[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 24 (Tuesday, March 8, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                E X T E N S I O N   O F   R E M A R K S


                      ANTHONY LAKE ON NORTH KOREA

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, March 8, 1994

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of 
my colleagues the recent remarks by the President's National Security 
Adviser, Anthony Lake.
  Of the various nonproliferation problems the United States now 
confronts, none is more pressing than the challenge posed by North 
Korea's nuclear program.
  In his remarks Mr. Lake succinctly sets forth U.S. policy for dealing 
with this challenge.
  I commend his speech to my colleagues and to the American people. The 
text of Mr. Lake's remarks follows:

 Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security Adviser Anthony 
                                  Lake

       It is a pleasure for me to be here at Yale University. It 
     is also an honor to be here as a Dirk Gleysteen Fellow. Dirk, 
     who was in the Pierson class of '51, served for over 30 years 
     in the Foreign Service. Like Winston Lord, our Assistant 
     Secretary of State for East Asia and another Pierson alumnus, 
     Dirk believed in the importance of public service and 
     international engagement.
       That is part of my message today. Your generation has 
     arrived at a moment of great opportunity. The Soviet Union 
     has disappeared. South Africa has abolished apartheid. Israel 
     and the PLO have joined in a handshake of hope. And democracy 
     is taking root in some of the world's roughest terrain, from 
     Cambodia to Kyrgyzstan.
       At the same time, we must contend with many dangers. 
     Terrorism on our soil and ethnic conflict abroad. Instability 
     within several states of the former Soviet Union. 
     Environmental degradation.
       In the face of all these changes--and in the absence of a 
     single defining threat--some have suggested that America pull 
     back from the world. But the fact is that the need for 
     American leadership is greater than ever.
       Over the past year, we have exercised that leadership and 
     worked to redefine national security in terms that directly 
     benefit Americans in their daily lives. We have opened new 
     markets for our goods and services through NAFTA and GATT. We 
     have worked to enlarge the world's community of market 
     democracies. And we have adapted our security policies to 
     this new era with a sweeping Bottom Up Review of our defense 
     needs.
       Yet no challenge is more serious than the one I want to 
     address today: the proliferation of nuclear, biological and 
     chemical weapons and the missiles that can deliver them. This 
     is not a new threat. But with advances in technology and the 
     end of the Cold War, it is a rapidly rising threat.
       Weapons of mass destruction pose a direct threat to our 
     interests. They can destabilize entire regions. They can give 
     dictators power on the cheap. They can allow terrorists to 
     hold our very sense of security hostage. Consider how 
     different the Gulf War would have been had Saddam Hussein 
     attacked Israel with nerve gas. Imagine if the World Trade 
     Center bombers had weapons of mass destruction.
       Soon after taking office, President Clinton ordered a 
     comprehensive review of our non-proliferation and export 
     control policies. And from the start of his Administration, 
     we have taken specific actions aimed at controlling and 
     countering weapons proliferation.
       We declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and began 
     negotiating a comprehensive test ban. We began working toward 
     an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We 
     submitted the Chemical Weapons Convention for Senate 
     ratification. We pressed for a international ban on the 
     production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for 
     nuclear weapons purposes. And we have worked to reform our 
     export control system to restrict the sale of dangerous 
     technologies without unfairly burdening U.S. exporters.
       At the same time, we have been working actively to reduce 
     the threat of proliferation in specific regions. Indeed, one 
     key test of an effective non-proliferation policy is how 
     deeply it is woven into the fabric of our relations with 
     other nations.
       Some of the most dramatic advances have been in the former 
     Soviet Union. In just one year, the President secured 
     commitments from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to eliminate 
     the nuclear weapons left in their territory when the Soviet 
     Union dissolved. We persuaded Russia not to sell dangerous 
     missile technology to India and to agree to international 
     guidelines against such sales.
       In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. has developed a new policy of 
     dual containment against Iraq and Iran--both states that seek 
     weapons of mass destruction. In the Middle East, we have 
     sponsored historic arms control and regional security talks.
       In South Asia, we have encouraged India and Pakistan to 
     work toward capping and eventually scaling back their nuclear 
     and missile capacities. And we have applauded South Africa's 
     decision to abandon nuclear weapons and its missile 
     development programs.
       But while all these efforts deserve our continued 
     vigilance, there is no non-proliferation challenge more 
     serious than that posed by North Korea. This is one of the 
     most pressing national security challenges we face. Today, I 
     want to describe this challenge and the efforts the Clinton 
     Administration is taking to resolve it.
       Let me start with the events that shape our role in Korea.
       Forty-four years ago, our nation went to war to help turn 
     back communist aggression on the Korean peninsula. We 
     succeeded, but at great cost: tens of thousands of American 
     and United Nations soldiers killed; the Korean countryside 
     devastated and divided. The armed peace on that peninsula 
     remains one of the Cold War's most perilous legacies. North 
     Korea still has over one million men in arms, most of them 
     within 30 miles of the demilitarized zone.
       In the decades since that war, South Korea has flourished. 
     On land once pockmarked by shells and covered with rubble, a 
     world-class economy has blossomed. And in recent years, the 
     Republic of Korea has adopted democratic reforms that 
     strengthen the bonds between our nations. South Korea has 
     become a beacon of freedom and opportunity in Asia.
       While the South thrived, the communist North became a 
     hermit of history, ignoring the Cold War's end and walling 
     itself off from the world. North Korea's police state stifles 
     the basic freedoms of its people. Its government has 
     supported terrorism against the South. And its failing 
     economy depends on remittances from Koreans abroad and from 
     the sale of deadly weapons.
       Indeed, North Korea has become one of the foremost 
     merchants of such weapons, especially to other backlash 
     states. It has sold Scud missiles to Syria and Iran, and is 
     actively marketing its next generation of ballistic missiles.
       Most disturbing of all, North Korea has been working for 
     many years to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Given 
     Pyongyang's history of weapons sales and its menacing posture 
     toward the South, we must view the North Korean nuclear 
     weapons program as a national security concern of the first 
     order.
       North Korea has for years operated nuclear reactors. One 
     byproduct of such operations is plutonium, a key element for 
     nuclear weapons. In 1992 the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency--the UN's nuclear watchdog--began to suspect the North 
     had produced more plutonium than it acknowledged.
       Indeed, North Korea may have produced enough plutonium for 
     one or two nuclear devices.
       To resolve the discrepancy, the IAEA requested a special 
     inspection of two suspect nuclear waste sites that might 
     provide clues about the plutonium. North Korea refused. And 
     in March 1993, the North announced its intention to withdraw 
     from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, raising even more 
     suspicions about its nuclear program.
       The international community called on North Korea to stay 
     in the NPT and to fulfill its non-proliferation commitments.
       Based on an UN Security Council resolution, the U.S. agreed 
     to meet with North Korea to seek a resolution to the nuclear 
     issue. After a round of talks last June, the North agreed to 
     ``suspend'' its NPT withdrawal.
       We made it clear at that time that we would meet only if 
     North Korea froze the dangerous aspects of its nuclear 
     program, accepted safeguards and made progress during the 
     talks. Now we have arrived at an important moment. Last week, 
     North Korea apparently agreed to the inspections necessary 
     for continuity of IAEA safeguards. It is important that those 
     inspections take place promptly.
       Let me be clear about America's interests here.
       Our interests are clearly at stake: in a stable peace in 
     Northeast Asia and in the security of our treaty allies, 
     South Korea and Japan; in preserving the safety of our own 
     troops in South Korea; in preventing the spread of weapons of 
     mass destruction and ballistic missiles; and in maintaining 
     the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation 
     regime.
       Our goals have been clear and consistent: a non-nuclear 
     Korean peninsula and a strong international non-proliferation 
     regime. Let me make five points about our strategy to achieve 
     these objectives.
       First, let me lay out what we expect from North Korea. In 
     1985 the North joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, requiring 
     it to identify all its nuclear-related sites and to accept 
     regular inspections of those and other suspect sites. That is 
     what we call ``full-scope safeguards.'' And in 1991 the North 
     and South signed an accord committing them to the goal of a 
     non-nuclear peninsula.
       What we seek now is what the North has explicitly agreed to 
     in the past. We seek their full compliance with the NPT; 
     implementation of full-scope IAEA safeguards, including 
     special inspections; and implementation of the North-South 
     denuclearization agreement.
       We cannot be confident North Korea has abandoned its 
     nuclear weapons program unless the IAEA has full access to 
     all relevant sites, declared and undeclared. Our first 
     priority now is to ensure that there is no further diversion 
     of plutonium for weapons purposes. That is why we have 
     insisted on immediate and continuing inspections of the seven 
     declared nuclear sites.
       We will also continue to insist that all inspections 
     requested by the IAEA take place. Access to the two suspect 
     nuclear sites, which can disclose important information about 
     North Korea's past actions, will be critical to any solution 
     to the nuclear issue.
       My second point is simple: If Pyongyang verifiably freezes 
     its nuclear program and resumes nuclear talks with the South, 
     the U.S. is prepared to engage in a broad and thorough 
     discussion of the issues that divide North Korea from the 
     international community. That would permit movement toward 
     more normal relations.
       I would add that this is not a policy shift; since the last 
     Administration, the U.S. has held out the prospect of 
     improved relations if the North abides by internationally 
     accepted standards of behavior.
       We recognize the nuclear issue is not the sole source of 
     tension on the Korean peninsula. As the North addresses our 
     concerns about its nuclear program and other matters--
     including such issues as the conventional military threat, 
     missile exports, terrorism and human rights--we can consider 
     steps to improve political and economic relations.
       I want to make something clear: Pyongyang's isolation is 
     self-imposed. Indeed, North Korea is coming to a crossroads. 
     Down one path the North can expect continued isolation, 
     insecurity and poverty. Down the other is entry into the 
     community of responsible nations and the chance to give its 
     people the benefits of the global economy. The choice lies 
     with North Korea.
       But my third point is this: if North Korea continues to 
     ignore its non-proliferation obligations, we are prepared to 
     turn to options other than negotiations, including economic 
     sanctions. As the President has said, ``our goal is not 
     endless discussions, but certifiable compliance.'' North 
     Korea must understand the price of non-compliance.
       My fourth point is that the nuclear issue is not simply or 
     even primarily a bilateral issue between the U.S. and North 
     Korea. It affects the entire region, and other nations have 
     critical roles to play--including Japan, China and Russia.
       For China, the North's nuclear program presents not only a 
     challenge to national interests but a chance to exercise 
     responsible regional diplomacy.
       Of course, our most important partner in this effort is 
     South Korea. We have fully coordinated every step we have 
     taken with the South. As the President said to the Korean 
     National Assembly last July, our commitment to South Korea's 
     security remains unshakable. We recognize that the fate of 
     the Korean peninsula must ultimately be resolved directly 
     between South and North. And we share with the people of 
     the South the faith that Korea will one day be reunified, 
     peacefully and on terms acceptable to the Korean people.
       My last point is that we must remain focused on the long 
     term. While we have made some progress, North Korea's pattern 
     over the years has been one of intermittent cooperation and 
     unpredictable hostility. This problem is not likely to 
     disappear, even if it disappears from the front pages.
       Even if the North agrees tomorrow to the terms of IAEA 
     inspections, we cannot simply breathe a collective sigh of 
     relief and move on. We will have to move to the next round of 
     talks. North Korea will continue to probe and to try to 
     divide the U.S. from its allies. And so we must remain 
     vigilant, patient and resolute.
       As events unfold, we must resist the tendency to lurch from 
     panic to exultation. There is security in steadiness.
       The North Korean situation is important to all of us--
     especially to those of you who will spend the majority of 
     your lives in the coming century. It is not just about 
     defusing today's crisis. It is about setting tomorrow's 
     precedent.
       We must demonstrate that the international non-
     proliferation regime is not some legal nicety but an active 
     force for security. Because every nation with nuclear 
     ambitions is watching closely.
       And we must remember that weapons proliferation, like so 
     many foreign policy issues, is not prone to quick fixes or 
     overnight solutions. This challenge requires hard work--
     across party lines, and across generations.
       Forty-three years ago this May, Dirk Gleysteen and his 
     classmates walked from the Pierson courtyard into a world 
     still plagued by war and the threat of nuclear annihilation. 
     Today, students like you are coming of age in a new world.
       My job is in some small way to help create for you the 
     brightest possible prospects for security and peace. Your 
     part of the deal is simple and vital: to immerse yourselves 
     in study of the wider world, to engage yourselves in the 
     shaping of our foreign policy.
       When World War II ended, a few famous Yale graduates--Dean 
     Acheson, Averell Harriman, Robert Lovett and others--made the 
     case for international engagement. The efforts of these 
     ``Wise men'' paid off with our victory in the Cold War. Now, 
     your generation, a new generation of wise men and women, must 
     rise to the fore.
       I won't ruin this nice evening now by singing ``For God, 
     For Country and For Yale.'' But I will say this: America has 
     arrived at a defining moment in its global leadership. Events 
     in North Korea remind us that we cannot afford to turn 
     inward. For America to be secure and prosperous in the next 
     century, we must choose to reach beyond our borders.
       That choice begins with you. I think I know how you will 
     choose, and I am glad for it.

                          ____________________