[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 30 (Thursday, March 17, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 17, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       SENATOR SHELBY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I am here today to issue a report 
following my investigation into the possible presence of chemical and 
biological weapons agents in the theater of operations during the 
Persian Gulf war. Additionally, I will discuss the possible connection 
between service in the Persian Gulf and the unexplained illness 
affecting thousands of veterans and their families.
  When Iraqi forces, at the direction of Saddam Hussein, crossed into 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990, they set off a chain reaction of events that 
resulted in the assembling of the largest coalition of forces since the 
Second World War. Countries that had been on opposite sides of the cold 
war were now joined with the expressed goal of driving Saddam Hussein's 
troops out of Kuwait.
  The United States led this effort with over 600,000 members of our 
armed services, including over 200,000 reservists.
  At the time of the Iraqi invasion, there was a strong belief among 
the coalition forces that chemical and even biological agents would be 
used as weapons by Iraq.
  Within a year after the highly successful Desert Storm operation, 
reports surfaced of a mystery illness affecting many veterans, 
primarily members of the National Guard and Reserve, who served in 
Saudi Arabia.
  This group is experiencing symptoms commonplace to many known 
illnesses. However, in the case of the Gulf War veterans, we have not 
been able to diagnose the causes of the illnesses and the illnesses 
themselves have not responded to any known treatments.
  I have seen firsthand the devastating, frustrating, and debilitating 
effects that this illness has had on many of these veterans. Citizens 
who were once healthy and able bodied can no longer hold jobs or 
participate as active members of society.
  Little progress has been made even though Congress mandated the 
establishment of a Desert Shield-Desert Storm registry, and treatment 
centers were created for the Gulf war syndrome. Veterans, increasingly 
frustrated by the inability of the Department of Veterans Affairs to 
treat their illness, began to seek treatment outside of the Department 
of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs medical community.
  My involvement in this issue has spanned 2 years.
  Early on, I met with a group of veterans after a town meeting that I 
held and pledged that I would do everything in my power to get them 
proper treatment and to find the causes of their ailments.
  The anxiety and fear experienced by our ill veterans was intensified 
throughout this period by constant reports in foreign and domestic 
media about the presence of chemical weapons agents during the Gulf 
war.
  I cannot imagine a greater fear than that experienced by someone who 
suffers from a mysterious illness and believes it may have been caused 
by exposure to chemical weapons.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I heard from afflicted veterans 
and saw first-hand the symptoms of these ailments.
  Following this hearing, Dr. Charles Jackson of the Tuskegee Alabama 
Veterans Medical Center diagnosed a patient as suffering from Gulf war 
syndrome and chemical-biological warfare exposure. In response to this 
announcement and pressure from Congress, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs established a pilot program to test Persian Gulf veterans for 
possible exposure to chemical weapons agents.
  As a result of these events, Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services, sent me, along with people on our staff 
and the people from DOD, to Europe and then to the Middle East to 
investigate the possible presence of chemical and biological weapon 
agents during Operation Desert Storm, as well as the possible 
connection between service in the Persian Gulf and the unexplained 
illness affecting thousands of veterans.
  Mr. President, I went to Europe to determine the validity of the two 
then reported detections of chemical warfare agents by Czech soldiers. 
Instead, there were not only two, but five separate detections of 
chemical weapons agents in the Persian Gulf.
  No one with whom I spoke could provide a solution to the mysterious 
illness; however, they could not rule out a possible link between the 
presence of chemical agents and the gulf war syndrome. Only the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the British Government have denied that 
chemical agents could have caused the illness.

  In light of my involvement, I have come to five major conclusions 
which I would like to share with you today.
  First, I have no doubt that chemical agents, accurately verified by 
the Czech chemical detection units, were present in the theater of 
operations during the Persian Gulf war.
  Both Czech and French forces detected and verified the presence of 
nerve and mustard agents at low levels during Desert Storm.
  Second, we may never be able to determine the origin of these 
chemical agents. While, I believe that we can rule out Iraqi Scud or 
Frog missiles, and Iraqi artillery, there still exists several 
possibilities. For example, the low-level chemical presence could have 
resulted from United States or coalition forces bombing Iraqi chemical 
weapons facilities or caches of Iraqi weapons on the Saudi border.
  It is also feasible that a cloud of nerve agent, dissipating in 
intensity, could have traveled under the correct climate conditions. 
There is also the possibility of a training accident involving chemical 
agents among coalition forces. Finally, it is possible that the 
detections were the result of Saudi officials attempting to test the 
abilities of the Czechs whom they had engaged to assist in chemical 
detections.
  Third, although a direct connection between the existence of low-
levels of chemical agents in the theater of operations and the Persian 
Gulf syndrome cannot be established at this time, such a connection 
cannot and should not be discounted. Little information is available on 
exposure to low levels of chemical agents, but I believe that the work 
being done at Walter Reed Army Medical Center is on the right track in 
this area. We must give it our full support.
  Fourth, the Department of Defense has proven reluctant to pursue or, 
in certain instances, to provide the information necessary to prove or 
disapprove allegations about the presence of chemical agents in the 
theater of operations. After my contact with our allies, we found that 
various chemical detections were reported to central command 
headquarters and were included in operational logs. Only then, and 
after traveling half-way around the world, did Department of Defense 
officials admit that they had been aware of these same instances.
  While I have not yet determined the reason for this apparent aversion 
to full disclosure by DOD, the staff working on this issue from our 
committee has been constantly challenged by the Department's 
evasiveness, inconsistency, and reluctance to work toward a common goal 
here.
  Finally, Mr. President, and I believe alarmingly, the Persian Gulf 
medical records of members of the 24th Naval Reserve Battalion are 
inexplicably missing from their files.
  Mr. President, despite the Czech and French detections and numerous 
reports, the Department of Defense is still reluctant to admit that 
there were chemical weapons agents present in the Persian Gulf. I 
cannot understand why they have taken this stand since we fully 
expected to be confronted with chemical weapons when we went there.
  I can only conclude, Mr. President, that when dealing with the 
Department of Defense on this issue, you have to ask the right question 
to receive the right answer. I do not believe they understand that we 
are only seeking the truth in a way to help our veterans. Therefore, I 
am going to continue to ask question after question until we find the 
right answer from DOD.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, following my remarks, 
first, a copy of my letter to Sam Nunn, chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services, be printed in the Record; second, a copy of my interim 
report provided in December to Senators Nunn and Thurmond be printed in 
the Record; third, a copy of my report on my trip to the Middle East to 
continue the investigation into the Persian Gulf syndrome; and, fourth, 
my conclusions and recommendations in detail on the Persian Gulf 
syndrome be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                   Washington, DC, March 16, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am enclosing a full report of our 
     investigation of the issues related to the possible presence 
     of chemical and biological weapons agents in the theater of 
     operations during Desert Storm and the possible connection 
     between service in the Persian Gulf and the unexplained 
     illness affecting thousands of veterans. This report 
     includes:
       Tab A: Interim report of European trip to investigate the 
     Persian Gulf War Syndrome.
       Tab B: Report of Middle East trip to continue the 
     investigation into the Persian Gulf War Syndrome.
       Tab C: Conclusions and Recommendations.
       Tab D: Floor Statement regarding the our investigation of 
     the Persian Gulf Syndrome on behalf of the Committee on Armed 
     Services.
       Iraq entered the conflict with a demonstrated chemical 
     weapons capability--having used chemical weapons 
     indiscriminately during the Iran-Iraq War, not only against 
     the Iranians, but also against the Iraqi Kurds. Iraq was also 
     suspected of developing a biological weapons capability, most 
     likely antrax and botulism. As the coalition formed to fight 
     Iraq's aggression, Suddam Hussein made inflamatory statements 
     implying that he was willing to use these weapons to defeat 
     the coalition by inflicting mass casualties.
       With this knowledge and Saddam Hussein's threatening 
     statements, the coalition forces strongly believed that Iraq 
     would use chemical and biological weapons should there be a 
     war. An array of defensive measures were adopted including an 
     air campaign against all known chemical and biological 
     weapons sites intended to disrupt Iraq's ability to use its 
     chemical and biological weapons arsenal and signal to 
     Iraqi military leaders that it would be in their interest 
     to disobey any orders from Saddam Hussein to use chemical 
     and biological weapons. Additionally, U.S. officials 
     repeatedly made statements that the use of chemical and 
     biological weapons would be taken very seriously.
       While the threat of the use of chemical or biological 
     weapons against the coalition forces was prevalent throughout 
     the conflict, we received no indication from the Department 
     of Defense that during or in the aftermath of the Persian 
     Gulf conflict Iraqi forces used either chemical or biological 
     warfare agents or that Coalition forces discovered any stocks 
     of chemical or biological warfare agents.
       Within a year after the highly successful Desert Storm 
     operation, reports surfaced of a mystery illness affecting 
     many veterans of the war. Symptoms included: joint pain, 
     fatigue, headaches, decreased short-term memory, rashes, 
     painful burning muscles, sleep disorders and diarrhea. While 
     individually these manifestations are common to many 
     illnesses, these particular series of ailments did not 
     respond to any known treatments.
       The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 
     required the establishment of a registry of all U.S. armed 
     forces in the theater of operations during Operation Desert 
     Storm who may have been exposed to fumes from burning oil 
     well fires. Despite the establishment of this registry and 
     the registry established by the Veterans Affairs Committee of 
     all participants in both Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
     little progress has been made on either the causes or the 
     treatment of this mysterious illness. As a result, veterans 
     have been seeking treatment outside of the Department of 
     Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs medical community.
       As the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements 
     and Personnel, I conducted a hearing on June 30, 1993, on 
     military medical health care. I included a panel of Gulf War 
     veterans consisting of Congressman Stephen Buyer of Indiana; 
     Army Staff Sergeant Kerry Riegel; Petty Officer Sterling 
     Sims, a member of the 24th Construction Battalion of the 
     Naval Reserves; and Sergeant Willie Hicks, a member of the 
     644th Ordinance Company of the Alabama Army National Guard.
       Just days before, a leading U.S. newspaper published a 
     report that U.S. forces may have been exposed to chemical 
     warfare agents during the Desert Storm. In testimony, both 
     Petty Officer Sterling Sims and Sergeant Willie Hicks spoke 
     in great detail about their possible exposure to chemical 
     attacks.
       On July 2, 1993, The Czech News Agency reported that 
     Czechoslovakian military units detected chemical warfare 
     agents, both nerve gas and mustard agent, in the Saudi 
     theater of operations during the opening days of the air war 
     against Iraq. G-series nerve gas was found by a Czech 
     chemical detection unit attached to Saudi troops in the 
     area of Hafar-Al-Batin on January 19, 1991. Mustard agent 
     was found in a 20200 centimeter patch in the desert north 
     of King Khalid Military City on January 24, 1991. A report 
     of these detections was forwarded to the Department of 
     Defense by the Czech government.
       This announcement by the Czech News Agency led to a series 
     of meetings with Department of Defense officials, including 
     Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch. While Department of 
     Defense officials maintained that they had no evidence of any 
     chemical weapons attacks by Iraq during the Gulf War, the 
     Department of Defense could not confirm or deny the presence 
     of chemical warfare agents at low levels in the theater of 
     operations.
       It was in response to these events that you authorized my 
     travel to the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and France 
     during the period of November 28 through December 5, 1993 and 
     to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Israel and Morocco from 
     January 3 to January 15, 1994. I was accompanied by Dr. Edwin 
     Dorn, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
     Readiness, on the first leg of this investigation. Major 
     General Ronald Blanck, Commander of Walter Reed Army Medical 
     Center, traveled with me on both legs of this journey.
       In preparation for the trips, I, and members of my personal 
     staff and the Committee on Armed Services staff received a 
     briefing by Department of Defense officials. Upon our return, 
     I tasked my personal staff and the SASC staff to meet again 
     with Department of Defense officials in an attempt to answer 
     questions and inconsistencies which arose as a result of 
     information learned from these trips.
       The following report provides details of my contacts with 
     high-level representatives of the Coalition forces, several 
     inescapable conclusions, and a floor statement addressing 
     this issue.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Richard Shelby.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                                   Washington, DC.
     Memorandum to Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond.
     From: Senator Shelby.
     CC: Senator Coats.
     Subject: Report on trip to investigate ``Persian Gulf 
         syndrome.''
       The following is a report on my trip to investigate issues 
     related to the possible presence of chemical/biological 
     weapons agents in the theater of operations during the 
     Persian Gulf War, and any possible connection between service 
     in the Persian Gulf War and the illness among U.S. veterans 
     referred to as the Persian Gulf Syndrome. The trip included 
     visits to Prague, Czech Republic; London, England; and Paris, 
     France.
       Members of the Codel included two members of my personal 
     staff, who serve as S. Res. to the SASC (Terry Lynch and Tom 
     Young) and four members of the SASC staff with 
     responsibilities in the area of manpower, personnel and 
     chemical/biological defense (Charles Abell, Monica Chavez, 
     P.T. Henry, and Frank Norton).
       Additionally, the Codel included representatives from DOD 
     (Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Ed 
     Dorn, Major General Ron Blanck, Commander, Walter Reed Army 
     Medical Center and Colonel John Speigel, military assistant 
     to ASD Dorn).
       Although the trip was productive, our investigation is 
     incomplete. I believe a trip to the Middle East to meet with 
     our coalition allies stationed in the areas in question is 
     necessary to resolve key questions about the possible 
     presence of chemical agents in the theater of operations and 
     the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome.
       The following is a summary of what the Codel learned during 
     its trip.


                    rhein main airport, west germany

       Enroute to Prague, the Codel had a layover in Frankfurt, 
     West Germany during which the Codel met with the Deputy Chief 
     of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) and representatives from the 
     Headquarters of the US Army Europe (USAREUR), and received a 
     briefing on the military and civilian draw down in Europe. 
     During the briefing, the USAREUR representatives provided 
     their assessment of possible chemical weapons use/employment 
     during the Persian Gulf War.
       The USAREUR representatives offered the following 
     information:
       On January 19, 1991, a Czech chemical unit detected G-
     series nerve agents in two locations on January 19 in 
     concentrations which were militarily insignificant. U.S. 
     chemical reconnaissance troops were called in to verify the 
     detection and were unable to detect any agent at either of 
     the two locations.
       On January 24, 1991, a Czech chemical unit detected mustard 
     agent in a wet sand patch, measuring 2 meters by sixty 
     centimeters, two kilometers north of King Khalid Military 
     City (KKMC). (Note: Other sources would place this detection 
     10 kilometers north of KKMC.)
       On January 17, 1991, the U.S. bombed a chemical weapons 
     munitions storage site at An Nasiryah, located 200 kilometers 
     from the Saudi-Iraq border. The U.S. does not believe this 
     action was the cause of the January 19 detection of nerve 
     agent by the Czech chemical unit.
       The USAREUR representatives believe that the Saudis had an 
     underground chemical training facility in the vicinity of the 
     ``wet spot,'' which could account for the small amounts of 
     chemical agents detected.
       The USAREUR representatives also believe that the chemicals 
     detected may have been a part of an attempt on the part of 
     the Saudis to test the capabilities of the Czech chemical 
     units. The briefers did not offer any information on where 
     the Saudis would have gotten the chemical weapons agents.


                         prague, czechoslovakia

       While in Prague, the Codel met with members of the Czech 
     chemical unit that served in the Persian Gulf: Colonel Kozak, 
     Chief of the Chemical Troops; Lieutenant Colonel Smehlik, 
     Senior Chemical officer in the Persian Gulf; Major Zilinsky 
     and Captain Ferus, leaders of the Czech chemical units in the 
     Persian Gulf during the operations.
       The following is a summary of what was learned in the 
     discussions with the members of the Czech chemical unit:
       The Czechs initially had 169 members in their chemical 
     detection unit that deployed to the Persian Gulf. That number 
     subsequently increased to approximately 190. These 
     forces included chemical, medical, and other support 
     personnel. The Czech chemical unit was under contract to 
     the Saudi government to provide chemical weapons/agent 
     detection to the Saudi government during the Persian Gulf 
     War.
       On January 19, 1991, Czech chemical units, that were 
     working with 4th and 20th Saudi brigades and were separated 
     by approximately 20 kilometers, made three nearly 
     simultaneous detections of a low concentration of G-series 
     nerve agent in the air. The Czechs consider the three nearly 
     simultaneous detections to be ``one'' event. The Czechs 
     indicated that the detections took place in the late 
     afternoon and that the event lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
     The Czechs determined that, at ground level at the time of 
     the event, the wind was blowing from the northwest. The 
     Department of Defense had previously advised the Committee 
     that the prevailing winds were blowing northeastward.
       The Czechs took air samples from two of the three 
     locations, and verified the contents of the air samples in 
     their mobile laboratory to contain G-series nerve agent. The 
     Czechs were not able to distinguish between sarin or soman. 
     LTC Smehlik indicated, however, that they had excluded V-
     series agents. These air samples were sent back to then 
     Czechoslovakia, and are no longer available, as they have 
     been used up. An air sample from the third location was not 
     taken for the purpose of verification because the Czech 
     chemical unit was moving at the time of the alarm.
       Note: In the U.S., G-series nerve agents Sarin and Tabun 
     are considered to be nonpersistent, evaporating at the same 
     rate as water. VX, a persistent nerve agent, evaporates much 
     more slowly, and spills of liquid VX can persist for a long 
     time under average weather conditions.
       Captain Ferus, a leader of one of the Czech chemical units, 
     informed us that on January 24, 1991, he was summoned by 
     Saudi officials to an area 10 kilometers north of KKMC. His 
     unit was accompanied to the area by Saudi soldiers, where he 
     was asked to check the area for chemical agents. His unit 
     detected mustard agent in the sand. No sample was taken 
     because the presence of mustard agent was confirmed on the 
     spot using a portable laboratory kit.
       LTC Smehlik informed the Codel that he had recently learned 
     that there had been another detection of mustard agent in the 
     air near the Engineer School in KKMC 2-3 days prior to the 
     detection on January 24, LTC Smehlik indicated that an air 
     sample was taken, verified by the mobile laboratory, and 
     forwarded to Czechoslovakia. This sequence of events was 
     confirmed for the Codel by the Czech warrant officer who 
     reported the actual detection.
       The Czechs believe both detections of mustard agent to have 
     been at levels that presented no danger to the health and 
     safety of the troops in the area, and were, therefore, 
     militarily insignificant.
       Colonel Kozak informed the group that Czech units did not 
     have any chemical agents in the Persian Gulf and they did not 
     use live agents during their training with the Saudis.
       The chemical detection equipment used by the Czechs 
     consisted of Czech and Russian equipment of 1970's and 1980's 
     vintage, yet, according to the Czechs, has a much lower 
     threshold level for detection of chemical agents than does 
     U.S. chemical detection equipment. The equipment used by the 
     Czechs includes the GSP-11, a chemical agent detector/alarm 
     which provides continuous monitoring capability; the portable 
     CHP-71, a chemical analyzer used as a backup for the GSP-11; 
     a portable laboratory which uses a litmus paper detection 
     method, as well as other wet chemical analysis; and a mobile 
     laboratory. We were told by the Czechs that the U.S. had 
     arranged to examine the above mentioned equipment and that 
     the equipment would be shipped to Edgewood Arsenal for 
     testing.
       During the conduct of discussions with representatives of 
     the Czech military, several events were mentioned which were 
     anecdotal in nature and based on hearsay. There is no 
     documentary evidence of these matters. Nonetheless, I believe 
     they merit further consideration.
       LTC Smehlik claimed that an air sample of the mustard agent 
     detected in the air in KKMC prior to January 24, 1991, was 
     given to a U.S. special forces member. In subsequent 
     discussions with the Codel staff, Smehlik indicated that the 
     individual in question could also have been an intelligence 
     specialist.
       LTC Smehlik also mentioned that he had heard the Egyptians 
     had detected mustard agent in the air in the vicinity of 
     KKMC. Representatives of the French military offered the same 
     thoughts on Egyptian detections.


                             great britain

       The Codel met with Dr. Graham Pearson, Director General, 
     Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment; Mr. Brian 
     Pitts, Surgeon General's Office; Ms. Jill Ferguson; LTC John 
     Esmonde-White, and Colonel Christopher Box.
       There were approximately 42,000 British soldiers who served 
     in the Persian Gulf War. The representatives of the British 
     government the Codel met were not very helpful.
       They do not believe that the Czech units detected 
     the presence of any chemical weapons, nerve or mustard 
     agents, in the Persian Gulf. They spent a considerable 
     amount of effort attempting to find plausible means of 
     discrediting the Czech reports.
       The British government does not recognize the possibility 
     of any connection between service in the Persian Gulf and any 
     illness that cannot be explained by conventional medical 
     diagnosis. The British have about 30 veterans from the 
     Persian Gulf with medical problems. These medical conditions 
     are not considered peculiar to their service in the Persian 
     Gulf. British citizens have, however, set up a Persian Gulf 
     Families Hot Line, located in Glouchester, England, that 
     serves as a clearing house for those who believe they have 
     illnesses related to their service in the Persian Gulf. I met 
     with Mr. Raymond Donn, a solicitor from Manchester, England, 
     who is in the process of filing a class action suit against 
     the British government to obtain compensation for these 
     veterans. Mr. Donn informed me that there could be as many as 
     500 sick British veterans.
       The British government does not recognize Multiple Chemical 
     Toxicity/Sensitivity as a valid concept. Additionally, the 
     representatives with whom the Codel met believe the Persian 
     Gulf Syndrome is the result of American veterans attempting 
     to increase their medical and disability benefits. The Codel 
     was advised that the United States did not have to invent a 
     new environmental disease to explain the symptoms being 
     experienced by American veterans.


                             paris, france

       While in Paris, the Codel met with Lieutenant Colonel 
     Gerrard Emile Ferrand, a French Army infantry officer who 
     served in the Persian Gulf. The French had about 12,000 
     personnel in the Gulf.
       Colonel Ferrand informed the Codel that the French had 
     detected nerve and mustard agent at a Logistics Facility 
     approximately 26 or 27 kilometers south of KKMC on the 
     evening of January 24th or January 25th. He indicated that 
     the wind at ground level had been from the north--from Iraq. 
     French chemical alarms were activated at two locations 
     approximately 100 meters apart. Colonel Ferrand, who arrived 
     at the location about 30 minutes after the initial alarm, 
     indicated that litmus badges on the protective suits worn by 
     French troops registered the presence of mustard agent. They 
     contacted a Czech chemical unit and asked it to conduct tests 
     to verify presence of the chemical agents. The Czech chemical 
     unit arrived about 2 hours later, confirmed the presence of a 
     mustard agent and a nerve agent--either Soman or Tabun--and 
     decontaminated the area.
       Colonel Ferrand also noted that, about 2 or 3 days 
     later the French chemical alarms were again activated in 
     the same area. At this time, the wind had shifted and was 
     from the south. The French were unable to determine what 
     chemical agent was present. They again asked the Czech 
     chemical units for assistance, but none responded.
       Colonel Ferrand reported both these events to the French 
     command located at Riyadh. Colonel Ferrand believes these 
     reports were forwarded to CENTCOM headquarters.
       Members of the Codel also met with representatives of the 
     French military medical community including Major General 
     Lauric, head of the French Military Medical Service. The 
     French have no empirical evidence on which to base a 
     connection between service in the Persian Gulf and any 
     illness that cannot be explained by conventional diagnosis. 
     The French veterans were all volunteers from the Rapid 
     Reaction Corps and the French Foreign Legion. As such, these 
     individuals had spent considerable time in Africa and other 
     areas which would have exposed them to hostile environmental 
     influences, and, perhaps, made them less susceptible to 
     environmental factors in the Persian Gulf. The French are, 
     however, monitoring the medical conditions of their veterans.
       (Note: In discussions with the members of the Czech 
     chemical defense unit, they did not mention any contact with 
     the French concerning a detection of either or both nerve 
     agent or mustard agent. The French had no knowledge of the 
     Czech chemical agent detections.)


                  questions that remain to be answered

       (1). Did any of the coalition allies serving in the Persian 
     Gulf have chemical weapons in the theater of operations or 
     conduct chemical weapons training using live agents or 
     simulants?
       (2). Did representatives of any of the coalition allies 
     receive any air samples from the Czechs while in the Gulf? 
     Specifically, did a US Special Forces soldier or Intelligence 
     Community member receive an air sample from the Czech 
     chemical defense unit?
       (3). Did any member of the allied coalition receive 
     reports, other than the report of the January 19 event, from 
     any coalition partner of a detection of chemical agents 
     including any reports of chemical agents at a level 
     considered to be militarily insignificant and no threat to 
     the safety or health of U.S. troops, or other coalition 
     personnel?
       (4). What were the true weather (wind) conditions during 
     the period in question. There is a discrepancy regarding the 
     reported wind directions during the time the various 
     detections were made.


                             recommendation

       1. In order to complete the investigation of possible 
     presence of chemical/biological agents in the Persian Gulf 
     and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome, it is 
     necessary for me to visit with members of the allied 
     coalition and meet with the appropriate representatives of 
     their foreign and defense ministries. Coalition allies 
     stationed in the area in question includes Morocco, Syria, 
     Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, it would be useful to 
     meet with appropriate defense and intelligence community 
     representatives from Israel regarding any information they 
     might have about the possible use of chemical weapons. I 
     believe it would be in the Committee's interest for me to 
     travel to the Middle East for this purpose during the first 
     two weeks of January 1994.
       2. Prior to my travelling to the Middle East, the 
     Department of Defense should provide maps to the Committee 
     showing the locations of battalion-level and above units 
     during the period from January 17, 1991, through February 1, 
     1991. Additionally, the Department of Defense should provide 
     maps showing the dates, times, and locations of all bombings 
     of chemical production or storage facilities and ammunition 
     storage areas.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                Washington, DC, February 28, 1994.
     Memorandum Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond.
     From: Senator Shelby.
     CC: Senator Coats.
     Subject: Report on trip to Middle East to continue the 
         investigation into the Persian Gulf syndrome.
       Upon the completion of my trip in December to 
     Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and France to investigate 
     issues related to the possible presence of chemical/
     biological weapons agents in the theater of operations during 
     the Persian Gulf War, and any possible connection between 
     service in the Persian Gulf War and the illness among U.S. 
     veterans referred to as the Persian Gulf Syndrome, I informed 
     you that I believed the investigation would not be complete 
     without meeting with other coalition allies stationed in the 
     theater of operations. On January 3-15, I travelled to 
     Riyadh, King Khalid Military City, and Jubail, Saudi Arabia, 
     Damascus, Syria; Cairo, Egypt; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, 
     Israel; and Rabat, Morocco to continue my investigation into 
     this matter.
       Members of the Codel included two members of my personal 
     staff who serve as S. Res.' to the SASC (Terry Lynch and Tom 
     Young), four members of the SASC staff with responsibilities 
     in the areas of manpower, personnel and chemical/biological 
     defense (Charles Abell, Monica Chavez, P.T. Henry and Frank 
     Norton), and a representative from the Department of Defense 
     (Major General Ron Blanck, Commander, Walter Reed Army 
     Medical Center).
       I believe the investigation of this issue has been 
     productive and is complete, to the extent that the Congress 
     can conclude the investigation. This report summarizes our 
     meetings and discussions in the Middle East and North Africa 
     with coalition allies on the possible presence of chemical 
     agents in the theater of operations and the possible causes 
     of the Persian Gulf Syndrome.


                    riyadh and jubail, saudi arabia

       On January 4-6, we visited Riyadh, King Khalid Military 
     City (KKMC) and Jubail, Saudi Arabia and met with several 
     high ranking members of the Saudi Arabian military, and 
     civilian representatives of the firms located in the 
     Jubail industrial region.

                                 Riyadh

       Major General Nazir Abd-Al Azziz al-Arfaj, Director of 
     Military Intelligence and Security, advised the Codel that, 
     on January 19 and 24, the dates when very low levels of nerve 
     agent and mustard agent were detected and verified by the 
     Czech chemical units, the Czechs reported this to the Saudi 
     Arabian military. In the absence of any evidence of a 
     delivery vehicle (missile, bomb, etc.), the Saudi's 
     determined that these low levels did not pose a threat to the 
     public health or to animals. He provided the following 
     additional information:
       To date, no Saudi military personnel or civilians have 
     complained of illnesses that can be attributed to service in 
     the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War.
       The Saudi Arabian government has no evidence of the use of 
     biological agents during the Persian Gulf War, although the 
     United Nations subsequently discovered evidence of research 
     and development on biological agents.
       On January 24, 1991, the French reported a possible 
     chemical agent detection to the Saudis (the ``wet spot'' 
     north of KKMC) who then contacted the Czech chemical defense 
     unit. The Czechs detected and verified the presence of 
     mustard agent on the ground. This incident was reported by 
     the Saudis to CENTCOM Headquarters. U.S. personnel were sent 
     to the area in question but were unable to detect a chemical 
     agent.
       Saudi intelligence had no information to offer regarding 
     the possible source of the low-level chemicals.
       When the wet spot was located (later determined by the 
     Czech chemical defense unit to be mustard agent), the Saudi 
     troops did not don chemical defense gear.
       The Saudis do not believe the symptoms suffered by the U.S. 
     soldiers are a result of exposure to chemical weapons. Major 
     General Nazir Abd-al Azziz al-Arfaj indicated that the Saudis 
     did not have chemical agents or simulants and did not know if 
     the other Coalition forces had chemical agents in the 
     theater. It is possible that the Egyptians and Syrians could 
     have had chemical agents/weapons, but the Saudi military 
     personnel do not have offensive chemical weapons in the area 
     and did not conduct defensive chemical weapons training. He 
     did, however, believe the reports of the Czech and French 
     detections.
       With regard to assistance from the Chinese, Major General 
     Nazir Abd-Al Azziz al-Arfaj indicated that, while the Saudis 
     have a relationship with the Chinese government because of 
     the CSS-2 missiles, the Chinese Military had no liaison in 
     the theater of operation during the Persian Gulf War.
       General Mohammed Saleh al Hammad, Chief of Staff, Minister 
     of Defense Education, had very little to offer regarding the 
     subject of the Codel's inquiry. He expressed confidence in 
     the reliability of the Czech and French detections. When 
     asked about from where the nerve agent and mustard agent 
     could have come, he stated that he had no idea. He 
     speculated, however, that they could have come from either 
     friendly or aggressor forces. He also speculated that perhaps 
     the U.S. military brought it.

                    King Khalid Military City (KKMC)

       On January 6, the Codel flew to King Khalid Military City, 
     where mustard agent had been detected in two locations. The 
     Codel met with Major General Al Alhami, Northern Area 
     Commander, who commanded KKMC during the Persian Gulf War.
       General Al Alhami indicated that, during the war, he 
     received no evidence of any detections of chemical agents nor 
     of any medical problems that could be viewed as ``unusual.'' 
     He indicated that, every time the Iraqis fired SCUDs, all 
     troops donned MOPP chemical protective gear (MOPP gear 
     includes a full body suit and mask with hood). Additionally, 
     he had no recollection of the French reporting their 
     detection of mustard agent to the KKMC Headquarters.
       He has no knowledge of the Saudis, U.S. or Syrians, or any 
     other Coalition forces, having chemical agents/weapons with 
     their forces during the Persian Gulf War.

                        Jubail Industrial Center

       Also on January 6, the Codel travelled to the Jubail 
     Industrial Center to discuss the possibility of industrial 
     chemical releases during the Persian Gulf War. The Codel met 
     with Mr. Terry Velanzano of the Jubail Planning Group and a 
     number of officials from the various civilian industrial 
     concerns located at Jubail. Most of those with whom the Codel 
     met were present at Jubail during the War.
       The industrialists advised the Codel that there were no 
     instances in which industrial chemicals were released either 
     intentionally or unintentionally during the periods of time 
     when coalition forces were located in the Jubail region. They 
     specifically denied the intentional release of chemicals from 
     pressurized systems in response to warnings of SCUD attacks.
       The industrialists also advised the Codel that there were 
     no and are no instances of medical ailments among the Jubail 
     work force and their families that could be construed as 
     ``unusual'' or in any way linked to chemical agents during 
     the War.


                            damascus, syria

       In Damascus, the Codel met with Major General Mohmend 
     Zughaybi, Chief of Medical Services, Ministry of Defense; 
     General Yaff, Director, Shrian Hospital; Mr. Assan, Assistant 
     Director; and Mr. Amur, Director, Department of Americas, 
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Nejdi Jazzar, Assistant 
     Secretary for American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
       The Chief of Medical Services initially emphasized that he 
     had no knowledge of Syrian chemical agents, weapons, their 
     capabilities or of a Syrian chemical defense program. 
     However, toward the end of the meeting, he responded 
     affirmatively that Syrian troops conducted chemical defense 
     training, but do not use chemical agents/weapons or simulants 
     in that training. He later told the Codel that Syrian 
     chemical defense equipment was of Eastern European origin. He 
     indicated that the Syrians did not conduct any chemical 
     defense exercises training in the theater of operation using 
     chemical agents or chemical simulants.
       General Zughaybi indicated that Syrian troops were 
     stationed near Hafir al Batin. He remarked that U.S. troops 
     panicked when the chemical alarms went off. He also indicated 
     that, when the Syrian troops responded to the chemical 
     alarms, they only put on masks, not protective suits.
       He advised the Codel that, to his knowledge, the Syrians 
     were not aware of any coalition allies having chemical 
     weapons in the theater of operation, and that, although other 
     Arab countries have chemical weapons, he did not think Syria 
     has chemical weapons.
       General Zughaybi was not aware of the Egyptians or Saudis 
     being informed of chemical agent detections, or whether they 
     complained that they were not informed.
       The diseases suffered by the Syrian military personnel who 
     participated in the Persian Gulf War are similar to symptoms 
     of illnesses that occur in peacetime.
       General Zughaybi asked General Blanck whether the diagnosis 
     was PTS (post traumatic stress), or psychological. General 
     Blanck replied that he believed it was organic. Additionally, 
     General Zughaybi added that he did not know about the long 
     term effects of exposure to chemical agents--or rather, the 
     occupance of symptoms long after exposure to low levels of 
     chemical agents. He did add, however, that Syrian military 
     personnel have different psychological mindset to the desert. 
     The underlying inference to be drawn is that, in his opinion, 
     the Persian Gulf Syndrome may in fact be psychological in 
     origin.


                              cairo, egypt

       On January 9, the Codel traveled to Cairo, Egypt. While in 
     Cairo, the Codel received a country team briefing from U.S. 
     Embassy personnel. Senator Shelby met with President Mubarak.
       On January 10, the Codel met with Lieutenant General Salah 
     Halaby, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces, and his staff. 
     General Halaby advised the Codel that Egypt had its own 
     chemical defense unit, which was very good, but he had no 
     recollection that they had detected any chemical agents 
     during the Persian Gulf War.
       General Halaby indicated that Egypt's chemical defense 
     equipment is from Eastern Europe and from the West, and that 
     their detection equipment is more sophisticated than the 
     Czech equipment. The Egyptians use an American chemical agent 
     alarm (the M-1) and a Russian chemical agent detector (the 
     bulb and probe). The Egyptians also use chemical agent 
     detection strips. He further indicated that the Egyptian 
     chemical defense unit took air samples every day and night to 
     check for changes.
       He suggested that the chemicals detected were not chemical 
     warfare agents, but industrial chemicals or substances used 
     in the construction and structure of the A-10 aircraft. (An 
     A-10 crashed near KKMC during the time frame when the KKMC 
     detections were made). He did not believe the aircraft 
     carried chemical weapons or chemical agents.
       General Halaby and his staff commented that Egypt has no 
     chemical weapons, only chemical defense equipment (protective 
     gear). He said that, although Egyptian troops conduct 
     chemical defense training, they do not use chemical 
     stimulants in their training other than tear gas. General 
     Halaby was not aware of the Syrians having had chemical 
     agents/weapons in the theater. He was certain that no Iraqi 
     aircraft or artillery (which could have been used to deliver 
     chemical agents) had crossed the border.
       He asked whether the illnesses suffered by the U.S. troops 
     resulted from their exposure to depleted uranium.
       The Egyptian troops were located approximately 6 miles 
     north of the French troops in KKMC. At one point, General 
     Halaby said they were not aware of the detection of chemical 
     agent by the Czech chemical defense unit, but later in the 
     interview, he acknowledged that they were aware of the 
     detections but did not verify any chemical agents or 
     equipment. General Halaby commented that he knew that 
     chemical agent alarms could be tripped off by cigarette 
     smoke. He suggested that the French and Czech detections 
     could have been false alarms because the atmosphere was so 
     full of petrochemical smoke.

                           President Mubarak

       President Mubarak acknowledged that Egypt has some chemical 
     weapons. He speculated that perhaps the chemical agents about 
     which the Codel was concerned came from Iran. He then 
     discussed with Senator Shelby general foreign policy issues 
     related to U.S. relations with Egypt, the peace process 
     between Israel and Syria, as well as Egypt's relations with 
     Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.


                           jerusalem, israel

       In Jerusalem, the Codel met with an intelligence officer of 
     the Israeli Defense Force. He indicated that he was aware of 
     chemical agents being used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, 
     and did not understand why they were not used in the Gulf 
     War. He believed that it was very significant that no 
     chemical weapons or delivery systems were found in theater 
     following the war. He surmised that there had been no 
     preparation for their use or they were withdrawn prior to D-
     Day.
       The Israeli Officer indicated that he did not believe the 
     Iraqis had a chemical weapons project underway but cautioned 
     that they could restart one at any moment.
       The Israeli Officer also noted that the symptoms of the 
     Persian Gulf Illness did not fit any of the symptoms 
     traditionally associated with exposure to chemical agents. He 
     offered that, perhaps, the United States should focus some 
     attention on biological agents. He was convinced that the 
     Iraqis had a small biological weapons capability but 
     indicated that no biological weapons or delivery systems had 
     been found.
       He indicated that the Israelis believed the Czech chemical 
     units to be very proficient and that their equipment is very 
     good. He noted, however, the prevalence of false alarms.
       He suggested that we study the symptoms of those exposed to 
     chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War and that we discuss 
     the Persian Gulf Syndrome with Iranian doctors.
       Contrary to information provided to the Codel in other 
     countries, the Israeli Officer indicated that all the 
     Coalition forces, especially Egypt and Syria use chemical 
     agent simulants in their training.


                             rabat, morocco

       On January 13, the Codel traveled to Rabat, Morocco. In 
     preparation for our meetings with Moroccan government 
     officials, the U.S. Embassy conducted a country team briefing 
     and informed us that during the Persian Gulf War, Morocco and 
     Saudi Arabia had a bilateral agreement which placed Moroccan 
     military personnel under the authority of the Saudi military. 
     Morocco sent a motorized infantry unit from the Western 
     Sahara to the vicinity a petrochemical facility north of 
     Jubail about 50 kilometers from the Kuwait border.
       In Rabat, the Codel met with Colonel Major Mohamed 
     Beuboumaudi, Inspector, Military Health Services. He 
     indicated that no Moroccan military personnel saw any 
     chemical weapons or equipment. He mentioned that, on one 
     occasion, his troops went to check the location in which an 
     artillery shell exploded for chemical agent. There were no 
     indications of any chemical agents present.
       The Moroccan troops did not experience any illnesses 
     symptomatic of exposure to chemical agents. Additionally, he 
     pointed out that Moroccan troops were acclimated to service 
     in the desert. The inference here being the possible 
     psychological or environmental origin of the Persian Gulf 
     Syndrome.
       With regard to the origin of Moroccan military chemical 
     defense equipment, he indicated that they used chemical 
     detection badges and gas masks provided by the Saudi 
     military. He noted that Morocco was a signatory of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (CC).
       In response to questions regarding the presence of chemical 
     agents or weapons in the theater of operations, and knowledge 
     as to whether coalition allies possessed chemical weapons or 
     agents, Colonel Major Beudoumaudi provided negative 
     responses. He indicated that he was not aware of Moroccan 
     troops participating in chemical defense training with 
     simulants during the Persian Gulf War.
       The Codel also met with deputy minister of foreign affairs, 
     who reiterated the comments made by Colonel Major Beudoumaudi 
     regarding the Morocco military personnel's not being aware of 
     the presence of chemical weapons/agent in the theater of 
     operations and not having any knowledge of other coalition 
     allies in possession of chemical weapons/agent in the theater 
     of operation.
                                  ____


      Conclusions and Recommendations on the Persian Gulf Syndrome

       After numerous Congressional hearings, after many meetings 
     with official of the Department of Defense and Department of 
     Veterans officials and after two trips abroad I have come to 
     the following conclusions regarding the possible presence of 
     chemical/biological weapons agents in the theater of 
     operations during the Persian Gulf War, and possible 
     connection between service in the Persian Gulf War and the 
     illness among U.S. veterans referred to as the Persian Gulf 
     Syndrome.
       1. Chemical agents were present in the theater of 
     operations during the Persian Gulf War. These chemical agents 
     were accurately verified by the Czech Chemical Units and 
     reported to CENTCOM Headquarters.
       On this vital issue I have no doubt. Czech and French 
     forces detected both nerve gas and mustard agent at low 
     levels during the early days of Desert Storm. In each 
     instance these chemical agents were verified by Czech 
     equipment. The Codel had the opportunity to view this 
     equipment and received a demonstration. Department of Defense 
     officials have informed us that the Czech detection 
     equipment, which is more sensitive than U.S. equipment, is 
     more than adequate and that Czech personnel are well trained.
       2. The origin of these chemical agents cannot be 
     determined.
       Although I have also concluded that we may never be able to 
     determine the origin of these chemical agents there are 
     several plausible scenarios. I believe that we can rule out 
     Iraqi Scud or Frog missiles. We can also rule out Iraqi 
     artillery--the distance from the Iraqi border is too far. The 
     presence of low-level chemical weapons agents could have 
     resulted from U.S. or coalition forces bombing either Iraqi 
     chemical weapons facilities or caches of Iraqi weapons on the 
     Saudi border. Hafar-Al-Batin is approximately 100 miles from 
     the Saudi/Iraqi border. A cloud of nerve agent, dissipating 
     in intensity, could possibly have traveled under the correct 
     climate conditions to Hafar-Al-Batin. There is also the 
     possibility of an accident involving chemical agents among 
     coalition forces. Finally, it has been offered that these 
     detections, especially those in Hafar-Al-Batin and the 
     detection of the mustard agent on the ground north of KKMC, 
     were the result of Saudi Officials attempting to test the 
     abilities of the Czechs who they had engaged to assist Saudi 
     troops in chemical detections.
       3. While a direct connection between the existence of low-
     levels of chemical agents in the theater of operations and 
     the Persian Gulf Syndrome cannot be established based on the 
     information available at this time, such a connection cannot 
     and should not be discounted.
       This is the most difficult issue that confronted my 
     investigation. There is very little information available on 
     studies of exposure to low-levels of chemical agents. I am 
     confident that the work being accomplished under Major 
     General Ronald Blanck, USA, Commander, Walter Reed Army 
     Medical Center is on the right track. I urge the Department 
     of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to finalize 
     a case definition for the Gulf War Syndrome. The Department 
     of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs should 
     initiate a serious project which focuses on the long term 
     effects of exposure to low-levels of chemical agents. 
     Additionally, the Department of Defense and the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs must cut through bureaucratic red tape and 
     seek all possible medical treatments for the Gulf War 
     Syndrome.
       4. The Department of Defense has proven reluctant to pursue 
     or, in certain instances, to provide the information 
     necessary to prove or disprove allegations about the presence 
     of chemical agents in the theater of operations during the 
     Persian Gulf War. The reason for this apparent aversion to 
     ``full disclosure'' has not been determined. Staff working on 
     this issue were constantly challenged by the Department's 
     evasiveness, inconsistency, and reluctance to work together 
     toward a common goal.
       Several examples will illustrate this point:
       During a briefing I attended on November 19, 1993 the Dr. 
     John Deutch, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
     advised that, while the Department could neither confirm nor 
     deny the Czech detections and verifications, the Department 
     position was that categorically there were no chemical 
     warfare agents present in the theater of operations.
       Having been advised by the Department of Defense that it 
     had no information to offer regarding the possible presence 
     of chemical warfare agents in the theater of operations, I 
     determined, with your concurrence, to travel to Europe and 
     the Middle East to pursue this matter with our allies. Only 
     after the Committee staff confronted the Department regarding 
     specific events that I learned about during these travels, 
     did the Department acknowledge that it had been aware of 
     these same events.
       Similarly, it was only after my contact with our allies 
     revealed that they had, in fact, reported various chemical 
     detections to the Central Command Headquarters, that the 
     Department acknowledged evidence of this reporting in the 
     operational logs.
       On page 45 of the history of the 2nd Marine division in 
     Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which was published 
     by Marine Corps' History and Museum Division, there is a 
     detailed incident in which Marines of the 2nd Marine Division 
     detected mustard agent. I am at a loss to explain how an 
     official Marine Corps publication can document such an event 
     and the Department of Defense could deny any evidence 
     regarding chemical weapons agents in the theater of 
     operations.
       Persian Gulf medical records of members of the 24th Naval 
     Reserve Battalion are missing from their files.
       This passivity on the part of the Department when combined 
     with rather obvious attempts to dissuade the Committee staff 
     from the need for further investigation typifies the 
     Department's attitude toward the Committee on this matter.
                                  ____


          Report and Conclusions on the Persian Gulf Syndrome

                     (By Senator Richard C. Shelby)

       When Iraqi forces, at the direction of Saddam Hussein, 
     crossed into Kuwait on August 2, 1990, they set off a change 
     reaction of events that resulted in the assembling of the 
     largest coalition of forces since the Second World War. 
     Countries that had been on the opposite sides of the Cold War 
     were now joined with the expressed goal of driving Saddam 
     Hussein's troops out of Kuwait.
       Soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines were sent to Saudi 
     Arabia from all over the globe. The U.S. led the way with 
     over 600,000 members of our armed services, including over 
     200,000 reservists. Troops were sent from Great Britain, 
     France, Italy, Egypt, Syria, Morocco and many other nations. 
     Czechoslovakia, at the behest of the Saudi Arabian 
     government, provided chemical warfare agent detection units.
       There was a strong belief among the coalition forces that 
     chemical and even biological agents would be used as weapons 
     by Iraq should the coalition forces invade Kuwait and Iraq. 
     Iraq was known to posses G-series nerve and mustard agents 
     and it was believed that they also possessed Anthrax and 
     possibly other biological agents. After all, Saddam Hussein 
     had freely and indiscriminately used chemical weapons, 
     delivered in artillery shells and dropped as bombs, during 
     his war with Iran, not only against Iranians, but also 
     against Kurds.
       When Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, there was 
     obvious concern among Coalition Forces about Saddam Hussein's 
     reaction to allied air strikes. U.S. bombing was stealthy and 
     effective, knocking out Iraqi communications in the first 
     hours of the war and Saddam Hussein's nuclear and chemical 
     warfare factories were targeted and destroyed. Additionally, 
     B-52's bombed Iraqi positions along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi 
     borders with Saudi Arabia.
       Saddam Hussein responded by launching Scud missiles toward 
     Saudi Arabia and Israel. Because there was always the 
     possibility of an Iraqi launch of a Scud armed with a 
     chemical warhead, gas masks and chemical protection suits 
     were donned at the first sign of attack. These Scud attacks 
     were met with moderate success by U.S. Patriot Missile 
     batteries. With the exception of one missile which landed on 
     a company of Pennsylvania reservists, the Scuds had more 
     success as a weapon of terror than as a weapon of physical 
     destruction.
       On February 24, 1991, Coalition forces began the ground 
     phase of the campaign as they charged into Iraq and Kuwait. 
     Within 100 hours Kuwait was in the hands of the Coalition, 
     and what was left of Saddam Hussein's forces was fleeing 
     toward Baghdad. A great victory had been won. General Norman 
     Schwartzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command; and 
     General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff; 
     were heroes and by the end of May 1991 the vast majority of 
     U.S. troops were home.
       However, by the summer of 1992, Gulf War veterans, 
     primarily members of the National Guard and Reserves, were 
     relating stories of a mystery illness affecting many who had 
     served in Saudi Arabia. Symptoms included: joint pain, 
     fatigue, headaches, decreased short-term memory, unexplained 
     rashes, painful burning muscles, sleep disorders and 
     diarrhea. While most of us have experienced similar symptoms 
     at one time or another, these ailments were not responding to 
     treatment.
       In response to possible Gulf War-related illness, the 
     Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision in the 
     Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 
     that established a registry for members of our armed forces 
     who served in the Persian Gulf theater of operations and may 
     have been exposed to fumes from burning oil wells. The smoke 
     from oil well fires, deliberately set by Iraqi soldiers as 
     they retreated from Kuwait, caused acute respiratory problems 
     which could result in long-term health problems. However, 
     none of these sick veterans were among those who had been 
     exposed to smoke from oil well fires. To assist in the 
     investigation of this issue a Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
     registry was established in the Department of Veterans 
     Affairs Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1993.
       By January 1993, the veterans were becoming increasingly 
     frustrated by the inability of the Veterans Department to 
     treat their illnesses. I met with a group of Alabama veterans 
     after a town meeting that I held in Bessemer and pledged that 
     I would do everything in my power to get them proper 
     treatment and to find the cause of their ailments.
       In February 1993, I met with Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
     Jesse Brown and received his pledge to assist these veterans. 
     Following this meeting, the Department of Defense and the 
     Department of Veterans Affairs announced that centers would 
     be established for the treatment of what had become known as 
     the Gulf War Syndrome. However, when little progress was 
     made, veterans were prompted to seek treatment outside of the 
     Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs 
     medical community.
       As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements and 
     Personnel, I included a panel of Gulf War veterans consisting 
     of Congressman Stephen Buyer of Indiana; Army Staff Sergeant 
     Kerry Riegel; Petty Officer Sterling Sims, a member of 24th 
     Construction Battalion of the Navy Reserves; and Sergeant 
     Willie Hicks, a member of the 644th Ordinance Company of the 
     Alabama Army National Guard in my June 30, 1993 hearing on 
     military medical health care.
       Just days before the hearing, a leading U.S. newspaper 
     reported that U.S. forces may have been exposed to chemical 
     warfare agents during Desert Storm and testimony from both 
     Petty Officer Sims and Sergeant Hicks confirmed the 
     possibility of their exposure to chemical attacks while 
     serving in the Persian Gulf War.
       I believe the most dramatic event of the investigation 
     occurred in the early morning hours of January 20, 1991, when 
     an explosion went off in the sky above Jabail along the North 
     East coast of Saudi Arabia alerting Seabees in the 24th 
     Construction Battalion to donn their chemical defensive gear. 
     After the all clear signal was given, a group of Seabees were 
     hit with a burning mist that smelled of ammonia and caused 
     their khaki colored t-shirts to turn purple.
       On July 2, 1993, possibly responding to reports in American 
     newspapers, the Czech News Agency reported that Czech 
     military units had detected chemical warfare agents, both 
     nerve gas and mustard agents in Saudi Arabia during the 
     opening days of the air war against Iraq. Nerve Gas was 
     detected by a Czechoslovakian unit attached to the Saudi 
     troops in the area of Hafar-Al-Batin on January 19, 1991 and 
     Mustard Agent was allegedly detected in a 20200 centimeter 
     patch in the desert north of King Khalid Military City on 
     January 24, 1991. A report of these detections was 
     supposedly forwarded to the U.S. Department of Defense by 
     the Czech government.
       This announcement led to a series of meetings with 
     Department of Defense officials, which continued throughout 
     the fall of 1993 and included a meeting with Undersecretary 
     of Defense John Deutch. Although a multitude of chemical 
     alarms were sounded during Operation Desert Storm, the 
     Department of Defense maintained that they had no evidence of 
     any chemical weapons attacks by Iraq during the Gulf War and 
     they could not confirm the detection of chemical warfare 
     agents. While Department of Defense officials did not deny 
     that the Czechs had detected chemical warfare agents at low 
     levels, they could not or would not confirm the presence of 
     chemical warfare agents in the theater of operations.
       On October 27, 1993, Dr. Charles Jackson of the Tuskegee, 
     Alabama Veterans Medical Center diagnosed a patient as 
     suffering from Gulf War Syndrome and Chemical-Biological 
     Warfare Exposure. In response to both this announcement and 
     pressure from Congress, Secretary Brown announced, on 
     November 1, 1993, that the Department of Veterans Affairs was 
     establishing a pilot program in Birmingham, Alabama to test 
     Persian Gulf veterans from Alabama and Georgia for exposure 
     to chemical weapons agents, and on November 10, 1993, 
     Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced a blue-ribbon task 
     force, headed by Dr. Josh Letterberg, to study the Gulf War 
     Syndrome.
       It was in response to these events that Sen. Sam Nunn, 
     Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, sent me to both 
     Europe and the Middle East to investigate all issues related 
     to the possible presence of chemical and biological weapon 
     agents in the theater of operations during Operation Desert 
     Storm and the possible connection between service in the 
     Persian Gulf and the unexplained illness affecting thousands 
     of veterans.
       The initial stage of my investigation of these issues led 
     me to Prague; London; and Paris. Dr. Edwin Dorn, then 
     Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
     and Maj. Gen. Ronald Blanck, Commander of Walter Reed Army 
     Medical Center, and members of both my personal staff and the 
     Senate Armed Services Committee staff accompanied me.
       Enroute to Prague, we met with the Deputy Chief of Staff 
     for Operations (DCSOPS) and representatives from the 
     Headquarters of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and were 
     provided with their assessment of possible chemical weapons 
     use and/or employment during the Persian Gulf War.
       According to the representatives, on January 19, 1991, a 
     Czech chemical unit detected G-series nerve agents in two 
     locations in concentrations which were militarily 
     insignificant. U.S. chemical reconnaissance troops were 
     called in to verify the detection and were unable to detect 
     any agent at either of the two locations. Also, on January 
     24, 1991, a Czech chemical unit detected mustard agent in a 
     wet sand patch measuring two meters by 60 centimeters, two 
     kilometers north of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). (Note: 
     Other sources would place this detection 10 kilometers north 
     of KKMC.) Additionally, on January 17, 1991, the U.S. bombed 
     a chemical weapons munitions storage site at An Nasiryah, 
     located 200 kilometers from the Saudi-Iraq border, but the 
     U.S. does not believe this action was the cause of the 
     January 19, detection of nerve agent by the Czech chemical 
     detection unit.
       The representatives from U.S. Army Europe continued by 
     saying that they believed the Saudis had an underground 
     chemical training facility in the vicinity of the ``wet 
     spot,'' which could account for the small amounts of chemical 
     agents detected. Finally, they believed that the chemicals 
     detected may have been part of an attempt by the Saudis to 
     test the capabilities of the Czech chemical detection unit, 
     but no information was offered on the part of the 
     representatives on where the Saudis would have gotten the 
     chemical weapons agents.


                           the czech republic

       In Prague, I met with members of the Czech chemical 
     detection unit that served in the Persian Gulf, including: 
     Col. Kozak, Chief of the Chemical Troops; Lt. Col. Smehlik, 
     Senior Chemical officer in the Persian Gulf; Maj. Zilinsky 
     and Capt. Ferus, leaders of the Czech chemical detection 
     units on the Persian Gulf during the operations.
       Initially, the Czechs' chemical detection unit deployed to 
     the Persian Gulf with 169 members, but increased to 
     approximately 190 members and included chemical, medical and 
     other support personnel. In addition, we were told that this 
     unit was under contract to the Saudi government to provide 
     chemical weapon and/or agent detection to the Saudi 
     government during the Persian Gulf War.
       Lt. Col. Smehlik informed us that on January 19, 1991, 
     Czech chemical units, that were working approximately 20 
     kilometers apart with 4th and 20th Saudi brigades, made three 
     nearly simultaneous detections of a low concentration of G-
     series nerve agent in the air. The Czechs condsider these 
     detections to have resulted from one event that occurred in 
     the late afternoon which lasted approximately 40 minutes. At 
     ground level, at the time of the event, they said the wind 
     was blowing from the northwest--a direct contrast to what 
     Department of Defense officials said to the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee earlier when they claimed that the 
     prevailing winds were blowing from the northeast.
       The Czechs took air samples from two of the three locations 
     and verified that the samples contained G-series nerve agent. 
     While they were not able to distinguish between sarin or 
     soman, Lt. Col. Smehlik indicated that they had excluded the 
     existence of V-series agents. These air samples were sent 
     back to then Czechoslovakia, and are no longer available. An 
     air sample from the third location was not taken for the 
     purpose of verification because the Czech chemical detection 
     unit was moving at the time of the alarm.
       As discussions continued, Capt. Ferus, a leader of one of 
     the Czech chemical units, informed us that on January 24, 
     1991, he was summoned by Saudi officials to an area 10 
     kilometers north of KKMC to test the area for chemical 
     agents. Using a portable laboratory kit, he detected mustard 
     agent in the sand--the on-site detection made the retention 
     of samples unnecessary.
       According to Lt. Col. Smehlik, another detection of mustard 
     agent in the air near the Engineer School in KKMC had been 
     made two to three days prior to the detection January 24. He 
     indicated that an air sample was taken, verified by the 
     mobile laboratory and forwarded to Czechoslovakia; this 
     sequence of events was confirmed for the group by the 
     Czech warrant officer who reported the actual detection. 
     It is important to note that these detections had not been 
     made public previously. In discussion with Czech 
     officials, we were able to determine that until recently 
     there had been no discussion between Czech units stationed 
     with Saudi troops near Hafar-Al-Batin and those stationed 
     in KKMC. The Czechs believe that both detections of 
     mustard agent and nerve agent were at levels that 
     presented no danger to the health and safety of the troops 
     in the area, and were, therefore, militarily 
     insignificant.
       Although they were unable to provide any documentary 
     evidence to support certain events, I believe that it is 
     necessary to acknowledge that the Czechs claim that an air 
     sample of the mustard agent detected in the air in KKMC prior 
     to January 24, 1991, was given to a U.S. special forces 
     member. In subsequent discussions with our group, Lt. Col. 
     Smehlik indicated that the individual in question may have 
     been an intelligence officer.
       The Czech units did not have any chemical agents in the 
     Persian Gulf, according to Col. Kozak, and did not use live 
     agents during their training with the Saudis. Their chemical 
     detection equipment, which we examined and watched as it was 
     demonstrated, was 1970s and 1980s Czech and Russian. However, 
     according to the Czechs, the equipment has much lower 
     threshold for chemical detection than does U.S. chemical 
     detection equipment. In addition, we were informed that the 
     equipment would be shipped to Edgewood Arsenal for testing.


                             great britain

       While in London, we met with Dr. Graham Pearson, Director 
     General of the Chemical & Biological Defense Establishment; 
     Mr. Brian Pitts from the Surgeon General's Office; Ms. Jill 
     Ferguson; Lt. Col. John Esmonde-White and Col. Christopher 
     Box. We were informed that approximately 42,000 British 
     soldiers served in the Persian Gulf War. Apart from this 
     information, the representatives of the British government 
     the group met were not very helpful.
       Officials in the British government do not believe that the 
     Czech units detected the presence of any chemical weapons, 
     nerve or mustard agents in the Persian Gulf and they spent a 
     considerable amount of effort attempting to find plausible 
     means of discrediting the Czech reports.
       In addition, the British government does not recognize the 
     possible of any connection between service in the Persian 
     Gulf and any illness that cannot be explained by conventional 
     medical diagnosis. The British government has about 30 
     veterans from the Persian Gulf who have reported medical 
     problems and does not consider these medical conditions 
     peculiar to service in the Persian Gulf.
       Furthermore, the British government does not recognize 
     Multiple Chemical Toxicity/Sensitivity as a valid concept. 
     The representatives with whom we met believe the Persian Gulf 
     Syndrome is the result of American veterans attempting to 
     increase their medical and disability benefits and we were 
     advised that the United States did not have to invent a 
     new environmental disease to explain the symptoms being 
     experienced by American veterans.
       Aside from the British government's lack of cooperation, or 
     acknowledgement of these existing conditions, British 
     citizens have set up a Persian Gulf Families Hot Line, 
     located in Glouchester, England, that serves as a clearing 
     house for those who believe they have illnesses related to 
     their service in the Persian Gulf. I met with Mr. Raymond 
     Donn, a solicitor from Manchester, England, who is in the 
     process of filing a class action suit against the British 
     government to obtain compensation for these veterans. He told 
     me that there could be as many as 500 British veterans 
     afflicted with the Gulf War Illness.


                                 france

       While in Paris, we met with Lt. Col. Gerrard Emile Ferrand, 
     a French Army infantry officer who served in the Persian 
     Gulf. He informed us that the French had detected nerve and 
     mustard agent at a Logistics Facility approximately 26 or 27 
     kilometers south of KKMC on the evening of January 24 or 
     January 25 and he indicated that the wind at ground level had 
     been from the north (from Iraq). French chemical alarms were 
     activated at two locations approximately 100 meters apart and 
     Colonel Ferrand, who arrived at the location about 30 minutes 
     after the initial alarm, indicated that litmus badges on the 
     protective suits worn by French troops registered the 
     presence of mustard agent. A Czech chemical detection unit 
     was contacted to verify the presence of chemical agents, 
     confirmed as both mustard agent and nerve agent--either Soman 
     or Tabun, and the area was decontaminated.
       Lt. Col. Ferrand also noted that approximately two or three 
     days later, the French chemical alarms were again activated 
     in the same area. This time, the wind had shifted and was 
     from the south. Unable to determine what chemical agent was 
     present, the French again asked the Czech chemical detection 
     units for assistance, but none responded. Lt. Col. Ferrand 
     reported both these events to the French command located at 
     Riyadh and believes these reports were forwarded to CENTCOM 
     headquarters.
       It is interesting to note that the Czech chemical detection 
     unit did not mention any contact with the French concerning a 
     detection of either or both nerve agent or mustard agent 
     during our discussions with them, and the French had no 
     knowledge of previous Czech chemical agent detections.
       Although the trip to Europe was productive, our 
     investigation remained incomplete. It was necessary to travel 
     to the Middle East to meet with our coalition allies 
     stationed in the areas in question to resolve key questions 
     about the presence of chemical agents in the theater of 
     operations and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf 
     Syndrome. Unanswered questions we set out to answer included 
     the following:
       Did any of the coalition allies serving in the Persian Gulf 
     have chemical weapons in the theater of operations or 
     conducted chemical weapons training using live agent 
     or stimulants.
       Did representatives of any of the coalition allies receive 
     any air samples from the Czechs while in the Gulf?
       Did a U.S. Special Forces soldier or Intelligence Community 
     member receive an air sample from the Czech chemical defense 
     unit?
       Did any member of the allied coalition receive reports, 
     other than the report of the January 19 event, from any 
     coalition partner of a detection of chemical agents including 
     any reports of chemical agents at a level considered to be 
     militarily insignificant and no threat to the safety or 
     health of U.S. troops or other coalition personnel?


                              Saudi Arabia

       On January 3, 1994, I, accompanied again by Maj. Gen. 
     Ronald Blanck, staff members from both my personal office and 
     the Committee on Armed Services, left for the Middle East. 
     Our first stop was in Saudi Arabia where we visited Riyadh, 
     KKMC and Jubail and met with several high ranking members of 
     the Saudi Arabian military and civilian representatives of 
     the firms located in the Jubail industrial region.
       According to the director of Military Intelligence and 
     Security, on January 19 and 24, 1991, the Czechs chemical 
     detection units detected and verified low levels of nerve 
     agent and mustard agent and reported this to the Saudi 
     Arabian military. In the absence of any evidence of a 
     delivery vehicle (missile, bomb, etc.), the Saudi military 
     determined that these low levels did not pose a threat to the 
     public health or to animals. In addition, he substantiated 
     this claim by explaining that to date, no Saudi military 
     personnel or civilians have complained of illnesses that can 
     be attributed to service in the theater of operations during 
     the Persian Gulf War, and the Saudi Arabian government has no 
     evidence of the use of biological agents, even though the 
     United Nations subsequently discovered evidence of research 
     and development on biological agents.
       In addition, on January 24, 1991, the French reported the 
     possible detection of chemical agents (the so-called ``wet 
     spot'' north of KKMC) to the Saudis who did not don 
     protective chemical defense gear, but contacted the Czech 
     chemical detection unit. The Czechs detected and verified the 
     presence of mustard agent on the ground and the incident was 
     reported by the Saudis to CENTCOM Headquarters. U.S. 
     personnel were sent to the area in question but were unable 
     to detect a chemical agent.
       Saudi intelligence had no information to offer regarding 
     the possible source of the low-level chemical agents.
       The Saudis do not believe the symptoms suffered by the U.S. 
     veterans occurred as a result of exposure to chemical 
     weapons, according to the head of Saudi military 
     intelligence. He said that the Saudis did not have chemical 
     agents or stimulants and was not aware if the other Coalition 
     forces had chemical agents in the theater. He indicated 
     that it is possible that the Egyptians and Syrians could 
     have had chemical agents and/or weapons, but the Saudi 
     military personnel did not have offensive chemical weapons 
     in the area, not did they conduct defensive chemical 
     weapons training. He did, however, believe the reports of 
     the Czech and French detections.
       We also met with Mohammed Saleh al Hammad, Chief of Staff 
     and Minister of Defense Education, He had little to offer 
     regarding the subject of our inquiry, but be expressed 
     confidence in the reliability of the Czech and French 
     detections. When asked about the origin of nerve and mustard 
     agents, he said he did not know, but he speculated that they 
     could have come from either friendly or aggressor forces. He 
     also speculated that the U.S. military might have brought it.
       On January 6, our group flew to KKMC, where mustard agent 
     had been detected in two locations. The base commander, Major 
     General Al Alhami, indicated that during the war he received 
     no evidence of any detections of chemical agents nor of any 
     medical problems that could be viewed as unusual. He 
     indicated that every time the Iraqis fired SCUDs, all troops 
     donned MOPP chemical protective gear (which includes a full 
     body suit and mask with hood). Additionally, he had no 
     recollection of the French reporting their detection of 
     mustard agent to the KKMC Headquarters, nor any knowledge of 
     the Saudis, U.S., Syrians or any other Coalition forces 
     having chemical agents and/or weapons with their forces 
     during the Persian Gulf War.
       On January 6, we travelled to the Jubail Industrial Center 
     to discuss the possibility of industrial chemical releases 
     during the Persian Gulf War. Our group met with Mr. Terry 
     Velanzano of the Jubail Planning Group and a number of 
     officials from the various civilian industrial interests 
     located at Jubail. Most of those with whom we met were 
     present at Jubail during the War.
       The industrialists advised us that there were no instances 
     in which industrial chemicals were released either 
     intentionally or unintentionally during the periods of time 
     when coalition forces were located in the Jubail region. The 
     specifically denied the intentional release of chemicals from 
     pressurized systems in response to warnings of SCUD attacks.
       In addition, they advised us that there have been no 
     instances of medical ailments among the Jubail work force and 
     their families that could be construed as unusual or in any 
     way linked to chemical agents during the War.


                                 syria

       Our group continued its investigation in Damascus, Syria 
     where we met with a series of Syrian military and Foreign 
     Ministry officials. While the Chief of Medical Services 
     initially emphasized that he had no knowledge of Syrian 
     chemical agents, weapons, or of a Syrian chemical defense 
     program, near the end of the meeting, he admitted that Syrian 
     troops conducted chemical defense training, but do not use 
     chemical agents and/or weapons or stimulants in that training 
     and did not conduct any chemical defense exercise training in 
     the theater of operation using chemical agents or chemical 
     stimulants. Later, he told us that Syrian chemical defense 
     equipment was of Eastern European origin.
       We were informed that Syrian troops were stationed near 
     Hafir al Batin. He remarked that U.S. troops frequently 
     panicked when the chemical alarms went off. He also indicated 
     that when the Syrian troops responded to the chemical alarms 
     they only put on masks, not protective suits. Furthermore, he 
     advised the Codel that the Syrians were not aware of any 
     coalition allies having chemical weapons in the theater of 
     operation and that, although other Arab countries have 
     chemical weapons, he did not think Syria has chemical 
     weapons. According to him, the Syrians did not know whether 
     the Egyptians or Saudis has been informed of chemical agent 
     detections.


                                 egypt

       President Mubarak, with whom I met in Cairo, acknowledged 
     that Egypt has some chemical weapons. During our discussion, 
     he speculated that the chemical agents we were concerned 
     about may have come from Iran. Additionally, we discussed 
     foreign policy issues related to U.S. relations with Egypt, 
     the peace process between Israel and Syria, as well as 
     Egypt's relations with Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.
       We also met with Lt. Gen. Salah Halaby, Chief of Staff for 
     the Egyptian Armed Forces, and his staff. Gen. Halaby advised 
     us that Egypt had its own chemical defense unit, which was 
     very good, but he did not recall their having detected any 
     chemical agents during the Persian Gulf War. When asked about 
     the chemical detections that were made, he suggested that 
     they were not chemical warfare agents, but industrial 
     chemicals or substances used in the construction and 
     structure of the A-10 aircraft. An A-10 crashed near KKMC at 
     the approximate time of the KKMC detections; however, he did 
     not believe the aircraft carried chemical weapons or chemical 
     agents.
       Lt. Gen. Halaby and his staff commented that Egypt has no 
     chemical weapons, only chemical defense equipment (protective 
     gear). He said although Egyptian troops conduct chemical 
     defense training, they do not use chemical stimulants, with 
     the exception of tear gas, in their training. Gen. Halaby was 
     not aware of the Syrians having had chemical agents/weapons 
     in the theater. He was certain that no Iraqi aircraft or 
     artillery (which could have been used to deliver chemical 
     agents) had crossed the border.
       At one point, Lt. Gen. Halaby said they were not aware of 
     the detection of chemical agents by the Czech chemical 
     detection unit, but later in the interview, he acknowledged 
     that they were aware of the detections but did not verify any 
     chemical agents or equipment. Lt. Gen. Halaby commented that 
     he knew that chemical agent alarms could be tripped off by 
     cigarette smoke. He suggested that the French and Czech 
     detections could have been false alarms because the 
     atmosphere was so full of petrochemical smoke.


                                 israel

       In Jerusalem, we met with an intelligence officer of the 
     Israeli Defense Force. He indicated that he was aware of 
     chemical agents being used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, 
     and did not understand why they were not used in the Gulf 
     War. In addition, he believed that it was very significant 
     that no chemical weapons or delivery systems were found in 
     the theater following the war and he surmised that there had 
     been no preparation for their use or they were withdrawn 
     prior to D-Day. The Israeli Officer indicated that he did not 
     believe that Iraq had a chemical weapons project underway but 
     cautioned that they could restart one at any moment.
       He continued by saying that the Israelis believe the Czech 
     chemical detection unit to be very proficient and that their 
     equipment is very good. He noted, however, the prevalence of 
     false alarms. In addition, he suggested that we study the 
     symptoms of those exposed to chemical agents during the Iran-
     Iraq War and discuss the Persian Gulf Syndrome with Iranian 
     doctors. Contrary to information provided to us in other 
     countries, the Israeli Officer indicated that all the 
     Coalition forces, especially Egypt and Syria, use chemical 
     agent stimulants in their training.


                                morocco

       On January 13, we traveled to Rabat. In preparation for our 
     meetings with Moroccan government officials, the U.S. Embassy 
     conducted a country team briefing and informed us that during 
     the Persian Gulf War, Morocco and Saudi Arabia had a 
     bilateral agreement which placed Moroccan military personnel 
     under the authority of the Saudi military. Morocco sent a 
     motorized infantry unit from the Western Sahara to the 
     vicinity a petrochemical facility north of Jubail about 50 
     kilometers from the Kuwait border.
       In Rabat, we met with Colonel Major Mohammed Beuboumaudi, 
     Inspector, Military Health Services. He indicated that no 
     Moroccan military personnel saw any chemical weapons or 
     equipment. He mentioned that, on one occasion, his troops 
     went to check the location in which an artillery shell 
     exploded for chemical agent. There were no indications of any 
     chemical agents present.
       The Moroccan troops did not experience any illnesses 
     symptomatic of exposure to chemical agents. Additionally, he 
     pointed out that Moroccan troops were acclimated to service 
     in the desert. The inference here being the possible 
     psychological or environmental origin of the Persian Gulf 
     Syndrome.
       In response to questions regarding the presence of chemical 
     agents or weapons in the theater of operations and knowledge 
     as to whether coalition allies possessed chemical weapons or 
     agents, Col. Maj. Beudoumaudi provided negative responses. He 
     indicated that he was not aware of Moroccan troops 
     participating in chemical defense training with stimulants 
     during the Persian Gulf War.
       Finally, we met with the deputy minister of foreign affairs 
     who reiterated the comments made by Col. Maj. Beudoumaudi 
     regarding the Morocco military personnel's not being aware of 
     the presence of chemical weapons and/or agents in the theater 
     of operations and not having any knowledge of other coalition 
     allies in possession of chemical weapons and/or agents in the 
     theater of operation.

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reid). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Kassebaum and Mr. Kerrey pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 1943 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Senator from Nebraska yields 
the floor.
  Who seeks recognition?
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Kohl.
  Mr. KOHL. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Kohl pertaining to the introduction of S. 1944 
and S. 1947 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on 
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Exon pertaining to the introduction of S. 1942 
and S.J. Res. 173 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on 
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I suggest absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak 
for 5 minutes as if in morning business.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________