[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 17 (Thursday, February 24, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: February 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the issue of North Korea's nuclear
weapons program has been of public interest for over a year. On some
days it appears on the front page of every major newspaper in America.
After conducting a recent energy committee fact-finding tour in Asia
last month, officials in all the countries I visited raised the
seriousness of a nuclear Korean peninsula.
What has not been made clear, Mr. President, is the risk which the
North Korean nuclear weapons program poses for all of us. That is, why
should we be so concerned? After all, we learned to live with the
threat of nuclear weapons from the now-defunct Soviet Union. How is the
anticipated behavior of North Korea any worse?
A geopolitical answer would suggest that a nuclear device in the
hands of North Korea raises the prospect that it would be used or
threatened to be used against South Korea. Further, some might suggest
that a frightened Japan would reverse almost 50 years of policy
prohibition against the development of nuclear weapons.
Frankly, I do not buy either argument. North Korea knows that use of
a nuclear weapon anywhere would have the most dire consequences. And, I
have faith in the good judgement of the Japanese people. As the only
country to suffer from a nuclear attack, a democratic government in
Japan will not choose the nuclear option.
What then is the problem?
The problem is, Mr. President, was ably set out by Washington Post
columnist Lally Weymouth in her column of February 17. As she notes,
extracted plutonium is ``a lot more valuable than cocaine.'' For a
desperate regime like North Korea, with a history of selling every
major weapons system it has ever produced, the temptation to sell to
the highest bidder could be too much. The danger to our national
security from a North Korean nuclear device in the hands of one of the
antidemocratic regimes in the Middle East is clear-cut and
unassailable.
Ms. Weymouth also points out that the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi, Senator Cochran, the distinguished Senator from South
Dakota, Senator Pressler, and the distinguished Senator from Colorado,
Senator Brown, recently visited the headquarters of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to discuss the North Korean problem with IAEA
Chairman Hans Blix. Our colleagues deserve enormous credit for their
personal concern over this vital issue.
Finally, Ms. Weymouth recounts Chairman Blix' statement to our
colleagues: his agency wants to be able to go ``anywhere, anytime'' to
inspect suspected North Korean nuclear weapons sites. His demand is
both reasonable and prudent and deserves to be supported by the
administration. To his credit, Assistant Secretary of State Winston
Lord has made it clear that the recent reluctant agreement by North
Korea that it will allow the IAEA back on a limited basis is just that:
limited. There is more to come and the Congress anticipates that the
administration will not make any final agreement with North Korea which
allows it to escape its full obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the February 17, 1994,
Washington Post column by Lally Weymouth be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1994]
North Korea's Hard Bargaining
(By Lally Weymouth)
Last December the director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, Hans Blix, was talking to three conservative
senators about the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear
program. In describing what the IAEA needs to make certain
that North Korea doesn't violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty--to which it is a party--Blix told Sens. Larry
Pressler (R-S.D.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Hank Brown (R-
Colo.) that the IAEA must have the right to go ``anywhere,
anytime'' to inspect North Korean nuclear facilities. Nothing
short of this would do, said the former Swedish foreign
minister, begging the senators not to let Washington undercut
the IAEA during U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks.
Since November, there had been no progress in achieving
Blix's goal. North Korea kept the IAEA inspectors out of the
country. IAEA cameras installed at North Korean nuclear
facilities actually stopped functioning. As a result, Blix
issued a statement a few weeks ago that all but said the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea had violated IAEA
safeguards. It had been widely expected that at the upcoming
IAEA board of governors meeting in Vienna, which starts on
Monday, Blix would declare safeguards broken and ask the
United Nations to impose economic sanctions.
Then, just as the international community appeared prepared
to unite on the need for sanctions against North Korea, the
IAEA suddenly declared a breakthrough this week. After eight
rounds of talks between IAEA and North Korean officials in
Vienna, North Korea agreed to what U.S. officials describe as
``a bridging deal.'' It amounts to this: North Korea consents
to let the IAEA verify that no nuclear material has been
diverted from officially declared nuclear facilities since
its last inspection in August 1993. Also, the IAEA will be
allowed to replace its batteries, reload its cameras and
change the seals on the seven nuclear facilities involved to
ensure ``continuity of safeguards.'' The key North Korean
facilities in question are a plant for reprocessing plutonium
and a nuclear reactor.
By giving the IAEA this limited access to its nuclear
facilities, North Korea--according to one U.S. official--has
bought ``a ticket to attend the third round of the bilateral
talks.'' (During the Clinton administration, the United
States and North Korea have held two rounds of bilateral
talks.)
What Clinton administration officials, anxious to claim
total victory, play down is that the IAEA doesn't usually
limit itself to inspections of this type. It mounts
``regular'' inspections of declared nuclear sites in member
countries--inspections of sites the host country declares to
be relevant to its nuclear program. The IAEA also pursues
``special'' inspections--which involve facilities the IAEA
asks to inspect, based on its suspicion that these locations
may somehow be involved with the country's nuclear program.
But North Korea hasn't even agreed to allow regular
inspections to resume--nor is it considering the so-called
``special inspections.'' Pyongyang has merely agreed that
these two types of inspection will be on the agenda at the
third round of U.S.-North Korean talks.
If this week's announcement is really a ``step''--as
Clinton administration officials claim--toward persuading
North Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as
a full member, it should be welcomed. But the dangers, can't
be ignored. The administration originally declared its policy
was to make sure North Korea would not develop a nuclear
weapon. Thus it's worth addressing a question posed by a
recent Rand Corp. study: Has the administration moved from
prevention to containment?
North Korea bargains hard. It agreed to join the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty in 1985, but not until April 1992
did it sign and ratify the safeguards agreement. (NPT usually
gives a country 18 months to sign the safeguards agreement.)
IAEA subsequently conducted six ``regular'' inspections to
check on the declared materials. The agency concluded there
were inconsistencies in the information it was receiving, and
sought to send a team of experts to visit two suspect sites.
The purpose was to see whether there were traces of plutonium
there. How much plutonium, in short, had North Korea
produced?
Pyongyang rejected this request and suspended its
membership in the NPT. Having threatened to withdraw from the
NPT last March, North Korea claims it currently has a
``special status'' as an NPT member--a status the IAEA is
refusing to recognize.
The U.S. intelligence community and others endeavoring to
combat proliferation deem it imperative that North Korea
comply with its NPT obligations. Aware that Pyongyang is
hard-pressed for cash and that its best hope for securing
hard currency consists in arms sales, American officials and
experts note with concern that North Korea has sold every
weapons system it has manufactured. One fear of U.S. experts
is that Pyongyang may sell either a nuclear device, fissile
material or the nuclear technology and know-how to rogue
states like Iran. The extracted plutonium, notes one U.S.
official, ``is a hell of a lot more valuable than cocaine.''
The IAEA must not be bludgeoned into accepting a phony deal
on North Korea. America, meanwhile, needs to remember that
North Korea is playing for time to complete its nuclear
program. In his December meeting with the three U.S.
senators, Blix explained that if North Korea is allowed to
block special inspections and fails to comply in full with
the NPT's provisions, other countries will feel they can
follow its lead. Blix's warnings should not be ignored.
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