[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 30 (Thursday, March 17, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 17, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                     UNITED STATES POLICY ON RUSSIA

  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, U.S. policy toward Russia is in disarray. 
The time of strategic partnership is over--if it ever began. President 
Yeltsin acts in increasingly erratic terms, the new parliament has 
freed antidemocratic coup-makers, the Russian military asserts itself 
throughout the territory of the former Soviet empire. The Russian 
foreign ministry is challenging American interests from Bosnia to the 
Middle East.
  The administration's reaction can only be characterized as denial. 
President Clinton equates Russian neo-imperialism with the liberation 
of Panama and Grenada, while the State Department defends, excuses, and 
even welcomes Russian actions from Georgia to Tajikistan to the 
Balkans. Meanwhile, our assistance program serves to enrich American 
consultants but is virtually invisible in the former Soviet Union.
  What we need is a fundamental reassessment of United States policy 
toward Russia. I hosted a breakfast meeting last week with outside 
experts, including two appointees from the Bush administration, a 
retired military officer who endorsed President Clinton, and an 
academic expert on Russia. There was unanimity that U.S. policy is 
headed in the wrong direction.
  Two of my colleagues have made important contributions over the last 
2 weeks in beginning this reassessment: Senator Lugar before the 
American Spectator Dinner Club, and Senator McCain before the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies. These insightful speeches, one 
by a senior member of the Armed Services Committee and the other by a 
senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee deserve wide 
attention. They constructively criticize the flaws in the current 
United States approach to Russia, and suggest alternative courses that 
should form the basis of further debate.
  Senator Lugar rightly points out that the idea of a mature strategic 
partnership between Russia and the United States--as claimed in the 
communique at the January Moscow summit--is nonsense. The Russians are 
not partners but, as Senator Lugar puts it, ``tough rivals.''

  Senator McCain points out that United States policy has ``squandered 
real opportunities for the United States to serve our own interests and 
advance our values, and to serve the interests of humanity in the 
bargain.'' On the reassertion of Russian imperialism, Senator McCain 
points out that the United States has ``tolerated and at times 
excused'' such actions, and that the ``United States should also make 
clear to Russia that it will no longer dismiss Russian meddling in the 
affairs of its neighbors. We obviously cannot guarantee their 
sovereignty but we should not help finance its violation.''
  Both Senator Lugar and Senator McCain argue for clear guidelines for 
NATO expansion--a policy which has widespread support in the Senate, as 
expressed in the approval of Senator McConnell's amendment on the 
subject last month.
  Mr. President, criticism of the administration's Russia policy is not 
partisan. President Carter's former National Security Adviser recently 
published an article which termed the administration's approach 
``flawed in its assumptions, focused on the wrong strategic goal, and 
dangerous in its likely geopolitical consequences.'' In fact, outside 
of Deputy Secretary Talbott, it is hard to find any expert that agrees 
with the administration's approach to Russia. The speeches of Senators 
Lugar and McCain are a good place to start the much-needed policy 
review.
  I ask unanimous consent that their speeches be printed in the Record 
at this point.
  There being no objection, the speeches were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  [Remarks prepared for delivery to the American Spectator Washington 
             Dinner Club, Four Seasons Hotel, Mar. 7, 1994]

              The Russians Are Tough Rivals, Not Partners

                     (By Senator Richard G. Lugar)


                  a strategic or limited partnership?

       The communique at the Clinton-Yeltsin January summit 
     meeting in Moscow claimed the achievement of a ``mature 
     strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, 
     and recognition of each other's national interests.'' The 
     parties noted their eagerness to ``move forward on the path 
     of openness and mutual trust.''
       But this statement and the concept it represents is 
     nonsense. A strategic partnership between Russia and the West 
     does not exist because it is impossible to attach any 
     realistic substance to it. This sort of rhetoric is bound to 
     raise and then dash public expectations of Russian behavior, 
     and it makes more likely an overreaction when Russia begins 
     to act in ways that dismay us. By ignoring the plain truth 
     about Russia, the Clinton Administration is not prepared for 
     the policy consequences that flow from the truth.


               a redefinition of russian vital interests

       The crisis last October in Moscow marked Russia's rejection 
     of the principle of integration with the West as the 
     underlying premise of Russia's security policies and the 
     substitution of Russian vital interests as the underlying 
     basis on which security decisions are made. The original 
     strategy of integrating with the West was based on an 
     assumption that the major threat to Russian security came 
     from political and economic isolation and that salvation 
     flowed from political and economic reforms and cooperation 
     with the West.
       A major tenet of that strategy, we assumed, was that Russia 
     would develop normal, cooperative relations with the other 
     Soviet successor states, based on mutual respect for 
     territorial integrity. But all of this was undercut by 
     unrealistic expectations regarding U.S. willingness to 
     nurture Russia back to economic and political health and by 
     the ethnic turmoil that engulfed her nearest neighbors, 
     threatening perceived Russian security interests as well as 
     Russian minorities.
       By the fall of 1993, a Russian consensus developed around 
     the notion that Russian security and her place in the 
     international community could be entrusted only to herself. 
     Consequently, Russian ``vital interests'' must become the 
     guiding principle of security policies. This rejection of 
     cooperation with the West in favor of ``vital interests'' has 
     alarmed the Newly Independent States who fear that ``vital 
     interests'' is a euphemism for renewed Russian imperialism. 
     The shift has also raised fears in the United States that an 
     expansionist-minded Russia may again threaten eastern Europe.
       While none of the publicly-stated Russian goals with 
     respect to the Newly Independent States and the ``Near 
     Abroad''--stability, protection of Russian minorities, 
     defense of security interests--has seemed all that alarming 
     to the State Department, they have, at minimum, called into 
     question some of the basic assumptions behind the Clinton 
     Administration's policies toward Russia.


                redefining american ``vital interests''

       In the spring of 1993, Under Secretary of State Peter 
     Tarnoff described a world of ``medium-sized bad guys'' who in 
     many ways are more irresponsible and dangerous than the bad 
     guys of the Cold War era. But the main theme of his remarks 
     before the Overseas Writers Club was that the end of the Cold 
     War has wrought dramatic changes, and that with the decline 
     of the nuclear threat, economic interests are ascendant in 
     U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. can no longer be counted on the 
     take the lead in regional disputes unless it can discern 
     clear national interests at stake.
       Secretary of State Warren Christopher subsequently 
     suggested that the U.S. would adopt a unilateral approach if 
     necessary when vital interests were involved, while a 
     multilateral approach would suffice for lesser U.S. 
     interests. But ``multilateralism'' became something of a 
     cover for U.S. retrenchment and the abandonment of leadership 
     to the vagaries of international vents--as well as an excuse 
     for diluting our definitions of what constitute ``clear and 
     vital national interests.''
       The Clinton Administration--after suggesting that it 
     planned to pursue lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
     Muslims with NATO air support--gave up that plan with little 
     struggle in the face of European opposition. The 
     Administration instead accepted a weak alternative of 
     protection safe havens for the Bosnian Muslims. But what 
     was worse, there appeared to be an inclination to turn 
     that policy mistake into a policy doctrine, a doctrine of 
     diminished U.S. leadership cloaked in ``multilateralism'' 
     at a time when security threats were increasing.
       The Administration seemed to classify Western Europe as a 
     vital interest while East-Central Europe and the Balkans were 
     not. They appeared to be using a definition of vital 
     interests that was a function of geography and nuclear 
     weapons. Their rhetoric was about democracy and shared 
     values, but their policies did not necessarily reflect this.
       I said at the time that this narrower definition had to be 
     challenged if other national leaders were to be persuaded to 
     confront instability borne of a new power vacuum in Europe 
     and if they were to be convinced that the risks of doing 
     nothing in the face of policy evolutions in Moscow were 
     great.
       It has been the budget-driven cuts in our defense 
     establishment, along with some ill-considered statements by 
     Administration officials on a narrower definition of vital 
     American national interests in the context of the debate over 
     what to do about Bosnia, that has produced an as-yet 
     unfocused discussion over U.S. willingness to define 
     commitment in Europe in a manner commensurate with out 
     security and economic interests.


                        from tarnoff to talbott

       Prior to Bosnia, NATO was a budget issue; then its efficacy 
     as a vehicle for promoting or protecting Western interests 
     arose. Now, its revitalization may be the key to sustaining 
     any long-term American involvement, not just in NATO, but in 
     Europe.
       Central Europe is adrift security-wise in the aftermath of 
     the breakup of the USSR as well as the slowed pace of 
     democratic and economic reforms. Eastern European states seek 
     more solid moorings in the West through NATO. Western Europe 
     has been loosened from some of its traditional mooring, as 
     the Maastricht Treaty has proven to be a less than reliable 
     stimulus and compass by which to achieve greater integration.
       The North Atlantic alliance has experienced a ``relevance'' 
     crisis every bit as psychologically intense as the fits and 
     starts encountered in trying to fashion a European security 
     identity. That NATO is experiencing a ``relevance'' crisis at 
     the same time as Europe is undergoing a security ``identity'' 
     crisis should surprise no one. What is surprising is United 
     States's reluctance to deal with the security crisis by 
     updating and revitalizing NATO. In addition, the U.S. is 
     groping for new post-Cold War strategies and polices under a 
     new administration, even as signs reappear that Russia may, 
     out of a sense of desperation, be moving in foreign policy 
     directions not-so-strangely reminiscent of its more imperial 
     predecessors.


             contending approaches to policy toward russia

       There have been two prominent schools of though in the U.S. 
     regarding the appropriate policy approach toward Moscow.
       To oversimplify, the first view, the Clinton 
     Administration's view, holds that Russia is a partner of the 
     U.S. and that Russia could and should be helpful in combating 
     global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and a force for 
     regional and global stability.
       The U.S. should therefore undertake policies designed to 
     help the Russians, to bolster President Yeltsin, and the 
     Russian democratic forces.
       Unfortunately, strong emphasis on partnership with 
     President Yeltsin and constant recognition of his political 
     needs in Russia is perceived by Ukraine, other NIS, and 
     European allies as giving short-shrift to their aspirations.
       The second school of U.S. thought holds that Russian 
     interests internationally are basically incompatible with 
     those of the United States. Such being the case, little 
     cooperation is expected and therefore a policy focusing on 
     U.S. engagement with Russia is misguided.
       This school of thought believes that Russian suppression of 
     human rights continues; modernization of strategic weapons 
     systems proceeds apace; export of conventional weaponry and 
     perhaps material components of potential weapons of mass 
     destruction is evident, and the payment of over $2 million to 
     a Russian spy in the CIA exemplifies the state of play. 
     American public figures then announce that all aid should be 
     cut off for a while, at least, pending further observation of 
     a potentially neo-imperialist rival.


               a ``national interest'' school of thought

       Neither of these approaches is satisfying because neither 
     meets our national interests, nor do they foster the kind of 
     Russia we want to see develop.
       We are not partners with Russia. We are tough-minded 
     rivals. Many Russians are suspicious of our assistance 
     efforts precisely because they cannot see how such assistance 
     benefits American national interests.
       The period of democratic breakthroughs in Russia has come 
     to an end, with the December election results undermining the 
     momentum of and the support for those reformers who favored a 
     steady movement toward the market, control of the money 
     supply and thus less subsidies for military industry, the 
     creation of democratic institutions and values, and a benign 
     and cooperative foreign policy toward its neighbors and the 
     West. Put differently, strong opposition to all of these 
     worthy objectives of Western policy has been exposed in the 
     December elections.
       President Yeltsin is less and less master of the Russian 
     political situation. He is increasingly a captive of his own 
     ``apparat'' that exercises political authority in the name of 
     the President while serving as a lightning rod for constant 
     criticism by an increasingly assertive Duma.
       In this situation of continuing political paralysis in 
     Moscow, two things are happening: (1) policy is being made 
     and implemented by the bureaucracies--the Ministry of 
     Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ``KGB''--each 
     of which has its own agenda; and (2) regional leaderships are 
     consolidating their autonomy, reducing the power and 
     authority of the center over the provinces.
       The continuing decline in the standard of living for most 
     Russians has eroded the political base in the country 
     necessary for a return to economic reforms and free-market 
     policies and makes more likely the reversion to economic 
     statism and central control of the economy. What is 
     economically necessary in the country seems politically 
     impossible. Rampant crime and corruption and growing 
     lawlessness feed the nationalist and chauvinistic forces 
     already gaining ground in the country and encourage public 
     support for policies emphasizing order and economic 
     stability.
       There is a rapidly growing climate of opinion, common to 
     all walks of life, that Russia threw away its empire 
     needlessly, and should recover it while it still can. But 
     another climate is clearly characterized by war weariness, 
     aversion to sending Russian troops anywhere, and despair over 
     military budgetary demands.
       There is a growing anti-Western sentiment which is turning 
     against Western values, epitomized by the prevailing spirit 
     of ``jungle capitalism,'' and Western institutions, with 
     NATO, the European Union and various international lending 
     institutions portrayed as enemies of the Russian people once 
     again.
       While the growing anti-Western feelings on the part of 
     ordinary Russians have deep cultural roots, these feelings 
     have been fed by the perception that the West never had any 
     intentions of making good on its widely publicized promises 
     of aid, and that, more generally, the underlying premise 
     behind Western efforts to impart democracy and reform to 
     Russia was to undermine the Russian state.
       The domestic economic and political trends in Russia--the 
     increasing nationalism, sometimes chauvinism--strengthen 
     those voices that argue for a more assertive and aggressive 
     Russian role in managing the affairs of its neighbors. 
     Russian definitions of its own national interests have been 
     and will continue to manifest themselves in ways that are 
     troubling and potentially even dangerous to the U.S. and the 
     West.
       For American policymakers, painful policy dilemmas will 
     become evident, tradeoffs will be posed, but, above all, 
     choices will be required. Moscow will interfere in the 
     affairs of the states of the former Soviet Union because it 
     firmly believes that these subjects belong under the Russian 
     umbrella rather than as independent entities, because it 
     believes that the rights of Russian minorities outside Russia 
     will be threatened if ongoing and future disputes are not 
     tackled decisively by Russia, and because it believes that 
     such instabilities and conflicts could spread to Russia 
     itself.


                  partnership with allies, not rivals

       The U.S. has misapplied the concept of partnership with 
     Russia in another area, and one vital to Western Europe--
     namely, the Partnership for Peace proposal.
       Partnership for Peace takes the idea of a ``partnership'' 
     with Russia to further extremes, as it invites Russia to 
     become a NATO ``partner.'' But this is not a sustainable 
     premise, unless the West is willing to accept both the 
     Russian definition of ``partner'' and their definition of 
     ``Russian geographic space.''
       For the Russians, participation in Partnership for Peace is 
     a means of derailing NATO enlargement and revitalization of 
     solidifying their interpretation of Russia's rights and 
     interests in the ``Near Abroad.''
       In many respects, Partnership for Peace epitomizes the 
     Administration's ad hoc approach to European security 
     problems. The whole effort appears to be driven by a desire 
     to avoid something--namely, ``line-drawing'' or the 
     reimposition of ``blocs'' in Europe.
       The basic flaw in Partnership for Peace is its underlying 
     premise--the avoidance of line-drawing. It is really an 
     attempt to avoid choices and thus to avoid the establishment 
     of clear policy objectives.
       Precisely because American and European interests with 
     respect to Central Europe and Russia are not necessarily 
     synonymous, the attempt to utilize the Partnership for Peace 
     as the primary multilateral alliance vehicle to accommodate 
     conflicting policies both within and among key Western allies 
     toward the East can be nothing more than a stop-gap measure 
     and will likely spin off more parochial variations over time.
       By avoiding lines, we cloud rather than clarify the answer 
     to the question as to whether the independence of East 
     European states and the consolidation of the fragile 
     democracies in the region constitute a vital American 
     interest. The resulting policy vacuum is filled by others who 
     are more than willing to provide a clear answer to that 
     question by setting the limits on and timeframe for the 
     Partnership for Peace process.
       On November 25, Evgeny Primakov, the head of Russia's 
     Foreign Intelligence Service, declared that any decision by 
     NATO during its January summit to expand NATO eastward would 
     be viewed as aggressive and require a fundamental reappraisal 
     of Russia's defense concepts. Mr. Primakov has been more than 
     willing to jump into a perceived policy vacuum and attempt to 
     exploit it by issuing ultimatums. This is one of the costs of 
     our having no well-defined strategy toward Europe.
       In short, we run the risk of permitting the Russians to 
     circumscribe the entire process. By making Russia the fulcrum 
     of U.S. policy, the Administration risks ceding to Moscow a 
     virtual veto over vital U.S. interests on issues like Bosnia, 
     the future of NATO and Eastern Europe. If the most 
     appropriate means for promoting stability and democracy in 
     Eastern Europe is NATO expansion, then this should be 
     undertaken, preferably with Russia's understanding, but if 
     necessary, without it. While Russia's leaders should not be 
     automatically excluded from European security arrangements, 
     they cannot be given free rein to call the security shots for 
     their neighbors and the West.
       I am not adverse to line-drawing. I believe that expanded 
     NATO membership should be a function of the alliance's own 
     priorities. My objective would be to provide a clear 
     perspective on criteria for eventual membership and to 
     provide promptly a stable security framework in the region to 
     consolidate democracy. There is much to be said for the idea 
     of utilizing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a 
     half-way house for candidate members, with the Alliance 
     drawing up its own list of priorities and criteria for future 
     membership which would lead to full membership under Article 
     5.
       The criteria for membership should include, inter alia, the 
     strategic importance of the candidate to NATO; commitment to 
     democratic rule; respect for minority rights and renunciation 
     of territorial claims; civilian control of the military; a 
     willingness to participate in the full range of NATO 
     operations; and geographical propinquity to NATO member 
     nations.
       But precisely because a large gap would remain between what 
     an expanded NACC offers and full NATO membership under 
     Article 5, it will take time for even the Visegrad countries 
     to close this gap. These countries need a stable framework 
     now. Therefore, I would favor the creation of the additional 
     intermediate step of ``associate membership'' to bridge that 
     gap and to provide a stable security framework in the 
     interest of consolidating democracy.
       Partnership for Peace may satisfy some East European needs 
     for a closer association with NATO. It does not satisfy their 
     need for a concrete perspective on eventual full membership. 
     The intermediate step of associate membership superimposed on 
     the Administration's proposal may fulfill that latter need 
     and add to the process of Partnership for Peace the needed 
     end goal. Establishment of the associate-membership 
     intermediate step would in fact constitute a limited form of 
     line-drawing, but I see no way of adequately addressing the 
     growing security policy vacuum in Central Europe without 
     express consideration of the criteria, modalities, and form 
     of membership.


                 the ``national interest'' litmus test

       President Clinton might protest that his January NATO 
     proposal was less the result of his own aversion to line 
     drawing than a recognition of a stiff U.S. domestic 
     opposition to the idea that NATO would guarantee the security 
     of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. The President 
     might argue further that if Ukraine sought NATO membership, 
     the U.S. and NATO might face a hostile Russia very soon. If 
     Ukraine was denied NATO membership, Russia might receive an 
     ambiguous signal that could encourage any empire-restoration 
     tendencies.
       But Presidential choices are difficult and essential 
     leadership is never easy. The President had a remarkable 
     opportunity in January to stake our a credible plan for our 
     security interests in Europe. He must seek another occasion, 
     soon, to return to that agenda.
       Even if Russia is a tough minded rival, the President is 
     correct in arguing that simply cutting off aid could do harm 
     to certain U.S. security interests embodied in some current 
     U.S.-Russian activities.
       For example, the Nun-Lugar Cooperative Nuclear Threat 
     Reduction Act supports a number of ongoing activities which 
     are resulting in the destruction of warheads and delivery 
     vehicles aimed at the United States and originally designed 
     to destroy our country. Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons 
     have been collected and transferred to sites in Russia for 
     destruction. U.S. money has accelerated the destruction of 
     strategic nuclear systems covered by START Treaties yet to be 
     implemented or ratified. The recent trilateral agreement 
     signed in Moscow on the disposition of nuclear systems 
     currently on Ukrainian soil was possible only because of such 
     assistance.
       Senator Nunn and I have also been pushing relentlessly for 
     consummation of a revenue-sharing purchase agreement in which 
     the United States has committed itself to buy all of the 
     highly enriched uranium extracted from tactical or 
     strategical warheads covered by the START Treaties and 
     returned to Russia. The material would be blended down and 
     purchased by the U.S. to meet its contract commitments to the 
     commercial nuclear power industry, thereby reducing a major 
     proliferation hazard.
       For the next 20 years, a stream of income would go to 
     Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in proportion to the 
     amount of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear 
     systems on their soil at the time of the dissolution of the 
     USSR. Such revenues would dwarf all of the Freedom Support 
     Act or other so-called conventional aid programs which have 
     been passed with great clamor but with diminishing political 
     support.
       The Russians and other Newly Independent States should move 
     swiftly to complete multi-year energy deals which provide a 
     stream of hard currency for them and a substantial energy 
     supply for world markets.
       Most of the so-called aid to Russia has been in the payment 
     of American consultants. Much of the political and economic 
     advice which they offered gave the Russians a glimpse of the 
     way the world works.
       When President George Bush mentioned $24 billion of multi-
     lateral aid to Russia in the Rose Garden, he probably should 
     have added that very little assistance would occur beyond 
     grain credits or various European tied-sale unless the 
     Russians established a banking system and a commercial code 
     that secured property rights, provided recourse to creditors 
     in the collection of loans, commenced a bank checking system 
     and other basic requirements for business relationships with 
     the West and Japan.
       Even in spite of Western concerns that the present Russian 
     government is likely to continue to feed credits from the 
     central bank into redundant state owned industries and thus 
     feed inflation of 20 per cent per month and 1000 percent plus 
     per year, this is a Russian choice. Our friendly advice to a 
     tough rival is to stop throwing good money after bad, and 
     adopt the commercial and legal standards compatible with 
     enhanced private investment and an increasingly competitive 
     position internationally. We advocate sale or closure of the 
     large, non-productive state-owned industries which include an 
     awesome array of munitions makers, elimination of weapons 
     of mass destruction, and respect for the independence and 
     territorial integrity of neighbors near and far.
       President Clinton is not the first President to talk about 
     partnership with Russia. The world prays instinctively for 
     such a development in which the two great land-mass countries 
     with awesome military authority find harmony in the 
     preservation of peace and the increase of human freedom.
       For the moment, however, we must perfect NATO, the GATT 
     agreement, and other arrangements with military and economic 
     allies who share our views. We should seek and participate in 
     hard-headed arrangements with Russians in which mutual 
     advantage is evident and spelled out. We should not hesitate 
     to offer advice on building democratic institutions, human 
     rights enlargement, and market economic arrangements which we 
     believe may be helpful. We should not be surprised if our 
     advice is rebuffed frequently, nor should we be shocked to 
     find that we are heard on occasion.
       Our relationship with the Russians is inevitably very 
     important, so important that we can not afford to make 
     mistakes because we are unrealistically hopeful, and so 
     important that we must never lapse into inattention because 
     we are too frequently disillusioned.
       The plain truth is that the Russians are tough rivals. If 
     we conduct a foreign policy based upon that truth and our 
     national security interests, they may choose to seek a 
     different relationship with us. And if they do, we should be 
     prepared to explore with them the cooperative or mutual 
     aspects of that relationship as well as to promote and defend 
     U.S. interests when our positions diverge. Ultimately, this 
     may come to constitute a far sounder basis for international 
     stability and security than the more romantic but less 
     realistic notion of partnership.
                                  ____


 Statement by Senator John McCain on the CSIS Roundtable, March 3, 1994

       No decade in this century began more auspiciously than the 
     1990s. That gross impediment to human liberty, the Berlin 
     Wall, was breached by the stronger forces of human yearning. 
     The central security problem of our time--the possible clash 
     of East and West on the plains of Germany--was resolved by 
     the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of 
     Germany. The Soviet Union imploded and ceased its militant 
     advocacy of an enslaving ideology.
       The euphoria that accompanied those events anticipated the 
     imminent arrival of a new world order of independent 
     democracies engaged only in peaceful commercial competition 
     with one another.
       But the resurgence of ancient conflicts and hideous 
     barbarism in the Balkans, the haunting familiarity of 
     Vladimir Zhirinovsky's odious appeals to a perverted 
     patriotism, the continued proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, and the waging of some forty wars across the 
     globe have dimmed humanity's hopes for a more just and 
     tranquil world.
       The most significant restraint on Western optimism, of 
     course, is the mounting evidence of Russian revanchism 
     coupled with Moscow's apparent intention to limit economic 
     reform to the exchange of one command economy for another. 
     These distressing developments occur despite and, in part, 
     because of the Clinton Administration's pursuit of a 
     relationship with Russia which is characterized by an acute 
     concern for Russian sensitivities. Their concern is employed 
     in service to an ambitious and laudable end--strategic 
     cooperation with a democratic Russia in building a more 
     stable and less threatening world.
       While our disappointments should not obscure the advances 
     we have made, the time has come to reassess Administration 
     policies which have abjured immediate opportunities to 
     improve the security of the U.S. and our allies; tolerated 
     and, at times, excused Russian attempts at imperial 
     restoration; and inconsistently supported urgent, systemic 
     economic reform in Russia.
       We need not abandon our most cherished aspirations for the 
     post Cold War World. But we should be more realistic in 
     assessing the prospects for their realization in the near 
     term. We should formulate a foreign policy with fewer 
     illusions, and more attentiveness to the problems and 
     opportunities that are before us today.
       You are all familiar with and understand, probably better 
     than I do, the events in Russia that have cast such a pall 
     over the prospects for real political and economic reform 
     there. The resolution of the October crisis achieved the 
     defeat of Yeltsin's adversaries in Parliament at the cost of 
     much greater presidential deference to Russian military 
     interests.
       The success of radical nationalists and communist 
     reactionaries in the December parliamentary elections chilled 
     most of the Government's remaining ardor for genuine 
     privatization and other free market reforms. The departure 
     from the Government of former Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar 
     and former Finance Minister Fyodorov--with a parting shot to 
     a Clinton Administration official for his perceived 
     exacerbation of Russian disillusionment with ``market 
     romanticism''--signaled the formal return to a command 
     economy.
       The Duma's recent amnesty of Rutskoi, Kashbulatov and the 
     other defeated December rebels along with the architects of 
     the August 1991 coup indicates what seems to be almost a 
     routine state of political crisis in Moscow that won't be 
     diminished by Yeltsin's accommodation of fascists and 
     reactionary forces in Parliament.
       Of course, the recent arrest of Mr. and Mrs. Ames has 
     reemphasized that American and Russian interests are not as 
     rapidly and neatly converging as some had hoped. Although I 
     am a little surprised by the Claude Raines reaction of 
     feigned indignation at the discovery that Moscow would have 
     the bad manners to steal secrets from its foremost Western 
     benefactor.
       None of these events, however, reveal anything that wasn't 
     apparent before they occurred. Even when reformers were still 
     welcome to the Kremlin, economic reform was considerably less 
     than systemic. Gaidar and Fyodorov were committed monetarists 
     who appreciated the dangers of hyperinflation. But the 
     reforms they managed to implement were at best half measures 
     which privatized state run industries by creating huge 
     monopolies fed by government contracts and subsidies.
       The Russian military's nostalgia for empire and its 
     indulgence by the political leadership was quite evident well 
     in advance of recent Kremlin references to spheres of 
     influence and protecting Russian populations in the ``near 
     abroad.'' After initially supporting Georgian separatists, 
     Russia then rescued the Georgian government earning the 
     praise of President Clinton for their trouble. The price for 
     Georgia, of course, was relinquishing a measure of 
     sovereignty by joining the C.I.S.
       Moscow has consistently assailed Ukrainian sovereignty with 
     economic and military pressure most notably by denying Kiev 
     energy resources and by refusing to relinquish the Black Sea 
     fleet. Moscow's refusal to accept Ukraine's permanent 
     separation from Russia, has been abetted by the Clinton 
     Administration which has demonstrated a legitimate concern 
     for Ukraine's nuclear status that is perceived as greatly 
     exceeding our concern for Ukraine's independence.
       Similar pressures and intrusions into the internal affairs 
     of its neighbors have been felt from Belarus to Tajikistan. 
     And the Russian military's traditional disregard for the 
     territorial integrity of its neighbors is expressed to its 
     current reluctance to vacate imperial outposts from Moldova 
     to Estonia.
       I am confident that Russia cannot sustain a reconstituted 
     empire in the form of a Confederation any more than it could 
     sustain the old Soviet empire. The costs are simply too 
     ruinous to such a weak economy. But it seems clear that 
     Moscow intends to try. And while the form which this imperial 
     restoration takes may be less severe or cruel than the Stalin 
     model, it should not be confused, as President Clinton has 
     confused it, with U.S. interventions in Panama and Grenada. 
     Aside from demonstrating a woeful misunderstanding of the 
     Monroe Doctrine, this invidious comparison encourages the 
     further subjugation of free peoples to misrule by a foreign 
     power, not the liberation of nations from tyranny.
       The President's nonsensical analogy is a good example of 
     the excruciating deference the Administration routinely pays 
     to Russian concerns, be those concerns delusional or real. It 
     is a policy that has, in my opinion, squandered real 
     opportunities for the U.S. to serve our own interests and 
     advanced our values, and to serve the interests of humanity 
     in the bargain. The fact that democratic values are no longer 
     strictly anathema to Russia, and that U.S. and Russian 
     interests converge more often than dreamed possible during 
     the Cold War does not mean that our values and interests have 
     become identical. They are not. Regrettably, our real 
     relationship with Russia is still marked more by rivalry than 
     cooperation. And it should be seen as thus by the U.S. 
     Government.
       What is urgently required of the Clinton Administration is 
     an unmistakably clear statement of policy: the developing 
     U.S.-Russia relationship depends foremost upon Russia's 
     respect for internationally recognized borders; urgent and 
     systemic economic reform; and the proliferation of the 
     practices and institutions of a democratic society. The 
     Administration must make equally clear our current estimation 
     that Russia's performance in all three areas in varying 
     degrees is not satisfactory. U.S. assistance should no longer 
     be awarded to help calm Russian concerns, but should be 
     conditioned on Russian progress in addressing ours.
       Important U.S. interests are at stake in the political and 
     economic transformation of Russia, and the U.S. should be 
     prepared to help finance that transformation. We should also 
     appreciate the human suffering caused by the unavoidable 
     dislocations that accompany the transformation of a command 
     economy to a free market economy. We can offer assistance to 
     help alleviate that suffering but only if we are assured that 
     the transformation is genuinely underway, and that the bulk 
     of U.S. assistance is facilitating it.
       Most hardships associated with economic reform in Russia 
     are not the result of real free market reform, but of reforms 
     that range from half hearted to fraudulent. Serious reform 
     will cause some dislocation, but half hearted or false reform 
     will cause greater discomfort without progress, and make real 
     reform and prosperity more elusive.
       We should no longer squander our resources on huge state 
     supported industrial monopolies that are only enriching the 
     same Russian elite that prospered under communism. Nor should 
     we allow our money to be invested by Moscow in Western bank 
     accounts instead of in the work and imagination of Russian 
     entrepreneurs.
       The U.S. should also make clear to Russia that it will no 
     longer dismiss Russian meddling in the affairs of its 
     neighbors. We obviously cannot guarantee their sovereignty, 
     but we should not help finance its violation. Moreover, U.S. 
     aid programs should show the former republics and captive 
     nations of the Soviet empire as much generosity as we have 
     shown Russia conditioned on the progress of economic and 
     political reform in their countries.
       Finally, we should no longer defer improvements in our own 
     security arrangements on misbegotten or false fears of 
     Russian encirclement. Why should the U.S. forgo opportunities 
     to expand the frontiers of NATO ever farther from the plains 
     of Germany even while Russia is busy coercing other nations 
     into a confederacy under Moscow's control?
       Giving the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians and others a 
     date certain for NATO membership should they meet a specific 
     set of political and economic conditions is sound security 
     policy and morally right. NATO is and always was a defensive 
     alliance. Russian fears of encirclement by a security 
     guarantee to the Czech Republic are absurd. Prague's fears of 
     finlandization or worse by a revanchist Russia are prudent.
       I have yet to see that the Administration recognizes the 
     contributions its policies have made to setbacks in Russia, 
     and am alarmed by that. The Administration still celebrates 
     that quality of its policies which has most damaged U.S. 
     interests--its intentional vagueness.
       Now, is a time for precise clarity. U.S. policy serves U.S. 
     interests. Russia's transformation to an economically viable 
     politically liberal and internationally responsible society 
     is a U.S. interest. We will assist that transformation as 
     long as it is a real prospect. Any deviation from the road to 
     reform we will oppose.
       We may reach a day when our loftiest aspirations for 
     strategic cooperation with Moscow will be realized. But we 
     are far from that day at present. And irrespective of whether 
     we are to be partners or rivals with Moscow, our policy 
     toward that nation should be premised only on that principle 
     upon which all democracies prosper--enlightened self-
     interest. We have drifted away from that premise in recent 
     months. I hope you will all join me in urging our swift 
     return to it.

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