[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 22 (Thursday, March 3, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 3, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: A CONFUSED POLICY

  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, one of the special friends that I have 
made since I came to Washington is a true patriot who has served his 
country long and well--Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny. Ed Rowny has 
distinguished himself in every assignment he has undertaken.
  As a military man, his career was nothing short of superb. As deputy 
chairman of NATO's military committee he earned the respect of everyone 
who observed his work. As an arms control negotiator, Ambassador Rowny 
handled every sensitive aspect in a manner that served well the hopes 
for peace in the world.
  Madam President, Ambassador Rowny was present at the Wehrkunde 
Conference in Munich in early February. He told friends later that the 
new Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, ``foreshadowed the 
administration's stiffening policy on Bosnia.''
  Upon his return, Ambassador Rowny penned an article for the Wall 
Street Journal which should be must reading for all Senators. I 
therefore ask unanimous consent, Madam President, that this article be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                Partnership for Peace: A Confused Policy

                    (By Ambassador Edward L. Rowny)

       My recent conversations with European and Russian 
     policymakers reveal they are confused over how to carry out 
     President Clinton's Partnership for Peace. In the rush to 
     cobble together a road map for the future of NATO, it is 
     understandable that the Clinton Administration was not able 
     to develop a coherent or sufficiently detailed plan for 
     policymakers to follow.
       Our allies, grateful for President Clinton's commitment to 
     NATO, and desirous of assuring that NATO has a viable future, 
     adopted a vague and painless proposal to which all could 
     quickly agree. Central European leaders, unhappy with the 
     proposal, were pressured into adopting it in the hope that 
     they could turn it to their advantage. Eastern European 
     leaders, jubilant that the proposal does not appear to be a 
     policy of neo-containment, likewise hope to turn its 
     implementation to their advantage. The Clinton 
     Administration, still reluctant to get deeply involved in 
     external affairs, appears content to have checked off this 
     square with a sketchy outline and let nature take its course. 
     As a result, Western European officials are unclear about the 
     ultimate objectives of Partnership for Peace. Central 
     European officials, stunned with their shabby treatment 
     because the West failed to make a distinction between them 
     and Eastern Europe, are content to pocket what they can in 
     the hopes for getting more later. Both groups naturally want 
     to see the plan carried out to suit themselves. Eastern 
     European policymakers, calculating that the initial steps 
     implementing the plan are working to their advantage, are 
     content with them. To regain credibility and demonstrate 
     leadership, the Clinton Administration should act quickly 
     to provide a more detailed plan which will clear up the 
     confusion and uncertainty.
       All would agree that the ultimate goal of Partnership for 
     Peace is to provide for security and stability in Central and 
     Eastern Europe. But by failing to establish priorities, the 
     uncharted course will either allow the proposal to continue 
     to flounder, or worse, cause it to fail completely. 
     Meanwhile, the Eastern European states will attempt to shape 
     events so as to continue to a gain unilateral advantage.
       I believe that the Clinton Administration should act now 
     and promise the Central European states of Poland, Hungary, 
     and the Czech and Slovak Republics early membership into 
     NATO. These states share Western cultural values and yearn to 
     be fully reunited with Europe from which they were snatched 
     by the Soviets. They have demonstrated courage in breaking 
     away from totalitarian communist regimes and have shown a 
     willingness to undergo hardships in transforming their 
     Marxist economies. They have moved a long way in the last 
     three years along the road to democratic capitalism. As soon 
     as they demonstrate that they will be able to shoulder the 
     burdens of membership, they should join NATO as full 
     partners.
       At the same time, Eastern European nations--Russia, 
     Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics--should be given more 
     support and encouragement to adopt democratic and economic 
     reforms. There should be no promise of early, or even 
     eventual, membership in NATO. Rather, they should be led to 
     understand that it is in their own interests to embrace 
     democracy and market economics as ways of promoting their own 
     security and prosperity.
       In talking to Russian and Ukrainian leaders, I am convinced 
     that drawing Central Europe into the NATO sphere will not 
     undermine Yeltsin's efforts to seek reforms. Thoughtful 
     leaders realize that NATO was--and will continue to be--a 
     purely defensive alliance which threatens no one. Western 
     leaders need to reiterate this point and drive it home so 
     that Yeltsin's opposition, such as Zhironovsky, the military, 
     and the successors to the KGB, are exposed as being paranoid. 
     They can then be prevented from capitalizing on the 
     instabilities resulting from Russia's experiments with 
     democracy. Yeltsin can then show Russian citizens and the 
     world that these anti-reformers undermine Russian stability 
     and prevent economic growth.
       The United States and its Western European allies, whose 
     resources are already stretched thin, should concentrate on 
     assisting Central Europe to become full members of NATO. This 
     will provide the West with a hedge against a resurgence of a 
     militant Russia. It will also promote stability in Europe.
       At the same time, the West should redouble its efforts to 
     help Eastern Europe reform. We should continue military 
     contacts between the states of NATO and Eastern Europe. But 
     the principal elements of assistance should be non-military, 
     such as cultural exchanges and training leaders in skills 
     necessary for democracy and economic health. When IMF 
     conditions are met, larger doses of financial aid should be 
     offered. We should also assist Eastern Europe in 
     transforming their industries from a military to a 
     civilian base, to scrap their missiles more rapidly, and 
     to place their growing stockpiles of plutonium and weapons 
     grade uranium under strict surveillance and control.
       I am not one who shares the notion that promoting democracy 
     and market economics in Eastern Europe is a hopeless 
     endeavor. It is true that these states lag behind Central 
     Europe in such efforts and have a long historical legacy to 
     overcome. But there is nothing inherent in the Russian 
     character which prevents them from moving toward Western 
     ideas and standards. The rapid fall of the Communist Party 
     and renunciation of Marxist economics are cases in point. 
     Further encouragement and investment in hastening reforms in 
     Eastern Europe can pay large dividends. We should not repeat 
     the mistake we made in the early 1930s in failing to support 
     the Weimar Republic. If we were to consider Russia--as we 
     then considered Germany--a pariah state, we could well create 
     a climate for the emergence of a totalitarian regime.
       There is another reason why membership of the Central 
     European states in NATO makes sense and membership for 
     Eastern Europe does not. Central European states are largely 
     homogeneous ethic entities. Western NATO allies need not 
     worry about preserving internal stability in Central Europe. 
     On the other hand, there are reasons to worry about the 
     stability of Eastern Europe. A quarter of the Russian 
     population lives beyond its current borders. Today there are 
     armed conflicts in Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and other 
     former republics of the Soviet Union. Ukraine, despite recent 
     security guarantees, remains suspicious of Russia in view of 
     the boasts by Russian hardliners that Ukraine will be 
     annexed. We can therefore expect considerable unrest, 
     resulting in conflict and bloodshed, in Russia and its 
     eastern and southern neighbors. These conflicts are not 
     matters in which an expanded NATO should become involved. In 
     fact, when the Eastern European states no longer have ethnic 
     conflicts, and when they become democracies with operating 
     market economies, they will no longer pose a potential threat 
     to others. NATO can then be declared a full success, and like 
     an old soldier, quietly fade away.
       As for providing security guarantees to Eastern Europe, the 
     United States can enter into agreements with Russia and 
     Belarus similar to those reportedly offered recently to 
     Ukraine. As part of the deal to get Ukraine to give up its 
     nuclear weapons to Russia, the United States and Russia 
     recognized the current Russian-Ukrainian boundaries. The 
     United States also promised to support any actions that the 
     United Nations decides are necessary to assure Ukraine's 
     sovereignty and territorial integrity.
       In sum, the Clinton Administration should quickly announce 
     its specific plans to implement Partnership for Peace. 
     Inaction and drift will only encourage further confusion and 
     invite chaos. The key to success is the leadership of the 
     United States. It should press for membership of the Central 
     European states into NATO. The Clinton Administration's 
     failure to take timely action will result in a missed 
     opportunity to enhance stability in Central and Eastern 
     Europe and support reforms in Russia.

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