[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 30 (Thursday, March 17, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: March 17, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
UNITED STATES POLICY ON RUSSIA
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, U.S. policy toward Russia is in disarray.
The time of strategic partnership is over--if it ever began. President
Yeltsin acts in increasingly erratic terms, the new parliament has
freed antidemocratic coup-makers, the Russian military asserts itself
throughout the territory of the former Soviet empire. The Russian
foreign ministry is challenging American interests from Bosnia to the
Middle East.
The administration's reaction can only be characterized as denial.
President Clinton equates Russian neo-imperialism with the liberation
of Panama and Grenada, while the State Department defends, excuses, and
even welcomes Russian actions from Georgia to Tajikistan to the
Balkans. Meanwhile, our assistance program serves to enrich American
consultants but is virtually invisible in the former Soviet Union.
What we need is a fundamental reassessment of United States policy
toward Russia. I hosted a breakfast meeting last week with outside
experts, including two appointees from the Bush administration, a
retired military officer who endorsed President Clinton, and an
academic expert on Russia. There was unanimity that U.S. policy is
headed in the wrong direction.
Two of my colleagues have made important contributions over the last
2 weeks in beginning this reassessment: Senator Lugar before the
American Spectator Dinner Club, and Senator McCain before the Center
for Strategic and International Studies. These insightful speeches, one
by a senior member of the Armed Services Committee and the other by a
senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee deserve wide
attention. They constructively criticize the flaws in the current
United States approach to Russia, and suggest alternative courses that
should form the basis of further debate.
Senator Lugar rightly points out that the idea of a mature strategic
partnership between Russia and the United States--as claimed in the
communique at the January Moscow summit--is nonsense. The Russians are
not partners but, as Senator Lugar puts it, ``tough rivals.''
Senator McCain points out that United States policy has ``squandered
real opportunities for the United States to serve our own interests and
advance our values, and to serve the interests of humanity in the
bargain.'' On the reassertion of Russian imperialism, Senator McCain
points out that the United States has ``tolerated and at times
excused'' such actions, and that the ``United States should also make
clear to Russia that it will no longer dismiss Russian meddling in the
affairs of its neighbors. We obviously cannot guarantee their
sovereignty but we should not help finance its violation.''
Both Senator Lugar and Senator McCain argue for clear guidelines for
NATO expansion--a policy which has widespread support in the Senate, as
expressed in the approval of Senator McConnell's amendment on the
subject last month.
Mr. President, criticism of the administration's Russia policy is not
partisan. President Carter's former National Security Adviser recently
published an article which termed the administration's approach
``flawed in its assumptions, focused on the wrong strategic goal, and
dangerous in its likely geopolitical consequences.'' In fact, outside
of Deputy Secretary Talbott, it is hard to find any expert that agrees
with the administration's approach to Russia. The speeches of Senators
Lugar and McCain are a good place to start the much-needed policy
review.
I ask unanimous consent that their speeches be printed in the Record
at this point.
There being no objection, the speeches were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[Remarks prepared for delivery to the American Spectator Washington
Dinner Club, Four Seasons Hotel, Mar. 7, 1994]
The Russians Are Tough Rivals, Not Partners
(By Senator Richard G. Lugar)
a strategic or limited partnership?
The communique at the Clinton-Yeltsin January summit
meeting in Moscow claimed the achievement of a ``mature
strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage,
and recognition of each other's national interests.'' The
parties noted their eagerness to ``move forward on the path
of openness and mutual trust.''
But this statement and the concept it represents is
nonsense. A strategic partnership between Russia and the West
does not exist because it is impossible to attach any
realistic substance to it. This sort of rhetoric is bound to
raise and then dash public expectations of Russian behavior,
and it makes more likely an overreaction when Russia begins
to act in ways that dismay us. By ignoring the plain truth
about Russia, the Clinton Administration is not prepared for
the policy consequences that flow from the truth.
a redefinition of russian vital interests
The crisis last October in Moscow marked Russia's rejection
of the principle of integration with the West as the
underlying premise of Russia's security policies and the
substitution of Russian vital interests as the underlying
basis on which security decisions are made. The original
strategy of integrating with the West was based on an
assumption that the major threat to Russian security came
from political and economic isolation and that salvation
flowed from political and economic reforms and cooperation
with the West.
A major tenet of that strategy, we assumed, was that Russia
would develop normal, cooperative relations with the other
Soviet successor states, based on mutual respect for
territorial integrity. But all of this was undercut by
unrealistic expectations regarding U.S. willingness to
nurture Russia back to economic and political health and by
the ethnic turmoil that engulfed her nearest neighbors,
threatening perceived Russian security interests as well as
Russian minorities.
By the fall of 1993, a Russian consensus developed around
the notion that Russian security and her place in the
international community could be entrusted only to herself.
Consequently, Russian ``vital interests'' must become the
guiding principle of security policies. This rejection of
cooperation with the West in favor of ``vital interests'' has
alarmed the Newly Independent States who fear that ``vital
interests'' is a euphemism for renewed Russian imperialism.
The shift has also raised fears in the United States that an
expansionist-minded Russia may again threaten eastern Europe.
While none of the publicly-stated Russian goals with
respect to the Newly Independent States and the ``Near
Abroad''--stability, protection of Russian minorities,
defense of security interests--has seemed all that alarming
to the State Department, they have, at minimum, called into
question some of the basic assumptions behind the Clinton
Administration's policies toward Russia.
redefining american ``vital interests''
In the spring of 1993, Under Secretary of State Peter
Tarnoff described a world of ``medium-sized bad guys'' who in
many ways are more irresponsible and dangerous than the bad
guys of the Cold War era. But the main theme of his remarks
before the Overseas Writers Club was that the end of the Cold
War has wrought dramatic changes, and that with the decline
of the nuclear threat, economic interests are ascendant in
U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. can no longer be counted on the
take the lead in regional disputes unless it can discern
clear national interests at stake.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher subsequently
suggested that the U.S. would adopt a unilateral approach if
necessary when vital interests were involved, while a
multilateral approach would suffice for lesser U.S.
interests. But ``multilateralism'' became something of a
cover for U.S. retrenchment and the abandonment of leadership
to the vagaries of international vents--as well as an excuse
for diluting our definitions of what constitute ``clear and
vital national interests.''
The Clinton Administration--after suggesting that it
planned to pursue lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian
Muslims with NATO air support--gave up that plan with little
struggle in the face of European opposition. The
Administration instead accepted a weak alternative of
protection safe havens for the Bosnian Muslims. But what
was worse, there appeared to be an inclination to turn
that policy mistake into a policy doctrine, a doctrine of
diminished U.S. leadership cloaked in ``multilateralism''
at a time when security threats were increasing.
The Administration seemed to classify Western Europe as a
vital interest while East-Central Europe and the Balkans were
not. They appeared to be using a definition of vital
interests that was a function of geography and nuclear
weapons. Their rhetoric was about democracy and shared
values, but their policies did not necessarily reflect this.
I said at the time that this narrower definition had to be
challenged if other national leaders were to be persuaded to
confront instability borne of a new power vacuum in Europe
and if they were to be convinced that the risks of doing
nothing in the face of policy evolutions in Moscow were
great.
It has been the budget-driven cuts in our defense
establishment, along with some ill-considered statements by
Administration officials on a narrower definition of vital
American national interests in the context of the debate over
what to do about Bosnia, that has produced an as-yet
unfocused discussion over U.S. willingness to define
commitment in Europe in a manner commensurate with out
security and economic interests.
from tarnoff to talbott
Prior to Bosnia, NATO was a budget issue; then its efficacy
as a vehicle for promoting or protecting Western interests
arose. Now, its revitalization may be the key to sustaining
any long-term American involvement, not just in NATO, but in
Europe.
Central Europe is adrift security-wise in the aftermath of
the breakup of the USSR as well as the slowed pace of
democratic and economic reforms. Eastern European states seek
more solid moorings in the West through NATO. Western Europe
has been loosened from some of its traditional mooring, as
the Maastricht Treaty has proven to be a less than reliable
stimulus and compass by which to achieve greater integration.
The North Atlantic alliance has experienced a ``relevance''
crisis every bit as psychologically intense as the fits and
starts encountered in trying to fashion a European security
identity. That NATO is experiencing a ``relevance'' crisis at
the same time as Europe is undergoing a security ``identity''
crisis should surprise no one. What is surprising is United
States's reluctance to deal with the security crisis by
updating and revitalizing NATO. In addition, the U.S. is
groping for new post-Cold War strategies and polices under a
new administration, even as signs reappear that Russia may,
out of a sense of desperation, be moving in foreign policy
directions not-so-strangely reminiscent of its more imperial
predecessors.
contending approaches to policy toward russia
There have been two prominent schools of though in the U.S.
regarding the appropriate policy approach toward Moscow.
To oversimplify, the first view, the Clinton
Administration's view, holds that Russia is a partner of the
U.S. and that Russia could and should be helpful in combating
global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and a force for
regional and global stability.
The U.S. should therefore undertake policies designed to
help the Russians, to bolster President Yeltsin, and the
Russian democratic forces.
Unfortunately, strong emphasis on partnership with
President Yeltsin and constant recognition of his political
needs in Russia is perceived by Ukraine, other NIS, and
European allies as giving short-shrift to their aspirations.
The second school of U.S. thought holds that Russian
interests internationally are basically incompatible with
those of the United States. Such being the case, little
cooperation is expected and therefore a policy focusing on
U.S. engagement with Russia is misguided.
This school of thought believes that Russian suppression of
human rights continues; modernization of strategic weapons
systems proceeds apace; export of conventional weaponry and
perhaps material components of potential weapons of mass
destruction is evident, and the payment of over $2 million to
a Russian spy in the CIA exemplifies the state of play.
American public figures then announce that all aid should be
cut off for a while, at least, pending further observation of
a potentially neo-imperialist rival.
a ``national interest'' school of thought
Neither of these approaches is satisfying because neither
meets our national interests, nor do they foster the kind of
Russia we want to see develop.
We are not partners with Russia. We are tough-minded
rivals. Many Russians are suspicious of our assistance
efforts precisely because they cannot see how such assistance
benefits American national interests.
The period of democratic breakthroughs in Russia has come
to an end, with the December election results undermining the
momentum of and the support for those reformers who favored a
steady movement toward the market, control of the money
supply and thus less subsidies for military industry, the
creation of democratic institutions and values, and a benign
and cooperative foreign policy toward its neighbors and the
West. Put differently, strong opposition to all of these
worthy objectives of Western policy has been exposed in the
December elections.
President Yeltsin is less and less master of the Russian
political situation. He is increasingly a captive of his own
``apparat'' that exercises political authority in the name of
the President while serving as a lightning rod for constant
criticism by an increasingly assertive Duma.
In this situation of continuing political paralysis in
Moscow, two things are happening: (1) policy is being made
and implemented by the bureaucracies--the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ``KGB''--each
of which has its own agenda; and (2) regional leaderships are
consolidating their autonomy, reducing the power and
authority of the center over the provinces.
The continuing decline in the standard of living for most
Russians has eroded the political base in the country
necessary for a return to economic reforms and free-market
policies and makes more likely the reversion to economic
statism and central control of the economy. What is
economically necessary in the country seems politically
impossible. Rampant crime and corruption and growing
lawlessness feed the nationalist and chauvinistic forces
already gaining ground in the country and encourage public
support for policies emphasizing order and economic
stability.
There is a rapidly growing climate of opinion, common to
all walks of life, that Russia threw away its empire
needlessly, and should recover it while it still can. But
another climate is clearly characterized by war weariness,
aversion to sending Russian troops anywhere, and despair over
military budgetary demands.
There is a growing anti-Western sentiment which is turning
against Western values, epitomized by the prevailing spirit
of ``jungle capitalism,'' and Western institutions, with
NATO, the European Union and various international lending
institutions portrayed as enemies of the Russian people once
again.
While the growing anti-Western feelings on the part of
ordinary Russians have deep cultural roots, these feelings
have been fed by the perception that the West never had any
intentions of making good on its widely publicized promises
of aid, and that, more generally, the underlying premise
behind Western efforts to impart democracy and reform to
Russia was to undermine the Russian state.
The domestic economic and political trends in Russia--the
increasing nationalism, sometimes chauvinism--strengthen
those voices that argue for a more assertive and aggressive
Russian role in managing the affairs of its neighbors.
Russian definitions of its own national interests have been
and will continue to manifest themselves in ways that are
troubling and potentially even dangerous to the U.S. and the
West.
For American policymakers, painful policy dilemmas will
become evident, tradeoffs will be posed, but, above all,
choices will be required. Moscow will interfere in the
affairs of the states of the former Soviet Union because it
firmly believes that these subjects belong under the Russian
umbrella rather than as independent entities, because it
believes that the rights of Russian minorities outside Russia
will be threatened if ongoing and future disputes are not
tackled decisively by Russia, and because it believes that
such instabilities and conflicts could spread to Russia
itself.
partnership with allies, not rivals
The U.S. has misapplied the concept of partnership with
Russia in another area, and one vital to Western Europe--
namely, the Partnership for Peace proposal.
Partnership for Peace takes the idea of a ``partnership''
with Russia to further extremes, as it invites Russia to
become a NATO ``partner.'' But this is not a sustainable
premise, unless the West is willing to accept both the
Russian definition of ``partner'' and their definition of
``Russian geographic space.''
For the Russians, participation in Partnership for Peace is
a means of derailing NATO enlargement and revitalization of
solidifying their interpretation of Russia's rights and
interests in the ``Near Abroad.''
In many respects, Partnership for Peace epitomizes the
Administration's ad hoc approach to European security
problems. The whole effort appears to be driven by a desire
to avoid something--namely, ``line-drawing'' or the
reimposition of ``blocs'' in Europe.
The basic flaw in Partnership for Peace is its underlying
premise--the avoidance of line-drawing. It is really an
attempt to avoid choices and thus to avoid the establishment
of clear policy objectives.
Precisely because American and European interests with
respect to Central Europe and Russia are not necessarily
synonymous, the attempt to utilize the Partnership for Peace
as the primary multilateral alliance vehicle to accommodate
conflicting policies both within and among key Western allies
toward the East can be nothing more than a stop-gap measure
and will likely spin off more parochial variations over time.
By avoiding lines, we cloud rather than clarify the answer
to the question as to whether the independence of East
European states and the consolidation of the fragile
democracies in the region constitute a vital American
interest. The resulting policy vacuum is filled by others who
are more than willing to provide a clear answer to that
question by setting the limits on and timeframe for the
Partnership for Peace process.
On November 25, Evgeny Primakov, the head of Russia's
Foreign Intelligence Service, declared that any decision by
NATO during its January summit to expand NATO eastward would
be viewed as aggressive and require a fundamental reappraisal
of Russia's defense concepts. Mr. Primakov has been more than
willing to jump into a perceived policy vacuum and attempt to
exploit it by issuing ultimatums. This is one of the costs of
our having no well-defined strategy toward Europe.
In short, we run the risk of permitting the Russians to
circumscribe the entire process. By making Russia the fulcrum
of U.S. policy, the Administration risks ceding to Moscow a
virtual veto over vital U.S. interests on issues like Bosnia,
the future of NATO and Eastern Europe. If the most
appropriate means for promoting stability and democracy in
Eastern Europe is NATO expansion, then this should be
undertaken, preferably with Russia's understanding, but if
necessary, without it. While Russia's leaders should not be
automatically excluded from European security arrangements,
they cannot be given free rein to call the security shots for
their neighbors and the West.
I am not adverse to line-drawing. I believe that expanded
NATO membership should be a function of the alliance's own
priorities. My objective would be to provide a clear
perspective on criteria for eventual membership and to
provide promptly a stable security framework in the region to
consolidate democracy. There is much to be said for the idea
of utilizing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a
half-way house for candidate members, with the Alliance
drawing up its own list of priorities and criteria for future
membership which would lead to full membership under Article
5.
The criteria for membership should include, inter alia, the
strategic importance of the candidate to NATO; commitment to
democratic rule; respect for minority rights and renunciation
of territorial claims; civilian control of the military; a
willingness to participate in the full range of NATO
operations; and geographical propinquity to NATO member
nations.
But precisely because a large gap would remain between what
an expanded NACC offers and full NATO membership under
Article 5, it will take time for even the Visegrad countries
to close this gap. These countries need a stable framework
now. Therefore, I would favor the creation of the additional
intermediate step of ``associate membership'' to bridge that
gap and to provide a stable security framework in the
interest of consolidating democracy.
Partnership for Peace may satisfy some East European needs
for a closer association with NATO. It does not satisfy their
need for a concrete perspective on eventual full membership.
The intermediate step of associate membership superimposed on
the Administration's proposal may fulfill that latter need
and add to the process of Partnership for Peace the needed
end goal. Establishment of the associate-membership
intermediate step would in fact constitute a limited form of
line-drawing, but I see no way of adequately addressing the
growing security policy vacuum in Central Europe without
express consideration of the criteria, modalities, and form
of membership.
the ``national interest'' litmus test
President Clinton might protest that his January NATO
proposal was less the result of his own aversion to line
drawing than a recognition of a stiff U.S. domestic
opposition to the idea that NATO would guarantee the security
of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. The President
might argue further that if Ukraine sought NATO membership,
the U.S. and NATO might face a hostile Russia very soon. If
Ukraine was denied NATO membership, Russia might receive an
ambiguous signal that could encourage any empire-restoration
tendencies.
But Presidential choices are difficult and essential
leadership is never easy. The President had a remarkable
opportunity in January to stake our a credible plan for our
security interests in Europe. He must seek another occasion,
soon, to return to that agenda.
Even if Russia is a tough minded rival, the President is
correct in arguing that simply cutting off aid could do harm
to certain U.S. security interests embodied in some current
U.S.-Russian activities.
For example, the Nun-Lugar Cooperative Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act supports a number of ongoing activities which
are resulting in the destruction of warheads and delivery
vehicles aimed at the United States and originally designed
to destroy our country. Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons
have been collected and transferred to sites in Russia for
destruction. U.S. money has accelerated the destruction of
strategic nuclear systems covered by START Treaties yet to be
implemented or ratified. The recent trilateral agreement
signed in Moscow on the disposition of nuclear systems
currently on Ukrainian soil was possible only because of such
assistance.
Senator Nunn and I have also been pushing relentlessly for
consummation of a revenue-sharing purchase agreement in which
the United States has committed itself to buy all of the
highly enriched uranium extracted from tactical or
strategical warheads covered by the START Treaties and
returned to Russia. The material would be blended down and
purchased by the U.S. to meet its contract commitments to the
commercial nuclear power industry, thereby reducing a major
proliferation hazard.
For the next 20 years, a stream of income would go to
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in proportion to the
amount of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear
systems on their soil at the time of the dissolution of the
USSR. Such revenues would dwarf all of the Freedom Support
Act or other so-called conventional aid programs which have
been passed with great clamor but with diminishing political
support.
The Russians and other Newly Independent States should move
swiftly to complete multi-year energy deals which provide a
stream of hard currency for them and a substantial energy
supply for world markets.
Most of the so-called aid to Russia has been in the payment
of American consultants. Much of the political and economic
advice which they offered gave the Russians a glimpse of the
way the world works.
When President George Bush mentioned $24 billion of multi-
lateral aid to Russia in the Rose Garden, he probably should
have added that very little assistance would occur beyond
grain credits or various European tied-sale unless the
Russians established a banking system and a commercial code
that secured property rights, provided recourse to creditors
in the collection of loans, commenced a bank checking system
and other basic requirements for business relationships with
the West and Japan.
Even in spite of Western concerns that the present Russian
government is likely to continue to feed credits from the
central bank into redundant state owned industries and thus
feed inflation of 20 per cent per month and 1000 percent plus
per year, this is a Russian choice. Our friendly advice to a
tough rival is to stop throwing good money after bad, and
adopt the commercial and legal standards compatible with
enhanced private investment and an increasingly competitive
position internationally. We advocate sale or closure of the
large, non-productive state-owned industries which include an
awesome array of munitions makers, elimination of weapons
of mass destruction, and respect for the independence and
territorial integrity of neighbors near and far.
President Clinton is not the first President to talk about
partnership with Russia. The world prays instinctively for
such a development in which the two great land-mass countries
with awesome military authority find harmony in the
preservation of peace and the increase of human freedom.
For the moment, however, we must perfect NATO, the GATT
agreement, and other arrangements with military and economic
allies who share our views. We should seek and participate in
hard-headed arrangements with Russians in which mutual
advantage is evident and spelled out. We should not hesitate
to offer advice on building democratic institutions, human
rights enlargement, and market economic arrangements which we
believe may be helpful. We should not be surprised if our
advice is rebuffed frequently, nor should we be shocked to
find that we are heard on occasion.
Our relationship with the Russians is inevitably very
important, so important that we can not afford to make
mistakes because we are unrealistically hopeful, and so
important that we must never lapse into inattention because
we are too frequently disillusioned.
The plain truth is that the Russians are tough rivals. If
we conduct a foreign policy based upon that truth and our
national security interests, they may choose to seek a
different relationship with us. And if they do, we should be
prepared to explore with them the cooperative or mutual
aspects of that relationship as well as to promote and defend
U.S. interests when our positions diverge. Ultimately, this
may come to constitute a far sounder basis for international
stability and security than the more romantic but less
realistic notion of partnership.
____
Statement by Senator John McCain on the CSIS Roundtable, March 3, 1994
No decade in this century began more auspiciously than the
1990s. That gross impediment to human liberty, the Berlin
Wall, was breached by the stronger forces of human yearning.
The central security problem of our time--the possible clash
of East and West on the plains of Germany--was resolved by
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of
Germany. The Soviet Union imploded and ceased its militant
advocacy of an enslaving ideology.
The euphoria that accompanied those events anticipated the
imminent arrival of a new world order of independent
democracies engaged only in peaceful commercial competition
with one another.
But the resurgence of ancient conflicts and hideous
barbarism in the Balkans, the haunting familiarity of
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's odious appeals to a perverted
patriotism, the continued proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and the waging of some forty wars across the
globe have dimmed humanity's hopes for a more just and
tranquil world.
The most significant restraint on Western optimism, of
course, is the mounting evidence of Russian revanchism
coupled with Moscow's apparent intention to limit economic
reform to the exchange of one command economy for another.
These distressing developments occur despite and, in part,
because of the Clinton Administration's pursuit of a
relationship with Russia which is characterized by an acute
concern for Russian sensitivities. Their concern is employed
in service to an ambitious and laudable end--strategic
cooperation with a democratic Russia in building a more
stable and less threatening world.
While our disappointments should not obscure the advances
we have made, the time has come to reassess Administration
policies which have abjured immediate opportunities to
improve the security of the U.S. and our allies; tolerated
and, at times, excused Russian attempts at imperial
restoration; and inconsistently supported urgent, systemic
economic reform in Russia.
We need not abandon our most cherished aspirations for the
post Cold War World. But we should be more realistic in
assessing the prospects for their realization in the near
term. We should formulate a foreign policy with fewer
illusions, and more attentiveness to the problems and
opportunities that are before us today.
You are all familiar with and understand, probably better
than I do, the events in Russia that have cast such a pall
over the prospects for real political and economic reform
there. The resolution of the October crisis achieved the
defeat of Yeltsin's adversaries in Parliament at the cost of
much greater presidential deference to Russian military
interests.
The success of radical nationalists and communist
reactionaries in the December parliamentary elections chilled
most of the Government's remaining ardor for genuine
privatization and other free market reforms. The departure
from the Government of former Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar
and former Finance Minister Fyodorov--with a parting shot to
a Clinton Administration official for his perceived
exacerbation of Russian disillusionment with ``market
romanticism''--signaled the formal return to a command
economy.
The Duma's recent amnesty of Rutskoi, Kashbulatov and the
other defeated December rebels along with the architects of
the August 1991 coup indicates what seems to be almost a
routine state of political crisis in Moscow that won't be
diminished by Yeltsin's accommodation of fascists and
reactionary forces in Parliament.
Of course, the recent arrest of Mr. and Mrs. Ames has
reemphasized that American and Russian interests are not as
rapidly and neatly converging as some had hoped. Although I
am a little surprised by the Claude Raines reaction of
feigned indignation at the discovery that Moscow would have
the bad manners to steal secrets from its foremost Western
benefactor.
None of these events, however, reveal anything that wasn't
apparent before they occurred. Even when reformers were still
welcome to the Kremlin, economic reform was considerably less
than systemic. Gaidar and Fyodorov were committed monetarists
who appreciated the dangers of hyperinflation. But the
reforms they managed to implement were at best half measures
which privatized state run industries by creating huge
monopolies fed by government contracts and subsidies.
The Russian military's nostalgia for empire and its
indulgence by the political leadership was quite evident well
in advance of recent Kremlin references to spheres of
influence and protecting Russian populations in the ``near
abroad.'' After initially supporting Georgian separatists,
Russia then rescued the Georgian government earning the
praise of President Clinton for their trouble. The price for
Georgia, of course, was relinquishing a measure of
sovereignty by joining the C.I.S.
Moscow has consistently assailed Ukrainian sovereignty with
economic and military pressure most notably by denying Kiev
energy resources and by refusing to relinquish the Black Sea
fleet. Moscow's refusal to accept Ukraine's permanent
separation from Russia, has been abetted by the Clinton
Administration which has demonstrated a legitimate concern
for Ukraine's nuclear status that is perceived as greatly
exceeding our concern for Ukraine's independence.
Similar pressures and intrusions into the internal affairs
of its neighbors have been felt from Belarus to Tajikistan.
And the Russian military's traditional disregard for the
territorial integrity of its neighbors is expressed to its
current reluctance to vacate imperial outposts from Moldova
to Estonia.
I am confident that Russia cannot sustain a reconstituted
empire in the form of a Confederation any more than it could
sustain the old Soviet empire. The costs are simply too
ruinous to such a weak economy. But it seems clear that
Moscow intends to try. And while the form which this imperial
restoration takes may be less severe or cruel than the Stalin
model, it should not be confused, as President Clinton has
confused it, with U.S. interventions in Panama and Grenada.
Aside from demonstrating a woeful misunderstanding of the
Monroe Doctrine, this invidious comparison encourages the
further subjugation of free peoples to misrule by a foreign
power, not the liberation of nations from tyranny.
The President's nonsensical analogy is a good example of
the excruciating deference the Administration routinely pays
to Russian concerns, be those concerns delusional or real. It
is a policy that has, in my opinion, squandered real
opportunities for the U.S. to serve our own interests and
advanced our values, and to serve the interests of humanity
in the bargain. The fact that democratic values are no longer
strictly anathema to Russia, and that U.S. and Russian
interests converge more often than dreamed possible during
the Cold War does not mean that our values and interests have
become identical. They are not. Regrettably, our real
relationship with Russia is still marked more by rivalry than
cooperation. And it should be seen as thus by the U.S.
Government.
What is urgently required of the Clinton Administration is
an unmistakably clear statement of policy: the developing
U.S.-Russia relationship depends foremost upon Russia's
respect for internationally recognized borders; urgent and
systemic economic reform; and the proliferation of the
practices and institutions of a democratic society. The
Administration must make equally clear our current estimation
that Russia's performance in all three areas in varying
degrees is not satisfactory. U.S. assistance should no longer
be awarded to help calm Russian concerns, but should be
conditioned on Russian progress in addressing ours.
Important U.S. interests are at stake in the political and
economic transformation of Russia, and the U.S. should be
prepared to help finance that transformation. We should also
appreciate the human suffering caused by the unavoidable
dislocations that accompany the transformation of a command
economy to a free market economy. We can offer assistance to
help alleviate that suffering but only if we are assured that
the transformation is genuinely underway, and that the bulk
of U.S. assistance is facilitating it.
Most hardships associated with economic reform in Russia
are not the result of real free market reform, but of reforms
that range from half hearted to fraudulent. Serious reform
will cause some dislocation, but half hearted or false reform
will cause greater discomfort without progress, and make real
reform and prosperity more elusive.
We should no longer squander our resources on huge state
supported industrial monopolies that are only enriching the
same Russian elite that prospered under communism. Nor should
we allow our money to be invested by Moscow in Western bank
accounts instead of in the work and imagination of Russian
entrepreneurs.
The U.S. should also make clear to Russia that it will no
longer dismiss Russian meddling in the affairs of its
neighbors. We obviously cannot guarantee their sovereignty,
but we should not help finance its violation. Moreover, U.S.
aid programs should show the former republics and captive
nations of the Soviet empire as much generosity as we have
shown Russia conditioned on the progress of economic and
political reform in their countries.
Finally, we should no longer defer improvements in our own
security arrangements on misbegotten or false fears of
Russian encirclement. Why should the U.S. forgo opportunities
to expand the frontiers of NATO ever farther from the plains
of Germany even while Russia is busy coercing other nations
into a confederacy under Moscow's control?
Giving the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians and others a
date certain for NATO membership should they meet a specific
set of political and economic conditions is sound security
policy and morally right. NATO is and always was a defensive
alliance. Russian fears of encirclement by a security
guarantee to the Czech Republic are absurd. Prague's fears of
finlandization or worse by a revanchist Russia are prudent.
I have yet to see that the Administration recognizes the
contributions its policies have made to setbacks in Russia,
and am alarmed by that. The Administration still celebrates
that quality of its policies which has most damaged U.S.
interests--its intentional vagueness.
Now, is a time for precise clarity. U.S. policy serves U.S.
interests. Russia's transformation to an economically viable
politically liberal and internationally responsible society
is a U.S. interest. We will assist that transformation as
long as it is a real prospect. Any deviation from the road to
reform we will oppose.
We may reach a day when our loftiest aspirations for
strategic cooperation with Moscow will be realized. But we
are far from that day at present. And irrespective of whether
we are to be partners or rivals with Moscow, our policy
toward that nation should be premised only on that principle
upon which all democracies prosper--enlightened self-
interest. We have drifted away from that premise in recent
months. I hope you will all join me in urging our swift
return to it.
____________________