[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 28 (Tuesday, March 15, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 15, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
     SENATE RESOLUTION 190--RELATING TO AN ANTIPROLIFERATION REGIME

  Mr. D'AMATO (for himself, Mr. Mack, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Roth, 
Mr. Helms, Mr. Bond, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Gregg, 
and Mr. Kerry) submitted the following resolution:

                              S. Res. 190

       Whereas the United States and its allies have agreed that 
     as of March 31, 1994, the Coordinating Committee (hereafter 
     referred to as ``CoCom''), the multilateral body that 
     controlled strategic exports to the former Soviet Union and 
     other Communist States, will cease to exist;
       Whereas no successor has yet been established to replace 
     the CoCom;
       Whereas threats to United States security are posed by 
     rogue regimes that support terrorism as a matter of national 
     policy;
       Whereas a critical element of the United States proposal 
     for a successor to CoCom is that supplier nations agree on a 
     list of militarily critical products and technologies that 
     would be denied to a handful of rogue regimes;
       Whereas some allies of the United States oppose this 
     principle and instead propose that such controls be left to 
     ``national discretion'', effectively replacing multilateral 
     export controls with a loose collection of unilateral export 
     control policies which would be adverse for United States 
     security and economic interests;
       Whereas multilateral controls are needed to thwart efforts 
     of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue regimes, 
     to acquire arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies 
     that could contribute to their efforts to build weapons of 
     mass destruction; and
       Whereas the United States would be forced to make the 
     difficult choice of choosing between unilateral export 
     controls under the Export Administration Act of 1979, which 
     would put American companies at a competitive disadvantage 
     worldwide, or allowing exports that could seriously harm the 
     national security interests of the United States: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the President should work to achieve a clearly defined 
     and enforceable agreement with allies of the United States 
     which establishes a multilateral export control system for 
     the proliferation of products and technologies to rogue 
     regimes that would jeopardize the national security of the 
     United States; and
       (2) the President should persuade allies of the United 
     States to promote mutual security interests by preventing 
     rogue regimes from obtaining militarily critical products and 
     technologies.

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution with Senators Mack, Riegle, Sasser, Roth, Helms, 
Bond, Bennett, Faircloth, Shelby, Gregg, and Kerry. The resolution 
expresses how extremely important it is that the President work with 
our allies in order to achieve a clearly defined and enforceable 
agreement which establishes a multilateral export control system for 
the antiproliferation of products and technologies to rogue regimes 
that would jeopardize the national security of the United States.
  On March 31, 1994, a mere 2 weeks from now, Cocom, the multilateral 
body that controlled strategic exports to the former Soviet bloc will 
cease to exist. On several occasions, I have expressed my concerns to 
the President on the absolute necessity of having a successor regime in 
place in order to deal with the new post-cold-war threats to our 
national security. Specifically, a multilateral export control 
organization is essential to deal with the threats posed by countries 
that support proliferation and terrorism.
  Today, three other multilateral control organizations exist. While 
they address proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological 
weapons and missile technology, they do not have the teeth of the Cocom 
organization which should and must be a part of the new multilateral 
proliferation organization. A regime without the Cocom characteristics 
of target destinations, veto power, or prenotification falls far short 
of achieving an enforceable multilateral, antiproliferation, export 
control organization.
  Enforceable and effective multilateral controls are essential to 
thwart efforts of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue 
regimes from acquiring arms and sensitive dual-use goods and 
technologies that could contribute to their efforts to build weapons of 
mass destruction.
  Last December 16, 1993, I wrote to the President expressing my deep 
concerns about the end of Cocom on March 31, 1994, and the dangers of a 
world with no clear international multilateral export control regime. I 
stated to him that ``I think that we have reached a critical moment for 
our Nation's ability to conduct an international regime to deal with 
threats of proliferation and terrorism in the 1990's.'' On January 10, 
1994, I, along with Senators Mack, Riegle, and Sasser, again wrote to 
the President on the same issue. After endless delays, I received a 
response from President Clinton which did not answer the tough 
questions but stated that he would have the State Department respond to 
me in detail. I am still waiting for this response.
  While the President committed to continue to pursue an ``effective 
multilateral regime that includes prior information exchange among 
members when needed to ensure that sensitive goods can be prevented 
from reaching dangerous destinations,'' I remain immediately concerned 
about the specific progress that has or has not been made in achieving 
commitments from our allies to establish an effective international 
multilateral control regime by March 31, 1994.
  The President should persuade allies of the United States to promote 
mutual security interests by preventing rogue regimes from obtaining 
militarily critical products and technologies. Without such an 
agreement, the President risks the national security interests of the 
United States and subjects the U.S. export community to inevitable 
unilateral export controls putting them at a competitive disadvantage 
worldwide.
  The administration must not repeat the mistakes of its recent past in 
allowing other nations to decide what is best for the United States. If 
we allow this to happen again we will place our Nation and our people 
at risk.

  Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution urging the United States to pursue a policy that 
would attempt to achieve multilateral cooperation on stemming the flow 
of militarily critical products and technology to rogue regimes. Such a 
policy is important to promoting the security interests of the United 
States and our allies.
  For over 40 years we cooperated with our allies under the auspices of 
COCOM, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Controls, in 
controlling exports of certain strategic items and technology to the 
former Soviet Union and other Communist countries. For over 40 years 
this cooperation worked well in slowing down the acquisition by our 
adversaries of dual use goods and technologies that could have helped 
them militarily.
  But times have changed, and COCOM will cease to exist on March 31. 
However, this does not mean that cooperation with our allies on expert 
controls must cease. We have an opportunity to use the experience of 
our past cooperation to focus on the threat of the future--the 
proliferation of militarily critical items to rogue regimes in volatile 
areas such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The United States has 
realized these threats for many years, but we alone cannot stem the 
proliferation of these items.
  I do not want this country to stand by, only to find out when it's 
too late, that exports from COCOM countries have helped North Korea, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and other rogue regimes to develop the capacity to 
make chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver 
them. It is in the interest of this country, as well as our allies, to 
prevent such regimes from obtaining military critical products and 
technologies. We and our allies should use the goodwill and experience 
of our past cooperation to prevent future proliferation problems.
  It is critical that the United States work to achieve a clearly 
defined and enforceable agreement with our allies that establishes a 
multilateral export control system preventing the export of militarily 
critical products and technologies to rogue regimes that would 
jeopardize our security and that of our allies as well.

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