTY.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, wherever a
Federal law provides for the imposition of the penalty of
death, the court shall instead impose the penalty of
imprisonment for life.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] will be
recognized for 10 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks]
will be recognized for 10 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
{time} 1230
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Mr. KOPETSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of
myself and my good friends, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Mfume] and
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Serrano].
The Kopetski-Mfume-Serrano amendment would, quite simply, strip out
all the death penalty provisions in H.R. 4092, and insert, in their
place, life imprisonment. And, as there is no parole in the Federal
system, our amendment requires life imprisonment without opportunity
for parole as a substitute for death sentencing.
Mr. Chairman, we have before us today one of the few instances where
the Congress clearly legislates morality. Certainly, many of us are
troubled by the death penalty on moral, and possibly, religious
grounds. But more importantly, from my point of view, the Government--
especially the Federal Government--sets the standards for society. I
believe I speak for many in this Chamber when I say Government should
be setting an example for our citizens on how to conduct their lives.
Government, by its actions, should not, therefore, ratify and
legitimize death in our society. But I do not want to dwell on that
aspect. There are substantive policy grounds on which to oppose the
death penalty. I will recount five of them here.
too expensive
Life imprisonment without hope of release is more cost effective than
the death penalty. Per case estimates of death sentences greatly exceed
the cost of life imprisonment. In California, for example, death
penalty cases cost an average of $600,000, according to the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review, compared with $427,000 for life imprisonment.
In Oregon the cost is $1.2 million for death penalty cases as opposed
to $600,000 for life without parole.
executing the innocent
A sentence with the finality and irrevocability of death is
inappropriate in a system where miscarriages of justice can and do
occur. Stanford Law Review documented hundreds of cases in which
innocent individuals were sentenced to death, 23 of whom were wrongly
executed. Let me repeat that, because it's a staggering number: 23
people lay dead who were later exonerated of wrongdoing. In the last
few years, several death-row prisoners have had their sentences
reversed and were freed based upon wrongful convictions.
racial discrimination
Between 1930 and 1990, roughly 4,000 persons were executed in the
United States, 53 percent of whom were black. During these years,
African-Americans made up roughly 12 percent of the country, indicating
they are executed in extreme disproportion to their representation in
society. A 1990 GAO report confirms prior findings that a convicted
perpetrator of a capital crime is much more likely to receive the death
penalty if the victim is white and much less likely to receive the
death penalty if the victim is black. Since 1976, 87 percent of those
executed had white victims while only 11 percent had black victims.
Besides race, the death penalty discriminates against the poor.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, roughly 90 percent
of those on death row could not afford to hire an attorney.
does not deter crime
Study after study shows that certainty of punishment is the main
deterrent to criminals, not severity of punishment, as some would have
us believe. The murder rates in death penalty States have generally
been higher than in non-death-penalty States. Even if severity were the
leading factor in deterrence, however, I believe you could make the
case that life imprisonment without parole is a sterner, more
foreboding sentence. A survey of death-row inmates in Tennessee found
that half felt a sentence of life without hope for release would be
worse, in their minds, than the death penalty.
Inequity of justice
We are casually, but unfortunately, federalizing what has
traditionally been an area of States' rights. My colleagues may be
interested to know that the Conference of Chief Justices, the
association of State supreme court chief justices, opposes the
federalization of State crimes as violative of long-held principals of
federalism. Moreover the State chief justices, judging by the
resolution I've read and will submit for the Record, find the
provisions of this bill little more than insulting to current State
efforts and illusory in their promised effects.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmum recently reversed his
longstanding support for the death penalty, in remarks made in the
context of a dissenting opinion in Callins versus Collins. Twenty years
ago, Justice Blackmum pointed out, when the Supreme Court swept away
existing death penalties and asked the States to start over,
governments and courts thought they could iron out the rough spots in
the application of the death sentence. But, as Blackmum suggests to say
in his recent dissent the courts and legislatures could not, and the
experiment itself is a failure. I have copies of Blackmum's dissent,
and I would be happy to share them with Members.
Mr. Chairman, this is our intent: To substitute the sternest
alternative sentence possible in place of the death penalty. We do not
deny that the crimes listed in the expansion of the Federal death
penalty in H.R. 4092 are heinous crimes, and deserving of the stiffest
sentences. In my view, life without any hope of release constitutes
death by incarceration, a stiff penalty by any standard.
I urge support of the Kopetski-Mfume-Serrano amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] which would strike
the death penalty provisions of H.R. 4092 and substitute mandatory life
imprisonment.
I have the utmost respect for the gentleman's sincere philosophical
beliefs about the death penalty. However, in a civilized society there
are acts so despicable, so heinous, that society must collectively
express its revulsion for these acts by imposition of the death
penalty. That penalty must, of course, be imposed under
constitutionally sound procedures, which I also support.
I believe the death penalty--in appropriate circumstances--to be a
just penalty. I do not believe in theoretical disputes about how much
deterrence or punishment is achieved by meting out the death penalty.
Plain common sense tells us the death penalty is the only way to send
an unequivocal message that some conduct simply will not be borne by
innocent victims of heinous crimes without the highest price to be
paid.
A civilized society cannot send out mixed or ambiguous signals about
how certain heinous acts will be treated. H.R. 4092 reflects this sound
philosophy, and I believe it should be preserved. I urge my colleagues
on both sides of the aisle to oppose this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Mfume].
Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman, the Kopetski-Mfume-Serrano amendment would
replace the death penalty called for in H.R. 4092, the bill we are
debating, with a bill more constitutionally morally sound and a less
expensive sentence of life without parole.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4092 would apply the death penalty, as my
colleagues know, to over 60 new Federal offenses. Yet, in February of
this year, Supreme Court Justice Blackmun stated--and I quote, that
``[t]wenty years have passed since this court declared that the death
penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency or not
at all,'' and he said, ``despite the effort of the states and courts to
devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting
challenge, ``Justice Blackmun said,'' the death penalty remains fraught
with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mistake.'' History
shows us, if we are wise, that minorities have continuously received a
disproportionate share of society's harshest punishments, from slavery
to lynchings. The race of the victim also constitutes a factor in the
discriminatory fashion in which the death penalty is applied. The GAO
stated, and I quote, that ``those who murdered whites were found more
likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks,'' when
we all know, as we must, all murder is wrong.
Moreover, a large body of evidence shows that innocent people are
often convicted of crimes, including capital crimes, and that some of
them have been executed. There have been, on the average, more than
four cases per year in which an entirely innocent person was convicted
of murder, and many of those persons were sentenced to death.
Mr. Chairman, I have here a list of 46 cases that have either been
overturned or where the prisoner was released in light of new evidence,
and include it with my remarks for printing in the Congressional
Record:
Forty-Six Death Row Cases Found To Be in Error
Released--1973
(1) David Keaton, Florida; Convicted: 1971. Sentenced to
death for murdering an off duty deputy sheriff during a
robbery. He was released after the actual killer was
convicted.
Released--1976
(2) Thomas Gladish, Richard Greer, Ronald Keine, Clarence
Smith, New Mexico; Convicted: 1974. The four were convicted
to murder, kidnapping, sodomy, and rape and were sentenced to
death. They were released after a newspaper investigation
caused a drifter to admit to the killings.
Released--1977
(3) Delbert Tibbs, Florida; Convicted: 1974. Sentenced to
death for the rape of a sixteen year old and the murder of
her companion. The conviction was overturned by the Florida
Supreme Court because the verdict was not supported by the
weight of the evidence.
Released--1978
(4) Earl Charles, Georgia; Convicted: 1975. Convicted on
two counts of murder and sentenced to death. He was released
when evidence was found that substantiated his alibi.
(5) Jonathan Treadway, Arizona; Convicted: 1975. Convicted
of sodomy and first degree murder of a six-year-old and
sentenced to death. He was acquitted at retrial by the jury
after 5 pathologists testified that the victim probably died
of natural causes and that there was no evidence of sodomy.
released--1979
(6) Gary Beeman, Ohio; Convicted: 1976. Convicted of
aggravated murder and sentenced to death. Acquitted at the
retrial when evidence showed that the true killer was the
main prosecution witness at the first trial.
released--1980
(7) Jerry Banks, Georgia; 1975. Sentenced to death for two
counts of murder. The conviction was overturned because the
prosecution knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence.
(8) Larry Hicks, Indiana; Convicted: 1978. Convicted on two
counts of murder and sentenced to death. He was acquitted at
the retrial when witnesses established his alibi and when the
eyewitness testimony at the first trial was proved to have
been perjured.
(9) Johnnie Ross, Louisiana; Convicted: 1975. Sentenced to
death for rape. He was released when his blood type was found
to be inconsistent with that of the rapist's.
released--1981
(10) Charles Ray Giddens, Oklahoma; Convicted: 1978.
Conviction and death sentence reversed by the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals on grounds of insufficient evidence.
(11) Michael Linder, South Carolina; Convicted: 1979.
Sentenced to death but was acquitted at the retrial on the
grounds of self defense.
Released--1982
(12) Annibal Jaramillo, Florida; Convicted: 1981. Sentenced
to death for two counts of first degree murder. He was
released when the Florida Supreme Court ruled the evidence
did not sustain the conviction.
(13) Lawyer Johnson, Massachusetts; Convicted: 1971.
Sentenced to death for first degree murder. The changes were
dropped when at this new trial a previously silent eyewitness
came forward and implicated the state's chief witness as the
actual killer.
Released--1983
(14) Chol Soo Lee, California; Convicted: 1977. Convicted
and sentenced to death for killing a fellow prisoner. The
conviction was overturned because of improper jury
instructions and Lee was released.
(15) Billy Jo Wallace, Georgia; Convicted and sentenced to
death for murder. His conviction was overturned by the
Supreme Court of Georgia based on perjured testimony.
Released--1986
(16) Anthony Brown, Florida; Convicted: 1983. Convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to death. At the retrial,
the state's chief witness admitted that his testimony at the
first trial had been perjured.
(17) Neil Ferber, Pennsylvania; Convicted: 1982. Convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to death. He was
released at the request of the state's attorney when new
evidence showed that the conviction was based on perjured
testimony.
released--1987
(18) Joseph Green Brown, Florida; Convicted: 1974. Charges
were dropped after the 11th Circuit ruled that the conviction
was based on suppression of exculpatory evidence by the
prosecution.
(19) Perry Cobb, Darby Williams, Illinois; Convicted: 1979.
They were convicted and sentenced to death for a double
murder. They were acquitted at retrial when an assistant
state's attorney came forward and destroyed the credibility
of the state's chief witness.
(20) Henry Drake, Georgia; Convicted: 1976. Reconvicted to
a life sentence at his second retrial. Six months later, the
parole board freed him, convinced by an exoneration of Drake
given by his alleged accomplice.
(21) John Henry Knapp, Arizona; Convicted: 1974. Released
after the state Supreme Court ordered a new trial.
(22) Wilbert Lee, Freddie Pitts, Florida; Convicted: 1963.
They were convicted of a double murder and sentenced to
death. They were released when they received a full pardon
from Governor Askew because of their innocence.
(23) Vernon McManus, Texas; Convicted: 1977. After a new
trial was ordered; the prosecution dropped the charges
because a key prosecution witness refused to testify.
(24) Anthony Ray Peek, Florida; Convicted: 1978. Convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. He was acquitted at his
second retrial because the erroneous conviction was based on
faulty expert testimony.
(25) John Ramos, Florida; Convicted: 1983. Sentenced to
death for a rape-murder. The decision was vacated by the
Florida Supreme Court. At his retrial, he was acquitted.
(26) Robert Wallace, Georgia; Convicted: 1980. Sentenced to
death for the slaying of a police officer. The 11th Circuit
ordered a retrial because Wallace was not competent to stand
trial. He was acquitted at the retrial because it was found
that the shooting was accidental.
released--1988
(27) Jerry Bigelow, California; Convicted: 1981. Convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. His conviction was
overturned by the California Supreme Court and was acquitted
at the retrial.
(28) Willie Brown, Larry Troy, Florida; Convicted: 1983.
They were released when the evidence showed that the main
witness at trial had perjured himself.
(29) William Jent, Earnest Miller, Florida; Convicted:
1979. They were released in a plea agreement at their
retrial.
(30) Clarence Womack, Alabama; Convicted: 1982. Convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. The conviction was
overturned by the Supreme Court of Alabama based on
suppression of evidence by the prosecution and false
testimony.
released--1989
(31) Randall Dale Adams, Texas; Convicted: 1977. Convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. He was ordered to be
released pending a new trial by the Texas Court of Appeals.
The prosecutors didn't seek a retrial due to substantial
evidence of Adam's innocence.
(32) Jesse Keith Brown, South Carolina; Convicted: 1983.
The conviction was reversed twice by the state Supreme Court.
At the third trial he was acquitted.
(33) Nathan Brown, Georgia; Convicted and sentenced to
death. U.S. District Judge Bowen reversed the conviction and
sentence based on prosecutorial misconduct.
(34) Robert Cox, Florida; Convicted: 1988. Released by an
unanimous decision of the Florida Supreme Court on the basis
of insufficient evidence.
(35) Timothy Hennis, North Carolina; Convicted: 1985.
Convicted on three counts of murder and was sentenced to
death. The state Supreme Court granted a retrial. At the
retrial, Hennis was acquitted.
(36) James Richardson, Florida; Convicted: 1963. Released
after reexamination of the case by the Miami State's Attorney
office concluded he was innocent.
released--1990
(37) Clarence Brandley, Texas; Convicted: 1980. Awarded a
new trial when evidence showed prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence and perjury by prosecution witnesses.
The case was not retried.
(38) Patrick Croy, California; Convicted: 1979. Conviction
overturned by the state Supreme Court because of improper
jury instructions. Acquitted at retrial after argument of
self defense.
(39) John Clifford Skelton, Texas; Convicted: 1982.
Convicted of killing a 46 year old man by exploding dynamite
in his pickup. The conviction was overturned by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals due to insufficient evidence.
released--1991
(40) Bradley P. Scott, Florida; Convicted: 1988. Released
by the Florida Supreme Court on the basis of insufficient
evidence.
(41) Gary Nelson, Georgia; Convicted: 1979. Convicted and
sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a 6-year-old
girl. Released after it was shown that the willful
suppression of evidence in the state's possession pointed to
the guilt of another.
(42) Jimmy Lee Horton, Georgia. Horton, a black man, was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an all white
jury. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the pattern
of wholesale strikes against black jurors by the prosecutor
were unconstitutional.
Released--1993
(43) Kirk Bloodsworth, Maryland; Convicted: 1984. Convicted
and sentenced to death for the rape/murder of a young girl.
He was granted a new trial and given a life sentence. He was
released after further DNA testing proved his innocence.
(44) Fredrico Martinez Macias, Texas; Convicted: 1983.
Convicted of the machete slaying of Robert Haney. A federal
appeals court overturned the conviction and the prosecution
was not able to get another indictment against him because
the grand jury felt there was a lack of evidence.
(45) Walter ``Johnny D'' McMillian, Alabama, Convicted:
1986. Conviction was overturned by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals and was freed after prosecutors decided not
to retry him.
(46) Gregory Ralph Wilhoit, Oklahoma, Convicted: 1985.
Convicted of killing his estranged wife while she slept. He
was released after 11 forensic experts testified that a bite
mark found on his dead wife's breast did not belong to him.
Finally, seeking and imposing the death penalty is much more
expensive than its closest alternative, life imprisonment without
parole. Capital trials are longer, they are more expensive at every
step of the way than other murder trials.
The death penalty is discriminatory, arbitrary, unfair, expensive and
fraught with error. Those are the conclusions of everybody who has
studied in a fair and objective way the imposition of this penalty, and
so imposing the death penalty for over 60 new Federal crimes is a
foolish attempt to appear tough on crime by seeking revenge instead of
seeking solutions and putting an even greater burden on the taxpayers
of this Nation. We all under stand; some of us do, what it is like to
be victimized, but we must also understand that we have to be honest
and fair in our assessment of what an enlightened society must do. It
is less expensive to put people away for the rest of their lives
despite those sorts of arguments to the contrary.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge support of the Kopetski-Mfume-Serrano
amendment.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Brooks] for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very important debate because many
people genuinely do not agree that the death penalty is a deterrent or
that it should be on the books.
{time} 1240
Others believe that there is some discrimination that is carried out
in the actual implementation of death penalties generically. I think
both positions are wrong. The death penalty has a place in our society.
We should defeat this amendment for that reason.
The death penalty with regard to deterrence is not going to deter
everybody who might commit a murder or commit a heinous crime subject
to the death penalty, but it does deter a certain number of people.
Statistically it is impossible for us to be able to demonstrate that in
every case because the people who do not commit those crimes or do not
commit the murders that would get the death penalty are not around on
death row or in jail somewhere to interview.
But it is just common sense, and I think it has been proven by many,
many studies that the death penalty indeed does deter a substantial
amount of crime when it is carried out properly.
The biggest problem we have with it today is that we do not have the
swiftness and certainty of punishment, and we have the endless appeals
that the death row inmates have, but that is another problem.
With regard to the discrimination aspect, I would submit that the
real statistics show that in actuality, as far as black men or women
who are sentenced to death are concerned, compared to white, normally
what we will find in those studies is that most of the crimes that were
committed by the blacks who get the death penalty were against other
blacks or minority members, and that indeed in most cases were the
studies have been done, whites actually have a greater chance in front
of a sentencing panel of getting life imprisonment rather than the
death sentence on a proportion of the number of cases that are brought
to bear.
So I think that the bottom line is that neither argument is
meritorious. The death penalty has a place. It is not discriminatory.
It is very important that it be properly structured and carried out.
but we do not want to strike the opportunity for the Federal Government
to give the death penalty. We need to finally, after many years of not
having it, reinstate the procedures in this legislation, which it does,
to allow the death penalty to be carried out for things like
assassination of the President, drug kingpins, and so forth.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas for yielding time to
me, and I urge a no vote on the amendment.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished
chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and a
great champion of the Bill of Rights, the gentleman from California
[Mr. Edwards].
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding time to me, and I compliment him on offering this important
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to make it very clear that all of the
evidence is that there is no deterrence in death penalties.
I do not know how many of you saw McNeil-Lehrer 3 nights ago where a
triple murderer was asked over and over again by Robert McNeil,
``Didn't you know if you murdered those people, you could get the death
penalty?''
He said, ``No, of course I didn't think about that.'' He said, ``It
doesn't deter anything. You feel you have to do it, you don't think you
are going to get caught, and that's it.''
And he said, ``Throughout the prisons where I have been incarcerated,
everyone has the same attitude.''
There are 13 States that do not have the death penalty, and I can
assure my colleagues that their murder rate is no higher in those
States than in the rest of the country, including States like
California that have the death penalty.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time I have
remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] has 2\1/2\
minutes remaining.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate one point for my colleagues: the
death penalty is more expensive, not less, than life imprisonment.
Again, estimates in California are that death penalty cases cost
roughly $600,000, compared to $427,000 for life imprisonment.
Moreover, adding more death penalty cases would further clog up the
already overburdened Federal courts, squeezing out not only other
criminal cases, but also civil cases, including business law. According
to a recent article in The Washington Post, nearly one-half the working
hours of the Florida supreme court are spent on death penalty cases.
The lesson from Florida is clear: death penalty cases crowd out other
court business. The Congress should think carefully before imposing the
same burden on the Federal system.
Mr. Chairman, let's instead learn from the experience of the States.
According to a recent article in The Washington Post, last year's level
of executions was the highest in 30 years, and yet, under present law,
there were roughly six new death sentences for ever execution. Under
present law, the backlog of death sentences continues to grow, the
average wait for execution may soon surpass 20 years, and death row
inmates come to fear old age more than execution. Quite frankly, we can
not kill them fast enough under current law. The system is broke.
Adding even one new Federal death penalty would add hardship to an
already overburdened system, yet, to my disbelief, the House is
proposing to add over 60 new Federal death penalties!
Mr. David Sarasohn of the Oregonian newspaper recently wrote of the
problems the Federal court system will encounter with death penalty
cases, and I will include the article at the end of my remarks.
And, Mr. Chairman, in addition to moral questions and policy
questions, there is another fundamental flaw with this provision, as
written. That flaw is in the values the bill, as written, espouses.
When I say the value systems are flawed, I should also point out, I
mean this as separate from the moral aspects, which I described
earlier.
We can only vote on what is before us, not on broad policy objectives
that we may wish to read into each bill for political benefit or
expedience. And before us today is a bill which places a higher value
on the life of a Federal bureaucrat than on the men, women and children
whom we represent. For example, if you murder a Federal court official,
you get sentenced to death under this bill, but, if you murder the 4-
year old down the street, you do not. If you are for the death penalty,
you have to explain to your constituents why you value a Federal
employee more than you value their life or the life of their child.
There is another anomaly. Under the bill if you murder someone in a
Federal courthouse you get the death penalty. If you murder them
outside the courthouse, you don't.
And before us today is a bill which places a higher value on our
lives, as Members of Congress, than on the men, women, and children we
represent. Again, if you are for the death penalty, you have to explain
to your constituents why you value your life and the lives of your
colleagues in Congress higher than you value their life or the life of
their child. If you are voting against the Kopetski-Mfume-Serrano
amendment today, my colleagues, you are not just voting for the death
penalty in the abstract, you are voting for some very troubling value
systems.
Life has its ironies. Today Americans are outraged at the punishment
by caning in Singapore. Our President has asked that the sentence not
be carried out. Yet today we vote as a society to impose the death
penalty.
I urge support of the Kopetski-Mfume-Serrano amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I include here the article to which I referred, as
follows:
50 New Death Penalties! Do I Hear 60?
(By David Sarasohn)
In 1988, faced with the embarrassing reality that eight
years of loudly tough-on-crime government had somehow turned
the country into an all-night drug store, Vice President
George Bush had a great idea. The answer, he explained, was
capital punishment for ``drug kingpins.''
Congress, most of which was running for re-election, ran to
pass a new federal capital punishment bill before the polls
opened. It was in such a hurry, in fact, that it failed to
specify how the kingpins were to be executed--although there
was some feeling that prolonged exposure to the Bush-Dukakis
debates might do it.
Five and a half years later, how many drug kingpins has the
federal government actually executed?
About as many as the nights George Bush has recently spent
in the White House. The federal government, in fact, hasn't
executed anybody for 30 years. The most dangerous thing a
drug kingpin could do would be to hold his breath until it
did.
On the other hand, the great majority of the congressmen
who voted for the idea got re-elected.
Inspired by their stunning success with this approach, the
Senate and House are now in the process of creating more
federal capital crimes, filling up two crime bills with
menacing poses. The House crime bill now includes 40 federal
capital counts--although different people reach different
courts--and the Senate includes 52.
Big talk from a jurisdiction that hasn't actually executed
anyone lately--a lot bigger than the chance that any of this
has anything to do with stopping crime.
Nobody's going to be terribly upset about the Senate's plan
to make genocide a capital crime--especially not in
Yugoslavia. And most people would stand behind execution for
murdering the president, vice president or high-level members
of their staffs, although this could immediately provoke an
inside-the-Beltway quarrel about who is or isn't high-level.
But the Senate bill also contains language that federalizes
any murder committed with a gun that crosses state lines,
which could flood the federal courts and set off some
substantial fights with states--many of which have recently
actually executed people.
Among the new listings included in the House's 40 death
penalties is ``Use of a weapon of mass destruction resulting
in death,'' which is probably already covered in most places.
The House joins the Senate in specifying a death penalty for
a killing on a maritime facility, such as an offshore oil
rig.
Most of these dozens of new capital crimes are different
ways of describing murder. Most of them will never be used;
many are what Leigh Dingerson, of the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty, calls ``statistically non-
existent.''
``Murder on a maritime platform,'' she notes, ``is not the
kind of crime I'm concerned about in my neighborhood.''
Kill a high-level member of the vice president's staff on a
maritime platform, of course, and you'd really be in trouble.
All the experience of a federal death penalty shows that
all this will be insignificant; the feds will not be
executing large numbers anytime soon. Lots of other
experience suggests that the federal courts are not currently
set up as the places to deal with capital trials, and a
sudden burst of them--the Senate's interstate gun amendment
could potentially create 6,000 a year--could blow out the
federal circuits' circuits.
``It's a foreign concept to this system,'' says Dennis
Balske, an assistant federal defender in Portland and former
chairman of the Death Penalty Committee of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. ``It's a whole body
of law totally different than anything else out there. It's
incredibly specialized, and everyone in the system would have
to go back to school.'' This, of course, is not Congress's
goal; Congress's goal is to go home and explain that it's
been tough on crime.
This entire approach has not been what you'd call closely
thought out. There is, for example, the question of just how
the federal government would execute someone.
The 1988 law, which currently has six people under federal
sentence of death, didn't say anything about how it should
happen. So just as the Bush administration was leaving
office, it ordered the Justice Department to build a federal
Death Row and lethal injection chamber at the federal prison
in Terre Haute, Ind. It should be completed this year, but
any attempt to use it--promises David Bruck of South
Carolina, one of the federal system's two Federal Death
Penalty Resource Counsels--will face a legal challenge
arguing that means of execution has to be set legislatively,
not bureaucratically.
The new laws suggest borrowing state facilities--which asks
just what the point is of the Terre Haute location.
You could ask the same thing about the new death
penalties--unless you're a congressman running for re-
election.
After all, it worked once.
Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent, with the
concurrence of the other side, that the gentleman from Oregon [Mr.
Kopetski] have an additional 1 minute to speak in hopes that he may
yield one-half of that time to me.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Maryland?
There was no objection.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Maryland [Mr. Mfume].
Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman, let me just say as we close this debate that
the argument by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] carries
merit. I believe, also, that you can make sensible arguments on both
sides of this issue, and you can be looked at as being laughable on
both sides of this issue.
Mr. Chairman, what we are saying with our amendment is to take this
burden off the taxpayers, millions of dollars wasted in appeal after
appeal after appeal instead of giving somebody life without parole,
using that money in the criminal justice system to enforce the law and
to take care of others who are breaking the law.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his support of the amendment
and I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] as well.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski] is recognized
for 30 seconds.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, in closing, we talk about being a
civilized society in this debate and I think life is often full of
ironies. This Nation has been debating whether the penalty in Singapore
ought to be carried out on a young man because he is going to be caned.
The irony is as that debate rages, and most Americans, I believe, are
opposed to the caning of that young man, here we are, the
representative body of the people, about to impose the most heinous
form of punishment, the death penalty, and I believe that to be wrong.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I had
the honor of offering a similar amendment before the House Judiciary
Committee last month.
This amendment replaces the death penalty with life imprisonment. Mr.
Chairman, I do not believe the death penalty is right, and I know there
are many who disagree with me. But even those who believe the death
penalty is morally right should be worried about mistakes. The death
penalty, once imposed, can never be recalled. Innocent people should
never be put to death. As the late Justice Marshall said:
No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of
perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human
error are all too real. We have no way of judging how many
innocent persons have been executed, but we can be certain
that there were some.
Last year, Chairman Edwards released a report which documents 48
people on death row who were released because of significant new
evidence of their innocence since 1973. Gary Nelson of Georgia spent 11
years on death row, waiting to be executed. He was finally released
after a review of the prosecutor's files revealed that material
information had been improperly withheld from the defense. Later the
district attorney admitted that there was not a single element of the
prosecution's case which had not been impeached or contradicted.
In 1984, Federico Macias was convicted of murder in Texas. He was
granted habeas because of ineffective assistance of counsel. He was
released in 1993 after a grand jury refused to reindict him for lack of
evidence.
Also in 1984, Kirk Bloodsworth was sentenced to death for the rape
and murder of a young girl. In 1993, he was released after subsequent
DNA testing confirmed his innocence.
These are not isolated incidents. In 1987 alone, nine people
sentenced to death were released because of a finding of innocence or
of guilt only of a lesser charge. The fact that so many came so close
to death makes me wonder how many weren't so lucky. I urge you to vote
to strike the death penalty, and substitute life imprisonment instead.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Oregon
[Mr. Kopetski].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 111,
noes 314, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 107]
AYES--111
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Barca
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Berman
Blackwell
Bonior
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
Dellums
Dixon
Edwards (CA)
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gutierrez
Hamburg
Hamilton
Hastings
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoekstra
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Kildee
Kleczka
Klug
Kopetski
LaFalce
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Maloney
Markey
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Penny
Rahall
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shays
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Thompson
Towns
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Wise
Woolsey
Yates
NOES--314
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Faleomavaega (AS)
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Foglietta
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Huffington
Hughes
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kreidler
Kyl
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Machtley
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meehan
Menendez
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Neal (NC)
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Rowland
Royce
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Valentine
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Williams
Wilson
Wolf
Wyden
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--12
Fish
Gallo
Grandy
Green
Johnson (CT)
Murphy
Pickle
Rangel
Roukema
Synar
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1306
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Rangel for, with Mr. Murphy against.
Mr. Washington for, with Mr. Green against.
Mr. SAXTON changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. GONZALEZ changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed
in part 1 of House Report 103-474.
amendment offered by mr. mccollum
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. McCollum:
Page 46, after line 21, insert the following:
``(d) Aggravating Factors for Drug Offense Death Penalty.--
In determining whether to recommend a sentence of death for
an offense described in paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of section
3591, the jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall
consider any aggravating factor for which notice has been
provided under section 3593 of this title, including the
following factors:
``(1) Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence
of death or life imprisonment was authorized.--The defendant
has previously been convicted of another Federal or State
offense resulting in the death of a person, for which a
sentence of life imprisonment or death was authorized by
statute.
``(2) Previous conviction of other serious offenses.--The
defendant has previously been convicted of two or more
Federal or State offenses, each punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different
occasions, involving the importation, manufacture, or
distribution of a controlled substance (as defined in section
102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) or the
infliction of, or attempted infliction of, serious bodily
injury or death upon another person.
``(3) Previous serious drug felony conviction.--The
defendant has previously been convicted of another Federal or
State offense involving the manufacture, distribution,
importation, or possession of a controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802)) for which a sentence of five or more years of
imprisonment was authorized by statute.
``(4) Use of firearm.--In committing the offense, or in
furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise of which the
offense was a part, the defendant used a firearm or knowingly
directed, advised, authorized, or assisted another to use a
firearm, as defined in section 921 of this title, to
threaten, intimidate, assault, or injure a person.
``(5) Distribution to persons under twenty-one.--The
offense, or a continuing criminal enterprise of which the
offense was a part, involved conduct proscribed by section
418 of the Controlled Substances Act which was committed
directly by the defendant or for which the defendant would be
liable under section 2 of this title.
``(6) Distribution near schools.--The offense, or a
continuing criminal enterprise of which the offense was a
part, involved conduct proscribed by section 419 of the
Controlled Substances Act which was committed directly by the
defendant or for which the defendant would be liable under
section 2 of this title.
``(7) Using minors in trafficking.--The offense or a
continuing criminal enterprise of which the offense was a
part, involved conduct proscribed by section 420 of the
Controlled Substances Act which was committed directly by the
defendant or for which the defendant would be liable under
section 2 of this title.
``(8) Lethal adulterant.--The offense involved the
importation, manufacture, or distribution of a controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), mixed with a potentially
lethal adulterant, and the defendant was aware of the
presence of the adulterant.
Page 51, line 7, strike ``, in the case'' and all that
follows through ``the jury'' in line 14, and insert ``an
aggravating factor required to be considered under section
3592 is found to exist, the jury''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
McCollum] will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes, and a Member opposed
will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Edwards] is opposed
to the amendment and will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the drug kingpin death penalty is for those who are
organizers and leaders of trafficking in very large quantities of
narcotics; for example, 300,000 grams of cocaine or 60,000 grams of
heroin.
We just passed, a few minutes ago, approved, I should say, the drug
kingpin death penalty and the technical terms of the actual language
saying we want to impose that death penalty. But because of the
bifurcated manner in which the legislation was brought to the floor
through committee, the aggravating factors that are constitutionally
essential to making this drug kingpin death penalty viable, which were
a part of it in the last Congress, when we passed the conference report
having the drug kingpin death penalty as part of it, because it was
bifurcated in the Committee on the Judiciary, those aggravating factors
were not a part of the bill. And they are not a part of it now.
{time} 1310
Consequently, in order to make the vote that the Members took
earlier, the majority of the Members of this body, valid, and have a
drug kingpin death penalty in this bill in a way that can be
implemented, we need to pass the amendment I am offering right now.
The general provisions of aggravating factors required by the Supreme
Court after its 1972 ruling, which made all death penalties in this
country unconstitutional, was that we come with specificity in naming
aggravating factors to be used in the imposing of the death penalty.
The States that had the death penalty before have long since enacted
those provisions. We today are getting our first shot at doing that at
the Federal level for those things such as assassinating the President
and other crimes on the books with the death penalty to be imposed.
Most of those involve situations in which there is, or has been, a dead
body or a murder that has clearly been committed.
In the case of the drug kingpin death penalty, no murder is required
to be proven itself. As we explained in the debate on the amendment of
the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt] to try to strike this from
the bill, there would be, however, a very egregious situation created
if anybody trafficked in the large quantities we are dealing with here,
as an organizer of such trafficking, and that is why as a matter of
public policy Congress wants to impose the death penalty.
In doing that, however, we need specific aggravating factors to be
put in the law to make the carrying out of this particular death
penalty for drug kingpins constitutional. The list of those that I have
included in my amendment for aggravating factors for consideration to
impose such a death penalty would be previous conviction of an offense
for which the sentence of death or life imprisonment was authorized,
previous conviction of another serious offense which is described in
the amendment, a previous drug felony conviction, the use of a firearm
in the commission of the drug crime that is described in the drug
kingpin bill, the distribution to persons under 21 of the narcotics
involved, distribution near schools, using minors in the trafficking
and organized trafficking effort that these organizers are directing,
and the use of a lethal adulterant in the process of doing this.
I believe that every one of these aggravating factors is an
appropriate one to be considered. Of course, the normal mitigating
factors could be used on the defense of the other side, as well.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCOLLUM. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed generally to imposing the
death penalty where death does not result. It seems to me that actual
murder should be necessary to impose the harshest of punishments. For
that reason, I supported the Watt amendment to strike the drug kingpin
death penalty. Having lost that vote, I would have difficulty resisting
the provisions which are constitutionally necessary and essential for
the implementation of the drug kingpin death penalty--which is now the
position of the House.
I will, therefore, support the McCollum amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his support and
explanation. I particularly thank the chairman of the committee. He has
done an excellent job of making his position clear and his support of
this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is a repeat debate over an old issue. I certainly
have not changed my position, but I do not think we ought to make it
easier to implement a law that is very clearly wrong.
The law established in 1977 by Coker against Georgia by the Supreme
Court was very explicit. That case was a terrible rape case, a brutal
rape case, but the woman was not killed. The Supreme Court ruled, and I
believe it was 7 to 2, that the death penalty was disproportionate, and
therefore unconstitutional under cruel and unusual punishment, because
for the Government to execute someone in connection with another crime,
somebody should have been killed, somebody should have been murdered.
Even in this brutal rape case, the Supreme Court said that it was
inappropriate and unconstitutional, cruel and unusual, to have the
death penalty.
Mr. Chairman, the subcommittee that I chair just in the last few
weeks received a report on the implementation of the drug kingpin law
that was put into effect a number of years ago. We found that, out of
37, I believe, Federal drug kingpin capital cases, the death penalty
was administered disproportionately against minorities. The crimes were
all similar.
African-Americans are 13 to 14 percent of our country, but in the
report that we issued, we found, and this was confirmed by the General
Accounting Office in an earlier report, that where the death penalty is
administered, overwhelmingly for the same kind of crimes, whites do not
get the death penalty, where African-Americans do.
In these drug kingpin cases, quite a number of them really are not
drug kingpins. A lot of them are just low-level participants who are
involved in drugs, and this law will be used conveniently to apply the
death penalty even in cases where no homicide has occurred.
Mr. Chairman, although I know the House has already decided to
approve the law generally, I think we ought to vote ``no'' on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I just wish to reiterate my strong position on this
particular matter in terms of the importance of putting the procedures
in place. As the chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks]
indicated in his reasoning for supporting this amendment, we need to
have the right aggravating and mitigating factors in law for dealing
with this peculiar beast that we have here, the drug kingpin death
penalty. Without having my amendment that I am offering now, we will
not have an effective death penalty, which the House recently voted--in
the past few minutes--that it supported.
Consequently, it seems to me that it is very important that the
Members understand that the vote is not, again, on the drug kingpin
death penalty itself, but it might as well be. It is on what is
required to sustain constitutional tests that the Supreme Court has
set, and those mitigating and aggravating factors that we normally
would have in a death penalty case are all available, but in addition
to that, because there is not necessarily a death that has to be proven
here, and because this is a very different kind of a death penalty
reasoning, then there are peculiar aggravating factors that need to be
put in law.
As I indicated earlier, we list those very explicitly, such as the
previous conviction of an offense for which a sentence of death or life
imprisonment was authorized, previous conviction of other serious
offenses, a previous serious drug felony conviction, the use of a
firearm, the distribution to persons under 21, distribution near
schools, use of minors in trafficking, and a lethal adulterant,
offenses involving adulterants.
The fact of the matter is that there are arguments that have been
made before about this whole matter, but the bottom line is that when
somebody is an organizer and leader of an organization that trafficks
in huge quantities of narcotics, as is in the drug kingpin death
penalty provision, clearly people are going to die as a result of that,
and people are in harm's way.
There is an abundance of evidence of the constitutionality of this by
experts, former attorneys general, like Barr and Meese and former
Solicitor General Ken Starr.
It is important, however, that we now place in the law to supplement,
to make sure it works, the drug kingpin death penalty, these procedures
that I have just outlined and described, so I urge a ``yes'' vote on
this amendment to put the procedures, the aggravating factors, into the
law and let the drug kingpin death penalty work. Let it become a part
of this bill, fully and completely.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. McCollum].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were ayes 340,
noes 87, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 108]
AYES--340
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Faleomavaega (AS)
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kreidler
Kyl
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Machtley
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meehan
Menendez
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Minge
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Rowland
Royce
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Swift
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Traficant
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--87
Andrews (ME)
Barca
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Blackwell
Bonior
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
Dellums
Dixon
Edwards (CA)
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Gutierrez
Hamburg
Hastings
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoekstra
Hughes
Jacobs
Jefferson
Kildee
Kopetski
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Maloney
Markey
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Nadler
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Reed
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Smith (NJ)
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Synar
Thompson
Towns
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Goodling
NOT VOTING--9
Fish
Ford (MI)
Gallo
Grandy
Murphy
Rangel
Roukema
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1340
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Murphy for, with Mr. Rangel against.
Mrs. Roukema for, with Mr. Washington against.
Mr. HILLIARD and Mr. BROWN of California changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. EHLERS, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SKAGGS, Ms. BROWN of Florida, Ms.
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and Mr. PENNY changed their vote from
``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
{time} 1340
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed
in part 1 of House Report 103-474.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Gekas
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the
amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Gekas: Page 48, strike line 1
through line 2.
Page 51, strike line 14 and all that follows through line 3
on page 52 and insert the following:
the jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall then
consider whether the aggravating factor or factors found to
exist outweigh any mitigating factors. The jury, or if there
is no jury, the court shall recommend a sentence of death if
it unanimously finds at least one aggravating factor and no
mitigating factor or if it finds one or more aggravating
factors which outweigh any mitigating factors. In any other
case, it shall not recommend a sentence of death. The jury
shall be instructed that it must avoid any influence of
sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
factors in its decision, and should make such a
recommendation as the information warrants. The jury shall be
instructed that its recommendation concerning a sentence of
death is to be based on the aggravating factor or factors and
any mitigating factors which have been found, but that the
final decision concerning the balance of aggravating and
mitigating factors is a matter for the jury's judgment.
Page 53, beginning in line 3, strike ``or life imprisonment
without possibility of release''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Gekas] will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes, and a Member opposed
will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] will be
recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes, and the Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the full attention of the Members
of the Congress, especially those who oppose the death penalty or who
oppose tightening up of the guidelines on the death penalty, for the
purpose of illustrating my amendment, and I want to walk the Members
through a trial, a first degree murder trial in which the antecedent
crime was a rape.
We have in my hypothetical a criminal who would commit a vicious rape
on a young woman. The jury had no difficulty, in my hypothetical case,
in finding murder in the first degree. The defendant raped, then killed
the victim. First degree murder was returned.
Now the jury was to set about the business of determining whether the
death penalty or life imprisonment shall be the final outcome.
Now is a separate hearing the bifurcated or the second part of that
hearing where the jury's responsibility was to weigh the factors to be
presented to them for the purpose of determining death or life.
Now the prosecutor who successfully was able to bring about a first
degree murder conviction has the burden of providing to the jury a set
of, or perhaps only one, aggravating factor. The defense then, in turn,
would bring into play a set of mitigating circumstances and the jury
under all the language or any concept of bifurcated hearings would
weigh the aggravating against the mitigating.
Now is the amendment, the language of the bill here, it is stated
that--and they take the position do the authors of the bill--that in my
hypothetical the prosecutor cannot produce as an aggravating factor the
fact that the individual we talked about was raped. That is not an
aggravating factor permissible for the second part of the hearing under
the language of the bill.
My amendment would permit the prosecutor to present as an aggravating
factor the fact that a woman was raped and then killed, so that the
jury would have the right to say ``Well, if she was raped'', and they
knew that because they convicted, then rape should be considered as an
aggravating factor.
Then the defense attorney can bring in any kind of mitigating factors
it wants.
Mr. Chairman, I am asking the Members of the House to vote for the
Gekas amendment to allow the prosecutor to bring in evidence of the
rape, that is, the antecedent cause of the death of this unfortunate
victim. That is all we ask. If you leave the bill alone, it means that
the prosecutor's hands are tied with respect to being able to present
the rape, which was the real crime that led to the murder, into
evidence at the hearing on whether the death penalty should apply. That
is how unreasonable that is.
Now, am I conjuring up this idea for the purpose of making a speech?
I did not just dredge this up from my own imagination.
In the Lowenfeld case, which found its way to the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court found that my theory, the one I am trying to propose
through the Gekas amendment, is constitutional and is effective because
it limits the parameters of aggravating factors. In that case there was
a brutal murder, murder in the first degree, which called for the death
penalty. In the second part of the hearing the jury was permitted to
hear from the U.S. Prosecutor, was permitted to hear the evidence as to
the multiple murders that took place, which were an essential part of
the murder conviction in the first place. So we have ample precedent in
the constitutional judgment of the Supreme Court, and we have the
absolute common sense truth that a rape, in my hypothetical, should be
accorded the status of an aggravating factor for the purpose of the
decision on the part of the jury as to whether or not to inflict the
death penalty.
Now if that is the case, then we revert to the second part of the
Gekas amendment. Let us assume I am correct on that--and I am--we go to
the second portion of the Gekas amendment. In the present language of
the bill, even if we had 100 aggravating factors, I repeat that, if we
had 100 aggravating factors that the prosecutor was able to present in
the second part of the hearing and the defense was able to present no
mitigating factors, under the present bill, under the language that is
contained in the present bill, the jury could still be instructed by
the judge to disregard all of what they have heard, the 100 aggravating
factors, and find for the life imprisonment portion of the penalty.
Now you would say, ``What is wrong with that?'' What is wrong with
that is that takes the bill back to the Neanderthal days, back before
1972. In 1972--and this is important for you to consider, ladies and
gentlemen and fellow Members of the House--in 1972 the death penalty
was struck down precisely because of what this bill would create, an
unfettered, wide discretion on the part of the jury to find life or
death based on their own whims, their own prejudices, their own biases,
their own determination whether the smile of the defendant is worth
considering or whether the ugliness of the defendant is worth
considering, all of these factors that are nonstatutory would enter
into play, and that is what the Supreme Court found so objectionable
about the death penalty, said it was cruel and barbarous treatment and
therefore struck it down.
{time} 1350
The instruction that is permitted in this language that is now in the
bill, which the Gekas amendment changes, the instruction that is now in
the bill says:
No matter what the aggravating factors are, you could
disregard them and, despite all of that, find for life
imprisonment.
What that does is allow these prejudices, biases, and all these other
nonstatutory elements, to enter into the deliberation of the jury.
My amendment simply says, and it is structured so well that it was
approved by the House of Representatives, this very same body, and the
Senate, and the President of the United States when we passed, and
passed into law, the drug kingpin murder statute of a few terms ago; in
my amendment the jury will hear the aggravating factors. Then it will
hear the mitigating factors. It will waive them, and, if they find that
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, they should
find the death penalty, and vice versa.
Now here is the other thing:
We do have another saving feature for those who have such great pity
for the convict, perhaps, who just killed this lady that I am talking
about in my hypothetical. If they still have sympathy and still want to
reach out to this defendant, still want to show how wonderfully
sympathetic they might be, we still have a saving clause for them.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas]
has expired.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask for unanimous support of the Gekas
amendment.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I want to say I agreed with the second to the last
statement of my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Gekas].
Mr. Chairman, I believe the procedures we have in the bill before us
are appropriate, workable procedures for carrying out the death
penalty.
For those who believe that capital punishment has a place in our
criminal justice system--and I certainly do--it is incumbent that there
are procedures crafted to ensure that justice is done. Justice requires
the procedures to be constitutionally sound--the bill's provisions
achieve precisely that. They appropriately channel a sentencing jury's
authority, so that we can separate out those killers who deserve the
harshest of punishments, and provide for life without any possibility
of release for others convicted of murder. They are tough, but they are
fair.
Mr. Gekas' amendment upsets the careful balance that is necessary to
fully and fairly implement the death penalty. By double counting an
offense as an aggravating factor, the Gekas amendment introduces a
harmful degree of arbitrariness; it eliminates the jury's ability to
impose life without the possibility of release if they decide against
death. Moreover, the Gekas amendment mandates that a death sentence be
imposed in certain circumstances--thus taking away the duly selected
jury's discretion.
I urge the Members to maintain the careful balance in the bill before
us by rejecting the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Schumer].
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
Mr. Chairman, as has been stated, there are times when I believe that
capital punishment is the appropriate punishment, but that does not
mean a jury should not have a choice, and, as this amendment is
written, my colleagues, the bill would give the sentencing jury three
options: the death penalty, life without the possibility of parole, and
a prison term set by the judge. The Gekas amendment would eliminate the
option of life without parole or release. So, if the jury thought that
this----
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. SCHUMER. After I make my point.
If this was a pretty horrendous crime, but they did not quite feel
that it should get the ultimate sentence, capital punishment, they
would then only get a term of years as sentenced by the judge, and I do
not think that makes a great deal of sense. I think the jury should
have the option. They can and should make the choice. But to eliminate
the middle choice will force juries, because they will not go for a
capital sentence, quite frankly, if they do not feel it merits it. So,
actually in effect it would reduce the sentence on those that have
committed pretty serious acts.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCHUMER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding on only
one point:
The Gekas language does provide for life without parole by the court
imposing same----
Mr. SCHUMER. OK; reclaiming my time, it is simply that the jury would
not be able to do that, and that is my point. We want to give the jury
the flexibility there because otherwise they would not find, they are
not going to find, for a capital crime unless they truly believe it is
needed.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] for
having yielded this time to me, and I urge opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes].
(Mr. HUGHES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes].
(Mr. HUGHES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Brooks], the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, for
yielding this time to me.
Let me say that I support the death penalty, as most of my colleagues
know, where I believe it can be constitutionally imposed, and those of
my colleagues who are basically opposed to the death penalty, opposed
to it, should support Gekas because he is going to put at risk the
Federal death statute, and he is doing it for this reason:
When the Supreme Court a few years ago upheld the death penalty, Mr.
Chairman, it did so because elements of the offense cannot be used as a
basis for aggravating offenses, and let me explain why.
When a jury finds that in fact the death penalty should be imposed,
they have already made a decision about the elements of the offense:
premeditation, malice aforethought. Those are the elements of the
offense.
When the gentleman from Pennsylvania talks about not being able to
consider a vicious rape, the gentleman from Pennsylvania is not
explaining basically the bill before us because under subsection c,
page 43, of the bill a jury can consider, as one of the aggravating
factors, the heinous nature of the offense, cruel nature of the
offense, or severe or serious physical abuse, all factors that can be
considered under six----
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUGHES. I do not have the time--under six of the aggravating
factors. The gentleman from Pennsylvania would have us, under his
amendment, basically consider the elements of the offense which, I
think, is going to open up the constitutional attack, so the gentleman
weakens the bill.
Second, Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer]
has indicated, the gentleman from Pennsylvania would eliminate life
imprisonment without parole.
So, Mr. Chairman, we are going to have those situations where a jury
does not want to give the discretion to the judge because they want to
put him away for a number of years. A jury is going to have to make a
decision as to whether to return capital punishment or give the judge
that discretion.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] weakens the
bill by what he has done, and I would urge a rejection of his
amendment.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Brooks] has?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has a minute and a half remaining.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield to me as a stroke
of surprise here?
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I repeat:
The latest case from the Supreme Court, the Lowenfield case versus
Phelps, 1988, found constitutional the prospect of having a rape in my
hypothetical be used as an aggravating factor, and if it is just an
ordinary rape, if there happens to be such a thing as an ordinary rape,
then the language that the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes] was
projecting, heinous, and vicious, and so forth, may not apply to a
rape. Yet we believe that a rape is a rape is a rape and, therefore,
should be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the rape murder
which I outlined to my colleagues.
Moreover, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes] misstates what
he says was my misstatement. The jury at all times can recommend life
without parole, under my language, and further, if they fail to do so,
the court on its own motion, when it is determined by the jury that
life imprisonment is the final answer, the judge himself can impose
life without parole.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas]
has expired.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the
distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes] is
recognized for 30 seconds.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], my friend, understands his own amendment. He
eliminates life imprisonment without parole where the death penalty is
involved.
Mr. GEKAS. That is not so.
Mr. HUGHES. Second, the gentleman has misread the bill. A rape, a
heinous rape or serious physical abuse, is an aggravating factor under
the bill as written.
Mr. GEKAS. Then vote for the Gekas amendment.
Mr. HUGHES. It is not an element of the offense. The gentleman
misunderstands what an element of the offense is. That is not an
element of the offense.
I say to my colleague from Pennsylvania, ``I tried capital cases. The
gentleman is trying to tell me that rape is an only offense.''
Mr. GEKAS. Aggravating factor.
{time} 1400
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 226,
noes 198, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 109]
AYES--226
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Brewster
Browder
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Darden
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards (TX)
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Kaptur
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lancaster
LaRocco
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Machtley
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Rowland
Royce
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Valentine
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--198
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (TX)
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barca
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Cantwell
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coppersmith
Coyne
Danner
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Ehlers
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klug
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lantos
Laughlin
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shays
Shepherd
Skaggs
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Towns
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Goodling
NOT VOTING--12
Fish
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Gallo
Grandy
Hayes
Murphy
Murtha
Roukema
Washington
Waxman
Whitten
{time} 1422
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Grandy for, with Mr. Washington against.
Messrs. SCOTT, FLAKE, BRYANT, and STUPAK changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. KLINK, and Mr. FINGERHUT changed their vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]
is about to offer a privileged motion pursuant to the provisions of
clause 7 of rule XXIII, relating to striking out the enacting clause of
this bill.
Mr. Chairman, the rule states that if a motion that the committee
rise and report to the House a recommendation that the enacting clause
be stricken out is adopted in the Committee of the Whole, then the
committee must rise, but before the House acts on whether or not to
kill the bill, I am quoting now, ``It is in order to entertain a motion
to refer the bill to any committee with or without instructions.''
My inquiry of the Chair is this: If we have reached this stage, is it
in order for the gentleman from Florida to offer a motion to refer with
instructions to report back forthwith with a germane amendment to this
bill?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot speculate on who would be recognized,
but the gentleman's point is correct, that it could be done in the
House.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, further, if this motion to refer with
instructions to report an amendment forthwith is adopted by the House,
it has the effect of making in order in the Committee of the Whole the
gentleman's amendment; is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. That could occur.
Mr. WALKER. That being the case, then, as I understand it, the Chair
has affirmed my position that this procedure allows the House the
opportunity to make in order additional germane amendments to be
considered by the House in committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The series of events that the gentleman has stated
could occur.
Mr. WALKER. I thank the Chair.
preferential motion offered by mr. mccollum
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I offer a preferential motion.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. McCollum of Florida moves that the Committee do now
rise and report the bill back to the House with the
recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of offering this motion, as
was discussed in the parliamentary procedure, is to get the opportunity
to offer an amendment on the floor that the Committee on Rules denied
us and which we do now have out here today.
This amendment is one which was adopted in the 99th Congress, the
100th Congress, the 101st Congress, and the 102d Congress right here on
the floor of the House in a crime bill. Unfortunately, the bill never
became law because it never got through the conference committee with
the Senate. But it is one that I would suggest that the vast majority
of this body would vote for and adopt again, if given the opportunity
to vote on it.
What it would do would be to establish what is known as the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule of evidence.
What the amendment that I would like to offer would allow would be
evidence to be admitted, if gained in an objectively, reasonable belief
that conduct was unlawful. If that evidence was gained by police in a
search and seizure in an objectively, reasonable belief that the
conduct was lawful, that the police conduct it, then we should not have
technical evidentiary procedures set up by the courts of this country
blocking that evidence and keeping us from getting convictions in many,
many cases. That is what has been occurring.
The exclusionary rule is a rule created by courts.
It is not a rule of the Constitution of the United States. We have
certain protections against unlawful searches and seizures, and those
protections are enforced in a number of ways.
The court has chosen to use this rule, but it has also granted a
good-faith exception and said that it is the appropriate method of
dealing with certain cases where warrants are involved. It has not ever
ruled on the case where warrants are not involved.
All my amendment does is to expand or would expand the opportunity
for a good-faith exception to exist in cases where there are no search
warrants and we are getting evidence that should be admitted into court
to get convictions.
The exclusionary rule has a major impact on drug prosecutions over a
3-year period. Also 3,000 felony drug arrests in California were not
prosecuted because of the exclusionary rule problems.
It is something that police all over this country have asked us to
adopt, a good-faith exception to that, we are establishing that clearly
in those cases involved good faith, there was no improper conduct by
the police.
The McCollum amendment would not eliminate the exclusionary rule.
Rather, it would maximize the availability over liable evidence bearing
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. So that is the purpose of
what I am offering this motion for today.
The motion for us to rise, as was explained in the parliamentary
discussion, and striking the enacting clause for the opportunity that
we would then have to instruct the Committee on Rules to come back out
here on the Floor with a bill that would let us offer this rule, this
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, to have a vote on it, to
offer an amendment and to have a vote on it, again, an amendment that
has passed in five previous House meetings and five previous Congresses
but was not allowed by the Committee on Rules to come out here today.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
I thank the gentleman for explaining the amendment that he has
proposed to bring forward. The House should know that because of the
ruling of the Chair that has taken place just previous, the Members are
really voting on the subject matter that the gentleman suggests.
Because what we have now established is that there is a procedure for
bringing this subject matter to the floor. And if, in fact, Members
vote against striking the enacting clause, they are in fact casting a
real vote against a procedure to bring this particular amendment at
this particular time to the floor.
It seems to me Members need to be clear now that they are not simply
voting on a procedural matter. They are voting on something that
ultimately could lead to a real vote on a real issue as described by
the gentleman from Florida.
{time} 1430
Mr. McCOLLUM. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I want to make
absolutely clear the point that what we are voting on today is a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule by this vote. It is the only
opportunity this House will have to do what it has done in the past and
give the police of this country and the citizens of this country the
proper exception to the exclusionary rule to let evidence in to get
convictions in the court proceedings that police all over this country
have asked again and again and again for.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer].
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to make a parliamentary
inquiry to the Chair, if I may.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I believe the gentleman can do that
without my time.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inquire, is the gentleman yielding to
the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer]?
parliamentary inquiries
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. If I
would yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer] for the
purposes of one, am I using my time up on the debate we are involved
with here for purposes of this privileged motion?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman would be.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, another parliamentary inquiry:
Mr. Chairman, do I have the right to reserve time or on this motion
do I have to consume all my 5 minutes?
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rules of this House, the gentleman does not
have the right to reserve time.
Mr. McCOLLUM. I do not?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman does not.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Then I do not wish to yield at this point, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I would inquire how much time I have remaining.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] has 5 minutes
remaining.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, once and for all, so the Members
understand why this motion is being made, it is being made because it
is our only opportunity to get a vote on the good-faith exclusionary
rule which would allow us once and for all to win for the police of
this country what they have been asking for for a long time, to end the
technicalities that are stopping good and well-founded evidence from
getting into court to get convictions in case after case.
An aye vote is for the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
this House has adopted in five previous Congresses.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield for a
parliamentary inquiry?
Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
parliamentary inquiries
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, am I correct that should the motion carry,
and this is not a motion to kill the bill, this is simply a motion for
the Committee to rise, and it can at that point decide that another
amendment can be made in order, is that right?
The CHAIRMAN. The motion is to report to the House with a
recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out, an action that
would reject the bill if carried in the House.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry:
Mr. Chairman, as we established in the previous colloquy, I think
that there is also an action available to the House at that point to
further amend the bill, is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. A motion to refer would be in order.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, it would be in order, and it could be a
motion to refer and report back forthwith, which would in effect at
that point allow an amendment on the floor?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would say that a motion to refer could
include that instruction.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, that has precedence over the motion to
strike the enacting clause, is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. A motion to refer would be in order pending the
question of the House's concurrence in the recommendation to strike out
the enacting clause.
Mr. WALKER. I thank the Chair.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]
has expired.
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. VOLKMER. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, in the event that the motion presently
pending by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] would prevail,
would any Member then be eligible for recognition to make a motion to
refer, or is the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] the only one
that can make that?
The CHAIRMAN. At that point we would be proceeding in the House and
it would be for the Speaker to recognize.
Mr. VOLKMER. I would ask the Chair, the Speaker could recognize any
Member?
The CHAIRMAN. The Speaker would have his usual power of recognition
under the precedents.
Does the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] seek time?
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the motion.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that this is a dilatory effort to
stop this bill. Originally, it was my impression that the other side
over here wanted to get 5 minutes to discuss some facet of the bill
that was not included as an amendment. Now I see that it is a rather
divisive effort to stop the entire bill, go back to what would be an
open rule, which is not what I want to do at all, which I think would
be counterproductive. I think we ought to kill this amendment to strike
the enacting clause if we have got the sense God gave a goose.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROOKS. I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], a
distinguished former Marine.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman knows we have the greatest
respect for him, but this is not an attempt to kill the bill. This is
simply an attempt to make one amendment in order that was not made in
order under the rule. It is a very, very germane amendment. It is very
critical to the bill. We would like to have the opportunity to not only
debate it for 5 minutes, but to vote on it.
Mr. BROOKS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would say to the
gentleman that that was not my understanding of the proposal. They
wanted 5 minutes to talk about something else, and that is fine.
However, if they want to amend this bill, they will have to go through
the Committee on Rules. The Committee on Rules had enough amendments on
this bill to choke a horse, a big horse.
Mr. SOLOMON. If the gentleman will continue to yield, we do not even
want it to come back to us. We want it to go through them.
Mr. BROOKS. We do not need any more amendments, Mr. Chairman. There
are enough amendments now available on this bill, and I am trying to
edit this to where it makes sense, to where it would be unbelievable
that they would want to have any more.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from
New York [Mr. Schumer].
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the Chairman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I hope all of my colleagues on this side of the aisle
will oppose this motion. We voted on the rule yesterday. That was a
vote. There was a great deal of debate and controversy, and the other
side amply had its chance to say there were not enough amendments, 68
was not enough, that we were not debating every controversial
provision, although anyone who listened on the floor this morning knows
we are debating every controversial provision two or three times over.
Now what we could do if we voted for this, what is to prevent another
motion and another motion and another motion?
I say to my colleagues, particularly those who were not here last
year and the year before, this is the same kind of delay. This is the
same kind of ``Well, let us bring the whole bill down unless it is
exactly my way'' that has led us not to pass any bills in the last
several years.
I would say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, Mr.
Chairman, they may not agree with every provision in this bill, but
they know overall it is a very good bill. They had their fight on the
rule, they know it, they know it, and many of them will vote for it.
They have had their fight on the rule. They have lost it.
Mr. Chairman, let us get on with the people's business and move this
crime bill, carefully crafted with both punishment and prevention, so
that the President can sign it and the voters and the people can
finally get some relief from the lack of safety that is plaguing every
home and every car and every street and every school.
We must defeat, we must defeat any of these attempts to delay us on
our path. We have already had that debate.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, what the gentleman is saying, he is afraid
to let the House work its will. Why is he so afraid?
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I would inquire of the Chair if the other
side has any additional time.
The CHAIRMAN. They do not. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] has
the only time remaining.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time, and
move the previous question on the preferential motion.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the preferential motion offered by the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 170,
noes 257, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 110]
AYES--170
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Gallegly
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Machtley
Manzullo
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Royce
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sundquist
Talent
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--257
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hayes
Hefner
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--10
Fish
Gallo
Grandy
Hilliard
Murphy
Quillen
Roukema
Washington
Waxman
Whitten
{time} 1457
Mr. SMITH of Michigan changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the preferential motion was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed
in part 1 of House Report 103-474.
amendment offered by mr. watt
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Watt:
Page 40, strike lines 23 through 25.
Page 46, strike lines 22 through 24.
Page 47, line 17, after ``tors'' insert ``listed in section
3592''.
Page 48, line 2, after ``factor'' insert ``listed in
section 3592''.
Page 50, beginning in line 19, strike ``and any other'' and
all that follows through ``exist'' on line 21.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from North Carolina
[Mr. Watt] will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes, and a Member opposed
will be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment and would
like to be recognized.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] will be
recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes in opposition to the amendment.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, let me put this amendment in perspective. The criminal
defendant has been convicted at this point, and we are at the penalty
stage, and we are deciding whether to impose the death penalty or not
to impose the death penalty.
{time} 1500
The statute provides this, this bill provides for consideration of
certain aggravating factors. Now we are at the penalty stage in a
criminal proceeding and deciding whether the defendant lives or dies,
is submitted to the death penalty or not. This bill specifies, starting
at page 40 of the bill and running for six solid pages, aggravating
factors which can be considered in determining whether the defendant is
put to death. Under an earlier amendment, if the defendant is a drug
kingpin, there are an additional six aggravating factors which can be
considered. In addition, the bill goes forward to say that in addition
to those aggravating factors, the prosecuting attorney can specify
whatever other aggravating factors he or she wishes to specify. And
that is where the problem arises, Mr. Chairman.
That provision which allows a prosecuting attorney to specify other
aggravating factors which are not specified in this bill, delegates to
the executive branch the authority to make up whatever the law is going
to be in that particular case and is unconstitutional.
I would appeal to my colleagues in this body, those on both sides of
the aisle who customarily argue that we should not be giving up our
authority to the executive branch, to exercise our responsibility in
this body and limit the prosecutor to the aggravating factors which are
specified in the bill which currently take up six or seven pages
already.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, this debate over this amendment is something which I
think is very important but probably not understood by many of the
Members. In this case of the death penalty, there is an opportunity
normally given in the State courts, and we certainly think we should do
it here in Federal courts, for there to be aggravating factors
presented as a possible matter by a jury, or a judge if he is doing the
sentencing, in determining the death penalty, that are particularly
tailored to the circumstances of an individual case. We cannot as
legislators think of all the circumstances that might exist that would
present aggravating factors that would warrant the giving of the death
penalty.
So, the bill as it is now constructed lists a number of very specific
aggravating factors, and there could of course also be mitigating
factors that could be listed here as well, but we outline certain very
specific ones so that we meet the Supreme Court guidelines, if there
are some clear paths that can be followed legislatively by those who
are making the decision on death penalties. But we should not do what
the gentleman wants to do; we should not strike and eliminate the
opportunity that is given in this bill for other aggravating factors
that we cannot think of now for every possible contingency or for every
possible type of case where the death penalty is warranted, to be
presented to a jury or a judge in making his or her decision.
There should be a chance with due notice which is given in this
bill--and I think a constitutionally correct way of doing it--for the
prosecutor to present some other well-crafted aggravating factor to
argue in favor of capital punishment being given.
If the gentleman's amendment passes, then the prosecutors will not
have that opportunity to tailor any aggravating factors to the
peculiarity of the case. I think that would bring about the potential
for grave injustice for death penalty perhaps not being imposed in a
case that has circumstances that are unusual or peculiar to it. I think
that is indeed the weakness of the gentleman's amendment. If it is
clear to everyone that that is what we are talking about and all we are
talking about, it seems to me we all would want to vote ``no'' on this
amendment and leave the discretion in the hands of the prosecutors to
look on each death penalty case on a case-by-case basis and be able to
craft an appropriate aggravating factor or two which is indeed beyond
the parameters of what we have written in our proposals here in the
bill as it now reads.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right to close, and I
have reserved the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina
[Mr. Watt].
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would point out the inconsistency of my colleague's
argument. Typically, he is the very person in this body who is talking
against the delegation of authority that we should be exercising to the
executive branch. There is nothing in the language in this bill which
even requires the prosecuting attorney to tailor the aggravating
factors in any way. There is not even any language that suggests that
the prosecuting attorney must make it somehow appropriate, as he has
characterized it. The prosecuting attorney could say the defendant got
an F on his report card in the 10th grade and that could be an
aggravating factor. He could pull any aggravating factor, unrelated to
this offense, unrelated to anything else, that he wanted to pull and
specify it. I would suggest, and I would ask my colleagues not to give
that kind of discretion to prosecuting attorneys. We should not be
pulling in prosecutors and giving them the authority to write the laws
in this way.
Additionally, the defendant deserves to know in advance the
aggravating factors that will be considered.
I would say that under this bill, given this discretion, the
defendant will never be able to understand and know what aggravating
factors will be considered.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. WATT. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. HUGHES. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlemen for yielding and congratulate
him. When the Supreme Court invalidated all death penalties more than
20 years ago, it did so because of the uncertainty in the law and
practice at that time. The Court found that it was not possible to find
any rational pattern or set of rules regarding which conduct would lead
to a death penalty and which would not.
A key factor in the Court's subsequent approval of new death penalty
systems was the addition of specific, statutory aggravating factors.
Uncertainty was substantially reduced, and guidance to jurors enhanced,
by the enumeration of specific aggravating factors, which, if found to
exist, could form the basis of a jury finding in support of a death
penalty.
The bill before us contains some 15 specific aggravating factors.
This is a proper exercise of legislative and policymaking authority,
and is in keeping with the Supreme Court's mandate that specificity and
certainty be built into death penalty statutes.
Much of that is lost, and the constitutionality of our death penalty
laws threatened, if we give prosecutors unrestricted and unguided
authority to fashion their own subjective aggravating factors, which
would then assume a stature equal to those aggravating factors spelled
out in the law.
The 15 statutory aggravating factors are not only quite extensive,
but quite broad. They include such far-reaching factors as a ``heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner of committing an offense.'' We should not
allow prosecutors and jurors to go beyond these already broad
provisions.
I support the Watt amendment.
Mr. WATT. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to support the amendment. I disagree with
the gentleman, ultimately, on capital punishment on other provisions in
this bill. I certainly believe, when you are going to invoke the
ultimate punishment, that is capital punishment, we ought to be very
careful and very delineating in what we do.
{time} 1510
To say that there should be an opened aggravating factor, that
anything could be an aggravating factor, does, in my opinion--it is a
close case, but it does, in my opinion, tip the scales over in favor of
too much discretion and too much abuse leading to some of the other
kinds of things that we have seen in certain capital cases, and so I
would urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Those of us who
believe in capital punishment have an obligation, I think, to see that
it is administered fairly, carefully, and with every, every, every
predisposition so that mistakes are not made, and for that reason I
urge that we adopt this amendment.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I would simply say that we have
a death penalty, we have added a number of additional death penalty
provisions. There ought to, at least, be standards for evaluating when
the death penalty will apply. If we do not have standards, the problem
that we have had with racially disparate application of the death
penalty will become that much more of a problem, and I would ask my
colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time I have
remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I have again a great deal of respect for the gentleman
from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], but I want to read the actual language
he is striking that is pertinent to this so we all understand what it
says in the bill. After the aggravating factors that are delineated for
imposing the death penalty there is this clause or sentence. It says:
The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider whether any
other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.
One thing is very clear from reading that, and that is that notice
must be given. The defense is not going to be surprised by what is
brought forward by the prosecutor.
In addition, it is just the common way of doing things, to allow some
flexibility in creating aggravating factors or mitigating factors when
we start considering sentences, including the death penalty. No way,
shape or form can we perfect here in the legislative body every single
conceivable circumstance which would be something we would find
aggravating enough in every case to be able to warrant the death
penalty or to be able to warrant any other sentence for that matter.
There are always new and strange cases coming about. That is why we
have so many varied court opinions all over this country. It is almost
mind boggling to look at how many different nuances we can find to try
cases and try to resolve issues that come up or how many new decisions
the Supreme Court is called upon to make over contentious matters every
term of court.
Mr. Chairman, we just simply find that there are a lot of variations
on factual circumstances that we cannot think of when we sit down here
and try to draft them all out in a neat little form. If we are going to
have an effective death penalty back again in the fall, which we should
have put in place for the Federal crimes that warrant the death penalty
a long time ago, then we need to do the right procedures, and one of
those procedures which is in this bill already the gentleman wants to
strike is to provide a catch-all for prosecutors to be able, with
notice, to frame and craft additional aggravating factors that might
warrant the death penalty, and I would submit we should not take that
type of opportunity away and foreclose an appropriate drafting of an
aggravating factor.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 116,
noes 308, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 111]
AYES--116
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
de Lugo (VI)
Dellums
Dixon
Edwards (CA)
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Gutierrez
Hamburg
Hastings
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hochbrueckner
Hoyer
Hughes
Inslee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klug
Kopetski
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Markey
McCloskey
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Mollohan
Nadler
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Swift
Synar
Thompson
Towns
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOES--308
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Grams
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kreidler
Kyl
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Machtley
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meehan
Menendez
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Minge
Moakley
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Neal (MA)
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Richardson
Ridge
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Rowland
Royce
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Stupak
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Williams
Wilson
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Goodling
NOT VOTING--12
Becerra
Fish
Gallo
Grandy
Laughlin
Murphy
Neal (NC)
Quillen
Roukema
Valentine
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1533
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Washington for, with Mr. Grandy against.
Mr. Becerra for, with Mrs. Roukema against.
Ms. SHEPHERD, Mr. ROSE, and Mr. MOAKLEY changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I would like this opportunity to step back
from all the rhetoric over the impact of this crime bill. Preventing
and fighting crime is not about the many meaningless provisions in this
bill that in actuality only serve political purposes and will have
little effect on how the law enforcement community protects the public.
Fighting crime is indeed about protecting people's lives and
livelihoods and making everyone feel safe and secure enough to walk
outside their own homes. It is about providing resources and technical
assistance to local law enforcement officials so that they can do their
job effectively.
It was for this very reason that Congressman Charlie Taylor,
Congressman Schumer, and I introduced the National Triad Program Act.
This bill advocates a strategy that in this age of cynicism is unheard
of--cooperation. It proposes to form a coalition between local
sheriffs, police chiefs, and senior citizens groups to reduce the
victimization and unwarranted fear of crime which disproportionately
plagues senior citizens. This program has been incorporated into the
prevention title of H.R. 4092, establishing 50 pilot such programs
across the country. The premise behind Triad is to make seniors feel
more comfortable about reporting crimes inflicted upon them, which they
have been reluctant to do in the past. It would, further, get seniors
directly involved through outreach and volunteer efforts to better
prevent crimes in their communities.
There are presently 100 Triad programs already operating under local
and State jurisdictions throughout the country. One of the first
programs was started in my district in St. Martin Parish, LA, by
Sheriff Charles Fuselier. It was through his tireless efforts and those
of the National Sheriff's Association that this program has become such
a nationwide success. Sheriff Fuselier has received more than a ten-
fold return on his investments in terms of the volunteers, which work
in his office 2 to 3 days a week, and the crimes that have been quickly
resolved because of greater senior participation.
By the year 2030 there will be approximately 66 million senior
citizens in American society. Accordingly, the Triad information
network has the potential to be the cornerstone of future crime
fighting activities within the seniors community. We must put our
muscle and limited resources behind programs that work.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Mr. Chairman, in the ancient Near Eastern empire once
ruled by the great Hammurabi, criminals would be punished for their
offenses by his code of law-- ``an eye for an eye.'' I would think that
by the year 1994 this uncivilized and barbaric concept of law would
have long since been made obsolete. Yet, I stand here in front of you
today debating over a modern version of Hammurabi's Code--the death
penalty.
It is my strong belief that criminals who commit violent crimes
should be adequately punished for their offenses, but that punishment
should not result in their death. Mr. Kopetski has offered an amendment
that punishes them for their violent acts with life imprisonment.
The death penalty is plagued by racial disparity and error. Numerous
studies have shown that racial minorities are being prosecuted under
the death penalty law far beyond their proportion in the general
population or the population of criminal offenders. An analysis of
prosecutions under the Federal death penalty provisions of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act signed by President Reagan in 1988, reveals that 89
percent of the defendants selected for capital prosecution have been
either African-American or Mexican-American. Moreover, studies have
shown that innocent people are being sentenced to death. In 1993 alone,
4 men sentenced to death were found innocent.
These figures paint a sad portrait of a discriminatory and
ineffective system of justice. They only confirm the conclusion's of
the Honorable Justice Harry Blackmun who wrote of the death penalty,
``the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination,
caprice, and mistake. The death penalty experiment has failed.''
Mr. Chairman, let us bring fairness and constitutionality back into
our justice system. I urge my colleagues to vote for Mr. Kopetski's
amendment.
Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. Chairman, as Congress begins its debate on
anticrime legislation, I find it extremely telling that we as
legislators have ignored the wisdom of the people who are implementing
the laws that we write. I would like to share with you a letter I
recently received from the Pennsylvania District Attorney's Association
which states that some of the provisions in the bill we are debating
are so slanted in favor of the criminal that they relegate victims to a
``position of irrelevance''.
Dear Congressman Santorum: We are writing to express the
views of the Pennsylvania District Attorney's Association and
virtually all of the prosecutors across the nation to ask you
to vote for the Hyde amendment to strike Title VIII from
House Bill 4092, the Omnibus Crime Bill. We also urge you to
support the McCollum amendment to substitute the Equal
Justice Act provisions for the so-called ``Racial Justice
Act'' provisions presently in the bill. It is scheduled for a
vote on the House floor on Wednesday, March 23, 1994.
Title VIII, the Habeas Corpus Revision Act of 1994, is a
virtual wish list for criminal defense attorneys. It
overturns significant United States Supreme Court case law
and authorizes Federal judges to overturn death sentences on
the basis of certain belated claims even if there was no
constitutional error.
As prosecutors, we don't want, nor do we expect, Congress
to stack the deck in our favor. We are, however, looking for
a level playing field. Title VIII is so defense oriented that
it doesn't approach fairness and relegates victims to a
position of irrelevance.
Title IX, the Racial Justice Act, is designed to
effectively end the death penalty in America by death penalty
opponents who, faced with overwhelming public opposition to
their position, cannot repeal the death penalty directly. It
mandates a highly offensive ``racial quota'' system to the
application of the death penalty and destroys the fundamental
principal that prosecutors must conduct death penalty
litigation in a manner that is entirely color blind.
Very truly yours,
Bill Ryan,
President.
Lynne Abraham,
Legislative Chairman.
Mr. Speaker, the message in this letter is clear, by passing these
provisions in the crime bill, we are not streamlining our appeal
process or correcting inequities in our implementation of the death
penalty. Instead, we are making it easier for criminals to continue to
abuse our system and rendering our criminal justice system paralyzed. I
believe it is time Congress stops talking about being tough on crime
and cleaning up our system, while we ignore the expert advise of people
who recognize the problems in our criminal justice system and
experience the frustration brought on by our inability to correct them.
With our Nation's escalating violent crime problem, we can no longer
ignore the opinions of law enforcement and simply pass legislation
designed to protect criminals.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to draw attention to an
important provision in H.R. 4092 designed to protect the traveling
public. Specifically, the purpose of the Abercrombie amendment is to
facilitate in the investigation of violent crimes against travelers.
Over the past few months we have seen an increasing number of crimes
of violence directed at travelers, both domestic and foreign, in the
United States. Unfortunately some of the incidents have been so
notorious that they have received international attention.
Our Nation is dependent on the travel and tourism industry. In 34
States, it is already the first, second or third largest employer.
Travel and tourism is the Nation's second largest employer, providing 6
million jobs. The $74 billion we earn from international visitors make
it our single biggest export. In the State of Hawaii, for example, the
travel and tourism industry accounts for over 30 percent of the State's
GDP. We cannot afford to stand by and let these crimes of violence
affect the travel patterns of individuals.
The Abercrombie amendment is not meant to increase the Federal role,
that is, federalize the crime, or diminish the authority of local
jurisdictions. Also, the amendment does not mandate States to provide
greater protection for travelers than for their own citizens. Instead,
the amendment gives local law enforcement officials the option to
utilize the resources of the Federal Government to assist in the
investigation of violent crimes against travelers. This is the approach
taken by the Department of Justice in mutual legal assistance treaties,
that is, assist in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. For the
purpose of the amendment the definition of a traveler is an individual
who is not a resident of the State in which the crime of violence
occurs. It applies to domestic and foreign travelers.
The amendment was drafted in consultation with Department of Justice
[DOJ] and is consistent with Attorney General Reno's notion of working
together. The DOJ recognizes that offenses against travelers may be
difficult for State authorities to prosecute because of problems in
securing testimony and other evidence, emphasizes the importance of the
Department of Justice fully assisting State authorities in their
efforts to obtain evidence needed for effective investigation and
prosecution. Thus, this provision underscores both the availability of
Federal assistance and the expectation that the Departments of Justice
and State will use their best efforts to secure evidence needed by
State and local prosecutors and investigators in cases involving
serious crimes against travelers.
The amendment has the strong support of law enforcement officials and
the travel and tourism industry. Accordingly, I ask my colleagues to
support the Abercrombie amendment.
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, as the ranking member on the House
Committee on Education and Labor, I have serious concerns about many of
the provisions included in H.R. 4092, the Omnibus Crime Control Act, as
well as many of the amendments which have been made in order by the
Rules Committee. In attempting to address the crime problem which faces
our Nation, the House Judiciary Committee brought several bills to the
floor aimed at preventing crime and rehabilitating prisoners. However,
many of these programs relate to issues within the jurisdiction of the
Education and Labor Committee and are substantially similar or
duplicative of existing programs.
I am not opposed to providing targeted assistance to youth in
neighborhoods with high incidence of crime and poverty, yet I am
opposed to creating duplicative programs. I strongly believe there
should be linkages between what we are doing in the area of crime
prevention, employment, and education and training if we are to be
successful in salvaging this Nation's youth. However, in creating these
linkages, we must build on existing programs, establishing a
comprehensive system of assistance, not a series of fragmented Federal
programs through which millions of limited dollars are wasted on
duplicative administrative structures. In fact, the GAO recently
identified 154 Federal programs that in some capacity provide job
training and assistance to disadvantaged adults and youth through a
wide variety of delivery mechanisms.
For example, title X of H.R. 4092 would establish a new Youth
Employment and Skills Crime Prevention Program. Currently, we have
numerous Federal statutes which provide very similar and in many cases
identical forms of employment, education, and training assistance to
disadvantaged and at-risk youth, as are provided under this
legislation's YES Program. We have the year-round training program for
disadvantaged youth, established under title II-C of the Job Training
Partnership Act [JTPA]; the Summer Youth Employment and Training
Program for disadvantaged youth, established under title II-B of JTPA;
the Youth Fair Chance Program, which targets assistance for
disadvantaged youth to high poverty communities established under title
IV, part H of JTPA. In addition, we have the Job Corps Program
established under title IV, part B of JTPA, which also provides
intensive assistance and services to severely disadvantaged the at-risk
youth. These are just the programs established under the Job Training
Partnership Act, not to mention numerous other Federal statutes which
independently provide employment and training assistance to youth and
young adults. I attempted to offer an amendment which would strike
title X, subtitle J of the bill, however, my amendment was not made in
order.
To further illustrate this point, the following is a list of
amendments which are duplicative of existing programs within the
jurisdiction of the Education and Labor Committee:
The Olver amendment would authorize the Attorney General to make 10
State demonstration grants that provide for at least one specialized
domestic violence court advocate in every court where a significant
number of protective orders are granted. This is substantially similar
to the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, which already
provides for demonstration grants to deal with family violence. This
existing program was appropriated $27.7 million for fiscal year 1994.
The Martinez amendment would authorize demonstration grants for
umbrella agencies in enterprise zones for strategic planning and
evaluation of service programs in low-income communities and gang
prevention programs, such as Boys and Girls Clubs. These grants
duplicate: First; the Community Services Block Grant Act which provides
funds for Community Action Programs [CAPS] in all communities, not just
enterprise zones. This program was already appropriated $464 million
for fiscal year 1994; and second; part D of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, which provides grants for gang prevention
activities which was appropriated $5 million in fiscal year 1994.
The McCurdy amendment would establish a Police Corps Program to allow
State and local law enforcement agencies to recruit young people to
serve a term with the police in return for aid for a college education.
It would also establish a Law Enforcement Scholarship Matching Grant
Program for current law enforcement personnel and young people
interested in a career in law enforcement. The first part of this
amendment is duplicative of the National Services Act, which
specifically lists programs that address unmet public safety needs as
eligible for national service grants and was appropriated $370 million
in fiscal year 1994.
The Gorton amendment would prohibit awarding Pell basic grants to
anyone incarcerated in a Federal or State prison.
I have serious concerns in regard to this amendment. During the 1992
Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, Congress enacted changes
affecting the eligibility of prisoners to receive Pell grants aimed at
preventing the abuse of the Pell Grant Program. These changes included:
First, determining that Pell funds can only be used for tuition and
books and not for cost of living; second, eliminating persons on death
row; third, limiting a schools total enrollment of prisoners; fourth,
prohibiting schools from participation in the Pell program if they
offer more than 50 percent of their courses by correspondence; and
fifth, prohibiting States from shifting the costs of post secondary
education for prisoners onto the Pell program.
The Wynn amendment would prohibit Pell grants to Federal or State
prisoners after January 1, 1996 unless it is certified by the Secretary
of Education or the Governor.
The Martinez amendment which would establish requirements for States
under which they would enact regulations regarding background
investigations and training requirements that apply to all persons
providing private security services.
The Owens amendment would permanently exempt State and local public
safety agencies from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in order
to permit them to consider age in their hiring and retirement policies.
In the Education and Labor Committee, we are currently looking into
ways to reform this array of education, welfare, training, and
employment assistance programs into a comprehensive system of services
designed to serve the many needs of youth and adults. I would be happy
to work with proponents of this legislation to amend our current
programs, where necessary, to address crime prevention and poverty
concerns. I do think however, that such amendments would be better
developed under the jurisdiction of the Education and Labor Committee
through comprehensive reforms of our existing systems.
Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, Americans are tired of living in fear and
are demanding crime legislation that deals with the root of decay in
our criminal justice system. Nationwide there is consensus that our
criminal justice system has failed and innocent Americans have become
the victims of a system originally conceived to protect them.
The President's rhetoric has stressed the importance of reforming our
criminal justice system, but he has failed to introduce a crime bill
that effectively reforms the process. His proposal is a weak attempt at
piecemeal legislation that is all talk and no action. He attempts to
offer short-term flawed solutions to intricate problems that merit
comprehensive responses.
The administration's crime bill squanders $8 billion into several new
useless social-welfare programs. Specifically it provides a formula
that gives $2 billion to localities with the highest self-imposed tax
rates. The theory is that since these communities have the highest tax
levels, they will also have the highest levels of unemployment and
poverty. To help alleviate their problems, President Clinton wants the
Federal Government to send these communities a blank check. This is
ludicrous. Why are we rewarding communities that have contributed to
their own economic chaos. Higher taxes do not create employment or
business and they certainly do not bring people out of poverty. In
fact, they have the reverse effect.
The remainder of the $8 billion from these social-welfare programs
will be used toward several Great Society-style programs. These
programs are targeted to crime-prone areas for recreation activities.
For example, there is a program called midnight sports where criminals
can participate in basketball games from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. I fail to
see how a friendly taxpayer financed basketball game will deter these
criminals from committing other crimes.
Even more disturbing than this, are the major loopholes that exist
under habeas corpus. The bill claims to reform habeas corpus, but in
reality it weakens current law and even overturns previous Supreme
Court decisions. These loopholes allow criminals to abuse and prolong
the appeals process in an effort to avoid the death penalty.
The administration's approach further weakens the legislative
language of the three strikes and you're out provision. The bill
imposes mandatory life imprisonment without parole for criminals
convicted of three violent crimes, but it requires that the third
strike must be a Federal crime. By diluting this language, repeat
offenders are not permanently removed from the street. Without
permanently removing these criminals from the street, the system fails
once again to close the revolving door that is at the core of the crime
epidemic in this country. How will these criminals be deterred when
they do not serve the whole portion of their sentence? As they say in
baseball, and I strongly believe the American people now echo this
sentiment, ``three strikes and you are out.''
The Clinton plan also allocates $3 billion in Federal grant money to
assist State in building new prisons or improve existing ones so they
have room to keep violent repeat offenders behind bars. However, there
is nothing in the bill's language to ensure that these offenders will
serve a significant portion of their sentence. Currently, convicted
criminals are only serving about 37 percent of their sentence. Why
should tax-paying citizens pour Federal money into State prison systems
without there being and type of guarantee that these reforms will keep
criminals behind bars. We must tie Federal funds to truth-in-sentencing
reforms, otherwise we are throwing taxpayer's money away.
The only way that we are going to stop the crime epidemic in this
country is by repairing our current criminal justice system and
permanently nailing shut the revolving door that enables violent
criminals from terrorizing innocent victims in our society.
The crime crisis in this country is real and it affects everyone.
This crime proposal does not reform the criminal justice system as
promised. Instead, we are once again left with empty political rhetoric
that fails to respond to the public's cry for criminal justice reform.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the
crime bill before us today. This is an issue which affects every
citizen in every district.
But let me tell you a story from my district. Less than 2 weeks ago,
7-year-old Marcellina Delgado was shot near the Charter Oak housing
project in Hartford. She was on her mother's lap as her family drove to
her grandmother's house. What did Marcellina do to deserve such a fate?
She was riding in a car that one gang member mistakenly thought
belonged to an enemy gang member.
We have all heard this story. Law abiding citizens, going about their
business, are getting caught in gang crossfire. How many innocent
victims must get hurt or be killed before we stand up and support those
fighting this battle every day? Today, we in the House must give the
answer: Enough is enough--enough crimes, enough bloodshed, and enough
deaths.
I know that there are Members on both sides of the aisle with
concerns over provisions included in H.R. 4092. But now more than ever,
we need a bipartisan approach to the fight against crime. We can no
longer afford to argue over Democratic and Republican responses to this
demoralizing problem. We must put our differences aside and directly
confront this issue. The American people are asking us to act and it is
high time we did.
H.R. 4092 contains much we can support. It addresses not only methods
of punishment, but methods of prevention as well. The legislation
authorizes more than $15 billion through fiscal year 1999 for a variety
of anticrime strategies over 5 years, half of which is for crime
control, with the other half for crime prevention. We are also voting
on whether to approve $3.5 billion to hire State and local police
officers for community policing programs, $3 billion for grants to
State prisons and $600 million for alternative incarceration for young
offenders. Roughly $7 billion is included in H.R. 4092 for community
crime prevention programs. Other important provisions in this bill call
for life imprisonment for three time violent offenders, more severely
punish crimes of violence against women, and make it a Federal crime to
sell or transfer a handgun to a juvenile.
The time for talk has passed. The time to act is upon us. I urge my
colleagues to support this bill so we can begin to take back our
streets.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr.
Gibbons] having assumed the chair, Mr. Torricelli, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4092) to
control and prevent crime, had come to no resolution thereon.
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