[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 34 (Wednesday, March 23, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: March 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
AID TO PAKISTAN
Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, the Clinton administration has
announced that it wishes to lift the restriction on aid to Pakistan on
a one-time basis and deliver F-16 aircraft to that country. As my
colleagues may know, such aid is now prohibited under the so-called
Pressler amendment, a law which says that Pakistan cannot receive
military or certain other forms of aid so long as the President fails
to certify that the country does not have a nuclear explosive device.
I am very much opposed to the Clinton administration's proposal
because I think it will both increase nuclear proliferation and
escalate the arms race in that part of the world. India will respond by
seeking additional fighter aircraft.
I find it very strange that an administration committed to nuclear
nonproliferation would seek to achieve that goal by delivering aircraft
that can deliver a nuclear bomb to another country.
I am strongly opposed to the Clinton administration's plan. I hope
the administration reverses itself. I think we need to reflect very
carefully on the history of this amendment. It was passed in the mid-
1980's with the support of Pakistan. At that time Pakistan said they
did not have a nuclear bomb nor were they developing such a weapon. In
the early 1990's, President Bush was unable to certify that Pakistan
did not have a nuclear weapon, and aid--including the sale of military
weapons--was cut off. Any renewal of assistance, including a one-time
exemption, would require congressional approval.
I could perhaps see some logic if the administration were going to
substitute renewal of some other kind of aid in exchange for Pakistan
putting a cap on its nuclear weapons. However, make no mistake. I would
seriously question even that type of approach. Unfortunately, all the
administration seems to be seeking from Pakistan is an agreement not to
build any more nuclear weapons. In exchange, Pakistan gets the F-16's
with which they can deliver a nuclear bomb against India.
This would be disastrous for a region that has already endured
numerous wars and conflicts. It would mean increased proliferation of
both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in that
region of the world. In addition it would set an extremely bad
precedent.
Our CIA has said--and this has been published in the newspapers--that
the existence of the Pressler amendment has played a role in causing
Egypt, South Africa, and Brazil to abandon their nuclear weapons
programs due to the consequences in Washington. This is the only law
that exists on nuclear nonproliferation that has any teeth. If Congress
were to repeal the Pressler amendment--even by granting a so-called
one-time waiver--it would send a very encouraging signal to every other
nation contemplating a nuclear weapons program.
It appears President Clinton and Vice President Gore have not focused
on this issue. I say this because the administration's new proposal
runs contrary to everything they said in their campaign. It astounds me
that this administration, at least the Departments of State, Defense,
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is proposing to make this
change.
I believe this process is to a great extent being driven by a desire
on the part of the manufacturer to keep the production line hot and
build more F-16's. I understand there are strong arguments for creating
employment opportunities for people in various parts of the country.
However, there are other much cheaper ways to achieve this goal without
destabilizing entire regions of the world and encouraging the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to place additional material
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, March 8, 1994.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I would like to request five minutes at
your earliest convenience to discuss nuclear non-
proliferation policy.
Despite repeated assurances from members of your
Administration, including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, I have
heard from several sources within the Administration about an
attempt to grant an exception to the Pressler amendment. As
you may recall, the Pressler amendment prohibits aid to
Pakistan unless the President certifies annually that
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.
Mr. President, I seek a meeting with you to underscore the
importance of retaining the only nuclear non-proliferation
law in force currently. I would appreciate having a meeting
of no more than five minutes, which can occur in your office,
or during a morning run. Should such a meeting prove
impossible to schedule, I will raise this issue the next time
I am at the White House, or if you should visit the Senate.
While I would rather not raise this issue in such a public
setting, I think it is critical for the Administration to
send a consistent signal about the importance of nuclear non-
proliferation.
Sincerely,
Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senator.
____
[From The New York Times, Mar. 23, 1994]
South Asian Lands Pressed on Arms
(By Michael R. Gordon)
Washington, March 22.--Worried about an arms race between
Pakistan and India, the Clinton Administration is proposing a
series of agreements to stop the production of nuclear
weapons in South Asia and the deployment of ballistic
missiles, Administration officials said today.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott plans to press the
arms control efforts when he visits India and Pakistan next
month, the officials said.
While American officials have long been concerned about the
nuclear programs of Pakistan and India, Washington's arms
control efforts have acquired a new urgency because of
advances in the two sides' nuclear and missile programs.
According to American intelligence reports, India will soon
field new surface-to-surface missiles and Pakistan is also
developing a new missile with help from China.
Opposition on Capitol Hill
But a key element of the Administration's plan could face
stiff opposition on Capitol Hill. As an opening move, the
Administration is offering to deliver to Pakistan F-16' jet
fighters that have been blocked by Congressional legislation,
if Pakistan agrees in return to accept a verifiable ban on
production of nuclear material for nuclear weapons. When the
White House raised that idea on Capitol Hill recently it met
with a mixed reception.
And all experts agree that negotiating the accord would
require overcoming difficult political issues in both
Pakistan and India, particularly in light of Washington's
currently strained relations with New Delhi.
The Administration's effort also comes as Pakistan and
India have continued to differ over Kashmir and are
proceeding with weapons programs, including the development
of missiles.
``India and Pakistan have the ability to move rather
quickly to deploy nuclear weapons and are moving fast to
deploy longer-range missiles,'' said Lynn E. Davis, Under
Secretary of State for International Security Affairs.
proposals by the United States
Washington is proposing several steps to restrain the arms
race. One is an agreement by India and Pakistan banning the
deployment of surface-to-surface missiles, which would give
each side the ability to launch nuclear strikes rapidly.
Another is a set of separate proposals to Pakistan and
India that they agree to stop producing nuclear material for
nuclear weapons and agree to international inspections to
determine that they are keeping their pledge.
That would still leave the two countries with small nuclear
arsenals, but officials say that ``capping'' each side's
nuclear potential is a far more realistic step than trying to
immediately negotiate the elimination of each side's nuclear
weapons stocks, which would, however, would remain the
ultimate goal.
The Administration also wants to establish a multinational
forum to consider ways to build confidence between the two
sides and reduce tensions.
incentives for arms curbs
To persuade India and Pakistan to agree to ban the
production of bombgrade materials for nuclear weapons, the
Clinton Administration is offering various incentives.
In the case of Pakistan the administration is offering to
deliver weapons Islamabad purchased but never received
because of the Congressional restrictions on aid to Pakistan,
including F-16 fighters and P-3 anti-submarine warfare
planes.
Legislation sponsored by Senator Larry Pressler, the South
Dakota Republican, and adopted in 1985 bans military aid to
Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan does
not possess nuclear weapons, Because of advances in the
Pakistani nuclear program, the White House has been unable to
make that certification for the last four years.
Administration officials say the Pakistani military wants
the F-16's because its Air Force's planes are getting older.
But experts say that letting international inspectors visit
will be a difficult political hurdle for the Pakistani
Government.
The Clinton Administration is calculating that Congress
will support a ``one-time'' exception to the Pressler
amendment if an agreement can be reached with Islamabad that
would ban the production of nuclear material.
Whether lawmakers would agree is unclear. Senator Pressler
has expressed alarm at the proposal. But Representative Lee
H. Hamilton, the Indiana Democrat who heads the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, has argued that the Pressler amendment has
failed to slow the Pakistani program and should be replaced
with a broader strategy.
____
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1994]
The United States Proposes Sale of F-16's To Pakistan
(By R. Jeffrey Smith)
The Clinton administration wants to give Pakistan new F-16
fighter planes in exchange for proof that the country has
capped its nuclear weapons program, Undersecretary of State
Lynn E. Davis said yesterday.
The proposal would require U.S. lawmakers to take the
politically difficult step of exempting the F-16 warplanes
from a congressional ban on U.S. weapons sales to Pakistan
that took effect in 1990 after the country built its own
nuclear bomb.
Some arms control experts and congressional aides have
raised questions about the plan, saying it could effectively
reward Pakistan for flouting U.S. warnings not to develop
nuclear weaponry and also may wind up provoking India to
purchase more advanced weapons of its own to offset the
Pakistani warplane purchase.
But the Clinton administration is portraying the proposed
$658 million sale of 38 F-16s to Pakistan as a first step in
a new diplomatic strategy aimed to getting around the long-
standing nuclear stalemate between India and Pakistan. U.S.
officials worry that the two arch-enemies might soon deploy
new ballistic missiles capable of hurling nuclear warheads at
each other.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott plans to present
the new U.S. plan to Islamabad and New Delhi during a two-day
visit to each city next month, Davis told reporters at a
breakfast meeting.
``The basic premise is that you have to have something
worthwhile for the Pakistanis to pursue this,'' a State
Department official said on condition he not be named. ``You
have to start out with something'' that eases Pakistan's
military anxieties and improves its ability to compete with
superior Indian forces.
Davis and other U.S. officials said that under the new
strategy, Pakistan would get the new warplanes only if it
accepts international inspections of key nuclear facilities,
proving to India and other nations it is no longer making
highly enriched uranium for nuclear arms.
India would then be asked to accept similar inspections at
nuclear reactors capable of making plutonium for nuclear
arms.
These moves, officials said, are meant to defuse tensions
growing out of mutual suspicion about nuclear weapons
development programs. Proving that both nations have halted
production would be ``a first step toward the reduction and
elimination'' of these weapons at a later date, Davis said.
Additionally, both India and Pakistan will be asked to take
part in new regional security discussions involving all five
declared nuclear powers as well as Japan and Germany.
They also will be asked to sign a ban on nuclear tests and
an agreement barring any ballistic missile deployments. But
the proposed warplane sale to Pakistan--which has been
aggressively promoted in Washington by the F-16's
manufacturer, General Dynamics Corp.--would not be
conditioned on these promises, just the nuclear inspections.
Officials said the strategy reflects an administration
decision that its policy of low-visibility, patient diplomacy
in the Asian subcontinent has not made enough headway. They
said Washington has chosen to pursue a higher-profile effort
to try to fend off potential deployments of the new Indian
and Pakistani missiles later this year.
Washington is not considering offering India any reward
such as F-16s to gain its participation, and some officials
predicted that Talbott will encounter significant resistance
there. ``Maybe they think they can get it for free, because
we are not aware of any programs [such as the F-16] for
India,'' said an Indian diplomat.
Said Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), the sponsor of the
legislation that blocked military sales to Pakistan: ``I feel
very strongly it would be a mistake to * * * have a one-time
lifting of the amendment.''
Several arms control experts who criticized the proposal
noted that last March when lawmakers asked Gordon Oehler, the
CIA's top expert on proliferation matters, which weapons
systems Pakistan might use to deliver its nuclear weapons,
Oehler replied, ``Our best judgment right now would be the F-
16s.''
But a senior U.S. official said that in response to
congressional criticism, ``we will find ways to verify'' that
the F-16s are not modified for that purpose. The official
added that as of now, ``we're not sure how'' this might be
accomplished.
____
[From the Washington Times, Mar. 23, 1994]
Pakistan Nuke Cap Might Win Arms
The Clinton administration wants Pakistan to cap its
nuclear weapons program in exchange for a one-time exemption
from the congressional ban on U.S. military aid,
Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis said yesterday.
If Pakistan accepts the deal, the administration will ask
Congress to lift the Pressler Amendment and allow the
delivery of F-16 fighters that Pakistan purchased from the
United States, she said.
Delivery was held up by the 1985 congressional dictum that
blocks all but humanitarian aid unless the U.S. government
can certify Pakistan is not producing a nuclear bomb,
something U.S. officials have been unable to do since 1990.
Miss Davis told a breakfast meeting of reporters that
getting Pakistan to cap its nuclear program is part of an
effort to stem nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
The proposal is for a one-time exception to the military
aid ban with the goal of getting Pakistan to cap production
of atomic materiel in a manner that could be verified, said
Miss Davis, who heads the administration's nonproliferation
efforts as undersecretary for international security affairs.
Pakistan and India are longtime rivals that have advanced
nuclear programs. U.S. officials are concerned about long-
standing friction between the two neighbors, and they hope to
get Pakistan to take a first step to calm the situation.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is traveling to
Pakistan and India next month and will discuss the issue with
both countries, officials said.
Administration officials say the ban on military aid has
failed to keep Pakistan from attaining nuclear capability and
that a new approach is needed to halt the growth of regional
nuclear programs and roll them back.
The plan would not require Pakistan to abandon its nuclear
program, but simply not to move beyond current production.
U.S. officials see the F-16s, for which Pakistan has paid,
as a carrot that could advance the policy.
Miss Davis said State Department officials are sounding out
Congress to see whether there would be support if Pakistan
agreed to the plan. They received some positive response.
But Sen. Larry Pressler, South Dakota Republican and author
of the 1985 legislation, opposes the administration's
proposal.
President Clinton has told the United Nations that stemming
the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a top priority.
____
The Reuter Transcript Report--Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing, March 23, 1994
Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD). Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and this question is related to nuclear non-
proliferation. It ties into Russia in the end, but it--I have
been concerned, and I saw in this morning's paper that you,
Mr. Talbott, will be leading the delegation to India and
Pakistan regarding a one-time lifting of the prohibition on
aid there to deliver the F-16s to Pakistan. And I can
appreciate very much your desire to try to open more talks up
there, but I think that is a--that is a very bad first step.
The secretary of state and you both pledged here that you
would not attempt to repeal that amendment, but--the
secretary of state did in particular--but I view a one-time
exemption to it to deliver the F-16s would be--would gut the
amendment and would leave us in a situation that we'd be much
worse off. And I might ask for your response to that.
But let me say that it seems contrary to the positions
President Clinton and Al Gore have taken on non-proliferation
because the--according to what's been published in this
morning's paper, that our intelligence people have said that
the F-16 would be the delivery vehicle for a bomb if Pakistan
were to use its bomb. And it seems passing strange to me that
if the administration is going to offer something, some
exemption, it wouldn't be some area of aid or something or
this sort rather than the F-16s.
Somebody has been very determined to get the F-16s
delivered, whether it's the state of Texas or General
Dynamics or Lockheed or whoever. I certainly don't see any
conspiracy here, but for some time now there have been--
maneuvering around to get the rest of them built and
delivered and paid for. But I think that this would increase
the arms race in that region, it would not really do
anything--
This amendment is the only piece of non-proliferation
legislation that has ever made it into law, and it seems
passing strange that the Clinton-Gore administration would
seek to essentially gut this with this effort.
If there were going to be something to be negotiated,
perhaps it could be aid. I'm not suggesting that that would
be acceptable. But the whole thing seems out of context with
the things that you stand for in non-proliferation with
Russia and so forth. What is going on here?
Mr. Talbott. Well, Senator Pressler, let me try to put it
as much into context as I can. And I do this acutely aware
that this is a subject that you and I have talked about for
the past month or so in connection with my own courtesy call
on you and, I believe, in open session as well.
I assure you that gutting either the Pressler amendment or
our non-proliferation agenda is exactly the opposite of what
the administration has in mind here--in fact, quite the
contrary. We see the Pressler amendment, which I stress will
remain in force, which will remain very much a part of
American law, as an important and positive instrument to use
in accomplishing our non-proliferation goals for the Indian
subcontinent.
When I came--I hope it's all right for me to try to
summarize one exchange between the two of us when I came and
spoke to you in your office. And I've--I appreciated your
being able to see me that day. You made clear that you do not
see the Pressler amendment as an anti-Pakistan measure or
directed against Pakistan per se, you see it as a means of
advancing the goal of non-proliferation, and that's the way
we see it, too. Our intention here would be to use the
leverage that we have because of your amendment in order to
try to achieve a verifiable cap on Pakistan's nuclear weapons
material production, in return for which we would seek
approval by Congress for some relief for Pakistan from some
legislative sanctions. And that would include the F-16s that
Pakistan has already paid for.
I am just beginning now, Senator Pressler, to prepare for
my trip to the subcontinent, and if you would permit and if
your schedule allows it, I would like very much to come by at
some point in the next week or so and talk to you about this
in detail. Obviously, there are several features of this
which will be feasible only if we have the necessary support
from the United States Congress. This is a classic example of
where we need to work in partnership with each other.
Senator Pressler. Well, let me say that I think that--it--
it's--well, it's been the opinion of our intelligence people,
it's been printed in the papers that Egypt, Brazil, and South
Africa all backed off their nuclear programs in part because
of fears of trouble from Washington as--as a result of this
amendment, that it's had a broader impact than just there.
Also, it was not an anti-Pakistan thing at the beginning;
indeed, Pakistan supported it strongly in this room when Alan
Cranston had another amendment that would have cut aid off
immediately, and they said ``We're not building a
bomb anyways,'' And this was the mid-1980s, and in the
early 1990s the Bush administration certified that they
did have a bomb in violation of it. So it didn't start off
to be an anti-Pakistan thing, but I think it has slowed
the arms race down in that region.
But it seems the logic of saying that since Pakistan still
has its bomb and the amendment has not been effective, the
logic of delivering F-16s, a delivery vehicle for the bomb,
in some sort of a settlement, it seems very ironic. If the
administration were proposing a one-time lifting of aid or
something of that sort, it would be more consistent with this
administration's stated non-proliferation of both
conventional weapons and--and nuclear weapons. The whole
thing seems to be delivered by a great desire to build the
remaining F-16s, get them paid for and delivered than it does
anything else. And that concerns me a great deal, because I
can't follow the logic of how delivering a nuclear weapons
delivery vehicle to a country that has a bomb is going to
somehow slow the arms race down there. That is my logic.
Mr. Talbott. I'm reluctant to get too deeply into this both
because of the sensitivity of the issue and also because I am
beginning now preparations for this trip. But I'm sure that
the last point that you make is very much on--I know that the
last point that you make is very much on the minds of my
colleagues: that is, looking for some way to ensure that we
don't inadvertently create new problems in terms of delivery
systems in the way that we address the problem of nuclear
weapons per se.
But I do assure you that the motive is one of high policy,
and the policy is one that you clearly support, and that is
trying to bring about a verifiable and comprehensive non-
proliferation regime on the subcontinent. But if you would
permit me to come and talk to you about this, I would be
grateful.
Senator Pressler. Okay, fine. Let me ask about the--about
Russia's sale of conventional arms or arms of any sort. How
much hard currency are they making from it, and are they
increasing or decreasing their sales?
Mr. Talbott. The short answer is that they are--they have
decreased their sales significantly from the Soviet period.
Nonetheless, Russian arms sales remain a subject of intense
and sometimes difficult discussion with them and will for a
long time to come. The dilemma is the following.
During the Soviet period in the Cold War, Russia--the
Soviet Union--used conventional arms sales as an instrument
of its foreign policy, which is to say, an instrument of its
political and ideological struggle with the United States. It
was--they were pieces that they played on the board of the
zero-sum game in the rivalry with the United States. That is,
they went out of their way to arm our enemies, as it were.
That is no longer the driving motivation. The motivation
now is that Russia is trying desperately to make hard
currency in any way it can. It doesn't have a great deal that
it can sell in international markets, but it does--has
inherited from the Soviet Union a considerable arms industry.
Our effort--and it's going to take time to accomplish it--
is to do two things: first of all, defense conversion so that
plants which are now making weapons will make items for the
civilian sector--and I know that that was a subject that
Secretary Perry raised when he was in Moscow--and the other
is to get Russia in as many ways as possible to adopt
responsible export control policies.
____________________