[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 18 (Friday, February 25, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 25, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                       BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT

  Mr. PACKWOOD. I will go ahead now and speak on the balanced budget 
amendment with a certain sense of deja vu. I am paraphrasing, but I 
think it was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said the history of the law is 
experience, not logic.
  Many times when you think things through logically, you know exactly 
how they should work, only they do not work out that way. And you end 
up basing many of your judgments on experience, not logic.
  Until about 10 or 12 years ago, I was an opponent of the balanced 
budget amendment because logic told me we should be able to have a 
rational fiscal policy without the compulsion of a constitutional 
amendment; that we were mature men and women, we understood the 
consequences of our actions, we knew that what we were doing was wrong, 
and we would right it.
  My first experience into this was not a constitutional amendment so 
much as a bill that we had before Congress in 1972, a bill that 
actually passed the House.
  Picture the situation. It is 1972. We are working on the fiscal year 
1973 budget. There is a possibility that spending in the following year 
may exceed $250 billion--may. I did not say deficit. I said spending. 
The deficit might be someplace between $15 and $35 billion, and we 
thought that was outrageous. And so a bill was passed in the House of 
Representatives to delegate to President Nixon the power to cut the 
Federal budget almost where he wanted if it exceeded $250 billion. It 
passed the House of Representatives, Wilbur Mills then chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee being the principal person who was pushing it.
  It came to the Senate, and we had an extraordinary debate on the 
Senate floor as to whether or not Congress wanted to delegate its power 
over the purse to the President. It was not so much an argument about 
the constitutional amendment to balance the budget. We had not yet 
reached the Draconian necessity for that. We thought we could take care 
of it ourselves. But should we delegate it to the President.
  I was opposed to delegating it to the President. We had a long debate 
on this issue, and I ask unanimous consent to place in the Record at 
this stage both the speech I gave in the Chamber and the notes from 
which I worked to give the speech.
  I ask only for those who read it to realize there is a typographical 
error in the Congressional Record as it was printed. It makes reference 
to a Charles I of England and his calling the Parliament together in 
1622. He actually did not ascend the throne until 1625 and he called it 
in 1629. So whenever you read that, just remember it is an error in 
printing.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Congressional Record, Oct. 13, 1972]

                  Temporary Increase in the Debt Limit

       The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill 
     (H.R. 16810) to provide for a temporary increase in the 
     public debt limit and to place a limitation on expenditures 
     and net lending for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.
       Mr. Packwood. Mr. President, I had intended earlier in the 
     day to speak at length on this issue, but the hour is late, 
     and I will not take up the time of the Senate with the rather 
     lengthy speech I had prepared to deliver.
       I ask unanimous consent at this time that the speech I 
     would have read in its entirety be placed in the Record at 
     the conclusion of my remarks, along with a historical 
     analysis prepared by my legislative assistant, Stan Heisler, 
     backgrounding the subject.
       The Presiding Officer. Without objection, it is so ordered.
       (See exhibit 1.)
       Mr. Packwood. Mr. President, this issue of a debt ceiling 
     that we are considering and probably are going to vote on in 
     the next hour or two has not been a significant issue before 
     this Congress before perhaps 6 weeks ago. When it was in the 
     House of Representatives, it was not seriously regarded, 
     apparently, until the chairman of the Ways and Means 
     Committee took it seriously and apparently met with the 
     President, and then that bill was passed by the House.
       Earlier tonight, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey) 
     spoke upon some of the constitutional issues that we face. 
     When most of the other speakers tonight have spoken, it has 
     not been on the substance or merits of the issue that the 
     Senator from Minnesota raised. We have talked about 
     pragmatics. We have talked about whether the President or 
     Congress is at fault for the $25 billion or $30 billion or 
     $35 billion or $40 billion deficit, but we have not really 
     examined this issue in as much depth as I think the junior 
     Senator from Minnesota and some of the others of us would 
     like to see it examined.
       We spend a year in a presidential campaign. We talk about 
     the environment and population stability. We talk about 
     spending in the campaign. We spent 6 or 7 weeks on the floor 
     talking about the direct election of the President. Last week 
     we spent a week talking about consumer protection. We talked 
     about busing. In both cases we could not get any action 
     because we could not break a filibuster.
       Some of those issues have been talked about for years.
       Yet the issue we are on tonight is of greater significance 
     to the Senate and the country. This entire issue has been 
     discussed in the news media for over 20 years. Yet we are 
     going to rush it through without sufficient consideration of 
     what we are doing or perhaps the background as to why we ever 
     got to where we are and why this power we are so anxious to 
     give away to the President adheres in the Congress at all.
       I am not altogether impressed necessarily with the 
     consistence of some Members of this body who say we are 
     guilty of giving our power away to the President. I think it 
     would be a lot better if we did not give away our power to 
     the President in all kinds of actions that we take here.
       I do not think we really became concerned about giving away 
     our power to the President until the Vietnam war. Regardless 
     of what our feelings may have been about Vietnam 10 years 
     ago, regardless of whether we would have opposed or supported 
     it, most of us now, I think, regret that we ever got into it 
     at all.
       If one can point to any single thing that caused Congress 
     to start thinking about giving away its powers, it was the 
     Tonkin Gulf resolution, passed with only two dissenting votes 
     in this body, cast by former Senator Morse and former Senator 
     Gruening. As this war began to go badly and as the light did 
     not appear at the end of the tunnel, as we were told it 
     would, we began to have second thoughts about why the Senate 
     had given away such power. We began flagellating the 
     President, to whom we had given the power, and saying he 
     should not have done the things he did.
       Whether or not he had the power under the Tonkin Gulf 
     resolution, I am not sure, but with this feeling of self-
     guilt setting in, we began to take back some of the power. We 
     repealed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution a couple of years ago, 
     which was a good step. We passed the Church-Cooper amendment, 
     prohibiting the introduction of American troops into 
     Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. That was a good step.
       Then, in April of this year, we passed the war powers bill, 
     which would have very severely limited the power of the 
     President to send troops overseas. That bill is still in 
     conference. It appears to be a casualty because of failure of 
     the conferees to agree. It appears that it will not come out 
     in this Congress.
       But after we had done those things, we sat back. Have we 
     really started to take back the power we have given to the 
     President?
       My fellow Senators, we have not really scratched the 
     surface. Let me read the Formosa resolution, which is still 
     on the books. It reads as follows:

       ``That the President of the United States be and he hereby 
     is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States 
     as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing 
     and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed 
     attack, this authority to include the securing and protection 
     of such related positions and territories of that area now in 
     friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he 
     judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense 
     of Formosa and the Pescadores.''

       We voted on that. We voted to repeal that resolution. It 
     failed by a 43 to 40 vote. We have left on the books a loop 
     hole big enough to allow any President to drive 10 Mack 
     trucks through if he wants to take us into a war in Asia.
       Then the Senator from Minnesota mentioned the Middle East 
     resolution, which is still on the books. We have not had the 
     courage to vote on whether that resolution should be left on 
     the books. It has been on the books since 1957. It states:

       ``the United States regards as vital to the national 
     interest and world peace the preservation of the independence 
     and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, 
     if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United 
     States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation 
     or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed 
     aggression from any country controlled by international 
     communism:''

       Whatever that means. I think what it means is that the 
     President wants to say that if Syria is controlled by 
     international communism, we can probably bomb Damascus. We 
     have left it on the books. So when we start talking here 
     tonight about how holy we are, and ``Don't give the President 
     this power to cut expenditures to $250 billion'' and ``Isn't 
     it time we took this back to ourselves,'' let us just begin 
     to wonder, what about the others?
       What about the Spanish bases, and the extension of a five-
     year executive agreement whereby we are going to pay the 
     Spaniards $400 million, as far as I can figure it out, 
     without so much as concurrence by Congress? Or the bases in 
     the Azores, or the naval base we are going to take over from 
     the British in Bahrain, where we have never had a military 
     base before of any kind, and I do not know what kind of 
     agreements we have entered into? Congress has not been asked 
     whether we think it is wise, and apparently we are not going 
     to be asked.
       But I know what will be said. This is foreign relations. 
     Apparently throughout history the President has had some sort 
     of paramount position in foreign relations, and it is 
     therefore argued that Congress should not impinge too much 
     upon the Executive's power in foreign affairs and should not 
     bother itself too greatly with how the Executive chooses to 
     run foreign policy.
       But let us take a look at the last 3 years, domestically, 
     at what we have done. We would think at least in the area of 
     domestic affairs Congress would want to keep its power. But 
     what have we done with the Post Office? We used to run the 
     Post Office--badly and politically. Now we have given it away 
     to the President, and he runs it through the U.S. Postal 
     Service, and it is run just as badly.
       Mr. Pastore. Even worse.
       Mr. Packwood. Even worse. I thank the Senator from Rhode 
     Island. But we have given all that away. It is no longer our 
     responsibility.
       What about the wages for all the white-collar workers in 
     the executive branch? We used to have a comparability board 
     that reported to us, and we decided whether or not to raise 
     their wages.
       We changed that a year and a half ago, and now the board is 
     the President's agent, and reports to the President what the 
     salaries should be. And the President has two alternatives. 
     He can send along the recommendations of his agents to 
     Congress just as he got them, and they go into effect 
     automatically--we cannot even veto them. Or, if the President 
     does not like the salaries, he can send his alternative 
     schedules to Congress, and either house of Congress can veto 
     those. But do you know what happens then? If either house 
     vetoes the alternative suggestions, the recommendations of 
     the President's agent go into effect. In neither event does 
     Congress have anything it can do about it.
       But neither of those concessions holds a candle to what we 
     have done with wage and price controls. I was privileged to 
     be a member of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
     Committee when the suggestions came along that we should 
     undertake the responsibility of delegating to the President 
     the power to set wage and price controls. One of the 
     witnesses who came to testify was Arthur Burns, Chairman of 
     the Federal Reserve Board.
       As I listened to Dr. Burns and others who testified before 
     him, I thought to myself, ``why should this power of whether 
     or not to administer wage and price controls, the decision 
     whether to have them, if we have them, when to have them, and 
     what to control, have to be delegated to the President? Why 
     cannot Congress make that decision? Why can we not at least 
     say that until Congress passes a concurrent resolution there 
     will be no wage and price controls?''
       Dr. Burns said it would be very simple. Then Charlie 
     Walker, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, testified. I 
     asked him some questions in the same vein as Dr. Burns: Why 
     could we not add an amendment so that before the President 
     could institute wage and price controls, Congress would have 
     to at least pass a resolution directing him to do so?
       Charlie Walker said that would be very simple. Then 
     Representative Reuss of Wisconsin testified, and I posed much 
     the same question to him.
       Perhaps he was more realistic--and I am afraid that is 
     where the problem, unfortunately, lies.
       He said that Congress could do it and Congress should do 
     it, but Congress probably will not do it, and so we must give 
     the authority to the President.
       That did not satisfy me. I drew up an amendment which would 
     have prohibited the President from instituting wage and price 
     controls without a prior concurrent resolution from Congress. 
     It was a simple amendment, which said:
       ``Whenever the Congress shall by concurrent resolution 
     determine that the public interest requires the imposition of 
     general controls affecting all industries and segments of the 
     economy, the President may issue such orders and regulations 
     as he deems appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, 
     and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on May 
     25, 1970.''
       I send the amendment off to Charlie Walker, and asked, 
     ``Could I have your opinion about it?''
       Two or 3 days later, I got a letter back from the then 
     Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally. Connally's letter 
     said:
       ``This letter is in response to your request for 
     Administration views on your proposed amendment to H.R. 4246, 
     ``To extend until March 31, 1973, certain provisions of law 
     relating to interest rates, mortgage credit controls, and 
     cost-of-living stabilization.
       ``As we understand your amendment . . . institution of a 
     general wage-price control program would have to be preceded 
     by adoption of a concurrent resolution by the Congress.
       ``We support your amendment. It provides a workable 
     mechanism with the safeguards we have consistently advocated 
     with respect to such powers, namely, that general wage-price 
     controls should not be instituted by the Chief Executive--
     short of an all-out national emergency--without a further 
     mandate from the Congress.''
       I offered the amendment on the floor. It failed 41 to 30 in 
     this body, and we gave away to the President the most 
     significant domestic economic power we can give away; for 
     until we have come to the situation we are considering 
     tonight, we did not even want the power. When the 
     administration was not even asking for it, we gave it away.
       But as I look at everything that has gone before, it pales 
     into insignificance in comparison with what we are 
     considering tonight. Because, for all of the powers this 
     Congress has, we have only two great ones. One is the power 
     to tax; the other is the power to spend. It is through those 
     two powers that we are able to transmute the rhetoric of 
     politics into the actuality of policy. If we give either one 
     of those powers away, we are giving away our ability to 
     affect the priorities and the policies of this Nation.
       The thing that bothers me, as I see us approaching this 
     issue, is that I feel we have no appreciation for why we have 
     this power.
       All one has to do is look at English history, where we got 
     most of our laws and the bulk of our interpretations, to see 
     that for almost five centuries the predominant battle between 
     the king and parliament was over only two things: Who had the 
     right to tax and who had the right to control 
     expenditures.
       It started with the Magna Carta, and that is a significant 
     document, because up until that time the king was entitled 
     only to feudal dues. All nobles were entitled to a certain 
     type of feudal dues, and it did not require any type of 
     authorization. But prior to the Magna Carta, the king tried 
     to tax the barons with taxes that were not customary and the 
     barons did not like it, and forced him to sign the Magna 
     Carta, which said that he could not levy any taxes on them, 
     other than the customary, normal feudal dues without their 
     consent.
       That was the start. And you know why the king, from time to 
     time, would have to come to the national council which 
     finally came to be the Parliament? It is no different now 
     than it was 800 years ago. He would have to call them 
     together because the normal feudal dues that he was entitled 
     to as a matter of right did not give him enough money to 
     fight wars.
       So every time he wanted to fight a war, he would call 
     parliament together, and he would plead for money; and if he 
     was a popular king or the war was popular, they would give 
     him the money he requested. If it was an unpopular war or an 
     unpopular king, they probably would not vote him the money. 
     Or even if he was popular and they liked the war, but 
     Parliament felt they had any of a variety of grievances 
     against the king to which the king had not paid enough heed, 
     they would come together, dally and delay, or give the king 
     less than what he wanted, until he would meet with the 
     parliamentary leaders and they would come to some kind of 
     conclusion about their grievances.
       It was a gradual development through this evolutionary 
     process, with the kings wanting to go to war and Parliament 
     saying, ``Okay, but not until we get this grievance met, or 
     not until you stop trying to assess illegal taxes or forced 
     loans or benevolences will we try to get you the money.''
       If they had strong kings and weak parliaments, the king 
     would dominate, or if, as finally under the Lancastrians, 
     they had a strong Parliament and weak kings, the parliaments 
     dominated.
       Finally the showdown came in the 16th century, when the 
     Stuarts came to the throne, who believed in the ``divine 
     right of kings'' and were not going to have any truck with 
     Parliament. James I was first, but he died. Then Charles I 
     came on the throne, and he could not stand parliament, and 
     finally decided in 1622, that he was going to abolish it. He 
     did not call Parliament together for 11 years, until 1640. 
     And do you know why he called it then? Because he had gone to 
     war with the Scots, they had beaten him in the Battle of 
     Newburn, and were knocking on the doors of London. Nothing 
     could be more humiliating to an Englishman than to be 
     defeated by the Scots.
       So he called Parliament together to ask for money to fight 
     the Scots; only at this stage Parliament had had it, not only 
     with the Scots but also with the King. So, instead of giving 
     money, it passed a bill of attainder, impeaching one of the 
     King's ministers and sentencing him to death. The civil 
     war started afterward, and Parliament won, and the King 
     was captured and executed, which was unheard of in that 
     day and age.
       England went for 11 years as a republic, but finally, in 
     1660, it restored the monarchy. But by this time an uneasy 
     but understood truce existed. There were no written 
     documents, but it was understood that the King could not 
     spend nor tax without parliamentary acquiescence.
       So, for 25 years, under Charles II, things went along 
     reasonably smoothly.
       When James II came to the throne in 1685, he did not have 
     his father's tact or diplomacy. He was a Scotch Catholic and 
     was determined to try to return his country to Catholicism. 
     But his country was principally Protestant. So in 3 short 
     years Parliament threw him out and invited William of Orange 
     to come from Holland and become King.
       They passed the Declaration of Right, which, with one or 
     two very minor changes, became the Bill of Rights in 1689. 
     Under that document, henceforth, every king of England, every 
     queen of England served at the sufferance and the will of 
     Parliament. They had no power to tax, no power to spend.
       By 1689, a hundred years before our Constitutional 
     Convention, England had settled upon itself who was going to 
     have the power to tax and the power to spend, and it was 
     Parliament.
       So when we get to our Constitutional Convention--you can 
     search the Federalist Papers or the debates and you will find 
     that there was very little discussion about who shall have 
     the power to spend and tax. Nobody seriously thought anyone 
     other than Congress should have it. No one seriously thought 
     the President should have any power at all in terms of 
     setting fiscal policy. They very clearly set it forth in 
     Article I, section 8, of the Constitution: ``The Congress 
     shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
     and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
     defense and general welfare of the United States.'' And 
     article I, section 9: ``No money shall be drawn from the 
     Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.'' 
     Here it is, in simple and straight language. What happened? 
     We went from the time of our Constitutional Convention all 
     through the 1800's with Congress perfectly able to draw 
     budgets, determine priorities, and raise money.
       In the First Congress, Alexander Hamilton, who was the 
     first Secretary of the Treasury, tried to come forth with an 
     Executive budget, and Congress rejected it. We did not have 
     an Executive budget in this country until 1921, when we 
     passed the Budget and Accounting Act. Of course, the 
     President obviously had a hand in talking with his Cabinet 
     heads; but every department submitted its budget and it was 
     sent to Congress, and Congress made the decision.
       We can do it again, if we want to. When people say, ``It is 
     beyond us. That was 1921. We were talking about a budget of 
     $3 or $4 billion. We cannot do it now with a budget of 
     $250 billion. Nobody in Congress can fathom that''--I say 
     that is baloney.
       Every parliamentary democracy in the world today manages to 
     come up with legislative budgets. A few of them have 
     executives, but they are weak executives. In England, France, 
     Germany, and in the Scandinavian countries there are 
     legislative budgets, and the majority party is able to 
     determine how much they can raise and spend. They come to the 
     parliament with it and debate it, but it is a legislative 
     budget. If it can be done in any other country in the world, 
     why can it not be done in this country?
       The fact that we have not done it in the last 10 or 20 
     years is no reason why we cannot do it again.
       The reason why I worry about this bill tonight is that it 
     is not the first time we have toyed with the idea of 
     delegating fiscal matters to the President. Senators will 
     recall that in the late 1950's and early 1960's there was 
     support for a bill to give the President power to raise or 
     lower taxes by 10 percent. It was even endorsed by two of the 
     major newspapers on the east coast that most of us read. 
     Congress kindly did not adopt it.
       In 1968, we got the first of our debt ceilings, another in 
     1969, and another in 1970; but they were really porous. We 
     put enough exceptions in them so that they really were not 
     debt ceilings, especially one which said there shall be a 
     debt ceiling except for those things Congress appropriates 
     over the debt ceiling. That was not much we had to worry 
     about. We had given away no power.
       But now we Senators are sitting here like a child on the 
     beach with his sand castle, watching the waves come in; and 
     as the tide comes in, the waves come closer, and now, for the 
     first time, tonight, we are seriously toying with giving away 
     half of the significant power that Congress can have.
       I look at us and I say, ``Why the dickens do we do it? Why 
     are we willing to give away this power?'' I can only come up 
     with two reasons. One is that we really do not want it. We 
     really do not want it.
       I see nothing in the legislation about the Post Office, 
     wage and price controls, the Formosa resolution, and the 
     Middle East resolution to convince me that we want the power 
     to make the decisions in this country. It is easy to give the 
     power to the President. Let him make the tough decisions; we 
     will not have to do it. Let him decide where to spend $2 or 
     $3 billion. We will sit back, and if it is unpopular, we will 
     criticize him. We will say, ``What a foolish mistake. Any man 
     in the White House who would do that should be defeated. We 
     would not have done it. But, of course, we do not have the 
     power. We have given it to the President.'' If he happens to 
     make a popular decision and cuts something nobody likes, we 
     applaud him, and we all get reelected together. In neither 
     event have we had to make the prospective decisions and the 
     tough ones as to what to cut ahead of time.
       In addition to not wanting it, I think we have gotten in 
     the habit in Congress of saying ``Can't--can't be done.'' We 
     cannot run the Post Office. We cannot determine wage and 
     price policies. We cannot determine where military bases 
     ought to be placed overseas. We cannot set executive 
     salaries. We cannot fathom the Federal budget. So we delegate 
     it to the President.
       Well, ``can't, can't, can't,'' to my mind, is just an 
     excuse for ``don't want to.'' ``Can't'' is an excuse to avoid 
     the onerous and unpleasant task of leadership, because 
     leadership is no fun. It is a lonely job, and you make 
     decisions in isolation. You make decisions that you later 
     wish you had not had to make. So we delegate the leadership 
     because we say it cannot be done.
       Let me make clear that I am not a defender of Congress. I 
     spoke earlier about the argument we had back and forth about 
     who was responsible for the deficits, and we say we have 
     trimmed appropriations, and we do. We trim appropriations 
     every year after we pass authorizations the year before, 
     requiring the President to double his budget, and then we 
     trim it.
       I think this Congress is fiscally corrupt. I do not think 
     we have the discipline or courage to raise the taxes or lower 
     the expenditures; or, at least, nothing I have seen since I 
     came to the Senate in 1969 would convince me that we have the 
     ability, capacity, wisdom, or discipline to do it.
       So we are faced with a Hobson's choice: Either we delegate 
     these powers to the President in order to save the country 
     from Congress, or we keep the powers in Congress and perhaps 
     run the country into bankruptcy. What it amounts to is a 
     choice between a fiscally irresponsible Congress and a 
     totally irresponsible Congress. If I have to make a choice 
     between the two, I will choose the fiscally irresponsible 
     Congress, because anything we do that is wrong, if we keep 
     the power, we can right. Once we give it away we have no 
     capacity to right it; and, frankly we have no course of 
     complaint if we once give it away.
       When President Kennedy was a Member of this body, he was 
     appointed chairman of a committee called the Committee on the 
     Senate Reception Room. For the life of me, I do not know the 
     history of why the committee was created. But one of the 
     things the committee undertook was to determine the five 
     greatest Senators of all time. There pictures are now in the 
     Reception Room.
       The committee picked two people out of this century, Bob 
     Taft and Bob LaFollette, and three out of the last century, 
     Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, the great southerner, and 
     Henry Clay, who is perhaps by historical acclaim the greatest 
     Senator of all time. It is interesting that Clay, Calhoun, 
     and Webster all served in the Senate at about the same time. 
     They served in that little Senate Chamber down there across 
     the hall from the Senate Disbursing Office, which I am 
     delighted to see we are going to restore under the 
     Legislative Appropriations Act of 1973 which we passed. The 
     room is kind of dusty. It is not used any more, but if we go 
     down there and sit quietly in the room, we can, with any 
     degree of imagination, almost hear the Clays, the 
     Calhouns, and the Websters arguing the great issues of 
     those days: The Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska 
     Act, the Tariff of Abominations where they argued about 
     the opening of the West, the Bank of the United States, 
     and the theory of nullification so eloquently argued in 
     the Webster-Hayne debates. The theory of nullification, if 
     it had prevailed, would have meant the dissolution of this 
     country. It was a theory that finally led to the War 
     Between the States.
       Mr. President, as I think about those men, I cannot help 
     recalling the banquet at the Indian Queen Hotel in Washington 
     in 1830. It was a Jefferson Day Banquet and the Democrats 
     were celebrating Thomas Jefferson. Andrew Jackson was 
     President then and he was, of course, trying to put down the 
     theory of nullification if he could. Calhoun was there. He 
     was actually Vice President but that was through a quirk of 
     the electoral college process, which allowed a man who ran 
     second to be the Vice President, although Calhoun said he 
     would much rather be a Senator than a Vice President.
       When the banquet reached the time appropriate for the 
     toast, Jackson rose and looking squarely at Calhoun proposed:

       ``Our Federal Union--it must be preserved.''

       Calhoun rose to the occasion. He raised his glass and said 
     with feeling:

       ``The Union--next to our liberty--the most dear.''

       Those were great men and great times. They did not agree 
     among themselves. The enmity among Clay, Webster, and Calhoun 
     is legendary. But they almost spanned 50 years, the length of 
     time those three men served here. They had many bitter 
     battles but they all agreed on one thing; they agreed on the 
     fact that the policies of this country were going to be made 
     on the floor of Congress and not in the White House. It was 
     not that they were unaware of the dangers of usurpation of 
     Executive power, because Clay said in 1840:

       ``In my deliberative opinion, the present distressed and 
     distracted state of the country may be traced to the single 
     cause of the action, the encroachment, and the usurpations of 
     the Executive Branch of the Government.''

       So, they were aware of the problems. They are not new. Only 
     we face graver problems now. The President has not tried to 
     steal our power. We want to give it away.
       Congressional power is like chastity, it is seldom lost by 
     force because it is usually given up voluntarily. We will 
     give up our power here tonight, if we vote for this bill.
       Short of physical or mental limitations that God places on 
     any man, there is nothing that cannot be done by man if he 
     believes it. God did not bless or circumscribe the President 
     with any greater physical or mental limitations than he did 
     us. Anything he can do as a President, we can do as a 
     Congress--if we want to. But we must have the will and the 
     capacity to do so.
       There is no reason today why we cannot appropriate money 
     sufficient for ourselves and for the committees to come forth 
     with a legislative budget.
       There is no reason why the distinguished majority leader 
     cannot come forth with a Democratic budget, an there is no 
     reason why our distinguished minority leader cannot come 
     forth with a Republican budget.
       Even Senator McGovern has a budget and he is only a 
     candidate. So, it can be done.
       I am simply saying: Why are we not willing to do it? Why, 
     after we have spent--as I look around this Chamber, some of 
     us are only 2 or 4 years in national politics, but there are 
     others here who have spent 30 years of their adult lives in 
     the service of their country, who ask the voters to delegate 
     to them the power to make the policies of this National--why 
     are we so wild to hand over our power to someone else?
       Mr. President, I tell you what will happen if we adopt the 
     Jordan amendment. It will not be a cure-all. Twenty years 
     ago, in politics, the cry was of the 5 percenters. What we 
     will have if we pass the Jordan amendment will be the cry of 
     the 10 percenters. Everyone will have a favorite project and 
     will come on the floor of the Senate and want to get his 
     appropriation increased 10 percent to take care of the 10 
     percent cut that will be made in the budget by the Executive. 
     Everyone will do the best he can, whatever committee it may 
     come from that has jurisdiction over it, to get his 
     particular little bailiwick, whether it be veterans, or 
     social security, put into the ``uncontrollable items'' list, 
     so that it cannot be cut at all.
       We will find some way to weasel around the Jordan 
     amendment, some way to increase the appropriations enough so 
     that when they are cut 10 percent it will still be too much. 
     So, I fear, instead of an 8-month experiment, we will find it 
     too easy so that we will say education needs $10 million 
     more, so make it $20 million. Housing needs $20 million so 
     make it $40 million, and we can go out and tell the people 
     that the President is the one that has got to cut the budget 
     and he does not have any humaneness or understanding of the 
     problem so that we blame it on him. We can go out and say to 
     the poor, ``We want to try to help you. It is that man in the 
     White House that does not have any sympathy for you.''
       Mr. President, let me make it clear that by that time, 
     Congress will be reduced to passing on minor matters of 
     trivia. The Senate will be called upon from the time to time 
     to confirm judges and ambassadors and that will be the sum 
     total of the function of this body, if we adopt the Jordan 
     amendment, or if we adopt the committee position.
       When Benjamin Franklin was leaving the Constitutional 
     Convention, walking down the steps of Independence Hall, a 
     woman, Mrs. Powell, came up to him and said: ``Dr. Franklin, 
     what have we got--a republic or a monarchy?''
       Benjamin Franklin replied: ``A republic, if you can keep 
it.''

       We are all going to be celebrating the 200th anniversary of 
     this Nation in 1976. I am curious whether we will be 
     celebrating 200 years as a Republic, or as year three of an 
     Executive monarchy.
       Can we keep it?
       That choice is ours.
       I hope that the Senate will opt on the side of the 
     republic.
       Mr. President, I yield the floor.
                                  ____


                               Exhibit 1

                       A Republic or a Monarchy?

                       (By Senator Bob Packwood)

       Mr. President, we are approaching the closing days of the 
     1972 presidential election. Many issues have been raised and 
     discussed. Among those are Vietnam, the economy, 
     environmental problems, race relations, equal rights for 
     women, and numerous others. Some of these were issues in 
     1968. Some were not. Some might still be issues in 1976 but 
     the greater likelihood is that most of the issues of 1972 
     will be but dim memories in 1976. For if there is any one 
     constant in history, it is that the only constant is change.
       We are at this moment in the United States Senate, however, 
     facing an issues that transcends all others. That issue, and 
     how we decide it, will be more important to the future of 
     this country than how we decide all other specific issues 
     combined. That issue is who will decide the main policies of 
     this country--the Congress or the President.
       For the past decade, we've heard a great deal in Congress 
     about the delegation of powers to the President. Much of this 
     has stemmed from the tragic conflict in Vietnam. Regardless 
     of our feelings a decade ago, most of us today realize that 
     we'd be better off if we had never become involved in 
     Vietnam.
       If any specific vote can be pointed to as the vote which 
     focused attention on delegation of power to the President, it 
     would be the vote in 1964 on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 
     Whether or not under that Resolution Congress gave to the 
     President authority he did not have is now moot, as the 
     Tonkin Resolution has now been repealed. But, from the date 
     of the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution onward, many 
     in Congress have become troubled by the erosion of 
     congressional powers and the increased authority and power of 
     the President. As the war dragged on, self-guilt in the 
     Congress, caused by the passage of the Tonkin Resolution, 
     increased. Congress started to flagellate the President and 
     to question the wisdom of the Tonkin Resolution specifically 
     and executive power in general.
       With much hoopla and breast beating, Congress, in June 
     1970, passed the Cooper-Church Resolution which prohibited 
     funds from being used to introduce American ground combat 
     troops in Laos, Thailand or Cambodia.
       In July of 1970, we repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
       In April of 1972, the Senate passed the war powers bill 
     substantially curtailing the power of the President to 
     involve the United States in armed hostilities overseas, but 
     that bill has yet to be enacted by the Congress.
       Having accomplished all of the above, Congress sat back 
     with a certain degree of smugness and prattled about its 
     reassertion of congressional authority.
       But what about the Formosa Resolution initially passed in 
     1955. That Resolution reads, ``. . . The President of the 
     United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the 
     armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for 
     the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and 
     the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to 
     include the securing and the protection of such related 
     position and territories of that area now in friendly 
     hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges 
     to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of 
     Formosa and the Pescadores.'' The Senate specifically 
     refused to repeal that resolution by a vote of 43-40 on 
     October 28, 1971.
       Or consider the Middle East resolution passed in 1957. That 
     resolution reads, ``. . . the United States regards as vital 
     to the national interest and world peace the preservation of 
     the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle 
     East. To this end if the President determines the necessity 
     thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to 
     assist any nation or group of such nations requesting 
     assistance against aggression from any country controlled by 
     international communism . . .'' Congress has never even voted 
     as to whether or not we should repeal this resolution.
       Under either the Formosa resolution or the Middle East 
     resolution, the President, if he didn't already have the 
     power, was certainly delegated the power by Congress to take 
     whatever military action he wishes in those areas under the 
     flimsiest of pretexts. If Congress wants to make sure that 
     some future President doesn't get us into a war over Formosa, 
     or the Middle East, they have done nothing to prohibit it by 
     leaving these two resolutions on the books.
       There are other examples. We've extended our lease on our 
     bases in Spain for 5 years through an executive agreement 
     which doesn't even require Senate ratification or 
     congressional concurrence. In this executive agreement, we 
     have agreed to pay Spain $400 million dollars. All of this 
     without so much as a by-your-leave of Congress even though it 
     is Congress that must find the money to fulfill the 
     agreement.
       We've extended our agreement with Portugal for the use of 
     bases in the Azores--again without so much as a request for 
     congressional acquiescence.
       In addition we apparently, by executive agreement, intend 
     to establish a naval base in Bahrain where we have never had 
     a naval base before, nor for that matter, any military base 
     of any kind in that country. Congress has never been asked 
     whether or not we thought the establishment of this base was 
     in our national interest. It may be. It may not be. But, 
     apparently it is going to be established without asking for 
     the benefit of Congress' thought on the matter.
       Now it might be said that all of these matters involve 
     foreign policy, and that constitutionally the President is 
     given paramountcy in foreign affairs and within reason ought 
     to be able to conduct the foreign policy of the nation as he 
     chooses. It is therefor argued that Congress should not 
     impinge too much upon the executive's power in foreign 
     affairs and should not bother itself too greatly in how the 
     executive chooses to run foreign policy.
       I don't agree with that premise. But, putting it aside for 
     the moment, without arguing for or against it, one might at 
     least suppose that Congress in the area of domestic matters 
     would be concerned with maintaining its preeminence in 
     deciding what policies shall be followed in running this 
     country.
       But what have we seen in the last few years. Well, to begin 
     with--take the Post Office. Congress used to run the Post 
     Office--politically and badly, now, Congress has delegated 
     its authority to run the Post Office to the United States 
     Postal Service, governed by a board of directors, appointed 
     by the President. And now, instead of the Post Office being 
     run politically and badly--it's just run badly. But don't 
     complain to Congress anymore about bad mail service, because, 
     you see, it's no longer our responsibility.
       Congress used to set the salaries of the workers in the 
     Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Now, we've given 
     that away also. Today the President receives reports from 
     various boards, appointed, I might add, by the President. 
     These boards recommend what the salaries of the employees 
     in the Executive Branch ought to be. The President passes 
     along these recommendations to Congress. They go into 
     effect automatically. No longer does Congress have to 
     worry about setting the policy as to what the wages in the 
     Executive Branch should be.
       Example upon example of such delegation can be compiled. 
     Some of it minor, some of it major. But the most sweeping and 
     dramatic power that Congress has recently delegated to the 
     President is in the field of wage and price controls--the 
     most critical power over the private lives of all of us. We 
     have delegated this power so broadly to the President that he 
     has virtually a carte blanche to set the wage and price 
     policies of this Nation--at his sole discretion.
       When Congress was first considering the matter of whether 
     to establish wage and price controls, the matter was referred 
     to the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee which I'm 
     privileged to be a member. Numerous witnesses testified. As I 
     listened to the witnesses, I began to think to myself, why 
     can't the specific decision as to when and whether there 
     should be wage and price controls be decided by Congress. Why 
     did we have to delegate to the President the decision when to 
     institute them or if to institute them. I posed this question 
     to Dr. Arthur Burns, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
     Board who was then testifying:
       Packwood.``I have some misgivings about yielding this power 
     to the President. Is there any reason why the legislation we 
     chose to enact cannot leave with Congress the discretion as 
     to whether or not to trigger the policy decision to institute 
     wage and price controls?''
       Dr. Burns. ``It could be done through a triggering 
     device.''
       Packwood. ``It would not be that difficult a piece of 
     legislation to enact, would it?''
       Dr. Burns. ``I would think that a triggering device could 
     be written into legislation, a device that would work 
     reasonably well.''
       Another witness was Charles Walker, the Under Secretary of 
     the Treasury, and I posed essentially the same question to 
     him as follows:
       Packwood. ``Let me ask you the same question I asked Dr. 
     Burns. While I have misgivings about giving the power to the 
     executive to make the decision to impose general controls, I 
     don't argue with giving the executive the authority to 
     administer such controls.
       ``Would it be relatively easy to draw a piece of 
     legislation which would enable Congress to quickly trigger 
     the policy decision as to whether or not we should institute 
     either general or specific wage and price controls and also 
     providing for the administration to administer them?''
       Dr. Walker. ``I think it would be.''
       Finally, Congressman Henry Reuss from Wisconsin was 
     testifying. He agreed that Congress ought to exercise this 
     power rather than the President, but he didn't have much hope 
     or faith that Congress would. I questioned him as follows:
       Packwood. ``What you are saying is that Congress could do 
     it; Congress probably should do it, but in all likelihood 
     Congress probably will not do it?''
       Mr. Reuss. ``A fair statement.''
       I had an amendment drafted that would reserve to Congress 
     the power to specifically decide when and whether we should 
     have wage and price controls. That amendment read:
       ``Whenever the Congress shall by concurrent resolution 
     determine that the public interest requires the imposition of 
     general controls affecting all industries and segments of the 
     economy, the President may issue such orders and regulations 
     as he deems appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, 
     and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on May 
     25, 1970.''
       I mailed the amendment to Under Secretary Charls Walker, 
     and asked for his comments and suggestions. In a few days, I 
     received a letter from Secretary of the Treasury, John 
     Connally. He indicated that the administration supported my 
     amendment. They did not want the power to institute general 
     wage and price controls without a further mandate from the 
     Congress. He indicated that I was free to use that letter in 
     support of my amendment on the floor of the Senate. That 
     letter, dated April 30, 1971, reads as follows:
       ``This letter is in response to your request for 
     administration views on your proposed amendment to H.R. 4246, 
     `To extend until March 31, 1973, certain provisions of law 
     relating to interest rates, mortgage credit controls, and 
     cost-of-living stabilization.'
       ``As we understand your amendment . . . institution of a 
     general wage-price control program would have to be preceded 
     by adoption of a concurrent resolution by the Congress.
       ``We support your amendment. It provides a workable 
     mechanism with the safeguards we have consistently advocated 
     with respect to such powers, namely, that general wage-price 
     controls should not be instituted by the Chief Executive--
     short of an all-out national emergency--without a further 
     mandate from the Congress.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``We have been advised by the Office of Management and 
     Budget that there is no objection to the submission of these 
     views.
                                                  John Connally.''

       I offered the amendment on the floor of the Senate and it 
     was defeated by a vote of 41-30 on May 3, 1971. When the 
     Senate, on a silver platter, was handed the opportunity to 
     limit the President's power in the field of wage and price 
     controls and to reserve unto Congress the final decision as 
     to when and if wage and price controls should be instituted, 
     the Senate refused to accept the opportunity. They preferred 
     to give away the power.
       Well, all the powers that Congress has delegated to the 
     President, be they in foreign affairs or domestic affairs, 
     pale into insignificance when we consider the matter now 
     under discussion.
       Congress has only two great powers--the power to tax and 
     the power to spend. It is through the exercise of these two 
     great powers that much of the rhetoric of politics is 
     transmitted into the fulfillment of policy. Now Congress is 
     seriously considering delegating to the President the power 
     to cut all Federal expenditures over $250 billion--wherever 
     he wants to cut them. The President is a good and able man. I 
     support his re-election and I'm certain that he will be 
     overwhelmingly re-elected. But no President should have this 
     power.
       Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said: ``A page of 
     history is worth a volume of logic.'' This statement should 
     be considered carefully by those in this body who contemplate 
     delegating the power of over-spending to the President.
       America received most of her concepts of government from 
     England. One of the most controversial of all subjects in the 
     history of England was the issue of who would have the power 
     to levy taxes and to appropriate money--the Parliament or the 
     King.
       The battle started in 1215 with Magna Carta. Under this 
     document, King John was forced to sign an agreement with the 
     nobles that he would levy no extraordinary taxes (as distinct 
     from the customary feudal dues to which the king was entitled 
     as a matter of right) without the consent of the nobles. From 
     that date onward for almost five centuries the battle waged 
     back and forth between king and the parliament. Parliament 
     was at its strongest when the king wanted to wage war. The 
     king's normal feudal dues simply would not produce enough 
     revenue to wage war.
       The king was, therefore, forced to go to parliament from 
     time to time and ask them to assess taxes for the starting or 
     continuance of a war. If the king or the war happened to be 
     popular with parliament, they would normally acquiesce. If 
     the king or the war was unpopular, it was quite common for 
     parliament to be quite miserly in providing funds. And even 
     if the war or the king was popular, if parliament felt that 
     it had other grievances to which the king had given little 
     heed, parliament might delay or appropriate less than the 
     king requested until the king would meet with parliamentary 
     leaders to discuss the grievances about which parliament had 
     complained.
       In spite of the efforts of parliament, it was not uncommon 
     for the king to attempt to levy what parliament regarded as 
     illegal or unconstitutional taxes. Under the Lancastrian 
     monarchs, parliament was greatly strengthened because the 
     kings respected the growing power of parliament and didn't 
     seriously attempt to undermine or circumvent it. But, under 
     the Yorkist and Tudor monarchies, arbitrary taxes, ``forced 
     loans'', and ``benevolences'' and other illegal methods of 
     extracting revenue without parliamentary consent were 
     attempted.
       The showdown arrived with the era of the Stuarts (James I, 
     1603 to 1625; Charles I, 1625 to 1649; Charles II, 1660 to 
     1685, and James II, 1685 to 1688). In the era of James I and 
     Charles I, not only did the normal contest between the king 
     and the parliament over the power to tax continue, but fused 
     into the dispute was the rise to power in England of the 
     Puritans and Oliver Cromwell.
       Parliament became more and more truculent. Not only would 
     the members of parliament refuse on most occasions to 
     authorize the taxes requested by the king, but in addition, 
     members would make speeches on the floor of the parliament 
     assailing the king and his ministers. Parliament attempted to 
     impeach ministers. The king, in turn, imprisoned members of 
     parliament.
       In the 1640's, the century's long battle erupted into a 
     bitter and bloody civil war. Cities divided against cities. 
     Nobles chose sides between the King and parliamentary forces. 
     Members of Parliament were imprisoned, their estates 
     forfeited and on occasion their lives lost. Finally in 1649, 
     the parliamentary forces led by Cromwell and his new model 
     army, were completely victorious; the King was captured and 
     executed. England ceased to become a kingdom and became a 
     republic with Cromwell at its head.
       But Cromwell proved in the long run to be the leader in not 
     of the entire country nor even of all the parliamentary 
     factions. Instead Cromwell's power rested narrowly on a 
     zealous band of religious fanatics known as Puritans. What 
     they tried to impose upon England was an anathema to 
     everything that that great country ever wished or ever 
     willed. Cromwell died in 1658. In 1660, the monarchy was 
     restored and Charles II became King.
       The House of Stuart was restored, however, with not 
     constitutional guarantees. The supremacy of Parliament was 
     not declared in any formal document nor was the King required 
     to acknowledge that his powers were limited or derived from 
     the people. And while in form and law, the King was supreme--
     in fact, he was no subservient to Parliament.
       During the reign of Charles II (1660 to 1685) there was a 
     de facto truce between the King and Parliament. The King 
     refrained from imposing taxes or levies without parliamentary 
     consent and the Parliament, in turn, granted the King greater 
     privileges and liberties than they had been willing to grant 
     to either James I or Charles I.
       On Charles II's death, however, James II ascended to the 
     English throne. But where Charles II had adjusted to the 
     parliamentary system, James II did not. James II lacked 
     Charles II's tact and diplomacy. He assumed the crown with 
     the full intention of exercising arbitrary authority. He 
     attempted to discard the law. He attempted to bring Roman 
     Catholicism back to an England that was now thoroughly 
     Protestant. Immediately, an intense and bitter battle 
     started between the King and Parliament. The King 
     imprisoned some members of Parliament. In a short span of 
     3 years, the situation became so tense that James was 
     driven from the throne.
       William of Orange was invited by Parliament to come to 
     England to assume the throne. William came and jointly 
     assumed the throne with Mary, the daughter of James II. But 
     at least, Parliament had proved itself supreme, William and 
     Mary were crowned subject to the conditions expressed in 
     ``the declaration of right.''
       These set forth innumerable parliamentary grievances and 
     asserted parliamentary powers. With slight changes ``the 
     declaration of right'' was enacted by Parliament as the Bill 
     of Rights. William and Mary, therefore, ruled England at the 
     sufferance and at the will of Parliament. They had limited 
     powers and, most importantly, were subservient to a 
     Parliament which had complete domination over the power to 
     tax and the power to spend. The bill of rights said 
     specifically.
       ``That levying money for or to the use of the crown by 
     pretense or prerogative, without grant of Parliament for 
     longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be 
     granted, is illegal.''
       The Bill of Rights is--without question--one of the most 
     crucial documents in Anglo-American constitutional history. 
     For it marked the end of a struggle which had taken almost 
     five centuries. As the great historian, Maitland observed, 
     with the passage of The Bill of Rights ``one great chapter of 
     England history has been closed.'' Or as Shepard Morgan in 
     his history of parliamentary taxation in England said:
       ``With the passage of the Bill of Rights the principle was 
     vindicated that Parliament rather than the Crown has the 
     power to tax. . . . The corollary principle that Parliament 
     has the power to appropriate supplies for specific purposes 
     and that it can demand an accounting for the money so 
     appropriated were accorded general acquiescence then and 
     thereafter.'' (The History of Parliamentary Taxation in 
     England by Shepard Morgan, New York: 1911; pp, 307, 308).
       The passage of the English Bill of Rights in 1689 occurred 
     almost a 100 years before our constitutional convention. By 
     the time we held our constitutional convention and started 
     discussing the theories of separation of powers, there was 
     relatively little debate on the power of the purse--that is 
     the power to tax and the power to spend. There was relatively 
     little debate because to everyone involved the question had 
     been irrevocably settled. Congress was to have the power of 
     the purse and no one seriously disputed it, challenged it, or 
     thought that any other conclusion should be reached. To 
     insure that Congress would be the ultimate repository of the 
     power of the purse, the constitutional convention enacted 
     article 1, section 8, of the Constitution which says:
       ``The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, 
     duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for 
     the common defense and general welfare of the United 
     States.''

     and article 1, section 9:
       ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
     consequence of appropriations may be law.''
       The issue of legislative fiscal supremacy could not have 
     been made more clear than it was in the first Congress. 
     Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, 
     tried to persuade the Congress to allow the President to 
     establish an executive budget. The effort was rejected out of 
     hand by the Congress. As one author has observed:
       ``. . . jealousy between the legislative and executive 
     branches of the Government became so intensified that 
     Congress sought executive decentralization in budgetary 
     matters . . . thus budget making became an exclusively 
     legislative function in the National Government and as such 
     it continued for more than a century.'' (Public Budgeting, by 
     A. E. Buck, p. 17)
       No--American blood has never been spilled, brother has not 
     been turned against brother nor the President against 
     Congress over the issue of taxing and spending, because 
     nobody, and I re-emphasize, nobody including Presidents, 
     thought the President should have that power.
       During the entire nineteenth century. Congress alone 
     determined the budgetary priorities of the United States. As 
     is required by the constitution, fiscal matters originated in 
     the House of Representatives. As a matter of fact, until 
     1865, the ways and means committee of the House was 
     responsible both for taxation and appropriations. In 1865, 
     the House appropriations committee was created to consider 
     appropriations and in 1867, the Senate followed suit. But, 
     regardless of the method of handling fiscal matters in the 
     Congress, it is fair to say that it was exclusively handled 
     in Congress.
       Even into the twentieth century, Congressional Supremacy of 
     budgetary matters continued. As a matter of fact, there was 
     no executive budget until 1921. Up to that time, although the 
     executive obviously had a hand in determining what the budget 
     recommendations of each of its cabinet departments would be, 
     the various recommendations from all departments were simply 
     given to the Secretary of the Treasury and he in turn 
     presented them to Congress. It was Congress that estimated 
     revenues, set priorities and determined appropriations.
       Then in 1921, Congress enacted the budget and accounting 
     act of 1921. This act was not designed to give the President 
     the power to determine the policies of this country, but 
     rather to give the President the power to administer the 
     Government--the fiscal power of planning and oversight--the 
     power that any executive officer of a corporation has to run 
     the corporation.
       And, what do we see today? We stand here in the Senate of 
     the United States, considering the possibility of giving the 
     President the power to limit all Federal expenditures over 
     $250 billion. We are considering saying: ``Cut where you 
     want, Mr. President. It doesn't matter what Congress thinks 
     our national priorities should be. You do whatever you want 
     to limit Federal expenditures to $250 billion. It's beyond 
     us.''
       The suggested $250 billion expenditure ceiling is not the 
     first time Congress has toyed with the idea of delegating 
     fiscal powers to the President. In the late `50's and early 
     1960's, the idea was in vogue of delegating to the President 
     the power to raise or lower the tax rates in the United 
     States by as much as 10% a year. Fortunately, this suggestion 
     received short shrift from Congress. Then in 1968, the 
     Congress passed the first of its so-called expenditure 
     ceilings. This ceiling, however, was not a firm ceiling. 
     First, ``uncontrollable'' programs were exempt. Secondly, a 
     two billion dollar cushion was allowed. So a ceiling that was 
     originally enacted to be $180 billion dollars in 1960, 
     totalled $185 billion.
       A ceiling was again tried in 1969, but the exemptions 
     enacted with the ceiling were sufficiently porous that the 
     effect was no ceiling at all. A similar attempt in 1970 was 
     equally unsuccessful Thus the efforts in 1968, 1989, and 1970 
     were illusory. There were too many holes to call these 
     genuine expenditure ceilings. But the efforts may have, 
     unfortunately, foretold the future. Like an incoming tide, 
     the waves of an expenditure. ceiling crept ever closer to 
     surrounding the fiscal powers of Congress.
       Now, Mr. President, we stand on the threshold of the 
     decision which may make the difference as to how this country 
     is governed in the future. We soon will vote on whether or 
     not to give the power to control spending to the President.
       Why does Congress give away this power? Why does Congress 
     not hold this power unto itself? I can find only two reasons. 
     First, its easier to give it away. That way we don't have to 
     make the tough decisions prospectively. We can wait until the 
     President makes them and then we can applaud or criticize him 
     as we choose, depending upon public opinion. If he makes an 
     unpopular decision, Congress can stand back and say--that was 
     a foolish thing for the President to do.
       Congress would not have made such a terrible decision. And 
     if the President happens to make a decision that is popular, 
     Congress can come forward and applaud the President, exclaim 
     how wise we all are, bask in the collective glory of the 
     popular decision, and hope that we'll all be re-elected 
     together. But in either event, Congress has no 
     responsibility, because we will have given that power to the 
     President.
       The second reason we give away these powers is that we say 
     to ourselves ``it can't be done.'' We ``can't'' really run 
     the post office well, if at all. We ``can't'' make decisions 
     about military bases overseas. We ``can't'' set the wages for 
     government employees. We ``can't'' determine when or whether 
     to institute wage and price controls. We ``can't'' fathom the 
     Federal budget and how to control Federal expenditures, so we 
     must delegate that power to the President. ``Can't''--can't--
     can't.'' Well, Mr. President, ``can't'' is just an excuse to 
     avoid the onerous and rather unpleasant task of leadership. 
     It's not that Congress can't answer these questions--it's 
     just that Congress has no desire to.
       Mr. President, the intricacies and mysteries of the Federal 
     budget are not beyond us. It is self-evident that every 
     parliamentary democracy in this world manages to estimate 
     government income, set priorities, determine appropriations 
     and put it all into a document called a budget.
       Most of these democracies don't even have the independent 
     executive and those that do usually have a weak executive 
     totally dependent upon the legislative branch of government. 
     The making and fashioning of taxation and expenditures in 
     most free countries of the world are done by the legislative 
     body, not by an executive, and if it can be done in those 
     countries, it can be done here.
       Mr. President, I am the first to fault Congress. We are 
     fiscally corrupt. Left to Congress, we will probably succeed 
     in bankrupting this Nation. We haven't the discipline and 
     courage to either expand revenues or trim expenditures. We 
     don't like to raise taxes and we're reluctant to cut 
     appropriations. The answer is said to be, ``delegate the 
     power to the President.'' Mr. President, this is a Hobson 
     choice--leave the power with a Congress with no discipline or 
     delegate it to the President to save the country from 
     Congress and the devil with what may be the ultimate 
     consequences of the delegation. It's the unfortunate choice 
     between a fiscally irresponsible Congress and a totally 
     irresponsible Congress.
       When Jack Kennedy was a member of this body, he headed a 
     commission to determine the five greatest Senators of all 
     time. The committee heard experts from all over the United 
     States. It weighed and sifted recommendations from the best 
     scholars in the field of American Government this country 
     could produce. And finally the Commission named the five 
     greatest Senators of all time. Two were from this century--
     Bob Taft of Ohio and Bob La Follette of Wisconsin--and three 
     out of the last century--Daniel Webster, perhaps the 
     greatest orator in the history of the Senate, John C. 
     Calhoun, the great southerner and Henry Clay, who is 
     perhaps by historical acclaim, the greatest Senator of all 
     time.
       It is interesting that the latter three, Clay, Calhoun and 
     Webster, all served in the Senate at about the same time. 
     They served at a time when that small room across from the 
     Senate disbursing office was the Senate Chamber. I'm happy to 
     see that the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1973 provides 
     for the restoration of this beautiful old Senate Chamber. But 
     even in its present rather disheveled condition, a person can 
     go into that room and sit quietly and with any degree of 
     imagination can hear the Clays, the Calhouns, and the 
     Websters debating the great issues of those days. The 
     Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the tariff of 
     abominations, the opening of the West, the Bank of the United 
     States, and perhaps most importantly, the theory of 
     nullification so strongly championed by Calhoun and so 
     eloquently argued in the Webster-Hayne debates. This theory 
     of nullification was, of course, the precursor of the 
     eventual War Between the States.
       The theory of nullification produced an extraordinary 
     struggle between the congressional forces led by Calhoun who 
     supported nullification and President Andrew Jackson who 
     opposed it with all his might and main.
       There perhaps could have been no more illustrative and 
     dramatic moment in the history of our country than at that 
     small banquet at the Indian Queen Hotel in Washington in 
     1830. President Jackson and Calhoun were at the banquet. 
     Calhoun and his supporters were determined to use the banquet 
     as a vehicle for furthering nullification. Jackson was 
     equally determined that no such effort succeed.
       When the banquet reached the time appropriate for toasts 
     Jackson rose and looking squarely at Calhoun, proposed the 
     following toast:
       ``Our Federal Union--it must be preserved!''
       Calm and reposed, Calhoun rose, gazed with determination at 
     the President and raised his glass and said:
       ``The Union--next to our liberty--the most dear.''
       These were great men facing momentous decisions. These were 
     men aware of the dangers of executive power and the 
     possibilities of the loss of Congressional prerogative. Henry 
     Clay was quite disturbed about it when he said in 1840:
       ``In my deliberate opinion, the present distressed and 
     distracted state of the country may be traced to the single 
     cause of the action, the encroachment, and the usurpations of 
     the executive branch of the government.
       Yes indeed these were great men--striding these corridors--
     sitting at some of the very desks we now use--debating the 
     critical issues of their day. But while these men may have 
     been divided in their opinions they were united on one thing. 
     And that was that the policies of this country should be made 
     on the floor of Congress--not in the White House.
       Today, the problem is not that the executive is trying to 
     steal our powers. The graver problem is that we are prepared 
     to give them away. Congressional power is like chastity. It 
     is seldom lost by force. It is usually yielded voluntarily. 
     We sit here a timid and tremorous little band, too 
     undisciplined to exercise our prerogatives and too unwilling 
     to exercise our authority.
       It's time to return to the courage and conviction of the 
     Clays and the Calhouns and the Websters--to determine for 
     ourselves as a Congress what the policies of this country 
     should be.
       It does require courage and determination, and most of all 
     it requires leadership. We can make the policies of this 
     country. Short of the physical and mental limitations that 
     God imposes upon man, there is nothing that man cannot do 
     if he believes in it. And Congress is nothing but man 
     combined into a legislative body for the purpose of 
     governing a country.
       The only thing that distinguishes us as members of the 
     House and Senate from the rest of our citizens is that we 
     have been elected to a position of political leadership, and 
     the minimum that the voters of this country have a right to 
     expect is leadership. It's incredible that the members of 
     Congress, who have spent the better part of their adult lives 
     asking the voters of their respective constituencies to 
     delegate to them the power to determine the policies of this 
     country, should now run from the chance to make those 
     decisions. Decisions, I might re-emphasize, that Englishmen 
     died for, so that policy might be made in parliament rather 
     than by a king. Decisions that a Clay, Calhoun or a Webster 
     would never delegate to a president. They would be aghast at 
     what we are contemplating and they would be ashamed to be 
     associated with such an act.
       We can delegate this power to the President, and having 
     done it once this year, we'll surely do it again the year 
     after that, and the year after that, and the year after that. 
     Once having told the President that he spend only $250 
     billion, the last restraints are off Congress. We can then 
     appropriate $260, or 70 or 80 or 90 billion dollars without 
     care. The responsibility will no longer be ours. We can then, 
     with total abandon, go back to our constituents and tell them 
     that we tried to appropriate $10 billion dollars for housing, 
     but the President cut it. We can tell educators that we tried 
     to appropriate $30 billion dollars for education, but the 
     President cut it. He's the one that has no heart or 
     humaneness, no understanding of the problems of this country. 
     We can say it in perfect safety because we know we can never 
     be called to account for our actions. And after four or five 
     years of making these reckless statements, Congress will then 
     gradually wither into a moribund instrument, called forth 
     from time to time to confirm ambassadors and judges and to 
     pass routinely upon matters of trivia.
       I'm reminded of that fateful day long ago in Philadelphia 
     as Benjamin Franklin emerged from the constitutional 
     convention in Independence Hall. A woman, Mrs. Powell, 
     anxiously approached Dr. Franklin and said: ``Well doctor, 
     what have we got--a republic or a monarchy?'' ``A republic,'' 
     replied Benjamin Franklin, ``If you can keep it.''
       We will soon be celebrating the 200th anniversary of that 
     republic. During those years, we have undergone much change. 
     But, throughout, we have jealously guarded the principles 
     upon which this republic was built and has flourished.
       Can we keep it? Will 1976 mark the celebration of 200 years 
     of a glorious republic or year 3 of an executive monarchy? 
     The decision is ours. What do we want: A republic or a 
     monarchy?
                                  ____


                 Historical Analysis of English History

   (Prepared by Stanley D. Heisler, Legislative Assistant to Senator 
                               Packwood)

       Congressional control of taxation and the purse strings of 
     government is not new--it is largely derived from England.
       Prior to the rise of Parliament, the medieval English king 
     was expected to pay for his government and his personal 
     household from revenues received from his own estates, from 
     feudal dues, etc. Taxation--as we now know it--was only 
     resorted to on extraordinary occasions. Indeed, Maitland 
     notes that ``it is not until the very end of the Anglo-Saxon 
     time that we hear of anything that can be called a tax.''
       After the Norman conquest, Maitland enumerates seven 
     different sources of royal revenue:
       In the first place there were the demesne lands of the 
     crown. The remnant of the old folk land had become terra 
     Regis, and this constituted the ancient demesne, Then 
     escheats and forfeitures were constantly bringing to the 
     King's hand new demesne lands. Apart from his being the 
     ultimate lord of many manors--he was by far the largest 
     landowner of the kingdom. Secondly, there were his feudal 
     rights--rights which had steadily grown in some directions, 
     if they had been diminished in others . . . Thirdly, the 
     profits of justice in the King's court must have been very 
     considerable. Under John the sale of justice had become 
     scandalous. By the charter, he promised to sell justice to 
     none--but without exactly selling justice, there was much 
     profit to be made by judicial agencies; fees could be 
     demanded from litigants, and in the course of proceedings, 
     civil as well as criminal, numerous fines and emercements 
     were inflicted. Fourthly, the King had many important rights 
     to sell, in particular the right of jurisdiction, and though 
     the more far sighted of the Kings dreaded and checked the 
     growth of proprietary jurisdiction, there was always a 
     temptation to barter the future for the present. The right to 
     have a market was freely sold, and many similar rights. 
     Pardons again were sold. The towns had to buy their 
     privileges bit by bit. What is more, the grantee of any 
     privilege had in practice to get the grant renewed by every 
     successive King. That the King was bound by his ancestors' 
     grants might be the law, but it was law that no prudent man 
     would rely on. Offices too, even the highest offices of the 
     realm, were at times freely bought and sold--this does not 
     seem to have been thought disgraceful. Fifthly, a good deal 
     could be made out of the church--when a bishop died, the King 
     took the temporalities, the lands, of the see into his own 
     hand, and was in no hurry to allow the see to be filled; this 
     however was an abuse. Sixthly, the King had a right to 
     tallage the tenants on his demesne lands were found many of 
     the most considerable towns . . . Lastly, somehow or another, 
     the process is obscure, the King had become entitled to 
     certain customs duties: Magna Carta recognizes that there are 
     certain ancient and right customs (antiquae et recate 
     consuetudines) which merchants can be called upon to pay, and 
     with these it contrasts unjust exactions, or maletolts. To 
     all this we may add that the obligations of tenure supplied 
     the King with an army which could be called up in case of 
     war.
       (The Constitutional History of England by F.W. Maitland, 
     pp. 92-94)
       However, in the reign of King John, taxes were so 
     oppressive that the barons were driven to revolt. The result 
     was Magna Carta.
       Magna Carta was, in essence, a treaty between the King and 
     the barons. And, though it antedated Parliament, in a very 
     real sense, it was a Parliamentary document. For it 
     established, if not the right, at least the unremitting claim 
     of the community of the realm to be consulted in matters of 
     high policy and in the demand that no extraordinary taxation 
     (as distinct from customary feudal dues) should be levied 
     without consent.
       Though Magna Carta spelled the beginning of the end of 
     absolutism--arbitary rule lingered on, in one form or 
     another, for anther four and a half centuries.
       During the reign of Henry III, it became customary for the 
     National Council to grant money to the King. On January 24, 
     1218 ``suctage'' or ``shield-money'' was exacted by the 
     National Council. Also, one writer has found a note of a land 
     tax levied by the National Council on January 9, 1218.
       (The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England by 
     Shepard Morgan P. 77).
       The above appear to be the very earliest instances of 
     general taxation in England through the National Council.
       In 1224, England was at war with Phillip II for the 
     possession of Poictou. But, as the taxes were insufficient to 
     fund Henry III's war effort, the King demanded that a tax be 
     placed on moveables. The Barons on the National Council 
     refused to consent to the tax unless the King should ``of his 
     own natural and good will'' renew Magna Carta. The King 
     yielded and re-issued Magna Carta. And, this re-issue took 
     the form of a contract between the barons and the King--as it 
     stated that:
       ``The archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, earls, barons, 
     knights, freeholders, and all persons of the realm, give the 
     fifteenth part of all moveables to the King for this 
     concession and granting of liberties.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in 
     England, P. 80.)
       This is likely the first--but certainly not the last--
     conditional grant of taxation of the King of England. Indeed, 
     there were instances in the thirteenth century when the 
     Council refused to make any grant of taxation on the King's 
     request. In 1232, for instance, the Earl of Chester--speaking 
     for the barons--objected to a request for money with which to 
     carry on the war with France because the barons had served in 
     France themselves.
       In 1242, as England was on the brink of war with France, 
     Henry III summoned the National Council. But realizing that 
     the King sought more revenue, and
       ``That the King had so often harassed them in this way on 
     false pretenses . . . they made oath together that at this 
     council no one should on any account consent to any extortion 
     of money to be attempted by the King.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England 
     by Shepard Morgan, Pp. 84-5.)
       When the Council met, it refused to raise money as the King 
     requested on the grounds that he had engaged in the war 
     without asking their advice and that he had so often extorted 
     large sums of money from them.
       But though the Council refused Henry III's demand for 
     revenue, he induced the barons individually to give him what 
     he had been unable to induce the Council to give him.
       In 1224, Henry asked the Council to raise funds to fight a 
     war in Scotland. Being unwilling to make an unconditional 
     grant of revenue, the Council appointed a committee of twelve 
     to respond to the King's demand. The Committee complained of 
     the King's nonobservance of Magna Carta, of the King's 
     reckless expenditure of money, and demanded the appointment 
     of a justiciar and a chancellor. However, as the King would 
     not submit to this compulsion, he refused the petition and 
     ordered the Council to reassemble in 1245. The nobles then 
     expressed their willingness to grant him revenue, provided 
     that in the meantime the King would choose proper counselors 
     and institute reforms. The nobles insisted that whatever 
     money was granted to the King should be expended not by the 
     King, but by a committee of twelve nobles for the King's 
     benefit. But Henry III refused to agree to these terms and 
     the Council adjourned
       In 1245, during Henry III's absence in Gascony, the 
     Regents--Queen Eleanor and Earl Richard Cornwall--broadened 
     the base of the Council by summoning two knights from each 
     county to meet with the Council. The Knights were to be 
     chosen by the counties themselves, probably in the county 
     court, since there the machinery of election already existed. 
     In 1246, at the assembly of the National Council in London, 
     the name ``Parliament'' was first applied to it.
       At the Parliament of 1255, the magnates of the realm were 
     summoned to Westminister. This was necessary because in 1254, 
     in an effort to secure the crown of Sicily for his son, Henry 
     III had agreed to pay the Pope 90,000 Pounds. But the 
     Parliament refused to grant this money to the King because 
     all the members of the Parliament had not been summoned, 
     according to the terms of Magna Carta.
       At the first Parliament of 1258, the barons refused to help 
     Henry III pay an installment on the 90,000 Pounds he owned 
     the Pope. The barons, led by Simon de Montfort, attacked the 
     King for reducing the realm to destitution by mortgaging it 
     to the Pope, and for granting such enormous favors to his 
     followers that it was now impossible to shake off even such 
     insignificant enemies as the Welsh. The barons insisted that 
     they intended to put an end to the King's excesses. They 
     demanded that the King sanction the appointment of a 
     committee of twenty-four ``by the whole of Parliament on 
     behalf of the community'' which would have complete control 
     over the Exchequer and full power to reform the government.
       The King relented and chose twelve persons and the barons 
     chose twelve more to compose the committee. The committees 
     began by drawing up a set of articles known as the Provisions 
     of Oxford, by which all the powers of government were placed 
     in their hands. In effect, this put the kinship into a 
     commission. All important administrative officials--i.e. the 
     chancellor, justiciar and treasurer--were appointed by and 
     responsible to the barons. The sheriffs were likewise under 
     control of the Council
       However, in actual operation, the Provisions of Oxford were 
     unsuccessful. The provisional government lasted for a year 
     and a half from its creation in June, 1258, without 
     interruption. Thereafter, it continued for four years with a 
     number of breaks until 1263, when the civil war began between 
     Simon de Monfort and the King.
       In 1261, Pope Alexander VI absolved Henry III from his oath 
     to obey the Provisions of Oxford and excommunicated all those 
     who opposed the King's absolution.
       This all but brought about the impending civil war. In 
     1263, Louis IX of France agreed to arbitrate the dispute 
     between Henry III and the barons. In the famous Mise of 
     Amiens, Louis decided in favor of Henry III. The result was 
     civil war.
       At the Battle of Leives, in May, 1264, Simon de Montfort 
     defeated and captured Henry III and his son, Prince Edward. 
     In January, 1265, de Montfort summoned a Parliament to 
     London, including the barons and ecclesiastics and two 
     knights from the shires and two burgesses or citizens from 
     each larger town. This led to de Montfort's fame as: ``The 
     founder of representative government in England.''
       In calling to the Parliament elected representatives of the 
     boroughs, de Montfort completed the formation of the English 
     Parliament on substantially the same basis on which it 
     operates today.
       De Montfort's action outraged many of the barons and he 
     quarreled with his principal supporter, the Earl of 
     Gloucester. In May, 1265, Prince Edward escaped from his 
     captors and was joined by Gloucester. In August, 1265, Simon 
     de Montfort was defeated and killed in the Battle of Evesham. 
     De Montfort's death was followed by Henry III's restoration 
     to the throne. On Henry's death in 1272, his son Edward I 
     became King.
       Edward I was a wise and prudent monarch. And, as one 
     historian has written:
       ``It was in the reign of the valiant and sagacious Edward I 
     that our Parliamentary institution and the civil law began to 
     advance by rapid strides.''
       Edward I's first Parliament met in April, 1275. This 
     Parliament consisted, not only of the prelates and barons but 
     of four knights from each county and four burgesses from each 
     borough. This Parliament enacted the first statute of 
     Westminster which was composed of 51 articles including a 
     provision for regulating the feudal aids which were 
     required upon the knighting of the lord's son or the event 
     of the marriage of his daughter. Twenty shillings on the 
     knight's fee and 20 shillings from each parcel of land 
     held in socage yielding 20 pounds a year would be the 
     maximum rates.
       This same Parliament also made a grant of customs duties on 
     wool, wool-felts, and leather. The grant of a duty on wool by 
     Parliament has great significance to the constitutional 
     history of England because, in granting this customs duty, 
     Parliament assumed the power of assenting to a tax which 
     previously had been considered within the prerogative of the 
     King himself.
       The knights of the shire were summoned to Edward's second 
     Parliament which met in October, 1275. This Parliament 
     granted the King a tax on movables.
       In 1282, Edward I was involved in a war to conquer Wales. 
     Finding himself in financial difficulty, Edward initially 
     sought to avoid calling a Parliament by negotiating with 
     individuals for the money he needed to carry on the war. But 
     as these private offerings were insufficient, the King 
     decided to call his second Parliament.
       On November 24, 1282, the King issued writs to the 
     sheriffs, ordering them to send to Northampton or York--as 
     the case may be--on January 20, 1283:
       All freeholders, not already with the army capable of 
     bearing arms and holding lands of more than 20 pounds annual 
     value; Four knights from each county having full power over 
     the community of the same county; and two men from each city, 
     borough and market town having like power for the community 
     of the same.
       The knights and burgesses--meeting at Northampton granted a 
     tax to the King. At York, the knights and burgesses also made 
     a grant to the King. In this manner the King discovered that 
     it was easier to raise his revenue through a Parliament than 
     through private solicitations.
       Four years later, on October 8, 1294, King Edward I being 
     in need of money--both to suppress a rebellion in Wales and 
     for his projected expedition against Phillip the Fair for the 
     recovery of Gascony--again summoned Parliament to meet at 
     Westminster on November 12. This Parliament granted Edward I 
     a tax.
       The following year, 1295, is a landmark in Parliamentary 
     history. For, in this year, Edward I summoned the first full 
     and model parliament in English history. This Parliament was 
     so constituted as to represent, and have the power to tax, 
     the entire nation.
       Edward I summoned the Model Parliament on the theory that 
     ``what touches all, by all should be approved.'' It met on 
     November 27, 1295. Each of the estates met by itself and each 
     made its grant to the King independently of the others. The 
     barons and the knights of the shire gave Edward an eleventh 
     of their moveables, the clergy a tenth, and the burgesses and 
     citizens a seventh. One author has remarked that this is 
     probably the first instance where three estates taxed 
     themselves in different proportions.
       But Edward I's financial problems grew with the passage of 
     time. To raise money to carry on his extensive wars, Edward I 
     needed massive infusions of revenue--which he raised by 
     arbitrary exactions from all classes of his subjects--both 
     lay and clerical. The clergy resisted these taxes, under the 
     bull of Pope Boniface VIII, Clericis Laicos, which forbade--
     under pain of excommunication--the payment of any tax, 
     whatever, on the revenues of the church to a layman.
       However, Edward I's outlawry of the clergy in January, 1294 
     and the temporary confiscation of the estates of the see of 
     Canterbury which followed, compelled the clergy to abandon 
     their untenable position and to yield to the King's 
     demands.
       The merchants were also upset with the King at this time, 
     because the King had taxed them heavily and seized their wool 
     (as wool was most readily convertible into currency). The 
     barons were irritated by the King's flagrant disregard of the 
     many provisions of Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest.
       Edward I next summoned a ``Parliament'' to meet at 
     Salisbury on February 24, 1297-but invited only the baronage 
     without any bishops or representatives of the Commons. The 
     King proposed that the barons should go to fight in Gascony. 
     But the barons refused and--on their refusal, the King 
     threatened to confiscate their lands and give them to those 
     who would go. The assembly broke up.
       On May 15, Edward I issued writs for a general military 
     levy on all the landowners of the kingdom, the value of whose 
     lands exceeded 20 Pounds. The barons were to assemble in 
     London on July 7, prepared to go to France. However, the 
     barons violently opposed this unconstitutional tax.
       As he was still in need of money to finance this war, 
     Edward I induced an irregular assembly of some of the barons 
     and others who had attended the military summons to make a 
     grant of an eighth from the barons and knights and a fifth 
     from the towns. Edward ordered the collection of the eighth 
     and fifth and directed the seizure of all the wool in the 
     kingdom-promising to pay for it as soon as he was able.
       As the King was prepared to embark for the continent, a 
     bill of grievances prepared by the barons was presented to 
     him. The barons complained of the heavy taxes which reduced 
     them to poverty; that they were not treated according to law 
     and custom; that the provisions of Magna Carta and the 
     Charter of the Forest had been breached; and that the tax on 
     wool was too heavy.
       Rather than answer the remonstrance, the King sailed to 
     Flanders leaving his son--the Prince of Wales--as regent. But 
     as soon as the King had sailed, the barons entered the 
     Exchequer and forbade the barons there to seize the wool or 
     collect the taxes until the charters had been confirmed. The 
     barons were supported by a large military following and by 
     the citizens of London.
       Assessing the gravity of the situation, the Prince of Wales 
     called a full Parliament--at which knights of the shire 
     attended as representatives of the commons as well as the lay 
     and clerical baronage. The Confirmatio Cartarum was published 
     on October 10, 1297 and immediately sent to the King at 
     Ghent, and there confirmed by him on November 5. The former 
     tax of an eighth and a fifth were annulled and a new grant of 
     a ninth was substituted.
       The Confirmatio Cartarum was not merely a re-issue of Magna 
     Carta and the Charter of the Forest. It also enacted a series 
     of new provisions intended to deprive the Crown, in the 
     future, of its assumed right of arbitrary taxation. The most 
     critical parts of this covenant are clauses 6 and 7. After 
     enumerating, in the fifth clause, the illegal taxes and 
     exactions of Edward I, the 6th clause declares:
       ``Moreover we have granted to us and our heirs, as well to 
     archbishops, bishops, abots, priors and other folk of holy 
     church, as also to earls, barons and to all the community of 
     the land, that no business from henceforth will we take such 
     manner of aids, mises, nor prises from our realm, and for the 
     common profit thereof, saving the ancient aids and prises due 
     and accustomed.''
       Clause 7 relates to the new duty on wool--``the 
     Maletote''--and provides that:
       ``The King shall never take this nor any other without 
     common consent and good will; saving to us and our heirs the 
     custom of wool, skins and leather granted before by the 
     commonalty.''
       This ``Confirmation of the Charters'' of 1297 is of crucial 
     significance to English constitutional history. One author 
     has observed that as a part of the foundation on which the 
     English constitution was built, the Confirmation is hardly 
     less important than Magna Carta itself.
       (Constitutional History of England, by George Buxton Adams, 
     p. 190).
       The significance of this Charter rests on the fact that it 
     established the exclusive right of Parliament to tax the 
     people of England--except for the collection of the customary 
     feudal dues.
       It has been written that:
       ``The articles generally represented the gain of a struggle 
     extending over a period of eighty-two years; and while 
     verbally they seemed to indicate but little advance over 
     John's Great Charter, in reality they were infinitely more 
     important as there was a power now behind them with due 
     machinery for their enforcement.
       (History of the English Parliament, Vol. I by G. Barnett 
     Smith, p. 162).
       In 1307, Edward I died. Six months later, on February 25, 
     1308, the new King was crowned. But, where Edward I was 
     strong and prudent, his son--Edward II--was weak and inept.
       The oath which Edward II took in French (as he was not 
     familiar with Latin) was of great constitutional importance, 
     for it not only recognized the limitation of the Royal power 
     by existing laws, but that the power to alter these laws and 
     enact others could only be exercised with the consent of the 
     people. In fact, Edward II's oath was unusually stringent. 
     The last of the four promises required of the King was this:
       ``Sire, do you grant to hold and to keep the laws and 
     righteous customs which the community and the realm shall 
     have chosen, and will you defend and strengthen them to the 
     honor of God, to the utmost of your power.
       Edward answered:
       ``I grant and promise.''
       Edward II didn't call on Parliament until April, 1309. It 
     was fully attended by the clergy, lords, burgesses and 
     knights. The Commons granted the King a twenty-fifth of their 
     movables, on condition of a redress of grievances which were 
     detailed in eleven articles.
       Two of the eleven articles dealt with taxation. The first 
     complained of the abuses of purveyance, and the seizure of 
     articles of food, the imposts on wine, cloth, and 
     merchandise. The second dealt with the New Customs which 
     Edward I had provided for in the Carta Mercatoria in 1303. 
     The king agreed to these conditions.
       In 1327, Edward II was deposed by a revolution. He was 
     succeeded by his son, Edward III, then only 14-years old. The 
     new King took the same stringent oath that his father had 
     taken earlier.
       The regularity with which Edward III summoned Parliament 
     had a decisive impact on English constitutional history--for 
     it strengthened the power of the House of Commons by 
     affording them an opportunity for its frequent exercise. As 
     Edward III was perpetually involved in wars, he was 
     repeatedly compelled to ask Parliament to raise money to pay 
     for them. Thus during the fifty years of his reign, forty-
     eight sessions of Parliament were held.
       In spite of the Confirmation Cartarum, Edward I, 
     occasionally Edward II, and Edward III continued to levy 
     arbitrary taxes of every kind. The Commons, however, by their 
     continual remonstrances, their conditional grants and their 
     liberal subsidies, succeeded in establishing its control over 
     direct taxation.
       In 1332, because rebellion had broken out in Ireland, the 
     King assigned commissioners to tallage--a tax levied at a 
     feudal lord's arbitrary discretion upon more or less 
     servile dependents, who had neither the power nor the 
     right to refuse--the cities, towns and royal demesnes 
     throughout England. But Parliament met three months later, 
     on September 9, 1332, and persuaded the King to revoke 
     these commissions to collect tallage. Parliament then 
     offered, as a substitute, the grant of a fifteenth from 
     the shires and a tenth from the towns. In accepting this 
     grant, Edward III promised for the future that he would 
     not lay such a tallage.
       ``Except as was customary in the time of our ancestors, and 
     as he might rightly do.''
       Paralleling the struggle against tallaging the royal 
     demesne, was the contest with the King in matters of custom 
     on wool. In 1303, Edward I established the Nava Custuma 
     (``New Customs'') on wools and other articles.
       This was annulled by the Ordinances of 1311 but renewed by 
     Edward II in 1322 and confirmed on the accession of Edward 
     III, who later--with his Council--imposed other similar 
     taxes. Repeatedly, the Commons petitioned against these 
     exactions or attempted to set up a precedent in its favor by 
     granting a similar tax. It was not until 1340 that Parliament 
     succeeded in controlling this illegal tax.
       On January 20, 1340, Parliament met. The Lords offered to 
     grant the King ``the tenth sheaf, the tenth lamb, and the 
     tenth fleece, payable in two years'' and the Commons granted 
     the King 30,000 sacks of wool--on condition that the King 
     accept certain articles drawn up by them. (In the event that 
     the King rejected the articles, they offered a free gift of 
     2500 sacks of wool).
       Edward did reject them and called a new Parliament which 
     met on March 29, 1340. Instead of a tenth, the prelates, 
     barons and knights of the shire granted the king the ninth 
     sheaf, fleece and lamb for two years. The towns granted a 
     ninth of goods and the rest of the nation a fifteenth. In 
     addition, a custom of forth shillings was granted on each 
     sack of wool, on each three hundred wool-fells, and every 
     last of leather. But the grants were conditional: the King 
     had to accept the articles prepared by the Commons. The king 
     finally accepted them and the articles were re-drafted into 
     statutory form.
       The statute pertaining to the duty on wool provided that:
       ``And for this grant, the King by the assent of the 
     prelates, earls, barons, and all others assembled in 
     Parliament, hath granted, that from the feast of Pentecost 
     that commeth in a year, he nor his heirs shall not demand, 
     assess, or take, nor suffer to be take more custom of a sack 
     of wool of any Englishmen but half a mark of custom only; and 
     upon woolfells and leather the old custom . . . And this 
     establishment lawfully to be holden and kept, the King hath 
     promised in the presence of the prelates, earls, barons, and 
     others in his Parliament, no more to charge, set, or assess, 
     upon the custom, but in the manner as afore is said.''
       The second statute is much more sweeping. It stated that:
       ``We . . . will and grant for us, and our heirs, to the 
     same prelates, earls, barons, and commons, citizens, 
     burgesses, and merchants . . . that they be (not) from 
     henceforth charged, nor grieved to make common aid, or to 
     sustain charge, if it be not by the common assent of the 
     prelates, earls, barons, and other great men, and commons of 
     our said realm of England, and that in the Parliament; and 
     that all the profits raising from the said aid, and of the 
     words and marriages, customs, and escheats, and other profits 
     rising of the said realm of England, shall be put and spent 
     upon the maintenance of the safeguard of our said realm of 
     England and of our wars. . . .''
       These statues are crucially important to the constitutional 
     history of England for they clearly enunciated the principle 
     that Parliament was the sole authority for levying taxes on 
     the nation at large.
       As one writer has observed:
       ``The promise of Edward to abide by the recommendation of 
     Parliament in the matter of the subsidy on wool, was an 
     admission by the King that not he but they had final control 
     over the laying of customs duties. Thus was established the 
     principle to be defended and likewise to be questioned in the 
     future. That Parliament alone had the power to lay a tax on 
     wool. . . . (Also), by the statute which provided that no 
     charge or aid should be levied but by consent of Parliament, 
     tallage died a legislative death. And not only was this 
     statute aimed at tallages but as well at every species of 
     unauthorized taxation.''
       (The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England by 
     Shepard Morgan; NY-1911; Pp. 178-9).
       After the enactment of the vital statutes of 1340. 
     Parliament was willing to bargain with the King for the 
     control of his customs duties. But problems developed 
     because, at this time, Parliament could not yet enforce this 
     right, but rather could only petition the King for redress. 
     And, the King frequently assented to Parliamentary petitions 
     and then broke his word. For instance, in 1340, Edward III 
     received a grant from Parliament of forty shillings on a sack 
     of wool, for a year and a half, on condition that he would 
     abolish the maletolt--Maletolt was ``evil tolls''--i.e. 
     unconstitutional duties or taxes.
       In 1342, the King procured a duty of forty shillings per 
     sack of wool from the merchants without the consent of 
     Parliament and issued orders for its collection. Parliament 
     balked at this because it realized that the tax fell not on 
     foreign merchants but upon English wool growers. Edward III 
     then declared that the price of wool would remain fixed, 
     pursuant to an act of Parliament, and that consequently the 
     foreign merchants would have to pay the tax. Commons agreed 
     to this and granted the King a duty of forty shillings on a 
     sack of wool for three years.
       After the passage of three years and the revocation of the 
     act fixing the price of wool, as the King had no authority to 
     continue the duty, Parliament petitioned against its 
     continuance. When the King replied that he had secured the 
     approval of the barons and of the merchants for the duty, and 
     that he had already pledged the revenues to be raised by the 
     duty to his creditors, the House of Commons--finding that it 
     couldn't win their point--contented themselves with the 
     belief that having established the principle, they could at 
     anytime demand the implementation of it, and extended the 
     duty for another two years.
       In 1348, the Commons presented a remonstrance to the King, 
     asserting that the wool subsidy was, in actuality, a land 
     tax. Parliament then granted a fifteenth for three years on 
     condition that the subsidy of wool should cease in three 
     years, and that for the future ``no such grant should be made 
     by the merchants.'' The language was all encompassing: no 
     ``imposition, tallage or charge by way of loan or in any 
     other manner,'' was to be laid ``without the grant and assent 
     of the commons in Parliament.'' Edward III accepted the grant 
     and the conditions.
       However, in 1362, arbitrary exactions on wool received the 
     attention of the Commons and the statute passed in that year 
     provided that thereafter no subsidy should be set on wool 
     without the assent of Parliament. But notwithstanding these 
     explicit and repeated assertions that Parliament had the sole 
     right to levy the subsidy on wool, Edward at times continued 
     to exact the maletolt. The matter arose again in 1371 and was 
     met with a similar statute.
       As Parliament's power grew, so too did its faculty to 
     supervise the expenditure of money so raised--which would 
     later evolve into the ``power of the purse''. In 1237, during 
     the reign of Henry III, William of Raleigh had suggested to 
     the National Council that it appoint a committee with whom 
     the proceeds of a grant of taxation be deposited and by whom 
     the money be expended. One writer has suggested that the 
     reason this proposal was not taken was perhaps, ``due to the 
     ignorance of the baronage'' of its ramifications.
       (The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England by 
     Shepard Morgan, pp. 184-5)
       Parliament never asserted the power to supervise the 
     expenditure of money during the reign of Edward I, because he 
     was too strong; or during the reign of his son, Edward II, 
     because the power of the Crown was for a time delegated to 
     others. But during the reign of Edward III--primarily because 
     of his endless and extravagant military expenditures--
     Parliament demanded a voice in the disposition of public 
     funds. In 1340, a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to 
     examine the accounts of the collectors of the last grant of 
     taxation to the King. In the words of the statute, the 
     committee was assigned to see that the ``profits of the said 
     realm of England shall be put and spent upon the maintenance 
     of the safeguard of our said realm of England, and of our 
     wars.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in 
     England, by Shepard Morgan, p. 185).
       The following year, Parliament appointed commissioners for 
     the same purpose. The 1341 act said:
       ``The great men and commons of the land pray, for the 
     common profit of the King and themselves, that certain 
     persons be deputed by commission to audit the accounts of all 
     those who have received the wool of our said lord, or other 
     aid granted to him; and also of those who have received and 
     paid out his money, as well beyond the seas as in the realm 
     from the commencement of his war until now; and that the 
     rolls and other remembrances, obligations and other things 
     made abroad be delivered into the chancery, to be enrolled 
     and recorded, just as was wont to be done heretofore.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in 
     England, by Shepard Morgan, p. 185).
       In time, this power of Parliamentary oversight evolved into 
     the ``power of the purse''. In 1344, for instance, Parliament 
     demanded that the money granted should be spent solely for 
     the purpose for which it had been asked. In 1348, it granted 
     money specifically to defend England against Scotland. And, 
     in 1353, a subsidy on wool was granted which could only be 
     applied to fighting the war.
       In fact, all of these acts were the starting point of 
     Parliamentary (and Congressional) appropriations. And, though 
     the Parliamentary appropriations we now perceive did not 
     exist at this time, the foundations for the appropriations 
     process were firmly laid by the end of the fourteenth 
     century.
       On Edward III's death in 1377, his eleven-year-old 
     grandson--Richard II--assumed the English throne. Parliament 
     took full advantage of Richard II's youth. It not only 
     solidified its power that no money could be levied or laws 
     enacted without Parliament's consent and that the 
     administration of government was subject to their inspection 
     and control but it also secured two vital rights which were 
     first established in the reign of Edward III--viz. the right 
     to examine public accounts and appropriate supplies and the 
     right to impeach the King's ministers for misconduct.
       At Richard II's first Parliament in 1377, grants of two 
     fifteenths and tenths were made for the prosecution of the 
     French war on the express condition that two persons be 
     appointed as Treasurers, to receive the money granted to the 
     King and to spend it ``for the said wars and for no other 
     work.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England 
     by Shepard Morgan; p. 185).
       Richard II's next Parliament met in 1378. The House of 
     Commons demanded that it be allowed to examine the public 
     accounts. The King ordered the governmental accounts produced 
     with the understanding:
       That this shall not in future be considered a precedent or 
     an inference that this should have been done otherwise than 
     by the personal volition and command alone of our said lord 
     the king . . .''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England 
     by Shepard Morgan, p. 192).
       In 1379, as England was in imminent danger of invasion, 
     Richard II called on Parliament to raise the needed money. It 
     is significant that this year, the King voluntarily, without 
     reservation and without waiting for a petition from 
     Parliament, informed the Commons that the Treasurers were 
     prepared to show them ``in writing their receipts and 
     expenditures made since the last Parliament.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England 
     by Shepard Morgan, p. 193).
       In 1380, a similar committee, with more extensive powers, 
     was appointed. Thus, it became apparent that by 1380, the 
     right of the Commons to investigate the accounts and 
     appropriate the supplies was clearly established.
       However, during this period, the expenses of the wars in 
     France and Scotland and the ordinary expenses of government 
     were so great that the Royal treasury was bare. Indeed, the 
     King had even pawned the Crown Jewels. To remedy this 
     problem, the House of Commons set up a poll tax and continued 
     the duty on wool. But as the new tax was the equivalent of a 
     laborer's weekly earnings, it ignited a political explosion. 
     Indeed, the poll tax of 1380 has been termed the last 
     precipitating cause of the great Peasant Revolt of 1381.
       The bloody rebellion was quelled within a short time, but 
     it had taught the members of Parliament what can happen when 
     the weight of taxation burdens the people.
       From 1389 to 1397, Richard was a model monarch--ruling 
     within the constitution and allowing Parliament to control 
     both taxation and the expenditure of public money. But in 
     1398, Parliament granted Richard II a custom on wool for five 
     years, tunnage and poundage for life and a duty on wool, 
     woolfells and leather for life. Further, Parliament gave the 
     King a tenth and a half and a fifteenth and a half for a year 
     and a half. And, if this wasn't enough, Parliament recklessly 
     delegated its authority to eighteen members chosen from the 
     whole body--ten lords temporal (six to be a quorum), two 
     earls as proctors for the clergy, and six members of the 
     House of Commons. As one commentator has observed:
       ``The committee consisted of persons devoted to the King's 
     interests, and its powers were so indefinitely expressed that 
     it completely usurped the rights of the legislature, and 
     exercised all the powers and functions of a full 
     parliament.''
       (History of English Parliament, Volume I, p. 237 by G. 
     Barnett Smith).
       Whatever Parliament's intention, these actions had the 
     effect of installing Richard II as an absolute monarch. The 
     cumulative effect of this delegated authority was to destroy 
     the limitations which Parliament had so painstakingly placed 
     on the King's prerogative.
       But Richard's despotism sealed his fate. He banished the 
     Dukes of Hereford and Norfolk. And then seized the estates of 
     John of Gaunt--in spite of his promise to secure them to 
     Hereford in the event of his father's death. Richard II's 
     tyranny incited Henry of Lancaster to action. While 
     Richard II was in Ireland, Henry led a revolt against the 
     King. With no difficulty, he raised an army of 60,000 men. 
     On Richard's return to England, he resigned his throne--
     and Parliament accepted his resignation.
       Richard's fate--much like that which awaited Charles I and 
     James II--resulted from his failure to understand the 
     developing constitutional history of England. As one writer 
     has observed:
       ``The trouble with Richard was that he did not go to school 
     to (learn) history. Parliament was putting into practice what 
     it could learn from the experience of its predecessors. 
     Richard, swept with a desire, intense and perhaps insane, to 
     wield the septre of absolutism, was blinded to what he might 
     have read, and underwent the consequences.''
       (The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England by 
     Shepard Morgan, p. 202.)
       Henry of Lancaster was crowned Henry IV on October 13, 
     1399. The new King chose not to buck the tide of increasing 
     Parliamentary authority. Indeed, during the reigns of the 
     three Lancastrian Kings, the power of the Parliament was more 
     complete than ever before--fuller than it would be until the 
     Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689. Parliament voted the 
     taxes, appropriated money to the King and examined public 
     accounts. Indeed, instances of direct taxation without 
     Parliament's assent were very rare under the Lancastrian 
     kings.
       An example of the freedom Parliament enjoyed under the 
     Lancastrians was the Common's attempt to make the granting of 
     appropriations dependent upon the redress of grievances a 
     regular Parliamentary procedure. In 1401 the House of Commons 
     asked that the King respond to their petitions before they 
     granted supplies. The King resisted firmly and the Commons 
     relented for the time being, but the practice gradually 
     became established.
       In 1410, Henry IV asked Parliament for permission to 
     collect a tenth and a fifteenth annually, whenever Parliament 
     was not in session. But Parliament had learned the effect of 
     such a grant from Richard II and was resolved never again to 
     foster the rise of a tyrant. Accordingly, it refused the 
     King's request.
       When Henry IV died in 1413, his son--Henry V--acceded to 
     the throne. Though his reign lasted less than a decade, he 
     proved to be a wise King and a brilliant soldier. And though 
     the taxation during his reign was heavy, Parliament willingly 
     granted taxes to the King to fight France.
       When Henry V died at the age of thirty-five, his son and 
     heir--Henry VI--was barely a year old. Henry VI won the 
     dubious distinction of being one of the only Lancastrians to 
     attack Parliament's supremacy in taxation. In 1425, while the 
     King was still a child, his uncles--the Duke of Bedford and 
     the Duke of Gloucester--as regents, united with other lords 
     and announced in Parliament that, with the advice of the 
     justices, a tax granted upon certain conditions by the House 
     of Commons in the previous Parliament should be collected and 
     levied by the King--notwithstanding any conditions in the 
     grant. The Commons, though, firmly established their 
     undoubted right by making a fresh grant and restating the 
     former conditions with the following explicit addition:
       ``No part thereof be beset ne dispendid to no othir use, 
     but oonly in and for the defense of the seid roialme.''
       (Quoted in English Constitutional History by Thomas Pitt 
     Taswell-Langmead, p. 207.)
       The War of the Roses--the intermittent civil and dynastic 
     war between the Houses of York and Lancaster--was responsible 
     for the fall of the Lancastrians and the accession of the 
     Duke of York to the throne in 1461. As one writer summed up 
     the reign of the three Lancastrian kings:
       ``The right of Parliament as against that of the King to 
     control taxation was enunciated again and again, not only in 
     the instance of direct taxation, including the levies of 
     tallage, but in the case of the customs, as indicated in the 
     legislation prohibiting the maletolt.
       ``But the enunciation of powers of Parliament was not 
     followed by complete and undisputed exercise of the rights so 
     enunciated. The Kings clung to what they deemed their ancient 
     prerogatives and more than once over-stepped the law. The 
     Yorkists and Tudors showed a disposition somewhat less 
     amendable.''
       (The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England by 
     Shepard Morgan p. 212.)
       While the Lancastrians respected the taxing powers of 
     Parliament, the Yorkist and Tudor monarchs continually 
     assailed them. Parliament granted Edward IV tonnage and 
     poundage and a duty on wool for life in 1465. Besides this, 
     Parliament granted the new Yorkist King frequent fifteenths 
     and tenths.
       But, not content with Parliament's generous grant, Edward 
     initiated a new method of extracting money from his subjects, 
     without the consent of Parliament--called ``benevolences''. 
     The benevolence was a ``gift'' made to the King by 
     individuals or groups, ostensibly out of charity, but really 
     under coercion. This means of extortion differed from the 
     ``forced loans'' of Richard II only in that the King incurred 
     no obligation for repayment.
       Apparently no objection was made in Parliament to this 
     unconstitutional tax. Edward IV also raised additional 
     revenue by reviving obsolete statutes and laying fines for 
     breaches of them. He also collected ancient debts due the 
     Crown. This enabled Edward IV to rule England as an absolute 
     monarch. He raised revenue in violation of the English 
     Constitution and the clear weight of precedent. During his 
     rule not a single statute was enacted in redress of 
     grievances. And, amazingly, Parliament seemed to acquiesce to 
     the King's assertion of his prerogative. Edward IV surely set 
     back the development of English constitutional history.
       Upon Edward IV's death in 1483, the crown passed to his 
     son--Edward V. But the twelve year old King lost his crown in 
     two months to his scheming uncle, Richard III. Richard III 
     received a grant from Parliament in 1484 of tunnage and 
     poundage and a duty on wool for life. But as his reign ended 
     with his death on Bosworth Field the next year, he didn't 
     have an opportunity to emulate the despotism of either 
     Richard II or Edward IV.
       However, Parliament spoke out against benevolences during 
     Richard III's reign. The address which was presented to 
     Richard in 1483, when he was invited to assume the throne 
     said:
       ``For certainly wee be determined, rather to aventure and 
     committe us to the perill of oure lyfs and jepardye of deth, 
     than to lyve in suche thraldome and bondage as we have lyved 
     long tyme heretofore, oppressed and injured by Extorcions and 
     newe Imposicions, ayenst the Lawes of God and Man, and the 
     Libertee, old Police and Lawes of this Realme, wheryn every 
     Englishman is enchanted.''
       (Quoted in English Constitutional History by Thomas Pitt 
     Taswell-Langmead, Pp. 232-3.)
       Further, Richard III's first and only Parliament in 1484--
     declared benevolences illegal and said that they were to be 
     ``dampened and annulled forever.''
       (Quoted in The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England 
     by Shepard Morgan p. 217.)
       Henry VII--the first of the Tudor kings--won his crown at 
     the Battle of Bosworth. During his reign--and that of the 
     other Tudor monarchs--Parliament didn't increase its powers; 
     but, rather, it lost ground.
       Though Henry VII ruled for nearly a quarter century, he 
     only called seven Parliaments--and six of the seven met 
     within the first eleven years of his reign. Henry's first 
     Parliament gave him a grant of tonnage and poundage and a 
     duty on wool for life. In 1491, Henry VII resorted to 
     benevolences to raise needed revenues. And, in 1495, 
     Parliament turned its back on the precedents and made this 
     benevolence lawful ex post facto. It further impowered the 
     King to enforce the promises of those who had promised 
     money but not yet paid it. The act points up the validity 
     of Maitland's observation that:
       ``Under the Tudors the danger is of a different kind--it is 
     not so much that the King will tax without Parliamentary 
     consent, but that Parliament will consent to just whatever 
     the King wants and will condone his illegal acts.''
       (The Constitutional History of England By F.W. Maitland, p. 
     181).
       Like Edward IV before him, Henry VII revived ancient 
     statutes and rigorously exacted fines for every violation of 
     them.
       Henry VII was succeeded by his son, Henry VIII, in 1509. 
     His first Parliament granted him tunnage and poundage for 
     life, but with the distinct proviso:
       ``That these grants be not taken in example to the Kings of 
     England in time to come.''
       (Quoted in English Constitutional History by Thomas Pitt 
     Taswell-Langmead p. 256)
       The four following parliaments granted Henry VIII liberal 
     subsides to wage the war with France. But in 1523, Cardinal 
     Wolsey committed a severe breach of Parliamentary privilege. 
     Since the time of Henry IV it was the custom that the King 
     should not know of the progress of a grant of taxation until 
     the House of Lords and Commons had agreed on the grant. 
     Wolsey reversed this process.
       He went to the House of Commons with all his following:
       ``With his maces, his pillars, his pole-axes, his cross, 
     his hatte, and the great seal too * * *''
       (Quoted in the History of Parliamentary Taxation in England 
     by Shepard Morgan, p. 223)
       Wolsey asked the Commons for 800,000 Pounds, collected over 
     four years and to be raised by a 20% property tax on 
     everyman's lands and goods. He addressed the House of Commons 
     and it debated the question for fifteen days. At the end, 
     Parliament granted the King a graduated property tax, much 
     smaller in amount and to be paid over four years.
       As a consequence of this action, Henry VIII did not summon 
     the next Parliament for seven years. In the meantime, the 
     King raised needed revenues through ``forced loans'' and 
     ``benevolences''. The forced loan of 1522 required every man 
     to swear to the value of his possessions and to contribute a 
     ratable portion according to such declaration, on the King's 
     promise of repayment out of the next subsidy granted by 
     Parliament.
       In 1526, commissions were issued for the collection of a 
     sixth from the goods of the laity and a fourth from the 
     clergy. This demand was unanimously resisted. The people knew 
     enough law to know that these exactions were illegal. The 
     clergy led the movement against the tax, asserting that:
       ``The king could take no man's goods without the authority 
     of Parliament.''
       (History of Parliamentary Taxation in England by Shepard 
     Morgan, p. 255)
       The royal commissions were forcibly resisted in several 
     counties and open rebellion erupted in Suffolk. The effect of 
     this was to force Henry VIII to withdraw the commission.
       As his ``forced loan'' scheme had failed, Henry VIII now 
     demanded a voluntary benevolence. However, the people of 
     London objected so strenuously to this, as it was illegal 
     under the statute of Richard III, that it also had to be 
     withdrawn.
       In 1544, Henry VIII again sought a ``forced loan'' from all 
     persons who earned 50 Pounds or more a year. Parliament was 
     so subservient to Henry VIII in this that a statute was 
     enacted granting the King all sums borrowed from his subjects 
     since 1542, with a further provision that any money which his 
     Majesty should have already paid in discharge of these debts, 
     should be refunded by the creditor or his heirs.
       Henry VIII died in 1547. He was succeeded by his son, 
     Edward VI, who died a child. Edward was followed by Mary. 
     After Mary's five year reign, Queen Elizabeth I ascended to 
     the throne.
       Though Queen Elizabeth's rule was despotic, she was loved 
     by the people of England. And, Parliament granted her taxes 
     with great liberality. She exacted ``forced loans'' from the 
     wealthy--but endeavored to repay them as soon as possible. 
     Elizabeth circumvented Parliament by raising revenue through 
     the grant of monopolies--based upon the right of the Crown to 
     assure an inventor the exclusive benefits of his invention or 
     innovation.
       The importance of the Yorkish and Tudor monarchs is that 
     though they did little to advance Parliamentary supremacy in 
     taxation and spending--they did not destroy whatever progress 
     had been made. And, the later effort of the Stuart Kings to 
     end Parliamentary supremacy was responsible for the 
     establishment of permanent parliamentary control over 
     taxation and appropriation.
       James I--the first of Stuart Kings was a staunch advocate 
     of the ``Divine Right of Kings.'' He earnestly believed that 
     a King was appointed by God and responsible only to him. His 
     subjects could not resist the King's commands, as that was a 
     sin. James I felt that, as God's deputy on Earth, he was 
     above Parliament, above the laws of England and above the 
     people. He believed that it was his duty to see to the 
     welfare of his subjects, for God would hold him accountable 
     for his stewardship. But beyond that point he had no 
     responsibility. Whatever privileges Parliament possessed, the 
     courts possessed, or any individual possessed, were theirs by 
     grace of the King, and were not held by any right. Clearly a 
     conflict between such a monarch, on the one hand, and 
     Parliament and the courts on the other was brewing.
       The Common Law courts were strongly opposed to James I's 
     concept of absolutism. Led by Sir Edward Coke--a noted 
     author, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and later 
     Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench--many influential 
     judges and lawyers insisted that the Common Law controlled 
     the King's royal prerogative. They asserted that the rights 
     of both Kings and Parliament were derived and limited by 
     precedent.
       The Common Law courts did not, however, early accept Coke's 
     view of the King's limited powers. This fact is pointed up by 
     Bate's Case (2 St. Tr. 371; 1606). As King James I needed 
     more revenue to pay for the necessary expenses of the state, 
     instead of applying to Parliament, he acted on his own 
     prerogative and imposed a duty of five shillings per 
     hundredweight on imported currants--over and above the duty 
     which was set on them by the Statute of Tunnage and Poundage.
       John Bate, an English merchant trading with the East, 
     refused to pay the duty. Bate was brought to trial before the 
     Court of Exchequer. The judges were unanimous in approving of 
     the King's right to impose the extra duty on his own 
     prerogative. However, as it was to later develop, this was in 
     incorrect statement of the Common Law.
       The right of earlier sovereigns to raise and lower tariff 
     duties by proclamations had been established. But the right 
     had been limited to trade regulation, to secure protection or 
     retaliation and fair trade. As one distinguished English 
     constitutional historian has written:
       ``In using it not for such purposes but to raise revenue, 
     James was assuming an important constitutional power which 
     the precedents did not warrant. It was perhaps natural, 
     however, that a court of law, bound normally by the letter of 
     precedents rather than by the remote consequences which might 
     be involved, should decide as it did.'' (Constitutional 
     History of England by George Buxton Adams (Holt, 1938).)
       Bates's Case is representative of the conflicts between the 
     Crown and Parliament that dominated England for the next 
     eight decades. The King would stretch a precedent to cover a 
     substantial increase in royal power, and the courts held that 
     the precedent justified the new application. On the basis of 
     the decision in Bate's Case, for instance, James I shortly 
     afterwards issued a new ``Book of Rates'' in which heavy 
     additional duties were placed on a great number of imports.
       However, Parliament did not sit idly by as the King imposed 
     new and unlawful taxes. In 1610, the Commons objected to the 
     schemes James I had used to raise more royal revenue. It 
     enacted a bill providing that no new duty could be imposed 
     without the consent of Parliament; but the House of Lords 
     rejected it.
       King James then forbade the Commons to continue. The 
     Commons thereupon refused and announced that they would 
     proceed to ``a full examination of the King's alleged 
     prerogative powers regarding taxation.'' As James had tired 
     of Parliament's haggling and at its delay in granting money 
     to him, he dissolved Parliament in February 1611 and didn't 
     call a second Parliament until April 1614.
       But, James I's second Parliament was inflamed over the 
     King's imposition of new taxes without Parliament's consent 
     and unanimously enacted a bill denying the King's right to 
     impose taxes on his own initiative. As Parliament refused to 
     grant the King the taxes he desired, James dissolved it in 
     June before it had voted him any taxes--and sent four members 
     of the House of Commons to the Tower in punishment for their 
     conduct.
       James I's third Parliament did not meet until January, 
     1621--and during the decade from 1611 to 1621, when no 
     Parliament except that of 1614 which did nothing, had met, 
     James resorted to a host of extra-legal means of raising 
     revenue. ``Forced loans'' were used, old debts and fines were 
     ruthlessly collected, titles were sold and a new title of 
     baronet was created.
       The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War between the Catholic 
     and Protestant states of Germany (whose leader, Frederick, 
     the Elector of the Palatinate, was James' son-in-law) incited 
     England to go the aid of the Protestants and the people 
     bitterly opposed the King's policy of securing peace in 
     Europe through an alliance with Spain. As Spain's invasion of 
     the Palatinate in 1620 signaled that England's involvement in 
     the conflict was imminent, James summoned Parliament to meet 
     at the end of January, 1621 to provide for a war if it should 
     prove necessary.
       When Parliament met, James asked that it appropriate 
     500,000 Pounds for an army. Parliament appropriated 160,000 
     Pounds for the King and then began to debate their 
     grievances. Led by Sir Edward Coke, Commons attacked the 
     granting of industrial patents to courtiers; it impeached the 
     Lord Chancellor--Francis Bacon--for accepting bribes; and it 
     placed ``The Great Protestation'' in their Journal which 
     declared that the Commons' privilege were ``the ancient and 
     undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of 
     England.''
       This infuriated the King. He ripped the ``Great 
     Protestation'' from the Journal and then dissolved 
     Parliament. Two leaders of the House--one of them Sir 
     Edward Coke--whom the King had earlier dismissed from the 
     post of Lord Chief Justice for refusing to accept his 
     commands--were imprisoned. Another member--John Pym--a 
     wealthy land-owner who sat for a small Wiltshire borough, 
     was placed under house arrest.
       As James I couldn't wage war with Spain without 
     Parliament's granting him taxes to raise an army and buy 
     supplies, he sent his son and The Duke of Buckingham to 
     Madrid in 1623 to arrange a marriage with the Infanta. But 
     when the negotiations broke down they returned to England hot 
     for war. James now called the Parliament again.
       James' fourth Parliament was summoned in 1624 and unlike 
     the earlier Parliaments of his reign, it felt more friendly 
     toward the King. This Parliament was determined to fight a 
     war against Spain in the Elizabethan manner and it was eager 
     to assist the Protestant cause in Germany. The House of 
     Commons voted 300,000 Pounds for the war against Spain but, 
     as it concluded that the King was often spending money for 
     purposes against its wishes, Commons devised a scheme for 
     parlimentary control, not only of its levying but of its 
     spending. Therefore, to ensure the proper expenditure of 
     money, the Subsidy Bill contained a clause whereby money was 
     paid into the hands of commissioners appointed by the House 
     of Commons, to be expended by them upon direction of the 
     council of war.
       James I's death in 1625 brought his son Charles I to the 
     throne. As he was eager to wage war with Spain, he asked his 
     first Parliament for a large grant of money for that purpose. 
     However, as the Commons were resolved to abolish the abuses 
     of Royal prerogative it refused to vote adequate funds to 
     fight Spain.
       The House of Commons immediately made it clear that they 
     intended to debate foreign affairs and religious reforms as 
     they didn't want to take any chance on Charles dissolving 
     Parliament as soon as it had granted him the needed taxes. 
     Instead of granting tonnage and poundage duties to the new 
     King for life--as had been the custom of two centuries--the 
     Commons gave them for one year only. In fact, Charles didn't 
     get this income at all as he later dissolved Parliament 
     before the House of Lords had passed the bill.
       The second Parliament of Charles I met from February to 
     June, 1626. The House of Commons proceeded to prepare for the 
     impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham--the King's favorite 
     minister--whom it believed responsible for the worst abuses. 
     The King told the Commons that he would not permit Buckingham 
     to be impeacheed and informed them that their first business 
     was the granting of supplies and that he would not permit his 
     servants in high posts to be impeached for they merely acted 
     at this command. The Commons refused to grant supplies until 
     their grievances were redressed.
       On May 8, the impeachment of Buckingham was brought up to 
     the House of Lords by the managers for the Commons. Two of 
     them were immediately thrown into the Tower for things they 
     said in their speeches--and the Commons resolved to do no 
     further business until the release of their members. The King 
     yielded with reluctance, but when the Commons resolved that 
     tonnage and poundage could not legally be collected unless 
     granted and that no supply would be voted until Buckingham 
     was removed, the King dissolved his second Parliament on June 
     15.
       Clearly since Charles' accession to the throne, Parliament 
     had assumed a new place of power in the state. Not even the 
     relatively powerful parliaments of the Lancastrian era, or of 
     James I showed the same spirit. But Charles' Parliament felt 
     themselves on a par with the King. They were resolved to 
     do battle with the sovereign on equal terms--for the 
     passage of time had given Parliament formidible weapons: 
     the levying of taxes, the power of impeachment and the 
     various other privileges of Parliament.
       As the Commons had once again refused to vote the King 
     supplies for the war, he had to find a way to meet the 
     necessary expenses of government. Charles I now pawned the 
     Crown jewels and mortgaged Crown lands. He began to levy 
     tonnage and poundage without Parliamentary consent and tried 
     to exact the revenue denied to him by levying a ``forced 
     loan'' which, again, was taxation without Parliamentary 
     sanction. The ``forced loan'' was widely resisted, whereupon 
     a number of knights and rich men were arrested under royal 
     warrants for their refusal to pay, while soldiers were 
     quartered with the King's poorer subjects.
       Chief Justice Carew, who refused to find these ``forced 
     loans'' legal, was dismissed from office. After this, the 
     Court of King's Bench granted Writs of Habeas Corpus to five 
     knights who had been imprisoned by the Crown for refusing to 
     contribute to the ``loan.'' but, though the Writ was granted, 
     the Warden of the Fleet refused to release the prisoners 
     because he declared that he was acting on a warrant from two 
     members of the Privy Council ordering that the knights be 
     held ``by special order of his Majesty.''
       This precipitated a grave constitutional crisis. The 
     prisoners, upon being informed that they were not entitled to 
     bail asserted that the ancient rights of the subject set 
     forth in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta were at stake. They 
     contended that freedom from arbitrary arrest was basic to 
     English liberty. But the knights were not released, and Chief 
     Justice Hyde held in the Case of the Five Knights (or 
     Darnel's Case) that:
       ``If no cause of the commitment be expressed, it is to be 
     presumed to be a matter of state which we cannot take notice 
     of.''
       Thus, the constitutional question of whether Charles I 
     could imprison his subjects without cause was, for the time, 
     left unsettled.
       After flagrantly violating the liberties of his subjects in 
     unexampled fashion, Charles was compelled--by the necessities 
     of the war with France--to call another Parliament which met 
     on March 17, 1628. Among the members of the new House of 
     Commons were no fewer than twenty-seven of the men who had 
     been imprisoned by orders of the King for refusal to pay the 
     ``forced loan.''
       When Charles I addressed Parliament, he concentrated upon 
     the grave dangers that England faced in the war with France 
     and Spain. He declared that it was their duty to find a 
     speedy way of supplying the government's needs and that if 
     they failed to do so, he would have to use those other means 
     which God hath put into my hands, to save that which the 
     follies of particular men may hazard to lose.
       But Parliament paid no attention to the King's urgings. 
     Instead of making even a small grant, the House of Commons 
     immediately set to work to reform the abuses before granting 
     a tax. However, unlike earlier Parliaments, this concentrated 
     not on the King's ministers--but on the King's 
     misinterpretation'' of the constitution which Commons felt 
     threatened to establish absolute government. The Commons--and 
     the nation--were greatly inflamed about four specific 
     grievances: illegal taxation, arbitrary imprisonment, the 
     billeting of soldiers on individuals and punishment by 
     martial law. The Commons put their grievances to the King in 
     the Petition of Right.
       In the Petition of Right, the Commons did:
       Humbly pray your most excellent Majesty that no man 
     hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, 
     benevolence, tax or such like charge without common assent by 
     act of Parliament.
       The King reluctantly agreed to consent to the Petition of 
     Right. And, though it was of little or no immediate practical 
     value, ``* * * the historical and constitutional meaning of 
     the Petition of Right stands in line with the more important 
     Magna Carta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights of 1689 * * * It 
     stated principles and precedents and it became a precedent 
     itself in the long assertions of the powers of Parliament and 
     the supremacy of law in England.'' (A Constitutional and 
     Legal History of England by Goldwin Smith (New York; 1955) P. 
     320.
       As another noted scholar has written of the Petition of 
     Right, it was: * * * the first attempt made since the 
     beginning of the struggle between King and Parliament to draw 
     a definite line between prerogative and law, to fix with some 
     exactness the point where the power which is above the law 
     shall end and where the reign of law shall begin. This it 
     attempts to do, not as to a general matter but in specific 
     particulars. That in doing this it reduces the King's 
     prerogative powers and sets new limitations to them is quite 
     in harmony with the spirit of past constitutional growth.'' 
     (Constitutional History of England by George Burton Adams 
     (NY; 1938) P. 295).
       After Charles I accepted the Petition of Right, the Commons 
     voted him money. But relations between the King and 
     Parliament had by no means healed. They soon clashed on the 
     question of tunnage and poundage--which the King had exacted 
     without the consent of Parliament and the Commons was 
     determined to place the grant upon its true constitutional 
     basis. A bill was then prepared granting tunnage and 
     poundage, but it was delayed to remonstrate against the 
     King's illegal collection of tunnage and poundage duties. To 
     prevent this Charles brought the session to an end.
       When the second session of Charles' third Parliament opened 
     six months later, Commons was still incensed with the King 
     and proceeded in its battle against unlawful taxation. Fuel 
     had been added to the fire by the proceedings against certain 
     merchants who had refused to pay the duty. Their goods had 
     been distrained, and when the owners sued on writs of 
     replevin, the courts found for the Crown holding that the 
     King's right had been established beyond question in the Case 
     of Bate--which had arisen two decades earlier.
       In order to prevent the Parliament from further 
     remonstrating against the King's claim to tunnage and 
     poundage, Charles at first ordered a short adjournment and 
     then a longer one. But this time, Commons was in no mood to 
     go home until it had placed its opinions on record. The House 
     of Commons accordingly voted against adjournment.
       When the Speaker declared that he had the King's orders to 
     leave his chair, he was forcibly held down by two members, 
     while the door was locked to prevent members who wished to go 
     from leaving. The House then passed resolutions providing 
     that:
       (1) Whoever advised the collection of tunnage or poundage 
     without Parliamentary consent should be considered ``a 
     capital enemy of the kingdom and commonwealth.''
       (2) Whoever voluntarily paid tunnage and poundage thus 
     levied should be considered a traitor to the liberties of the 
     land.
       After these resolutions were passed, the Commons voted to 
     adjourn.
       The King was outraged at the Commons' action. He accused 
     the Commons of attempting to exert a universal, overswaying 
     power which belongs only to me and not to them.
       The King dissolved Parliament on March 10, 1629--and it 
     would not meet again for eleven years. The King was 
     determined to govern England ``by those means God put into my 
     hands.''
       Charles moved swiftly to punish the leaders of the 
     opposition. Nine members of the House of Commons were 
     arrested, sent to the Tower and their papers seized. When 
     they sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the prisoners learned 
     that they were detained under the King's order. At their 
     trial, the prisoners pleaded the privileges of Parliament 
     and declined to make any other pleas. The court found that 
     they should each be imprisoned at the King's pleasure.
       As no adequate grant of taxes had been made by any of his 
     three Parliaments and he no longer dreaded the checks which 
     might be imposed by Parliament, the King proceeded to govern 
     England without Parliament. He continued his illegal levies 
     of tunnage and poundage. He revived such obsolete customs as 
     the compulsory distraint of knighthood and forest fines based 
     upon Henry II's Assize of the Forest of 1184. He expanded his 
     extensive sale of monopolies--soap, fisheries, the vintner's 
     company, etc. He collected feudal dues whenever he could.
       But the most important discovery of new revenue was the 
     revival and extension of ``ship money.'' In medieval times 
     this had been a levy imposed in times of national emergency 
     on the port towns of England by which these ports were asked 
     to provide ships for the navy. Charles' first writ for ship 
     money was issued in October, 1634 and it was near enough to 
     the tradition practice not to lead to serious opposition. It 
     called upon port towns to furnish ships of war, but of a size 
     which were only found in London, or in lieu of these to levy 
     a sum of money sufficient to cover the cost of one. As one 
     author has observed: ``The demand was a transition from 
     ancient precedent to a practically undisguised tax.'' 
     (Constitutional History of England by George Burton Adams 
     (New York, 1938) P. 301).
       The Lord Mayor of London at first resisted the writ. But it 
     was soon acceded to with little opposition.
       When the second writ appeared in August, 1635, it was 
     extended to all the Kingdom on the ground that as the support 
     of the navy concerned the safety and defense of all, so all 
     should contribute to that end. It then became clear that ship 
     money had become a general tax on the people of England. For, 
     whereas the earlier writs only demanded the actual equipment 
     of ships, the latter writs directed the sheriffs to assess 
     every landowner and other inhabitatnts--according to his 
     particular means--and to enforce the payment by distress.
       Considerable resistance developed to the second writ. It 
     was felt that ship money had become, in fact, a tax levied 
     without Parliamentary grant--violating the Petition of Right.
       The third writ was issued in October, 1636, and like the 
     second extending the levy to the whole kingdom made it plain 
     to everyone that the King had discovered a method of annual 
     taxation which could be used to finance the government.
       And, it soon became evident that if the King could lay such 
     a tax upon alleged grounds of national necessity--determined 
     by himself alone--that there was no limit to this arbitrary 
     taxation. And, believing that the writs of ship money were 
     clearly an unconstitutional tax, many persons resisted them. 
     But by far the most celebrated case was that of John Hampden. 
     In 1637, the sum of 4500 Pounds was demanded from 
     Buckinghamshire. John Hampden--a cousin of Oliver Cromwell--
     refused to pay twenty shillings assessed upon his land in the 
     parish of Stoke Mandeville. Hampden was tried before the 
     Court of Exchequer in November, 1637.
       Hampden was eloquently defended by Oliver St. John who 
     argued against the tax alleging that it violated the Magna 
     Carta, the statutes of Edward III, the Petition of Right and 
     there was no national emergency as England was not actually 
     engaged in a war at that time. But the judges found for the 
     King. Two judges decided in favor of Hampden on technical 
     grounds and three judges found for him on all counts. But the 
     remaining seven held against him. One judge wrote that:
       ``The King pro bono publico may charge his subjects, for 
     the safety and defense of the kingdom, notwithstanding any 
     act of Parliament, and a statute derogating from the 
     prerogative doth not bind the King; and the King may dispense 
     with any law in cases of necessity.''
       Further, another judge wrote that:
       ``No act of Parliament can bar a King of his regality--
     therefore acts of Parliament to take away his royal power in 
     the defense of his kingdom are void.''
       But, though Hampden had lost the case, he had won a place 
     in the hearts of the people of England for resisting the 
     hated tax. The trial galvanized the resistance of the people 
     to the tax. But, in spite of popular resistance to it, the 
     King succeeded in financing the government without Parliament 
     for eleven years. As one writer has observed:
       ``The financial dependence of the King on Parliament, which 
     was at that date the only thing making a meeting of 
     Parliament necessary, seemed for the moment at least to be 
     successfully overcome.''--Constitutional history of England 
     by George Buxton Adams (New York, 1938, P. 304-5).
       For a period, Charles I's arbitrary measures were 
     successful and it appeared that Parliament would never again 
     be summoned to Westminster. During this period Charles and 
     Archbishop Laud endeavored to reconstruct the Church of 
     England according to the aristocratic ideas of the high 
     church party--which had the effect of ending religious and 
     political liberty in England. And, the ensuing persecution of 
     the Puritans drove many to America.
       The oppressive policies of Charles I are of more than 
     passing interest to Americans because they generated the 
     basic constitutional ideas which the English Puritans brought 
     to America and which--in a century and a quarter--became the 
     bedrock on which the American Constitution was fashioned.
       As Charles was apparently successful in reconstructing the 
     Church of England, he endeavored to do the same thing to 
     Scotland by crushing Presbyterianism in Scotland. In the 
     summer of 1637, Charles and Archbishop Laud sought to impose 
     a version of the English Book of Common Prayer on the Church 
     of Scotland. But the Scots were too thoroughly devoted to 
     Presbyterianism to accept this. When an attempt was made to 
     read services from the Book of Common Prayer in Edinburgh, 
     riots broke out. The Scots set up a resistance group known as 
     ``The Tables'' and the Scottish Covenant was drafted inviting 
     the Scottish Protestants to swear the resist to the death 
     these religious innovations. To meet the Scottish resistance, 
     Charles was compelled to raise an army--which placed too 
     great a strain on his make-shift finances.
       When the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed him that the 
     Royal Treasury was empty, Charles sought a contribution from 
     London and then from the entire nation and loans were 
     requested. Another obsolete levy upon the counties for the 
     support of a military force--``coat and conduct money''--was 
     revived. But every levy was resisted and failed to raise the 
     needed revenue.
       Therefore, the King bowed to necessity and called what 
     became known as the ``Short Parliament''--which met on April 
     13, 1640. But it soon became evident that the members of the 
     House of Commons sympathized with the Scots and would do 
     nothing until their many grievances were redressed. The King 
     pressured Commons to vote an immediate grant of money to 
     allow him to prosecute the war--and to settle their 
     grievances later. The House of Lords voted that 
     appropriations should come before grievances which the 
     Commons rejected as a ``high breach of privilege.'' The King 
     then offered to give up ship money in return for a grant 
     of twelve subsidies. But the Commons balked at this too--
     holding the collection of ship money to be a crime and the 
     judgment against Hampden an infamy; which they would never 
     assent to.
       When Charles was convinced that they could not be moved, he 
     dissolved the Parliament, after a three week session in which 
     nothing had been done. But, though Parliament accomplished 
     little of a tangible nature, it learned how strong it was 
     against the king and it learned that the bulk of the English 
     people were united behind them.
       After the dissolution of the ``Short Parliament'', the King 
     imprisoned some members of the House of Commons and the 
     sheriffs ruthlessly proceeded to collect ship money and coat 
     and conduct levies. The King seized pepper from the 
     warehouses of the East India Company and bullion from the 
     London goldsmiths. The Lord Mayor and aldermen of London were 
     coerced into making a ``loan.'' A convocation--which 
     supported the King's Scottish policy--tried to support a 
     general benevolence; two attempts were made to get a loan 
     from Spain in return for help against the Dutch; it was 
     proposed that the coinage be debased and it was planned to 
     seize Spanish bullion deposited in the Tower for coinage. But 
     all these efforts were of no avail. They generated very small 
     sums while the expenses of government skyrocketed.
       Meanwhile, the army which had been raised posed a critical 
     problem. It was undisciplined, poorly supplied, and scarcely 
     paid at all. It had to be quartered on the country and 
     martial law had to be rigorously enforced--both in violation 
     of the Petition of Right.
       Finally, in August of 1640, the Scots crossed the border. 
     When the two armies confronted each other at Newburn--near 
     Newcastle--a mere cannonade dispersed the English ranks. 
     Newcastle surrendered to the Scots and once more the King was 
     forced to come to terms with them.
       As the historian Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead has observed:
       ``After the defeat at the ford of Newburn-on-Tyne, the 
     English army, disheartened, undisciplined, and disaffected, 
     had retreated to York, leaving the counties of 
     Northumberland, and Durham to be possessed by the victors. 
     `The game of Tyranny' observes Macaulay, `was now up. Charles 
     had risked and lost his stake. . . . His army was mutinous, 
     his treasury was empty; his people clamoured for a 
     parliament; addresses and petitions against the government 
     were presented. Strafford was for shooting the petitioners by 
     martial law; but the king could not trust the soldiers.'''--
     (English Constitutional History by Thomas Pitt Taswell-
     Langmead; P. 440.)
       At the end of August, 1640, twelve peers petitioned the 
     King ``to summon a Parliament within some short and 
     convenient time.'' But in a last-ditch effort to avoid 
     summoning Parliament, Charles seized on an old precedent. As 
     the National Council had once performed some of the functions 
     of Parliament--and as it had continued to meet long after 
     Parliament had been established--the King issued writs for a 
     meeting of Peers at York on September 24, 1640. The Great 
     Council met and concluded a treaty with the Scots, by which 
     they were to hold the two northern counties until a definite 
     peace was made and to receive 25,000 Pounds per month for 
     their expenses. The Council also pledges the security of the 
     Peers to a loan to fill the King's sagging coffers.
       But, as this expedient proved inadequate to solve the 
     King's staggering problems, King Charles reluctantly called 
     his fifth Parliament--the so-called ``Long Parliament.'' It 
     met at Westminster on November 3, 1640.
       The entire House of Commons stood united in their 
     opposition to the King. Roughly sixty percent of the members 
     of the previous ``Short Parliament'' were reelected. As one 
     historian has observed:
       ``The King addressed the Commons in an unusually 
     conciliatory speech, but the Stuart tyranny had gone too far, 
     and the Lower House was absolutely bent upon redress. Neither 
     can the men who came to this Parliament with such a resolve 
     be blamed, for it depended upon them whether people and 
     Parliament should recover their ancient liberties, or become 
     the mere vassals of the Sovereign.''--(History of the English 
     Parliament By G. Barnett Smith; Volume I, Page 399)
       And, in a large sense, it was the Long Parliament which 
     framed the basic constitutional ideals upon which the 
     American Republic was fashioned.
       Under the leadership of John Pym and John Hampden, the 
     House of Commons struck first at the King's advisors--by 
     impeaching the Earl of Strafford. Strafford was accused of 
     subverting ``the fundamental laws'', of ``exercising 
     tyrannical and exorbitant power.'' When it became clear that 
     Strafford would never be found guilty of high treason by the 
     judicial process of impeachment before the House of Lords, 
     the Commons turned to condemn him to death by a Bill of 
     Attainder. The bill passed both Commons and Lords. Realizing 
     that he, too, was in peril, the King signed the Bill and on 
     May 12, 1641, over 200,000 people saw Strafford executed.
       Meanwhile, Parliament acted to make arbitrary rule 
     impossible in the future. First, to protect itself against a 
     possible ``untimely adjourning, proroguing, or dissolving'' 
     by the King, it provided that a Parliament could not be 
     dissolved without its consent. Second, in the Triennial Act, 
     it established that Parliament was to meet once every three 
     years, whether or not it had been summoned by the King.
       Ship money was next attacked and declared illegal--and the 
     judgment against John Hampden was annulled. The collection of 
     tunnage and poundage duties without the consent of Parliament 
     was made unlawful). Compulsory knighthood and the abuse of 
     forest fines were prohibited.
       However, in November, 1641, Parliament prepared the Grand 
     Remonstrance which recited the wrongdoings of Charles I, and 
     set forth what had to be done to remedy national grievances 
     and set forth further demands. For example, it proposed that 
     the King's ministers should be ``such as Parliament may have 
     cause to confide in.'' This Grand Remonstrance passed Commons 
     by a majority of only eleven out of over 300. This angered 
     Charles I and he directed the Attorney General to lay 
     articles of impeachment for treason before the Lords against 
     five members of the House of Commons. And, though the men 
     escaped before they could be arrested, this greatly inflamed 
     the passions of the people and hastened the drift toward 
     civil war.
       But, before the civil war actually broke out, Parliament 
     presented its final demands to the King in the so-called 
     Nineteen Propositions. By the terms of the Nineteen 
     Propositions, the privy councillors, the principal officers 
     and judges of the state, the tutor's of the King's children, 
     all were to be appointed only with the approval of 
     Parliament. It asked the King to put royal forts and castles 
     under Parliamentary control, to dismiss his military forces; 
     to take away the votes of all Roman Catholic peers, and to 
     promise that his children would not conclude any marriage not 
     approved by Parliament.
       Charles refused and the civil war began--to be terminated 
     in a little over two years. After the Presbyterians had been 
     expelled from Parliament, the remainder (known as the 
     ``Rump'') tried the King for treason and sentenced him to 
     death.
       What followed were eleven years of military despotism. 
     After Cromwell's death, the dead King's son, Charles II, 
     was placed on the throne. The House of Stuart was restored 
     to the throne, but with no constitutional guarantees. The 
     supremacy of Parliament was not declared in any formal 
     contract, nor was the King required to acknowledge that 
     his powers were limited by, or derived from, the people. 
     Indeed, there was nothing of a constitutional character to 
     even indicate that Charles I had been deposed. And, 
     though, in form and law, the King was supreme--he was now, 
     in fact, subservient to Parliament.
       Charles II's first Parliament granted him the proceeds of 
     the Customs for life. Parliament abolished the feudal 
     incidents, e.g., wardship, marriage and knight's service, and 
     the three feudal aids: knighting the King's son, ransoming 
     the King, and furnishing a dowry for his eldest daughter. 
     Parliament made up for the revenues lost by abolishing these 
     by granting the Crown an hereditary tax on beer and some 
     other liquors.
       The year 1665 marked the reassertion of legislative control 
     over the spending of the public money, viz., the practice of 
     Parliamentary appropriations. Prior to this time, the King 
     went to Parliament with requests for money. But, generally, 
     once the money was raised, the King could spend it as he 
     wished.
       Sir George Downing amended the Subsidy Bill of 1665 to 
     provide that the money raised in accordance with the Bill be 
     applicable solely to the prosecution of the Dutch War--and 
     that money could not be paid out by the Exchequer save by 
     special warrant stating that as the purpose of the payment.
       In 1667, Parliament solidified its control of the purse 
     strings of England by appointing a Parliamentary commission 
     to examine the public accounts in order to determine that the 
     funds raised in the Supply Bill of 1665 were, in fact, spent 
     solely for the Parliamentary designated purpose. This 
     Parliamentary commission later expelled the Treasurer of the 
     Navy from the House of Commons for spending public money 
     without a warrant.
       As one author has observed:
       ``The bill was the natural consequence of the liberty of 
     appropriation enjoyed under the Commonwealth. The exercise of 
     the principle of appropriating supplies in detail was not 
     carried to its full extent until after 1689. Its importance 
     is difficult to overestimate. It placed the executive power 
     in a position of perfect dependence upon the bill of 
     Parliament, for the money requisite for any administrative 
     act was to be forthcoming only in accordance with the 
     previously expressed intent of Parliament.''--(The History of 
     Parliamentary Taxation in England by Shepard Morgan; New 
     York: 1911; Pp 304-5).
       Another writer has written:
       ``The foundation was securely laid for the changes that 
     followed after his expulsion. Modern Anglo-Saxon legislatures 
     have considered the practice of appropriations, now extended 
     to even minute items of expense, to be one of the most 
     essential sources of their power and have guarded it with the 
     utmost care. It is a check upon government policy not by 
     calling a minister to account for what he has done, but by 
     rendering action which is not approved of impossible in 
     advance. The full establishment of the right of appropriation 
     should probably be regarded as the last step in the creation 
     of so great a power in Parliament over the executive that 
     resistance was hardly possible . . . ''--(Constitutional 
     History of England by George Buton Adams, New York: 1938, P. 
     349).
       On Charles II's death in 1685, James II acceded to the 
     English throne. But where Charles II had been willing to 
     adjust to the Parliamentary system, James II was not. James 
     II lacked Charles II's tact and diplomacy. He assumed the 
     Crown with the full intention of exercising arbitrary 
     authority--as had the earlier Stuart Kings. He attempted to 
     bring Roman Catholicism back to England.
       Prior to calling his first Parliament James II had 
     collected customs duties by proclamation--i.e. without 
     Parliamentary sanction. But, in spite of this poor beginning, 
     the Parliament--which was overwhelmingly royalist--granted 
     him a large revenue for life and seemed ready to do anything 
     else within reason which the King wished. But this spirit of 
     harmony didn't last long.
       Primarily because of his zealous desire to restore England 
     to Catholicism, James clashed with Parliament. In 1685, 
     Parliament balked when the King asked that a large standing 
     army be raised in which Roman Catholics were to hold key 
     positions. Instead of complying with the King's request, the 
     Commons gave the King less than he sought and attempted to 
     impose conditions. This infuriated the King to the extent 
     that he committed a member of the Parliament to the Tower for 
     saying: ``We are all Englishmen and not to be frightened out 
     of our duty by a few high words.''
       Refusing to tolerate such criticism, the king dismissed his 
     first, and only, Parliament.
       These and other outrages so inflamed the nation that in 
     November, 1688, William of Orange was invited to come to 
     England. An advisory ``assembly'' was called to assume the 
     provisional government of England pending the calling of a 
     Parliament--composed of the Lords and of the members of the 
     House of Commons which last met in the Parliament of Charles 
     II. The assembly advised the calling of a convention 
     Parliament, and letters were issued for the holding of 
     Parliamentary elections. The convention Parliament met on 
     January 22, 1789, and remained in session until August 20, 
     and later continued its work in a second session.
       On February 13, 1689, William and Mary were crowned subject 
     to the conditions expressed in the Declaration of Right. That 
     same day, the Convention Parliament declared itself to be the 
     Parliament and its acts valid law.
       The Declaration of Right with some slight changes was--in 
     the second session of Parliament--incorporated into the Bill 
     of Rights. Specifically, the Declaration of Right enumerated 
     the arbitrary acts of James II and declared each of them 
     specifically to be illegal.
       On October 25, 1689, the Declaration of Right was enacted 
     by Parliament, in statutory form, as the Bill of Rights. It 
     stated that King James ``did endeavor to subvert and 
     extirpate . . . the laws and liberties of this kingdom . . . 
     by levying money for and to the use of the crown, by pretense 
     of prerogative, for other time and in other manner than the 
     same was granted by Parliament.'' Then followed the absolute 
     assertion ``that levying money for or to the use of the crown 
     by pretense or prerogative, without grant of Parliament for 
     longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be 
     granted, is illegal.''
       The Bill of Rights is--without question--one of the most 
     crucial documents in Anglo-American constitutional history. 
     For, it marked the end and summed up the results of a 
     struggle which had lasted for over four centuries. As 
     Maitland observed, with the Bill of Rights ``one great 
     chapter of English history had been closed.''
       Clearly the impact of the Bill of Rights was not limited to 
     England. It had as great an impact on the British colonists 
     who came to America--who had suffered as much in their 
     charters and in their free governments from the absolutism of 
     Charles I and James II as had the people of England. And, 
     reacting from British experience--and from their own 
     experience under British rule--the Framers wrote into our 
     Constitution the exclusive function of Congress to impose 
     taxes and to control public expenditures by appropriations.
       As one author has observed:

       ``With the passing of the Bill of Rights the principle was 
     vindicated that Parliament rather than the crown has the 
     power to tax. . . . The corollary principle that Parliament 
     has the power to appropriate supplies for specific purposes 
     and that it can demand an accounting for the money so 
     appropriated were accorded general acquiescence then and 
     thereafter.''--(The History of Parliamentary Taxation in 
     England by Shepard Morgan; New York: 1911; pp. 307-8).
                                  ____


                   [Resumption of Senate Proceedings]

       The Presiding Officer (Mr. Bentsen). The question is on 
     agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. 
     Jordan).
       Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, I just want to make a brief 
     statement about this.
       The Presiding Officer. The Senator from Arkansas is 
     recognized.
       Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, I have prepared a comparable 
     amendment, not identical, to be introduced and would have 
     possibly offered it had I the opportunity to do so. However, 
     during the afternoon, I was engaged in a conference with the 
     House members of the Appropriations Committee on the 
     Supplemental Appropriation bill. I would prefer to have had 
     the amendment I prepared to the one of the Senator from Idaho 
     (Mr. Jordan), but it will have to go to conference if it is 
     adopted and some moderate change would be made in conference 
     if it is found advisable to do so. Since it does have the 
     basic approach that I have in the amendment that I intended 
     to offer, I intend to support this amendment.
       Now I want to say at this time that I will have serious 
     difficulty voting for the House bill just voted for the $250 
     billion limitation.
       I am reluctant, most reluctant, to vote for a measure and 
     confer upon the Chief Executive the power to completely 
     reject and to strike from the bill what Congress, on any 
     project or program that Congress, in its judgment and wisdom, 
     has established and authorized under the law.
       For that reason, Mr. President, I hope that the senator's 
     amendment will be agreed to.
       While I have this moment, Mr. President, I would like to 
     say to the Senate that immediately after action on this 
     amendment, if I can get the floor, I intend to offer an 
     amendment, adding a new title to the bill.
       It will be noticed in this bill that provision has been 
     made for a joint committee to deal with the study from now 
     until some time next year. That would be a temporary 
     committee. And that committee's functions and duties would 
     expire.
       Mr. Proxmire. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that 
     point?
       Mr. McClellan. I yield.
       Mr. Proxmire. Mr. President, I am very interested in the 
     Senator's proposed committee.
       However, I would like to tell the Senator that at about 
     2:30 this afternoon I was to be recognized. And I understood 
     that I was the next one to follow the Jordan amendment. I 
     will not take very long.
       Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, I am very sorry. The Senator 
     understands that I have not been on the floor. If that is the 
     order, of course, I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.
       Mr. Proxmire. Mr. President, I would be happy to yield to 
     the chairman of the Appropriations Committee if he desires. 
     However, I would prefer it if I could proceed.
       Mr. McClellan. No. I will confer with the Senator about 
     this in the course of our voting. However, in the meantime I 
     intend to advise the Senate that I shall offer an amendment 
     to add a new title, and the new title will be practically 
     identical to a bill that the Senate passed on eight different 
     occasions to create a Joint Committee on the Budget, not 
     temporary, but permanent. I have added one thing to its 
     duties, and that is that after performing the duties already 
     provided in that bill, that it submit its recommendations 
     with respect to a ceiling each year in the budget on the 
     amount of appropriations we should make.
       I hope that amendment will be adopted. I have just taken 
     this moment to make mention of my purpose to support the 
     distinguished Senator's amendment. And I think that it may 
     need some small modifications, at least in conference. But I 
     shall support it. And I would hope that the Senate would 
     agree to it. At least, we passed this bill eight times, and 
     the House only rejected it one time, and only rejected it by 
     15 votes. That is the first time they considered it. They 
     never could get to a vote before that because it was opposed 
     by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House 
     primarily. Now that the House has awakened to the necessity 
     for some kind of committee, for some kind of study, and for 
     some kind of additional service that is necessary for the 
     Congress to ably and properly and effectively perform its 
     duties, I think it is time to consider the bill that the 
     Senate has already passed eight times. I think it is 
     perfectly appropriate that that measure be adopted as an 
     amendment and add a new title to the bill.
       Mr. Pastore. It was my privilege for the past several years 
     each time the distinguished Senator, the chairman of the 
     Appropriations Committee, introduced his bill for a joint 
     committee, to cosponsor that particular legislation. As I 
     understood, it was not exactly a study. It was not a study at 
     all. But here we are dealing with $250 billion every year, 
     which is a tremendous amount of money. It comes to the 
     committee under 12 different titles, and there is no 
     coordination.
       We do not know once we have appropriated the money just how 
     the money is being spent. We have no facilities, no 
     faculties, to follow that money to make sure. The only 
     opportunity we have is when they come up again, to ask them 
     how they spent the money last year. We have to take their 
     word for it.
       After all, the Office of Budget and Management has a 
     continuance of operation. They can follow these things 
     through with the administration. But we have no facilities, 
     no faculties at our disposal.
       What the Senator did suggest was that we would have a joint 
     operation with the House, that we would have 
     proportional steps in there, that once we appropriate 
     money, we make sure that the money has been used for the 
     purpose for which it was appropriated. That was the 
     purpose of his bill.
       Mr. McClellan. That was one of the purposes. We hear only 
     the appropriations on most every bill, with one or two 
     exceptions, like Public Works. But we hear primarily from 
     agencies that want the money to spend, but there is no way 
     for us to check against the immediate intentions they say 
     they have and the information they submit to us.
       While I have the floor, I would like to suggest to my 
     colleagues that this bill to which I have referred and that 
     has passed a number of times had many cosponsors. In the 87th 
     Congress it had 67 cosponsors. In the 88th Congress, it had 
     77 cosponsors. In the 90th Congress it had 66 cosponsors. So 
     at least nearly two-thirds of the Senate have cosponsored the 
     bill each time in the past.
       Now, I do hope tonight, or when this amendment is offered, 
     that I will have the support of my colleagues who have 
     heretofore been very well advised as to what this proposal 
     will do and the need for it.
       Mr. Bennett. Will the Senator yield to me?
       Mr. McClellan. I am glad to yield.
       Mr. Bennett. As the manager of the bill, I think I am 
     prepared to accept the amendment of the Senator. I would like 
     to see it. I would appreciate the opportunity to look at a 
     copy of it. By the time the Senator is ready to offer it, I 
     think we would probably be willing to accept it without 
     question.
       Mr. McClellan. I will be glad to do that. I would like to 
     suggest one thing to be added to the bill, other than 
     technical amendments not necessary to meet existing law. This 
     clause has been added to the bill. This is under subsection 
     (2) of some section of the bill--the duty of the committee:

       ``Recommended to the appropriate standing committees of the 
     House of Representatives and the Senate such changes in 
     existing laws as may effect greater efficiency and economy in 
     government.''

       And we added at that point:

       ``(b) a ceiling for expenditures and net lending under the 
     budget of the United States Government for the fiscal year.''

       Mr. Bennett. May I see that?
       Mr. McClellan. Yes. This is the only one I have before me 
     now. It is one I shall want to introduce.
       Mr. Bennett. After the Senator from Wisconsin is 
     recognized. I will be glad to discuss it with the Senator.
       Mr. McClellan. That is the only substantive change made in 
     the bill as it passed the Senate.
       Mr. Cranston. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
       Mr. McClellan. I yield.
       Mr. Cranston. Mr. President, I am delighted that the 
     chairman of the Committee on Appropriations lends his support 
     to the Jordan amendment. The Jordan amendment is the way we 
     can have a ceiling without delegating the authority of this 
     body to the executive branch.
       The distinguished Senator from Oregon (Mr. Packwood) made 
     an eloquent, articulate address on this topic, and it is a 
     very important topic.
       I believe, contrary to his conclusions, that the Jordan 
     amendment gives us the opportunity to behave in a fiscally 
     responsible way while retaining our power.
       The Senator went through a long history respecting the 
     abdication of power.
       Mr. President, behind the Jordan amendment is the Percy 
     amendment, which I have been privileged to cosponsor. It does 
     set a procedure where we can have a solid, constructive, 
     prudent approach to this matter, to set a ceiling that takes 
     into account what we can expect to come in and take out, and 
     put that together in an overall budget, which is what the 
     Senator from Oregon discussed.


                  TEMPORARY INCREASE IN THE DEBT LIMIT

       The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill 
     (H.R. 16810) to provide for a temporary increase in the 
     public debt limit and to place a limitation on expenditures 
     and net lending for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.
       Mr. Javits. Mr. President, I shall be brief. I wish to put 
     the Senate in mind of another point which has been made, in 
     addition to the very, very moving address of the Senator from 
     Oregon. I think we all liked it so much because he does not 
     speak too often and it was really a great speech. Many of us 
     feel he is entitled to our sincere congratulations.
       He put me in mind of talk in the corridor that whatever we 
     pass will go right down the hatch in conference and we will 
     be right back here with a $250 billion ceiling, which is just 
     like the administration asked for and which passed the other 
     body.
       So I express the hope, as one Senator, that when I vote 
     ``yea'' on the Jordan amendment, because I agree with the 
     Senator from Georgia, the Senator from California (Mr. 
     Cranston) and many other Senators that this is the way to do 
     it under present circumstances and because the people have 
     a say, in this, too, and I think they have a right to feel 
     as they do about expenditures and taxes, that we are going 
     to stay with this and we should. By the size of the vote 
     we serve notice that conference reports coming back here 
     with these provisions dropped down the nearest hole are 
     not going to find favor in the Senate.
       Mr. President, that is one of the things that the speech of 
     the Senator from Oregon should inspire in us all. This is not 
     just a vote that we are not for giving up our powers on this 
     amendment, but these things have a way to come back in a 
     final way with lots of feeling.
       I hope Senators will vote with the understanding that when 
     they vote this way on the Jordan amendment they will vote so 
     that there votes will not be meaningless. I hope very much 
     the size of the vote and the conviction of the Senate will 
     carry that message.
       Mr. Schweiker. Mr. President, I rise to strongly associate 
     myself with the remarks of the Senator from New York (Mr. 
     Javits). As a cosponsor of the amendment of the Senator from 
     Idaho (Mr. Jordan) I believe this is a very important basic 
     principle. I certainly concur with the thoughts of the 
     Senator from Oregon.
       I though the Senator made some very fine statements, 
     explicit points, and pertinent principles. I differ with him 
     slightly. I feel that the way to do the things that he wants 
     to do is to vote for the Jordan amendment, to stand up and 
     vote on that measure. Nevertheless, I commend him and I join 
     with the Senator from New York (Mr. Javits) in saying that if 
     this body expresses its favor with the Jordan amendment, and 
     I hope for that, I could not vote for a conference report 
     which would come back and incorporate the House approach, 
     which is the reason the Senator from Oregon so well outlined 
     it. I associate myself with the Senator from New York because 
     that could be the issue.
       I believe the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Jordan) has the votes 
     to win that basic issue. I hope it does not stop there. The 
     conferees should take this into account in conference because 
     it is a gut issue and as a gut issue I am going to vote down 
     any conference report that goes back to the House approach of 
     giving away economic responsibilities.
       Mr. Gravel. Mr. President, I share the same views as my 
     colleague. I, too, went over to my colleague from Oregon and 
     congratulation him on a fine speech. In fact, I can say that 
     during my service here it is the finest speech I have heard 
     in this Chamber. I have heard better rhetoric but I have 
     heard no better grasp of history or better logic of an 
     important problem affecting this Nation. So I am going to pay 
     him what to my mind is the ultimate compliment, when I hear 
     something very good. I say to him that he persuaded me. I was 
     going to vote for the Jordan amendment; I am now going to 
     vote against it.
       It is not to often in the legislative process that minds 
     are really changed in this Chamber, because of the 
     operation of the system. But I was persuaded, I went up to 
     my colleagues from Oregon and I asked what solution he 
     had. I understand the Jordan amendment. It is a tinkering 
     process to get to another goal. Of course, it is true, and 
     I understand the statement of the Senator from New York 
     and the statement of the Senator from Pennsylvania, that 
     we are going to continue that quid pro quo; we will go for 
     that if something does not occur; but that is the way 
     erosion usually takes place, with one simple act.
       I asked the Senator from Oregon what his solution was. He 
     said he was going to vote against the Jordan amendment. Then, 
     he was going to vote against the whole piece of legislation. 
     That strikes me as logic because there is no way we will get 
     into trouble if we do not hold things down.
       I do wish to address a question to a member of the 
     committee. What would happen if we voted this down? I address 
     that question to the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), who has 
     just returned to the floor.
       Mr. Bennett. One week after October 31 the Federal 
     Government would be unable to pay its bills. It could not 
     meet its obligations. The dollar would die in the world 
     market because nobody could trade it. We would have about 1 
     week's flow; 1 week's money in the bank. After that week the 
     Federal Government would be bankrupt, unable to pay its 
     bills, and I cannot conceive that any Senator would want to 
     take the responsibility for voting for that.
       I have been in the Senate a long time and I know there are 
     always votes against the debt limit. Remember that the debt 
     limit is the basic objective of this bill--the spending 
     ceiling is the secondary objective. I know many Senators are 
     going to vote against the debt limit in this bill--I suppose 
     praying in their hearts that enough of us will vote for it so 
     that this event will not take place, but there is not any 
     question about it. This is what would happen.
       Mr. Gravel. If my colleague will excuse my ignorance, I 
     would like a little information as to how this would be 
     precipitated. What would really happen?
       Mr. Bennett. The debt limit would fall from $450 billion to 
     $400 billion on that day. We already have more than $400 
     billion of debt outstanding--something like $435 billion. 
     That debt outstanding is represented by bonds that constantly 
     need to be renewed. Some of them are notes that have to be 
     renewed every week. We could not renew another note. Then all 
     we could do would be to float around on the amount of money 
     in the bank. That would last until about election day, and 
     then the Federal Government would grind to a halt.
       It could not pay its bills, it could not pay its salaries. 
     The dollar would drop in the world market so precipitously 
     that no one can imagine the debacle it would create.
       Mr. Gravel. How much are we shy between now and the end of 
     the fiscal year if we leave the debt where it is right now?
       Mr. Bennett. I will answer that question. The Treasury says 
     they need a limit of $465 billion to get us through the 
     fiscal year, but if we let the bill die, the Federal debt 
     limit drops back to $400 billion. That would be 
     disastrous. We do not have a continuing debt ceiling of 
     $450 billion. We only have a ceiling of $450 billion to 
     the end of October. Then it drops to $400 billion.
       Mr. Gravel. So if we do not get it, what is it we are 
     talking about? A difference of $15 billion?
       Mr. Bennett. I cannot tell the Senator to the day. We 
     probably would have to be back here in February or March to 
     pass it again.
       Mr. Gravel. Suppose on Monday we pass a ceiling we have 
     now? What is the ceiling now? $450 billion? Is that not what 
     the ceiling is now?
       Mr. Bennett. Yes.
       Mr. Gravel. What catastrophe would be visited upon this 
     occasion if that were to occur?
       Mr. Bennett. That would take us to about March, and then we 
     would face the same situation.
       Mr. Gravel. Which would mean it would put the 
     responsibility on the rest of us. Is that right?
       Mr. Bennett. I have been through this many, many times in 
     my 22 years in the Senate. We come up to this point, we argue 
     about it, and we rail about the fact that the Government 
     should not go into debt, but we eventually face up to the 
     fact that none of us wants the responsibility of letting the 
     Government go bankrupt.
       Mr. Gravel. I want to assure my colleague that I do not 
     want to let the Government go bankrupt, but I like the 
     concept that my colleague from Oregon has enunciated, and I 
     am not reluctant to take the responsibility of lowering taxes 
     or raising taxes to raise money. I want to make my vote 
     meaningful in that direction. If that means voting against 
     this amendment and voting against them all, that may be the 
     way to do it.
       What happens if we continue the debt ceiling at $450 
     billion?
       Mr. Packwood. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I 
     would like to propound a question to my friend from Utah. 
     Could not we do better simply by deleting title II of this 
     bill, which is the debt limitation, and send that out from 
     Congress?
       Mr. Bennett. No. It would have to eliminate the $465 
     billion.
       I am reminded that it automatically drops to $400 billion. 
     If we want to keep going as we are now, we have to replace 
     the $465 billion figure with the figure of $450 billion.
       Mr. Gravel. This is title I.
       Mr. Packwood. That is title I of the bill.
       Mr. Bennett. Yes.
       Mr. Gravel. I address myself to my colleague from Oregon. 
     If we wanted it to stay the same, we would substitute for 
     title I a provision saying we raise the debt ceiling to $450 
     billion. That would be a check on the administration and 
     protect us. Is that correct?
       Mr. Packwood. These sections are severable. Title II has 
     the debt limitation. That could go. We could amend title I to 
     make it whatever we wanted.
       Mr. Gravel. That would give us some control, because that 
     would give us a $15 billion hammerlock on the administration, 
     which we are giving away now.
       Mr. Bennett. It would not have that effect. It would merely 
     bring us back that much sooner to face the same problem. We 
     have already faced it twice this year. This is the third 
     time. If we put it off until March, we will have to come back 
     in March.
       Mr. Gravel. What is the problem we are facing? Is it the 
     fact that we are spending money?
       Mr. Bennett. No, that is not the problem. The problem is 
     that full faith and credit of the United States dies because 
     we can no longer sell any bonds.
       Mr. Gravel. But my colleague overlooks one thing. I say 
     this humbly. The full faith and credit is attached to 
     borrowing money to spend money on projects. That is what the 
     $15 billion is for.
       Mr. Bennett. No.
       Mr. Gravel. What are they borrowing for if it is not to 
     spend money?
       Mr. Bennett. Because we already have a debt of $450 
     billion. We turn it over. It is not like a continuing debt 
     such as one might have in a bank for 20 years. It is 
     represented by hundreds of issues. It is represented in large 
     part by notes which are floated for 90 days or 6 months.
       Mr. Gravel. I confess I do not have the brain power or 
     understanding, but if we are borrowing money just to tread 
     water, then we can tread water with $450 billion. If through 
     some device the interest is creeping it up and making it $465 
     billion, then obviously that increase is all due to an 
     increase in the interest. I do not think that is the case, 
     because we are supposed to be servicing the debt by 
     appropriating money for it. Where is that $15 billion?
       Mr. Bennett. That comes from increased appropriations which 
     the Congress has already made, and they have got to be met. 
     Congress has appropriated the money. We have to have it. That 
     is a part of the problem. The other part is that we have 
     accumulated a debt over many years. I cannot think of the 
     year when we had no Federal debt.
       Mr. Gravel. Was not this debt contributed to by a deficit 
     this year?
       Mr. Bennett. Yes.
       Mr. Gravel. Will not this debt be contributed to by a 
     deficit next year?
       Mr. Bennett. Yes.
       Mr. Gravel. What is the best way to get our hands on that 
     deficit? It is to stop the spending. Is that right?
       Mr. Bennett. Yes.
       Mr. Gravel. A good conservative, however, in my mind, if a 
     person is fiscally responsible, is not going to let them run 
     wild by raising the ceiling. That is the first grip we could 
     get on this problem.
       Mr. Bennett. Unfortunately, that does not work.
       Mr. Gravel. Why?
       Mr. Bennett. Because it is not an effective brake. It does 
     not say to the American people, ``We are going to stop 
     spending when we reach this point.'' It says to all the 
     people who own bonds, including people who own savings 
     bonds, ``Your bonds are no longer worth anything, because 
     we cannot redeem them.''
       Mr. Gravel. I do not understand that, and I do not think I 
     can accept it at face value. Does the Senator mean to tell me 
     that $15 billion is all the money that is going to redeem 
     bonds?
       Mr. Bennett. Look----
       Mr. Gravel. I am prepared to vote for $450 billion, which 
     is what we have now. All I am suggesting is the possibility 
     of continuing that. The Senate is telling me they need 
     another $15 billion to redeem bonds that people are going to 
     put up.
       Mr. Bennett. No. I have to go back and start all over 
     again. We now have a debt ceiling of $450 billion, which 
     permits the Treasury to borrow what it needs.
       Mr. Gravel. Up to that amount.
       Mr. Bennett. Up to $450 billion. All the money that 
     Treasury is borrowing is represented by bonds that are 
     outstanding. Does the Senator follow that?
       Mr. Gravel. I follow that, but let me ask one point. In 
     that $450 billion we already have covered the deficit of this 
     year, which was over $20 billion. Was it not?
       Mr. Bennett. No; we do not have it covered, because this is 
     the fiscal year of 1973, and to cover that deficit we have 
     got to have the additional $15 or $16 billion, in the opinion 
     of the Treasury. They are the people we have to trust in 
     these matters.
       Mr. Gravel. That is money we have appropriated. That is the 
     point I am trying to make. It accounts for that increase?
       Mr. Bennett. But in the management of the debt, which is 
     another part of the function of the Treasury, these 
     outstanding bonds keep coming due every day or two.
       Mr. Gravel. I realize that, and I realize that we must meet 
     our obligations, but I am not sure by the Senator's argument, 
     that we have to increase the debt to meet the bonded 
     indebtedness. Our indebtedness today is $450 billion. If we 
     raise the ceiling, that is raising spending.
       Mr. Bennett. Let me go back further. I have said that if we 
     keep it at $450 billion--and we can--that simply means we 
     will be back in February or March to raise it again. What we 
     have already appropriated will carry us to another crisis, 
     and we will have to raise the debt ceiling to take care of 
     the deficit that will accumulate during the fiscal year 1973.
       Mr. Humphrey. Will the Senator yield?
       Mr. Gravel. I am happy to yield.
       Mr. Humphrey. I am beginning to get the sense of this 
     debate. For a period of time it was somewhat difficult, but 
     what I believe I am hearing is that Congress cannot adjourn 
     and there will be no problem in the next 3 months.
       Mr. Bennett. No, no.
       Mr. Humphrey. Wait a minute. This Congress could adjourn--
     --
       Mr. Bennett. This Congress could not adjourn without having 
     to come back on October 31, because on October 31 we will be 
     $50 billion over the authorized debt ceiling.
       Mr. Gravel. Perhaps I can help the Senator from Minnesota. 
     If we took title 1 and just made it the status quo--that is, 
     left it at $50 billion, which would give us a ceiling of $450 
     billion, which is what it has been and then throw the rest of 
     this away--we would still have some power left.
       Mr. Humphrey. That is exactly what the Senator from 
     Minnesota was getting at: that we could leave the debt 
     ceiling at what it is. Instead of inserting the figure $65 
     billion, it would be $50 billion, and it would carry us 
     through until March.
       Mr. Bennett. The Senator is correct. It will be $450 
     billion on January 1. On January 15 we will be over the $450 
     billion.
       Mr. Humphrey. So before the new Congress would come into 
     operation or session----
       Mr. Bennett. That is right.
       Mr. Humphrey. We would have, as a matter of Government, to 
     default on the payments.
       Mr. Bennett. That is right. We would have to be called 
     back.
       Mr. Gravel. Would not that depend on the revenues received 
     between now and then? If the economy were in good shape, 
     obviously the revenues would increase.
       Mr. Bennett. That is based on past estimates by the 
     Treasury Department of the revenues that will be available 
     between now and then. But I do not think we can take that 
     chance and say that revenues will be better.
       Mr. Cranston. Will the Senator yield?
       Mr. Gravel. I yield.
       Mr. Cranston. We are talking about two ceilings. One is the 
     ceiling on the debt, and we will have to keep upping that 
     until we get a ceiling on spending. Once we get a ceiling on 
     spending and get a budget that takes into account what is 
     incoming and what is outgoing, then we will not have to get 
     together on the ceiling or deficit. We will finally get the 
     deficit in hand. But we will not get it in hand without a 
     ceiling. That is why I am supporting the Jordan amendment.
       Mr. Bennett. But we cannot go home until this bill expires. 
     We would destroy the credit of the United States, and we 
     cannot leave the debt limit at $450 billion, unless we come 
     back before January 15 and go through the same exercise.
       Several Senators. Vote, vote.
       Mr. Packwood. Mr. President, regardless of the outcome, 
     whether the Jordan amendment is voted up or down, I will 
     offer an amendment to strike title II of the bill, which is 
     the expenditure ceiling.
       The Presiding Officer. The question is on agreeing to the 
     amendment.
       Several Senators. Vote, vote.
       Mr. Aiken. If the Jordan amendment is approved by a sizable 
     majority, then I suggest that when we go into conference, 
     after the conferees have been appointed, they be instructed 
     to stock with the amendment. That will save them a lot of 
     time on rejecting an undesirable conference report, which I 
     feel will not be passed.
       I hope the Jordan amendment will be adopted and that the 
     Senate sticks with it. Such action will save us hours before 
     the end of the session--possibly several days.
       Mr. Buckley. Mr. President, I am deeply troubled by the 
     proposal that the Executive should be delegated the authority 
     to cut expenditures at will in order to maintain a $250 
     billion ceiling on Federal spending during the current fiscal 
     year.
       I am troubled, in large part, because it represents a 
     delegation of congressional authority which could establish a 
     most dangerous precedent. But I am even more troubled by the 
     abdication of fiscal responsibility, on the part of the 
     Congress which has made the proposed delegation probable and 
     even necessary.
       We are caught on the horns of the proverbial dilemma. On 
     the one hand, we are faced with the fact that the Congress 
     has shown no disposition to exercise that self-restraint 
     which is essential to avoid adding new fuel to our 
     inflationary pressures. The political and social consequences 
     of a significant rise in the rate of inflation are simply too 
     serious to ignore. They will not be alleviated by asserting 
     prerogatives which on the record the current Congress will 
     not exercise. On the other hand, we run the danger of 
     establishing a practice which is subject to the gravest abuse 
     by a future President and which will merely encourage a 
     further abdication of fiscal responsibility by future 
     Congresses.
       This lack of self-discipline on Capitol Hill forces us to 
     consider alternatives each of which poses substantial 
     dangers. And in this there is a lesson. The Constitution will 
     safeguard our liberties only so long as each branch of our 
     Government will face up to its responsibilities.
       On balance I would approve a delegation of budget-cutting 
     authority to the President within reasonably narrow limits. 
     This is why I have voted for the Taft amendment. I must 
     oppose the Jordan amendment, however, because of its 
     mechanical rigidity. I simply do not feel that it is prudent 
     to require one reciprocal percentage cut in each of the 
     nonexcluded categories of expenditures.
       The Presiding Officer. The question is on agreeing to the 
     amendment of the Senator from Idaho. On this question the 
     yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the 
     roll.
       The legislative clerk called the roll.
       So the amendment of Mr. Jordan of Idaho was agreed to.
       Mr. Jordan of Idaho. Mr. President, I move to reconsider 
     the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
       Mr. Pastore. I move to lay that motion on the table.

  Mr. PACKWOOD. The reason for that debate was a long history in the 
speech as to the battle in England of Parliament to gain control of 
spending. And a thumbnail history of it is roughly as follows.
  The King normally had enough revenues, crown revenues without consent 
of Parliament to run the royal household, to run the kingly duties, but 
the King never had enough money to make war. So whenever he wanted to 
make war, he would have to go to Parliament and ask it to pass taxes or 
revenues of some kind to make enough money to make war. And if the King 
was popular, the Parliament would often do it. Or if war was popular, 
it would do it. But in doing it, they would gradually put riders in the 
bill to correct some grievance that Parliament had in terms of the 
kingly exercise of prerogatives, and they often related to his efforts 
to raise money by what Parliament thought were extracurricular methods.
  Over the centuries and finally culminating in 1689 in the English 
Bill of Rights, the Parliament finally gave itself the full power of 
the purse, which is why, 100 years later when we adopted our 
Constitution, there was almost no debate about the issue of who had 
control of the purse. Congress did. It was not a significant factor in 
the debates when we adopted our Constitution.
  There is no question but what Congress still has that power. We can 
argue all we want--how long have we heard this argument the President 
says, well, Congress cannot spend any money, or this country cannot 
spend any money Congress does not appropriate. And then somebody else 
will say appropriations have been cut every year above the level that 
the President wanted. And then somebody else will say, yes, that is 
because Congress 2 years ago passed some kind of an authorization 
compelling the President to ask for more money that he did not want to 
ask for, and then we cut it 5 percent and say we cut what he asked.
  That argument can go back and forth as long as we are here. Both the 
President and Congress are at fault. Both Republicans and Democrats are 
at fault. And there is no point in finger pointing at the President or 
finger pointing at the Congress, one or the other, and saying it is 
your fault; no, it is your fault; it is your fault; it is your fault.
  This is what we are up against and why I finally changed my mind on 
the constitutional amendment, and it was experience, not logic. In a 
democratic society--and we are that--it is difficult, well-nigh 
impossible, for elected officials to say no unless they are compelled 
to say no.
  Take the health reform bill we are considering, for example. Every 
single group that has any tangential connection to the delivery of 
health wants to be included in the basic benefit package. They may have 
the most tangential connection, but they are convinced they are the 
linchpin to the delivery of health services so they come to us and they 
lobby us. And all of us, being decent and nice people, not wanting to 
say no, say, ``I will consider your position.''
  Finally, 10 or 15 groups, all of which want to be included, have come 
to us and, not wanting to say no and not having enough money for all of 
them, we probably include them all but say we will only pay these 
particular groups 50 percent of their bills, when everyone else gets 
100 percent and that way it fits within the money alloted. In a year or 
two they come to us and say why are we only getting 50 percent when 
they are getting 100 percent? We say that is not fair; you should get 
100 percent, so the spending compounds and goes on.
  I am not saying we are any worse sinners than anybody else. It is I 
think human nature when somebody comes up to you and asks for your 
help, you like to help them. You do not want to say no, get out of 
here; I do not agree with you. At worse, if that is what you are 
thinking, you probably finesse it. You finesse it with your neighbor; 
you finesse it with your constituents. You say thanks very much; I 
appreciate it. That is a very well-reasoned argument. I will give it 
consideration. They go away thinking you have agreed with them.
  That is why we are in the situation that we find ourselves. We have 
said yes to everybody. We have said yes to Social Security recipients, 
yes to Medicare, yes to Medicaid, yes to defense for a long period of 
time, although defense is now not the factor that is driving the 
deficit. It may have been at one time, but it certainly is not now.
  I will cite the statistics you have heard in one form or another, or 
take four programs: Social Security, other Government civilian 
retirement, military retirement, and Medicare-Medicaid. Those four plus 
interest: Those four, plus interest, in 1963 were 24 percent of our 
budget. In 1973, they were 37 percent; those four, plus interest. In 
1983, 47 percent; 1993, 56 percent. Absent any change in the law, in 
the year 2003, they will be 69 percent of all the money we spend. That 
means one of two things. Either all other programs get squeezed--
Amtrak, education, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest 
Service, airport safety, and everything else gets squeezed--or we raise 
taxes to pay for it, or we borrow.
  The latter is what we have been doing most of the time because we did 
not want to say no to Amtrak, we did not want to say no to the Forest 
Service, and we did not want to say no to the EPA. So we borrowed. The 
only restraint we have had at all in the last 6 years was the budget 
agreement made between the Congress and President Bush in 1990 and then 
extended again last year that put caps on what could be spent. That is 
the only restraint we have had. And those do not apply to the 
entitlements. They are exempt.
  So I have come, out of experience, to the conclusion that we need a 
balanced budget amendment to compel us to do what we know we should do. 
I do not think even those who are going to vote against this amendment 
will disagree with the conclusion of what is trying to be reached.
  We know what we should do. But by experience we have proven ourselves 
and Presidents incapable of doing it. Or do we have temporary moments 
of euphoria when the deficit goes down a bit? Yes. But over the years, 
is that euphoria justified year after year? No. Not a bit.
  So I congratulate the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Simon], and the 
Senator from Idaho [Mr. Craig].
  Are there defects in this amendment? I have listened to the 
arguments. I suppose there are defects in everything we do. If I were 
king of a government, I am not sure I could draft it better. Will it 
work exactly as we hope it will work? Will the courts do exactly what 
we think it will do? There is no guarantee. But ask yourselves: What is 
the alternative? Because it is not perfect in somebody's eyes, does 
that mean we do nothing and go on with what we are doing, or do we say 
we cannot do that? So let us try this. The risk of doing nothing and 
continuing on our present path is worse than the risk that the 
amendment might not be perfectly drawn.
  So I am happy to support it; have been happy to support it for the 
last 10 years. I have been here long enough that I came to that 
conclusion, not out of logic but out of experience, that decent as most 
Members of Congress are--I find them decent in the House and Senate--
and decent as most constituents are, everybody sees the world in their 
eyes. Their eyes is that we should balance the budget but not at their 
expense.
  How many times have you gone to the civic club lunch and somebody 
gets up, and says, ``You cannot run this place like you ought to.'' He 
says, ``You borrow money,'' to which I first used to say, ``Yes. You 
can run your business like we run the Government, if the bank will loan 
you money forever and only ask you to pay the interest. You can run 
your business at a loss forever.'' Most businesses cannot do that.
  Then I will say to the person, ``All right, how many people in the 
room favor a balanced budget amendment?'' Ninety-five percent put up 
their hands. ``How do you think we should balance the budget? Raise 
taxes?'' ``No. Oh, no. Do not raise taxes.'' ``Cut spending? How many 
want to cut spending?'' Ninety-five percent. ``Where should we cut? 
Social Security?'' ``Oh, no, no, no, not Social Security.'' 
``Medicare?'' ``Heavens no. That does not even pay for prescription 
drugs now.'' We cannot cut Medicaid. ``Highways? Highways are 
terrible.'' ``No, not highways.''
  You start going down the list of where you are going to cut. You know 
where we are going to cut? Waste, fraud, and corruption. That is where. 
That is going to balance the budget by getting rid of all the waste, 
fraud, and corruption. Except when you look at Social Security and you 
realize that their administrative costs are less than 2 percent--Social 
Security, not the Medicaid part. The pension part is a relatively 
automatic program. How long did you work? How much did you make? How 
old are you? Here is your check. It goes up automatically with the 
Consumer Price Index, and there is not much discretion. We can 
administer that program very effectively.
  Is there any waste, fraud, and corruption in that program? I do not 
think so. Is there any waste, fraud, and corruption in Medicare? There 
we have cuts in fraud in Medicare more on the part of the providers 
than the consumers, and it is a more difficult program to administer 
because there is more discretion in it. But if you ask the average 
citizen if there is waste, fraud, and corruption in Medicaid, they 
would say, ``No, I do not think so.'' Medicare? Not many people say so. 
Interest on the debt? We have to pay that. We would be sued if we did 
not pay that.
  So do I understand the ramifications of this amendment, if it works? 
Again, I am not going to try to second-guess what the courts may do 5 
years now. Do I understand the ramifications? Yes. Do I understand 
that, if it passes, we will have to raise taxes or cut programs or a 
combination of both? Yes, I understand that. Am I prepared to cut 
programs? Yes. Where? I have said it for the last several years. I will 
say it again. I think our retirement programs--military retirement, 
civilian retirement, Social Security--need to be restrained. And we 
should not be raising them by a cost of living every year.
  I think our health programs have to be dramatically restrained. And 
perhaps the most discouraging comment I have heard about the 
President's program was given not by a supporter, but by somebody who 
certainly thought it was not bad, Dr. Reischauer, head of the 
Congressional Budget Office, when he was testifying. He indicated what 
the effect of the President's program would be. This is where he said 
the premiums are taxes, and it made some of the President's supporters 
mad that they were being called taxes. But they are in essence.
  He testified more or less favorably about the President's program. 
Then he made this statement: If this program goes into effect, the 
President's health reform program, and everything works right, why, 
then the percentage of our gross national product that we spend on 
health in 10 years will be 19 percent instead of 20 percent. We are 
currently spending 14 percent. And if everything the President proposes 
works right, we go from 14 to 19 percent of our gross national product 
spent on health.
  Our health outlays will have to be trimmed. That means there may be 
some services we now pay for that we cannot pay for, and we may have to 
ask consumers to pick up more of the costs. Yes. That is where I would 
like to start before I consider tax increases although I do not write 
off tax increases as a possibility. We have done it in conjunction with 
cuts.
  So Madam President, let me say again that I have reached my decision 
on experience, not logic. My experience is that Republicans and 
Democrats, Presidents and Congress, will continue to spend and increase 
the deficit so long as we are governed by the present Constitution, or 
until the country goes bankrupt, which has happened in most other 
civilized countries in their history. I assume it could happen to us. 
It has happened to most countries in the world. Then you repudiate your 
debt and start over. And for a long time you are on a balanced budget 
because nobody will loan you money. I hope it does not come to that.
  I hope this amendment is adopted. There is ample period of phasing in 
of this amendment to meet its requirements--assuming it works, as we 
hope it will. There is ample time to meet the requirements. It is not 
like we are passing it and saying tomorrow, find out how you are going 
to narrow a $200 billion deficit.
  If we are forced to it, can we do it? Yes. If we are not forced to 
it, will we do it? No.
  So, Madam President, I hope this Congress will pass this. I have no 
doubt that the States will ratify it in a very short period of time, 
even though they may know that some of the things we may cut are gifts 
and grants and matching funds that we now give to the States.
  I congratulate the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Idaho 
again. They have done a yeoman's job on this. I wish them good luck, 
and I hope they have 67 votes.
  Mr. SIMON. Madam President, I simply want to commend the Senator from 
Oregon. The reality is that we have to simply face up to this thing. 
The Senator has learned, as he says, from experience, that we have to 
do this. We just cannot let these things go up endlessly. In fact--if 
the page can take this over to Senator Packwood--this is from OMB's 
four volumes that we get with the budget. If you look at that graph 
there, it says ``Lifetime Net Tax Rates Under Alternative Policies.'' I 
was born in 1928, and I end up with about 30 percent. I assume the 
Senator was born around 1940.
  Mr. PACKWOOD. 1930.
  Mr. SIMON. You are in the same category.
  This was put together by OMB to show what a great thing they have 
done. Down here it says ``future generations.'' Before we passed 
reconciliation last year, column 1 says that 93 percent of lifetime 
earnings would go for taxes. Then after we pass reconciliation, it is 
82 percent; and then in the next two columns, if you assume health care 
reform and you assume the optimistic economic scenario of the 
administration, in 10 years, without a down blip at all, future 
generations will pay 66 to 75 percent of their net lifetime earnings in 
taxation.
  Mr. PACKWOOD. If the health bill works.
  Mr. SIMON. If it works.
  Madam President, as my colleague from Oregon knows, that just is not 
going to happen. What we will do before we get there is we will do what 
countries have done historically, from ancient Florence down to Germany 
after World War I, and others: We will start printing money. We will 
devastate savings and retirement funds and everything. I think the 
Senator from Oregon has hit the nail on the head in his comments. I 
simply commend him for what he has said.
  Mr. PACKWOOD. I thank my good friend.
  Mr. SIMON. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I 
ask unanimous consent that the time of the quorum call be divided among 
Senator Craig, Senator Reid and myself, but not Senator Byrd.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for 8 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator is recognized.

                          ____________________