[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 28 (Tuesday, March 15, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 15, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                      NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I am hopeful that there has been 
enough time for reflection and further thought on the pending bill--S. 
4, the National Competitiveness Act--to break the impasse that stalled 
us last week. This body debated this legislation for over 4 days. Some 
of it was on the bill, as it should have been. I wish more of it had 
been on the legislation itself, so that we could determine what if any 
further steps we need to take to improve the bill and pass it.
  As we begin again to discuss this legislation, let us review what we 
are being asked to consider:
  S. 4, the National Competitiveness Act, is legislation designed to 
equip our Nation to meet the challenges of our global economy that 
demand a great deal from our industries, our workers, and our 
Government. This is a bill that builds on a tradition--one might even 
say a routine--of our Government to work directly with industry in 
doing what is necessary to stay ahead economically. For many decades, 
we have invested in research, in technology, and in related activities 
to ensure that we are producing, manufacturing, and putting our people 
to work. That tradition includes funding partnerships and extension 
efforts in agriculture, medicine, energy, defense, and aerospace.
  With this bill, we are proposing how and where to build on the 
American tradition of working with industry to improve America's 
manufacturing base, create new jobs, and retain existing jobs. It is 
precisely why this country's small, medium, and large businesses and 
industry support this legislation.
  They recognize that our Government has a unique and essential role in 
making sure that the private sector is involved in developing new 
technologies, turning them into commercial products, exporting and 
selling those products, and putting people to work in jobs that pay 
good wages, raise families, and are part and parcel of the American 
dream.
  If anyone is prone to saying ``keep Government out,'' it is American 
business and industry. But Madam President, they are saying the exact 
opposite. They are urging us to pass this legislation because they 
recognize the place for Government in making America prosperous and 
competitive--a role that industry asserts, admits, and continues to 
remind us every day that they can't fill on their own.
  That is the point of S. 4, the bill before us. With years of thought 
and effort, those of us who put this package together carefully pieced 
together the existing programs and crafted some modest new programs 
that we believe will reap short-term and long-term dividends--dividends 
called jobs and growth. In fact, as the chairman has said for a week, 
the main purpose of this legislation is, in fact, to continue and 
sustain programs that have been in existence for years.

  Programs like the Manufacturing Technology Centers that are modelled 
directly after what we have done for decades to help the farmers of 
this country. We need the same kind of network to extend basic 
technical assistance to this country's small- and medium-sized 
manufacturers.
  Another criticism that doesn't belong in this bill is the charge 
about ``industrial policy.''
  Now, I might say that if any of my colleagues believe that we are 
engaging in sinister ``industrial policy'' every time this body or the 
U.S. Government does something to promote jobs, competitiveness, and 
prosperity, then let's all 'fess up--we are guilty.
  But if we are really honest about what all of us in this body has in 
common, it is a commitment to economic growth, jobs, and sustaining the 
American dream. That is precisely the basis for the broad and deep 
support for the research and development--the R&D--tax credit that we 
discussed at length last week.
  It is the basis of support for our energy labs involved in cutting-
edge research and that many Members of this body fight for year in and 
year out. It is why so many Senators have invested so much effort in 
what we call ``defense conversion'' so that we make use of the 
facilities and the people involved in our national defense to play a 
role in reviving our own economy.
  This bill is about common sense economic and jobs policy. If that is 
someone's way of saying industrial policy, so be it.
  But the way I see it, almost no one in this body is adverse to 
Government promoting, helping, and investing in what keeps our 
industries on top and our people employed. Some might say the R&D tax 
credit is enough. Others might say even more money should be poured 
into energy research or agricultural subsidies. The point of S. 4 is to 
complement all of the other ways we invest in economic growth and 
strength, and to fill some serious voids that threaten our ability to 
compete where technology is what's at stake.
  In fact, this legislation--S. 4--is about as far as you can get from 
targeting a specific industry, technology, or region. It is designed to 
fill, again, the role that the private sector cannot fill and doesn't 
want to. The programs in this legislation are essentially generic tools 
to invest in technologies that industry chooses and picks; 
to distribute information about the latest technologies to small- and 
medium-sized businesses that can't otherwise get their hands on key 
lessons and ideas; and to give technical assistance to companies that 
are trying to learn how to lower costs, improve quality, and speed new 
products to the marketplace. I have listened to the debate over the 
last 5 days and I am very concerned that this discussion has 
degenerated into a partisan debate. We need to remember that one of our 
major responsibilities as elected officials is to assure that there are 
jobs for the current generation of Americans and their children and 
grandchildren. This bill speaks specifically to that long-range goal.

  Madam President, I truly believe that there is support for this 
program on the Republican side of the aisle. Further this is not a new 
concept. To illustrate my point I would like to read from a letter from 
Dean Thomas Murrin of Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. As many of you 
remember, Dean Murrin was the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce under President George Bush. In addition to his positions 
in the Federal Government and universities, he has been elected to the 
prestigious National Academy of Engineering which has 1,700 members. 
There are over 1 million engineers in the United States--this election 
to the academy is clearly a great honor.
  Dean Murrin wrote to me:

       Dear Senator Rockefeller: I want to indicate my support for 
     Senate 4 which is currently under debate in the Senate. This 
     legislation will create the National Competitiveness Act of 
     1994 to assist in identifying, developing, acquiring and 
     deploying assistance to finance needed Industrial Technology.
       You may know that I have some strong positive biases on 
     such initiatives as I was one of the few senior people in the 
     previous Administration who vigorously supported a national 
     effort to provide technical assistance and financial support 
     to manufacturing industries and to encourage technology based 
     enterprise to start--such as Commerce's ATP and Manufacturing 
     Center Programs.
       Overall, our United States urgently needs to develop an 
     effective National Technology Strategy. Locally, I believe 
     Senate 4 is a promising approach that will promote the 
     economic growth needs of our Southwestern Pennsylvania 
     region.
       Accordingly, I urge you to pass Senate 4.

  This letter is from the former Republican Deputy Secretary of 
Commerce.
  Further, I believe that there is extensive support for this bill 
outside of the Beltway. We need to listen to constituents in the 
business community.
  Friday morning, I also received a letter from National Coalition for 
Advanced Manufacturing [NACFAM]. NACFAM is the leading industrial group 
working to modernize the manufacturing base in this country. It is a 
nonpartisan, industry-led coalition. Its members include 65 
corporations--including Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co, Allen Bradley; 
175 manufacturing technology centers--including Center for Materials 
Production at Carnegie Mellon in Pittsburgh, Center for Technology 
Transfer at University of Maine, and in my home State, the West 
Virginia University-Industrial Extension--and 27 national trade and 
technical associations--representing over 80,000 companies and 
thousands of technical education institutions. NACFAM was the leading 
organization working with Senator Bingaman to develop the Technology 
Reinvestment Program. As you all know this program is part of the 
bipartisan effort to convert our defense industrial base into 
commercial production. The executive director, Leo Reddy, writes:

       Dear Senator Rockefeller: On behalf of the National 
     Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing (NACFAM), I want to 
     reaffirm our strong support for the Senate version of the 
     National Competitiveness Act, S.4.
       We believe that the bill deserves bipartisan support and 
     ask that you join many of your colleagues in supporting the 
     bill when it reaches the floor. Its passage will enhance the 
     ability of U.S. manufacturing companies to compete in the 
     international marketplace. S. 4 would also help to expand the 
     pool of high skill, high wage jobs for the American 
     workforce.
       NACFAM especially supports the manufacturing provisions of 
     the bill (Title II) which, among other things, will develop a 
     national system of manufacturing extension centers and 
     technical services. This system will improve the ability of 
     the nation's 360,000 small and medium-sized manufacturers to 
     modernize through the adoption of advanced manufacturing 
     technology and related processes critical to increasing their 
     productivity, product quality, and competitiveness.
       These small- and medium-sized manufacturers are the 
     backbone of our domestic industrial base. Manufacturing 
     establishments with fewer than 500 employees represent 98% of 
     the nation's total, employ two-thirds of the manufacturing 
     workforce, and produce nearly half of the nation's value 
     added in manufacturing.
       NACFAM, a non-partisan, non-profit, industry-led coalition, 
     has worked as a catalyst for public-private cooperation in 
     modernizing America's industrial base for over 5 years. 
     NACFAM's rapidly growing membership includes 65 corporations, 
     175 manufacturing technology centers (making NACFAM the 
     largest association of such centers) and 27 national trade 
     and technical associations (representing between them over 
     80,000 companies and thousands of technical education 
     institutions).
       Thanking you in advance for your kind consideration of S. 
     4.

  Several Senators seem to believe that this is some new Government 
program in industrial policy. In fact the Federal Government has been 
involved with industry to improve competitiveness for many years. Prior 
to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, competitiveness was defined using 
the military paradigm. Today the word implies manufacturing for 
consumer goods. This bill is part of a overall strategy to move from 
defense-based manufacturing to consumer-oriented products.
  This is not a new program. As an example, I point to a successful 
Defense Department program which serves as model for this program. The 
ManTech (Manufacturing Technology) and its predecessor, the 
Manufacturing Testing and Technology programs, were initiated 20 years 
ago to help U.S. industry develop and implement new manufacturing 
processes. Some examples:
  A company in Woburn, MA has developed a process to produce silicon 
carbide--a material which is important for defense applications in the 
SDI program but now has commercial applications.
  A company in Rochester, NY developed a new type of glass which 
reduces the number of lenses in sophisticated optical systems which are 
used in military periscopes and riflescopes. This material is now being 
applied to low-cost endoscopes which are used in minimally invasive 
surgery. These medical procedures reduce the cost of gall bladder 
removals and reduce the trauma to the patient. Goals which we all 
support.
  A consortium led by Boeing (Washington) and Sikorsky (Missouri) has 
developed a state of the art manufacturing system for airframes. The 
objective is to significantly reduce processing time. Potential cost 
savings on one DOD project, the Comanche helicopter, is $63.6 million. 
This represents exactly the same type of project that this bill 
supports.
  Clearly the Department of Defense has been able to manage these 
programs. I am equally convinced that the Department of Commerce and 
Small Business Administration will be able to manage the programs 
embodied in this bill.
  It is interesting that the DOD program has no requirement that the 
industry provide any of the finding. In S. 4, we require that industry 
to put up at least 50 percent of the funding.
  Madam President, I am absolutely convinced that if everyone in this 
body took a deep breath, and then would take a fresh look at this 
legislation, it would win over the vast majority of this body's 
support. It would be criminal to abandon the work that is already well 
underway with American industry to get on top of the technologies that 
define what kind of country we will be for the next decades. The losers 
would not be the authors of this bill, although it would hurt, let me 
tell you. The losers would be the thousands of businesses that stand to 
gain from the help and investment that this bill calls for. The even 
greater losers would be American workers and their families whose 
livelihoods depend on the public-private partnerships envisioned in 
this legislation.
  I ask my colleagues to take a fresh look at S. 4. Help us break this 
impasse. Help us determine what we can do to find a consensus on this 
legislation. It would be needlessly destructive to abandon this basic, 
common sense part--and it is only one piece--of what we know we have to 
do to be competitive and promote jobs for all Americans.
  This bill deserves support inside of these walls that is as broad, as 
deep, and as intense as it has outside in the private sector and among 
people who are trying to get our attention. The reason is that this 
bill charts very basic steps that we need to continue taking to make it 
in a global economy--and I promise you, we will rue the day we get 
complacent about the challenges we clearly face to stay ahead in 
technology, manufacturing, and jobs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, while awaiting our colleague on the 
other side of the aisle, we have been talking about the various 
antecedents to this bill--other Government-industry partnerships in 
recent history. On that score, I would cite President Bush's National 
Science Board, which reported some 2 years ago. I ask unanimous consent 
that the entire report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the 
Record as follows:

  The Competitive Strength of U.S. Industrial Science and Technology: 
                            Strategic Issues

 [From the National Science Board, Committee on Industrial Support for 
                           R&D, August 1992]

       The U.S. industrial R&D system is in trouble not only 
     because the recent growth of R&D expenditures is lagging that 
     of foreign competitors, but also because--in the view of many 
     knowledgeable observers--the distribution and allocation of 
     those expenditures is not optimal.
       Both Federal and corporate policies need to be improved if 
     the Nation is to meet international competitive challenges.
       There are significant gaps in U.S. industrial R&D strength 
     (e.g., in engineering research); further, a new threat is 
     emerging to the country's traditional sources of strength--
     pioneering discoveries and inventions.
       In short, the United States is spending too little, not 
     allocating it well, and not utilizing it effectively.


                                findings

       The Committee's principal findings follow.
       1. The real rate of growth in U.S. industrial R&D spending 
     has declined since the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 
     addition, the Nation's position has deteriorated relative to 
     that of its major international competitors whose investment 
     in nondefense R&D has been growing at a faster pace than U.S. 
     nondefense R&D since the mid-1980s.
       Domestic industrial R&D expenditures slowed from an average 
     annual growth rate of 7.5 percent (constant dollars) during 
     1980-85 to only 0.4 percent during 1985-91. The federally 
     supported portion of these expenditures dropped from a growth 
     rate of 8.1 percent to -1.7 percent over these two periods; 
     industry's own support dropped from 7.3 percent to 1.3 
     percent. Almost all major R&D-performing industries 
     contributed to this reduced growth rate.
       Since 1985, U.S. growth in both total and nondefense R&D 
     expenditures has been less than that of many of its major 
     industrial competitors.
       The United States now trails Japan and (West) Germany, its 
     strongest competitors, in nondefense R&D spending as a 
     percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
       2. The allocation of U.S. R&D expenditures is not optimal.
       The balance between defense and nondefense expenditures is 
     disadvantageous compared to that of foreign competitors.
       International data for defense and nondefense components of 
     total R&D expenditures (not industrial alone) as a percentage 
     of GDP can be compared. Using six countries--Japan, (West) 
     Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Sweden--as a 
     benchmark, the United States in 1989 spent almost as much as 
     they did on total R&D, but 25 percent less on nondefense R&D.
       This imbalance has been deteriorating: the fraction of U.S. 
     R&D expenditures on nondefense decreased slightly (from 74 to 
     71 percent) during the 1980s, while that of the competitor 
     group increased (from 90 to 92 percent). Thus, during the 
     1980s, these six competitors moved from being 22 percent 
     ahead of the United States in nondefense R&D expenditures to 
     being 34 percent ahead. This increase has been driven largely 
     by Japan's huge growth in nondefense R&D spending; today, 
     Japan spends about 3 percent of its GDP on nondefense R&D, 
     compared to 1.9 percent for the United States.
       Too little is spent on process-oriented R&D.
       Several studies have found that U.S. industrial R&D is 
     weighted much more heavily toward product technology rather 
     than process technology. U.S. firms also allocate a 
     disproportionately small share of their R&D budgets to the 
     search for new and/or improved processes compared to their 
     Japanese counterparts.
       Inadequate effort is devoted to fundamental engineering 
     research.
       The rapid conversion of ideas into products and processes 
     requires command of an ever-expanding engineering knowledge 
     base. Yet there is an insufficiently broad and deep 
     fundamental engineering research base on which to build.
       There is insufficient emphasis on emerging and 
     precompetitive technologies.
       In the Industrial Research Institute survey, industry's 
     ``relutance to invest in new enabling technologies because 
     the R&D may be too expensive, long-term, multi-industry, and 
     interdisciplinary'' received the largest number of first 
     place rankings as a factor adversely affecting U.S. 
     industry's ability to compete in global markets for high-
     technology products under the major category of technology 
     management practices.
       The United States faces an emerging risk of losing its 
     traditional strength in pioneering discoveries and 
     inventions.
       Most pioneering advances of the past that have created the 
     basis for new industries have originated in either the 
     corporate laboratories of private firms or in research 
     universities. Both of these institutions are under severe 
     stress today.
       U.S. expenditures are not as effective as they should be in 
     producing needed results.
       The U.S. competitive position in important, technologically 
     based industries is deteriorating.
       The once strong across-the-board U.S. position of a decade 
     ago has deteriorated substantially. U.S. industry has already 
     lost its leadership in several technologies that are critical 
     to industrial performance, and is weak or losing competitive 
     strength in others.
       The U.S. time horizon has become too short, and the 
     Nation's business decisions tend not to be based on strategic 
     technological considerations.
       In large corporations, effort is shifting away from central 
     laboratories toward division-level effort with greater 
     emphasis on risk minimization to meet the needs of today's 
     customers; emphasis is also shifting away from new markets 
     toward existing markets.
       U.S. R&D is not translated into beneficial economic and 
     social results quickly enough.
       Many companies trail their foreign rivals in the 
     commercialization of new technology. In many U.S. industries, 
     development of new products proceeds at a much slower pace 
     than in other countries.
       4. The current information based on industrial science and 
     technology is inadequate it has gaps, is questionable in 
     parts, and does not provide enough detail to meet the needs 
     of policymakers.


                            recommendations

       The Committee's findings lead to significant apprehension 
     about the present trajectory of U.S. industrial R&D and to 
     the conclusion that stronger Federal leadership is needed in 
     setting the course for U.S. technological competitiveness. 
     Implementation of a national technology policy, including 
     establishment of a rationale and guidelines for Federal 
     action should receive the highest priority. The start of such 
     a policy was set forth 2 years ago by the President's Office 
     of Science and Technology Policy, but more forceful action is 
     needed by the President and Congress before there is further 
     erosion in the U.S. technological position.
       The Committee's recommendations focus on areas where NSF or 
     other agencies of the Federal Government may be able to 
     contribute to strengthening U.S. industrial competitiveness. 
     The recommendations include policy and programmatic 
     directions. They fall short of what is ultimately needed, 
     however. The current course of U.S. industrial R&D demands 
     creative policies, programs, and initiatives beyond those 
     devised and examined by the Committee. Committee 
     recommendations are listed below:
       1. Stimulate the resumption of more rapid growth of 
     industrial R&D to match that of foreign competitors.
       Adopt Federal fiscal and monetary policies that encourage 
     strategic investment in both tangible and intangible assets 
     for R&D.
       Encourage changes in Federal regulations and in the 
     regulatory process to promote and facilitate technological 
     innovation.
       Establish a permanent R&D tax credit.
       Put a permanent moratorium on Treasury Regulation 1.861-8 
     which can create a tax benefit for U.S. corporations with 
     foreign sales that move some of their R&D to a foreign 
     country.
       2. Encourage a reallocation of R&D expenditures toward--


                             nondefense R&D

       Establish new programs to stimulate the redirection of 
     resources from defense to nondefense R&D.
       Increase support for NSF strategic science and engineering 
     research, particularly for activities that attract industrial 
     cosupport. These activities include engineering research 
     centers, science and technology centers, cooperative multi-
     user facilities, consortia, and individual investigator 
     projects with coparticipation by industry.
       Expand programs that directly support technology transfer 
     activities in Federal laboratories.


                              process R&D

       Expand and strengthen the Manufacturing Technology Centers 
     Program and the State Technology Extension Program of the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
       Encourage substantial NSF involvement in the emerging 
     Federal Coordination Council for Science, Education, and 
     Technology (FCCSET) Presidential initiative in manufacturing.


                          engineering research

       Encourage and assist in the expansion of Federal support of 
     fundamental engineering research.
       Expand and strengthen NSF's Engineering Research Center 
     Program.


                emerging and precompetitive technologies

       Activate a U.S. technology policy that favors Federal R&D 
     investment in generic precompetitive and emerging 
     technologies important to industry.
       Encourage and assist in the expansion of Federal support of 
     fundamental scientific and engineering research that 
     contributes to emerging and precompetitive technologies, 
     including the FCCSET initiatives in biotechnology, advanced 
     materials and processing, and high-performance computing and 
     communications.
       Expand the effectiveness, scope, and outreach of NSF's 
     Science and Technology Centers, Industry/University 
     Cooperative Research Centers, and other industry-related 
     programs, and couple these programs even more closely with 
     future industry needs.
       Further expand NIST's Advanced Technology Program.


                 pioneering discoveries and inventions

       Create more programmatic opportunities that encourage 
     interaction of scientists and engineers in academic and 
     industry to explore joint research interests with the 
     potential for pioneering discoveries and inventions.
       Support traditional and nontraditional education programs 
     that motivate creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship.
       3. Improve the speed and effectiveness of moving R&D 
     results from lab to market.
       Explore the feasibility of NSF supporting joint science, 
     engineering, and management education programs that focus on 
     the integration of technology and management for leadership 
     of both high-tech and traditional industries.
       Encourage NSF activities that lead to faster dissemination 
     of knowledge and research results among researchers in 
     academia, industry, and other sectors.

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, quoting from that record:

       The committee's findings lead to significant apprehension 
     about the present trajectory of U.S. industrial R&D and the 
     conclusion that stronger Federal leadership is needed in 
     setting the course for U.S. technological competitiveness. 
     Implementation of a national technology policy, including 
     establishment of a rationale and guidelines for Federal 
     action, should receive the highest priority. The start of 
     such a policy was set forth 2 years ago by the President's 
     Office of Science and Technology Policy, but more forceful 
     action is needed by the President and Congress before there 
     is further erosion in the U.S. technological position.

  We put in the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy 2 
years before that, in 1990 and again in 1992. But the report still 
calls for more forceful action. I quote further from the report:

       The balance between defense and nondefense expenditures is 
     disadvantageous compared to that of foreign competitors. 
     International data for defense and nondefense components of 
     total R&D expenditures, not industrial alone, as a percentage 
     of GDP can be compared using six countries, Japan, Germany, 
     France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Sweden as a bench 
     mark. The United States in 1989 spent almost as much as they 
     did on total R&D but 25 percent less on nondefense R&D.

  Then in another section the particular report, it states:

       There is insufficient emphasis on emerging and 
     precompetitive technologies. The Industrial Research 
     Institute surveyed industry reluctance to invest in new 
     enabling technologies, because the R&D may be too expensive 
     long term, multi-industry and interdisciplinary, received the 
     largest number of first-place rankings as a factor adversely 
     affecting U.S. industry's ability to compete in the global 
     market for high-technology products under the major category 
     of technology management practices.
       The United States faces an emerging risk of losing its 
     traditional strength in pioneering discoveries and 
     inventions. Most pioneering advantages of the past that 
     created a basis for new industries have originated either in 
     the corporate laboratories of private firms or in research 
     universities. Both of these institutions are under severe 
     stress today.

  That is exactly what S. 4 is intended to address, and that is the 
reason why, some 6 years ago, we upgraded the old Bureau of Standards 
into the high-technology National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, at the same time launching the Advanced Technology Program.
  So, I was aghast here last Monday, a week ago, when we started debate 
on the bill and I outlined its provisions.
  Someone said, ``You ought to talk more on the bill.'' I said, ``I 
have been trying.'' Of course, Monday, most of our colleagues were not 
here. But we went over the different components of the bill.
  We heard from the Senator from Wyoming, who said, ``It is not 
industrial policy, it is political policy.'' That is Senator Wallop, 
and you will see that in the Record.
  You begin with resentment in some quarters that these programs are 
under the Department of Commerce. Then, going all the way back to a 
news article of April of last year in the San Francisco Chronicle to 
the effect that the National Chairman of the Democratic Party said, 
``Look, California is the be-all end-all of Presidential politics and 
we are going to have Secretary Brown channel conversion and retraining 
funds to that state.''
  S. 4 does not have any retraining funds in it. It is totally industry 
initiated and totally peer reviewed and based on merit selection.
  But when you talk about industrial policy, there is no question that 
for 132 years Government has been heavily involved in agriculture. It 
began with the Land Grant College Act in 1862. So for 132 years, we 
have had an industrial policy for agribusiness.
  For 79 years, Government has been in aerospace and aeronautics, with 
all of the spinoffs into the private commercial aircraft industry, 
which we all, both sides of the aisle, support. I certainly support it 
very strongly.
  I will never forget in 1955, President Eisenhower, when we put import 
quotas on oil. That was industrial policy for the energy industry. 
Then, later in the 1970's with OPEC, we came in with the moneys for 
gasohol, for fusion research, oil shale, solar energy and so on. So for 
40 years, we have had industrial policy in energy.
  For 15 years, we have had industrial policy, it might be said, for 
automobiles with the Chrysler bailout.
  For the past 6 years, industrial policy for all of technology, with 
the resolution of the National Bureau of Standards into the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology and the Advanced Technology 
Program.
  So, you cannot come now and say, ``Wait a minute. This is a new 
departure, a new philosophy, an industrial policy that we have not 
discussed.''
  This is industrial policy consonant with all the other policies in 
aircraft and energy and agriculture and automobiles and much more.
  And now to say of S. 4, ``Wait a minute; we have not discussed it''; 
this is simply not so. We passed it out of the committee, we passed it 
over on the House side, we passed it out of the committee unanimously 
again and again. Not partisanly done, but bolstered by President Bush's 
Competitiveness Policy Council in 1991, with the eminent Erich Bloch.
  Mr. Bloch was the director of the National Science Foundation, at the 
appointment of President Reagan, and at the appointment of President 
Bush headed up this Competitiveness Policy Council. Therein they did 
talk of amounts and said we were so far behind that we ought to have a 
program of anywhere from $4 to $8 billion, specifically referring to 
the Advanced Technology Program that has already been in the Department 
of Commerce, the report said funding should be $750 million. We only 
have $457 million for next year in this and for the following year, 
$575 million.
  So we have not even gotten up to the levels that President Bush and 
his eminent council recommended.
  There was no idea of politicizing these programs or this bill, but 
obviously you can see from the vote that it has been politicized. This 
is a filibuster on a bill that our colleagues on the other side 
previously supported, a bill that they strongly recommended.
  We had, 2 years ago, the distinguished Senate Republican task force 
on defense conversion. We had a Democratic task force. Both of them 
agreed.
  But let us go to the words of the 12 distinguished Senators of the 
Republican task force, including my distinguished ranking member. I 
quote:

       The task force endorses two programs. The National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology is important to the 
     effort to promote technology transfer to allow defense 
     industries to convert to civilian activities. These programs 
     are the Manufacturing Technology Program and the Advanced 
     Technology Program.

   When a problem arose here last year with respect to Airbus, the 
distinguished Senator responded with the introduction on February 24 
last year of S. 419. I will read from that particular measure, from 
page 3, section 7:

       Given current and expected reductions in defense spending 
     and increased competitive pressures in the commercial 
     aircraft market, it is critical for the Federal Government to 
     coordinate its aeronautics and related programs and redirect 
     these resources to assist the U.S. commercial aircraft 
     industry to meet the competitive challenge from Airbus 
     industry.

  Then it says in section 8:

       The Federal Government has played an active role in 
     research and development of aeronautical technology since the 
     National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics [NACA] was created 
     in 1915.

  That is exactly the purpose and exactly the reference that we would 
give when they incorrectly say that industrial policy represents some 
new departure or new philosophy. So, my colleagues, do not let us get 
bogged down on this industrial policy rhubarb. Here it is; we have been 
in industrial policy since 1915, according to the Senator from 
Missouri.
  Then going further, I read again on the next page--I ask unanimous 
consent that the entire bill, S. 419 of the 103d Congress, be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 419

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Aeronautical Technology 
     Consortium Act of 1993''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) a strong commercial aircraft industry is critical to 
     the health of the United States economy: aircraft production 
     in the United States affects nearly 80 percent of the 
     economy, and for every additional dollar of shipments of 
     aircraft, output of the economy increases by an estimated 
     $2.30;
       (2) a strong commercial aircraft industry is critical to 
     the national security of the United States because of the 
     synergies between commercial and military aeronautical 
     technologies and the need for a strong advanced technology 
     industrial base;
       (3) the National Critical Technologies Panel has identified 
     aeronautics as one of twenty-two categories of technologies 
     critical to the national economic prosperity and to national 
     security;
       (4) while the United States has traditionally dominated the 
     world commercial aircraft market, the United States aircraft 
     industry is facing two critical challenges: significant 
     cutbacks in defense procurement and related military 
     spending, and the growing competitive strength of the 
     European aircraft consortium, Airbus Industrie;
       (5) Airbus Industrie, a consortium of four European 
     aircraft manufacturing companies that have received almost 
     $26,000,000,000 in government subsidies over two decades, has 
     developed a family of competitive aircraft models and has 
     captured one-fourth of the world market for large civil 
     aircraft;
       (6) in 1992, the United States signed an agreement with the 
     European Community that permits the European governments to 
     continue to subsidize up to 33 per centum of the development 
     costs of new large civil aircraft;
       (7) given current and expected reductions in defense 
     spending and increased competitive pressures in the 
     commercial aircraft market, it is critical for the Federal 
     Government to coordinate its aeronautics and related programs 
     and redirect these resources to assist the United States 
     commercial aircraft industry to meet the competitive 
     challenge from Airbus Industrie;
       (8) the Federal Government has played an active role in 
     research and development of aeronautical technologies since 
     the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) was 
     created in 1915;
       (9) in recent years, however, Federal Government support 
     for aerospace research and development has focused 
     overwhelmingly on military and space technologies;
       (10) Federal programs relating to aeronautics research and 
     development today are spread among a number of different 
     agencies and departments, including the Departments of 
     Defense, Transportation, and Commerce, as well as the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the 
     National Science Foundation;
       (11) Federal financial assistance to the semiconductor 
     industry consortium known as Sematech has been successful in 
     improving the competitiveness of the United States 
     semiconductor industry;
       (12) the Federal Government should use Sematech as a model 
     in developing a program to provide financial assistance to an 
     industry-led consortium of United States commercial aircraft 
     manufacturing companies; and
       (13) such a government-industry consortium should focus its 
     efforts on research, development, and commercialization of 
     new aeronautical technologies and related manufacturing 
     technologies, as well as the transfer and conversion of 
     aeronautical technologies developed for national security 
     purposes to commercial applications for large civil aircraft.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to strengthen and 
     assist the United States commercial aircraft industry by--
       (1) providing for an interagency aeronautical technology 
     program to coordinate and expand Federal research and 
     development programs relating to aeronautical technologies 
     and related manufacturing technologies; and
       (2) assisting the United States commercial aircraft 
     industry in developing an Aeronautical Technology Consortium 
     for the purpose of providing Federal assistance to industry-
     led joint ventures established for research, development, and 
     commercialization of aeronautical technologies and related 
     manufacturing technologies applicable to large civil 
     aircraft.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act--
       (1) The term ``Director'' means the Director of the Office 
     of Science and Technology Policy.
       (2) The term ``eligible firm'' means a company or other 
     business entity that, as determined by the Secretary of 
     Commerce--
       (A) conducts a significant level of its research, 
     development, engineering, and manufacturing activities in the 
     United States; and
       (B) either--
       (i) is a United States-owned company; or
       (ii) is a company incorporated in the United States and has 
     a parent company which is incorporated in a country the 
     government of which--

       (I) affords United States-owned companies opportunities, 
     comparable to those afforded any other company, to 
     participate in research and development consortia to which 
     the government of that country provides funding directly or 
     provides funding indirectly through international 
     organizations or agreements; and
       (II) affords adequate and effective protection for the 
     intellectual property rights of United States-owned 
     companies.

     Such term includes a consortium of such companies or other 
     business entities, as determined by the Secretary of 
     Commerce.
       (3) The term ``Federal laboratory'' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 4(6) of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
     Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3703(6)).
       (4) The term ``joint venture'' has the meaning given such 
     term in section 28(j)(1) of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278n(j)(1)).
       (5) The term ``large civil aircraft'' means all aircraft 
     that are designed for passenger or cargo transportation and 
     have one hundred or more passenger seats or its equivalent in 
     cargo configuration.
       (6) The term ``manufacturing technology'' means techniques 
     and processes designed to improve manufacturing quality, 
     productivity, and practices, including engineering design, 
     quality assurance, concurrent engineering, continuous process 
     production technology, energy efficiency, waste minimization, 
     design for recyclability or parts reuse, shop floor 
     management, inventory management, worker training, and 
     communications with customers and suppliers, as well as 
     manufacturing equipment and software.
       (7) The term ``United States-owned company'' means a 
     company or other business entity the majority ownership or 
     control of which is by United States citizens.

     SEC. 4. AERONAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--The President shall establish an 
     Aeronautical Technology Program (hereafter in this Act 
     referred to as the ``Program''), which shall--
       (1) provide for interagency coordination of Federal 
     research and development programs relating to aeronautical 
     technologies and related manufacturing technologies;
       (2) provide a mechanism for private industry comment and 
     guidance regarding the cost-effectiveness and commercial 
     practicability of existing and proposed Federal research and 
     development programs relating to aeronautical technologies 
     and related manufacturing technologies;
       (3) promote, to the maximum extent practicable, the 
     transfer and conversion to commercial applications of 
     aeronautical technologies developed for national security 
     purposes;
       (4) coordinate and expand existing Federal research and 
     development programs relating to--
       (A) subsonic aeronautics, and
       (B) supersonic aeronautics,

     with particular focus on government-industry cooperative 
     programs to develop large civil aircraft beyond the financial 
     means of any single company;
       (5) assist the United States commercial aircraft industry 
     in developing an Aeronautical Technology Consortium for the 
     purpose of providing Federal assistance to industry-led joint 
     ventures established for research, development, and 
     commercialization of aeronautical technologies and related 
     manufacturing technologies applicable to large civil 
     aircraft; and
       (6) establish other goals and priorities for Federal 
     research and development programs relating to aeronautical 
     technologies and related manufacturing technologies.
       (b) National Aeronautics Strategy.--
       (1) In general.--The President, acting through the 
     Coordinating Committee established in subsection (c), shall 
     develop a National Aeronautics Strategy (hereafter in this 
     Act referred to as the ``Strategy'') to implement the 
     Program. The Strategy shall contain specific recommendations 
     for a five-year national effort, to be submitted to the 
     Congress within six months after the date of enactment of 
     this Act.
       (2) Contents of strategy.--The Strategy shall--
       (A) establish the specific goals and priorities for the 
     Program for the fiscal year in which the Strategy is 
     submitted and the succeeding four fiscal years;
       (B) set forth the role of each Federal agency and 
     department in implementing the Program;
       (C) describe the levels of Federal funding for each agency 
     and specific research, development, and commercialization 
     activities required to achieve such goals and priorities;
       (D) take into account the recommendations of the Advisory 
     Committee established in section 6; and
       (E) consider and use, as appropriate, reports and studies 
     conducted by Federal agencies and departments, the National 
     Research Council, or other entities.
       (3) Federal agencies and departments to be addressed.--The 
     Strategy shall address, where appropriate, the relevant 
     programs and activities of--
       (A) the Department of Defense, particularly the Department 
     of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, and the Defense 
     Advanced Research Projects Agency;
       (B) the Department of Commerce, particularly the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology;
       (C) the Department of Transportation, particularly the 
     Federal Aviation Administration;
       (D) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
       (E) the National Science Foundation;
       (F) the Federal laboratories; and
       (G) such other agencies and departments as the President or 
     the Coordinating Committee considers appropriate.
       (c) Coordinating Committee.--
       (1) Authority; composition.--The Program shall be 
     administered by an Aeronautical Technology Coordinating 
     Committee (hereafter in this Act referred to as the 
     ``Coordinating Committee'') composed of the following 
     officials:
       (A) The Director, who shall be chairperson.
       (B) The Secretary of Defense.
       (C) The Secretary of Commerce.
       (D) The Secretary of Transportation.
       (E) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration.
       (F) The Director of the National Science Foundation.
       (2) Functions.--The Coordinating Committee shall--
       (A) serve as the lead entity responsible for implementation 
     of the Program;
       (B) coordinate all Federal research and development 
     programs relating to aeronautical technologies and related 
     manufacturing technologies;
       (C) consult regularly with and seek recommendations from 
     the Advisory Committee established by section 6;
       (D) consult with academic, State, industry, and other 
     appropriate groups conducting research on and using 
     aeronautical technologies; and
       (E) submit to the Congress an annual report, along with the 
     President's annual budget request, describing the 
     implementation of the Program.

     SEC. 5. AERONAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY CONSORTIUM.

       (a) In General.--Under the Program, the Coordinating 
     Committee shall provide assistance to an Aeronautical 
     Technology Consortium (hereafter in this Act referred to as 
     the ``Consortium''), which shall consist of all eligible 
     firms that--
       (1) are engaged in research, development, testing, 
     demonstration, or production of aeronautical technology 
     applicable to the production of large civil aircraft;
       (2) are selected by the Coordinating Committee, through the 
     Director, on the basis of the criteria specified under 
     subsection (d); and
       (3) are necessary to enable the Consortium to achieve its 
     purpose as described under subsection (b). 
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Consortium is to conduct 
     industry-led joint ventures relating to--
       (1) manufacturing technologies applicable to the production 
     of large civil aircraft;
       (2) the transfer and conversion of aeronautical 
     technologies developed for national security purposes to 
     commercial applications for large civil aircraft;
       (3) subsonic aeronautical technologies applicable to the 
     development and production of large civil aircraft; and
       (4) supersonic aeronautical technologies applicable to the 
     development and production of large civil aircraft.
       (c) Assistance To Be Provided.--In providing assistance to 
     the Consortium, the Coordinating Committee, acting through 
     the Director, shall--
       (1) provide financial and other assistance to the United 
     States commercial aircraft industry in the formation of the 
     Consortium;
       (2) support the Consortium, and such subordinate joint 
     ventures as the Consortium may establish, by making available 
     equipment, facilities, and personnel;
       (3) aid the Consortium, and such subordinate joint ventures 
     as the Consortium may establish, by means of grants, 
     cooperative agreements, contracts, and provision of 
     organizational and technical advice;
       (4) enter into contracts and cooperative agreements in 
     support of the Consortium with independent research 
     organizations, institutions of higher education, and agencies 
     of State and local governments;
       (5) involve the Federal laboratories in the Consortium, 
     where appropriate, using among other authorities the 
     cooperative research and development agreements provided for 
     under section 12 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
     Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3710a); and
       (6) carry out, in a manner consistent with this section, 
     such other cooperative research activities with the 
     Consortium and joint ventures as may be authorized by law or 
     assigned to the Coordinating Committee by the President.
       (d) Selection of Consortium Participants.--The criteria for 
     selection of industry participants in the Consortium, as 
     referred to in subsection (a)(2), are as follows:
       (1) The extent of present participation of the eligible 
     firm in Federal research and development programs relating to 
     aeronautical technologies and related manufacturing 
     technologies.
       (2) The extent of present commercial activity of the 
     eligible firm relating to the development and production of 
     large civil aircraft, engines, advanced materials, avionics, 
     and other related components.
       (3) The extent of present commercial activity of the 
     eligible firm relating to aeronautical technologies developed 
     for national security purposes that may have commercial 
     applications for large civil aircraft.
       (4) The technical excellence of the eligible firm.
       (5) The extent of financial commitment of the eligible firm 
     to the Consortium.
       (6) Such other criteria that the Director prescribes.
       (e) Charter; Operating Plan.--The Consortium shall have--
       (1) a charter, agreed to by all industry participants in 
     the Consortium, that meets requirements established by the 
     Coordinating Committee; and
       (2) an annual operating plan that is developed in 
     consultation with the Coordinating Committee and the Advisory 
     Committee established in section 6.
       (f) Financial Commitment of Industry Participants.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall ensure that, to the 
     maximum extent the Director determines to be practicable, the 
     total amount of the funds provided by the Federal Government 
     to the Consortium does not exceed the total amount provided 
     by the industry participants in the Consortium.
       (2) Authority to exceed 50 per centum federal funding.--
     Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the 
     Federal Government from providing greater than 50 per centum 
     of the funds for any individual joint venture, project, or 
     program where the Director determines such funding to be 
     consistent with the goals of the Program.
       (3) Consideration of in-kind contributions.--The Director 
     shall prescribe regulations to provide for consideration of 
     in-kind contributions by industry participants in the 
     Consortium and joint ventures for the purpose of determining 
     the share of the funds that have been or are being provided 
     by such participants.
       (g) Merit Review.--No contract or other award for a 
     research project may be made under this section until the 
     research project in question has been subject to a merit 
     review, and, in the opinion of the reviewers appointed by the 
     Director, has been shown to have scientific and technical 
     merit.
       (h) Oversight of Consortium Activities.--The Coordinating 
     Committee, acting through the Director, shall take such 
     actions as are necessary and appropriate to ensure that the 
     Consortium's activities help to achieve the purposes of this 
     act, including--
       (1) prescribing regulations for the purpose of this 
     section;
       (2) establishing procedures for the use by the Coordinating 
     Committee of funds authorized to a particular Federal agency 
     or department that is participating in the Consortium;
       (3) establishing procedures regarding financial reporting 
     and auditing to ensure that contracts and other awards are 
     used for the purposes specified in this section and are in 
     accordance with sound accounting practices;
       (4) monitoring how technologies developed through the 
     Consortium are used, and reporting to the Congress on the 
     extent of any overseas transfer of those technologies;
       (5) assuring that the recommendations of the Advisory 
     Committee established in section 6 are considered routinely 
     in carrying out the responsibilities of the Coordinating 
     Committee under this Act; and
       (6) providing for the expeditious and timely transfer of 
     technology developed and owned by the Consortium to the 
     participants in the Consortium.
       (i) Export of Aeronautical Technology.--Any export of 
     materials, equipment, and technology developed by the 
     Consortium in whole or in part with financial assistance 
     provided under this section shall be subject to the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) and 
     shall not be subject to the Arms Export Control Act.
       (j) Freedom of Information Act.--Section 552 of title 5, 
     United States Code, shall not apply to the following 
     information obtained by the Federal Government on a 
     confidential basis in connection with the activities of any 
     industry participant in the Consortium:
       (1) information on the business operation of any industry 
     participant in the Consortium; and
       (2) intellectual property, trade secrets, and technical 
     data possessed by any industry participant in the Consortium.
       (k) Intellectual Property.--
       (1) Disclosure limitations.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, intellectual property, trade secrets, and 
     technical data owned and developed by the Consortium or any 
     industry participant in the Consortium may not be disclosed 
     by any officer or employee of the Federal Government except 
     in accordance with a written agreement between the owner or 
     developer and the Director.
       (2) Title to and licensing of inventions and patents.--
     Title to any invention or patent arising from assistance 
     provided under this section shall vest in a company or 
     companies incorporated in the United States. The Federal 
     Government may reserve a nonexclusive, nontransferable, 
     irrevocable paid-up license, to have practiced for or on 
     behalf of the Federal Government, in connection with any such 
     invention or patent, but shall not, in the exercise of such 
     license, publicly disclose proprietary information related to 
     the license. Title to any such invention or patent shall not 
     be transferred or passed, except to a company incorporated in 
     the United States, until the expiration of the first patent 
     obtained in connection with such invention. For purposes of 
     this paragraph, the term ``invention or patent'' means an 
     invention patentable under title 35, United States Code, or 
     any patent on such an invention.
       (3) Licensing to companies.--Nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed to prohibit the licensing, to any company, 
     of intellectual property rights arising from assistance 
     provided under this section.

     SEC. 6. AERONAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established an Aeronautical 
     Technology Advisory Committee (hereafter in this Act referred 
     to as the ``Advisory Committee'').
       (b) Functions.--The Advisory Committee shall advise the 
     Coordinating Committee and the Consortium on--
       (1) the Strategy and other appropriate goals and priorities 
     for the Program, and how best to achieve those goals;
       (2) the operating plan of the Consortium;
       (3) the annual progress of the Program and the Consortium 
     in meeting the requirements of section 4(a) and, in the first 
     five years, the Strategy;
       (4) organizational and programmatic reforms which would 
     improve the effectiveness of Federal research and development 
     programs relating to aeronautical technologies and related 
     manufacturing technologies in promoting the competitiveness 
     of the United States commercial aircraft industry;
       (5) mechanisms for private industry comment and guidance 
     regarding the cost-effectiveness and commercial 
     practicability of existing and proposed Federal research and 
     development programs relating to aeronautical technologies 
     and related manufacturing technologies; and
       (6) policies and mechanisms to promote the transfer and 
     conversion to commercial applications of aeronautical 
     technologies developed for national security purposes; and
       (7) other goals and priorities for Federal research and 
     development programs relating to aeronautical technologies 
     and related manufacturing technologies.
       (c) Membership.--The Advisory Committee shall be composed 
     of twelve members, who shall be appointed by the President 
     from among individuals who, because of their experience and 
     accomplishments in the field of aeronautics and related 
     technological and scientific fields, are exceptionally 
     qualified to analyze and recommend policy relating to 
     aeronautical technology research and development. Membership 
     of the Advisory Committee shall be composed of 
     representatives of--
       (1) large civil aircraft manufacturing companies;
       (2) aircraft engine manufacturing companies;
       (3) advanced materials companies;
       (4) avionics and other systems companies;
       (5) other subcontractor firms engaged in aeronautical 
     technology research, development, and production; and
       (6) Federal laboratories, universities, and independent 
     research institutes.
       (d) Terms of Membership.--Each member of the Advisory 
     Committee shall be appointed for a term of three years, 
     except that of the members first appointed, four shall be 
     appointed for a term of one year, four shall be appointed for 
     a term of two years, and four shall be appointed for a term 
     of three years, as designated by the President at the time of 
     the appointment. A member of the Advisory Committee may serve 
     after the expiration of the member's term until a successor 
     has taken office.
       (e) Chairperson.--The President shall appoint one member of 
     the Advisory Committee to serve as chairperson.
       (f) Quorum.--Seven members of the Advisory Committee shall 
     constitute a quorum.
       (g) Meetings.--The Advisory Committee shall meet at least 
     quarterly at the call of the chairperson or one-third of its 
     members, and at the call of the Coordinating Committee.
       (h) Compensation and Expenses.--
       (1) No compensation for members.--Each member of the 
     Advisory Committee shall serve without compensation.
       (2) Travel expenses authorized.--While away from their 
     homes or regular places of business in performance of the 
     duties of the Advisory Committee, members of the Advisory 
     Committee shall be allowed travel expenses in accordance with 
     subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
       (i) Federal Advisory Committee Act.--Section 14 of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not 
     apply to the Advisory Committee.

     SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Office of 
     Science and Technology Policy, to carry out the provisions of 
     this Act, such sums as may be necessary for the fiscal years 
     1994 and 1995.

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, I read on page 4, section 11:

       Federal financial assistance to the semiconductor industry 
     consortium, known as Sematech, has been successful in 
     improving the competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor 
     industry.

  Not just agriculture, not just energy, not just automobiles, not just 
aerospace, but what about semiconductors?--$10 billion, they are 
talking about. We have not even gotten to a billion. They want to talk 
about amounts in this particular bill, and we have not gotten to a 
billion for the manufacturing extension centers and Advanced Technology 
Program; less than a billion right now.
  Likewise, don't accuse us of burning holes in our pockets with money. 
I note in S. 419 that it calls for spending of ``such sums as is 
necessary.'' That is mighty elastic. Boy, would that not be a wonderful 
thing, to simply authorize ``such sums as necessary'' in this 
particular bill?
  Then I read down section 13:

       Such a Government industry consortium should focus its 
     efforts on research, development, and commercialization of 
     new aeronautical technologies and related manufacturing 
     technologies, as well as the transfer and conversion of 
     aeronautical technologies developed for national security 
     purposes to commercial applications for large civil aircraft.

  At one time in the debate last week, they said they asked the 
President of Boeing if he had ever gotten anything out of the defense 
research in aircraft. Here the distinguished Senator cites it in his 
bill. He did not have to ask that question of the head of Boeing at a 
hearing. Rather, he cites it with approval here:

       The conversion of aeronautical technologies developed for 
     national security or defense purposes to commercial 
     applications for large civil aircraft.

  Then, again, moving along quickly now:

       The purpose of this act is to strengthen and assist the 
     U.S. commercial aircraft industry by providing for an 
     Interagency Aeronautical Technology Program to coordinate and 
     expand Federal research and development programs relating to 
     aeronautical technologies and related manufacturing * * *.

  You are getting into the business part of it; not just research, but 
manufacturing technologies--

       (2) assisting the U.S. commercial aircraft industry in 
     developing an aeronautical technology consortium for the 
     purpose of providing Federal assistance to industry-led joint 
     ventures established for research, development, and 
     commercialization of aeronautical technologies and related 
     manufacturing technologies applicable to large civil 
     aircraft.

  Then, under section 3 of definitions, the term ``Director'' means the 
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Madam 
President, listen closely here on point 2:

       The term ``eligible firm'' means a company or business 
     entity as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.

  That is where they started off in saying something new was started in 
S. 4 because now, do you really want the Secretary of Commerce 
determining eligibility? Yet look at the bill, S. 419, authored by the 
distinguished Senator last year; it says ``as determined by the 
Secretary of Commerce,'' that is section 3, subsection 2, on page 5.
  It is wrong to claim the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology is a new departure, that it is industrial policy, that it is 
a matter we had not discussed. It has not only been passed twice, it is 
not only referred to in the Republican task force on defense 
conversion, but the distinguished Senator says, in this particular act, 
on page 7, and I read section 4:

       The term ``joint venture'' has a meaning given such term in 
     section 28(j)(1) of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act, 15 United States Code 278-A and J-1.

  So it is cited with approval here, with the 1988 act and the 1992 
act; again, in this particular one, the authorization of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology Act. On the next page, under 
section 4:

       The President shall establish an aeronautical technology 
     program which shall, under subsection 3, promote to the 
     maximum extent practical the transfer and conversion to 
     commercial applications of aeronautical technologies 
     developed for national security purposes.

  Madam President, I do not know how you can spell it out more 
explicitly and then come now and say, ``Wait a minute; this is a new 
departure.''
  For example, again, on page 10:
  ``The strategy shall address, where appropriate, the relative 
programs of the Department of Commerce,'' it says under subsection B.

       The programs and activities of the Department of Commerce, 
     particularly the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology of the program, to be administered by the 
     aeronautical technology coordinating committee.

  It goes on to further say:

       The act shall be composed of, A, the Director; B, the 
     Secretary of Defense; C, the Secretary of Commerce--

  Again, it is in here.
  Now they are asking the question, and I cannot give you a better 
answer than my distinguished colleague has given in his own preparation 
here, if you are trying to get defense conversion, you are trying to 
convert it from defense to civilian, how do you turn it into a civilian 
entity? Do you put it in the Department of the Interior? Do you put it 
in the Indian Affairs Committee? Do you put it in the Budget Bureau or 
wherever else you want to put it? It would have to go to the Department 
of Commerce. Everyone acknowledges that.
  I do not want to read further. The entire act is there. But it goes 
to, finally, on page 21, the Technology Advisory Committee:

     * * * organizational and programmatic reforms which would 
     improve the effectiveness of Federal research and development 
     programs relating to aeronautical technologies relating to 
     manufacturing technologies in promoting the competitiveness 
     of the U.S. commercial aircraft industry.

  That is not defense; that is the commercial aircraft industry. And 
finally, they are authorized to be appropriated ``such sums as is 
necessary.''
  Reading in the earlier part of the bill--we patented this after 
Sematech, reading the final paragraph--``such sum as is necessary,'' it 
is logical to conclude Sematech took $10 billion and, heavens above, 
the aircraft industry is just as important, perhaps larger or 
otherwise, than the semiconductor industry. And so I do not know how 
much. All I do know is President Bush's Science Board came out and said 
look, you ought to have a program of $4 to $8 billion--and we have less 
than a billion--on the Advanced Technology Program. It cites the 
specific figure--this is 2 years ago--of $750 million, and we only have 
for next year $425 million and for the following year $525 million. So 
we are within bounds on the amount.

  There is some discussion that this is a runaway program. Not at all, 
Madam President, when you bring over some five programs from DARPA, as 
we all have been working on--the Armed Services Committee with Senator 
Bingaman, the Competitiveness Council on both sides, the task force on 
defense conversion on both sides. We have all been working in lockstep, 
moving right along in a unanimous way.
  Now they come with ``industrial policy.'' Now they come with, ``Wait 
a minute; the amount is just outrageous.''
  It is 10 times less than what has been recommended by President Bush 
and others who have been looking at this, because as you take it from 
the $40 billion--$40 billion over there in defense for all the 
instrumentalities of weaponry--and move it over to the 
instrumentalities of commerce and business and civilian use, I hope we 
could get up to--I do not want to fly under any false colors--we could 
get up to $8 billion.
  We have to stay within the budget. I serve on the Budget Committee, 
so when this bill was referred to the Office of Management and Budget, 
they actually cut it back, I say to the Senator, and that is why we had 
a substitute in the very early stage when we presented the bill. We 
were authorized by the Committee of Commerce to put in the subject with 
lesser amounts than what the committee had reported last year because 
we have to stay within the reduced budget as enunciated here by the 
Office of Management and Budget.
  I yield the floor.


                Amendment No. 1521 to amendment no. 1493

  Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I rise to send an amendment to my 
amendment No. 1493 to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1521 to amendment No. 1493.

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In lieu of the language proposed to be inserted, insert the 
     following:
       Strike line 19 on page 49, through line 21 on page 51 and 
     insert the following:
       (B) strike paragraph (1)(B)(ii) and replace with: 
     ``participation in such joint ventures, if the Secretary, 
     acting through the Director, determines participation to be 
     appropriate and if the joint venture as a whole agrees to pay 
     at least half of the total costs of such joint ventures 
     during the participation period, which shall not extend 
     beyond 5 years,'';
       (C) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) by striking ``and cooperative agreements'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``cooperative agreements, and 
     subject to the last sentence of this subsection, other 
     transactions''; and
       (D) by adding after paragraph (4) the following:
       ``The authority under paragraph (1)(B) and paragraph (2) to 
     enter into other transactions shall apply only if the 
     Secretary, acting through the Director, determines that 
     standard contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements are not 
     feasible or appropriate, and only when other transaction 
     instruments incorporate terms and conditions that reflect the 
     use of generally accepted commercial accounting and auditing 
     practices.'';
       (3) in subsection (d)(3), by striking $2,000,000; and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``$3,000,000.''
       (4) by adding at the end of the following new subsection: 
     ``(1) Notwithstanding subsections (b)(1)(B)(ii) and (d)(3), 
     the Director may grant an extension beyond the deadlines 
     established under those subsections for joint venture and 
     single applicant awardees to expend Federal funds to complete 
     their projects, if such extension may be granted with no 
     additional cost to the Federal Government.''.
       (b) United States Joint Ventures.--(1) Section 28(d)(11)(A) 
     of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 
     U.S.C. 278N(D)(11)(A)) is amended by striking the period at 
     the end of the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof 
     the following: ``or any other person otherwise eligible to 
     participate in an eligible joint venture, as agreed by the 
     parties, receiving funding under any particular award, 
     notwithstanding the requirements of section 202 (a) and (b) 
     of title 35, United States Code.''
       (2) The amendments made by sections 303 (a) and (b) shall 
     be effective only with respect to assistance for which 
     solicitations for proposals are made after the date of 
     enactment of this Act or October 1, 1994, whichever occurs 
     later.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, this amendment is in response to the 
observations of the distinguished chairman when this measure was 
originally brought up. The chairman's suggestions have been 
incorporated into this amendment. We have checked with the Commerce 
Department and included their recommendations.
  I would like to publicly thank the chairman for his very helpful 
efforts. Frankly, his suggestions are ones that will not only improve 
the amendment but make it clear that I think the purpose of the 
amendment can be accomplished with less paperwork and less wasted 
accounting techniques than the original version.
  The impact of the amendment, as amended, is simply this: It would 
make it clear that joint ventures have to have at least 50 percent of 
the operation coming from the investors themselves, from the venture 
itself, so that the Government is not in a position of putting out more 
than half the money.
  I see that as a very valuable effort because I think it is the No. 1 
way of assuring this money is well spent, and that is to be sure 
somebody else comes up with their own funds. So the matching nature of 
this amendment I think will be helpful.
  In addition, this amendment does put back into law a cap of $3 
million over 3 years. In other words, there is a cap of how much these 
ventures can receive.
  Both measures I think will improve the quality of the endeavors that 
take place under this bill.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, it is an excellent initiative by the 
distinguished Senator from Colorado. We have worked it out, staffs on 
both sides, the Department and otherwise. We go along with great 
approval, and if the Senator urges adoption, we will join him.
  Mr. BROWN. I thank the Senator for his help.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question 
is on agreeing to amendment No. 1521.
  The amendment (No. 1521) was agreed to.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment to 
the amendment?
  The question now is on agreeing to amendment No. 1493, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 1493), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 
minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Breaux). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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