[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 28 (Tuesday, March 15, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: March 15, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
SENATE RESOLUTION 190--RELATING TO AN ANTIPROLIFERATION REGIME
Mr. D'AMATO (for himself, Mr. Mack, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Roth,
Mr. Helms, Mr. Bond, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Gregg,
and Mr. Kerry) submitted the following resolution:
S. Res. 190
Whereas the United States and its allies have agreed that
as of March 31, 1994, the Coordinating Committee (hereafter
referred to as ``CoCom''), the multilateral body that
controlled strategic exports to the former Soviet Union and
other Communist States, will cease to exist;
Whereas no successor has yet been established to replace
the CoCom;
Whereas threats to United States security are posed by
rogue regimes that support terrorism as a matter of national
policy;
Whereas a critical element of the United States proposal
for a successor to CoCom is that supplier nations agree on a
list of militarily critical products and technologies that
would be denied to a handful of rogue regimes;
Whereas some allies of the United States oppose this
principle and instead propose that such controls be left to
``national discretion'', effectively replacing multilateral
export controls with a loose collection of unilateral export
control policies which would be adverse for United States
security and economic interests;
Whereas multilateral controls are needed to thwart efforts
of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue regimes,
to acquire arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies
that could contribute to their efforts to build weapons of
mass destruction; and
Whereas the United States would be forced to make the
difficult choice of choosing between unilateral export
controls under the Export Administration Act of 1979, which
would put American companies at a competitive disadvantage
worldwide, or allowing exports that could seriously harm the
national security interests of the United States: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the President should work to achieve a clearly defined
and enforceable agreement with allies of the United States
which establishes a multilateral export control system for
the proliferation of products and technologies to rogue
regimes that would jeopardize the national security of the
United States; and
(2) the President should persuade allies of the United
States to promote mutual security interests by preventing
rogue regimes from obtaining militarily critical products and
technologies.
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution with Senators Mack, Riegle, Sasser, Roth, Helms,
Bond, Bennett, Faircloth, Shelby, Gregg, and Kerry. The resolution
expresses how extremely important it is that the President work with
our allies in order to achieve a clearly defined and enforceable
agreement which establishes a multilateral export control system for
the antiproliferation of products and technologies to rogue regimes
that would jeopardize the national security of the United States.
On March 31, 1994, a mere 2 weeks from now, Cocom, the multilateral
body that controlled strategic exports to the former Soviet bloc will
cease to exist. On several occasions, I have expressed my concerns to
the President on the absolute necessity of having a successor regime in
place in order to deal with the new post-cold-war threats to our
national security. Specifically, a multilateral export control
organization is essential to deal with the threats posed by countries
that support proliferation and terrorism.
Today, three other multilateral control organizations exist. While
they address proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological
weapons and missile technology, they do not have the teeth of the Cocom
organization which should and must be a part of the new multilateral
proliferation organization. A regime without the Cocom characteristics
of target destinations, veto power, or prenotification falls far short
of achieving an enforceable multilateral, antiproliferation, export
control organization.
Enforceable and effective multilateral controls are essential to
thwart efforts of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue
regimes from acquiring arms and sensitive dual-use goods and
technologies that could contribute to their efforts to build weapons of
mass destruction.
Last December 16, 1993, I wrote to the President expressing my deep
concerns about the end of Cocom on March 31, 1994, and the dangers of a
world with no clear international multilateral export control regime. I
stated to him that ``I think that we have reached a critical moment for
our Nation's ability to conduct an international regime to deal with
threats of proliferation and terrorism in the 1990's.'' On January 10,
1994, I, along with Senators Mack, Riegle, and Sasser, again wrote to
the President on the same issue. After endless delays, I received a
response from President Clinton which did not answer the tough
questions but stated that he would have the State Department respond to
me in detail. I am still waiting for this response.
While the President committed to continue to pursue an ``effective
multilateral regime that includes prior information exchange among
members when needed to ensure that sensitive goods can be prevented
from reaching dangerous destinations,'' I remain immediately concerned
about the specific progress that has or has not been made in achieving
commitments from our allies to establish an effective international
multilateral control regime by March 31, 1994.
The President should persuade allies of the United States to promote
mutual security interests by preventing rogue regimes from obtaining
militarily critical products and technologies. Without such an
agreement, the President risks the national security interests of the
United States and subjects the U.S. export community to inevitable
unilateral export controls putting them at a competitive disadvantage
worldwide.
The administration must not repeat the mistakes of its recent past in
allowing other nations to decide what is best for the United States. If
we allow this to happen again we will place our Nation and our people
at risk.
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution urging the United States to pursue a policy that
would attempt to achieve multilateral cooperation on stemming the flow
of militarily critical products and technology to rogue regimes. Such a
policy is important to promoting the security interests of the United
States and our allies.
For over 40 years we cooperated with our allies under the auspices of
COCOM, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Controls, in
controlling exports of certain strategic items and technology to the
former Soviet Union and other Communist countries. For over 40 years
this cooperation worked well in slowing down the acquisition by our
adversaries of dual use goods and technologies that could have helped
them militarily.
But times have changed, and COCOM will cease to exist on March 31.
However, this does not mean that cooperation with our allies on expert
controls must cease. We have an opportunity to use the experience of
our past cooperation to focus on the threat of the future--the
proliferation of militarily critical items to rogue regimes in volatile
areas such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The United States has
realized these threats for many years, but we alone cannot stem the
proliferation of these items.
I do not want this country to stand by, only to find out when it's
too late, that exports from COCOM countries have helped North Korea,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and other rogue regimes to develop the capacity to
make chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
them. It is in the interest of this country, as well as our allies, to
prevent such regimes from obtaining military critical products and
technologies. We and our allies should use the goodwill and experience
of our past cooperation to prevent future proliferation problems.
It is critical that the United States work to achieve a clearly
defined and enforceable agreement with our allies that establishes a
multilateral export control system preventing the export of militarily
critical products and technologies to rogue regimes that would
jeopardize our security and that of our allies as well.
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