[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 36 (Friday, March 25, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 25, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                SOME OF THE SUBJECTS RECEIVING ATTENTION

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, tonight I would like to talk about several 
subjects which many Senators, including myself, have been engaged in in 
the past few days in the Senate. The first subject involves the Safe 
Drinking Water Act. Under the leadership of Senators Baucus and Chafee, 
the Environment and Public Works Committee had a markup this week of 
this important piece of legislation.
  I had considerable doubt, as did other Republican Senators on this 
committee, that we would achieve a bill and report it to the floor. But 
through the diligence and cooperation of all members of the committee 
on both sides of the aisle, we did achieve that goal and reported out a 
bill this past week. I would like to share with the Senate some of the 
highlights of this very important piece of legislation.
  There are not a lot of us that do not desire that all Americans have 
the finest drinking water that is obtainable. The name of the act 
itself implies that desire: Safe Drinking Water Act. However, there are 
a number of economic concerns that must be faced by communities all 
across this country. Eighty-seven percent of the communities in America 
are under 10,000 people. And quite frankly, they cannot afford--it is 
beyond the budgets of their communities to achieve certain standards. 
That factor was taken into consideration by the committee in its work 
this week.
  So I would like now to discuss the work of this committee. I will 
start off by giving a little history.
  In 1974, the Safe Drinking Water Act, Public Law 93-523, was enacted 
to ensure that public drinking water systems throughout the Nation 
provide water that is free of harmful contaminants. Previously, the 
Public Health Service set standards for drinking water which were used 
as a voluntary reference for drinking water systems. The drinking water 
program was transferred to EPA when that agency was created in 1970. 
The SDWA requires EPA to establish drinking water regulations to 
protect public health. EPA established a maximum contaminant level 
goal. That is referred to as MCLG, which is a level at which no known 
or anticipated effects on the health of persons occur, and allows an 
adequate margin of safety.
  EPA then sets a maximum contaminant level, MCL, which is the 
enforceable level set as close to the goal as is feasible. Feasible 
means the application of the best available treatment technology taking 
costs into consideration.
  The regulations apply to both privately and publicly owned systems 
which serve at least 25 people or 15 connections. There are 
approximately 60,000 community water systems in this country. There are 
another 140,000 noncommunity water systems, including hospitals, 
schools, and campgrounds that serve more than 25 people regularly, and 
are regulated under the act as written in 1974.
  While the national drinking water program is based on Federal law, 
States have primary enforceable responsibility for implementing the act 
within their borders. The act authorizes EPA to provide grants to 
assist the States in developing their programs funded by $60 million, 
and that was the level of funding in 1993.
  A key aspect of the drinking water program is the variability in size 
of drinking water systems. Eighty percent, as I said, of the population 
receive their drinking water from large systems operated by major 
cities or private utilities. These systems can afford to monitor and to 
treat the water at a relatively small cost to consumers. There are a 
large number of very small systems serving only a few hundred people. 
Sixty-two percent--this was the forecast in 1974--of systems serve less 
than 500 persons.
  These systems often lack sufficient resources and expertise to comply 
with the regulations. Available technology in monitoring requirements 
that EPA sets are established to reflect the capabilities of large 
systems, not small ones.
  Let us look at the legislation since 1972. The Safe Drinking Water 
Act was last reauthorized in June of 1986. And appropriations are 
authorized through fiscal year 1991. The 1986 amendments established 
the schedule for issuing additional MCLs. Many in Congress felt that 
the regulatory process should be streamlined, and that EPA was not 
developing revised regulations quickly enough. In 1986, only 23 
contaminants had standards.
  Consequently, the 1986 amendments redesignated the remaining 23 
interim regulations as promulgated primary regulations and set a 3-year 
deadline for EPA to develop primary drinking water regulations for 83, 
including the 23 already-regulated specified contaminants.
  In addition, the 1986 amendments required EPA to add 25 contaminants 
every 3 years after the standards for the initial 83 contaminants had 
been issued. In other words, aggressively through research add the 
additional contaminants so as to further improve our water systems.
  The 1986 amendments also created two new programs that focused on 
ground water protection: grants for sole source aquifer demonstrations 
and the Well-Head Protection Program.
  In the past several years there has been a growing controversy over 
the new drinking water regulations issued by the EPA, and the cost of 
monitoring and treatment to meet these new regulations. Senator 
Lautenberg, a member of the Environment and Public Works Committee, a 
man who has taken a great deal of interest in the Superfund 
legislation--and I worked with him on that, as I have on many other 
programs. Senator Lautenberg held a general oversight hearing on the 
Safe Drinking Water Act in May of 1991 to review progress in 
implementing the program and evaluate concerns about the costs of the 
program.
  In July of 1992, the Senate passed a Chafee-Lautenberg second-degree 
amendment to a Domenici amendment addressing the safe drinking water. 
The Domenici amendment would have suspended several promulgated 
drinking water standards and prevented EPA from issuing new standards 
until reauthorization of the act. The Chafee-Lautenberg amendment 
called for a study of the whole act; extended the deadline for radon in 
drinking water regulations; and reduced the requirement for monitoring 
small systems from 4 times every 3 years to just once.
  Mr. President, that invoked quite a considerable savings to these 
small communities. The small communities were quite anxious to comply. 
But, again, it is a matter of economics. Oftentimes, the costs 
associated with complying with the various regulations of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act is as big as their whole budget for law enforcement, 
and their whole budget for health care in their community. Therefore, 
we have to be very cautious as we mandate these regulations down on 
these small communities. That is what we are doing now as we are 
working on our rewrite for this year of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
  In early 1993, President Clinton proposed a major new initiative to 
establish State revolving loan funds, called SRFs, to help communities 
comply with drinking water standards, modeled after a similar loan 
program under the Clean Water Act, and authorized the $600 million in 
fiscal year 1993, and $1 billion per year in fiscal year 1994 and 
fiscal year 1997.
  Last year, the Energy and Commerce and Public Works Committees in the 
House reported legislation authorizing drinking water loan funds. The 
HUD appropriations bill for fiscal year 1994 reserved $600 million for 
the drinking water loan funds pending enactment of legislation 
authorizing the funds.
  The HUD bill also extends the deadline for issuing the radon drinking 
water standard until the end of 1994 for the reauthorization of the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, or whichever occurs first.
  In September 1993, EPA issued a major report to Congress on the 
drinking water program. The report views the key elements of the 
program, and includes 10 major recommendations for changes to the act. 
On October 14, 1993, Senator Baucus introduced comprehensive 
legislation to amend the Safe Drinking Water Act, S. 1547. The bill 
authorizes the State loan fund--that is the new feature--and makes 
significant changes to the regulatory provisions of the previous act. 
The Environment and Public Works Committee held a hearing on the act 
and proposed legislation in October of last year, 1993.
  Drinking water issues, the Chairman's marks: A few comments on that.
  Drinking water systems and States argue costs of meeting drinking 
water standards is an unfunded Federal mandate. While the Clean Water 
Act provided funds to help communities meet clean water goals, the 
Drinking Water Act never included funding for meeting drinking water 
standards.
  Current law provides for grants to States to manage the program. The 
fiscal year 1993 appropriations for State grants is $60 million. States 
argue that this is far less than they need to run the program. The EPA 
estimates that States need an additional $162 million to cover program 
costs. The chairman's mark authorizes an SRF for drinking water at $600 
million for 1994 and $1 billion for fiscal year 1995 through the turn 
of the century--2000.
  States may use a percentage of the SRF to pay for program costs--50 
percent in 1995, 100 percent in 1996 through 1998, and 50 percent in 
1999.
  If the State lacks adequate funding, EPA may withdraw delegation of 
the program and have authority to impose a Federal drinking water fee 
to pay the cost of the program. In addition, the authorization level 
for the PWSS grants is increased from $40 million to $100 million.
  Let us talk about the small systems, Mr. President. Many small 
systems face very high user charges when complying with the drinking 
water regulations because of the limited economies of scale. These 
systems argue that they need financial help to keep costs down, or 
authority to reduce expected treatment.
  In addition, small systems argue that they are unable to afford or 
manage the monitoring requirements of the act. The chairman's mark 
directs EPA to develop small-system best-available technology. Any 
system serving under 3,300 persons is eligible for a variance if--I 
repeat if--in addition, small systems argue they are unable to afford 
or manage the monitoring requirements of the act. The chairman's mark 
directs EPA to develop small-system best-available technology.
  Any system serving under 3,300 persons is eligible for a variance if 
it cannot afford to comply with current regulations through 
conventional treatment system restructuring or finding an alternative 
source of water. This determination is made by the State.
  Mr. President, I am going to digress from the comments I have on the 
Safe Drinking Water Act to a second subject. I worked on it this week, 
together with 43 other Senators on this side of the aisle.
  Today, all 44 Republican Senators are sending to the President of the 
United States the following letter:

       Dear Mr. President: 
       We are writing regarding negotiations that the 
     administration has entered into on the future of the ABM 
     Treaty and the potential impact that any resultant agreement 
     might have on U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) programs.
       Over the last several years, the Senate has taken a very 
     active role in promoting the resolution of this issue. The 
     Missile Defense Act of 1991--

  A piece of legislation which I and several others had a hand in 
drawing up

     as amended, directs the executive branch to clarify the 
     distinctions between permitted TMD systems and precluded ABM 
     systems. During the Senate's consideration of the fiscal year 
     1994 defense authorization bill, this issue was again debated 
     at length. The Senate subsequently adopted a congressional 
     finding, now codified in law, section 234 (a) (7), of PL 103-
     160, that states that the ABM Treaty does not apply to the 
     TMD systems unless such systems are ``tested against or have 
     demonstrated capabilities to counter modern strategic 
     ballistic missiles.''
       As you know, there is an emerging consensus in the Senate 
     that any agreement to substantively modify the ABM Treaty 
     should be submitted by the administration for Senate advise 
     and consent. We agree with this view and look forward to 
     reviewing the final agreements on ABM Treaty succession and 
     TMD demarcation.
       To date we have been encouraged by the administration's 
     handling of the TMD demarcation issue. The U.S. proposal 
     tabled at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in 
     November 1993--that any TMD system not tested against a 
     ballistic missile target with a maximum speed in excess of 5 
     km/sec be deemed compliant with the ABM Teaty--was an 
     important and positive step. We believe that this proposal is 
     consistent with the ``demonstrated standard'' contained in 
     last year's Congressional finding would not constrain 
     currently planned U.S. TMD development or deployment efforts.
       As a new round of discussions in the SCC begins, we urge 
     you to adhere to the ``demonstrated standard.'' In this 
     regard, we are particularly concerned by the reported Russian 
     counter-proposal to add constraints on TMD interceptor and 
     sensor characteristics. This would undermine the 
     ``demonstrated standard'' and likely preclude several 
     promising U.S. TMD efforts. By so precluding a class of TMD 
     systems, the U.S. would assume new legal obligations under 
     the AMB Treaty--constraints that were not envisioned or 
     intended when the treaty was ratified. It is unlikely that we 
     would be able to support any such agreement.
       At a time when the ballistic missile threat is dramatically 
     expanding--as highlighted by the news that North Korea is 
     developing three new standard-range ballistic missiles--we 
     should do everything possible to maximize the capabilities of 
     our TMD programs.
       The administration has done an excellent job in formulating 
     the TMD demarcation issue to date. We respectfully urge you 
     to stay the course and resist efforts to erode the position.
  Signed by myself, Senator Thurmond, ranking member of the Armed 
Services Committee, and 42--all of our Republican colleagues.
  I am quite certain that, given the opportunity, there are many 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle that would likewise be in 
support of our position.
  I would like to amplify our position. I would like to go back just 
for a personal recollection, Mr. President.
  During the course of the gulf war, I and many colleagues here made 
trips to the gulf theater of operations, and I remember one trip very 
vividly. I was accompanied this time by the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Nunn, Senator Inouye, and Senator Stevens. 
The four of us constituted a codel of the then leadership of the 
Appropriations Subcommittee over which the Presiding Officer is the 
chairman, the Acting President of the Senate, and the Senate Armed 
Services Committee chairman, Mr. Nunn, and myself. We visited the gulf 
theater of operations and felt it very important that we, on our return 
leg home, visit Israel.
  The people of Israel had shown remarkable courage during the gulf war 
in many ways not the least of which to withstand repeated attacks by 
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military, repeated Scud missile attacks. 
These weapons were fired indiscriminately--indiscriminately--at the 
helpless, innocent people of Israel. There was no military reason for 
firing those missiles. It was pure politics. It was an act of 
terrorism.
  That night, when we arrived in Israel, we were taken to the office of 
the Defense Minister where we immediately proceeded to have an indepth 
meeting respecting our report of the mission to the gulf operations, 
our visit with General Schwarzkopf and his commanders.
  We made it very clear on behalf of the Senate, on behalf of the 
Congress, on behalf of the President and the people of the United 
States how much we admired the courage of the people of Israel and its 
leadership in their forbearance from striking back against Iraq.
  Had Israel taken an active military role in that operation, there 
would have been, in all likelihood, complications with respect to the 
very fragile coalition of forces put together by the President and 
other leaders of the Western World and, indeed, other gulf states, Arab 
nations in putting together an extraordinarily able, competent, 
fighting force to repel the Iraqi invaders.
  During the course of our meeting at the Defense Ministry, we were 
advised that a Scud had been launched at Tel Aviv. I remember so well 
the calmness with which the Defense Minister and all present received 
that news and the careful manner in which they proceeded to take 
precautions in the Defense Ministry and the fact that all televisions 
in Tel Aviv suddenly switched from their programming that evening to a 
repetition of what they played many times before; namely, instructions 
as to how to handle gas masks, how to deal with children, and other 
precautions such that they could hopefully survive this terrorist 
attack of a Scud missile.
  The Defense Minister knew exactly, almost to the second, as to 
whether there would be impact from that missile. They could not predict 
where in Tel Aviv it would fall, but they knew basically the timing, 
and in due course we did hear a very clear and loud and sensed the 
impact of the incoming missile.
  We resumed our meeting, and the next day the delegation went out to 
view the area of impact and give our condolences to the people in the 
region who had suffered certain loss--of damage and other losses. It 
was a tragic situation, but it was a remarkable hour for the people of 
Israel to show that strength, to take and endure those terrorists 
attacks and to not take an active role of intervention.
  Mr. President, that evening left an indelible recollection in this 
Senator's mind, as it did my three colleagues. It is for that reason 
that I, along with many others, have taken a great interest in seeing 
that the United States of America takes every step we can to research 
and develop systems to protect our troops, to protect our allies, 
troops of our allies, to protect others against these short-range 
intermediate theater missiles. And under the leadership of President 
Clinton and the Defense Department and other departments, we are doing 
that.

  Nevertheless, this group of 44 colleagues became concerned that we 
should give the President our best advice, that we did not want the 
current rounds of consultation through the SCC in any way to inhibit 
this country as we proceed with the research and development and 
upgrading.
  For instance, we are in an upgrade with the Patriot system, the only 
system we had at that time to defend against these missiles, a system 
that we quickly sent to Israel and which effectively, in many 
instances, prevented greater damage from Scuds in Israel.
  The system was effective in protecting some of our troops; 
regrettably not all. The largest number of casualties from a weapons 
system in that Gulf operation resulted from the Scud attacks.
  So, Mr. President, today I address the Senate about an important 
letter, as I said, sent to the President of the United States on the 
relationship between theater missiles defense systems and antiballistic 
missiles, the ABM treaty.
  Currently, there is no agreed-upon understanding of what defines a 
strategic defense system, to which the limits of the ABM Treaty apply, 
and what defines a theater ballistic defense, not subject to the 
treaty. The reason for this lack of understanding is that at the time 
the treaty was negotiated in the early 1970's, the drafters did not 
anticipate a threat from theater ballistic missiles. Such systems were 
not even on the drawing board.
  In other words, people were not, at the time of the negotiation of 
the ABM Treaty, envisioning the advancement of weaponry to where we had 
these short range systems. Therefore, the drafters of the treaty, the 
signatories to the treaty--and, incidentally Mr. President, if I may 
say, I was present in Moscow. I was a part of the delegation to the 
signing of the ABM Treaty, as well as SALT I. I was then privileged to 
serve as Secretary of the Navy and had been part of the delegation for 
the purpose of signing the Incidents at Sea agreement, an agreement 
which I negotiated and executed on behalf of the United States in May 
1972, the day before the signing of the ABM Treaty.
  But my point is that the ABM was never envisioned to cover the short 
range theater ballistic systems. Therefore, as we begin to look through 
how this ABM should be revised, it should not apply in any way to 
America's ability to proceed to protect our own interest against future 
attacks by these short range systems.

  Until the definitional problem is resolved, we cannot proceed with 
the development of an effective, treaty-complaint theater missile 
defense.
  Mr. President, as the United States engages in a new round of 
negotiations to clarify the intent of the ABM treaty, all 44 
signatories to this letter propose a reasonable solution to this 
problem. The solution we advocate maintains the integrity of the ABM 
treaty while insuring the development of an effective defense against 
theater ballistic missiles. It is the administration's current 
position, and we simply ask that this position not be changed during 
the negotiations.
  Mr. President, allow me to begin with some background. We all 
remember the Persian Gulf war. During the war, our Patriot system was 
the premier defense against Iraqi Scud missile attacks--attacks which 
terrorized our forces and our close friend Israel. The Patriot system 
was not designed to defend against missiles, but the Iraqi Scuds were 
not very well advanced in technology, and this Patriot system had a 
measure of effectiveness. Thus, the Patriot proved successful at 
intercepting a number of the Scud missiles fired upon the Allied forces 
in the Gulf and to help the people of Israel.
  In the future, we will not have this luxury--that is perhaps because 
of the advancement in missiles technology, we will not have a system; 
certainly the Patriot cannot keep up in many respects with the advanced 
technology of the missiles--and, therefore, we must be better prepared, 
and that requires intensive research and development of advanced 
systems to deter and defend against these missiles.
  Our Nation's most immediate concern is with the proliferation of 
advanced weapons, including modern theater ballistic missiles. The 
threat from such missiles is real and growing, with more and more 
countries capable of launching them. The recent announcement by James 
Woolsey, the director of Central Intelligence, that North Korea is 
developing several variants of medium range missiles--the No-Dong 1, 
the Taepo Dong 1, and the Taepo Dong 2--capable of striking all of 
South Korea, the Japanese mainland, and perhaps as far south as 
Southeast Asia--is simply the latest reminder of the seriousness of 
this threat, and the proliferation of these weapons. And now we know 
that North Korea is selling these weapons to buyers throughout the 
world.
  The theater missile threat is not simply a conventional threat. These 
missiles can carry nuclear, chemical, or biological explosives, thus 
significantly increasing the danger faced by our troops.
  Now I have been present at meetings in the White House when President 
Clinton has spoken about this problem. He understands this problem very 
clearly, Mr. President. I say to my colleagues, he understands the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, he understands their 
delivery systems.
  I commend the President and his administration for having taken a 
position on this prior to the opening of these talks on the ABM Treaty. 
He has called it the most serious security threat facing America today, 
and I agree with the President. As legislators, we are compelled to do 
everything in our power to protect American, allied, and friendly 
nations against attack from such missiles.

  In order to develop the best possible defense against theater 
ballistic missiles, the United States, Russia, and other potential 
successor states to the Aanti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty must agree 
upon precisely what constitutes a theater ballistic missile. As we are 
all aware, the ABM Treaty places a limit of 100 on the number of ABM 
interceptors each side can possess and limits the location of these 
interceptors to a single site on the signatories' territory. The treaty 
does not apply to theater missile defenses. Unfortunately, the treaty 
does not clearly define the difference between a strategic missile, to 
which its provisions would apply, and a theater missile, to which its 
provisions would not apply.
  It is clear, Mr. President, that because there is no agreed upon 
demarcation line between theater and strategic missiles among the 
signatories, we have no way of knowing for sure whether or not a 
theater ballistic missile defense program is compliant with the ABM 
Treaty. At first glance, the common sense solution would seem to be 
range, but let me address that issue. A strategic missile is a missile 
that can travel say 5,000 miles and a theater missile is one that can 
travel far less. However, an interceptor that can take out a missile 
traveling 2,000 miles can also take out a missile traveling 5,000 
miles. Conceivably, a country could manufacture hundreds or thousands 
of interceptors capable of intercepting strategic missiles, declare 
them theater missile defense interceptors, and thereby claim compliance 
with the ABM Treaty. Clearly, range is not a workable criteria.
  In order to deal with this difficult definitional problem, Congress 
last year passed an amendment to the fiscal year 1994 defense 
authorization bill, which expressed the sense of the Congress that a 
theater missile defense system is compliant with the ABM Treaty unless 
it has a demonstrated capability against strategic ballistic missiles. 
After extensive consultation within the administration, between the 
administration and Congress, and with outside experts, the 
administration very wisely--this is the Clinton administration--adopted 
a concrete proposal, consistent with the overall guidance provided by 
Congress, which stated that a theater ballistic missile defense is 
compliant with the ABM Treaty if--and I ask my colleagues to listen 
carefully--if it can destroy an incoming missile traveling no faster 
than 5 kilometers per second. That is the criteria. In effect, any 
missile traveling faster is deemed a strategic missile and any missile 
traveling slower is deemed a theater missile.
  There are practical reasons why this formula makes sense. In general, 
missiles that travel farther must travel faster to achieve the 
distance; missiles that travel shorter distances travel slower to limit 
the distance traveled. Overcoming this fact of physics requires an 
increase in missile complexity and in missile cost that no country has 
been willing to pay. All modern strategic missiles travel much faster 
than 5 km/sec, while all current and foreseeable theater missiles 
travel 5 km/sec or less. Thus, for the time being a 5 km/sec standard 
is a reasonable one. The Clinton administration devised this formula, 
and it is the correct one. We hope that the administration does not 
agree to Russian counterproposals to further constrain the performance 
characteristics of theater missile defense systems.

  Mr. President, the bottom line is this. Adopting the 5 km/sec 
standard will allow the United States to proceed with development of an 
effective theater missile defense. The integrity of the ABM Treaty will 
be preserved, our forward-deployed troops will be better protected in 
the future, and our tax dollars will be spent more wisely.
  Mr. President, every Republican Senator has signed my letter, and 
thus this letter stakes out a clear Republican position on the issue of 
theater missile defense. For years, the Republicans have advocated the 
development of an effective national and theater defense against the 
threat of ballistic missile attack. We continue to do so today with 
this letter, and we look forward to reviewing the final outcome of the 
current negotiations.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that this brief statement explains a 
complicated but important letter. By remaining faithful to the 5 km/sec 
demarcation line, we can be sure that we can build the best possible 
theater missile defense systems to protect our troops, allies, and 
friendly nations from any foreseeable theater missile threat. We should 
do no less.

                          ____________________