[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 21 (Wednesday, March 2, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   THE TRUTH ABOUT BOMBING IN BOSNIA

                                 ______


                         HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, March 2, 1994

  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I strongly recommend that all of my 
colleagues and all the citizens of this country carefully read the 
following article by former top gun and Navy fighter ace, Congressman 
Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham, about the difficulties with bombing in 
Bosnia:

          [From the Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 16, 1994]

                   The Truth About Bombing in Bosnia

                         (By Randy Cunningham)

       Three hundred air missions over Vietnam and five air-to-air 
     victories taught me harsh lessons about surgical airstrikes; 
     Chiefly, air missions are hardly surgical. Targets are 
     destroyed much less frequently than one might suppose. If we 
     embark on these strikes in Bosnia--or worse, if we allow the 
     United Nations to direct American airstrikes for us--our 
     pilot losses could be great and our impact low.
       Let me first state what airstrikes are not: They are not 
     Star Wars, video games, or precise and painless operations. 
     Airstrikes are deadly and costly. The planes are flown by 
     real people. In training operations alone one out of five 
     United States Navy fighter pilots are killed. They leave 
     families behind. As a Top Gun instructor and Adversary 
     Squadron commander, I attend chapel services for lost 
     comrades.
       In war, it's worse. Dying for your country is serious 
     enough, and every combat pilot knows that risk. Under no 
     circumstances should we put our military men and women under 
     UN command.
       But why are airstrikes not more effective? Imagine speeding 
     in a car across an interstate overpass at 700 m.p.h., 
     dropping a golf ball out of the window and in the cup dug 
     into the cross-street below. That is about as close as one 
     can get to a real airstrike. Except in a real airstrike, the 
     enemy is shooting at you, and you are flying in three 
     dimensions, not driving in two.
       Wielding air power I very difficult, even for the most 
     talented military commander. Fortunately, our experiences in 
     Vietnam and the Persian Gulf teach us quite a bit.
       The jungles of Vietnam hid deadly artillery and surface-to-
     air missiles all too well. We normally flew on clear days. We 
     could see the missiles coming and take evasive action. But in 
     the Balkan winter we would be flying beneath an overcast sky, 
     and our aircraft would be silhouetted against the clouds. 
     (Flying would be risky even without enemy fire.)
       In late 1971 in North Vietnam I flew in Operation Proud 
     Deep, a massive strike that required Navy pilots to bomb 
     Hanoi's supply depots and airfields. Despite bad weather, we 
     were ordered to fly. Blinded by overcast, we were sitting 
     ducks for surface-to-air missiles the size of telephone 
     poles, rocketing toward us at twice the speed of sound. Anti-
     aircraft artillery was another threat. In five days, we lost 
     over a dozen aircraft and pilots. Target destruction was 
     minimal.
       We were ordered to break the most common-sense rule of air 
     power: Never attack through an overcast sky. In the Balkan 
     winter, overcast is the order of the day, and the mountains 
     there bristle with anti-aircraft artillery. Military planners 
     would be tragically foolhardy to ask our pilots to place 
     their lives at such extraordinary risk.
       But even on the clearest days, surface-to-air missile and 
     anti-aircraft attacks are a constant danger. On May 10, 1972, 
     after I had downed three enemy MiGs over North Vietnam, I 
     turned my F-4 Phantom back toward the carrier Constellation 
     in the South China Sea. Still 40 miles inland, a surface-to-
     air missile I saw too late exploded near my plane, disabling 
     most of my controls. I barrel-rolled the burning aircraft 
     until we reached the mouth of the Red River. My Radar 
     Intercept Officer Willie Driscoll and I ejected just as the 
     plane exploded. As we parachuted down, we watched the Viet 
     Cong assemble on the beach, ostensibly to take us prisoner. 
     But a Marine Corps helicopter rescued us in the water, just 
     in time. If our pilots get shot down over Bosnia, I can't 
     believe they would be as lucky or as blessed as we were to 
     avoid capture.
       Operation Desert Storm began with a blistering six-week air 
     attack. Pilots dropped more tons of bombs in those six weeks 
     than we did in all our years in Vietnam. And each Desert 
     Storm bomb was generally more effective, thanks to high-tech 
     targeting equipment not available to Vietnam-era pilots. The 
     air war of early 1991 severely weakened the Iraqi army for 
     Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's masterful ground assault.
       Even so, military writer Rick Atkinson, in his Gulf-war 
     history, ``Crusade,'' finds that after millions of air 
     missions, including thousands purposely sent on ``Scud 
     patrols,'' battle damage reports cannot conclusively say if 
     we destroyed a single Iraqi Scud site.
       And that was over open Iraqi desert. Our F-117 stealth 
     fighters attacked heavily defended sites at night. But the 
     ancient city of Sarajevo lies deep in a valley that is 
     surrounded on all sides by steep, forested mountains, where 
     Bosnian Serbs have placed heavy artillery. Surreptitious low-
     level nighttime raids would be nearly impossible.
       Flying at 600 knots toward Mt. Zuc, four miles north of 
     Sarajevo, the most eagle-eyed, well-equipped American pilot 
     will have awful trouble finding even one artillery piece, 
     must less destroying it. And should our pilots find and 
     target an artillery piece (there are surely tens of thousands 
     of guns in those mountains), they must fly toward the target, 
     dodging small-arms fire or missiles from the ground. The 
     pilot has to release the ordnance at just the right moment, 
     then pull up and away while dodging more missiles. Even under 
     optimum conditions, it's treacherous. And it can take days 
     for battle damage assessments to determine whether the target 
     was hit.
       Can our pilots bomb from high altitude? Yes, but great 
     altitude decreases accuracy. ``Carpet bombing'' from B-52s is 
     a weapon of terror. Don't count on ``smart'' bombs to do the 
     job. More than 95 percent of the bombs the allies dropped on 
     Iraq were the conventional ``dumb'' kind.
       But let us assume that despite all these concerns, 
     airstrikes are ordered. The Bosnian Serbs can read history: 
     As the North Vietnamese did, they will place their artillery 
     in residential areas. They may even gather UN peacekeepers 
     (read ``hostages'') around critical weapons sites. Americans 
     will not stomach such horrors. We are not a warlike nation. 
     Even our warriors much prefer peace, and would recommend 
     staying out of wars if, as in Bosnia, our interests are not 
     at stake.
       Defense Secretary William Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman 
     John Shalikashvili both caution against American airstrikes. 
     Experience shows that these missions just won't work, and 
     they'll get our pilots killed. A similar commitment of ground 
     troops would prove costlier, in human lives and dollars, than 
     Vietnam.

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