[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 17 (Thursday, February 24, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             COCOM ENDS--WHAT ABOUT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY?

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the 
administration's position in the Cocom successor regime negotiations.
  From the start of the debate over the EAA reauthorization, I have 
been dismayed at the administration's lack of attention to the 
importance of this bill. The administration has been slow to respond 
with their proposal, and in my opinion, has been lacking in our 
diplomacy in negotiations for the successor regime to Cocom. Simply 
put, I would like to know what has happened to American diplomacy. We 
seem to have become followers, not leaders in areas that are of crucial 
importance to our international security. Yet, I am not surprised by 
this lack of leadership, owing to the administration's past record on 
crucial international security issues.
  On more than one occasion, I have expressed my concerns to the 
President on a successor regime to Cocom. On December 16, 1993, I wrote 
to the President expressing my deep concerns about the end of Cocom. I 
stated to him that ``I think that we have reached a critical moment for 
our nation's ability to conduct an international regime to deal with 
threats of proliferation and terrorism in the 1990's.'' On March 31, 
1994, Cocom will expire leaving the world with no clear international 
multilateral export control regime. I believe that this will endanger 
our national security.
  On January 10, 1994, I, along with some of my colleagues, again wrote 
to the President on the same issue. After endless delays, I received a 
response from President Clinton which did not answer the tough 
questions but stated that he would have the State Department respond to 
me in detail.
  While the President committed to continue to pursue an ``effective 
multilateral regime that includes prior information exchange among 
members when needed to ensure that sensitive goods can be prevented 
from reaching dangerous destinations,'' I remained immediately 
concerned about the specific progress that has or has not been made in 
achieving commitments from our allies to establish an effective 
international multilateral control regime by March 31, 1994.
  As stated in the January 10 letter, it is my understanding that the 
core of the U.S. proposal for a successor regime to Cocom is that 
supplier nations agree on a list of militarily critical products and 
technologies that would be denied to a handful of rogue regimes. It is 
also my understanding that some of our allies oppose this principle and 
instead propose that such controls be left to ``national discretion,'' 
effectively replacing multilateral export controls with a loose 
collection of unilateral export control policies. This approach would 
obviously be adverse for the U.S. security and economic interests.
  With Cocom gone and no comprehensive multilateral controls in place, 
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue regimes will be able to 
accumulate the technology to build weapons of mass destruction with 
increased speed and greater quality. Are we going to allow another 
nation to grow into a monster like Iraq did and are we prepared to deal 
with this eventuality?
  While I continue to wait for detailed answers from the President, the 
clock is ticking. Within the next month, the President needs to achieve 
a clearly defined and enforceable agreement with allies of the United 
States which establishes a multilateral export control system or the 
proliferation of products and technologies that would jeopardize the 
national security of the United States.
  The President should persuade allies of the United States to promote 
mutual security interests by preventing rogue regimes from obtaining 
militarily critical products and technologies. Our diplomacy must be 
better. We must make our allies understand that there are still many 
threats still out there. While the administration talks about 
nonproliferation, it seems to be allowing proliferation. We do not have 
to look any farther than North Korea and Iran, to see that without such 
an agreement, the President risks the national security interests of 
the United States and subjects the United States export community to 
inevitable unilateral export controls putting them at a competitive 
disadvantage worldwide.
  The administration must not repeat the mistakes of its recent past in 
allowing other nations to decide what is best for the United States. If 
we allow this to happen again, we will place our Nation and our people 
at risk.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my and 
colleagues letters to the President, as well as the preliminary 
response to my letter from the President be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, December 16, 1993.
     President Clinton,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear President Clinton: It would seem that the United 
     States Government and its allies have begun the process of 
     dismantling the international structure for export controls 
     with no clear replacement identified to take its place. I 
     think that you would agree that with all its flaws CoCom 
     provided coherence and predictability to the Western effort 
     to control the flow the dual-use goods and technology to 
     potential adversaries. Yet, the Congress has been informed 
     that CoCom is scheduled to cease its operations as of March 
     31, with only an ambiguous commitment from other governments 
     that there will be anything created to take its place.
       It is my understanding that it was the U.S. delegation to 
     the Hague ``High Level'' talks in November that proposed the 
     deadline for the dismantling of CoCom. However, despite the 
     utility and value of CoCom and its well organized secretariat 
     in Paris over the past four decades, no institutional 
     structure was proposed to take its place. I support the idea 
     that the successor regime will be dealing with the problem of 
     preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
     But I am disappointed that apparently so little thought went 
     into this critical decision to end CoCom and join with our 
     allies to form a successor regime.
       I am very concerned about the danger of unilateralism. In a 
     world with no clear international export control regime of 
     rules to identify prohibited exports and prohibited end-
     users, the United States Government is likely to control 
     exports more restrictively than everyone else. Mr. President, 
     I think that we have reached a critical moment for our 
     nation's ability to conduct an international regime to deal 
     with threats of proliferation and terrorism in the 1990s. I 
     would respectfully suggest that the current efforts have not 
     set a course that is likely to achieve a regime that we both 
     desire.
       Please advise me as to who your key representative is on 
     this issue. Also, I have enclosed a number of questions to 
     help me better understand your objectives and your strategy. 
     Thank you for your urgent attention to this issue.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Alfonse D'Amato,
                                                     U.S. Senator.
                                  ____



   questions regarding the new multi-lateral regime to replace cocom

       1. I would like to know what the Administration views as 
     the successor regime to CoCom? What do you envision with 
     regard to structure and membership?
       2. In this regard, what will the United States attempt to 
     accomplish in regard to unified lists, both for nations and 
     technology, and at what levels?
       3. Has the United States deferred to our allies and 
     withdrawn the request for prenotification? Why?
       4. Has the United States given up its veto power in the 
     CoCom successor regime? Why?
       5. Are there any plans to create an international export 
     registry so that there is shared knowledge of exports and 
     their destinations?
       6. In light of the outcome of the recent High Level talks 
     in the Hague, what effect will they have on the 
     Administration's plans regarding the Export Administration 
     Act? And when will we see the Administration's plans in this 
     regard?
                                  ____



                                               The White House

                                Washington, DC, February 23, 1994.
       Dear Senator D'Amato: Thank you for your letter on COCOM. 
     The United States and its partners decided to phase out the 
     existing COCOM arrangements and, at the same time, to create 
     a successor export control regime. The new regime would be 
     aimed at meeting new threats and covering transfers of both 
     armaments and sensitive dual-use goods. Negotiations are 
     continuing to define the scope and procedures of this new 
     control regime. Progress has been made, but tough issues 
     remain.
       I can assure you that our objective in these negotiations 
     remains an effective multilateral regime that includes prior 
     information exchange among members when needed to ensure that 
     sensitive goods can be prevented from reaching dangerous 
     destinations. The existing nonproliferation export control 
     regimes will continue to operate; the new regime will 
     complement, not supplant, them.
       I agree that COCOM provided a valuable coherence and 
     predictability to export controls, and that we need an 
     effective follow-on global dual-use arrangement that will not 
     disadvantage U.S. exporters. I share your view that any 
     future export control regime must hold all its members to the 
     same high standard. We are working hard to promote that aim.
       Thank you again for sharing your views on this important 
     issue. I have asked the State Department, which is 
     responsible for negotiations on the successor regime, to 
     respond in detail to the questions you provided.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.
                                  ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, January 10, 1994.
     Hon. Bill Clinton,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear President Clinton: In your speech to young Europeans 
     yesterday in Brussels you warned regarding the spread of 
     weapons of mass destruction that ``the danger is clear and 
     present'', and said that countering this threat will require 
     ``close cooperation, honesty and discipline, and a 
     willingness of some not now willing to do it to forego 
     immediate financial gain.''
       We share your concern and wish to highlight a related 
     matter that deserves your attention: the end of COCOM and its 
     replacement. We and our allies have agreed that as of March 
     31, 1994, COCOM, the multilateral body that controlled 
     strategic exports to the former Soviet bloc, will cease to 
     exist. It is our understanding that the U.S. has proposed a 
     new export control regime that will target the proliferation 
     threats of today--rogue regimes that support terrorism as a 
     matter of national policy.
       Our concern is that the proposal put forward by the United 
     States is in danger of being rejected by our allies. The core 
     of the U.S. proposal is that supplier nations agree on a list 
     of militarily critical technologies that will be denied to a 
     handful of rogue regimes. Some of our allies oppose this 
     concept and are instead proposing that such controls be left 
     to ``national discretion'', effectively replacing 
     multilateral controls with a loose collection of unilateral 
     control policies.
       With COCOM gone and with no ironclad, multilaterally agreed 
     upon controls, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya will be 
     able to accumulate the technology to build weapons of mass 
     destruction with impunity. We, as a nation, will be put in a 
     difficult situation, forced to choose between unilateral 
     controls and allowing exports that could seriously harm our 
     national security interests.
       We urge you to impress upon our allies in the strongest 
     possible manner the necessity of clearly defined and jointly 
     enforced multilateral controls on the critical technologies 
     that, in the hands of rogue regimes, would jeopardize the 
     security of all of us. We appreciate your attention to this 
     matter and wish you success in representing our nation on the 
     remainder of your trip.
           Sincerely,
     Alfonse M. D'Amato,
       Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs.
     Connie Mack,
       Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on International 
     Finance and Monetary Policy.
     Donald W. Riegle, Jr.,
       Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
     Jim Sasser,
       Chairman, Subcommittee on International Finance and 
     Monetary Policy.

                          ____________________