[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 21 (Wednesday, March 2, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: March 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

                                 ______


                            HON. DAN BURTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, March 2, 1994

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert in the 
Record an excellent column written by my colleague from Indiana, Mr. 
Hamilton, about the Pressler amendment and nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia.
  Chairman Hamilton makes the point, quite correctly, that the Pressler 
amendment hasn't worked, and encourages India to avoid meaningful 
negotiations with Pakistan because current United States policy 
punishes only Pakistan. My colleague calls for replacing the Pressler 
amendment with a more even-handed policy that would pursue attainable 
goals, such as encouraging both India and Pakistan to take part in 
regional negotiations toward reversing the nuclear arms race.
  I agree wholeheartedly with the sentiments expressed by my colleague. 
In fact, I have advocated replacing the Pressler amendment with a more 
clearly thought-out policy for a number of years. I hope all of my 
colleagues will read Lee's thoughtful piece and support efforts to 
develop a workable, more effective policy toward nuclear 
nonproliferation in South Asia this year.

                [From the New York Times, Feb. 22, 1994]

                              Bomb Scares

                          (By Lee H. Hamilton)

       American nonproliferation policy in South Asia isn't 
     working. Both India and Pakistan have the capacity to develop 
     nuclear weapons in short order. The barn door is open, the 
     horse long gone.
       This troubling fact should guide Congress and the Clinton 
     Administration in the next few months as they reconsider the 
     Pressler amendment, which has driven U.S. policy on the issue 
     since 1985. The amendment, sponsored by Senator Larry 
     Pressler of South Dakota, bans most U.S. aid to Pakistan 
     unless the President certifies that Pakistan does not possess 
     a nuclear explosive device.
       The aim was to induce Pakistan to forgo its nuclear 
     capability. Unfortunately, the premise is obsolete. Since 
     1990, U.S. officials have been unable to make such a 
     certification, and U.S. assistance and military sales to 
     Pakistan have all but dried up.
       This policy has damaged U.S. relations with Pakistan. A 
     long partnership has been undermined by feelings of suspicion 
     and betrayal. As U.S. influence in Pakistan has declined, 
     Chinese and Iranian influence has increased. Our impact on 
     democracy and human rights has diminished at a time when 
     Pakistan is trying to break with its authoritarian past. Our 
     ability to stem the flow of drugs from the region--the 
     second-largest supplier of heroin to the U.S.--has been 
     undercut.
       These costs might have been acceptable if our 
     nonproliferation policy were working. But it isn't. Pakistan 
     clearly has no intention of complying with the Pressler 
     requirements. Instead, our policy risks pushing Pakistan into 
     the arms of renegade states like Iran, Libya or North Korea, 
     which would pay handsomely for Pakistani nuclear secrets. And 
     the policy encourages India to avoid meaningful negotiations 
     with Pakistan, since it is content with a policy that 
     punishes only Pakistan.
       The solution is not to abandon our nonproliferation goals 
     for South Asia, but to pursue attainable ones. Recognizing 
     that both India and Pakistan have nuclear capacities, we need 
     to offer both of them incentives to work toward a nuclear-
     free South Asia.
       The need could hardly be more urgent. James Woolsey, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, recently named South Asia 
     as the most likely place for the outbreak of a nuclear 
     conflict. And failing to stop the spread of nuclear weapons 
     in South Asia would make it harder to keep such weapons out 
     of the hands of Iran, Iraq and other would-be nuclear powers.
       A realistic nonproliferation strategy for South Asia would 
     start out with these four objectives:
       First, it would focus on negotiating a comprehensive test 
     ban, something the U.S. Pakistan and India can all agree on.
       Second, it would work for a global ban on the production of 
     nuclear material--another area where there is considerable 
     agreement among the three countries.
       Third, it would seek a ban on deploying missiles in the 
     subcontinent--a substantial step toward a nuclear-safe South 
     Asia.
       Fourth, it would try to draw the Chinese into the South 
     Asian dialogue, since our nonproliferation efforts in South 
     Asia can succeed only if India's concerns about China are 
     adequately addressed.
       There are other ways to advance our nonproliferation 
     agenda. We should urge both India and Pakistan to be full 
     participants in next year's conference to review the 
     Nonproliferation Treaty. And we should hold out South 
     Africa's decision to disclose and abandon its nuclear weapons 
     programs as a model for the Asian subcontinent.
       Once India and Pakistan are co-operating on 
     nonproliferation, we can pursue other important goals--co-
     operation at the U.N. and on global hot spots, drug control, 
     democracy and human rights.
       Repealing the Pressler amendment would be controversial, as 
     the Clinton Administration learned when it raised the 
     possibility last November. But by revising our policy to 
     reflect reality in South Asia, we stand a much better chance 
     of achieving not only our nonproliferation objectives but 
     other important goals.

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