[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 30 (Thursday, March 17, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: March 17, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
SENATOR SHELBY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I am here today to issue a report
following my investigation into the possible presence of chemical and
biological weapons agents in the theater of operations during the
Persian Gulf war. Additionally, I will discuss the possible connection
between service in the Persian Gulf and the unexplained illness
affecting thousands of veterans and their families.
When Iraqi forces, at the direction of Saddam Hussein, crossed into
Kuwait on August 2, 1990, they set off a chain reaction of events that
resulted in the assembling of the largest coalition of forces since the
Second World War. Countries that had been on opposite sides of the cold
war were now joined with the expressed goal of driving Saddam Hussein's
troops out of Kuwait.
The United States led this effort with over 600,000 members of our
armed services, including over 200,000 reservists.
At the time of the Iraqi invasion, there was a strong belief among
the coalition forces that chemical and even biological agents would be
used as weapons by Iraq.
Within a year after the highly successful Desert Storm operation,
reports surfaced of a mystery illness affecting many veterans,
primarily members of the National Guard and Reserve, who served in
Saudi Arabia.
This group is experiencing symptoms commonplace to many known
illnesses. However, in the case of the Gulf War veterans, we have not
been able to diagnose the causes of the illnesses and the illnesses
themselves have not responded to any known treatments.
I have seen firsthand the devastating, frustrating, and debilitating
effects that this illness has had on many of these veterans. Citizens
who were once healthy and able bodied can no longer hold jobs or
participate as active members of society.
Little progress has been made even though Congress mandated the
establishment of a Desert Shield-Desert Storm registry, and treatment
centers were created for the Gulf war syndrome. Veterans, increasingly
frustrated by the inability of the Department of Veterans Affairs to
treat their illness, began to seek treatment outside of the Department
of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs medical community.
My involvement in this issue has spanned 2 years.
Early on, I met with a group of veterans after a town meeting that I
held and pledged that I would do everything in my power to get them
proper treatment and to find the causes of their ailments.
The anxiety and fear experienced by our ill veterans was intensified
throughout this period by constant reports in foreign and domestic
media about the presence of chemical weapons agents during the Gulf
war.
I cannot imagine a greater fear than that experienced by someone who
suffers from a mysterious illness and believes it may have been caused
by exposure to chemical weapons.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I heard from afflicted veterans
and saw first-hand the symptoms of these ailments.
Following this hearing, Dr. Charles Jackson of the Tuskegee Alabama
Veterans Medical Center diagnosed a patient as suffering from Gulf war
syndrome and chemical-biological warfare exposure. In response to this
announcement and pressure from Congress, the Department of Veterans
Affairs established a pilot program to test Persian Gulf veterans for
possible exposure to chemical weapons agents.
As a result of these events, Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, sent me, along with people on our staff
and the people from DOD, to Europe and then to the Middle East to
investigate the possible presence of chemical and biological weapon
agents during Operation Desert Storm, as well as the possible
connection between service in the Persian Gulf and the unexplained
illness affecting thousands of veterans.
Mr. President, I went to Europe to determine the validity of the two
then reported detections of chemical warfare agents by Czech soldiers.
Instead, there were not only two, but five separate detections of
chemical weapons agents in the Persian Gulf.
No one with whom I spoke could provide a solution to the mysterious
illness; however, they could not rule out a possible link between the
presence of chemical agents and the gulf war syndrome. Only the U.S.
Department of Defense and the British Government have denied that
chemical agents could have caused the illness.
In light of my involvement, I have come to five major conclusions
which I would like to share with you today.
First, I have no doubt that chemical agents, accurately verified by
the Czech chemical detection units, were present in the theater of
operations during the Persian Gulf war.
Both Czech and French forces detected and verified the presence of
nerve and mustard agents at low levels during Desert Storm.
Second, we may never be able to determine the origin of these
chemical agents. While, I believe that we can rule out Iraqi Scud or
Frog missiles, and Iraqi artillery, there still exists several
possibilities. For example, the low-level chemical presence could have
resulted from United States or coalition forces bombing Iraqi chemical
weapons facilities or caches of Iraqi weapons on the Saudi border.
It is also feasible that a cloud of nerve agent, dissipating in
intensity, could have traveled under the correct climate conditions.
There is also the possibility of a training accident involving chemical
agents among coalition forces. Finally, it is possible that the
detections were the result of Saudi officials attempting to test the
abilities of the Czechs whom they had engaged to assist in chemical
detections.
Third, although a direct connection between the existence of low-
levels of chemical agents in the theater of operations and the Persian
Gulf syndrome cannot be established at this time, such a connection
cannot and should not be discounted. Little information is available on
exposure to low levels of chemical agents, but I believe that the work
being done at Walter Reed Army Medical Center is on the right track in
this area. We must give it our full support.
Fourth, the Department of Defense has proven reluctant to pursue or,
in certain instances, to provide the information necessary to prove or
disapprove allegations about the presence of chemical agents in the
theater of operations. After my contact with our allies, we found that
various chemical detections were reported to central command
headquarters and were included in operational logs. Only then, and
after traveling half-way around the world, did Department of Defense
officials admit that they had been aware of these same instances.
While I have not yet determined the reason for this apparent aversion
to full disclosure by DOD, the staff working on this issue from our
committee has been constantly challenged by the Department's
evasiveness, inconsistency, and reluctance to work toward a common goal
here.
Finally, Mr. President, and I believe alarmingly, the Persian Gulf
medical records of members of the 24th Naval Reserve Battalion are
inexplicably missing from their files.
Mr. President, despite the Czech and French detections and numerous
reports, the Department of Defense is still reluctant to admit that
there were chemical weapons agents present in the Persian Gulf. I
cannot understand why they have taken this stand since we fully
expected to be confronted with chemical weapons when we went there.
I can only conclude, Mr. President, that when dealing with the
Department of Defense on this issue, you have to ask the right question
to receive the right answer. I do not believe they understand that we
are only seeking the truth in a way to help our veterans. Therefore, I
am going to continue to ask question after question until we find the
right answer from DOD.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, following my remarks,
first, a copy of my letter to Sam Nunn, chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services, be printed in the Record; second, a copy of my interim
report provided in December to Senators Nunn and Thurmond be printed in
the Record; third, a copy of my report on my trip to the Middle East to
continue the investigation into the Persian Gulf syndrome; and, fourth,
my conclusions and recommendations in detail on the Persian Gulf
syndrome be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, March 16, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am enclosing a full report of our
investigation of the issues related to the possible presence
of chemical and biological weapons agents in the theater of
operations during Desert Storm and the possible connection
between service in the Persian Gulf and the unexplained
illness affecting thousands of veterans. This report
includes:
Tab A: Interim report of European trip to investigate the
Persian Gulf War Syndrome.
Tab B: Report of Middle East trip to continue the
investigation into the Persian Gulf War Syndrome.
Tab C: Conclusions and Recommendations.
Tab D: Floor Statement regarding the our investigation of
the Persian Gulf Syndrome on behalf of the Committee on Armed
Services.
Iraq entered the conflict with a demonstrated chemical
weapons capability--having used chemical weapons
indiscriminately during the Iran-Iraq War, not only against
the Iranians, but also against the Iraqi Kurds. Iraq was also
suspected of developing a biological weapons capability, most
likely antrax and botulism. As the coalition formed to fight
Iraq's aggression, Suddam Hussein made inflamatory statements
implying that he was willing to use these weapons to defeat
the coalition by inflicting mass casualties.
With this knowledge and Saddam Hussein's threatening
statements, the coalition forces strongly believed that Iraq
would use chemical and biological weapons should there be a
war. An array of defensive measures were adopted including an
air campaign against all known chemical and biological
weapons sites intended to disrupt Iraq's ability to use its
chemical and biological weapons arsenal and signal to
Iraqi military leaders that it would be in their interest
to disobey any orders from Saddam Hussein to use chemical
and biological weapons. Additionally, U.S. officials
repeatedly made statements that the use of chemical and
biological weapons would be taken very seriously.
While the threat of the use of chemical or biological
weapons against the coalition forces was prevalent throughout
the conflict, we received no indication from the Department
of Defense that during or in the aftermath of the Persian
Gulf conflict Iraqi forces used either chemical or biological
warfare agents or that Coalition forces discovered any stocks
of chemical or biological warfare agents.
Within a year after the highly successful Desert Storm
operation, reports surfaced of a mystery illness affecting
many veterans of the war. Symptoms included: joint pain,
fatigue, headaches, decreased short-term memory, rashes,
painful burning muscles, sleep disorders and diarrhea. While
individually these manifestations are common to many
illnesses, these particular series of ailments did not
respond to any known treatments.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992
required the establishment of a registry of all U.S. armed
forces in the theater of operations during Operation Desert
Storm who may have been exposed to fumes from burning oil
well fires. Despite the establishment of this registry and
the registry established by the Veterans Affairs Committee of
all participants in both Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
little progress has been made on either the causes or the
treatment of this mysterious illness. As a result, veterans
have been seeking treatment outside of the Department of
Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs medical community.
As the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements
and Personnel, I conducted a hearing on June 30, 1993, on
military medical health care. I included a panel of Gulf War
veterans consisting of Congressman Stephen Buyer of Indiana;
Army Staff Sergeant Kerry Riegel; Petty Officer Sterling
Sims, a member of the 24th Construction Battalion of the
Naval Reserves; and Sergeant Willie Hicks, a member of the
644th Ordinance Company of the Alabama Army National Guard.
Just days before, a leading U.S. newspaper published a
report that U.S. forces may have been exposed to chemical
warfare agents during the Desert Storm. In testimony, both
Petty Officer Sterling Sims and Sergeant Willie Hicks spoke
in great detail about their possible exposure to chemical
attacks.
On July 2, 1993, The Czech News Agency reported that
Czechoslovakian military units detected chemical warfare
agents, both nerve gas and mustard agent, in the Saudi
theater of operations during the opening days of the air war
against Iraq. G-series nerve gas was found by a Czech
chemical detection unit attached to Saudi troops in the
area of Hafar-Al-Batin on January 19, 1991. Mustard agent
was found in a 20200 centimeter patch in the desert north
of King Khalid Military City on January 24, 1991. A report
of these detections was forwarded to the Department of
Defense by the Czech government.
This announcement by the Czech News Agency led to a series
of meetings with Department of Defense officials, including
Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch. While Department of
Defense officials maintained that they had no evidence of any
chemical weapons attacks by Iraq during the Gulf War, the
Department of Defense could not confirm or deny the presence
of chemical warfare agents at low levels in the theater of
operations.
It was in response to these events that you authorized my
travel to the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and France
during the period of November 28 through December 5, 1993 and
to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Israel and Morocco from
January 3 to January 15, 1994. I was accompanied by Dr. Edwin
Dorn, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, on the first leg of this investigation. Major
General Ronald Blanck, Commander of Walter Reed Army Medical
Center, traveled with me on both legs of this journey.
In preparation for the trips, I, and members of my personal
staff and the Committee on Armed Services staff received a
briefing by Department of Defense officials. Upon our return,
I tasked my personal staff and the SASC staff to meet again
with Department of Defense officials in an attempt to answer
questions and inconsistencies which arose as a result of
information learned from these trips.
The following report provides details of my contacts with
high-level representatives of the Coalition forces, several
inescapable conclusions, and a floor statement addressing
this issue.
Sincerely,
Richard Shelby.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
Memorandum to Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond.
From: Senator Shelby.
CC: Senator Coats.
Subject: Report on trip to investigate ``Persian Gulf
syndrome.''
The following is a report on my trip to investigate issues
related to the possible presence of chemical/biological
weapons agents in the theater of operations during the
Persian Gulf War, and any possible connection between service
in the Persian Gulf War and the illness among U.S. veterans
referred to as the Persian Gulf Syndrome. The trip included
visits to Prague, Czech Republic; London, England; and Paris,
France.
Members of the Codel included two members of my personal
staff, who serve as S. Res. to the SASC (Terry Lynch and Tom
Young) and four members of the SASC staff with
responsibilities in the area of manpower, personnel and
chemical/biological defense (Charles Abell, Monica Chavez,
P.T. Henry, and Frank Norton).
Additionally, the Codel included representatives from DOD
(Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Ed
Dorn, Major General Ron Blanck, Commander, Walter Reed Army
Medical Center and Colonel John Speigel, military assistant
to ASD Dorn).
Although the trip was productive, our investigation is
incomplete. I believe a trip to the Middle East to meet with
our coalition allies stationed in the areas in question is
necessary to resolve key questions about the possible
presence of chemical agents in the theater of operations and
the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome.
The following is a summary of what the Codel learned during
its trip.
rhein main airport, west germany
Enroute to Prague, the Codel had a layover in Frankfurt,
West Germany during which the Codel met with the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) and representatives from the
Headquarters of the US Army Europe (USAREUR), and received a
briefing on the military and civilian draw down in Europe.
During the briefing, the USAREUR representatives provided
their assessment of possible chemical weapons use/employment
during the Persian Gulf War.
The USAREUR representatives offered the following
information:
On January 19, 1991, a Czech chemical unit detected G-
series nerve agents in two locations on January 19 in
concentrations which were militarily insignificant. U.S.
chemical reconnaissance troops were called in to verify the
detection and were unable to detect any agent at either of
the two locations.
On January 24, 1991, a Czech chemical unit detected mustard
agent in a wet sand patch, measuring 2 meters by sixty
centimeters, two kilometers north of King Khalid Military
City (KKMC). (Note: Other sources would place this detection
10 kilometers north of KKMC.)
On January 17, 1991, the U.S. bombed a chemical weapons
munitions storage site at An Nasiryah, located 200 kilometers
from the Saudi-Iraq border. The U.S. does not believe this
action was the cause of the January 19 detection of nerve
agent by the Czech chemical unit.
The USAREUR representatives believe that the Saudis had an
underground chemical training facility in the vicinity of the
``wet spot,'' which could account for the small amounts of
chemical agents detected.
The USAREUR representatives also believe that the chemicals
detected may have been a part of an attempt on the part of
the Saudis to test the capabilities of the Czech chemical
units. The briefers did not offer any information on where
the Saudis would have gotten the chemical weapons agents.
prague, czechoslovakia
While in Prague, the Codel met with members of the Czech
chemical unit that served in the Persian Gulf: Colonel Kozak,
Chief of the Chemical Troops; Lieutenant Colonel Smehlik,
Senior Chemical officer in the Persian Gulf; Major Zilinsky
and Captain Ferus, leaders of the Czech chemical units in the
Persian Gulf during the operations.
The following is a summary of what was learned in the
discussions with the members of the Czech chemical unit:
The Czechs initially had 169 members in their chemical
detection unit that deployed to the Persian Gulf. That number
subsequently increased to approximately 190. These
forces included chemical, medical, and other support
personnel. The Czech chemical unit was under contract to
the Saudi government to provide chemical weapons/agent
detection to the Saudi government during the Persian Gulf
War.
On January 19, 1991, Czech chemical units, that were
working with 4th and 20th Saudi brigades and were separated
by approximately 20 kilometers, made three nearly
simultaneous detections of a low concentration of G-series
nerve agent in the air. The Czechs consider the three nearly
simultaneous detections to be ``one'' event. The Czechs
indicated that the detections took place in the late
afternoon and that the event lasted approximately 40 minutes.
The Czechs determined that, at ground level at the time of
the event, the wind was blowing from the northwest. The
Department of Defense had previously advised the Committee
that the prevailing winds were blowing northeastward.
The Czechs took air samples from two of the three
locations, and verified the contents of the air samples in
their mobile laboratory to contain G-series nerve agent. The
Czechs were not able to distinguish between sarin or soman.
LTC Smehlik indicated, however, that they had excluded V-
series agents. These air samples were sent back to then
Czechoslovakia, and are no longer available, as they have
been used up. An air sample from the third location was not
taken for the purpose of verification because the Czech
chemical unit was moving at the time of the alarm.
Note: In the U.S., G-series nerve agents Sarin and Tabun
are considered to be nonpersistent, evaporating at the same
rate as water. VX, a persistent nerve agent, evaporates much
more slowly, and spills of liquid VX can persist for a long
time under average weather conditions.
Captain Ferus, a leader of one of the Czech chemical units,
informed us that on January 24, 1991, he was summoned by
Saudi officials to an area 10 kilometers north of KKMC. His
unit was accompanied to the area by Saudi soldiers, where he
was asked to check the area for chemical agents. His unit
detected mustard agent in the sand. No sample was taken
because the presence of mustard agent was confirmed on the
spot using a portable laboratory kit.
LTC Smehlik informed the Codel that he had recently learned
that there had been another detection of mustard agent in the
air near the Engineer School in KKMC 2-3 days prior to the
detection on January 24, LTC Smehlik indicated that an air
sample was taken, verified by the mobile laboratory, and
forwarded to Czechoslovakia. This sequence of events was
confirmed for the Codel by the Czech warrant officer who
reported the actual detection.
The Czechs believe both detections of mustard agent to have
been at levels that presented no danger to the health and
safety of the troops in the area, and were, therefore,
militarily insignificant.
Colonel Kozak informed the group that Czech units did not
have any chemical agents in the Persian Gulf and they did not
use live agents during their training with the Saudis.
The chemical detection equipment used by the Czechs
consisted of Czech and Russian equipment of 1970's and 1980's
vintage, yet, according to the Czechs, has a much lower
threshold level for detection of chemical agents than does
U.S. chemical detection equipment. The equipment used by the
Czechs includes the GSP-11, a chemical agent detector/alarm
which provides continuous monitoring capability; the portable
CHP-71, a chemical analyzer used as a backup for the GSP-11;
a portable laboratory which uses a litmus paper detection
method, as well as other wet chemical analysis; and a mobile
laboratory. We were told by the Czechs that the U.S. had
arranged to examine the above mentioned equipment and that
the equipment would be shipped to Edgewood Arsenal for
testing.
During the conduct of discussions with representatives of
the Czech military, several events were mentioned which were
anecdotal in nature and based on hearsay. There is no
documentary evidence of these matters. Nonetheless, I believe
they merit further consideration.
LTC Smehlik claimed that an air sample of the mustard agent
detected in the air in KKMC prior to January 24, 1991, was
given to a U.S. special forces member. In subsequent
discussions with the Codel staff, Smehlik indicated that the
individual in question could also have been an intelligence
specialist.
LTC Smehlik also mentioned that he had heard the Egyptians
had detected mustard agent in the air in the vicinity of
KKMC. Representatives of the French military offered the same
thoughts on Egyptian detections.
great britain
The Codel met with Dr. Graham Pearson, Director General,
Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment; Mr. Brian
Pitts, Surgeon General's Office; Ms. Jill Ferguson; LTC John
Esmonde-White, and Colonel Christopher Box.
There were approximately 42,000 British soldiers who served
in the Persian Gulf War. The representatives of the British
government the Codel met were not very helpful.
They do not believe that the Czech units detected
the presence of any chemical weapons, nerve or mustard
agents, in the Persian Gulf. They spent a considerable
amount of effort attempting to find plausible means of
discrediting the Czech reports.
The British government does not recognize the possibility
of any connection between service in the Persian Gulf and any
illness that cannot be explained by conventional medical
diagnosis. The British have about 30 veterans from the
Persian Gulf with medical problems. These medical conditions
are not considered peculiar to their service in the Persian
Gulf. British citizens have, however, set up a Persian Gulf
Families Hot Line, located in Glouchester, England, that
serves as a clearing house for those who believe they have
illnesses related to their service in the Persian Gulf. I met
with Mr. Raymond Donn, a solicitor from Manchester, England,
who is in the process of filing a class action suit against
the British government to obtain compensation for these
veterans. Mr. Donn informed me that there could be as many as
500 sick British veterans.
The British government does not recognize Multiple Chemical
Toxicity/Sensitivity as a valid concept. Additionally, the
representatives with whom the Codel met believe the Persian
Gulf Syndrome is the result of American veterans attempting
to increase their medical and disability benefits. The Codel
was advised that the United States did not have to invent a
new environmental disease to explain the symptoms being
experienced by American veterans.
paris, france
While in Paris, the Codel met with Lieutenant Colonel
Gerrard Emile Ferrand, a French Army infantry officer who
served in the Persian Gulf. The French had about 12,000
personnel in the Gulf.
Colonel Ferrand informed the Codel that the French had
detected nerve and mustard agent at a Logistics Facility
approximately 26 or 27 kilometers south of KKMC on the
evening of January 24th or January 25th. He indicated that
the wind at ground level had been from the north--from Iraq.
French chemical alarms were activated at two locations
approximately 100 meters apart. Colonel Ferrand, who arrived
at the location about 30 minutes after the initial alarm,
indicated that litmus badges on the protective suits worn by
French troops registered the presence of mustard agent. They
contacted a Czech chemical unit and asked it to conduct tests
to verify presence of the chemical agents. The Czech chemical
unit arrived about 2 hours later, confirmed the presence of a
mustard agent and a nerve agent--either Soman or Tabun--and
decontaminated the area.
Colonel Ferrand also noted that, about 2 or 3 days
later the French chemical alarms were again activated in
the same area. At this time, the wind had shifted and was
from the south. The French were unable to determine what
chemical agent was present. They again asked the Czech
chemical units for assistance, but none responded.
Colonel Ferrand reported both these events to the French
command located at Riyadh. Colonel Ferrand believes these
reports were forwarded to CENTCOM headquarters.
Members of the Codel also met with representatives of the
French military medical community including Major General
Lauric, head of the French Military Medical Service. The
French have no empirical evidence on which to base a
connection between service in the Persian Gulf and any
illness that cannot be explained by conventional diagnosis.
The French veterans were all volunteers from the Rapid
Reaction Corps and the French Foreign Legion. As such, these
individuals had spent considerable time in Africa and other
areas which would have exposed them to hostile environmental
influences, and, perhaps, made them less susceptible to
environmental factors in the Persian Gulf. The French are,
however, monitoring the medical conditions of their veterans.
(Note: In discussions with the members of the Czech
chemical defense unit, they did not mention any contact with
the French concerning a detection of either or both nerve
agent or mustard agent. The French had no knowledge of the
Czech chemical agent detections.)
questions that remain to be answered
(1). Did any of the coalition allies serving in the Persian
Gulf have chemical weapons in the theater of operations or
conduct chemical weapons training using live agents or
simulants?
(2). Did representatives of any of the coalition allies
receive any air samples from the Czechs while in the Gulf?
Specifically, did a US Special Forces soldier or Intelligence
Community member receive an air sample from the Czech
chemical defense unit?
(3). Did any member of the allied coalition receive
reports, other than the report of the January 19 event, from
any coalition partner of a detection of chemical agents
including any reports of chemical agents at a level
considered to be militarily insignificant and no threat to
the safety or health of U.S. troops, or other coalition
personnel?
(4). What were the true weather (wind) conditions during
the period in question. There is a discrepancy regarding the
reported wind directions during the time the various
detections were made.
recommendation
1. In order to complete the investigation of possible
presence of chemical/biological agents in the Persian Gulf
and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome, it is
necessary for me to visit with members of the allied
coalition and meet with the appropriate representatives of
their foreign and defense ministries. Coalition allies
stationed in the area in question includes Morocco, Syria,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, it would be useful to
meet with appropriate defense and intelligence community
representatives from Israel regarding any information they
might have about the possible use of chemical weapons. I
believe it would be in the Committee's interest for me to
travel to the Middle East for this purpose during the first
two weeks of January 1994.
2. Prior to my travelling to the Middle East, the
Department of Defense should provide maps to the Committee
showing the locations of battalion-level and above units
during the period from January 17, 1991, through February 1,
1991. Additionally, the Department of Defense should provide
maps showing the dates, times, and locations of all bombings
of chemical production or storage facilities and ammunition
storage areas.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, February 28, 1994.
Memorandum Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond.
From: Senator Shelby.
CC: Senator Coats.
Subject: Report on trip to Middle East to continue the
investigation into the Persian Gulf syndrome.
Upon the completion of my trip in December to
Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and France to investigate
issues related to the possible presence of chemical/
biological weapons agents in the theater of operations during
the Persian Gulf War, and any possible connection between
service in the Persian Gulf War and the illness among U.S.
veterans referred to as the Persian Gulf Syndrome, I informed
you that I believed the investigation would not be complete
without meeting with other coalition allies stationed in the
theater of operations. On January 3-15, I travelled to
Riyadh, King Khalid Military City, and Jubail, Saudi Arabia,
Damascus, Syria; Cairo, Egypt; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem,
Israel; and Rabat, Morocco to continue my investigation into
this matter.
Members of the Codel included two members of my personal
staff who serve as S. Res.' to the SASC (Terry Lynch and Tom
Young), four members of the SASC staff with responsibilities
in the areas of manpower, personnel and chemical/biological
defense (Charles Abell, Monica Chavez, P.T. Henry and Frank
Norton), and a representative from the Department of Defense
(Major General Ron Blanck, Commander, Walter Reed Army
Medical Center).
I believe the investigation of this issue has been
productive and is complete, to the extent that the Congress
can conclude the investigation. This report summarizes our
meetings and discussions in the Middle East and North Africa
with coalition allies on the possible presence of chemical
agents in the theater of operations and the possible causes
of the Persian Gulf Syndrome.
riyadh and jubail, saudi arabia
On January 4-6, we visited Riyadh, King Khalid Military
City (KKMC) and Jubail, Saudi Arabia and met with several
high ranking members of the Saudi Arabian military, and
civilian representatives of the firms located in the
Jubail industrial region.
Riyadh
Major General Nazir Abd-Al Azziz al-Arfaj, Director of
Military Intelligence and Security, advised the Codel that,
on January 19 and 24, the dates when very low levels of nerve
agent and mustard agent were detected and verified by the
Czech chemical units, the Czechs reported this to the Saudi
Arabian military. In the absence of any evidence of a
delivery vehicle (missile, bomb, etc.), the Saudi's
determined that these low levels did not pose a threat to the
public health or to animals. He provided the following
additional information:
To date, no Saudi military personnel or civilians have
complained of illnesses that can be attributed to service in
the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War.
The Saudi Arabian government has no evidence of the use of
biological agents during the Persian Gulf War, although the
United Nations subsequently discovered evidence of research
and development on biological agents.
On January 24, 1991, the French reported a possible
chemical agent detection to the Saudis (the ``wet spot''
north of KKMC) who then contacted the Czech chemical defense
unit. The Czechs detected and verified the presence of
mustard agent on the ground. This incident was reported by
the Saudis to CENTCOM Headquarters. U.S. personnel were sent
to the area in question but were unable to detect a chemical
agent.
Saudi intelligence had no information to offer regarding
the possible source of the low-level chemicals.
When the wet spot was located (later determined by the
Czech chemical defense unit to be mustard agent), the Saudi
troops did not don chemical defense gear.
The Saudis do not believe the symptoms suffered by the U.S.
soldiers are a result of exposure to chemical weapons. Major
General Nazir Abd-al Azziz al-Arfaj indicated that the Saudis
did not have chemical agents or simulants and did not know if
the other Coalition forces had chemical agents in the
theater. It is possible that the Egyptians and Syrians could
have had chemical agents/weapons, but the Saudi military
personnel do not have offensive chemical weapons in the area
and did not conduct defensive chemical weapons training. He
did, however, believe the reports of the Czech and French
detections.
With regard to assistance from the Chinese, Major General
Nazir Abd-Al Azziz al-Arfaj indicated that, while the Saudis
have a relationship with the Chinese government because of
the CSS-2 missiles, the Chinese Military had no liaison in
the theater of operation during the Persian Gulf War.
General Mohammed Saleh al Hammad, Chief of Staff, Minister
of Defense Education, had very little to offer regarding the
subject of the Codel's inquiry. He expressed confidence in
the reliability of the Czech and French detections. When
asked about from where the nerve agent and mustard agent
could have come, he stated that he had no idea. He
speculated, however, that they could have come from either
friendly or aggressor forces. He also speculated that perhaps
the U.S. military brought it.
King Khalid Military City (KKMC)
On January 6, the Codel flew to King Khalid Military City,
where mustard agent had been detected in two locations. The
Codel met with Major General Al Alhami, Northern Area
Commander, who commanded KKMC during the Persian Gulf War.
General Al Alhami indicated that, during the war, he
received no evidence of any detections of chemical agents nor
of any medical problems that could be viewed as ``unusual.''
He indicated that, every time the Iraqis fired SCUDs, all
troops donned MOPP chemical protective gear (MOPP gear
includes a full body suit and mask with hood). Additionally,
he had no recollection of the French reporting their
detection of mustard agent to the KKMC Headquarters.
He has no knowledge of the Saudis, U.S. or Syrians, or any
other Coalition forces, having chemical agents/weapons with
their forces during the Persian Gulf War.
Jubail Industrial Center
Also on January 6, the Codel travelled to the Jubail
Industrial Center to discuss the possibility of industrial
chemical releases during the Persian Gulf War. The Codel met
with Mr. Terry Velanzano of the Jubail Planning Group and a
number of officials from the various civilian industrial
concerns located at Jubail. Most of those with whom the Codel
met were present at Jubail during the War.
The industrialists advised the Codel that there were no
instances in which industrial chemicals were released either
intentionally or unintentionally during the periods of time
when coalition forces were located in the Jubail region. They
specifically denied the intentional release of chemicals from
pressurized systems in response to warnings of SCUD attacks.
The industrialists also advised the Codel that there were
no and are no instances of medical ailments among the Jubail
work force and their families that could be construed as
``unusual'' or in any way linked to chemical agents during
the War.
damascus, syria
In Damascus, the Codel met with Major General Mohmend
Zughaybi, Chief of Medical Services, Ministry of Defense;
General Yaff, Director, Shrian Hospital; Mr. Assan, Assistant
Director; and Mr. Amur, Director, Department of Americas,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Nejdi Jazzar, Assistant
Secretary for American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Chief of Medical Services initially emphasized that he
had no knowledge of Syrian chemical agents, weapons, their
capabilities or of a Syrian chemical defense program.
However, toward the end of the meeting, he responded
affirmatively that Syrian troops conducted chemical defense
training, but do not use chemical agents/weapons or simulants
in that training. He later told the Codel that Syrian
chemical defense equipment was of Eastern European origin. He
indicated that the Syrians did not conduct any chemical
defense exercises training in the theater of operation using
chemical agents or chemical simulants.
General Zughaybi indicated that Syrian troops were
stationed near Hafir al Batin. He remarked that U.S. troops
panicked when the chemical alarms went off. He also indicated
that, when the Syrian troops responded to the chemical
alarms, they only put on masks, not protective suits.
He advised the Codel that, to his knowledge, the Syrians
were not aware of any coalition allies having chemical
weapons in the theater of operation, and that, although other
Arab countries have chemical weapons, he did not think Syria
has chemical weapons.
General Zughaybi was not aware of the Egyptians or Saudis
being informed of chemical agent detections, or whether they
complained that they were not informed.
The diseases suffered by the Syrian military personnel who
participated in the Persian Gulf War are similar to symptoms
of illnesses that occur in peacetime.
General Zughaybi asked General Blanck whether the diagnosis
was PTS (post traumatic stress), or psychological. General
Blanck replied that he believed it was organic. Additionally,
General Zughaybi added that he did not know about the long
term effects of exposure to chemical agents--or rather, the
occupance of symptoms long after exposure to low levels of
chemical agents. He did add, however, that Syrian military
personnel have different psychological mindset to the desert.
The underlying inference to be drawn is that, in his opinion,
the Persian Gulf Syndrome may in fact be psychological in
origin.
cairo, egypt
On January 9, the Codel traveled to Cairo, Egypt. While in
Cairo, the Codel received a country team briefing from U.S.
Embassy personnel. Senator Shelby met with President Mubarak.
On January 10, the Codel met with Lieutenant General Salah
Halaby, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces, and his staff.
General Halaby advised the Codel that Egypt had its own
chemical defense unit, which was very good, but he had no
recollection that they had detected any chemical agents
during the Persian Gulf War.
General Halaby indicated that Egypt's chemical defense
equipment is from Eastern Europe and from the West, and that
their detection equipment is more sophisticated than the
Czech equipment. The Egyptians use an American chemical agent
alarm (the M-1) and a Russian chemical agent detector (the
bulb and probe). The Egyptians also use chemical agent
detection strips. He further indicated that the Egyptian
chemical defense unit took air samples every day and night to
check for changes.
He suggested that the chemicals detected were not chemical
warfare agents, but industrial chemicals or substances used
in the construction and structure of the A-10 aircraft. (An
A-10 crashed near KKMC during the time frame when the KKMC
detections were made). He did not believe the aircraft
carried chemical weapons or chemical agents.
General Halaby and his staff commented that Egypt has no
chemical weapons, only chemical defense equipment (protective
gear). He said that, although Egyptian troops conduct
chemical defense training, they do not use chemical
stimulants in their training other than tear gas. General
Halaby was not aware of the Syrians having had chemical
agents/weapons in the theater. He was certain that no Iraqi
aircraft or artillery (which could have been used to deliver
chemical agents) had crossed the border.
He asked whether the illnesses suffered by the U.S. troops
resulted from their exposure to depleted uranium.
The Egyptian troops were located approximately 6 miles
north of the French troops in KKMC. At one point, General
Halaby said they were not aware of the detection of chemical
agent by the Czech chemical defense unit, but later in the
interview, he acknowledged that they were aware of the
detections but did not verify any chemical agents or
equipment. General Halaby commented that he knew that
chemical agent alarms could be tripped off by cigarette
smoke. He suggested that the French and Czech detections
could have been false alarms because the atmosphere was so
full of petrochemical smoke.
President Mubarak
President Mubarak acknowledged that Egypt has some chemical
weapons. He speculated that perhaps the chemical agents about
which the Codel was concerned came from Iran. He then
discussed with Senator Shelby general foreign policy issues
related to U.S. relations with Egypt, the peace process
between Israel and Syria, as well as Egypt's relations with
Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.
jerusalem, israel
In Jerusalem, the Codel met with an intelligence officer of
the Israeli Defense Force. He indicated that he was aware of
chemical agents being used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War,
and did not understand why they were not used in the Gulf
War. He believed that it was very significant that no
chemical weapons or delivery systems were found in theater
following the war. He surmised that there had been no
preparation for their use or they were withdrawn prior to D-
Day.
The Israeli Officer indicated that he did not believe the
Iraqis had a chemical weapons project underway but cautioned
that they could restart one at any moment.
The Israeli Officer also noted that the symptoms of the
Persian Gulf Illness did not fit any of the symptoms
traditionally associated with exposure to chemical agents. He
offered that, perhaps, the United States should focus some
attention on biological agents. He was convinced that the
Iraqis had a small biological weapons capability but
indicated that no biological weapons or delivery systems had
been found.
He indicated that the Israelis believed the Czech chemical
units to be very proficient and that their equipment is very
good. He noted, however, the prevalence of false alarms.
He suggested that we study the symptoms of those exposed to
chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War and that we discuss
the Persian Gulf Syndrome with Iranian doctors.
Contrary to information provided to the Codel in other
countries, the Israeli Officer indicated that all the
Coalition forces, especially Egypt and Syria use chemical
agent simulants in their training.
rabat, morocco
On January 13, the Codel traveled to Rabat, Morocco. In
preparation for our meetings with Moroccan government
officials, the U.S. Embassy conducted a country team briefing
and informed us that during the Persian Gulf War, Morocco and
Saudi Arabia had a bilateral agreement which placed Moroccan
military personnel under the authority of the Saudi military.
Morocco sent a motorized infantry unit from the Western
Sahara to the vicinity a petrochemical facility north of
Jubail about 50 kilometers from the Kuwait border.
In Rabat, the Codel met with Colonel Major Mohamed
Beuboumaudi, Inspector, Military Health Services. He
indicated that no Moroccan military personnel saw any
chemical weapons or equipment. He mentioned that, on one
occasion, his troops went to check the location in which an
artillery shell exploded for chemical agent. There were no
indications of any chemical agents present.
The Moroccan troops did not experience any illnesses
symptomatic of exposure to chemical agents. Additionally, he
pointed out that Moroccan troops were acclimated to service
in the desert. The inference here being the possible
psychological or environmental origin of the Persian Gulf
Syndrome.
With regard to the origin of Moroccan military chemical
defense equipment, he indicated that they used chemical
detection badges and gas masks provided by the Saudi
military. He noted that Morocco was a signatory of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CC).
In response to questions regarding the presence of chemical
agents or weapons in the theater of operations, and knowledge
as to whether coalition allies possessed chemical weapons or
agents, Colonel Major Beudoumaudi provided negative
responses. He indicated that he was not aware of Moroccan
troops participating in chemical defense training with
simulants during the Persian Gulf War.
The Codel also met with deputy minister of foreign affairs,
who reiterated the comments made by Colonel Major Beudoumaudi
regarding the Morocco military personnel's not being aware of
the presence of chemical weapons/agent in the theater of
operations and not having any knowledge of other coalition
allies in possession of chemical weapons/agent in the theater
of operation.
____
Conclusions and Recommendations on the Persian Gulf Syndrome
After numerous Congressional hearings, after many meetings
with official of the Department of Defense and Department of
Veterans officials and after two trips abroad I have come to
the following conclusions regarding the possible presence of
chemical/biological weapons agents in the theater of
operations during the Persian Gulf War, and possible
connection between service in the Persian Gulf War and the
illness among U.S. veterans referred to as the Persian Gulf
Syndrome.
1. Chemical agents were present in the theater of
operations during the Persian Gulf War. These chemical agents
were accurately verified by the Czech Chemical Units and
reported to CENTCOM Headquarters.
On this vital issue I have no doubt. Czech and French
forces detected both nerve gas and mustard agent at low
levels during the early days of Desert Storm. In each
instance these chemical agents were verified by Czech
equipment. The Codel had the opportunity to view this
equipment and received a demonstration. Department of Defense
officials have informed us that the Czech detection
equipment, which is more sensitive than U.S. equipment, is
more than adequate and that Czech personnel are well trained.
2. The origin of these chemical agents cannot be
determined.
Although I have also concluded that we may never be able to
determine the origin of these chemical agents there are
several plausible scenarios. I believe that we can rule out
Iraqi Scud or Frog missiles. We can also rule out Iraqi
artillery--the distance from the Iraqi border is too far. The
presence of low-level chemical weapons agents could have
resulted from U.S. or coalition forces bombing either Iraqi
chemical weapons facilities or caches of Iraqi weapons on the
Saudi border. Hafar-Al-Batin is approximately 100 miles from
the Saudi/Iraqi border. A cloud of nerve agent, dissipating
in intensity, could possibly have traveled under the correct
climate conditions to Hafar-Al-Batin. There is also the
possibility of an accident involving chemical agents among
coalition forces. Finally, it has been offered that these
detections, especially those in Hafar-Al-Batin and the
detection of the mustard agent on the ground north of KKMC,
were the result of Saudi Officials attempting to test the
abilities of the Czechs who they had engaged to assist Saudi
troops in chemical detections.
3. While a direct connection between the existence of low-
levels of chemical agents in the theater of operations and
the Persian Gulf Syndrome cannot be established based on the
information available at this time, such a connection cannot
and should not be discounted.
This is the most difficult issue that confronted my
investigation. There is very little information available on
studies of exposure to low-levels of chemical agents. I am
confident that the work being accomplished under Major
General Ronald Blanck, USA, Commander, Walter Reed Army
Medical Center is on the right track. I urge the Department
of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to finalize
a case definition for the Gulf War Syndrome. The Department
of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs should
initiate a serious project which focuses on the long term
effects of exposure to low-levels of chemical agents.
Additionally, the Department of Defense and the Department of
Veterans Affairs must cut through bureaucratic red tape and
seek all possible medical treatments for the Gulf War
Syndrome.
4. The Department of Defense has proven reluctant to pursue
or, in certain instances, to provide the information
necessary to prove or disprove allegations about the presence
of chemical agents in the theater of operations during the
Persian Gulf War. The reason for this apparent aversion to
``full disclosure'' has not been determined. Staff working on
this issue were constantly challenged by the Department's
evasiveness, inconsistency, and reluctance to work together
toward a common goal.
Several examples will illustrate this point:
During a briefing I attended on November 19, 1993 the Dr.
John Deutch, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
advised that, while the Department could neither confirm nor
deny the Czech detections and verifications, the Department
position was that categorically there were no chemical
warfare agents present in the theater of operations.
Having been advised by the Department of Defense that it
had no information to offer regarding the possible presence
of chemical warfare agents in the theater of operations, I
determined, with your concurrence, to travel to Europe and
the Middle East to pursue this matter with our allies. Only
after the Committee staff confronted the Department regarding
specific events that I learned about during these travels,
did the Department acknowledge that it had been aware of
these same events.
Similarly, it was only after my contact with our allies
revealed that they had, in fact, reported various chemical
detections to the Central Command Headquarters, that the
Department acknowledged evidence of this reporting in the
operational logs.
On page 45 of the history of the 2nd Marine division in
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which was published
by Marine Corps' History and Museum Division, there is a
detailed incident in which Marines of the 2nd Marine Division
detected mustard agent. I am at a loss to explain how an
official Marine Corps publication can document such an event
and the Department of Defense could deny any evidence
regarding chemical weapons agents in the theater of
operations.
Persian Gulf medical records of members of the 24th Naval
Reserve Battalion are missing from their files.
This passivity on the part of the Department when combined
with rather obvious attempts to dissuade the Committee staff
from the need for further investigation typifies the
Department's attitude toward the Committee on this matter.
____
Report and Conclusions on the Persian Gulf Syndrome
(By Senator Richard C. Shelby)
When Iraqi forces, at the direction of Saddam Hussein,
crossed into Kuwait on August 2, 1990, they set off a change
reaction of events that resulted in the assembling of the
largest coalition of forces since the Second World War.
Countries that had been on the opposite sides of the Cold War
were now joined with the expressed goal of driving Saddam
Hussein's troops out of Kuwait.
Soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines were sent to Saudi
Arabia from all over the globe. The U.S. led the way with
over 600,000 members of our armed services, including over
200,000 reservists. Troops were sent from Great Britain,
France, Italy, Egypt, Syria, Morocco and many other nations.
Czechoslovakia, at the behest of the Saudi Arabian
government, provided chemical warfare agent detection units.
There was a strong belief among the coalition forces that
chemical and even biological agents would be used as weapons
by Iraq should the coalition forces invade Kuwait and Iraq.
Iraq was known to posses G-series nerve and mustard agents
and it was believed that they also possessed Anthrax and
possibly other biological agents. After all, Saddam Hussein
had freely and indiscriminately used chemical weapons,
delivered in artillery shells and dropped as bombs, during
his war with Iran, not only against Iranians, but also
against Kurds.
When Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, there was
obvious concern among Coalition Forces about Saddam Hussein's
reaction to allied air strikes. U.S. bombing was stealthy and
effective, knocking out Iraqi communications in the first
hours of the war and Saddam Hussein's nuclear and chemical
warfare factories were targeted and destroyed. Additionally,
B-52's bombed Iraqi positions along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi
borders with Saudi Arabia.
Saddam Hussein responded by launching Scud missiles toward
Saudi Arabia and Israel. Because there was always the
possibility of an Iraqi launch of a Scud armed with a
chemical warhead, gas masks and chemical protection suits
were donned at the first sign of attack. These Scud attacks
were met with moderate success by U.S. Patriot Missile
batteries. With the exception of one missile which landed on
a company of Pennsylvania reservists, the Scuds had more
success as a weapon of terror than as a weapon of physical
destruction.
On February 24, 1991, Coalition forces began the ground
phase of the campaign as they charged into Iraq and Kuwait.
Within 100 hours Kuwait was in the hands of the Coalition,
and what was left of Saddam Hussein's forces was fleeing
toward Baghdad. A great victory had been won. General Norman
Schwartzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command; and
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff;
were heroes and by the end of May 1991 the vast majority of
U.S. troops were home.
However, by the summer of 1992, Gulf War veterans,
primarily members of the National Guard and Reserves, were
relating stories of a mystery illness affecting many who had
served in Saudi Arabia. Symptoms included: joint pain,
fatigue, headaches, decreased short-term memory, unexplained
rashes, painful burning muscles, sleep disorders and
diarrhea. While most of us have experienced similar symptoms
at one time or another, these ailments were not responding to
treatment.
In response to possible Gulf War-related illness, the
Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision in the
Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992
that established a registry for members of our armed forces
who served in the Persian Gulf theater of operations and may
have been exposed to fumes from burning oil wells. The smoke
from oil well fires, deliberately set by Iraqi soldiers as
they retreated from Kuwait, caused acute respiratory problems
which could result in long-term health problems. However,
none of these sick veterans were among those who had been
exposed to smoke from oil well fires. To assist in the
investigation of this issue a Desert Shield/Desert Storm
registry was established in the Department of Veterans
Affairs Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1993.
By January 1993, the veterans were becoming increasingly
frustrated by the inability of the Veterans Department to
treat their illnesses. I met with a group of Alabama veterans
after a town meeting that I held in Bessemer and pledged that
I would do everything in my power to get them proper
treatment and to find the cause of their ailments.
In February 1993, I met with Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Jesse Brown and received his pledge to assist these veterans.
Following this meeting, the Department of Defense and the
Department of Veterans Affairs announced that centers would
be established for the treatment of what had become known as
the Gulf War Syndrome. However, when little progress was
made, veterans were prompted to seek treatment outside of the
Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs
medical community.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements and
Personnel, I included a panel of Gulf War veterans consisting
of Congressman Stephen Buyer of Indiana; Army Staff Sergeant
Kerry Riegel; Petty Officer Sterling Sims, a member of 24th
Construction Battalion of the Navy Reserves; and Sergeant
Willie Hicks, a member of the 644th Ordinance Company of the
Alabama Army National Guard in my June 30, 1993 hearing on
military medical health care.
Just days before the hearing, a leading U.S. newspaper
reported that U.S. forces may have been exposed to chemical
warfare agents during Desert Storm and testimony from both
Petty Officer Sims and Sergeant Hicks confirmed the
possibility of their exposure to chemical attacks while
serving in the Persian Gulf War.
I believe the most dramatic event of the investigation
occurred in the early morning hours of January 20, 1991, when
an explosion went off in the sky above Jabail along the North
East coast of Saudi Arabia alerting Seabees in the 24th
Construction Battalion to donn their chemical defensive gear.
After the all clear signal was given, a group of Seabees were
hit with a burning mist that smelled of ammonia and caused
their khaki colored t-shirts to turn purple.
On July 2, 1993, possibly responding to reports in American
newspapers, the Czech News Agency reported that Czech
military units had detected chemical warfare agents, both
nerve gas and mustard agents in Saudi Arabia during the
opening days of the air war against Iraq. Nerve Gas was
detected by a Czechoslovakian unit attached to the Saudi
troops in the area of Hafar-Al-Batin on January 19, 1991 and
Mustard Agent was allegedly detected in a 20200 centimeter
patch in the desert north of King Khalid Military City on
January 24, 1991. A report of these detections was
supposedly forwarded to the U.S. Department of Defense by
the Czech government.
This announcement led to a series of meetings with
Department of Defense officials, which continued throughout
the fall of 1993 and included a meeting with Undersecretary
of Defense John Deutch. Although a multitude of chemical
alarms were sounded during Operation Desert Storm, the
Department of Defense maintained that they had no evidence of
any chemical weapons attacks by Iraq during the Gulf War and
they could not confirm the detection of chemical warfare
agents. While Department of Defense officials did not deny
that the Czechs had detected chemical warfare agents at low
levels, they could not or would not confirm the presence of
chemical warfare agents in the theater of operations.
On October 27, 1993, Dr. Charles Jackson of the Tuskegee,
Alabama Veterans Medical Center diagnosed a patient as
suffering from Gulf War Syndrome and Chemical-Biological
Warfare Exposure. In response to both this announcement and
pressure from Congress, Secretary Brown announced, on
November 1, 1993, that the Department of Veterans Affairs was
establishing a pilot program in Birmingham, Alabama to test
Persian Gulf veterans from Alabama and Georgia for exposure
to chemical weapons agents, and on November 10, 1993,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced a blue-ribbon task
force, headed by Dr. Josh Letterberg, to study the Gulf War
Syndrome.
It was in response to these events that Sen. Sam Nunn,
Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, sent me to both
Europe and the Middle East to investigate all issues related
to the possible presence of chemical and biological weapon
agents in the theater of operations during Operation Desert
Storm and the possible connection between service in the
Persian Gulf and the unexplained illness affecting thousands
of veterans.
The initial stage of my investigation of these issues led
me to Prague; London; and Paris. Dr. Edwin Dorn, then
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
and Maj. Gen. Ronald Blanck, Commander of Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, and members of both my personal staff and the
Senate Armed Services Committee staff accompanied me.
Enroute to Prague, we met with the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations (DCSOPS) and representatives from the
Headquarters of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and were
provided with their assessment of possible chemical weapons
use and/or employment during the Persian Gulf War.
According to the representatives, on January 19, 1991, a
Czech chemical unit detected G-series nerve agents in two
locations in concentrations which were militarily
insignificant. U.S. chemical reconnaissance troops were
called in to verify the detection and were unable to detect
any agent at either of the two locations. Also, on January
24, 1991, a Czech chemical unit detected mustard agent in a
wet sand patch measuring two meters by 60 centimeters, two
kilometers north of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). (Note:
Other sources would place this detection 10 kilometers north
of KKMC.) Additionally, on January 17, 1991, the U.S. bombed
a chemical weapons munitions storage site at An Nasiryah,
located 200 kilometers from the Saudi-Iraq border, but the
U.S. does not believe this action was the cause of the
January 19, detection of nerve agent by the Czech chemical
detection unit.
The representatives from U.S. Army Europe continued by
saying that they believed the Saudis had an underground
chemical training facility in the vicinity of the ``wet
spot,'' which could account for the small amounts of chemical
agents detected. Finally, they believed that the chemicals
detected may have been part of an attempt by the Saudis to
test the capabilities of the Czech chemical detection unit,
but no information was offered on the part of the
representatives on where the Saudis would have gotten the
chemical weapons agents.
the czech republic
In Prague, I met with members of the Czech chemical
detection unit that served in the Persian Gulf, including:
Col. Kozak, Chief of the Chemical Troops; Lt. Col. Smehlik,
Senior Chemical officer in the Persian Gulf; Maj. Zilinsky
and Capt. Ferus, leaders of the Czech chemical detection
units on the Persian Gulf during the operations.
Initially, the Czechs' chemical detection unit deployed to
the Persian Gulf with 169 members, but increased to
approximately 190 members and included chemical, medical and
other support personnel. In addition, we were told that this
unit was under contract to the Saudi government to provide
chemical weapon and/or agent detection to the Saudi
government during the Persian Gulf War.
Lt. Col. Smehlik informed us that on January 19, 1991,
Czech chemical units, that were working approximately 20
kilometers apart with 4th and 20th Saudi brigades, made three
nearly simultaneous detections of a low concentration of G-
series nerve agent in the air. The Czechs condsider these
detections to have resulted from one event that occurred in
the late afternoon which lasted approximately 40 minutes. At
ground level, at the time of the event, they said the wind
was blowing from the northwest--a direct contrast to what
Department of Defense officials said to the Senate Armed
Services Committee earlier when they claimed that the
prevailing winds were blowing from the northeast.
The Czechs took air samples from two of the three locations
and verified that the samples contained G-series nerve agent.
While they were not able to distinguish between sarin or
soman, Lt. Col. Smehlik indicated that they had excluded the
existence of V-series agents. These air samples were sent
back to then Czechoslovakia, and are no longer available. An
air sample from the third location was not taken for the
purpose of verification because the Czech chemical detection
unit was moving at the time of the alarm.
As discussions continued, Capt. Ferus, a leader of one of
the Czech chemical units, informed us that on January 24,
1991, he was summoned by Saudi officials to an area 10
kilometers north of KKMC to test the area for chemical
agents. Using a portable laboratory kit, he detected mustard
agent in the sand--the on-site detection made the retention
of samples unnecessary.
According to Lt. Col. Smehlik, another detection of mustard
agent in the air near the Engineer School in KKMC had been
made two to three days prior to the detection January 24. He
indicated that an air sample was taken, verified by the
mobile laboratory and forwarded to Czechoslovakia; this
sequence of events was confirmed for the group by the
Czech warrant officer who reported the actual detection.
It is important to note that these detections had not been
made public previously. In discussion with Czech
officials, we were able to determine that until recently
there had been no discussion between Czech units stationed
with Saudi troops near Hafar-Al-Batin and those stationed
in KKMC. The Czechs believe that both detections of
mustard agent and nerve agent were at levels that
presented no danger to the health and safety of the troops
in the area, and were, therefore, militarily
insignificant.
Although they were unable to provide any documentary
evidence to support certain events, I believe that it is
necessary to acknowledge that the Czechs claim that an air
sample of the mustard agent detected in the air in KKMC prior
to January 24, 1991, was given to a U.S. special forces
member. In subsequent discussions with our group, Lt. Col.
Smehlik indicated that the individual in question may have
been an intelligence officer.
The Czech units did not have any chemical agents in the
Persian Gulf, according to Col. Kozak, and did not use live
agents during their training with the Saudis. Their chemical
detection equipment, which we examined and watched as it was
demonstrated, was 1970s and 1980s Czech and Russian. However,
according to the Czechs, the equipment has much lower
threshold for chemical detection than does U.S. chemical
detection equipment. In addition, we were informed that the
equipment would be shipped to Edgewood Arsenal for testing.
great britain
While in London, we met with Dr. Graham Pearson, Director
General of the Chemical & Biological Defense Establishment;
Mr. Brian Pitts from the Surgeon General's Office; Ms. Jill
Ferguson; Lt. Col. John Esmonde-White and Col. Christopher
Box. We were informed that approximately 42,000 British
soldiers served in the Persian Gulf War. Apart from this
information, the representatives of the British government
the group met were not very helpful.
Officials in the British government do not believe that the
Czech units detected the presence of any chemical weapons,
nerve or mustard agents in the Persian Gulf and they spent a
considerable amount of effort attempting to find plausible
means of discrediting the Czech reports.
In addition, the British government does not recognize the
possible of any connection between service in the Persian
Gulf and any illness that cannot be explained by conventional
medical diagnosis. The British government has about 30
veterans from the Persian Gulf who have reported medical
problems and does not consider these medical conditions
peculiar to service in the Persian Gulf.
Furthermore, the British government does not recognize
Multiple Chemical Toxicity/Sensitivity as a valid concept.
The representatives with whom we met believe the Persian Gulf
Syndrome is the result of American veterans attempting to
increase their medical and disability benefits and we were
advised that the United States did not have to invent a
new environmental disease to explain the symptoms being
experienced by American veterans.
Aside from the British government's lack of cooperation, or
acknowledgement of these existing conditions, British
citizens have set up a Persian Gulf Families Hot Line,
located in Glouchester, England, that serves as a clearing
house for those who believe they have illnesses related to
their service in the Persian Gulf. I met with Mr. Raymond
Donn, a solicitor from Manchester, England, who is in the
process of filing a class action suit against the British
government to obtain compensation for these veterans. He told
me that there could be as many as 500 British veterans
afflicted with the Gulf War Illness.
france
While in Paris, we met with Lt. Col. Gerrard Emile Ferrand,
a French Army infantry officer who served in the Persian
Gulf. He informed us that the French had detected nerve and
mustard agent at a Logistics Facility approximately 26 or 27
kilometers south of KKMC on the evening of January 24 or
January 25 and he indicated that the wind at ground level had
been from the north (from Iraq). French chemical alarms were
activated at two locations approximately 100 meters apart and
Colonel Ferrand, who arrived at the location about 30 minutes
after the initial alarm, indicated that litmus badges on the
protective suits worn by French troops registered the
presence of mustard agent. A Czech chemical detection unit
was contacted to verify the presence of chemical agents,
confirmed as both mustard agent and nerve agent--either Soman
or Tabun, and the area was decontaminated.
Lt. Col. Ferrand also noted that approximately two or three
days later, the French chemical alarms were again activated
in the same area. This time, the wind had shifted and was
from the south. Unable to determine what chemical agent was
present, the French again asked the Czech chemical detection
units for assistance, but none responded. Lt. Col. Ferrand
reported both these events to the French command located at
Riyadh and believes these reports were forwarded to CENTCOM
headquarters.
It is interesting to note that the Czech chemical detection
unit did not mention any contact with the French concerning a
detection of either or both nerve agent or mustard agent
during our discussions with them, and the French had no
knowledge of previous Czech chemical agent detections.
Although the trip to Europe was productive, our
investigation remained incomplete. It was necessary to travel
to the Middle East to meet with our coalition allies
stationed in the areas in question to resolve key questions
about the presence of chemical agents in the theater of
operations and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf
Syndrome. Unanswered questions we set out to answer included
the following:
Did any of the coalition allies serving in the Persian Gulf
have chemical weapons in the theater of operations or
conducted chemical weapons training using live agent
or stimulants.
Did representatives of any of the coalition allies receive
any air samples from the Czechs while in the Gulf?
Did a U.S. Special Forces soldier or Intelligence Community
member receive an air sample from the Czech chemical defense
unit?
Did any member of the allied coalition receive reports,
other than the report of the January 19 event, from any
coalition partner of a detection of chemical agents including
any reports of chemical agents at a level considered to be
militarily insignificant and no threat to the safety or
health of U.S. troops or other coalition personnel?
Saudi Arabia
On January 3, 1994, I, accompanied again by Maj. Gen.
Ronald Blanck, staff members from both my personal office and
the Committee on Armed Services, left for the Middle East.
Our first stop was in Saudi Arabia where we visited Riyadh,
KKMC and Jubail and met with several high ranking members of
the Saudi Arabian military and civilian representatives of
the firms located in the Jubail industrial region.
According to the director of Military Intelligence and
Security, on January 19 and 24, 1991, the Czechs chemical
detection units detected and verified low levels of nerve
agent and mustard agent and reported this to the Saudi
Arabian military. In the absence of any evidence of a
delivery vehicle (missile, bomb, etc.), the Saudi military
determined that these low levels did not pose a threat to the
public health or to animals. In addition, he substantiated
this claim by explaining that to date, no Saudi military
personnel or civilians have complained of illnesses that can
be attributed to service in the theater of operations during
the Persian Gulf War, and the Saudi Arabian government has no
evidence of the use of biological agents, even though the
United Nations subsequently discovered evidence of research
and development on biological agents.
In addition, on January 24, 1991, the French reported the
possible detection of chemical agents (the so-called ``wet
spot'' north of KKMC) to the Saudis who did not don
protective chemical defense gear, but contacted the Czech
chemical detection unit. The Czechs detected and verified the
presence of mustard agent on the ground and the incident was
reported by the Saudis to CENTCOM Headquarters. U.S.
personnel were sent to the area in question but were unable
to detect a chemical agent.
Saudi intelligence had no information to offer regarding
the possible source of the low-level chemical agents.
The Saudis do not believe the symptoms suffered by the U.S.
veterans occurred as a result of exposure to chemical
weapons, according to the head of Saudi military
intelligence. He said that the Saudis did not have chemical
agents or stimulants and was not aware if the other Coalition
forces had chemical agents in the theater. He indicated
that it is possible that the Egyptians and Syrians could
have had chemical agents and/or weapons, but the Saudi
military personnel did not have offensive chemical weapons
in the area, not did they conduct defensive chemical
weapons training. He did, however, believe the reports of
the Czech and French detections.
We also met with Mohammed Saleh al Hammad, Chief of Staff
and Minister of Defense Education, He had little to offer
regarding the subject of our inquiry, but be expressed
confidence in the reliability of the Czech and French
detections. When asked about the origin of nerve and mustard
agents, he said he did not know, but he speculated that they
could have come from either friendly or aggressor forces. He
also speculated that the U.S. military might have brought it.
On January 6, our group flew to KKMC, where mustard agent
had been detected in two locations. The base commander, Major
General Al Alhami, indicated that during the war he received
no evidence of any detections of chemical agents nor of any
medical problems that could be viewed as unusual. He
indicated that every time the Iraqis fired SCUDs, all troops
donned MOPP chemical protective gear (which includes a full
body suit and mask with hood). Additionally, he had no
recollection of the French reporting their detection of
mustard agent to the KKMC Headquarters, nor any knowledge of
the Saudis, U.S., Syrians or any other Coalition forces
having chemical agents and/or weapons with their forces
during the Persian Gulf War.
On January 6, we travelled to the Jubail Industrial Center
to discuss the possibility of industrial chemical releases
during the Persian Gulf War. Our group met with Mr. Terry
Velanzano of the Jubail Planning Group and a number of
officials from the various civilian industrial interests
located at Jubail. Most of those with whom we met were
present at Jubail during the War.
The industrialists advised us that there were no instances
in which industrial chemicals were released either
intentionally or unintentionally during the periods of time
when coalition forces were located in the Jubail region. The
specifically denied the intentional release of chemicals from
pressurized systems in response to warnings of SCUD attacks.
In addition, they advised us that there have been no
instances of medical ailments among the Jubail work force and
their families that could be construed as unusual or in any
way linked to chemical agents during the War.
syria
Our group continued its investigation in Damascus, Syria
where we met with a series of Syrian military and Foreign
Ministry officials. While the Chief of Medical Services
initially emphasized that he had no knowledge of Syrian
chemical agents, weapons, or of a Syrian chemical defense
program, near the end of the meeting, he admitted that Syrian
troops conducted chemical defense training, but do not use
chemical agents and/or weapons or stimulants in that training
and did not conduct any chemical defense exercise training in
the theater of operation using chemical agents or chemical
stimulants. Later, he told us that Syrian chemical defense
equipment was of Eastern European origin.
We were informed that Syrian troops were stationed near
Hafir al Batin. He remarked that U.S. troops frequently
panicked when the chemical alarms went off. He also indicated
that when the Syrian troops responded to the chemical alarms
they only put on masks, not protective suits. Furthermore, he
advised the Codel that the Syrians were not aware of any
coalition allies having chemical weapons in the theater of
operation and that, although other Arab countries have
chemical weapons, he did not think Syria has chemical
weapons. According to him, the Syrians did not know whether
the Egyptians or Saudis has been informed of chemical agent
detections.
egypt
President Mubarak, with whom I met in Cairo, acknowledged
that Egypt has some chemical weapons. During our discussion,
he speculated that the chemical agents we were concerned
about may have come from Iran. Additionally, we discussed
foreign policy issues related to U.S. relations with Egypt,
the peace process between Israel and Syria, as well as
Egypt's relations with Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.
We also met with Lt. Gen. Salah Halaby, Chief of Staff for
the Egyptian Armed Forces, and his staff. Gen. Halaby advised
us that Egypt had its own chemical defense unit, which was
very good, but he did not recall their having detected any
chemical agents during the Persian Gulf War. When asked about
the chemical detections that were made, he suggested that
they were not chemical warfare agents, but industrial
chemicals or substances used in the construction and
structure of the A-10 aircraft. An A-10 crashed near KKMC at
the approximate time of the KKMC detections; however, he did
not believe the aircraft carried chemical weapons or chemical
agents.
Lt. Gen. Halaby and his staff commented that Egypt has no
chemical weapons, only chemical defense equipment (protective
gear). He said although Egyptian troops conduct chemical
defense training, they do not use chemical stimulants, with
the exception of tear gas, in their training. Gen. Halaby was
not aware of the Syrians having had chemical agents/weapons
in the theater. He was certain that no Iraqi aircraft or
artillery (which could have been used to deliver chemical
agents) had crossed the border.
At one point, Lt. Gen. Halaby said they were not aware of
the detection of chemical agents by the Czech chemical
detection unit, but later in the interview, he acknowledged
that they were aware of the detections but did not verify any
chemical agents or equipment. Lt. Gen. Halaby commented that
he knew that chemical agent alarms could be tripped off by
cigarette smoke. He suggested that the French and Czech
detections could have been false alarms because the
atmosphere was so full of petrochemical smoke.
israel
In Jerusalem, we met with an intelligence officer of the
Israeli Defense Force. He indicated that he was aware of
chemical agents being used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War,
and did not understand why they were not used in the Gulf
War. In addition, he believed that it was very significant
that no chemical weapons or delivery systems were found in
the theater following the war and he surmised that there had
been no preparation for their use or they were withdrawn
prior to D-Day. The Israeli Officer indicated that he did not
believe that Iraq had a chemical weapons project underway but
cautioned that they could restart one at any moment.
He continued by saying that the Israelis believe the Czech
chemical detection unit to be very proficient and that their
equipment is very good. He noted, however, the prevalence of
false alarms. In addition, he suggested that we study the
symptoms of those exposed to chemical agents during the Iran-
Iraq War and discuss the Persian Gulf Syndrome with Iranian
doctors. Contrary to information provided to us in other
countries, the Israeli Officer indicated that all the
Coalition forces, especially Egypt and Syria, use chemical
agent stimulants in their training.
morocco
On January 13, we traveled to Rabat. In preparation for our
meetings with Moroccan government officials, the U.S. Embassy
conducted a country team briefing and informed us that during
the Persian Gulf War, Morocco and Saudi Arabia had a
bilateral agreement which placed Moroccan military personnel
under the authority of the Saudi military. Morocco sent a
motorized infantry unit from the Western Sahara to the
vicinity a petrochemical facility north of Jubail about 50
kilometers from the Kuwait border.
In Rabat, we met with Colonel Major Mohammed Beuboumaudi,
Inspector, Military Health Services. He indicated that no
Moroccan military personnel saw any chemical weapons or
equipment. He mentioned that, on one occasion, his troops
went to check the location in which an artillery shell
exploded for chemical agent. There were no indications of any
chemical agents present.
The Moroccan troops did not experience any illnesses
symptomatic of exposure to chemical agents. Additionally, he
pointed out that Moroccan troops were acclimated to service
in the desert. The inference here being the possible
psychological or environmental origin of the Persian Gulf
Syndrome.
In response to questions regarding the presence of chemical
agents or weapons in the theater of operations and knowledge
as to whether coalition allies possessed chemical weapons or
agents, Col. Maj. Beudoumaudi provided negative responses. He
indicated that he was not aware of Moroccan troops
participating in chemical defense training with stimulants
during the Persian Gulf War.
Finally, we met with the deputy minister of foreign affairs
who reiterated the comments made by Col. Maj. Beudoumaudi
regarding the Morocco military personnel's not being aware of
the presence of chemical weapons and/or agents in the theater
of operations and not having any knowledge of other coalition
allies in possession of chemical weapons and/or agents in the
theater of operation.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reid). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mrs. Kassebaum and Mr. Kerrey pertaining to the
introduction of S. 1943 are located in today's Record under
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Senator from Nebraska yields
the floor.
Who seeks recognition?
The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Kohl.
Mr. KOHL. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Kohl pertaining to the introduction of S. 1944
and S. 1947 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Exon pertaining to the introduction of S. 1942
and S.J. Res. 173 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I suggest absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak
for 5 minutes as if in morning business.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
____________________