[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 17 (Thursday, February 24, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the issue of North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program has been of public interest for over a year. On some 
days it appears on the front page of every major newspaper in America.
  After conducting a recent energy committee fact-finding tour in Asia 
last month, officials in all the countries I visited raised the 
seriousness of a nuclear Korean peninsula.
  What has not been made clear, Mr. President, is the risk which the 
North Korean nuclear weapons program poses for all of us. That is, why 
should we be so concerned? After all, we learned to live with the 
threat of nuclear weapons from the now-defunct Soviet Union. How is the 
anticipated behavior of North Korea any worse?
  A geopolitical answer would suggest that a nuclear device in the 
hands of North Korea raises the prospect that it would be used or 
threatened to be used against South Korea. Further, some might suggest 
that a frightened Japan would reverse almost 50 years of policy 
prohibition against the development of nuclear weapons.
  Frankly, I do not buy either argument. North Korea knows that use of 
a nuclear weapon anywhere would have the most dire consequences. And, I 
have faith in the good judgement of the Japanese people. As the only 
country to suffer from a nuclear attack, a democratic government in 
Japan will not choose the nuclear option.
  What then is the problem?
  The problem is, Mr. President, was ably set out by Washington Post 
columnist Lally Weymouth in her column of February 17. As she notes, 
extracted plutonium is ``a lot more valuable than cocaine.'' For a 
desperate regime like North Korea, with a history of selling every 
major weapons system it has ever produced, the temptation to sell to 
the highest bidder could be too much. The danger to our national 
security from a North Korean nuclear device in the hands of one of the 
antidemocratic regimes in the Middle East is clear-cut and 
unassailable.
  Ms. Weymouth also points out that the distinguished Senator from 
Mississippi, Senator Cochran, the distinguished Senator from South 
Dakota, Senator Pressler, and the distinguished Senator from Colorado, 
Senator Brown, recently visited the headquarters of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to discuss the North Korean problem with IAEA 
Chairman Hans Blix. Our colleagues deserve enormous credit for their 
personal concern over this vital issue.
  Finally, Ms. Weymouth recounts Chairman Blix' statement to our 
colleagues: his agency wants to be able to go ``anywhere, anytime'' to 
inspect suspected North Korean nuclear weapons sites. His demand is 
both reasonable and prudent and deserves to be supported by the 
administration. To his credit, Assistant Secretary of State Winston 
Lord has made it clear that the recent reluctant agreement by North 
Korea that it will allow the IAEA back on a limited basis is just that: 
limited. There is more to come and the Congress anticipates that the 
administration will not make any final agreement with North Korea which 
allows it to escape its full obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the February 17, 1994, 
Washington Post column by Lally Weymouth be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1994]

                     North Korea's Hard Bargaining

                          (By Lally Weymouth)

       Last December the director of the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency, Hans Blix, was talking to three conservative 
     senators about the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear 
     program. In describing what the IAEA needs to make certain 
     that North Korea doesn't violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
     Treaty--to which it is a party--Blix told Sens. Larry 
     Pressler (R-S.D.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Hank Brown (R-
     Colo.) that the IAEA must have the right to go ``anywhere, 
     anytime'' to inspect North Korean nuclear facilities. Nothing 
     short of this would do, said the former Swedish foreign 
     minister, begging the senators not to let Washington undercut 
     the IAEA during U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks.
       Since November, there had been no progress in achieving 
     Blix's goal. North Korea kept the IAEA inspectors out of the 
     country. IAEA cameras installed at North Korean nuclear 
     facilities actually stopped functioning. As a result, Blix 
     issued a statement a few weeks ago that all but said the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea had violated IAEA 
     safeguards. It had been widely expected that at the upcoming 
     IAEA board of governors meeting in Vienna, which starts on 
     Monday, Blix would declare safeguards broken and ask the 
     United Nations to impose economic sanctions.
       Then, just as the international community appeared prepared 
     to unite on the need for sanctions against North Korea, the 
     IAEA suddenly declared a breakthrough this week. After eight 
     rounds of talks between IAEA and North Korean officials in 
     Vienna, North Korea agreed to what U.S. officials describe as 
     ``a bridging deal.'' It amounts to this: North Korea consents 
     to let the IAEA verify that no nuclear material has been 
     diverted from officially declared nuclear facilities since 
     its last inspection in August 1993. Also, the IAEA will be 
     allowed to replace its batteries, reload its cameras and 
     change the seals on the seven nuclear facilities involved to 
     ensure ``continuity of safeguards.'' The key North Korean 
     facilities in question are a plant for reprocessing plutonium 
     and a nuclear reactor.
       By giving the IAEA this limited access to its nuclear 
     facilities, North Korea--according to one U.S. official--has 
     bought ``a ticket to attend the third round of the bilateral 
     talks.'' (During the Clinton administration, the United 
     States and North Korea have held two rounds of bilateral 
     talks.)
       What Clinton administration officials, anxious to claim 
     total victory, play down is that the IAEA doesn't usually 
     limit itself to inspections of this type. It mounts 
     ``regular'' inspections of declared nuclear sites in member 
     countries--inspections of sites the host country declares to 
     be relevant to its nuclear program. The IAEA also pursues 
     ``special'' inspections--which involve facilities the IAEA 
     asks to inspect, based on its suspicion that these locations 
     may somehow be involved with the country's nuclear program.
       But North Korea hasn't even agreed to allow regular 
     inspections to resume--nor is it considering the so-called 
     ``special inspections.'' Pyongyang has merely agreed that 
     these two types of inspection will be on the agenda at the 
     third round of U.S.-North Korean talks.
       If this week's announcement is really a ``step''--as 
     Clinton administration officials claim--toward persuading 
     North Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as 
     a full member, it should be welcomed. But the dangers, can't 
     be ignored. The administration originally declared its policy 
     was to make sure North Korea would not develop a nuclear 
     weapon. Thus it's worth addressing a question posed by a 
     recent Rand Corp. study: Has the administration moved from 
     prevention to containment?
       North Korea bargains hard. It agreed to join the Nuclear 
     Non-proliferation Treaty in 1985, but not until April 1992 
     did it sign and ratify the safeguards agreement. (NPT usually 
     gives a country 18 months to sign the safeguards agreement.) 
     IAEA subsequently conducted six ``regular'' inspections to 
     check on the declared materials. The agency concluded there 
     were inconsistencies in the information it was receiving, and 
     sought to send a team of experts to visit two suspect sites. 
     The purpose was to see whether there were traces of plutonium 
     there. How much plutonium, in short, had North Korea 
     produced?
       Pyongyang rejected this request and suspended its 
     membership in the NPT. Having threatened to withdraw from the 
     NPT last March, North Korea claims it currently has a 
     ``special status'' as an NPT member--a status the IAEA is 
     refusing to recognize.
       The U.S. intelligence community and others endeavoring to 
     combat proliferation deem it imperative that North Korea 
     comply with its NPT obligations. Aware that Pyongyang is 
     hard-pressed for cash and that its best hope for securing 
     hard currency consists in arms sales, American officials and 
     experts note with concern that North Korea has sold every 
     weapons system it has manufactured. One fear of U.S. experts 
     is that Pyongyang may sell either a nuclear device, fissile 
     material or the nuclear technology and know-how to rogue 
     states like Iran. The extracted plutonium, notes one U.S. 
     official, ``is a hell of a lot more valuable than cocaine.''
       The IAEA must not be bludgeoned into accepting a phony deal 
     on North Korea. America, meanwhile, needs to remember that 
     North Korea is playing for time to complete its nuclear 
     program. In his December meeting with the three U.S. 
     senators, Blix explained that if North Korea is allowed to 
     block special inspections and fails to comply in full with 
     the NPT's provisions, other countries will feel they can 
     follow its lead. Blix's warnings should not be ignored.

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